

Selected African Studies
in Memory of
Zsuzsánna Biedermann

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Edited by

Judit Kiss and István Tarrósy

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INTRODUCTION

This book is dedicated to the memory of our late colleague, Zsuzsánna Biedermann (PhD), a young Hungarian Africanist who untimely passed away in May 2022. The fundamental concern for development and the main focus on improving people's economic conditions and choices drove Zsuzsánna Biedermann's professional work, leading her to choose development economics as her field of specialization. She consistently focused on real-world issues, using economic theories and methodologies as tools to better comprehend complex problems. Her research aimed to create policy implications that could enhance people's capabilities and productivity, leading to improved development and quality of life. Her ultimate goal was to make a positive impact on society. Her numerous field trips to Sub-Saharan African countries and her connecting research projects showed her strong dedication and commitment to the continent, its development, and its people, together with her strong desire to "make the world a better place."

The authors of this collective volume are Hungarian scholars from research and higher education institutions who worked with Zsuzsa in the field of African Studies either in Hungary or specific African countries (Botswana, Namibia, Rwanda). The studies selected for the volume represent various academic disciplines (development studies, economics, geography, history, political economy, and political science) and delve into diverse subjects, all inspired by Zsuzsa's work.

The book discusses current African issues at global, regional, and country levels, both from theoretical and real-life perspectives. The individual studies are based on secondary and/or primary research results and use various methodological tools, including archival research, field research, case studies, interviews, and statistical analysis, and deal with topics or themes in which Dr. Biedermann was also cultivating an interest in, or had published about. In several instances, papers she had collaborated on could not materialize due to her unfortunate passing.

The volume can be structured into three parts. Part I includes four studies. The first study (*Vörös, Zoltán and Tarrósy, István: Africa, Central and*

Eastern Europe and the changing world order) is a theoretical piece about the changing world order, in which both Africa and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have been re-positioning themselves in the first decades of the 21st century. The chapter first looks at key concepts and theories and then contemplates three possible scenarios of the world order. The analysis focuses on African geopolitics and examines the potential role of CEE in African foreign policies. It then explores how Africa has regained significance in the foreign policy agendas of CEE countries, which have been EU members since 2004. The chapter contributes to the discussion of an enlarged scope of Europe–Africa relations in light of the changing world order, within which the European Union also searches for tangible solutions for coping with global challenges, together with the African Union (AU) and its member states, which also seek enhanced collaborations with Europe and other global players.

As the theory and practice of developmental state stood in the forefront of Biedermann's professional work (see: Biedermann, Zsuzsánna: "A fejlesztő állam koncepció érvényesülése Ruandában"; "The case of Rwanda as a developmental state" and "Rwanda: developmental success story in a unique setting"), two studies in Part I are dedicated to the concept and its analysis.

One of the studies (*Africa's renewed quest for (new) developmental state*) is written by Judit Ricz, who – together with Zsuzsa – began to study and research developmental states at the Institute of World Economics (Budapest) a decade ago. While having different regional focuses, they shared a broad theoretical framework and primary research approaches. They often discussed emerging similarities and differences between the political economies and development trajectories of Sub-Saharan African and Latin American countries. Furthermore, they had planned future research and publication projects together. Some were started but never finished. Remembering all their conversations and discussions, Judit Ricz dedicates her chapter to the memories of Zsuzsánna Biedermann, where African developmental aspirations from the developmental state perspective are explored. After presenting the theoretical background of the developmental state approach based on the classical East Asian developmental state model, the study looks at early, post-independence developmentalism in African countries. Then, it turns towards the more recent, new developmentalist cycle, a renaissance of developmental statism, which seems to be a (re-emerging) developmentalist discourse coupled with the revival of state interventionism rather than any coherent and viable new model promoting inclusive and sustainable development in Africa.

The other study on the developmental state (*Pásztor, Szabolcs: Ethiopia: building a developmental state or just overheating the economy?*) applies the theory to the case of Ethiopia with the aim of presenting the characteristics and peculiarities. The Ethiopian form of developmental capitalism embraced strong governmental intervention, regulation, and economic planning. Social development was emphasized and built on the state's resources, certain sectors of the economy (telecommunication, aviation industry, retail industry) underwent gradual liberalization, and larger-scale industrialization was implemented. It was clear from the beginning that public support for the state's development project was lacking, the Ethiopian bureaucracy also had limited power, and the bureaucrats were not independent from the ruling party. In this context, the Ethiopian development model differed from the East Asian one. Many question even the foundations of this model, arguing that the government has been injecting billions of birrs (Ethiopian currency, ETB) into only the economy. The chapter gives a fuller picture of Ethiopia's economic policy by comparing the features of the Ethiopian developmental state with the East Asian model cases. It aims to decide whether a well-intentioned developmental state has been created or the ruling party (the government) has only overheated the economy by injecting money into the different sectors.

The fourth study in Part I (*Solymári, Dániel and Czirják, Ráhel: Dilemmas of international development and development policies around African urban segregates from the post-development perspective*) combines theory and practice. Within this multidisciplinary field of development studies, the paper focuses on development aid and the international aid regime. It explores a brief overview of the main criticisms of aid programs and ways to improve aid effectiveness. The goal is to find an approach that helps the recipient country or society. The focus then shifts to the issue of slums in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania as specific contexts for appropriate assistance. The projects of the Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta and a reflection on the possibilities they offer are examined.

Papers in Part II are dedicated to the overarching and hotly debated current global issues of Sub-Saharan Africa, such as the food crisis, migration, and remittances. The first paper (*Búr, Gábor: Grain for Africa? The war in Ukraine and the continent's food supply*) deals with the aggravating food supply crisis of low-income African countries that heavily rely on Russian and Ukrainian grain deliveries. This study examines how Africa changed from a food self-sufficient continent to a continent in need of major food imports, above all grain, what role cereals play in African food consumption,

what source the imports come from, and how the outbreak of war affected deliveries and prices. It intends to provide a comprehensive summary of the changes since the beginning of the war, highlighting the developments surrounding the renovation of Ukrainian grain shipments. In recent decades, it has become common practice for African officials to turn to the international community for additional aid in the event of a crisis. Today, instead of external aid, the emphasis is increasingly shifting to reliance on the continent's own human and natural resources.

As Zsuzsa Biedermann has widely researched the causes, consequences, and pattern of outmigration from Africa in the context of the migration–development nexus (see: Biedermann, Zsuzsánna: “A szubszaharai Afrikából Európába irányuló migráció kiváltó okai” and “Migráció szubszaharai Afrikából Magyarországra és Európába”), two papers in Part II deal with the issue of African migration. Viktor Marsai’s study (*African irregular migration towards Europe: a geographic indicator for a possible EU grand strategy?*) examines African outmigration from the point of view of the EU’s grand strategy and its geographic scope of interest. In the chapter, irregular border crossings from Africa to Europe are used as an indicator to analyse and define the EU’s ‘Grand Area’ on the continent and the space in which Brussels and the member states must act to pursue and protect their interests. The theoretical approach is followed by the analysis of the Frontex data between February and December 2016 and January through November 2022, when 177,428 and 107,530 African citizens reached Europe irregularly. Despite a decline in the numbers, there has been a shift in the countries of origin: while in 2016, only 10 percent of migrants arrived from North Africa, by 2022, this figure rose to 63 percent.

Most migration research – conducted mainly by experts from the global North – analyses the phenomenon from the view of the receiving countries as they consider “irregular migration” a danger with marginal benefit. Zsuzsánna Biedermann and Judit Kiss, colleagues and field research partners, initiated research on the impact of outmigration on the sending African countries by analysing the impact of remittances. No previous research attempt has been made to disclose the overall impact of remittances on the migration-remittances-economic development context in Sub-Saharan Africa. Although they submitted a research proposal to the Hungarian National Research Fund, the proposal was not funded. However, without Zsuzsa, the project would have been almost impossible to complete. Judit Kiss’ paper (*The balance of remittances: the case of Sub-Saharan Africa*) is only a modest replacement attempt.

The paper examines remittances' positive and negative effects on micro and macroeconomic levels in the context of migration, development, and remittances. Specifically, it aims to assess the overall impact of remittances on Sub-Saharan Africa from a political economy perspective. The reasons behind their transfer largely influence how remittances impact a region and the factors determining such transfers. In Africa, altruism and self-interest are the primary motivations for remittances, with internal migration, exchange, and portfolio approaches playing a role in determining the size and frequency of such transfers. Factors such as the migrant's educational background, legal status, personal characteristics, and political and economic situations in both the host and home countries also affect remittance inflows. The paper analyses the micro and macroeconomic impacts of the \$50 billion remittance inflow Africa receives annually, drawing on the remittance-developmental pluralist school of thought. The study considers the causes and uses of remittances and concludes that Africa should encourage and sustain remittance inflows as an alternative source of financing for development, minimizing the negative effects of corruption, inflation, moral hazard, brain drain, and the Dutch disease while maximizing positive outcomes such as economic growth, savings, investment, financial and human development, and poverty and inequality reduction.

Zsuzsánna Biedermann's favourite part of Africa was the Great Lake region and East Africa, with special affection for Rwanda. She wrote her PhD dissertation about the genocide and the destabilization of the region with special reference to the economic dimensions of conflicts. The PhD work was published in 2015 as her first book: *The Economic Dimension of Conflicts* (see: Biedermann, Zsuzsánna: "Genocídium és destabilizáció az afrikai Nagy Tavak régióban: a konfliktusok gazdasági vetülete"). Apart from her doctoral thesis, she conducted field research, attended conferences in Rwanda, and wrote widely on the issues of the developmental state, ethnic hatred, and genocide in Rwanda (see Biedermann Zsuzsánna: "A fejlesztő állam koncepció érvényesülése Ruandában"; "The case of Rwanda as a developmental state"; "Rwanda: developmental success story in a unique setting"; "A ruandai népirtás és a nemzetközi közösség passzivitása" and "Mobutu bukása, a ruandai hutu menekültek ellen elkövetett atrocitások és a kelet-zairei instabilitás regionális hatása").

As such, Part III is dedicated to the case of Rwanda. The first study (*Bagi, Judit and Tarrósy, István: Gender equality in Rwanda: a real success story or a well-established brand?*) deals with the question of gender equality in Rwanda, which has been stirring debates both within the country and in academic circles in the Western world. Based on fieldwork in 2015 and

2016, coupled with relevant desk research up to 2023, the study investigates the political and social integration of women in post-genocide Rwanda, with particular attention devoted to the legal framework, activism, privileged status of certain groups of women, and the progress the East-Central African country has made since the 2003 elections in terms of female political participation. The research shows that Rwanda took significant steps towards achieving equality between women and men legally and in practice. Although the chapter concludes that the vast majority of these achievements are numerical, including women's representation in parliament, women's land ownership, or that the government has made noteworthy efforts in the field of family planning, there are a lot of issues that require increased and continued policy attention, such as gender-based violence (GBV) against women.

The other study highlights sexual violence in the African Great Lakes region (*Lator, Anna: Sexual violence in the African Great Lakes region: patterns of peacetime and wartime*), as this region, over the past 50 years, has witnessed numerous armed conflicts, ranging from civil war to ethnic cleansing and genocide. These events were accompanied by widespread sexual violence, sometimes in a systematic manner. While most of the conflicts have officially ended, sexual violence has not. The chapter first gives an overview of the main theories and contributing factors of conflict-related sexual violence. The cases of Uganda, Rwanda, and the Democratic Republic of Congo are used to analyse socio-cultural dynamics and patterns of sexual violence. The study examines the occurrence of sexual violence during a war by analysing specific characteristics, using six months of field research in the region. Its purpose is to illustrate how the symbolic meaning of gender and the nature of the conflict (purpose, narrative, etc.) impact the patterns of conflict-related sexual violence.

The last study was written by a historian, Attila T. Horváth, regarding the language policy of Rwanda (*Language policy and use in Rwanda: the case of English and Swahili*). The paper provides an overview of the milestones in Rwanda's language policy, the latest research findings in the field, and the challenges posed by globalization. It aims to examine the motivations behind the language policy decisions of the Rwandan government, the current status of English and Swahili, and the policymakers' vision regarding language policy, with a focus on legislation and education. While in Rwanda, unlike many other African countries, despite the Kinyarwanda language being spoken by nearly everyone, ethnic conflicts have existed throughout history. During the colonial and post-colonial periods, French became the language of the elites, but after the 1994 crisis and a change in

the ruling elite, the English language gained increasing prominence. Additionally, the government supports the introduction of Swahili as an official language. Although the introduction of English and Swahili as official languages reflects the country's integration into regional and global systems, the dominance of the English language has primarily benefited the elites in power since 1994. Despite Rwanda's linguistic homogeneity and the fact that almost everyone speaks Kinyarwanda, mother tongue education is not sufficiently developed. The Rwandan education system faces challenges due to frequent regulatory and linguistic changes, negatively impacting the entire education system. Insufficient resources further exacerbate these problems. In contrast, the informal spread of Swahili and the growing connections among East African countries contribute to its revitalization and strengthening.

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The editors and the authors of the volume hope their work is a worthy tribute to Zsuzsa's memory. Studies of Hungarian Africanists may arouse interest among various disciplinary circles of academic researchers, contribute modestly to African studies, and can be relevant reading for students and professionals alike.

The Editors
January 2024

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PART I

CHAPTER ONE

AFRICA, CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE AND THE CHANGING WORLD ORDER

ZOLTÁN VÖRÖS – ISTVÁN TARRÓSY

Abstract

In this theoretical article, the main focus is on gaining a better understanding of the changing world order. Specifically, attention is paid to the re-positioning of both the African and Central and Eastern European (CEE) macro-regions in the first few decades of the 21st century. The chapter begins by reviewing important concepts and theories, followed by an examination of three possible scenarios for the world order. The analysis focuses on African geopolitics and explores the potential role of Central and Eastern Europe in African foreign policy. It then looks at the reciprocal relationship, considering how Africa has become more significant in the foreign policy agendas of Central and Eastern European countries, which have been EU members since 2004. The chapter aims to contribute to the discussion of expanding Europe-Africa relations by providing more insight into the connections between CEE and Africa in the context of the changing global order. The European Union is also searching for more tangible solutions to address global challenges, and the African Union and its member states are seeking enhanced collaborations with external actors from Europe and other parts of the world.

Keywords: World Order, Central and Eastern Europe, Africa, Geopolitics, Foreign Policy

1. Introduction

We are dedicating this study to the memory of our highly respected colleague and friend, Zsuzsánna Biedermann, with whom we cherished the opportunity of working together on several joint projects and collaborations.

We recall when, in 2014, she approached us with her manuscript and asked for our opinion about its potential publication. It eventually became her first book, *Genocide and Destabilization in the African Great Lakes Region. The Economic Dimension of Conflicts* [Genocídium és destabilizáció az afrikai Nagy Tavak régióban. A konfliktusok gazdasági vetülete, Pécs: Publikon Kiadó, 2015]. This was followed by other instances of cooperation, including journal articles and future plans for joint research. Unfortunately, due to her sudden and – to all of us – incomprehensible death, these plans were never realized.

This chapter discusses the shifting global power dynamics and economic structures from both geopolitical and geoeconomic standpoints. It is based on extensive research conducted on the foreign policies of post-Communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries towards African and Asian nations in general, with a particular focus on countries such as Tanzania, Rwanda, Ethiopia, China, and Japan. The co-authors have carried out several fieldwork-driven investigations in these countries and intend to look at the positions of the Central and Eastern European and the African macro-regions in contemporary international relations in this piece. The aim is to offer further thoughts to engage in deeper discussion regarding CEE–Africa linkages in the broader context of the changing Europe–Africa relations of the third decade of the 21st century. We hypothesize that the two regions analyzed are located on the periphery of global processes – not necessarily in the ‘Wallerstein-sense’ –with limited economic and trade interactions. Their dependence on more developed regions and more technologically and economically advanced states highlights the minor importance of their shared interactions. Therefore, these regions encounter more challenges than opportunities within the recent global changes. With this hypothesis, we propose that by fostering closer ties between the two regions, they can mitigate dependencies, uphold, and potentially enhance, their global influence. This response addresses the uncertainties and challenges they encounter, while their peripheral position could facilitate mutual efforts to decrease the dependence on developed regions. We are working with three research questions (RQs). RQ1: Amidst recent power shifts in the international system, what are the impacts of the changing landscape on the positions of the Central and Eastern European region and the African continent? RQ2: From geopolitical and geoeconomic perspectives, what are the challenges and opportunities for the two macro-regions to better integrate or re-integrate in the global arena? RQ3: With highlighted attention on foreign policy, trade, and investments, how have the linkages and engagements between the two macro-regions changed in the first decades of the 21st century? The present work stems from our new book

entitled *Changing World Order. The end of the unipolar moment?* [Átalakuló világrend. Az unipoláris pillanat vége? forthcoming in 2024], and we would like to enrich this edited volume of selected Hungarian studies in memory of Zsuzsánna from the academic discipline of Political Science. Bearing in mind the limitations of our research, we aim to contribute to the academic debate surrounding the changing world order, with a particular focus on Central and Eastern Europe and Africa

2. The changing world order

The United States' hegemony¹ over the world since the end of the Cold War is coming to an end; however, two aspects of this transformation merit attention: first, the United States continues to play a significant role in international relations, and second, unipolar world order is coming to an end. This shift has been happening since the turn of the millennium, with events such as 9/11 and the rise of transnational terrorism foreshadowing a change in global power dynamics. The time following the collapse of the Soviet Union referred to as the “unipolar movement,” was characterized by the US's unmatched cultural and military power. Globalization progressed rapidly along the trade routes secured by Washington, and the United States maintained a dominant position in global multilateral organizations such as the United Nations.

A collapse of the United States is not expected; however, its worldwide influence and presence is unmistakably waning. Currently, there are no legitimate challengers to Washington or its nearly hegemonic global position. In contrast, the emerging actors seek to alter the prevailing state of affairs and the *status quo* to diminish the United States hegemony and interests in each respective region. As Háda put it, for example, in the case of India, “South Asia's largest state is interested in a truly multipolar world order in which it retains its strategic autonomy and does not become directly involved in the conflicts of others” (Háda 2024, 84). In the case of Turkey, Tárík notes similar interests (Tárík 2024), but this can also be found in the visions of China (Vörös and Horváth 2024), and Latin American states (Lehoczki 2024), and Tarrósy and Marsai point out that African states “have much greater opportunities for manoeuvre in a global space that is becoming multipolar” (Tarrósy and Marsai 2024, 292). While direct confrontation between the dominant and emerging powers is unattainable, they can indirectly alter the US's presence and effectiveness in their respective

¹ The Greek word *hegemon* means leader, supreme power, dominant player.

spheres of interest, specifically in narrow regions, by leveraging years of political, economic, and cultural influence.

Concerning the rather rapidly fading unipolar moment, illustrative instances include the year 2008, when Russia's incursion into Georgia predicted the trajectory of Russian foreign policy towards the former Soviet republics, and the year 2012, when ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) states adjourned their meeting without a final declaration for the first time in 45 years due to an inability to reach a consensus on how to express regional apprehensions regarding China's increasingly aggressive approach in the South China Sea. Although the future of the emerging world order remains uncertain, numerous forces, including emerging economies like China, Brazil, India, Russia, and Turkey, for instance, are pushing for a multipolar system. However, contemporary crises such as the global pandemic, supply chain disruptions, the regional and global repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, and the emerging new war in Israel may incite global actors to take action that alters the course of these developments. Indeed, regarding structures of the world order, Krauthammer has stated, "roles, however, are not invented in the abstract; they are a response to a perceived world structure" (1990, 23).

We argue that to comprehend international processes, political science and international relations have developed the theory of poles, which defined the world according to the number of states (rather than alliances) that dominated militarily, economically, and technologically. It is important to point out that theories are primarily based on material elements characterizing force (Buzan 2013, 156), but soft elements can also be included in these objects of study. However, Acharya, mentioned later, calls the theory of poles obsolete for this reason and speaks of the need to create a new framework (Acharya 2017). In this manner, world orders can be classified as unipolar, bipolar, or multipolar, respectively. The international system consists of one, two, or more major powers or centers of gravity from a power perspective. These centers are categorized as the first, second, or third based on their respective abilities to project and act upon their interests, determined by their strength and power. Polarity, or the theory of poles, is linked to realism, particularly neorealism, and author Kenneth N. Waltz (Waltz 1979 and Buzan 2013, 156).

The theory covers the influence of significant powers, or "protagonists," in terms of their quantity and comparative strength, focusing on the outcomes and dynamics of international politics. According to the theory of poles, great powers are the actors who possess the preponderance of material

goods. From this perspective, the theories *exclusively* focus on major powers, furnish a structure for comprehending how power dynamics influence the conduct of states, alliances, conflicts, and the overall stability of the international system, and examine the repercussions of transitioning between different structures (Buzan 2013, 156).

Waltz argued, while analyzing the various configurations, that the bipolar system is the most stable because it establishes a distinct balance of power and decreases the probability of large-scale interstate conflicts (Waltz 1979). The theory of bipolar world order won the approval of Washington and Moscow because it placed the superpowers at the center, and, as Freedman pointed out, allowed them to create their own exclusive clubs while retaining the possibility of excluding others from those clubs (Freedman 1999, 23-25). In the context of the unipolar world order, the developer of the theory emphasized instability due to the logic of the poles, as the absence of countervailing powers can lead to potential imbalances of power and encourage other states to balance against the dominant power. Initially, the post-war world order was more confidently formulated as a *non-bipolar world* than a unipolar one, owing to the absence of a coherent worldview from neorealists regarding the latter (Buzan 2013, 160). Not everyone thinks this way, however, as hegemonic stability theorists argue that unipolarity can lead to a more peaceful world order, as the dominant power acts as a stabilizing force (D'Anieri 2010, 69). Huntington also argues that "the superpower or hegemon in a unipolar system, lacking any major powers challenging it, is normally able to maintain its dominance" (Huntington 1999, 36). Even in the context of a multipolar world order, although limited in geographical scope, our historical knowledge is that such multipolar systems defined the international system in Westphalia until the Second World War. It is no coincidence that Waltz argued that multipolar systems with three or more major powers are generally less stable than bipolar systems. A multipolar system is characterized by a greater dispersion of power and a frequently precarious balance of power, which increases the likelihood of conflict and strategic uncertainty (Waltz 1979). Such a balanced power system, according to Mingst, necessitates norms established by the powers that existed in the previous multipolar structure (Mingst 2011, 98).

The theory has faced criticism for various reasons throughout its development. These include its limited capacity to effectively define and forecast international relations, its inability to provide a comprehensive understanding of state behavior, its failure to consider regional nuances and internal factors (such as religious, linguistic, ethnic, cultural, and political

interests) that may influence state actions, and its focus on the primacy of states despite the growing significance of regional cooperation and multinational corporations in global politics and economics. It is important to acknowledge that even during the bipolar era, the notion of two perfect poles was not applicable, as emphasized by Brooks and Wohlforth, who contend that the true concern lies not in the demise of the unipolar world, but rather in its characteristics and operations, with the United States still maintaining a significant advantage due to the great power gap (Brooks and Wohlforth 2023). Moreover, this theory oversimplifies the international landscape by disregarding the complexities introduced by individual nations, groups of nations, and regional dynamics.

Critics of polarity theories emphasize the limits of exclusively focusing on power distribution. The authors contend that additional variables, such as ideology, culture, and non-state actors, significantly influence the formation and development of international relations. Moreover, the influence of technical advancements, economic interconnectedness, and regional dynamics can shape the conduct of states and pose challenges to conventional understandings of polarity. Acharya posits that the applicability of polarity theory as a descriptive framework for the global landscape is diminishing due to its inadequate consideration of the significance and influence of soft power. Furthermore, Acharya contends that the theory fails to acknowledge the transformative shifts in the international arena, characterized by the emergence of non-state actors alongside traditional nation-states. According to Acharya (2017), the idea posits a decentralized and *multiplex* global order that extends beyond the dominance of nation-states. Grevi (2009) provides a nuanced perspective that accurately describes the current global order, using the word *interpolar*. The latter concept pertains to the collaboration among prominent global and regional entities to effectively handle the growing interconnectedness and establish a functional multilateral system. This system is characterized by intricate networks of relationships, including the South–South connections (Tarrósy 2017, 37).

However, is it possible to ascertain the probable trajectory of this global power transformation? In addressing this inquiry, it is pertinent to revisit the prevailing unipolar global arrangement, sometimes referred to as the “unipolar moment,” which has persisted since the early 1990s. This era is distinguished by the dominant presence of the United States as a formidable superpower. Krauthammer thinks a shift towards multipolarity is inevitable, suggesting that the present moment represents a transitional phase within this overarching trajectory. What is the rationale behind this thinking? According to Krauthammer (1990), the emergence of a unipolar world order

cannot be considered a direct outcome of the previous bipolar world order. Instead, it can be characterized as a form of pseudo-multilateralism. This perspective suggests that the United States, possessing superior military, diplomatic, political, and economic capabilities, has assumed the role of the dominant player in any global region or conflict. Krauthammer highlights that while in the 1980s China was described as a semi-pole and Japan or Germany as potential poles, neither of these actors possessed capabilities that were even remotely similar to the US' power.

Over the past two decades, there has been a notable shift in global power dynamics, characterized by the emergence of regional powers such as China, the re-arrival of Russia, and a gradual repositioning of the United States away from its previous central role. According to Vörös (2022), it became evident in the early 2000s that the United States, as the dominant power, was reluctant to uphold the established institutions that had characterized the unipolar global system. These mechanisms had shaped the world order, facilitated complimentary services, and ensured secure commerce for developing nations. The world order referred to as post-hegemonic by Tálas (2021) is witnessing a notable shift towards a more *multi-player dynamic*. The rising prominence of various actors characterizes this transformation in terms of their economic, political, cultural, and military influence. These actors are increasingly prioritizing their own regional interests and are capable of challenging the interests of Washington. The following brief overview encapsulates the current state of the globe; nonetheless, while contemplating potential trajectories, it is imperative to contemplate the subsequent scenarios:

- The **unipolar world order** will continue to exist, but the global activity of the great powers seeking to overthrow the *status quo* will become increasingly significant.
- A **multipolar global order** is anticipated to emerge, wherein the United States will assume a position as one among several influential powers that shape global dynamics and exert influence over global affairs. A global landscape is currently evolving wherein the discourse revolves around the possibility of the existence of 8-10 regional powers and the establishment of a state of equilibrium among them. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that this multipolarity aligns with Acharya's thesis, indicating its (1) *modern and post-state* nature. Furthermore, it (2) *extends beyond the confines of Europe, signifying its global character*. Additionally, Grevi's perspective reminds us of the (3) *interconnected* nature of this multipolarity. In the framework of a multipolar global order, it is crucial to

acknowledge a prevailing reality that has become progressively evident since the 1980s: the emergence of regional powers is in progress. However, they have not yet attained commensurate global capacities comparable to the United States. In conclusion, it is noteworthy that a multipolar world order is expected to exhibit (4) *asymmetry*, characterized by the presence of multiple smaller superpowers as state actors within the system, in addition to a single superpower with the capacity to exert influence over global processes. In addition, it is pertinent to establish a connection with the notion of a 'uni-multipolar' hybrid system, as posited by Huntington in 1999. This framework delineates a scenario wherein a single superpower coexists with multiple great powers, each exerting significant influence within specific global regions, albeit lacking the capacity to extend their interests and capabilities on a global scale in a manner as complex as that of the United States (Huntington 1999, 36).

- The current global landscape reverts to a **bipolar structure**, wherein the United States continues to have a prominent position, potentially serving as a counterbalance to China.

The emerging states and regional powers of the world exhibit a greater inclination towards establishing a multipolar global order, whereas the dominant superpower is inclined towards reverting to a bipolar world order. The potential success of Washington's interests lies in the fact that these emerging states primarily consider the concept of multipolarity, as they lack the global capacity and influence comparable to that of the United States. The primary motivation behind their interest lies in the prospect of a global landscape characterized by a delicate balance among multiple dominant nations. Within such a framework, they seek to exert influence and exercise control over their predominantly regional and, subsequently, global interactions. This objective entails delineating their sphere of interests and, if circumstances warrant, engaging in confrontations with American interests within their respective regions. In the next section, we look at the dynamics of two macro-regions of this international landscape, i.e., Central and Eastern Europe and the African continent, and the interconnected linkages between them.

3. Geopolitics at play

Given the multitude of alterations taking place, it is vital to inquire about the anticipated outcomes for the regions, including Central and Eastern Europe and Africa. In the case of these territories, historically situated on

the periphery of global processes, the ongoing transitions and subsequent instability may give rise to various problems, disputes, and potentially even armed confrontations. In the present context, the dominant actor, the USA, is experiencing limitations in its ability to address the many regional challenges, and in certain areas and regions, it may also exhibit a lack of willingness to react. This situation, the disengagement of the hegemon from the center of global processes, has led to the emergence of regional powers on a global scale who are motivated to alter the existing state of affairs. Consequently, regional powers may adopt a more proactive approach to foreign policy, potentially leading to conflicts of interest. Moreover, the reduced involvement of the dominant actor could escalate these conflicts into armed confrontations. The contemporary era is characterized by notable events such as military coups in Africa, the Russian–Ukrainian conflict in East-Central Europe, and a challenging scenario in Kosovo, to name just a few geopolitical hotspots. In the background, these are triggered by power shifts, including China’s rise: “The appearance of several medium powers that reject important aspects of the order, and the emergence of nonstate actors (from drug cartels to terrorist networks) that can pose a serious threat to order within and between states” (Haass 2019, 28). It is not an easy task to pursue a pragmatic approach that serves the national interest while also addressing pressing common issues. However, “cooperation on global challenges would be all but precluded” (Ibid, 30).

Simultaneously, the transformations pertaining to security can also present prospects for global (re)positioning. In this regard, the interests of the two regions being examined are mutually shared. The advent of a multipolar world order, characterized by the presence of multiple centers of power, as previously mentioned by Tarrósy and Marsai, may imply that African states possess increased possibilities for strategic maneuvering within an evolving global landscape that exhibits multipolarity (Tarrósy and Marsai 2023). However, a similar observation can be made regarding Europe, particularly the Central and Eastern European macro-region. It is important to note that the issue of autonomy from the United States (and from Russia in the CEE region) is a significant difficulty for this particular region. According to Ugrósydy’s observation (2023), the imperative for Europe to effectively engage in the restructuring of the global order necessitates a thorough consideration of strategic autonomy. It is imperative to engage in a dynamic and substantial discourse over the deliberation of assuming the risks, responsibilities, and expenditures associated with autonomy. As he puts it, Europe possesses distinct interests that necessitate their defense and proactive engagement in global affairs to promote and safeguard these interests. In this section, we will look into African geopolitics in general and

via an innovative approach developed by Dominique Moïsi (2009) in particular.

Since 1960, the African continent has gradually gained increasing attention on international agendas. This attention has been driven not only by the numerous armed conflicts that have hampered African development over the years, some of which have escalated into civil wars (such as the one in Sudan at the time of writing this chapter) but also because the continent has experienced significant and stable economic growth in many of its regions, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa, during the first two decades of the 21st century. The situation analysis presented in this section focuses on the Sub-Saharan macro-region of the African continent from a geopolitical perspective.

In addition to the North Ethiopian (Tigray) civil war, which attracted global political attention in 2022-2023, the armed struggle in Burkina Faso, which Islamist militias have waged for years, the jihadist insurgency in northern Mozambique, or the coup d'états in Niger and Gabon, to name a few current events, the news is more about the continent's future development. Recovering from the shocks of the novel coronavirus epidemic and food inflation, the African Development Bank estimates that the continent is expected to enjoy a compound annual growth rate of 4% in 2023 and 2024 (AfDB 2023). This exceeds preliminary expectations and is the highest in the world. The five best-performing economies in Africa before the COVID-19 pandemic are projected to grow by an average of more than 5.5% in 2023–2024, regaining their place among the world's ten fastest-growing economies. These countries are all from Sub-Saharan Africa: Rwanda (7.9%), Côte d'Ivoire (7.1%), Benin (6.4%), Ethiopia (6.0%) and Tanzania (5.6%). Other Sub-Saharan countries expanding by more than 5.5% over this period are the Democratic Republic of Congo (6.8%), The Gambia (6.4%), Mozambique (6.5%), Niger (9.6%), Senegal (9.4%) and Togo (6.3%). According to Kevin Urama, Acting Chief Economist and Vice President of the African Development Bank, Africa is still a favorable destination for investment in human capital, infrastructure, private sector development, and natural resources. He said: "Africa has a significant role to play in driving inclusive growth and sustainable development globally. There are many smart investment opportunities in key sectors: agriculture, energy markets, minerals, health infrastructure and pharmaceutical industries, light manufacturing, transport and logistics, digital economy and more. The continent remains a treasure trove for smart investors globally" (AfDB 2023).

In the May-June 2023 issue of *Foreign Affairs*, African Studies Professor Tim Murithi from the University of Cape Town and Stellenbosch University highlighted the African Union's (AU) role in proposing a reform of the world body in 2005. This proposal was made in the context of Africa's vision for a new world order. One of the AU's arguments was that, by the 21st century, Africa had the capacity to implement, influence, and thematize the UN reform agenda. However, as the International Peace Institute (IPI) has consistently pointed out in its analyses, although “more than half of the Security Council meetings and 70 per cent of Security Council resolutions with Chapter 7 mandates [...] concern[ed] African security issues” (Murithi 2023, 27), the UN has not yet been able to implement the reform agenda fully. Chapter 7 resolutions – which authorize peacekeepers to use armed force/coercive measures – are connected with numerous African security instances, and this is still not enough to include African representation among the permanent members. The AU itself is the clearly accepted pan-African representative of the continent's states by the third decade of the 21st century, and it even stated that “Africa is now in a position to influence the proposed UN reforms by maintaining her unity of purpose,” adding that “Africa's goal is to be fully represented in all the decision-making organs of the UN, particularly in the Security Council” (Ibid).

When dealing with “how power differences get expressed in the international arena spatially” (Carmody 2019, 95), i.e., considering geopolitics, in several African (and Asian) cases, we see how largely development is interconnected with security. Carmody points out that: “The most successful ‘developmental states’ in Asia and Africa have not necessarily had development as their overriding priority, but have in reality been security states, pre-occupied with regime and/or state survival” (Carmody 2019, 97). Security, therefore, presents a pivotal domain to investigate from several angles, including first and foremost the individuals, thus embracing the notion of ‘human security,’ as well as the engagements of state and non-state entities, together with external actors in contributing to certain elements of security. Human perceptions and soft elements, as much as hard power deals and the enhancement of governmental securitizing capacities need to be elaborated on simultaneously. The softer dimension is tackled in the following section, drawing upon Moïsi's innovative geopolitical map of emotions.

4. Perceptions and the “geopolitics of emotions” in 2023

In the ‘supra-territorial space’ of international relations, Dominique Moïsi (2009) argues that it is worth broadening our geopolitical perspective and

looking at the global world from an emotional angle, in a complex system of interrelated emotions, especially fear, humiliation, and hope (Tarrósy 2012). Moïsi notes at the outset of his reflection that geopolitical thinking from the side of emotions is complicated because the group and category of emotions are inherently subjective and thus ‘soft’ and difficult to define as a framework for reflection. However, it is relevant to suggest that the relationality of emotions can provide a basis for understanding global international relations and conflicts. Emotions themselves may indicate the degree of (self-)confidence and self-assurance a given society has in itself and its self-development. In our reading, this may be linked to the ‘agent role,’ i.e., the decision-making capacity, which is the basis of this confidence. As Moïsi explains: “It is this degree of confidence that in turn determines the ability of a society to rebound following a crisis, to respond to a challenge, to adjust to changing circumstances” (Moïsi 2009, 29). As he goes on, we understand that: “Emotions matter. They impact the attitudes of peoples, the relationships between cultures, and the behavior of nations. Neither political leaders nor students of history nor ordinary concerned citizens can afford to ignore them” (Ibid).

Some criticize this ‘soft’ approach, suggesting it lacks arguments backed up by figures and measurements, and they object to the measurability itself. It should be pointed out that, in this latter context, the existing system of statistics and indicators is open to criticism, while the complexity of the system and the processes involved has led to the gradual emergence of new indicators since the 1990s, one of which can be considered the most authoritative, the HDI (Human Development Index), now the benchmark index, used by the UN specialized agencies (such as UNDP) and other international organizations, which have sought to ‘track’ and more accurately describe several of the changes taking place in the countries of the world.

In May 2022, in a lecture at Leiden University, Moïsi confirmed that it is obvious that emotions have become more important than ever. Moïsi speaks about emotions as a tool for understanding geopolitics, highlighting the prevalence of negative emotions, especially in the context of the Russian–Ukrainian war. In his rationale, he underlines that negative emotions, such as anger and hatred, amplify fear and humiliation in our globalized world (Moïsi 2022). Using Moïsi’s hypothetical emotional geopolitical map, we attempt to situate Sub-Saharan Africa. There was a time when Africans themselves were optimistic about their own position and future. In particular, this refers to the period from the 1960s onwards, with decolonization and the period that followed. 1960, the ‘Year of Africa,’ saw the independence

of seventeen former colonial territories, and everyone experienced a euphoric mood of optimism. With Africanization, Sub-Saharan Africa had taken control of its destiny. Free of the white colonial rulers, they believed they could make their own economic policies, as pan-Africanism had long been the watchword. The important objective was to reclaim their land and make their own decisions in a real ‘African way.’ However, this Afro-optimism faded by the late 1980s and 1990s, as it became clear that most economic policies were not working very well, partly due to external factors. We must also remember that they had inherited structural weaknesses and several dependencies from the colonial period and faced a number of challenges, including the lack of well-educated Africans to run the new governments properly.

Unfortunately, many have been unable to cope with the implementation of their plans; they have been forced to borrow, debt spirals have aggravated, and structural adjustment expectations from multilateral levels have not helped. The continent – and the world – turned into an Afro-pessimistic state. In the third decade of the 21st century, we are again witnessing a ‘developmental arc’ involving the aforementioned Sub-Saharan African economies, internal and external actors, notable political changes, and economic investments in various parts of the region. Some form of democratization is also taking place in several countries in West and East Africa, and some exemplary achievements, such as in Rwanda, bring a new, more optimistic tone. However, as pointed out by the Sudanese-British businessman Mo Ibrahim, whose foundation has introduced a now widely considered indexation of governance in Africa (the Ibrahim Index of African Governance, IIAG), we highlight the need for a kind of calm, ‘Afro-realist’ lens to better understand what is happening across the macro-region (Tarrósy 2023). This has been starkly highlighted by the novel coronavirus outbreak, the subsequent economic difficulties, and yet another food crisis, this time following the Russian aggression in Ukraine, which has hit the continent particularly hard (see Búr’s chapter in this volume and Marsai and Tóth 2022). In recent years, many experts have emphasized the importance of Afro-realism. This approach involves looking at the various contradictions and contrasts across Africa as a whole in order to promote both qualitative and quantitative development. By taking a holistic view of the continent, we can better understand and address the complex issues facing its people. (Biedermann and Kiss 2017).

In general, we can observe that each external actor, including Asian, North and Latin-American, Western, and Central and Eastern European states, is striving to identify and capitalize on the opportunities for mutual benefit in

the relationship using their own initiatives. At the same time, they continue to strengthen the African relationship system through the use of similar instruments such as summits, business forums, scholarship programs, and more. When examining the African policies of these different actors, national interests can be identified. However, when analyzing Africa's development potential, the African perspective needs to be addressed. Do the two sides meet? Who and how should plans ensure that African visions (formulated by Africans, not by the developed Global North or the emerging Global South) are realized while serving the national interest? The question remains valid for 2023 and beyond: Can the African interest be an interest, or rather an aspect, a strategy for maintaining and gaining an internationally competitive position under the pressures of the changing world order?

In light of this, one of the most important areas of investigation in the coming period will be the changing role of the “African agent” and, specifically, the chances and conditions for its strengthening. A more precise understanding and mapping of this may reveal the interrelated dimensions and the background to the interactions, dynamics, and changes analyzed in this chapter. When viewed from the African context, the agent determines the long-term positioning of countries and actors in the region and the global space and is therefore (also) geopolitically important. The capacity of African governments to develop a thoroughly considered long-term strategy, again with geopolitical implications, and to implement it professionally and consistently remains critical to the development of forward-looking African perspectives in the emerging new world order. However, the active engagement of African non-state actors and civil society in shaping the future must be the focus of African and international attention. In any long-term societal transformation, “civil society is the key,” as it “pulls the divergent time scales and dimensions of political and economic reforms together. It is the ground in which both have to be anchored in order not to be blown away” (Dahrendorf 1990, 93).

5. CEE–Africa cooperative agendas still marginal?

Dahrendorf's reasoning makes sense across Central and Eastern Europe when we look at the regime changes at the end of the 1980s and beginning of the 1990s. As Piotr Sztompka explained Dahrendorf's ‘clock theory,’ we learn that: “The reconstruction of civil society [...] is the key to the ultimate victory of anti-communist revolutions. But here we encounter the greatest challenge, and perhaps the most fundamental dilemma. It may be called [...] ‘the dilemma of three clocks.’ The point is that successful transformations

at various levels of post-revolutionary society require various spans of time. The deeper we move into it, the longer it takes. At the top, there are the reforms of laws and political institutions, culminating in the enactment of new constitutions. [...] Then, at a little deeper level, there are the reforms of the economic system. They take much longer. [...] Finally, at the deepest and most important level, there is the rebuilding of the cultural codes, discourses and underlying social life. The most important factor here is the reconstitution of civil society. This takes the longest and meets the strongest, though perhaps unwitting, resistance” (Sztompka 1991, 310).

After the political transformations of the late 1980s, the most important foreign policy objective for the former members of the Eastern Bloc was to quickly acquire EU and NATO memberships. The entire international system was paying great attention to the end of the bipolar world and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, while Africa was – again – largely ignored. As Tull (2008, 3) underlined: “In the early 1990s, Africa lost more and more in importance as European attention was absorbed by economic opportunities in Asia and even more importantly by the enlargement of the EU to eastern Europe [...] structural imbalances between the two regions have prevailed.” Hutchful (1991, 51) added that it was felt that “the investment of billions of dollars that would be required to revive Eastern European economies (not to mention that of the Soviet Union) and to consolidate democracy may occur primarily at the expense of Third World countries,” including many from the African continent. However, he also highlighted that, “one should insist that the primary significance of the political changes in Eastern Europe should be sought in Africa’s relations with the countries and regimes in that area, as well as with the world order evolved as a result of the emergence of the zone of socialism after the Second World War. Furthermore, it should be sought at least as much in the intangible world of politics, diplomacy and power as in the tangible one of economics” (Hutchful 1991, 52).

As a geopolitical predicament, according to Judy Blatt: “Central and Eastern Europe often seems easier to define by what it is not, than by what it is. It is an area, without clear geographical borders [...] sometime called the ‘Lands in Between’, a broad frontier zone between Russia and Germany, Europe and Asia, East and West” (Batt 2013, 7). In a broad sense, the corridor stretching from the Baltic States to the Balkan States can be referred to as Central and Eastern Europe. This term embraces the countries that became members of the European Union (EU) after 2004, except Malta and Cyprus, as well as those currently awaiting future enlargements. The CEE region encompasses more than only the Visegrad Group (V4) nations: Hungary,