

Classical Phenomenology Applied to Gender Identity

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The Gendered Human

By

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PREFACE

Dear Reader, I will make some comments to orient you to the personal mission and the professional task for philosophers, psychologists, human scientists and phenomenologists. After Immanuel Kant, there must be self-aware critical engagement with the real, public shared world in order to make claims about it. Following Kant, Edmund Husserl mentioned “the problem of the sexes”, in section 55 of *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, in the midst of a discussion of how history and the transmission of sense occur from one generation to the next. This comment, made in passing, raises the topic of how Husserl and Heidegger would address the living human body that varies biologically and how persons exist socially in communal space. When Husserl and Heidegger were colleagues and agreed on Husserl’s project to idealize objects and the sense-fields in which they appear, they challenged theoreticians and empiricists to consider real natural and human phenomena in a broader manner than Kant had begun. From the mathematician’s view of empirical science, it is important to understand how ideals enable hypothesis-testing in scientific experimentation.

To answer how classical phenomenology would attend to real embodied people in interaction with each other is the mission of this work. In this light, the problem of dimorphic maleness and femaleness is a biological fundamental for a second, co-occurring problem, the problem of how to live with respect to traditional customs and practices of how to be gendered, masculine, feminine and otherwise. Given that social norms act like ideal conceptual norms, in that both provide coordination for action in the real cultural life, then a major topic about human being is mentioned in passing by Husserl. This text provides an answer to the problem of the sexes by understanding the original relationship between the ideal and the real that Kant, Husserl and Heidegger shared. Husserl offered the idea that real types, real generality, is preconstituted within ordinary living and that such understanding is what enables people to identify what exists in the common sense of everyday life.

People who have become accustomed to the phenomenological vocabulary of ‘reductions’ and ‘methods’, often become blasé about the revolutionary perspectives and methods to which they refer. The revolution is: If other people, their objects, and detailed relationships

within and between objects, are not personally studied in our experience of their experience - then such relations cannot be represented in concepts and universal claims. The sense of the inquiry is generalizing and universalizing about necessary moments that comprise a whole, when specifying an initial starting point to make definitions.

Secondly, there is an important omission, generally. In the understanding of Husserl and Heidegger, ideal a prioris about consciousness and their functions in logic, applied mathematics and ideal preparations for the practice of empirical science, are often omitted. This is problematic because accurate ideal understanding functions to permit collaboration on a task, and permit a sufficiently adequate orientation to phenomena, the objective appearances of reality, which are there for everyone. It is well known that phenomenology is strongly related to first- and second-hand accounts of qualitative reality. It is not well known that the purpose of such direct connection with evidence is for the purpose of making ideal definitions, and possibly, being open to receiving understanding about fundamental constant relations between the objects of attention and belief in relation to sense-fields of awareness. The introductions to the *Prolegomena*, the *Sixth Logical Investigation*, section 3 of *Phenomenological Psychology*, and the first chapter of *Ideas I* make it perfectly clear that the mission is to idealize the qualitatively real and so answer Kant. Such openness to qualitative evidence indicates the meaning-constituting dimensions of phenomena in the contexts in which they need to be worked with - and not ignored and worked against.

The important reason for a return to Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and Gestalt psychology is to prevent an omission, because what is taught lacks accuracy about the original project. It would be a failure if philosophers and psychologists of the meaning of cognized being were unable to identify, for themselves and others, what the most basic technical terms mean in the original writings of their discipline and what the empirical consequences are because of them.

If that were the case, their teaching and writing would be worthless: They could never be expected to communicate in ways that bore a relation to how their discipline was founded. If the conceptual drift between 1938, when Husserl died, and today were so great that there was no consensus about how and why the discipline of phenomenology started, then there would be no continuity between Kant, Husserl, Heidegger and the contemporary readings and usages that wish to justify and identify themselves by the word 'phenomenological'. If so, whatever the new usages and practices were, they would have no justification to use the name of the old tradition to refer to what the contemporary writers had

invented themselves. The omission exists because of a lack of self-awareness within the new writings that is often in total contradiction to what the original project wanted to achieve. This is not to say that the theoretical original must be used to form empirical practices. Rather, the way to make empirical practices that are phenomenological should be by encountering the original project and so create empirical protocols, experiments and methods that are in the spirit of the original project – not in contradiction to it. Criticism of the original could only be achieved on the basis of understanding it.

More than a hundred years after the publication of the *Logical Investigations* in 1900 and 1901, there are currently a large number of positions that claim the word ‘phenomenological’, but it is a point of debate to work out how close any of the contemporary claims are to what the original issues and practices were. The problem is particularly vexed because the position that Husserl had was complex, and the methods and positions he proposed were often only briefly defined, then reconsidered and redefined by him. Reading Husserl requires consulting works by scholars who can determine when particular topics came to maturity and explain why the prior accounts were given up. One interpretative problem, when providing a brief overview of Husserl’s approach, is that he provided an over-abundance of detail in his, very many, little picture researches.

Insufficient understanding is a practical problem because understanding guides actions. Following Kant, Husserl and Heidegger means transcendentalising, idealizing, because ideal formalisms such as mathematics, structure the empirical sciences, as stated about chemistry in *Prolegomena*, section 31. In short, ideals structure thought and action and are guided by ideal understanding. Like all projects, the endpoint of the mission for classical phenomenology was set by its originators’ shared intention. The original clarification offers methods to see with the mind’s eye of rational understanding, after reductions to lived experience that enable renewals of understanding. It is hoped that the focus across regions of cognized being will provide insight about qualitative evidence pertinent to achieving real work.

One aim of theorising is to specify the reflective seeing of part-whole relationships in tangible sense-fields and seeing types of higher and lower meaningful objects, and the detailed typicalities that make them, into complex composite meaningful wholes - *gestalts* of all kinds. A detailed definition of the seeing of objects in sense-fields is provided in Chapters 3, 7 and 8. Sense-fields are important because they are backgrounds against which objects and mental and cultural processes stand out. The novelty of radicalizing Kant, made by Husserl, is to introduce philosophy not just to

its perceptual sense-fields, but also to those that include the I in memory, imagination, understanding pictures and retention, the automatic memory and learning that integrates ongoing learning about the world and others (Kern 2019a, 110). The aim of intentional analysis is to disclose the work of consciousness through the comparison of qualitative sense (VI, 120-1), first revealed in the *Fifth Logical Investigation* (XIX/1, V, §§1-6, 10). The ambition is to theorize all forms of awareness and temporality involved in making common sense, the publicly known senses of cultural objects, what are mutually understood objects in the same culture. For Husserl, taking consciousness seriously requires theorizing it seriously. In traditional philosophy and science, the role of consciousness is entirely ignored. To prevent this omission, it is helpful to prevent linguistic and conceptual reference from becoming disconnected from what raw experiential data is about.

One category error between the real and the ideal is the sin of Psychologism: An example of Psychologism in psychology, or any science, is merely assuming professional ideals and concepts as valid, through assumption and brief empirical investigation, without attending to the real phenomena that the concepts and ideals are about. Psychologism believes that even ideal disciplines such as logic are only empirical problems, and so it fails to judge properly, the relation between the real and the ideal. The original classical phenomenology, between Husserl and Heidegger, was a focus on real experience and real objects and types – in order to idealize the objects, relations and types, and consider directly how understanding arises from qualitative sense.

Elisabeth Ströker, a Director of the Husserl Archives at Cologne, comments on how Husserl left pure psychology behind in *The Crisis*. Despite Husserl clearly using the phrase “pure psychologist” in that work, Ströker points out that the late Husserl made a stronger focus on idealism and he annulled the prior difference between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology, to recommend only transcendental phenomenology as the theoretical project in which the human sciences could ground themselves. Traditional philosophy prior to Husserl and Heidegger, opposed realism and idealism and held them to be mutually exclusive. Idealism is generally used to refer to consciousness and its cognitive and affective processes and spiritual values which are believed to be fundamental.

Realism, on the other hand, refers to the idea that other people and physically real things are external to consciousness and exist independently of sensuality and understanding within consciousness. Accordingly, the natural attitude of the ordinary citizen, and the naturalistic attitude of the

sciences and Scientism, believe that what exists for consciousness and its values are merely the superficial product of the workings of real matter, and that conscious experience and understanding is reducible to matter and biological processes. Scientism is arrogant, from a philosophical perspective, because it assumes that only science is the arbiter of real thoughts and it alone is the judge of reality and truth. Scientism says 'qualitative reality is irrelevant because it is not scientific. There is no point in studying the qualitative lifeworld'.

The original project of phenomenology took a novel position between the real and the ideal. Although phenomenology is not the same as subjectivistic first-hand and second-hand accounts, of what it is like to be a human being involved in various missions, there are many definitive passages where the focus was clearly on making ideal understanding. The inheritance left us by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger is a preference for ideals – gained from real phenomena. In this light, and toward the project of theoretically grounding the forthcoming human sciences, the counsel of perfection offered in pure psychology is idealizing what it is like to live in sense-fields. For instance, the senses of audition and empathy overlap with each other, as they do with all the other mental processes humans have. Together audition and vision of other people, often have associated with them, in each individual, a storehouse of nonverbal senses about what it feels like, when a person looks a specify way on their face and in their bodily demeanour. In a radical sense, qualitative studies begin at home. When we are very young our parents present us with the totalities of real and modal worlds, the cosmos of real and merely possible sense, not in an infinitely possible theoretical space, but a human one. Sound development in adulthood rests on the necessity of good quality child care, patience, education in a broad sense, and support to help the next generation thrive.

Because concepts and fundamental constant ideals guide empirical protocols, then they must be accurate, otherwise scientific practices and discussions are not focused accurately on the same phenomena across the same profession. In short, Husserl's position is a pure mathematician applying Euclidean principles to unbuild wholes of qualitative meaning, as they occur in sense-fields of experience, in order to understand how they exist as ontological wholes. I argue that, over and above Husserl opposing Psychologism, his creation of ideals from reality is his mathematical way of philosophising. The consequence of Husserl's position is the possibility to appraise and coordinate the practice of science and any academic area around ideals. One key topic in Husserl's phenomenology is the assertion of rationality with respect to the relevant evidence appropriately interpreted.

Below, Husserl and Heidegger's views are brought together as a foil to define a central point around which it is possible to compare and contrast other phenomenological views. The project is to teach the practice of Husserl's reflection, where direct, second-order, higher awareness is created through a change of attitude, leading to idealization of the real: the 'eidetic attitude' of personally seeing the conditions of possibility of universal and typically necessary ideals in one's own real experiences. The identification of cognized being as a direct means of practising philosophy, as defined by Husserl from 1896 onwards, Heidegger accepted as beginning the consideration of being, the straightforward, object-directed, definitive *what* that is experienced; along with the *how*, the manner of its appearing as cognized by consciousness and evident in a sense-field of the body of some sort. The position taken by Kant, Husserl and Heidegger was metaphysical, a fundamentalism about rationality, concerning how temporality and mental processes work to constitute the meanings of what exists, understood as qualitative objects of attention appearing in the sense-fields of the living body.

Husserl began his career as a philosopher of mathematics and applied mathematical manners of reasoning to meaningful cognized being to produce mental methods for ideal theory creation. These methods and stances have been misunderstood and maligned. Phenomenology has influenced many academic disciplines and promoted empirical methods of understanding psychosocial, meaningful reality, driven by a desire to capture the truth of empirical participants. The revolutionary sense of enthusiasm and promise that occurred in intellectual circles in the first half of the twentieth century, about Husserl's phenomenology, necessitated the justifying of ideals gained by a qualitative attention and belief about lived experience. Furthermore, in relation to those psychologists and human scientists who are inspired to grasp qualitative sense, it was a breakthrough by Husserl that legitimized idealizing qualitative studies about being human.

Because adults are shaped in their childhoods, then to say something about my personal family situation is entirely relevant. My maternal grandmother was a suffragette and the first elected leader of the Towns Women's Guild, in Darlington, County Durham, UK. My mother was a feminist. At home as a child, there was plenty of critical discussion of the virtues and shortcomings of men and women. My fascination with gender is born of this heritage. In 1994, I began 11 years of part-time PhD studies at City University, London, while working full time at the University of Wolverhampton as a Senior Lecturer in Counselling Psychology and was in public service, one day per week, as a Psychotherapist in the British

National Health Service, in the local Psychology Department. I was a Graduate Member of the British Psychological Society from 1993 to 2021 and a Registered Integrative Psychotherapist with the UK Council for Psychotherapy from 1995 to 2021.

My PhD, completed in 2005, focused on Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger's agreement on phenomenological practice, and this is the position I call 'classical phenomenology'. Despite the differences between the two thinkers, there are sufficient agreements to define their joint project of 'classical pure psychology', a theoretical transcendental philosophy to ground conceptually the human sciences that uses 'psychology' as an all-embracing term that includes the family of human sciences. Transcendental philosophy is an acausal approach to meaning and signification, as it exists across all manner of verbal and nonverbal social acts that communicate between people. Kant's original project was to find such ideal concepts and perspectives for judging proper knowledge and understanding, and make conclusions independent of experience and the body's senses.

Personally, I write this work as a person who has a PhD in the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger, and practised as a Registered Psychotherapist in the public health system in the UK, the National Health Service, (NHS) for 26 years. I worked with complex mental health problems in secondary services for 34 years. I also taught Counselling Psychology at the University of Wolverhampton, UK, from 1995 until 2001. I taught the practice of Freud's psycho-analysis and the therapeutic skills of Carl Rogers to undergraduates, postgraduates and on a taught Doctorate in Counselling Psychology. I taught these approaches theoretically and practically. The practical skills of how to practise individual psychotherapy I have covered in previous works (Owen 2007). For undergraduates, I also taught the history and philosophy of psychology where I lectured on consciousness and Husserl studies.

Professionally, I started working life as a Mechanical Engineer and did not get interested in philosophy and psychotherapy until I was 25 when I had started looking for suitable training to become a psychotherapist. Because I have worked as a Mechanical Engineer, designed internal combustion engine parts with higher mathematics, written software in Fortran and Basic and worked in the beginnings of computer-aided design, I am qualified to write about mathematical modelling and natural science as empirical hypothesis testing. My undergraduate project was on the use of laser interferometry for the measurement of heat transfer. I worked in placements in research and development for BL Cars in 1980 and the National Coal Board in 1981. At Loughborough University, where I

completed my first degree in 1982, lecturers from the Department of Engineering Mathematics stated proofs from first principles. These were the construction of formal mathematical models about the causes of natural being, which is standard practice in the natural sciences. The natural sciences assume they are kings of truth and the keepers of proper facts, and that qualitative sense has little relevance when establishing scientific understanding.

In 1988 I met, intellectually speaking, the work of Edmund Husserl, Sigmund Freud, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Lacan, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emmanuel Levinas, Jacques Derrida and John Bowlby while taking the foundation year at the Philadelphia Association, London. In 1989 I began a master's degree in the Psychology of Counselling and Therapy, at what is now called Regents University, London. This was supplemented with a year of lectures at the Centre for Freudian Analysis and Research, London. I also gained a qualification in Medical Anthropology at Middlesex University, and gained two mentors, Gerald Mars, a cultural anthropologist who was working at the Tavistock Clinic, London, and David Grove, a psychotherapist from New Zealand, the inventor of clean language.

My 2015 publication, *Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy* introduced Husserl's human science theorising, a theoretical and philosophical psychology of the solo person as a part of their larger cultural lifeworld. In it, I did not present every major concept of Husserl's, nor did I argue against every false accusation that his work received, nor specify his major assumptions, like the use of methods in philosophy for systematizing, nor the need for colleagues to confer, nor did I argue for and against an ideal view of linguistic reference. However, Kant, Husserl and Heidegger agreed that objectivity, the two-way reference between language and fulfilled nonverbal referents in lived experience and social life, is central for theorising. Objectivity in Husserl's sense is when linguistic concepts refer to the many appearances of cognized beings in different sense-fields that present (in the technical language 'constitute') one object. For Husserl and Heidegger, objectivity is the experiential sense of thereness-for-everyone, one that transcends the now, and exists in and across other past experiences, self and others have had. Objects appear in the public world as there for everyone, across several sense-fields in which people experience them. The natural attitude of merely assuming what the local common sense believes employs speech and thought to connote objects in the social world. Objects and their many different types of being there for everyone is what it means to understand being: it is cognized being present in some way through the many intentional forms of

consciousness. Accordingly, what is primary is how to apply the ideal-real distinctions particularly when real evidence exists in nonconceptual ways.

However, from the perspective of mathematics, Husserl and Heidegger are close to Euclid, in wanting to read off the definitive being of objects, and close to Kant, in wanting to understand how mental processes of reference, the intentionalities, span time, place and the social contexts of persons. What is truly revolutionary about the original phenomenology is that it radicalized Kant, even more than those who previously had been returning to Kant, to improve the consistency of his system of justification. Kant's reformers wanted to correct faults they found in his system of focusing on appearances, in order to clarify metaphysical fundamentals. Because after Kant, fundamentally, understanding of the human world starts with qualitative appearances.

Some remarks need to be made about how Husserl has been read. Husserl studies and the broader camp of phenomenology is a rationalist and structuralist bastion, a stronghold against the forces of irrationality, bad philosophy, bad science and intellectual complacency. However, generations of undergraduates have been taught falsehoods about Husserl, proclaimed as greatness. Because the word 'phenomenology' is used in different senses, I will specify the use I am making of it: The point of transcendental-universal claims is to keep open a much wider context to understand the meaning of cognized being. For example, the rules of formal intellectual systems of algebra and computing have their own exact standards. It would be a gross category error to confuse the map and the territory, where different orders of logic that rely on different grounds of evidence, are confused.

This reading of Husserl and Heidegger accepts the view of the Bern School of Husserl interpretation provided by Iso Kern and Eduard Marbach. Iso Kern has done much to show how Husserl responded to Immanuel Kant. My reading of Edmund Husserl is influenced by scholars like Iso Kern, Elisabeth Ströker and Eduard Marbach. This reading of Edmund Husserl is similar to the one I made in *Phenomenology in Action in Psychotherapy*. At that time, the work reached out to the natural and human sciences, hermeneutics and mathematics, and made a reading of Husserl for psychological purposes to promote the use of ideal theory in therapy. Husserl and Heidegger require an attention to detail, so that brief accounts are inevitably sketchy in their presentation of their major themes. It follows that any short definition of Husserl's practice could only be an inaccurate characterisation. Such was the creativity of his output that a brief introduction requires reading past, and downplaying some details,

because the total output he did provide, unfortunately, confuses diligent readers through an over-abundance of novel distinctions.

Whilst Husserl and Heidegger differed in detailed ways, the draft by Heidegger for the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* and his letter of October 22, 1927, to Husserl, expressed approval of Husserl's position on the topics of consciousness in its habitat of social life in family, culture, society and history. Because Husserl and Heidegger agreed that references cross history, this is reason enough to declare there is a midpoint between their positions. Both agreed that historical references of associated sense supply meaning. Husserl's pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology, and Heidegger's fundamental ontology of "Da-sein", Heidegger's term for human being, are post-NeoKantian. At this early stage in the explanation, it is worth pointing out that pure psychology grounds the human sciences and exists in this real world; whereas transcendental phenomenology is a theoretical-philosophical enterprise to ground understanding, similar to pure mathematics. Allegedly, transcendental phenomenology is not constrained by worldly thinking.

In medieval philosophy and Brentano's work, existence for consciousness was called 'inexistence' in the sense that cognized being *exists in* consciousness. By 1907, Husserl had developed a position to produce a sophisticated radicalization of Kant's enterprise: ideal theorizing starts with real embodied, self-aware consciousness living in a social world of sociocultural shared meanings. The I is a mixture of choice, willing and explicit rationality with its unchosen automatic capacities, of which there are many. Embodied consciousness has many involuntary, automatic mental processes that give sense immediately without deliberation and action by the ego. Many readers of the phenomenology literature in general, have not understood that what transcendental philosophy concerns is accounting for how mental processes, for the most part entirely involuntarily, provide us with the mass of implicit understanding through which we live our lives. The intentional analysis of consciousness reaching out is about instantaneous understanding, provided for the conscious ego, the I, the sense of self in relationship with the world. The manner of the prereflective primary passive constitution of appearances is instantaneous and occurs without the ego's active choices and deliberations. The intentional analysis of constitution means understanding objects as meaningful according to their types. Intentional analysis of constitution also means taking a developmental and historical view of how such sense first arose and how it develops and is maintained thereafter.

After the publication of *Ideas I*, the method and viewpoint became clearer. The revolutionary sense of reduction is an attempt to abandon the

influence of assumptions about reality, hearsay, false ideas, and what culture and society says is consensus - in order, personally and collectively, to see the evidence of the natural attitude sense in one's own experiences and analyze it according to the various goals of professional perspectives in philosophy, psychology and other professions.

What appears is that people are aware through mixtures of egoic choice, volition and deliberation plus sense-making processes that are entirely involuntary and automatic. What gets seen is understanding itself, in order to gain personal and professional renewal of what concepts and systems of formalism mean in experiential detail: sensual facts and ideal a prioris about consciousness in relation to them co-exist.

Intentional analysis is the method that derives evidences and can uncover presuppositions. Husserl radicalized Kant by demanding that pure mathematicians, logicians, applied mathematicians, and intellectual professions of all kinds and stripes, should account for themselves in radical clarity and assumptionless, bias-free demonstration of their guiding concepts and theories, and justify the beliefs through which they practice – explicitly towards specific ends. Idealized evidence is applied by mathematicians, statisticians, logicians and pure mathematics. Logic is what provides normative ideal guidance to the empirical sciences. Sciences get their hands dirty with reality but require the execution of mathematics and logic, and other ideal formal systems, to know what to expect. As regards dealing with real people though, clarity about the norms of society is what helps people get around inside it. To the extent that social learning has any influence, it prepares us to imagine, at least, how others would feel and behave, if we were asked to guess how people feel in a specific photograph, for instance. To know what is expected of oneself in any specific situation, is evident in getting a sense of what we would see in a photograph of people in action with each other. A photograph of a group ensemble is frequently immediately understandable. The norms that guide human relating and behaviour in any scenario make sense because they are shared by communities and provide guidance on how to act, practically, ethically, theoretically and ideally.

To get specific about the natural attitude refers to understanding the open space of how meaning exists in the temporal unity in the now, into which other forms of givenness are presentiated, *Vergegenwärtigen*, such as times future and past, each in their own forms of givenness: how they appear. The natural attitude of assuming existence is a taken-for-granted outcome, one of very many intentional achievements made by consciousness, in intersubjective connection with other consciousness.

The radical method of reduction is part of reflecting on experience concerning how objects and other people are connected through social learning in the accumulation of associations of sense. In human development, there is also the acquisition of emotional self-regulation in learning how to soothe one's own distress and become morally competent, particularly after the age of four when the meta-representation of false, as opposed to true, beliefs becomes possible developmentally.

The transcendental attitude is an attitude of research that should be fit to capture the many different ways in which consciousness constitutes and transcends time, place and social context in the world. The transcendental question of specifying the conditions of possibility of objects and the many forms of transcendence of consciousness in relation to them, all ontological identity and difference, is the scope of the research project Husserl and Heidegger shared (Owen 1999). The technical terms about intentionality exist in a cohesively experienced temporality, where the timeframes of the future and the past, appear seamlessly in the present. The term 'intentionality' is used equivalently with the terms 'noetic', 'intentional implication', 'references' and 'appresentations' of sense. What is being referred to are the very many types of cognitive process and how these exist across multiple timeframes. The word 'intentional' should not be understood as purposeful, but as a technical term concerning specific modes of awareness, the many intentionalities of embodied socialized consciousness.

Consciousness is temporal and socially situated in that acquired senses of objects are continually, retentionally, updated across time. Kant, Husserl and Heidegger agreed that temporality is "the formal condition of the manifold of the internal sense", (B, 176). Husserl agreed with Kant that "*time is the form of sensibility*", (EU, §38). During the time of their collaboration, this agreed focus was not in doubt. During the time of their classical collaboration, Heidegger changed his mind on this issue as he claimed that Husserl over-privileged consciousness and treated it like an absolute, as inaugurated by Kant and his focus on appearances. Consciousness is a beginning in the sense that all cognized being exists and has sense for it. The phenomenological attitude serves the purpose of understanding how the Objectivity of appearances represent the real, while simultaneously, appearances indicate in such a way that, egoically and nonegoically, the world and others are present, for both choosing and passive processes of the mind. The detail of Heidegger's about face on these matters is presented in Chapter 5.

Within this wholism, no partial perspectives are admissible. The perspective is to acknowledge that objects lie in greater and greater

contexts that exceed the local everyday and extend to the overlap between the world and its history as an all-encompassing cosmos. The phenomenological claim is to distinguish conditions of possibility for the natural - from the history of the human spirit - gained through reflection and interpretive work. The fundamentalism that Kant began and Husserl continued, wants to understand the basic sense-fields of awareness through which objects appear and define how they make the senses that they do. Over the span of Husserl's writings before 1938, the focus for Husserl spread to the connection between appearances, mental processes, and other people in their cultures, in order to have direct experience of what is already understood and available to consciousness. Husserl extended Kant's view to propose reflective methods for understanding how sense adequately functions when it is correctly associated in memory, habits and embodied skills that work towards specific endpoints. Such a focus is also able to accept biological drives to love and attach to others, which are also part of the human calling. Sexuality is a type of intentionality arising from a biological drive, but because of the added complexity it would bring, the analysis below considers identity as comprised of biological sex and social gender.

As part of the wholism set by the *Third Logical Investigation*, classical phenomenology is theoretical metaphysics and uses the term 'world' to mean, in specific texts, either cultural lifeworld or the entire global community, and sometimes, the world of one person. It is an appeal to map the territory of the ordinary cultural world. On mentioning the outer horizon of the lifeworld, a distinction has to be drawn between two senses of it. Its central meaning in *The Crisis of European Sciences* was to refer to the product of idealization, an invariant common and necessary function of a cultural structure as background to what is foregrounded in attention and action towards specific outcomes. The second common sense meaning of it, as a real current or historical cultural context was secondary to its idealized sense. The guiding importance of ideals, ideal reference, and systems of ideals such as mathematics, probability theories and unacknowledged idealization include standardised and consensually accepted questionnaires or theoretical constructs, which are accepted as valid. Then, for natural and human sciences, there are many fixed ideals active, but often their content is assumed, uncritically, and their presence and role are not given the important scrutiny that they deserve. Ideals held by professional researchers play a role in designing the questionnaires used in empirical studies and other aspects of experimental design, and so, ideals and values drive the research and structure its content, focus and

operational processes: An empirical study transforms the meanings of participants in to the conclusions made.

The promise of claiming anything about specific other people and human nature in general, is that what is claimed in conceptual representations, is actually accurate with respect to what others actually do feel, think and believe. I call this “The Promise” and it applies to all qualitative and quantitative research about human beings. Empirical research into people promises to be accurate. Whether it is, or not, is another question that is judged with respect to the phenomena themselves.

The aim is to make a return to Husserl via an acknowledgement of Heidegger’s appropriate criticisms, and a return to first principles in understanding how to identify patterns in complex experiences. Studying the full spectrum of gendered and sexed variations in the meaningful human body is one way to a transcendental attitude of understanding of the natural attitude constituted by history and contemporary conditions. The transcendental attitude, also called the universal epoché, is an attitude of, allegedly, leaving the perspective of the usual natural attitude world-frame behind, in order to occupy a new perspective – regarding consciousness in relation to its involvement and participation with others in community. However, to see the human world is to go beyond the usual frame of understanding.

The way forwards is proper concepts pointing at properly construed understanding of human processes. The concepts of the ordinary understanding need to be set aside. Rationality only points accurately at the real, and if it can’t judge between the real and other objects and processes, it doesn’t point at all. The transcendental attitude is a counsel of perfection because it wants to have freedom from false influences.

To make matters more complicated, Husserl held after 1935 approximately, that transcendental phenomenology was the only means of applying transcendental philosophy to the natural sciences, empirical psychology and other empirical sociocultural approaches such as social psychology and cultural anthropology. To be specific about what transcendental philosophy is would be to hold a number of different ways of theorising the relation between consciousness and types of cognized being, and develop ideal ways of interpreting the types of part and whole that exist in each region of science and academic study. Husserl’s previous remarks on pure psychology as an introductory discipline were abandoned in *Crisis*, his incomplete concluding work that features the ideal grounding of how consciousness works in relation to objects, others and the polythetic concept of the lifeworld. To prevent a misunderstanding though, pure psychology is not necessarily about believed phenomena but

demands the practice of intellectual seeing of regular structures and processes through imagined, purely possible, fundamental constant ideal aspects in *objects* – and - *how they appear* in intentional reference across types of tangible sense-fields. All the same, real phenomena legitimate and condition ideal conclusions. The real and the ideal are interrelated and not to be confused.

One problem with studying human development across the lifespan is that both nature and nurture co-occur and cannot be separated. Both biological nature and social loving nurture are required, and they continually interact across the lifespan, to condition the unique personal style of the individual. In a big picture view, the social history of genders in social space co-exists with the evolutionary biological history of the biological substrate.

In this light, qualitative typicality refers to detailed moments of an object and its relation with other objects, contexts and its real evidence. Also, sufficiently similar variants of a type of an object are identifiable. This automatic and involuntary, implicit ability operates continuously, and provides the sense of the already known pregiven lifeworld. This sense as a whole is the sense of the world as a limit case, the public frame of all worldly gestalts of the total contextual frame of reference, wherein all identifiable objects of a culture take their sense. When understanding other people and oneself, then the way that embodied researchers encounter embodied participants is not about hormones and chromosomes. Rather, there are sexed persons who show an enduring style of being-in-the-world across their lifespan that are gendered according to the local historical traditions that permit different degrees of freedom and constraint to each gender, according to local gender norms of social existence. Being-in-the-world is founded on sexed embodiment plus gendered enculturation and is situated in time, place and social class, and the inevitability of having a perspective therein. People belong to multiple social types.

Another aim of the work is to help academic gender and transgender studies appreciate gendered phenomena and how to interpret qualitative human encounters. Transgender experience is particularly relevant because persons who change their gender live life in two genders and occupy a position between the binary genders, masculinity and femininity, in a binary society. The gendered differences they make for themselves are the direct evidence that shows socially and personally accessible evidence about gender. The social and personal experiences of self and others, about gendered lives, are the referents capable of agreement and disagreement, and permit ideal universal conclusions about how a higher, gendered sense is expressed through a variety of means. Not all societies are binary

though and some have well-established, historically approved traditions for gender change and the establishment of third gender roles in family and society that are publicly accepted and recognized as having their own cultural norms of permitted, socially acceptable noncompliance. Commentaries identify how ideals can be used in qualitative or quantitative, empirical human science research.

However, phenomenology has had a bad reputation in some parts of philosophy, psychology and psychiatry, and elsewhere in the human sciences. Often, the criticisms voiced have been incorrect. If people wish to criticise Husserl and Heidegger, they would do well to employ what was originally practised in their methods and make criticisms based on the methods and interpretive stances they used.

However, when it comes to explanation, if the need to justify is strong, then it increases the size of the text; and consequently reduces the clarity of the overall message. To reduce complexity and length while attending to the original issues, the manner of presentation employed below expresses Kant, Husserl and Heidegger in the main, and presents their voices according to their key conclusions. If issues are disputed, the works of the Directors of the Husserl Archives are chosen to provide authoritative conclusions. There is a need to make clean arguments that can be understood and acted on to communicate the practices and methods used.

Similarly, this text does not argue for or against every claim made by Husserl and Heidegger, nor does it track Husserl's reconsiderations of methods for philosophy as fundamental meta-science across nearly 50 years of published and private writings. Because this is a teaching text, numerous references are made without footnotes and endnotes, in order to improve readability. The focus is on discussing the actual issues between Husserl and Heidegger that are rich and complex. The Husserl-Heidegger nexus is chosen as being important for the theorising of areas where justification, to colleagues and the public, is required.

The first six chapters cover the Husserl-Heidegger relationship on substantive issues. The analysis of meant-sense between them is introductory to the empathic understanding of people in interaction with each other in Chapters 7 to 11. The necessity of starting with the qualitative real is established because it reveals the Euclidean role of interpreting self-evidence, to understand the metaphysics of the human body enacting its role and identity, and be related with the cultural beings through which persons find meaning in the everyday cultural lifeworlds they inhabit. After Kant, metaphysics refers to the most fundamental considerations of time and space including that of the perspectives between people in a

cultural milieu, plus consideration of being and interpretations of causes and their effects. Chapters 7 to 11 explore how meaningful, gendered sex is constituted in the shared space of culture, society and history. Chapter 8 asks readers to practice what is required.

An Epilogue follows the main text. It features seminar questions to support each chapter, they have the aim of promoting further integration between the contents of each chapter to help the reader appraise where they are in relation to it in their current understanding. This is in addition to the brief questions made at the end of each chapter that also have the aim of consolidating the learning made as a result of having read each chapter.

The page references below are made with respect to the German originals in the Husserliana series, published by Springer; and referred to by Roman numerals. The Gesamtausgabe series for Heidegger, published by Vittorio Klostermann, is referred to by “GA” and the volume number. The first edition of Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* of 1781 is referred to by page numbers starting with the letter A, the second edition of 1787 is referred to by pagination starting with the letter B. The work of Sigmund Freud is referred to according to the numbering system of the *Standard Edition* of the English translations by James Strachey, published by Hogarth Press.

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What a piece of work is a man! How noble in reason! How infinite in faculty! In form and moving, how express and admirable! In action how like an angel! In apprehension how like a god! The beauty of the world! The paragon of animals! And yet, to me, what is this quintessence of dust?

—Hamlet, Act II, scene ii.
William Shakespeare

ORIENTATION: HUSSERL AND HEIDEGGER ON HUMAN BEING IN THE SOCIAL WORLD

Phenomenology has no worth in what it promises but only in what it delivers. This text is a return to the origins of phenomenology as transcendental philosophy exemplified by the post-NeoKantian positions of Edmund Husserl and Martin Heidegger and makes clear the relation to Gestalt psychology and mathematics. Husserl credited Carl Stumpf (1890) and Ernst Mach as sources of the idea that a dependent whole of sense, an object, is greater than the sum of its dependent moments, the senses that comprise it. The commonality with Kant is to show how temporality works between the present and the past. For the most part, understanding arises out of sensuality, and even without language, what is already understood can be identified because of past learning. Husserl and Heidegger agreed that ideal a priori about consciousness and its objects can be found from real situations. Different regions of evidence support different ideal conclusions about what can be seen within them.

The way of referring to Objectivity, wholes of sense, is to use 'object' as a technical term. Objects of attention show the qualitative types that define them in the sense-fields that they appear in. Similarly, qualitative mental processes, including those that present the future and the past, have their own types of giving sense. For instance, it would be hard to confuse imagining what to do tomorrow with giving a lecture to 200 people; or confuse watching the TV news with meeting someone for the first time and shaking their hand. It is promised that the study of the cosmos of sense differentiates each object experienced with respect to the differences apparent with other objects in sense-fields. Study of the cosmos of sense also differentiates each sense-field with respect to the differences apparent in other sense-fields. In this view, consciousness's relation with cognized being shows idealizable types. What is shown is how consciousness differentiates its own manners of how it is relationally aware. The way to understand phenomenology as a broad movement is to think of it in its context of NeoKantianism and German Idealism.

This work creates a shared perspective between Husserl and Heidegger about how they turned to the Ancients, mathematics, Kant and the study of

gestalts of sense. The thinkers who were closest to Husserl and Heidegger were Ernst Cassirer, Paul Natorp and Heinrich Rickert, and others who wrote on the relations between Kant and contemporary philosophy when Gestalt psychology and Freud's psycho-analysis were getting to grips with how to determine how the mind works, but from different sets of assumptions driving their inquiries.

The idealizing practice of seeing moments, and reflecting and rationalising sense and signification in relation to referents, is understood as a huge set of real-world possibilities. The term 'higher' refers to dependent details of sense within an object or between objects. This higher sense overlaps with the idea of Gestalt, a unity or whole of sense. Gestalt is the term best known in Anglophone writing. However, in Husserl and Heidegger, *gestalts*, tangible felt-senses of wholes of identifiable sense, are given a variety of names across the years. Phenomenology in its original forms concerned what could be called a qualitative cognitivism, or qualitative cognitive anthropology, whereby meaningful sense gets carried by the unconscious mental processes that create it, against the background of the world (VI, §28).

The focus is on wholes of sense: Gestalts of qualitative sense are referred to by the terms 'abstracta', 'concreta' and 'noemata', senses that appear in sense-fields of consciousness. These terms overlap and need explaining. A gestalt is a whole of sense comprised of moments, its meaningful parts, identifiable in its whole. Abstracta are abstract senses, often cultural senses associated with using an object within a cultural practice of some sort. Abstracta are higher conceptual, practical or culturally-shared senses carried by the concreta of material appearance in the perceptual senses related to other forms of appearing, such as imagination, empathy and memory, that are added to the perceptual sense. Empathy is the means of directly understanding people in a way that brings us the senses of the social world. The intentions and perceptions of others, their missions and histories, are the felt-sense of otherness in self that we can allocate to the social world and what it appears to want to do. Empathy, is to feel into others, to have a place within self that is forever felt to be theirs, so much so that it becomes possible to have immediate senses created, through our past contact with other human beings, sufficient for us to understand accurately this meeting, where the other ends and the self begins.

Concreta are tangible senses that appear to the perceptual senses and are given in a variety of ways to vision, memory or the imagination. For instance, what people experience is a meaningful world of identifiable songs by specific artists, if a tune is familiar, it is not just music in general

or irregular sounds. Life is understandable already because of personal development across time that, without formal teaching, has already taught us a great deal.

The technical term 'noemata' refers to the manifold qualitative senses of an object that appear across many sense-fields of awareness. The best example of the difference between noema and an object is the real life example of a person's signature. Even when a person signs their name the same way, there are slight noematic variations in the appearance. Overall, the signature is the same object, the same name – the noemata are all the many varying appearances of the same signature by the same person. These technical terms refer to the tangible experiences of living through object-directed sense in general. What shows to personal reflection and analysis of qualitative sense, of course, refers to very many real scenarios and those that are merely possible. The focus is on how consciousness identifies and distinguishes between identities, in verbal propositions about cognized objects, cognized beings in their contexts. These senses are identifiable within larger, complex wholes of sense. The project is a generalized way of thinking about what we all live through.

It is not widely known that Husserl had two different forms of phenomenology from 1925 to 1933, before annulling the view of pure psychology in *Crisis*. What was put in the place of pure psychology in *Crisis* was the promise that transcendental phenomenology was the perspective that could facilitate science and academia. It is worthwhile to summarise the form that is expressed in this work. Pure psychology uses reflection, interpretation and seeing moments to find generalities (as candidates for possible necessary universals). Pure psychology concludes on the genuine universal and necessary ideals of the region of consciousness and its world of cultural objects (I, 72-4). What is being discussed in the technical narrative of the cultural object is the manifest noematic set of senses of it, appearing across sense-fields. For instance, the horizons of referential sense for being a person include gendered conditions of possibility for socially-approved gender norms and their obliging rules for relating. One consequence of social norms is that there can be a taboo enforcement for those who flout gender conventions, who can be deemed to have broken the moral compulsions for being a good citizen (Douglas 1966).

To be clear, what is investigated by pure psychology are senses of other people, social types, their perspectives and social senses, and the senses donated to and claimed about others in their social contexts. The sense of oneself as a person and what and how objects have appeared to the self across time can be studied. The *Amsterdam Lectures* define the

scope of pure psychology as reflecting on what and how objects are in cultural lifeworlds (IX, 348). The sense of a lifeworld as an outer horizon is a usually unthematized assumed, but ignored context, which is the background against which understanding arises. Understanding arises out of sensuality, and the sensuality is horizontal and cultural, and extends progressively up to a noumenal limit. Normally, the natural attitude believes in the real existence in the world but does nothing to account for how idealization produces working ideals that make sense against the lifeworld as an absolute ground. Even after the transcendental-psychological reflection, pure psychologists remain in this one real world as it is believed to exist (IX, 345).

Pure psychology theoreticians see ideal a prioris of consciousness, with respect to its objects, in sense-fields, and so, idealize what was sensed of the real, all the while considering themselves as nonparticipating onlookers (IX, 313), who could also consider senses that appear in their own lifespans (IX, 320). Pure psychology is an ideal theoretical grounding for forthcoming empirical psychologies, in a wide sense, and considers the qualitative experiences of meanings, norms and motivated purposes as their regional ground.

In 1928, temporality and retained learning were included in pure psychology in relation to a “*general psychology of reason* and its functions; alongside ... unreason and the whole category of the functions of consciousness which carries the label of ‘association’”, (IX, 327), in the prereflexive presence of the pregiven world (IX, 336): meaning that consciousness has learned how to identify most objects in its homeworld cultural context and takes that learning with it wherever it goes. Husserl’s hammer example in joinery (IV, 187, XXV, 319-20), and the comments on the relation between the verbal and the nonverbal in *Being and Time* (GA 2, 157, 360-1), express the relation between the higher, reflective analyzing ego and the prereflexive. This is inevitably the same for all persons. ‘Egology’ was Husserl’s way of referring to the prereflexive wholeness of the I in relation to the empirical reality of others and the sociocultural world, where the focus is not only on the meaningful content, but also is set much wider, where the secondary analyzing inspecting ego cannot be separate from its involuntary passivities, yet because the I can never be a full object to itself, its quasi-appearing is not a relationship to itself, but rather one between the ego that observes and analyzes - with the layers and levels of its whole self that appear with respect to different presences and objects.

Despite the transcendental-psychological reduction, what appears remains in the context of this One Real World (VI, 238-76, EU, §42). Pure

psychology is a partial relation to the biopsychosocial whole but does not include the natural biological moment in its study of sense (VI, 132-8, IX, 304). 'Biopsychosocial' means regarding human being as the complex overlapping of three regions, the biological, with individual psychology due to learning, and with the social and intersubjective dimension of living in culture and society influenced by history.

The second form of Husserl's phenomenology is transcendental phenomenology for the purposes of a Kant-inspired transcendental philosophy. Transcendental phenomenology investigates others and the self in culture and history, allegedly, within a wider and freer scope of neutrality. After 1936, the biopsychosocial view of human being is one that understands people as comprised of three different regions within one whole. There exists a biological nature that is born, lives, grows, matures and ages - within the intersubjective social space of nurture. It is social contexts that hold the contents of meaningful nurture in civilization, through customs and practices about people and cultural objects. When real cultural objects are understood, they are socially identifiable as belonging to cultural groups, and this enables numerous persons to coordinate themselves around the same, socially shared understanding.

Because the claim of neutrality is investigated critically in Chapters 4 to 5, in brief, the transcendental attitude is claimed to confer a neutral sense of existence, a judged neutrality of the being-senses of phenomena, considered as mere possibilities, encountered in its research attitude. Husserl contemplated the phenomena that appear after a reduction. The theoretical work is done in the transcendental attitude: "If we remain consistent in this sort of meditation, with a radical consistency that quite exclusively goes after subjective and intersubjective consciousness in all its actual and possible forms, particular and synthetic forms, and quite exclusively directs its gaze upon what belongs to consciousness in and for itself – then we are already in the *transcendental attitude*", (VII, 254). The word "synthetic" began with Kant as it concerns identifying ongoing learning about human and natural cognized being, the phenomena, the unified sense of objects in their contexts that appear, that are then given conceptual descriptors. Synthetic, in Kant's writing, refers to beliefs about real possible human and natural being that are assumed to represent accurately the truth of such evidence in the world. The transcendental attitude is theorising by considering the full spectrum of seeing across the actual variance of one type of object within the awareness of one sense-field as most basic: any object's meaning in the pretheoretical lifeworld exists with respect to its own type, and in contra-distinction to other types of object in its region (III, 16, 307, V, 23). Each sense-field has its own

type of intentionality, its own mode of being conscious-of what appears within it. What is seen by phenomenologists, in the full transcendental reduction, allegedly produces a neutral universal epoché: Others, cultural practices, objects and pure psychologists are understood as possibilities by disinterested nonparticipant onlookers who, allegedly, never add inappropriate sense to what they understand and then idealize (IX, 338, 345-9).

The difference between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology is defined as their perspectives being parallel to each other, but they involve two different ‘attitudes’, theoretical interests. Pure psychology requires an abstraction from the biopsychosocial whole of the real historical flow; whereas transcendental phenomenology focuses on this whole (Kern 1977). I come to a conclusion on the topic of epoché in Chapter 8. The difference between pure psychology and transcendental phenomenology exists in relation to the conditions of possibility for sense as a whole, because all-encompassing contexts condition what lies within their boundaries. As a technical term, ‘pure psychology’ is a partial approach only to qualitative experience. Transcendental phenomenology is wholistic and attends to the biopsychosocial whole. More broadly, ‘phenomenology’ is used as an umbrella term for approaches that attend to first and second person qualitative evidence.

Ultimately, Husserl preferred his transcendental phenomenology for providing a reborn transcendental philosophy as a meta-science, thus returning to Kant and surpassing him. This metaphysical meta-science of the implicit makes explicit what applies to oneself and others. Kern explains the relation between the philosophical study of sciences of the real world, the human and natural sciences, of which pure psychology is the study of the qualitatively human (Kern 2019a, 2019b). “From the years 1921/22 onwards, in Husserl’s phenomenological philosophy, the experience of **reality** of something **precedes** the presentation (Vorstellung) of its **conditions of possibility**, just as in ... Aristotle”, (Kern 2019a, 118).

Transcendental phenomenology is an all-encompassing study of sense. Pure psychology is an umbrella term for the grounding of concepts for empirical work in the human sciences in human reality. The unifying themes in Husserl’s published works are a philosophy of consciousness and theory of mind approach that was stated by him in *Cartesian Meditations* and *Crisis*. *Cartesian Meditations* identifies fundamental constant ideal places in intersubjectivity that exist in the family and across the entirety of sociocultural life. The main body of *Crisis* argues for the importance of communalization of common sense around specific types of objects – whereas its appendix, *The Origin of Geometry*, concerns the