The Human and Humanities in the Age of Globalization

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Edited by

Afis A. Oladosu, Ayobami Ojebode
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Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing

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This book first published 2024

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-0364-0788-9
ISBN (Ebook): 978-1-0364-0789-6

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NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Editors

Adeshina Afolayan teaches philosophy at the University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His areas of specialisation include philosophy of politics, African cultural studies, and African philosophy. He is the author of *Philosophy and National Development in Nigeria* (2018), and a co-editor of the *Palgrave Handbook of African Philosophy* (2017) and *Global Health, Humanity and the covid-19 Pandemic* (2023).

Afis A. Oladosu is a professor in the Department of Arabic and Islamic Studies, University of Ibadan. His scholarly expertise straddles cultural criticism, Islamic orthopraxis, Arab-Muslim modernities, and Christian-Muslim relations. Oladosu has won many international fellowships and scholarships, including the Fulbright scholarship.

Ayobami Ojebode is Professor of Applied Communication in the Department of Communication and Language Arts, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His research interests include community communication, governance, new media, and political communication. Two of his publications, *Doing Community Radio* (2009) and *Audience Research for Campus Radio Stations* (co-authored, 2010), have been adopted as training manuals in radio stations within and outside Nigeria.

Contributors

Oluwagbemiro **ADESINA** holds a doctorate in Literature-in-English from the Babcock University, Nigeria. His scholarly interests include media studies, postcolonial literature, and literary journalism. He is also an independent researcher and investigative journalist. He is the publisher of PrimeStar News online.

Amadi Enoch **AHIAMADU** is an Associate Professor in the Department of Religious and Cultural Studies, University of Port Harcourt. He is a Biblical scholar and exegete with research interests in biblical studies, biblical Hebrew and hermeneutics, eco-theology, and Bible translation. He is the

President of the South-South zone and a member of the National Board of Trustees, Nigerian Association for Biblical Studies (NABIS).

Akeem Adebayo **AKANNI** is an associate professor of Islamic Studies at the Department of Religious Studies, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria.

Muhammed **HARON** is a research associate at the University of Johannesburg. He has taught at the Universities of the Western Cape, Stellenbosch, Rhodes, and the National University of Malaysia. He has published on Southern African Muslim media, Christian-Muslim relations, Arabic-Afrikaans Literature, Arabic Grammar, Quranic studies, and South Africa-Malaysia Relations. Haron compiled two annotated bibliographies: South Africa's Muslims (Cape Town 1998) and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (New York 2009). He co-authored *First Steps and Second Steps in Arabic Grammar* (2007 & 2009) and edited a text on *South Africa-Malaysia Relations* (2008). He is also the Editor of a special issue of *Tydskrif vir Letterkunde* (2008) on Arabo-Islamic literature in Africa and *BOLESWA: Journal of Theology, Religion & Philosophy* on Southern Africa's Muslims (2012).

Emmanuel **KENNETH** is a doctoral student at the University of Ibadan, Ibadan, Oyo State.

Mahmood **MAMDANI** is the Herbert Lehman Professor of Government. He was also a professor and executive director of Makerere Institute of Social Research (2010-2022) in Kampala, where he established an interdisciplinary doctoral program in Social Studies. His latest work, *Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities*, Harvard, 2020, was shortlisted for the British Academy Book Prize for Global Cultural Understanding, 2021, and as "World History Finalist" by Association of American Publishers Awards for Professional and Scholarly Excellence (PROSE Awards).

Doris A. **NWOSU** teaches in the Department of Mass Communication at Gregory University, Nigeria. She holds doctorate from the Department of Mass Communication at Ebonyi State University, Nigeria. She is a member of the African Council for Communication Education (ACCE), Nigeria Chapter, a member of the Association of Media and Communication of Nigeria (AMCRON), and an Associate at the Nigerian Institute of Public Relations (NIPR).

Emmanuel **OFUASIA** received his PhD from Lagos State University in 2023. Before that he has been teaching philosophy at the Philosophy Department of National Open University of Nigeria (NOUN). His research areas span process ontology and philosophical logic, as well as African Philosophy of Religion and *Ifá* Studies. He is well published in several international journal outlets of repute like *Philosophia Africana*, *Journal for the Academic Study of Religion, Journal of Africana Religions, International Journal of African Renaissance Studies - Multi-, Inter- and Transdisciplinarity*, *Journal of World Philosophies*, *History and Philosophy of Logic*, *South African Journal of Philosophy, Nigerian Journal of Philosophy,* to name a few. In addition to publishing, Emmanuel Ofuasia is also a recipient of local and international grants from organizations and institutions such as: the English Language Support of the Global Philosophy of Religion Project led by Yujin Nagasawa and Culture and Animal Foundation (CAF).

Samuel Oluwatosin **OKANLAWON** is a Senior Lecturer in Christian Theology in the Department of Religious Studies, University of Ibadan, Nigeria. His research interests are in the theological interpretation of issues within socio-ecclesiological contexts. His intellectual concerns hover around how the various expressions of Christianity in Africa can serve as a source of resolving the myriads of problems in Africa rather than being the source of the problems. He has several publications to his credit. He is a resource person for the Women's Commission of the World Evangelical Alliance and the World Council of Churches. He is a Life Coach, theological consultant, and the Editor of the *Nigerian Journal of Christian Studies.*

Chrysogonus **OKWENNA** is a Philosophy graduate student and a Biagioni scholar at Simon Fraser University. He is more broadly interested in the intersection between African philosophy, ethics, epistemology, and the associated areas of philosophy of medicine and bioethics. He is particularly interested in an African perspective on ethical-epistemic issues in medicine, science, and society.

Emmanuel **OLABAYO** is a member of the Faculty of Humanities at Ajayi Crowther University, Oyo. He teaches undergraduate Theatre and Film courses in the Department of Performing Arts and Music.

Tunji **OLAOPA** is a Professor of Public Administration at Lead City University, Nigeria, a former permanent secretary, and the current chairman of the Federal Civil Service Commission in Nigeria. His areas of

specialisation include public administration and governance, and institutional reforms. He is the executive vice-chairman of the Ibadan School of Government and Public Policy, Ibadan, and a directing staff at the National Institute for Policy and Strategic Studies (NIPSS), Kuru, Jos.

Samuwilu Alade **OWOYEMI** is a senior lecturer in the Department of Religious Studies, Olabisi Onabanjo University, Ago-Iwoye, Nigeria.

Oluwaseun D. **SANWOOLU** is a PhD student of Philosophy at the University of Kansas, United States of America. Her research interests are in Ethics, Philosophy of Technology, Environmental Philosophy and Philosophy of Love. And more concisely, the Ethics of AI.

Aniefiok J. **UDOUDO** is a Professor in the Department of Journalism and Media Studies, Faculty of Communication and Media Studies, University of Port Harcourt, Rivers State, Nigeria. He has published widely in academic journals and contributed chapters to many edited books within and outside Nigeria. He is the author of *Book Publishing in Nigeria: An Introduction* and *The Dynamics of Newspaper Editing.* He is a member of many professional bodies and the founding Chairman of the Journalism Educators Foundation (JEF).

PREFACE

Sometime in 2019, the idea to organise the First Graduate Conference in the Humanities was born. Nowhere else could that have taken place other than the Faculty of Arts, University of Ibadan – the *primus inter pares* in humanistic studies in West Africa and one of Africa's leading academies for humanities. However, while thinking through that idea, the necessity to resuscitate the faculty's tradition of organising Biennial Conferences that usually draw the participation of scholars from across the world became urgent. Thus, it came to pass that the two conferences were scheduled to be held at different intervals in the year 2020. While the Graduate Conference was themed *Humanities in the Age of Globalization*, the Biennial Conference focused on *The Humanities and the Apocalypse*. Two world-renowned scholars, social scientists, and cultural critics, Professor Mahmood Mamdani and Professor Mohammed Haron, consented to present the keynotes to the conferences.

However, hardly anybody could have known that our choice of the "Humanities and the Apocalypse" as the theme of the Biennial Conference was indeed provisionary; that the idea of "the Apocalypse'' would not be chimeric nor unreal after all. This became evident with the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in the first quarter of the year 2020. This outbreak eventuated large-scale global socio-economic disruptions and fatalities that found comparison only in 1918. Our conferences had to be rescheduled for early 2021 when the world had started to experience some felicities and benedictions.

Therefore, this book is conceived in the womb of time to be a product of resilience and commitment to eternal human values taught and preserved by the humanities. It also mirrors humans' need to turn trials into triumphs and see threats as opportunities. It is designed to "memorialise" the interface between humanity and forces of globalisation, to function as a "griot" whose duty is to preserve our experiential genealogies and cosmogonies while keeping an eye on the future.

I should, therefore, be quick to express my deep appreciation to my colleagues at Ibadan who rose beyond the encumbrances and the limitations of the "Apocalypse" to organise the two conferences. I should not be remiss

in expressing our thankfulness to Professors Mahmood Mamdani and Mohammed Haron, who overcame the maze of uncertainties that nest in globalisation so that they may fulfil their obligations to scholarship and discharge their duties to the African continent. I take solace in the knowledge that colleagues who presented papers at the two conferences from which this volume derives credence know that our faculty is deeply thankful to them for benefiting the humanities with their wonderful perspectives.

Together, we shall do this again and again!

—Prof. Afis A. Oladosu
Dean of Arts (2019-2021)

INTRODUCTION: THE HUMAN AND THE HUMANITIES IN THE AGE OF TERROR

AFIS A. OLADOSU, AYOBAMI OJEBODE AND ADESHINA AFOLAYAN

The idea of the human and humanity is at the centre of the humanities. Humanities, that is, has to do with "The concept of man, of what is proper to man, of human rights, of crimes against the humanity of man" (Derrida 2001, 25). For Martha Nussbaum, the "spirit of the humanities" consists of "searching critical thought, daring imagination, empathetic understanding of human experiences of many different kinds, and understanding of the complexity of the world we live in" (2010, 7). In *Cultivating Humanity*, Nussbaum expanded on her perspective about the critical role of humanities in the formation of global citizenship. A broad-minded education, encompassed by the humanities, ought to produce citizens with broad and empathetic minds able to reflect on the nature of the multicultural and multinational world and its numerous and diverse problems. These problems

> require an intelligent, cooperative solution, a dialogue that brings together people from different national, cultural and religious backgrounds. Even those issues that seem closest to home, such as the family structure, the regulation of sexuality, and the future of children, need to be approached with a broad historical and cross-cultural understanding (Nussbaum 1997, 8).

Such a humanistic education is liberal because it facilitates the liberation of the minds of the citizens from "the bondage of habit and custom, producing people who can function with sensitivity and alertness as citizens of the whole world" (ibid.). This is what Seneca meant by the cultivation of humanity— "a higher education that is a cultivation of the whole human being for the functions of citizenship and life generally" (ibid, 9).

Unfortunately, the idea of the human at the core of the humanities is not undifferentiated. Indeed, Michael Bérubé argues thus:

> Nussbaum's untrammelled confidence in both the universality of reason and the diversity of human life makes hers a challenging and curious book. If her book is read as carefully and sympathetically as it was written, it might give humanism a good name again. *However, can it convince readers who do not understand "reason" as she does?* That is another question entirely (2006, 112. Emphasis added).

The idea of the human is subjected to multiple paradoxes and contradictions on a world scale. What it means to be human, that is, is differentiated along racial and regional lines, with differing connotations of the "humans", "sub-humans", and the "non-humans".

> The principal trouble with the grand construction of *the* Euro-modernity human is that it was founded on unhappy circumstances and for tragic purposes. *As* a performative idea, man created inequalities and hierarchies usable for the exclusion and oppression of the other. The status of the *human* was self-attributed to dominant people powerful enough to name themselves and define others. That which was categorised as non-human became things, reduced to resources, usable and disposable by the unapologetic *humans*. The attribute *human,* in other words, is not self-evident or assured. It can be wielded, given and taken away. The threat of its withdrawal from, or permanent denial to, weaker peoples in peripheralised spaces continues to define life within a climate of fear that makes being human a fragile condition and an uncertain reality (Mpofu and Steyn 2021, 1).

An entire level of discourse revolves around the frame of Euro-modernity, its bifurcated worldview, and the vehicle of its transmission through education and technology. From the First Industrial Revolution, racism and its Eurocentric template have been travelling through all possible channels. There is, for instance, a significant debate on how Western humanities have facilitated the unfolding and consolidation of Eurocentrism across the world. One cannot forget Ngugi wa Thiong'o's rebellion against the English Department at the University of Nairobi that perpetuated the myth of empire and European reason. Through the English department, there was a syllabus that ingrained the assumption that the "study of the *historic continuity of a single culture throughout the period of the emergence of the modern West,* [which] makes it an important companion to History and Philosophy and Religious Studies" (Ngugi 2003, 438, emphasis in original). This assumption presumes, according to Ngugi, that:

> The English tradition and the emergence of the modern West is the central root of our consciousness and cultural heritage. Africa became an extension of the West, an attitude which, until a radical reassessment, dictated the teaching and organisation of history in our University (ibid, 439).

Thus, with the humanities firmly entrenched within the mould of Eurocentrism and white reason, the Euro-American cultural hegemony was on its way throughout the world, borne solidly on the technological capacities of globalisation. What Toyin Falola calls the "forces and pressures of globalisation" carry the agenda of Western imperialism worldwide. There is thus the challenge to ensure that "globalisation and its knowledge and policies do not become the transitional narrative to imperialism" (Falola 2016, 58). Falola places the burden of this challenge at the feet of the humanities in Africa: "Global 'knowledge', as a narrative of western power and its expansion, provincialises Africa, turning the national concerns of one great power into the metanarrative of global affairs" (ibid, 59).

This is a herculean task for the humanities, not only in Africa but across the globe, given the omnipotent sovereignty of the neoliberal capitalist hegemony and the disciplinary capacity of modernity it wields. Capitalist disciplinarity is invested with the power over life itself. The idea of capitalist biopower is the ability to produce and reproduce life itself (Hardt and Negri 2000). With biopower, what Giorgio Agamben calls the state of exception—a situation where the government can kill its citizens without attracting the force of the law—becomes the normative form of governing. Thus, Foucault claims that the "Modern man is an animal whose politics places his existence as a living being in question" (1978, 143). It takes little reflection to grasp immediately how the technologies of capitalist biopower lead straight to the apocalypse, the type that the COVID-19 pandemic unleashed on the entire world. Thus, the acquisition of biopower has led capitalism to cross what Michel Foucault calls the "threshold of biological modernity" (ibid.). Moreover, for Lorenzini, the modern capitalist society "crossed such a threshold when the biological processes characterising the life of human beings as a species became a crucial issue for political decision-making, a new 'problem' to be addressed by governments—and this, not only in 'exceptional' circumstances (such as that of an epidemic) but in "normal" circumstances as well" (2020, 41).

The humanities, therefore, has the responsibility to stand against the agenda of biopower and biopolitics that has the possibility of unleashing the apocalypse on humanity. Thus, when the Faculty of Arts Biennial Conference was convened in 2021, its focus was drawn to the relationship between the global processes under the auspices of the neoliberal capitalist hegemony and the possibility of the apocalypse. The counterpart Graduate Conference was equally drawn to the discourse on the fate of the humanities in the age of globalisation. The participants at both conferences interrogated various aspects of the humanities and their prospects in a world dominated

by capitalist domination and disciplinarity. In a magisterial review, Mahmood Mamdani provides a panoramic unravelling of the ideas of humans and humanity in a world that became global around the idea of empire. In his chapter, Mamdani takes the opportunity afforded by his definitive book—*Neither Settler nor Native*—to dare a rethinking of "our world, not an area, but the world, from the vantage point of someone born and brought up in a former colony". Through the settler-native motif, Mamdani takes on the daunting task of exploring the notions of the human and humanity through a conceptual lens afforded by the ideas of the nation-state, modern colonialism, postcolonial modernity, and political identity. Even in the prelude to the emergence of political modernity in Europe and the post-colonies, humanism became "a fig leaf for the powerful", a human rights framework that was not applied with regard to Europe's old states, but that was enforced when it came to others (Mamdani 2020, 9).

In chapter two, Muhammed Haron focuses substantively on the humanities in the context of neoliberal developments. The chapter critically interrogates the efforts of academic bodies and organisations, from Euro-America to Africa, on the crisis of the humanities and how these bodies have attempted to intervene. It critiques, for instance, the African Union and its exclusion of the humanities in its vision of giving birth to the African Renaissance. The chapter commends the effort of a national organisation—the Human Sciences Research Council in South Africa for its proactive collaboration with a regional organisation like CODESRIA. Chrysogonous Okwenna, in chapter three, reconsiders the status of the humanities in a techno-scientific age that seems to have whittled away the relevance of humanistic education. For him, the humanities would probably survive this siege against its significance if it becomes innovative through what he calls a "pragma-constructive model" that facilitates a practical orientation around which the humanities can extend their interrogation of human cultures and experiences. Essentially, the pragma-constructive model implies complementing the theoretical and speculative frameworks of the humanities with the practical and innovative. Chapter four focuses on the relationship between religion and spirituality in understanding Nigeria's socio-political malaise. Amadi Ahiamadu argues that contrary to the assumption that spirituality and religious pieties produce moral excellence that could serve as the panacea for a society's dystopic tendencies, Nigeria's socio-political dilemma undermines the search for synthesis that could yield religious inclusiveness or socio-political harmony. Through the analysis of Jeremiah 30:1, Ahiamadu argues for a shift from religious pietism to what he calls theo-praxis that allows for a dialectic relationship between thesis and antithesis necessary for social transformation.

In chapter five, Damilola Sanwoolu deploys philosophy's conceptual capacity to interrogate the scourge of plastic pollution in the world. In humanising the environment, Sanwoolu contends that we must commence by asking critical questions, the type that the humanities, and especially philosophy, ask if we would ever hope to generate the plausible answers to understand and successfully battle climate change and plastic pollution. Chapter six, by Emmanuel Ofuasia, focuses on pre-colonial Africa's legacies of ethnomathematics and divination. He argues that it is only through the active promotion of the humanities in Africa that Africa's civilisational contribution, especially in these two areas, represented, for example, by the Ifá and Bamana divinatory systems, can be appropriately situated to counter the epistemicide against indigenous knowledge in Africa. In chapter seven, Doris Nwosu and Aniefiok Udoudo further the thread of the apocalypse by investigating Nigerian media reportage of suicide as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. They argue that, contrary to the World Health Organisation's guidelines on the reportage of suicides, the Nigerian traditional media and online blogs failed to comply in ways that accentuate their social responsibility. A proper reportage of suicide, according to the authors, could de-escalate its rising incidence.

Emmanuel Kenneth returns the focus of the volume to the relevance of the humanities in chapter eight. Unlike Okwenna, Kenneth argues for the traditional relevance of the humanities as the safeguard against a world that is going out of joint with the fast-paced developments in science and technology. Thus, according to him, while science, technology, and the global economy cannot be discountenanced, the humanities cannot be undermined. Tunji Olaopa, in chapter nine, situates the relevance of the humanities and the social sciences within the Nigerian state's attempt to come to terms with her development project. Thus, he furthers the focus on the relevance of the humanities within higher education by advancing the argument that without the humanities, the Nigerian state will ultimately fall short of her concern with the well-being of her citizens. In "Religion, the Humanities and National Development in Nigeria", Samuwilu Owoyemi and Akeem Akanni, in chapter ten, explore the significance of religion in founding a society that promotes a robust understanding of national development. Chapter eleven situates the church between the utopic and the eutopic regarding worship and membership. For Samuel Okanlawon, the argument is that the COVID-19 pandemic has made it imperative that its theology must radically consider a shift from the desirable (utopia) to the necessary (eutopia) due to the radical transformation of ecclesiastical contexts. The pandemic of the coronavirus constitutes the focus of the last chapter. Emmanuel Olabayo deploys the pandemic to interrogate the

possible responses and adaptations that theatrical performance can deploy in the face of the new media and their popularity, given the reinvention of space and time imposed by the pandemic.

In all, this volume promises various reflections on the state and dynamics involved in the humanistic understanding of the human world and its different frames of meaning. The volume is an invitation to consider how humanistic thinking and investigations can enable discursive possibilities to stem the tide of the apocalypse, either in the form of a rampaging globalisation or a dystopic pandemic.

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CHAPTER ONE

NEITHER SETTLER NOR NATIVE: THE CRITICAL TRAJECTORIES OF SOVEREIGN AND NON-SOVEREIGN CITIZENSHIP

MAHMOOD MAMDANI

We have come through an age of positivism when the natural sciences reigned supreme and set the tone for other forms of knowledge. Throughout this era, the social sciences suffered from natural science envy. Some, like the study of politics, claimed to be a science, as is the case with political science. Some others, like economics, gave up on language as inexact and full of too many nuances; as much as they could, economists expressed themselves in mathematical figures using stylised equations. In this brave new world, the humanities came to occupy the bottom rung of the ladder. Known as the arts or the liberal arts, the humanities were said to be about feelings, not facts.

Modernist hubris soon faced a critical wave, which has come to be known as post-modernism. It began by challenging the modernist claim that time was linear, that the flow of time represented the march of progress, and that we were assuredly moving to a brave new world. It spoke in the name of the victims of this line of march, those excluded, those left in the margins, those trampled under the feet of soldiers marching in the army of progress – working people, working women, people of colour. The postmodernists moved the focus from facts to their interpretation, from truth to its representation.

Post-modernism arose in the heart of the empire. It went with numerous other posts, some on the margins of the empire. Riding on a wave of doubts, agnosticism of many sorts, each a ripple, together they made for a wave of self-doubt in the heart of the empire. Let us recall that time in human history. This time followed the two world wars and several great revolutions, the Russian, the Chinese, the Vietnamese, and the Cuban. It was also the time

of the end of the Cold War, when the American establishment celebrated a march of victory, what they called "the American century". With America triumphant in the Cold War, Bush Senior proclaimed the dawning of the age of globalisation.

In retrospect, we know that rather than a clear-sighted view of the horizon, this was more like the proverbial turning point. Few could see what lay around the corner. The postmodernists were among the doubters. Rather than just the hour of the triumph of the West, for that it was, it was also the hour of the beginning of its demise. It was a historical moment when the proverbial child could see that the world that had come into being in 1492 was coming to a close.

The half millennium since 1492 represents an era during which Western powers reshaped the contours of the world; its cartographers drew boundaries and named each part of the world. They created a knowledge system in which the West represented the engine and the head and heart of this world; the rest of the world became the domain of "area studies", each area a latecomer onto the world stage, each understood as a pale shadow; its challenge was to catch up, but its fate was, just like that of a shadow, never to catch up. However, should it, as at high noon, it would cease to be, just like the shadow.

This is the legacy we renounced when we set up a doctoral program at MISR a decade ago, in 2012. We renounced the tradition of "area studies". We refused to limit knowledge to one area, even if that area is "Africa". We said we would study the world but with one caveat. The world, we said, can be studied from different vantage points, both spatially and temporally.

Moreover, from each vantage point, the world and the experience that led to the making of this world must look and feel different. There could be no single universal understanding of the world. We said we would study the world from an African vantage point.

I am proud to have been part of this journey, which has been a collective one. Today, I want to share with you the outlines of one fruit of this journey. That fruit is in the form of a book. Titled *Neither Settler nor Native: The Making and Unmaking of Permanent Minorities*, this book dares to rethink our world, not an area, but the world, from the vantage point of someone born and brought up in a former colony. *Neither Settler nor Native* is about the nation-state and post-colonial modernity. The introduction opens with a history of the two phases of a nation-state, non-liberal and liberal. The

nation-state was born in Iberia in 1492. Its agenda was summed up by a single slogan: 'one country, one people, one religion'. This project set fire to relations between the majority and minorities within the boundaries of the state, setting in motion processes of ethnic cleansing, specifically of Jews and Muslims. This was followed by a century of religious wars in Europe. I identify this as the first, the non-liberal phase, in the making of the nation-state.

The liberal solution to religious wars was the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648. Two critical components of the modern state were born in Westphalia: religious toleration at home and the reciprocal guarantee of sovereignty abroad. John Locke theorised the liberal solution in his treatise on tolerance, published in 1689: Catholics can be tolerated if they renounce any political support of the Pope or any power outside England. This is how Locke formulated the key tenet of the liberal theory of the nation-state: The liberal notion of the nation-state turned majority and minority into permanent political identities. Only the majority has sovereignty; the minority must not participate in sovereignty. The notion of a sovereign majority alongside non-sovereign minorities was the original sin of liberal political theory.

In *Neither Settler nor Native*, I explore exporting the notion of different kinds of citizens, sovereign and non-sovereign, from the U.S. to South Africa and Nazi Germany, and finally to Israel. At the same time, the book explores the construction of an epistemological project that grounded the political distinction between sovereign and non-sovereign subjects in a legal distinction. Beginning with religious groups, this distinction was extended to a civilisational difference between races and tribes. I explore this development in some detail in the chapter on Sudan. *Neither Settler nor Native* is a book about the United States as a founding experience in modern colonialism. The *first* chapter explores the Indian reservation as the site where core institutions of modern colonialism were forged. It is also a book about extreme violence as a consequence of modern nation-state building in the post-colonies. Should we think of extreme violence as the consequence of a criminal project executed by individuals, no matter how numerous, along the lines of the criminal model popularised by Nuremberg and today upheld by the ICC? Or should we consider it a political project, a notion born of the transition from apartheid in South Africa? What can we learn from the failure of denazification and the relative success of post-apartheid South Africa? Finally, the book asks: what is transportable in the South African experience? What does South Africa have to teach us? To answer this question, the last chapter takes a fresh look, a look through South

African lenses, at Israel/Palestine, likely the most intractable political problem in today's world.

In this chapter, I would like to comment on four issues. First, by taking the U.S. as a case, I will compare the colonial conquest of Indians and the racial domination of Africans to distinguish between colonial conquest and racial domination as two different ways of subjugation, each with a radically different consequence. Second, I ask: what is the difference between an immigrant and a settler? Third, I suggest we think of two different ways of thinking of political identity: as political and changing as opposed to natural and unchanging. To historicise identity is to see it as born of a particular form of the state and, therefore, as changeable. However, to see it as the ground for a natural and permanent claim is to think of identity as a timeless expression of a trans-historical and innate cultural self. Finally, we should decouple the nation and the state as we seek an alternative to the nation-state. I shall begin with American Indians and African Americans.

Colonial Conquest and Racial Domination

American Indians and African Americans

What should we call the pre-Columbian resident communities of the Americas? As Indian or as native? What is in a name? Indian is the name Columbus gave the peoples of the New World. Today, we consider *native* a more politically correct designation, yet neither the U.S. government nor the people they colonised accept it. The Museum in Washington D.C. dedicated to pre-Colombian civilisations in the Americas is called the Museum of the American Indian. What difference would it make if we were to call it the Museum of the Native Americans? Why did the 1964 Civil Rights Act not apply to Indians in reservations so that a separate Indian Civil Rights Act had to be passed in 1968? The two acts are different: the 1964 Act is constitutionally binding, whereas the 1968 Indian Act is not; it is only advisory. Reservation Indians are not and never have been rights-bearing citizens of the United States in a constitutional sense.

There were no reservations before the United States; the reservation was a creation of the United States. Though the reservation is geographically within the territory of the United States, it is a polity separate from the United States. The Europeans who came to America were not immigrants; they were settlers. What is the difference? Whether they seek equality or advantage, immigrants come to join existing polities. Settlers come to displace existing polities and establish their exclusive sovereignty. Indian

reservations are not part of the sovereign state we call the United States. In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall in the mid-19th century, reservations are "domestic dependent colonies". The term "Indian Tribal Sovereignty" – another politically correct phrase – masks this reality of colonial domination. Legally, reservation Indians are wards of Congress. Reservation authorities are overseen by a vast federal bureaucracy called the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The BIA is no different from the colonial bureaucracy that governed any indirect rule colony in Africa.

The Indian reservation was part of a two-state solution. The two-state solution – a sovereign state alongside a non-sovereign protectorate – was Lincoln's contribution in the second half of the 19th century: it claimed to provide a permanent solution for Indians who had survived the genocide. Germany also embraced a two-state solution after Nuremberg. Instead of reintegrating Jews as equal citizens in a single state – as part of a one-state solution – post-Holocaust Germany embraced the idea of a separate state for Jews. As a result, even if the Nazi project was defeated militarily, it survived politically. The two-state solution gave the Nazi project a longer political lease. The latest version of the two-state solution is in Israel/Palestine. In contrast to South Africa, where the population was subordinated, the majority of the population in Israel was expelled outside its boundaries, as it had happened in the U.S. when Indians were herded into reservations.

America also originated the notion of differentiated citizenship, with only some participating in sovereignty. Until 1921, Indians were nationals but not citizens. After that, Indians were first purged as members of Indian polities before being naturalised as U.S. citizens. Colonised Indians and enslaved Africans represent two different colonial solutions. Both were turned into minorities, one inside the state, the other outside it. One was sustained by colonial conquest, the other by racial domination. The consequences have been radically different. Racial and colonial domination is not the same, even if racial discrimination is common to both. Reservation Indians have a different relationship to the U.S. than African Americans. Colonisation refers to the conquest of territory. The American Indian symbolised land which has been stolen; the enslaved Africans embodied captive and coerced labour.

The one-state solution provided a political frame for the development of the struggle against Jim Crow and racial domination. Even if it proceeded by fits and starts, even receding at times, the one-state framework underlined the necessity of developing alliances and made it possible. The two-state solution explains the continued isolation of the reservation Indians through

colonisation and their ongoing fragmentation as a people. The radical difference in the political effect of each solution is clear from the American case: the one-state solution has provided a political context for *alliance-building* in a general emancipatory struggle; in contrast, a two-state solution has imposed isolation on an oppressed group by imposing on it a separate political home, a protectorate, and compounded that isolation with ongoing fragmentation in multiple reservations. I conclude that a one-state solution is politically preferable to a two-state solution. The American model was exported to a number of places, among these South Africa, Germany, and Israel.

The Colonial Solution: South Africa and North America

South African settlers attained state independence in 1910. A delegation visited North America, the USA, and Canada two years later to study how Indians were governed. Three key elements of governance were imported to South Africa: homeland, traditional authority, and customary law. The starting fiction was that every tribe has lived in a territorially contained *homeland* from time immemorial. In reality, the fiction of a homeland masked a program to expel each tribe from the bulk of its historical lands. Second, every homeland was said to have been administered by a *traditional authority,* also said to be from time immemorial; eternally sanctioned by custom, this authority was said to be customary, not elected. Third, this traditional authority claimed the right to enforce *customary* law in the homeland. Custom, too, was said to have been there from time immemorial. This time, though, settlers insisted that custom be excised of all practices or notions that settlers considered repugnant to civilisation. After discussing Germany and Israel, I will return to discussing the lessons of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa.

Germany and the Racial Solution

South Africa was not the only one that learnt from the U.S. So did Nazi Germany and Hitler. Hitler drew two lessons from the U.S. The first was that genocide is doable and, therefore, thinkable. The second was that it was possible to create second and third-class citizenship as that of African Americans, Indian citizens after 1921, and later Puerto Ricans in the U.S. Hitler appointed a committee of lawyers to study American citizenship laws. This background preparation led to the drafting of Nuremberg laws. James Q. Whitman of Yale University has documented the learning process in his book, *Hitler's American Model*.

I argued that post-war denazification failed because the Allies shut their eyes to the political project that inspired and propelled Nazism. Nazism was a striving for a purified nation-state that would go beyond distinguishing the national majority from national minorities to purifying the nation by expunging all minorities. After the Second World War, there was an American debate on Nazism: was Germany liberated or occupied? Was Nazism a state project or a social project? Who should be held responsible for Nazism: the nation or the state, Nazi leaders or the German people? The American consensus was that the responsibility for Nazism lay with the German people. At Nuremberg and after, millions were considered criminally culpable – though each individually – yet Nazism was never probed as a political project.

A similar debate unfolded inside Germany, particularly among German left intellectuals – the most prominent being Franz Neumann and Herbert Marcuse. Neumann wrote *Behemoth*, a book that dissected national socialism. His answer: Nazism was neither a state project nor a project of German society. Nazism was, rather, a nation-state project – a project of both the Nazi state and the nation (the *Volk*) to eradicate the presence of national minorities, Jews, Roma, and others, from state territory. From this point of view, Nazism was, above all, a political project. Denazification would thus require an alliance of all anti-Nazi forces, external and internal, the Allies and those sections of German society that had resisted Nazism. However, Americans were unwilling to do so. Only the Soviets were willing, in the east, but only temporarily, and not after the Berlin uprising.

Extreme Violence: criminal or political

I argue that Nuremberg failed to root out Nazism politically. To understand why, I distinguish the criminal model, which understands violence as the result of anti-social acts of individual perpetrators, from the political model, which sees extreme violence as the result of group mobilisation around a collective nation-state project. Rather than individualise the violence as a stand-alone act, I point to cycles of violence sustained by groups mobilised as so many constituencies. Rather than catalogue atrocities so as to name, shame, and punish individual perpetrators, I seek to identify the issues around which constituencies were mobilised. More importantly, rather than exclude perpetrators from the political process, I seek to include them along with all those who survived – victims, perpetrators, beneficiaries, and bystanders. I use the term ‘survivor’ differently from how it was used after the Holocaust or after the Rwandan genocide, not just to refer to surviving victims of extreme violence but to all who survived the catastrophe we know

as extreme violence. The point is to try and stop the cycle of violence by shifting attention from perpetrators to the issues that drive the violence.

Let me return to the nation-state project and its development from a non-liberal to a liberal project. As I have already suggested, political liberalism unfolded as part of a counter-insurgency project in Europe after Westphalia and the colonies. *Neither Settler nor Native* pursues this line of inquiry as part of a detailed case study of race and tribe-making in Sudan after its colonisation by Britain.

The Epistemology and Politics of Race and Tribe: Sudan

The late 19th-century Mahdiyya in Sudan was one of the three events that shook the foundations of the British empire between the middle and end of the 19th centuries. The others were the Indian Uprising of 1857 and the Morant Bay rebellion in the West Indies a decade later. The subsequent imperial reform was led by Henry Maine, a member of the Viceroy's Legal Commission in India, who argued that the Indian Uprising was the result of an "epistemic defect". Maine called for an epistemic rethink that would both anchor the colonial project in a reshaped custom and fracture the colonised into smaller groups, each claiming a longer and, thus, authentic history. I examine this project in the context of Britain's reformed governance as it unfolded in two steps following the imperial defeat of the Mahdiyya. The first step divided the population into two major blocks, each identified as a separate "race", one "Arab" and the other "African". In Sudan, the language of race begins with colonialism. The second step was to divide each "race" into several "tribes". Even if a tribe may previously have designated a distinct cultural group, an ethnic group in the language of anthropologists, it now became the basis of several connected claims: a separate homeland, a traditional authority enforcing its customary law.

The Sudanese anti-colonial movement embraced these claims as if they were natural. The anti-colonial movement must be understood as more of a derivative than a creative act. From the start, the anti-colonial movement presented itself as a national movement. Embracing the language of 'nation', anti-colonialists described their struggle as "nationalist", their object being to set up their nation through an act of national self-determination. The question thus arose: who was the nation, the self in self-determination? Was the nation Arab, Islamic, or African? These three definitions of the nation sum up the three phases in the nationalist movement that followed state independence in 1954.

The person who came closest to breaking through the nationalist mythology was John Garang, who argued that Sudan was both Arab and African – that Arabic was a language and Africa a place. You could thus be both Arab and African. He called for a New Sudan, a state that would acknowledge 'Arabs' and 'Africans' as among its citizens. Garang's political project seemed to die with Garang when he was murdered. Those who replaced him in the SPLA called for the division of Sudan into two homelands: one for Arabs, the other for Africans. Backed up by a coalition of Western states led by the Troika (the U.S., Britain, and Norway), the project gave birth to an independent South Sudan, which in no time disintegrated as different tribal militias fought over the spoils, which included cabinet positions, ministries, even districts, each claiming the right to its tribal homeland in a South Sudan that should rightfully be a federation of tribes. In less than two years, the tribal coalition fell apart, and a tribal war followed in 2013.

Faced with this unanticipated catastrophe in the short aftermath of much-celebrated independence, the African Union set up an independent 5-person Commission of Inquiry. The Commission produced two reports. The majority report reproduced the logic of Nuremberg and cosied up to the ICC – it denounced the violence as criminal and demanded that individuals be held responsible for it. As always with the discourse of criminal justice, the assumption was that the state cannot commit a crime; only individuals in the state can. I authored the minority report and suggested we think of the violence as political, and thus look for a solution by calling for the reform of the state based on a project other than that of creating a nation-state.

Settlers and Immigrants: Israel and the U.S.

Are Jewish people in Israel settlers or immigrants? The Jewish population of Mandate Palestine belonged to three groups. First were those who had never left – they were among the natives of Palestine. Second were those who returned to the Holy Land on a pilgrimage seeking a religious homeland. They were content to be part of the existing polity. This group was known as the first Aliyah. They were immigrants. They then followed those in the second and the third Aliyahs. They looked to create their exclusive polity, a Jewish nation-state, in place of the existing polity. These are the settlers.

The Zionists drew a lesson from Germany. Victims of the nation-state project in Germany and Europe, Zionists decided to set up a nation-state in Eretz Israel. The Zionist state project unfolded in two phases. The first reduced Palestinians from a majority to a minority. This catastrophic

expulsion is known as the *Naqba*. The Zionist's project has continued to demonize the minority that remained within its territorial boundaries as a demographic threat whose numbers must be cut down; in other words, the *Naqba* continues. Palestinians inside Israel do not participate in sovereignty. They have rights, even political rights, including the right to vote, but they do not participate in power. This vision has become more apparent as the state project has been redefined, from Israel as a Jewish and Democratic state to Israel as a Jewish state.

In this context, Palestinians face two options: a one-state solution where they would face racial exclusion, including political marginalization, but within the same state; in contrast, the two-state solution would create a protectorate and lead to indirect colonialism under Zionist rule. *Neither Settler nor Native* argues that a one-state solution will provide a better framework for building alliances for durable resistance. Second, I argue that resistance is not enough. One also needs a vision of a different future. I propose that we look at the South African transition from apartheid for a glimpse of a third alternative.

South Africa – A Third Alternative

A different vision emerged in South Africa in the 1970s. Before the 1970s, anti-apartheid politics was largely derivative; by uncritically embracing the architecture of apartheid, the resistance reproduced it. Each racial group was organized separately as defined by apartheid power – Africans as ANC, Indians as Indian Congress of Natal, Coloureds as Coloured People's Congress, and whites as Congress of Democrats. Apartheid's ideological hold was not broken until the 1970s. The key initiative came from the student movement, white *and* black. The starting point was after Black students under Biko left the liberal white student organization, formed their own separate body, and went on to organize township dwellers, starting with Soweto. Radical White students left in the wilderness turned to organizing hostel workers on the fringes of these same townships.

The turning point in anti-apartheid politics was not the armed struggle but the strikes that began in Durban in 1973 and the uprising in Soweto in 1976. The Soweto uprising unfolded under the banner of Black Consciousness. Biko said, "Black is not a colour; if you are oppressed, you are black". The important thing is to recognize that there was nothing inevitable about the impact of BC on the anti-apartheid struggle. BC could have led to a nation-state consciousness – claiming that South Africa is a black nation of the black majority, thus essentializing black as a trans-historical identity.

Instead, it led to an epistemological awakening – the consciousness of black as a historical political Identity.

Afrikaaners journeyed from being junior partners of British colonialism to being part of the anti-apartheid coalition. Even here, there was no consensus. The rift inside the Afrikaaner community was demonstrated by the publication of a book titled *My Traitor's Heart* by Rian Malan, the great-grandson of a Boer state president. Malan was a crime reporter for the *Jo'berg Star*. His beat covered black townships. Each chapter of his book focused on a specific type of what was then called black-on-black violence. One chapter was devoted to The Hammer Man, a big black man who wielded a heavy hammer to smash the skull of his victims, all equally black, but poor people who would yield small pittances. Malan's subtext was not difficult to decipher: if they can do this to their own, what will they do to us if given half a chance?

The South African moment was born in the 70s and 80s. This birth was marked by a three-fold shift in vision. (a) From opposition to apartheid, they looked for an alternative to apartheid; rather than being content with turning the world upside down, they dared to think of a different world; (b) From a state of the majority – the national majority, the black majority – the resistance began looking to create a state of all the people; and (c) From opposition to whites, the resistance went on to oppose white power. I suggest we think of 1994 as marking the birth of a new political community. The alternative would have been to rupture the existing community into two separate ones, as in Sudan, one for victims, the other for perpetrators, one for blacks, and the other for whites, requiring a partition of South Africa as of South Sudan. Let us not forget that, in 1994, Afrikaaners were divided about the future, with a minority asking for a homeland where Afrikaaners would have their state. The anti-apartheid movement chose a different future, a common future for survivors of apartheid, whom they often described as a 'rainbow', not just victims who survived, but *all* who survived, whether victims, perpetrators, beneficiaries, or bystanders.

The principal critique of 1994 is that there was no social justice. This critique both states a truism and misses the significance of the political rebirth that was 1994. I argue that we should see rebirth as the beginning of political decolonization. The turning point was the reformulation of the central demand from Black majority rule to non-racial rule. Rather than deny the existence of race as a phenotypical difference, they refused to endow racial difference with a political significance. The first step to decolonizing the political was deracialisation. The next step would be

detribalization. Rather than deny the cultural significance of a tribe as an ethnic group, detribalization would decouple the link forged under colonialism between culture and territory, ethnicity, and homeland. To do so would reverse the process whereby colonialism and apartheid politicized culture through the creation of homelands, where a homeland authority would enforce a customary law. The result would be single citizenship, not multiple citizenships based on separate identifications, race in the central state, and tribe in the homelands. 1994 created formal political equality in South Africa regardless of race, but it has yet to create formal political equality in the former Homelands regardless of ethnic identity.

My claim is that a successful struggle for social justice must cut across the political divide imposed by race and tribe. Without political equality, the mobilization for social justice will be fragmented into many races and tribes. It will more likely lead to an internal civil war. The result will stink, like the 1994 genocide in Rwanda or its mini version, the ongoing xenophobic violence in South Africa.

Israel/Palestine

At the core of political Zionism is a political project to build not just a Jewish religious community in the Holy Land but also a Jewish *state*. Political Zionism seeks to erase the distinction between state and society. The conflation of society with the state is the foundation of the nation-state and its program of rule by a permanent national majority. The nation-state may call itself a democracy, as Israel does, but this majority is not determined through political contestation. Rather, the majority is defined pre-politically, as in the nation. The most the majority can hope for is a democracy for the majority but not for all. But even majoritarian democracy remains a difficult project in Israel because the state defines who can be a member of that majority, in other words, who is officially recognized as a Jew.

If Israel is to be a state for Jews only, it must answer the question of who is a Jew. Its answer cannot avoid flattening the diversity of world Jewry into the Jewry sanctioned by the state. At the legal level, this question has bedevilled Israeli authorities since the Law of Return was passed in 1950. Is a Jew defined by religion or by ethnicity? Or both? The state of Israel now has two legal definitions of who is a Jew: the *narrow* definition provided by *halacha* law, which Israel enforces in the sphere of personal affairs, and the *broad* definition in the amended *Law of Return*. At the political and social level, Judaization eliminates unacceptable forms of Jewishness. The acceptable form is associated with Ashkenazim, European