Reframing the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy

Reframing the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy:

Scripting the Role of the European Army

By

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In a context where war doctrines are unfortunately still useful in making credible deterrence of potential adversaries, and where states such as the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are openly threatening the United States of America, or the Russian Federation is conducting real war theatres in Ukraine, on the eastern border of the European Union, the latter is facing relatively limited results in terms of progress of the Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP). Established since 1999, with the aim of strengthening the European Union's military capabilities through concrete actions of cooperation and strategic integration, its progress after more than two decades still seems limited and lacks the capacity of regional military autonomy. Despite the recent defense initiatives such as PESCO, CARD, EDF or the Strategic Compass – classified as a whole new level of ambition for the European Union in assuming its defense responsibilities, the ultimate goal of CSDP still remains uncertain. In this respect, the paper aims to clarify the extent to which cultural barriers, political interests and the tendency toward individual state sovereignty will still continue to fuel the dependence on the United States in military defense matters, as well as the desirability or even the necessity for the European Union to build up its own army.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CARD – Coordinated Annual Review on Defense
CDP – Capability Development Plan
CSDP – Common Security and Defense Policy
CFSP – Common Foreign and Security Policy
DG E VIII – Directorate-General for the External Relations
ECAP – European Capabilities Action Plan
EDA – European Defense Agency
EDAP – European Defense Action Plan
EDF – European Defense Fund
EDIDP – European Defense Industrial Development Programme
EEAS – European External Action Service
EI2 – European Intervention Initiative
EPF – European Peace Facility
ESDC – European Security & Defense College
ESDP – European Security and Defense Policy
ESA – European Space Agency
ESS – European Security Strategy
EU – European Union
EUGS – EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy
EUMC – European Union Military Committee
EUMS – European Union Military Staff
Europol – European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation
FPI – Service for Foreign Policy Instruments
HHG – Helsinki Headline Goal
MApN – Ministry of National Defense of Romania
MARSUR – Maritime Surveillance
MENA – Middle East and North Africa
MPCC – Military Planning and Conduct Capability
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NB8 – Nordic-Baltic Eight
NDPP – NATO Defense Planning Process
NPT – Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
OSCE – Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PADR – Preparatory Action on Defense Research
PESCO – Permanent Structured Cooperation

PSC – Political and Security Committee
SDIP – Security and Defense Implementation Plan
TEU – Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union
UN – United Nations
USA – United States of America
USSR – Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

1. Introduction

1.1. Geopolitical Context

In the alarming context of a world in which economic tensions between states continue to grow due to increasingly limited natural resources, racial and ethnic differences fail to disappear, radical movements are increasingly felt on all continents, and states are investing colossal sums of money in military industry research – arming themselves not only with conventional defense technology but also with nuclear attack technology – a viable strategy that truly guarantees global peace is imperative. Both history and recent events have shown that when it comes to such situations, humanity is somewhat powerless (either for cultural reasons, or for political or geostrategic interests), or even incapable of prompt mobilization and rapid and effective intervention. But history also shows that regional and global associations or alliances have had the power at key moments to change the course of events in a positive direction, and organizations such as the United Nations (UN)[1], the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)[2], or the European Union (EU)[3] are extremely relevant in this regard. Although they initially worked at a low level, they've developed over time on several sides and departments, in order to respond to the direct needs of a constantly changing society, succeeding in initiating, executing, and contributing to actions in different fields such as human rights, environmental security, peace and security worldwide, or the free movement of citizens and goods.

Though the European Union initially began as an organization designed to ensure a fair distribution of steel and coal resources in order to prevent a new continental conflict, it eventually got to gradually cover the economic, politic, and social matters of the Union, by constantly enlarging its Member States and managing in this way to represent a global solid example of

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[1] *Online source*, United Nations / History,
https://www.un.org/en/about-un/, accessed on 31.05.2020.
[2] *Online source*, NATO / What is NATO?,
https://www.nato.int/nato-welcome/index.html, accessed on 31.05.2020.
[3] *Online source*, European Union / About EU,
https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/eu-in-brief_ro, accessed on 31.05.2020.

Figure 1.1: Europe nowadays.

democratic unity, becoming even one of the most powerful legislative frameworks worldwide. But despite its many achievements, defense progress has been extremely slow compared to other areas, and these concerns have always been largely left to NATO, considered appropriate and sufficient for this type of mission. Nevertheless, in the context in which not all of the Member States of the European Union were also part of the North Atlantic Alliance, the conflicts in the Balkans (1992-1999)[4] brought again to the fore the need for the European Union to have an autonomous military capability, without having to rely on NATO assistance. Even so, when this need was addressed as a matter of utmost importance, the efforts of the consultations unfortunately only resulted (initially) in the establishment of defense agencies or combat groups designed to be able to rapidly deploy a limited number of military personnel.

In this regard, the research comes therefore not only with the tendency to analyze the current stages of consultations or the reasons that have blocked over time the course of such common defense policies within the European Union – issues that would have inevitably been explored during the thesis – but rather aspires to the possibility of testing the feasibility of an even more advanced solution than that, namely, the creation of an Army of the European Union. The paper is therefore meant to test the sustainability of such an approach not only from an administrative, logistical, or financial point of view, but also from an international and diplomatic one, and also questions how the existence of such an entity would influence the current foreign policy of the European Union. Therewith, analyzing how and to what extent such a military alliance would be in line with the policies of organizations such as the UN or NATO, or with medium and long-term visions of societies and economies that are ideally subjected to globalization and not regionalization, is a topic of major importance in a current context apparently lacking (until recently) a viable solution in this regard.

In order to delimit the perspective of the research and to position it as clearly as possible within the spectrum of the main theories of international relations – such as Realism, Neorealism, Idealism, Liberalism, Neoliberalism, Marxism, Constructivism, or Feminism – the paper proposes to present it only through the lens of liberalism, a theory that favors institutionalization and integration processes. Also called "complex interdependence" or "liberal internationalism", the theory of liberalism is based on the belief that the current international system is much more capable of generating a

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[4] Branka Magaš și Ivo Žanić, *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina 1991–1995,* Abingdon, Frank Cass Publishers, 2001.

peaceful world order than relying on direct force (such as military action), with an emphasis on international cooperation as a means of promoting the interests of individual nations. Liberals believe that the totality of the negative consequences of force, such as economic and human losses, far outweigh its potential benefits, given that in today's increasingly globalized society, the use of economic tactics (such as multilateral trade agreements and international diplomacy) can be far more effective in advancing political interests than the threat of force – but unfortunately, not always enough. Promoting clearly established values and international institutions that regulate this order. Liberalism points out that the broad ties between states have made it difficult to define national interest and have diminished the usefulness of military power, while globalization, the rapid growth of communications technology, and the intensification of international trade have meant that states can no longer rely on simple power politics to decide issues, and therefore, international cooperation in as many areas remains a primary interest where possible.[5]

1.2. Thesis Content

Initiated with the aim of making a scientific contribution to the Common Defense and Security Policy of the European Union, the work is structured in five large sections, which include an introductory part, two theoretical parts, a practical part, and the final section allocated to conclusions. The introductory part begins with methodological notions, which establish the directions and objectives of the research, and presents its fundamentals such as the motivation and interrogations of the research, the limits, the expected results, as well as the possible risks associated with the selected topic, and is continued by two theoretical chapters.

The first theoretical chapter is intended to provide an overall perspective on European security and defense, using not only direct historical landmarks on the evolution of CSDP consultations and various notable EU successes in this respect, but at the same time, adjacent notions with an indirect impact on it, such as the influence of political decisions on climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, or theoretical parameters and limits of cooperation, interdependence, and institutional integration.

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[5] *Online source*, Norwich University Online / Academic Programs / Resources / Key Theories of International Relations, https://online.norwich.edu/academic-programs/ resources/key-theories-of-international-relations, accessed on 08.06.2022.

The second theoretical chapter proposes a more specific and up-to-date approach toward all the notions with a relevant meaning for the research, institutional bodies, or military formations related to the security and defense of the European Union, with the aim of completing as objective as possible the theoretical foundation of the selected theme. The section promises through its six sub-chapters, to cover areas such as the sovereignty of the European Union, its foreign policy, European military cooperation structures, economic and monetary policy aspects of the CSDP, commitments and public statements of European leaders, or official forecasts of Europe's future in terms of security and defense.

The third chapter represents the practical part of the work, which, using the survey method as a research technique, has the following objectives: 1) the direct collection of opinions with a high degree of expertise from the academic and institutional environment, as well as 2) the collection of general perceptions felt among the population regarding the selected topic, as will be detailed in the methodology section below.

As for the final part of the paper, namely, the one allocated to the conclusions, it is intended to acquire, with the support of the theoretical and practical content, the ability to respond in the most punctual, objective, and closest way to the likely future reality, to the questions of the present research.

1.3. Research Questions

Beyond the multitude of secondary perspectives arising from the analysis of the literature used as a foundation for this research, the main objective of it remains to outline certain representative ideas aimed at clarifying the impact of the creation of a European Union Army, in spheres such as political, economic and social, but only in the context of a medium and long-term vision of it. In this respect, the paper has set out to answer three core questions, which aim not only to test the sustainability of such an imposing common defense approach but also to highlight its possible side effects:

1. Does the creation of a European Union army really represent an opportunity for political, economic, and social stability, or would such a military force lead to a certain extent to regional isolation and even more international differences and tensions?
2. What would be the global diplomatic impact of the European Union Army on the current military alliances, and what mitigating measures of possible negative effects could be applied?

3. To what extent is the current Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union affected by the withdrawal of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (Brexit)[6] from the EU?

Both the need and the aspirations of these questions come from a desire to move forward with the current understanding and approach to the European security and defense segments and wish to bring further clarity to this academic and scientific research area. By elaborating on these answers, the paper will also highlight the benefits and negative aspects of such a formation, both in peacetime and in wartime, and also in the context of natural disasters or pandemics, such as the one that humanity is currently facing – caused by the SARS-CoV-2[7] virus. Furthermore, the paper also aspires to document the understanding and perception of European citizens on several issues related to military security and defense of the EU, as well as their real expectations in this direction.

1.4. Research Methodology

Beyond the theoretical background, the paper proposes a practical, exploratory approach, which includes data and forecasts for testing such a major administrative undertaking, such as the scenario of the creation of the European Union Army. The proposed practical analysis is divided into two sections: 1) a qualitative one, based on a wide range of official data and forecasts obtained in interviews with various academic and institutional figures, whose expertise is intended to bring a substantial contribution to the argumentation of the questions raised in this paper; and 2) a quantitative one, using also investigative and data collection tools such as the questionnaire. The latter aims at collecting the degree of understanding of the current security and defense context of Europeans, the variation in the degree of perceived security among citizens (both in the current scenario and equally in that of the implementation of such a common defense framework), as well as various other opinions, expectations, or predictions regarding the future of this sphere, especially while also taking into account

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[6] *Online source*, "Consiliul Uniunii Europene / Brexit", https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/policies/eu-uk-after-referendum/, accessed on 01.06.2020.
[7] *Online source*, World Health Organization / Diseases / COVID-19", https://www.who.int/emergencies/diseases/novel-coronavirus-2019/technical-guidance/naming-the-coronavirus-disease-(covid-2019)-and-the-virus-that-causes-it, accessed in 13.06.2020.

the Brexit circumstance. All this information promises therefore to offer an authentic, reliable, and relevant perspective to this initiative not yet defined within the ongoing framework of the EU's Common Security and Defense Policy, as well as a relevant scientific contribution in support of deepening this area of research.

Regarding the first research method, namely the interview, it aimed at interviewing experts from the military and defense field – such as institutional representatives or heads of various cabinets within the Ministry of National Defense of Romania (MApN)[8], or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs[9] and at the same time, personalities from the academic environment, whose research concerns have been directed in recent years mainly towards Common Security and Defense Policy of the European Union. In order to obtain final opinions as accurate as possible, the method sought to maintain a balance between the number of respondents from institutional and academic backgrounds, and had as its main objectives the deepening of the current state and future prospects of these segments of EU military security and defense, and also the opportunity of establishing a European Union Army. The data collection took place during the second half of the research program, respectively February 2021 – July 2022, by the instrumentality of videoconferencing and electronic correspondence, and used a total of fifteen questions as starting points for discussion – twelve of which were open-ended and three of which had pre-defined answer options. In the case of the videoconference meetings, the duration of the meetings averaged around 60 minutes, depending on the progress of the discussions and the availability of the respondents.

As regards the second research method, respectively the questionnaire, it aimed at collecting European citizens' perceived security, their shared understanding of the importance of military security and defense, along with their predictions of the future objectives of these areas in the light of their expressed expectations. In terms of structure, it contained a total of twenty-eight questions with a single selectable answer and one open-ended question with an editable field, while the structure, length, and complexity of the questions were as such that the time taken to complete the entire questionnaire did not exceed ten minutes. In order to participate, respondents had to meet the following two conditions: they had to be at least

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[8] *Online source*, "Ministerul Apărării Naționale / Despre noi",
https://www.mapn.ro/legislatie/index.php, accessed on 14.06.2020.
[9] *Online source*, "Ministerul Afacerilor Externe", https://www.mae.ro/, accessed on 11.02.2022.

18 years of age at the time of participation and they had to be a national or resident of a Member State of the European Union. Thanks to the complexity and adaptability of digital tools, the questionnaire was conducted for a period of 45 days on the online platform https://www.surveylegend.com/, dedicated to these types of surveys, and its content was available not only in Romanian but also in international communication languages such as English, French, and Spanish. Concerning the targeted sample, with the support of the International Relations, European Studies and/or European Integration Departments of the partner universities at the EU level, the questionnaire aimed to register participants from all 27 Member States, and a minimum number of at least 250 participants. In interpreting the results, no individual analyses were intended but only general ones. The main objective of the section being that of bringing the views of a smaller population as close as possible to those of the collective ones, representing in this way as faithfully as possible, the dominant average of European society as a whole.

The information shall be collected and analyzed in compliance with all norms on the ethics of scientific research in the field of social sciences, and only through standardized procedures. This will make it possible to extrapolate the results, with an acceptable error, from a small part of investigated groups to collectively accepted opinions, which will thus be able to reflect the population as a whole. At the same time, this type of error coefficient also offers the possibility of adjustment by comparison, by relating the expressed opinions with real facts that are already being generated directly into the society – for which reason, official statistics and theoretical sources referred to will constitute main complementary methods of information and analogy of these investigated concepts. However, even if adjustments are theoretically intended to provide an even more objective interpretation of the expressed opinions, the information gathered in this case study does not, in principle, aim to use by default any such corrections.

1.5. Paper's Contribution to the Field of International Relations and European Studies

Concerning the results of the research, they are expected to add value to existing solutions by setting out the various elements of novelty both in terms of arguments and counter-arguments to which they might be subject, while always bearing in mind a close link between the innovative and slightly idealistic solutions, and the objective and feasible ones; especially since such an initiative – which is designed to achieve the ideal of a

European Union army under the current Common Security and Defense Policy – is a chapter in a continuous, albeit slow, multi-level development within the European Union. And the decision to make it a tangible reality depends in particular on finding joint, viable solutions (or perhaps compromises), in congruence with the predictions of what is desired to represent the near and distant future of the Union, and which, at the same time, should rise not only to the level of external (conventional) threats but also to the internal ones – increasingly sophisticated from a social and technological point of view, and also increasingly difficult to foresee.

In this sense, by mixing existing studies with the results of the proposed analysis, the paper aspires to answer as elaborately as possible the questions underlying it, and to have in the future the capacity to bring more clarity and concrete solutions to the current stages of military cooperation and integration, while opening at the same time new and relevant paths towards further and deeper research reflections in this regard.

1.6. Limits

From the point of view of its delimitation, the paper will treat the selected material through the lens of the theory of liberalism in international relations, seeking narratives and arguments that favor or criticize the institutionalization and strategic integration processes of the EU, while avoiding any associations with extreme concepts such as realism or idealism. In terms of the theoretical approach, it focuses primarily on the evolution of the current Common Security and Defense Policy and the obstacles it has encountered in the pursuit of a formalized maturity through more complex and tactical defense bodies, leaving the history and evolution of armies and military alliances to be discussed only as introductory notions, or as elements of comparison and brief argumentation. At the same time, at a theoretical level, it aspires to include data and statistical indicators from official public sources and academic works from prestigious and internationally recognized publishing houses, without dealing with unofficial data or current ongoing negotiations that do not yet have any published or ratified legal basis. From the point of view of temporal and spatial delimitation, the paper includes the analysis of the opportunity to create the European Union Army only in the context of the current Member States and tests through the theoretical and practical support its applicability in a timeframe of approximately 25 to 50 years.

Despite the need for firm and unambiguous solutions in this direction, the academic approach to such questions has nevertheless remained an

extremely risky task in terms of its volatility – a fact that could have affected the detailed elaboration of such hypotheses over time, and which, in the absence of a scientific coagulation of all the factual situations and existing information, has also tacitly contributed to a certain extent to the current pace of development of the consultations. Being directly dependent either on some unpredictable military events (especially within the transatlantic area and its immediate borders), on simple clashes of interests, or major changes in the vision of European and American leaders in this regard, the work was and still is therefore exposed to a high degree of volatility. But this fact should not block the validation of such hypotheses but rather lead to the urgency of finding answers – an argument also supported by the initiative of this paper. However, if the need for such queries is nevertheless invalidated during the course of the research by a series of major political and social factors, the collected data are intended to be redirected and adapted to support, complement, or even criticize those developments.

2. EUROPEAN SECURITY
AND MILITARY DEFENSE –
THE COMMON GOAL OF THE MEMBER STATES

This first theoretical chapter is intended to provide an introduction to the selected topic, by briefly addressing relatively different, but closely interconnected frameworks at the same time. In order to form a broader perspective on the notions that are to be developed in this section, and gradually introduce us to the next theoretical chapter of the paper, a chapter that will deal in a more precise manner with the closest aspects of the European Union's military security and defense. For a clear reflection on the following lines, we summarize the main aspects that are going to be addressed: the evolution of joint defense and security consultations following the Treaty of Amsterdam, notable European Union security and defense achievements, the European Green Deal and the impact of policy decisions on climate change, nuclear non-proliferation and counter-proliferation, as well as parameters and limits of cooperation, interdependence, and institutional integration within the European Union.

2.1. The Evolution of Joint Defense and Security Consultations Following the Treaty of Amsterdam

According to specialists, the capability of military action is ideally rooted in a strategy, which has the particularity of specifically outlining its objectives and means of action. Whether it is peacekeeping operations, separation of parties by force, or humanitarian assistance, the positive result will always be the right mix between a strategy that offers options for capacity development, institutional command structures, and effective military deployment capability.[10] So should military strategy actually be the European Union's biggest shortcoming? The 1990s conflicts in the Balkan region could support this hypothesis, because, despite the fact that Europe

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[10] Ettore Greco, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Stefano Silvestri, *EU Crisis Management: Institutions and Capabilities in the Making*, Roma, Quaderni IAI, 2010, pp. 11 – 12.

had more than 2 million active soldiers, it was not able to mobilize promptly, requesting NATO support.[11]

In June 1999, the European Union formally set up the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) at the Cologne Summit, agreeing that "the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO"[12], but managed to establish concrete actions only six months later at the Helsinki Summit, where they came up with the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG), a strategy that aimed to develop, over the next three years a number of 60,000 troops, capable of moving to any theater of war in less than 60 days and have a capacity for action of up to one year. Member States have also agreed to set up politico-military bodies within the Council of the European Union, such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Union Military Committee (EUMC), the European Union General Staff (EUMS), and the Directorate-General. for External Relations (DG E VIII) as a support body. All this was later brought together under the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP), and in 2003, with the enactment of the first European Security Strategy (ESS), the first military operation, Artemis, took place in the Democratic Republic of Congo.[13]

As a result of this advancement, in June 2004 the Member States set up a new Headline Goal for 2010 (HD 2010), which this time aimed to create a rapid response capability of around 1,500 to 2,500 troops, and which was agreed to be set up upon multinational contribution. At the same time, in order to improve cooperation between states – an extremely important element of coagulation at that point – the investiture of the European Defense Agency (EDA) was also necessary; but the realization of such successful cooperation, unfortunately, remained an extremely difficult task in the years to come. That is to say, the financial expenditures with the waiting battle groups, as well as the interests of protecting their own national economies when the purchase of arms was in question and the establishment of budgets for this entire arms sector, along with the effects of the ensuing financial crisis, have pushed states to remain somewhat reluctant to commit in

[11] Magaš and Žanić, *Op. cit.*
[12] Biscop Sven, *Strategic autonomy: not without integration*, Foundation for European Progressive Studies (FEPS), Brussels, 2022, https://www.feps-europe.eu/attachments/publications/220113%20strategic_ autonomy_sven_biscop.pdf, accessed on 13.01.2022.
[13] Greco, Pirozzi and Silvestri, *Op. cit.*, pp. 12 – 13.

supporting the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). Moreover, another major cultural barrier to achieving deeper cooperation was represented by the tendency of the Member States to preserve their national sovereignty and capacity for action. However, the threshold of confidence that they failed to overcome was the very way to maintain this national sovereignty, and at the same time, a way of increasing their military capacity – namely through this strengthening of mutual cooperation and integration. With the aim of giving the treaty itself an even greater weight, in 2009, on its 10th anniversary, the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) suggestively changed its name to Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP)[14], a body that is currently chaired by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep BORRELL FONTELLES, who also holds the position of Vice-President of the European Commission.

Although no less than 26 missions were carried out between 2003-2009 under the coordination of ESDP, between 2009 – 2011, their number remained surprisingly – zero. Even if this aspect was closely linked at that time to the global financial crisis which broke out in 2008 and which has led to a significant reduction in the budgets of this sector, the effects were being felt at an ever-deeper level – a level where we can also discuss about a crisis in the coagulation of visions among the Member States. Therefore, despite the context, it is to be reminded here that in theoretical terms the actions of complying with ratified commitments find their effectiveness and maximum efficiency in times of crisis, and not in times of peace and well-being. But at the same time, we cannot deny that all those divergences were based – and some still are – on extremely complex historical and geopolitical conjunctures: 1) while Eastern Europe still perceives the Russian Federation as the most real threat to its existence, Western Europe is concerned instead about terrorism; 2) what kind of merger are NATO (whose existence depends to a certain extent by its perpetual activity) and the CSDP actually capable of, is also a topic seen quite differently at the level of the European Union; 3) the common strategy for managing political instability in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is further another cause not only for concerns, but also for political controversy; 4) the position of the European Union towards the transition from a unipolar global order to a multipolar one, by the worrying rise of countries such as Brazil, Russia, India, and China, are again issues perceived extremely differently. Therefore, whether

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[14] *Ibidem*, pp. 14 – 18.

or not a future European Army will serve as a "school of the union", is a question that is legitimately asked in this research too.[15]

2.2. Notable European Union Security and Defense Achievements

Analyzing the current situation in terms of actual achievements in this direction, despite the Strategic Compass[16] – an instrument only partially implemented at present and which will be elaborated on in the second chapter of the paper, the most advanced point of the negotiations is represented by the decision of the Council of the European Union to establish the Military Planning and Conduct Capability (MPCC)[17], officially published on June 9, 2017. It follows the need highlighted by the European Council since December 2016 and involves improving the EU's military response capability. This approach is extremely important because it represents – at least at a theoretical level – a somewhat more relevant example of establishing a bridge of communication between a political body and a military one, which is essential in such situations. Moreover, according to Council decisions, this command unit should, by the end of 2020, be able to take over operational planning responsibilities and conduct both regional non-executive missions and executive military operations under the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)[18], limited to the European Union battlegroup.[19]

Continuing to approach its actual achievements in terms of security and intervention capacity-building activities, the European Union has, apparently, focused in recent years more on peacebuilding missions rather than military intervention or capacity building. Analyzing the situation in the western

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[15] Maxime H. A. Larivé, *Debating European Security and Defense Policy – Understanding the Complexity*, Abingdon UK, Routledge, 2016, Chapter 12.
[16] *Online source*, European Parliament / European Parliamentary Research Service, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2021/698057/EPRS_BRI(2021)698057_EN.pdf, accessed on 07.12.2021.
[17] *Online source*, "Consiliul Uniunii Europene / Comunicate", https://www.consilium.europa.eu/ro/press/press-releases/2017/06/08/military-mpcc-planning-conduct-capability/, accessed in 15.06.2020.
[18] *Online source*, "Ministerul Afacerilor Externe / Securitate Internațională", https://www.mae.ro/en/node/2064, accessed on 15.06.2020.
[19] Yf Reykers, *A permanent headquarters under construction? The Military Planning and Conduct as a proximate principal*, Taylor & Francis, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/07036337.2019.1599882.

Figure 2.1: Global representation in % and mil. $ of the humanitarian and development contributions of the EU.

Source: European Commission, *White Paper on the Future of Europe*, Brussels, 2017, p. 9.

side of the Balkan region, which includes countries such as Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Kosovo, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Serbia or Montenegro, as well as the Horn of Africa region, mainly the Federal Republic of Somalia, Tanzania or the Republic of Kenya – countries that have faced and are still facing a number of economic and security irregularities and challenges – one can observe that they have been the direct beneficiaries of several EU missions, targeting a wide range of reforms in the field of national security, including military reform, police, the prison sector, maritime security, but also state borders. Led by Brussels, in collaboration with the local authorities of the states involved, they have had a positive impact that could justify the Union's decision to allocate a large part of its available resources to the long-term establishment of peace in countries at high risk of conflict, and less on the construction of a European defense structure to subsequently combat these potential conflicts.[20]

Even in this context, the agenda of the former European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker does not seem to have ruled out this perspective of strengthening European defense. Quoting from the European Commission's public documents, he said: "I also believe that we need to work on a stronger Europe when it comes to security and defense matters. Yes, Europe is chiefly a 'soft power'. But even the strongest soft powers cannot make do in the long run without at least some integrated defense capacities."[21]

Although the chances of success for such an aspiration more than seven decades old have never been more favorable than now for Europe, it seems that though it is constantly debating this possibility, it is somewhat reluctant to fulfill it, preferring to project at a global level the pattern image of a democratic superpower, with liberal visions, who does not want to use force and violence as tools of influence. If one would put in context the reaction of the United States of America after the attacks of September 11, 2001, with their statements and firm actions of war, and then compare them with those of the European Union after the terrorist attacks in Madrid, London, Brussels or Paris, the discrepancy is without any doubt an extremely

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[20] Timothy Edmunds, Ana E. Juncos and Gilberto Algar-Faria, *EU local capacity building: ownership, complexity and agency*, Taylor & Francis, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1080/23340460.2018.1528878.
[21] European Commission, *Reflection Paper on the Future of European Defense*, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/reflection-paper-defense_en.pdf, Brussels, 2017.

obvious one.[22] The controversies of the 2003 invasion of Iraq or the details of the subsequent visa restrictions imposed by the United States after the September 11 attacks will not be addressed in this paper, but are worth mentioning as precise measures in a brief comparison with the integration policy of immigrants and refugees negotiated and applied at the European Union level in the recent years.

Probably the very historical context of Europe – one that seems too full of conflicts, whether we are talking about Antiquity, the Middle Ages, or the Modern Age – makes this option no longer a viable solution in the cultural projections of decision-makers. However, both in substantiating such a general vision and also in the negotiations for the establishment of an eventual Army of the European Union, the public will is also a prerequisite; and polls consistently show that although they are very open to cooperation, Europeans are still partially reluctant when it comes to the need of military integration.[23] In a Eurobarometer conducted in November 2018, data show that only 22% of respondents considered conflicts outside the EU as a real threat to the community, and only 15% of them within the Union. Their main fears remain terrorist attacks, poor migration management, and pollution. Nevertheless, these are only average values of the survey, and the cultural differences between the Eastern and Western countries of the European Union remain a difficult aspect to neglect – especially in the context of the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 by the Russian Federation.[24] Even if the average result of the community does not regard the Army of the European Union as a priority, an extensive analysis of this choice is still to be considered, given that respondents from Eastern European countries were, in a percentage between 50 and 71%, in favor of deepening the Common Security and Defense Policy; moreover, in the case of the countries directly neighboring the Russian Federation, this direct need registered values between 71% and 87%.[25]

However, focusing on the greatest fear of the citizens of the European Union – that of terrorist threats – and correlating it with the theme of this analysis,

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[22] Alessandro Dal Lago and Salvatore Palidda, *Conflict, Security and the Reshaping of Society; The civilization of war*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2010, pp. 103 – 115.
[23] Amanda von Trapp and Mark O. Hatfield, *European Defense Integration: Public Opinion and Instinct*, European Union Studies Association, 2019, https://www.eustudies.org/eusa-forum/eusa-interest-section-essays/18/download.
[24] Martin Quencez and Sophia Besch, *The Challenges Ahead for EU Defense Cooperation*, German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2020, http://www.jstor.com/stable/resrep21219, p. 2, accessed on 23.03.2021.
[25] *Ibidem.*

one can notice considerable progress in this direction. By ratifying the Amsterdam Treaty (1997)[26], which is in fact a revision of the Maastricht Treaty[27], the Member States have agreed to transfer certain powers of national governments to the service of the European Parliament. Specifically, they decided on the basis of Article K.1 to set up the European Police Office (Europol)[28], which, with constant legislative support from the European Union, managed in the following years to prove to be the most important tool in the fight against terrorism and crime ever developed by it. Throughout extensive efforts conducted by its agencies, it has been possible not only to thwart numerous attacks but also to prevent the support or formation of new terrorist groups, through strategic actions of combating their funding. It should be noted accordingly, that these successes were possible not only through a simple collaboration, but rather through a strategic integration, based on a plan with a common vision, and also in agreement with Gijs de Vries, European Union's first Counter-Terrorism Coordinator, which actively supported such institutionalized coagulation measures and which has stated since then, in one of its interventions: "we are not the United States of Europe … we do not have an EU police force, or an EU army."[29]

Among the visible measures taken by Europol to increase security among citizens are the increasingly active implementation of drone technology for surveillance and intervention in the border areas of the European Union – originally intended to combat migration – as well as increasingly sophisticated video cameras located in major European cities and beyond. The effectiveness of these measures shows that this direction could represent in the near future a significant approach to local and regional defense[30], as also confirmed by

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[26] *Online source*, European Union / Documents / Amsterdam Treaty, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_of_ amsterdam_en.pdf, accessed on 20.06.2020.
[27] *Online source*, European Union / Documents / Maastricht Treaty, https://europa.eu/european-union/sites/europaeu/files/docs/body/treaty_on_ european_union_en.pdf, accessed on 20.06.2020.
[28] *Online source*, European Union / Documents / Europol, https://europa.eu/euro pean-union/about-eu/agencies/europol_ro, accessed on 20.06.2020.
[29] Christian Kaunert, *The external Dimension of EU Counter-Terrorism Relations: Competences, Interests, and Institutions*, Taylor & Francis, 2019, https://doi.org/10.1080/09546550903409551.
[30] Michael Friedewald, J. Peter Burgess, Johann Čas, Rocco Bellanova and Walter Peissl, *Surveillance, Privacy and Security; Citizens' Perspectives*, Abingdon, Routledge, 2017, pp. 107 – 122.