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Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing

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This book first published 2024

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN: 978-1-0364-1186-2
ISBN (Ebook): 978-1-0364-1187-9

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AUTHOR'S PREFACE

SETTING THE PREMISE FOR DISCUSSING IDENTITY AND ITS VECTORS IN THE CONTEXT OF SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

The concept of identity is related to the self and, more intrinsically, to the concepts of autonomy or sovereignty. As reported in Chapter One of this book, Erikson's theory on identity crises maintains that "one cannot separate the identity crisis in individual life and contemporary crisis in historical development because the two help to define each other and are truly relative to each other" (Erikson, 1968, p. 23; In Norman, 2023, p. 55). By "crisis" he meant "opportunity", such as a moral crisis where one is confronted with choices. Whether one chooses to do good or bad depends on one's motivations, moral nature and experiences. Consistent with this viewpoint, it has been noted that, to do justice to the discussion of identity politics or political party identity matters in Africa or elsewhere, one has to approach the issue from the individual point of view, as well as an interpersonal angle. One also has to assess the conduct of the personalities or groups making the analysis with regard to the environmental factors exerting pressure or influence over those actors.

It has been previously stated in literature and in other research that from empirical sources, one can conveniently say that "principle-based ethics (PBE) appears to be a recent addition to sub-Saharan Africa's rights profile, although universal principles of morality have been part of the region from time immemorial" and that this is measured on a purely subjective basis and on the relative weighing of conduct on a "good" and "bad" spectrum. In this regard, periodic reviews of how PBE is being integrated into the socio-political systems of Africa, health-care, health-seeking behaviours of sub-Saharan Africa and the mundane activities of the people of the African continent and its governance, is consistent with best practices everywhere (Norman, 2016, pp. 344-345; Beauchamp and Childress, 2001). PBE such as autonomy, capacity, informed consent, paternalism, choice, justice, responsibility, beneficence, non-malfeasance and truth-telling, for example,

have been part and parcel of the collective African morality in an unprincipled or structured basis. That is to say, if one looked for truth-telling in African morality, one would find it. If one looked for paternalism, it is obvious that one would see it. However, they have not been a systematic part of African ethics, or even morality, until recently when revisionist researchers and philosophers in Africa began to force PBE onto the collective, despite its non-existence in the African moral compendium of ethics and culture. Part of this omission, by and large, is due to the professional laziness of many African scholars who would rather do funded and repeat or confirmation research or intervention studies than pursue a subject of great ethnic, cultural and racial importance at their own cost or for no financial reward. We can observe, then, that African research in its universities and institutions is driven by rent-seeking and profiteering impulses: a *quid pro quo* system of exchanging research for honorarium or stipend, or salary top-ups for principal investigators, chiefs of party, co-principal investigators or deputy chiefs of party and other team members.

The ethics of any society are predicated on the oral or written compilation of normative ideas of good and bad social behaviours. These determine what is considered to be right and wrong. In African morality, there has not been a strict division between etiquette and ethical conduct in the same way that Western societies promote PBE in a systematic way, with tools of evaluation and analysis. Whereas etiquette deals with the customs or rules governing the behaviour regarded as correct or acceptable in social or official life, as well as being a conventional but unwritten code of practice followed by members of certain professions or groups, ethics is often defined as the philosophical study of the moral value of human conduct and the rules and principles that ought to govern it. It is also a social, religious or civil code of behaviour, especially of a particular group, profession or individual. It is used as a measure of the moral fitness of a decision, or a course of action. The tools for evaluating ethical conduct include utility, competing rights, exceptions, choice, justice, common good versus community rights, and issues of character versus virtue (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001).

Normative simply means that which is based on norms. For example, medical ethics is based on norms of medicine. That is to say, the moral norms (culturally) for the guidance and evaluation of conduct that we should accept and why. Non-normative ethics consists of two broad areas: descriptive ethics, which uses factual investigation or moral conduct and beliefs to arrive at a decision (e.g. a pathologist uses factual information to establish a cause of death); and meta-ethics, which involves the use of

language, concepts and methods of ethical reasoning and uses terms like "right," "obligation," "virtue," "justification," "morality" and "responsibility". A good example of this would be court decisions, as they are based purely on the evaluation of facts, irrespective of the antecedents of the narrator. Meta simply means that which indicates change or alteration. For example, academic disciplines such as philosophy or ethics keep changing though the basis may be rooted in a fundamental idea, truth or proven theory. Meta-ethics is the philosophical study of questions about the nature of ethical judgement as distinct from questions of normative ethics. For example, it uses terms like "right," "obligation," "virtue," "justification," "morality" and "responsibility" to give meaning to a given set of facts in order to resolve them (Beauchamp and Childress, 2001).

African moral framework is not divided into normative and non-normative ethics, meta-ethics, descriptive and applied ethics, or utilitarianism, deontology and so on, despite recent attempts by revisionist researchers and writers to make it appear this way. There is no classical intellectual basis or canon such as exists in the Western world, where it consists of writings by Immanuel Kant, Georg William F. Hegel, Jeremy Bentham and Stuart Mills (to mention just a few), used to evaluate conduct as good, right, virtuous, supererogatory and wrong (Norman, 2016, 2023). One would not find anywhere in Africa works like *The Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807), also known as *The Phenomenology of Mind*, or *The Philosophy of Right* (1821), by Hegel, making it difficult to understand from the African point of view what is identity or what is self. Such concepts, however, have local equivalents and significance in the lives of African people, with the labelling left to the imagination of each. Systematization was never a material part of appreciating a rigid set of rules for logical thinking and analysis. For example:

> Does a person from Ghana have a set of code that can be described as national values, unique to him or her and certainly very definitional of the core values of what it is to be of a Ghanaian pedigree? For example, the Parliament of Ghana or the Ghana Bar Association or Ghana Medical and Dental Council have their own sets of professional codes of ethics. This can be mainstreamed among different successive and consecutive cohorts of politicians that become parliamentarians, or Ghanaians that become lawyers or medical doctors. Is there a set of moral precepts that can pedagogically be passed on from one generation of Ghanaians to another? (Norman, 2023, p. 27)

When I was growing up, my grandmother used to remind me that our family is an old one with ancestors that go back thousands of years, including kings

and queens. That I was not the most important one among the long list of those before me, in my cohort or among those after me, meant I must always remember to do good in order to maintain and sustain the good image and name of the family. The fact that I knew that some of the older members of my family were underachievers, drunks, and irresponsible parents was not an important consideration in the lesson she wanted to teach me, which was moral responsibility to myself, to others and to the community. Most importantly, and in line with the purpose of this book, she wanted to teach me that I am somebody with an identity belonging to a long list of ancestors before me and those who will come after me, as well as my contemporaries. By that example, she brought in matters of the soul, consanguinity, and dignity.

In his brilliant book, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and Politics of Presentment* (2018), Francis Fukuyama discusses the apparent decay that identity politics has brought to American society. This idea would not fit with the African situation because of Fukuyama's approach to defining identity. His work is influenced by three attributes of leadership identity: thymos, isothymia and megalothymia.

He defines "thymos" as the part of the soul that craves recognition of dignity. If one comes from a long list of ancestors, what is the point of craving or the need to crave recognition of dignity? Haven't one's ancestors erected that edifice of dignity already?

"Isothymia" is the demand to be respected on an equal basis with other people. If one's ancestors had not been respected by their peers, wouldn't they have perished by now? So, what is the point of looking for a value that is already an intrinsic quality of who you are?

"Megalothymia" is the desire to be recognized as superior. He provides that megalothymia "thrives on exceptionality by taking big risks" in order to appear special or gifted to oneself and others (ibid, p. 9). These descriptors of the self would not fit with the African context as a general matter because, in sub-Saharan Africa, one does not think of oneself in such terms.

The position being advanced on a lack of structured ethical framework in the African context is supported by other researchers:

> African societies as organized and functioning human communities, have undoubtedly evolved ethical systems – ethical values, principles, rules – intended to guide social and moral behaviour. But, like African philosophy itself, the idea and beliefs of the African societies that bear on ethical

> conduct have not been given elaborative investigation and clarification and thus, stand in real need of profound and extensive analyses and interpretation, although the last three decades or so, attempts have been made by contemporary African philosophers to give sustained reflective attention to African moral ideas (Gyekye, 2010, p. 1).

The mistake the revisionist African researchers appear to be making in their attempt to create a record of African philosophy or ethics is that they often use Western ethical and philosophical concepts and literature to build a framework for African ethics and philosophy. To create a true African philosophical thought base, one needs to develop a new approach with no regard to classical, neo-classical and contemporary philosophers from the Western world. One needs to allow for a truly comparative philosophical study and learning.

When discussing the issue of African identity, it is very difficult to lump all the nations in Africa together as one and discuss the manifestations of identity as if there is an overarching acceptance of what identity or self means. For example, would it mean the same to a Kikuyu in Kenya as it would to a Tutsi (Batusi, Tussi, Watusi) in Rwanda and Burundi? A Hutu (Bantu) in Burundi does not identify with a Bantu (Ashanti) in Ghana, and so on, in terms of cultural and sociological approximations of who they are. The three major tribes in Nigeria, for example (Yoruba, Hausa and Igbo) have different pedigrees in blood or DNA, as well as in culture and morality, with the Igbos and Yoruba sharing closer ties in DNA to each other than either of them does with the Hausa.

In 2018, Olukanni A. Atitilaya, Amoo O. Samuel, Olukanni O. David, and Taiwo Adewunimi carried out "Genetic variations among three major ethnic groups in Nigeria using RAPD" (Random amplified polymorphic DNA) and found that, between the Igbos and Yorubas, there were similar genetic dispositions, while the Hausa displayed on PCR (polymerase chain reaction) analysis "bands 471 and 435 bp (base pair) to be specific for the Hausa ethnic group at 66.67% frequency." This distinguishes the Hausa from the other ethnic groups. It appears the only galvanizing mediums – the amalgamative vehicle for identity in many of the nations in Africa – are tribes, religion and political party memberships or affiliations. In terms of culture, there are many crossroads where one may find similarities but, all in all, the culture of Kessena-Nankani in the Upper East region of Ghana is drastically different from the Ashanti of the Ashanti Region or the Akyems of the Eastern Region. It is therefore irresponsible to bunch all the different cultures together and label them collectively as "African culture."

There is nothing like Ghanaian culture, Ugandan culture or African culture. These are terms of convenience which deny the reality of differences and uniqueness with the ethnic groups. For example, in Ghana, Ashantis have a different cultural ethos from that of the Ewes, even though there are many intersections between those cultures. When these two ethnic group cultures bump heads, it is often because confusion and misunderstanding have been created due to the nuanced interpretation of what initially appeared as similar but, on closer inspection, has important differences. One such instance is strongly associated with mate selection. Whereas the institution of marriage is accepted by both cultures as cardinal to the survival of families and the generations, the choice of a man from the Ewe tribe to marry an Ashanti woman or the other way round often leads to contentious debate and a demand for the justification and rationalization of that choice. Stereotypical approximations of what each tribe does to their spouses are involved here, along with hate and rejection. It is seldom that one finds both sides of two families wholeheartedly respecting and accepting the choice of that couple to marry across tribal lines.

James Rachels and Stuart Rachels's work, *The Challenge of Cultural Relativism:* Chapter Two: The Elements of Moral Philosophy (2019) argued against cultural relativism, making an argument in favour of the proposition that the cultural differences argument was not valid, because the conclusion does not follow from the empirical premise that different cultures have different moral codes. Rachels' argument is different from the wholesale combination of the different cultural rites and attributes of the various ethnic groups, as they discuss the essence of conduct and not of being. By moral code, it is presumed that ethical code is also implied. If such were so, then, Rachels maintained, there can be no objective moral truths. To every general rule, there is an exception, despite the sheer strength of Rachels' intellectual clarification on the matter. In sub-Saharan Africa, the individual may not be the possessor of capacity as an ethical value as it is in Western industrialized nations, but rather the family or community, which may allow, for example, an Ashanti family to reject the choice of a spouse from the Ewe tribe (Norman, 2015). Rachels maintained that, in minor cultural matters, different cultural and ethical codes are acceptable. The issue of shared autonomy is a defining issue of great significance to the sanctity of a human being in Africa because it underlines individual capabilities and relates to identity.

Another important matter is the issue of capacity. In Africa, capacity cannot always be said to rest with the individual – a fact of culture dictated by cultural relativism. For example, African ethics places premium on the inter-

relatedness of people, communal decision making, respect, responsibility, hospitality and service to humanity (Ekeopara and Ogbonnaya, 2014; Udokang, 2014; Onunwa, 2008; Ross, 2010; Murove, 2009; Osei-Hwedie, 1997). In such a cultural situation, the individual's contributions, while being praised, may be considered important to the extent that they advance the community or communal interests over that of the individual.

Although urbanization and its effects on behaviour may have diluted the communal imperative in terms of the actions of the individual to a large extent in today's sub-Saharan African cities and towns, there is still a strong attachment to the conventional edict that the individual puts the community before his or her own private interests (Ross, 2010). Since capacity may be shared by the individual man and his wife, son and father or a person and his family, its definition should, by cultural necessity and not cultural relativism, be cognizant of this reality. Within the African context, the capabilities approach does not require a perfect world for people to function, do the things they need and want to do and conduct the affairs that allow them to live their best lives. In a democracy, although not a necessity, it still seems the capabilities approach requires that, for people to express their autonomy and choice and make the decisions that lead them to the kinds of lives they want to achieve, they need to be part of the broader politico-social machinery. The capabilities approach cannot be said to operate in a utopia. It is a social concept erected on the collective consciousness of society that operates efficiently and effectively when its members are free. Where individual freedom is a restricted notion, it makes plenty of sense for the individual to build affiliations, networks of support and relational interests in others so the network provides the support the individual may need at some point in the future. Here, autonomy equals freedom of association and freedom of association becomes the moral equivalent of an identity group.

What appears to be missing, even in the scientific literature and in practice, is that autonomy by itself is not an unrestricted social ideal. As a human rights concept, it is subjected to sovereign encroachment and modification for the public good as well as for the good of the possessor of the privilege of autonomy (Hohfeld, 1919; Mill, 1859). Autonomy is like a well-constructed housing complex for the high-end homeowner. It is admired from afar and near and is constitutionally protected, at least with respect to the actual and residual interests in each unit, but the seemingly hard and constitutionally protected reality of the right to exclusive possession of such real property can easily melt away when the government expresses its eminent domain powers over that parcel of land or property. When the government demands, with due compensation, to build a motorway through

a neighbourhood that was once a haven for the rich and famous, the previous allure and the well-manicured lawns and gardens disappear into oblivion. For autonomy or freedom to be experienced by the individual when receiving healthcare or bureaucratic services, the national, regional and local cultures concerning the rights of the individual should be embedded into the mundane social exchanges of the population. If the underlying culture does not, on a day-to-day basis, support autonomy at home by spouses and parents, at work by supervisors and bosses, and between superiors and subordinates, it may not be easily expressed at the interface of the redistribution of income or wealth, jobs and opportunities or bureaucratic service delivery. Freedom of information, a critical ingredient for functioning, doing and being, is still a virgin concept in many of the nations in sub-Saharan Africa in science and scientific studies, politics and in the daily endeavours of society.

The discussion of identity in this book has not taken a grandiose approach that delves into classical literature on the soul, ego, self or the ID. Because the definition of identity or self is so nebulous in Africa, this book takes a simplistic approach, adopting a generalized or amorphous nature of identity without specific definition. For starters, Africans are already demarcated by nations, tribes, religions, ethnicity and a multiplicity of languages and cultures. These divisions are good, so long as they are not harnessed into groups that promote hate, discrimination and isolation. Unfortunately, since independence, African politicians have done nothing but place wedges between the tribes and the nations so they can maintain their control at the helms of respective nations.

We may describe the theoretical approach of this book as "amorphous theory". This provides a better analytical framework for the topic of identity politics in Africa because it provides consistency, rationality and historicity in the claim of autonomy and self. There is no determinate, fixed pattern, or structure to identity politics in Africa. Despite the hatred that existed between the two dominant tribes in Rwanda leading to the genocide in that nation, there were inter-tribal marriages, business associations and partnerships between the two groups. In Africa, nothing really appears to be what it is. Muslims marry Christians; Christians and Shiites marry Sunnis; the educated class marries the uneducated class; and the poor marry the rich. In Ghana, opposition members of parliament marry across the political divide, creating a more amorphous identity situation in the nation. Therefore, within each chapter of this book the concept of identity is approached conceptually and contextually on a situational basis, without any regard to questions of self or the soul, encouraging openness and optimism.

CHAPTER ONE

CONCEPTUALIZING AND ASSESSING IDENTITY POLITICS, IDENTITARIANISM, AFROXENOPHOBIA AND VIGILANTISM ON AN AFRICAN SCALE

The conceptualization and assessment of these topics: identity politics, identitarianism, Afroxenophobia and vigilantism on the sub-Saharan African stage in isolation from the economic and social realities of sub-Saharan Africa would be an exercise in futility, just as it would be in any geopolitical location. All identity politics, identitarian conduct, Afro-xenophobic and vigilante activities have specific locus. The place is inured with the competing interests of the people in that specific location resulting in or arousing the sentiments and feelings that may coalesce into any one of these social ills. In a racially homogeneous group of female professional medical doctors, for example, where the members have each met the basic licensure requirements and thus reducing the natural development of professional jealousies, the evolution of a different identity group from among them would have to be invented and segregated from the mainstream of that group having the same racial and gender attributes. That is to say, identity politics, identitarianism, Afroxenophobia and vigilantism are each a social construct and rise out of the human condition as a matter of necessity. Identity politics is an emotional as well as perceptive compulsion of a group of people that want to cause changes to their status or situation, either through legitimate avenues or otherwise. It is a survival mechanism that emanates from the soul, and not just from learned behaviour from endogenous sources or only from hate brought on by the presence of others. In its manifestations, those under the spell of identity politics do not even notice how much of their consciousness has been taken over by those sentiments, due to the intoxicating effects of hate, anger, desire for retaliation for some imagined hurt or previous crime against those individuals, or sometimes, against a distant relative or even a great-great-grandfather or grandmother.

In this work, I looked at the evolution of identity groups and identitarianism from both the group dynamical point of view and as a personal or group ideology, and how these can spin xenophobic tendencies, which could result in vigilantism or violence into a wider social space. For this reason, the location of the occurrence or incidence of identity group events or demonstration of identitarian conduct or hate, whether it rises to the level of criminality or misdemeanour, is germane in defining the concept as it pertains in that location and affects the people in that location. Identity politics and identitarian philosophy do not come in one-size- fits-all situations or narratives. Identity politics in Ghana may be intrinsically different from how identity politics is practiced in Kenya due to the ethnic make-up of each of these African nations.

In this book, I will first discuss what is meant by identity politics on an international level, before situating the conversation within the context of politics in Africa with specific country examples. I will use these as illustration by relying on documented incidences of the practice of identitarian proclivities in those locations. Such an approach seems to be in line with Erik Erikson's definition of "identity crisis," as reported in a previously published work on the topic, "Identity Politics in Ghana" (2023, p. 55). "Erikson's theory on identity crisis maintains that one cannot separate the identity crisis in individual life and contemporary crisis in historical development because the two help to define each other and are truly relative to each other'" (Erikson, 1968, p. 23; In Norman, 2023, p. 55). Consistent with this viewpoint, it has been noted that, to do justice to a discussion of identity politics or political party identity matters in Africa or elsewhere, one has to approach the issue from an intersectional angle and assess the conduct of the personalities and groups making up that unit of analyses, with regard to the environmental factors exerting pressure or influence over those actors.

This is borrowed from Sargent Florence's theory of location (1999), in analysing where industry sits in a given geographical space, based on "location factor and coefficient localization". He theorized that when it comes to production, whether it is a fungible product or service or, as in our case, human conduct, the traditional view was that geography was the deciding factor. Sargent argued that it is the working population in an area that is more important in deciding whether the industry in that area is evenly distributed or not. He used simple linear mathematical equations to explain his theory of location factor and coefficient localization. In applying this theory to the incidence of hate, for example, the important thing to remember is that it is not the phenomenon of interest (e.g. vigilante conduct)

that is important in deciding whether or not that geographical location is a hostile environment, but the conduct of the people in that area and how widespread they are distributed within that district, town, or city. Even in a decidedly hostile area of town, when one moves a few metres away from the locus of active hostility, the issues that were once so compelling to those in that hostile ecosystem begin to lose their intensity and relevance. In a racially homogeneous location, identitarianism may be dictated by political and economic disparities but not by the desire to maintain common ethnicity, language, or cultural, racial and other common characteristics. Sargent's theory does not take into consideration the causes of hostilities, available alternatives to the hostile location, and the propensity of the people in that area to commit hostile acts. This book, however, is interested in the aetiology of the hostilities (Sargent, 1999).

The themes of this book ought to be cast in the context of African economic endeavours, the challenges that confront and disrupt well-thought-out micro- and macroeconomic strategies and programmes, and why many of these plans often yield less than optimal results. It is therefore expected that issues on national development programmes, regional and continental integration, and efforts at continental trade promotion such as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) would be co-opted into the discussion in this book.

Since the goal of this book is an attempt to break down the various aspects of identity politics on the continent for better understanding, the issue of African integration would also be an important consideration. This author, like a few enlightened historical and current pan-Africanists, such as Kwame Nkrumah and Professor Arthur Guseni Oliver Mutambara of Zimbabwe, believe that the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and its successor entity, the African Union (AU), are probably the most active promoters of African political identitarianism. It is a concept that undermines African integration even though it has appeared, for more than 62 years, to the world and to Africans, that the OAU/AU is working towards African unity.

I first made this assertion in my paper, "The Axis of Hate: Identitarianism, Afroxenophobia and Vigilantism" (2022, pp. 38-51). By its constitution (a matter which would be discussed in detail in Chapter Six of this book), the Constitutive Act of 2005, article three, together with the OAU Charter preserves the sovereignty of African nations as exclusive political and legal domains against which there was first a call against interference. Under the AU, the non-interference call was modified slightly to a non-indifference

call. This has allowed the AU to interfere in the internal affairs of member nations from time to time. Almost all recorded xenophobic attacks on the continent of Africa against other citizens of African nations could find their causal links to the OAU Charter and then to the AU Constitutive Act.

In analyzing the causal triggers for identity politics in any location or nation, one size does not fit all. This is an oversight which many researchers on identity politics have encountered in their works (Alumona and Azom, 2017; Nwanegbo, 2016; Agbo, 2010; Robinson, 2009). Numerous researchers and writers maintain the thinking that the concept of "identity" is an ambiguous one and that anyone can be defined to fit any class of people that have a different identity from the mainstream. There are different motivations and triggers for incidence of identity politics even within the same nation and from one epoch to another, from one political party or social group to another, and even within the same political party or social group. More elucidation could be made on the typology of the casual agents or instigators of identity politics, identitarianism and the attendant ills of xenophobia and vigilantism, even though the end result may be similar. Fukuyama's book, *Identity: The Demand for Dignity and Politics of Presentment* (2018), is instructive in helping to describe the various types of identity politics and identitarianism. Fukuyama's work is influenced by three attributes of leadership: thymos, isothymia and megalothymia. He defines "thymos" as the part of the soul that craves recognition of dignity. "Isothymia" is the demand to be respected on an equal basis with other people. Megalothymia is the desire to be recognized as superior. "Megalothymia" "thrives on exceptionality by taking big risks." All of these activities are meant to "lead to self-recognition as superior to others" (Fukuyama, 2018, p. 9). These concepts are helpful in understanding a lot more about identity politics than previous writings and publications on the topic.

Part one of this book has three chapters that lay the foundation for the other chapters. These provide the rationale and themes for the book. It offers an overview of emerging social challenges and conflicts in the economic developments of many African nations. It also investigates how national challenges bleed into other nations and complicate border crossings, as well as how cross-border issues concern the entire continent regarding the desire to achieve, for example, continental free trade and the free movement of people. Both of these goals are progressive aspirations of regional integration, as in the case of the ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) protocol, for example. These, however, are often truncated by insular thinking in some nations' policies and their agents in immigration and customs, and even in innocuous institutions such as the Driver and

Vehicle Licensing Authority (DVLA), the Rent Control Authority and the Ghana police, in frustrating the purpose of such goals. Agencies like the DVLA and some members of the Motor Traffic and Transport Department of the Ghana police (MTTD) make life difficult for drivers with foreign license plates authorized by the ECOWAS Protocol (A/P.1/5/79 relating to the free movement of persons, residence and establishment) to use their vehicles in any of the member nations within 90 days without hassle. Article 5(1) and (2) of the Protocol allow for a citizen of a member state to enter the territory of another member state and remain there for a period of not more than 90 days with a private vehicle and not more than 15 days with a commercial vehicle registered in the territory of a member state where she or he resides. This is upon the presentation of a valid driving licence; matriculation certificate or ownership card or logbook; an insurance policy recognized by the member states; and an international customs carnet recognized within the community.

Despite this straightforward arrangement, Ghana's police and agents of the DVLA are notorious for arresting such drivers from other nations that meet the documentation requirements. These are drivers who may only be seeking safe passage from, say, Togo to Ghana and on to the Ivory Coast. In a 2017 quantitative paper on "The Incidence and Prevalence of Money Collected by the Ghana Police from Drivers During Routine Traffic Stops and ad hoc Road Blocks," the authors found that "the Ghana police engage in active intimidation of drivers, extracts and demands money from drivers of all classifications for cause and without cause. The traffic police conduct these activities in the most blatant and public manner. These activities have contributed to the lessening of respect for the profession, the rule of law, and the general public's belief that justice in Ghana correlates to the size of expenditure to bribe law enforcement operatives."

Road traffic corruption undermines road safety programmes, national efforts to reduce money laundering or cross-border movement of terrorists and narcotics drug smuggling cells and above all, African integration (Norman; Dzidzonu; Aviisah; et al., 2017, p. 197-198). Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang (2016) examined data on 2,100 long-haul journeys in West Africa, a very common feature within the ECOWAS zone. They found that Ghana's police became more corrupt after their salaries increased, both absolutely and relative to Burkina Faso's police and Ghana's customs officers. The police erected more roadblocks, detained lorries for longer (the average driver was stopped 16 times as he drove through Ghana, for eight minutes each time) and extracted more money. Economic theory suggests the opposite should have happened (Foltz and Opoku-Agyemang, 2016; In

The Economist, 2016). In Ghana, the cost of renting a two- or three-bedroom unit is unreasonably inflated beyond fair market value for foreigners, simply because of their foreign identities. Such activities and complaints make African integration elusive. It demonstrates how identity politics, identitarianism, Afroxenophobia and vigilantism are conceptualized and experienced by individuals in the African continent and in the various nations where the incidence of these phenomena is high.

Chapters four and five of this book interrogate the key driving philosophy of Pan-Africanism and how it is supposed to promote national development and consciousness. This helps to determine if it is a continental vehicle for identity politics, an identitarian proclivity in policy formulation, or if it promotes unintended consequences of Afroxenophobia and vigilante activities in Africa. Whereas Pan-Africanism was a sociological, philosophical and cultural driving force in the 1950s until the 1970s in sub-Saharan Africa, propelling the independence movements and leading to the creation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, in today's African context, continental integration appears to be gradually replaced by country-specific nationalism, at the expense of either regional or continental integration (De Melo and Tsikata, 2015; Duthie, 2011; Aleme, 2011; Akwen, 2011). At the national level, many citizens experience social and political exclusion because of their ethnicity, religion and consanguinity (Erikson, 1968, p. 23; Fraser, 1996, p. 4-6; Norman, 2023, p. 55-56).

For many academics and researchers in southern Saharan Africa, the poor outcomes to date on African economic integration have rendered research and studies on integration stale, or "a subject which is of little or no interest" (Duthie, 2011, p. 1-4). When national political leaderships were in the hands of personalities like Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, it was not only African scholars that were interested in African integration, but a myriad of institutions, including research institutes, security agencies, multinational corporations and governments. Invoking the concept of integration at the formative stages of the newly independent nations, leaders like Nkrumah, Kaunda and Nyerere accepted the basic thinking articulated by the first president of Ghana on the eve of independence on 6th March 1957: that the independence of each of the member nations of Africa "was meaningless unless each was linked to the total liberation of Africa" (Nkrumah, 1957). Such sentiments helped to fuel massive support for South Africa's struggle for liberation from the apartheid system, which continued with some fervency until the final settlement of the white supremacy question by Nelson Mandela and Frederik Willem de Klerk in 1994.

> The record of regional integration in Africa so far has been a sobering one, and many regional groupings are marked by uncoordinated initiatives, political conflicts and low levels of intra-regional trade, although the external and domestic factors that impeded African integration in the past have improved in recent years (Harsch, 2002, p. 1).

In today's sub-Saharan Africa, concepts of continental integration and re-integration appear to be surviving on life support from the Secretariats of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Southern African Development Community (SADC); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); East African Community (EAC); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) and other elements of these such as trade integration, productive integration, macroeconomic integration, infrastructure integration and the free movement of people. S.K.B. Asante (1997) saw these developments as positive signs that regional and continental integration represented "the consolidation of the African economic space through the formation of subregional common markets leading eventually to a continental common market and economic community" (Asante, 1997, p. xiv; 1). Notice that each one of these dimensions has been subjected to substantial limitations and disruptions, due to different roles, structures, mandates and foci of each one of these regional blocs. This will be discussed in more detail later on in this book. These regional groups were suggested by the 1990 Lagos Plan of Action for the Development of Africa and the Abuja Treaty of 1991, which proposed the creation of the Regional Economic Communities "with a view to regional and eventually continental integration" (Africa Regional Integration Index, 2023).

On or about the 19th February 2023, the African Union Convention on Cross-Border Cooperation, also known as the Niamey Convention, was ratified by the Ghanaian Parliament, in accordance with Article 75 of the 1992 Constitution of Ghana. It appears Ghana operates under monist and dualist concepts of international law with respect to the incorporation of international protocols and conventions into its domestic legal framework, depending upon the specific protocol and the promoter of that protocol. But the parliamentary ratification of the protocol was intended to improve Ghana's image as a country, which is committed to the African Union and ECOWAS. So far, only 17 of the 55 AU member states have signed the Convention, and only 5 of those 17 have ratified it and deposited the instruments of ratification with the AU Commission in accordance with

Article 17 of the Convention (Adu, 2023, personal communications). Such policies and regulations tend to eat into the spirit of regional integration due to the misapplication of the regulation or policy at national and operational levels. Despite these developments, the incidence of identity politics, identitarian adverse activities on immigrants and migrants, Afroxenophobia and vigilante activities in a dozen African nations in the last decade and, even now, show that the promulgation of regional or continental treaties does not positively influence the functioning and capabilities of the individual citizens of those respective nations. Further, African central governments are not in tune with the needs of their people, rendering performative security and safety services to them and guaranteeing them freedom from fear and intimidation.

This book investigates whether these new regional and continental groupings collectively possess the glue that will bind the continent or the respective regions together, or if it encourages social exclusion (De Melo and Tsikata, 2015). The member nations in sub-Saharan Africa appear to adopt the segregationist approach of "separate but equal" when it comes to regional integration concerned with national development. This approach is akin to parochialism – a narrow outlook on the affairs of men by a group, person or nation. In international relations and diplomacy studies, researchers such as Holsti (1987), Bilgin (2018), and Smith (2018) have cautioned against the adoption of parochial approaches to nations' engagement with each other. It is problematic to separate one period of international thought, development and dealings from another because international relations operate in a continuum, both in terms of geopolitical and national aspirations and interests. Parochialism lends itself to identitarianism and Afro-xenophobic tendencies because of the bigotry underlying the identitarian philosophy. In terms of how it is adopted for this book, parochialism theory presumes "the life of one nation is not more significant than the life of any other nation." It further assumes that the progressive development of one nation is not inversely related to that of another nation because each is separate and independent of the other. Additionally, due to the different vulnerabilities of each nation, as well as competition and national abilities, the development of the respective African nations cannot be mutually promoted and supported by other nations. Each nation ought to take care of its own strategic development and progress in order not to be pulled down by the inertia of the others.

Parochialism used in this context goes further and provides the emotional and intellectual impetus for intra-country identity politics, identitarianism and even xenophobic tendencies. Ultimately, it brings about the violent

expression of hate for the citizens of one nation through vigilante conduct. The anti-cosmopolitan elements of parochialism have been the bane of the respective African nations in the sub-Saharan region since the dawn of the independent movements of the formerly colonized nations in Africa. This manifests in the way the various parliaments promulgate new laws, how their highest courts interpret those laws, and in the manner that justice is administered in those nations.

Since these nations became independent, their intellectuals, political leaders, university lecturers, basic school-teachers and the huge bureaucratic establishments collectively have not wanted to combine their national resources, wealth, and other material and intrinsic assets in a collaborative manner with those of other nations. Their national pride, egoism and desire to preserve their respective cultural identities, as if they are fixed in perpetuity, continue to gnaw at their conscience, embedding a belief that such a move would lead to a loss of self-identity. These new groupings, in common with what has been observed by other researchers on European integration and the good efforts of the European Union, would themselves provide the cleavages that would splinter the African continent into blocs or sectional political units. Again, this would come down to ethnic egoism, feelings of cultural relativism, and the political classes of the various nations having parochial aspirations of prominence, validity and relevance. African unity itself appears to have been replaced by the sectionalism, regionalism and nationalism of the various nations, which is reinforced by disparate cultural and language differences, relative economic vulnerabilities and geopolitical idiosyncrasies, dictated by geopolitical influences from the United States of America, Britain and Canada on one side; from China, India and Russia on the other side; and from the Middle East and the rest of Asia (South Korea, Taiwan, Japan) on yet another arm of the geopolitical divide.

Today, each nation is for itself, and God is for us all. Despite the continuing efforts of the AU as well as the efforts of regional conglomerates such as the Economic Community of West Africa, Southern African Development Community and even the African Continental Free Trade Area, all meant to promote regional and continental integration and accelerated mutual economic development, there still remains strong nationalist impulses that often disrupt these efforts. As each nation strives to outdo the other in the competition to be the fastest and best developing nation in sub-Saharan Africa, to the applause of the Western nations, those with political power and proximity to government funds restrict access to opportunities and public investments. Some government functionaries use investments in

infrastructure as a vehicle to siphon huge payouts to themselves by way of illegal kickbacks and commissions. Such a situation creates a number of conflicting social notions for wealth creation and raises many troubling questions as to who has access or who should be granted access to opportunities for individual and group development. In some of the market economies of Africa where official corruption is observed to be generally expected and accepted as an occupational cost of doing business, questions about the denial of access to opportunities are often being asked but not resolved. The incidences of such cases have emerged with frequency and, in some cases, have coalesced into social and economic operational thought and tradition (Seka, 2009, p. 160).

An analysis of recent xenophobic and vigilante attacks on foreigners and migrants in Europe and Africa will be discussed in more detail later in this chapter. Identitarianism, or the European brand of the far-right political dogma, is built on an adherence to the concept of a homogeneity of race or ethnicity, culture, religion, language, and the general aspirations of a body politic. This is the same as the basic foundations of a Pan-Africanism design. Identity politics is typified by the systematic exclusion of people with dissimilar ethnicity, racial characteristics and disparate sociopolitical belief-systems. The aim is to show how these concepts are being deployed by certain sociopolitical elements in Europe against Africans and other migrants, or even legal immigrants. It also shows, broadly, how Africans in some African nations deploy the same tools of hate and exclusion towards other Africans of different nationalities by using physical attacks, economic sabotage and the invasion of businesses owned by foreigners, despite their many years of investment into African economic integration. Such experiences have previously occurred in Nigeria, South Africa, Ghana, Uganda, Gabon, Angola, Kenya, and others. The chapter concludes that the European brand of identitarianism and xenophobia, in all of its hostilities, is not intrinsically different from the Afro-xenophobic foundations of Pan-Africanism found in African societies even today. What is different is that identity politics is actively practised within the culturally-relative African democracies, where the party in power doles out appointments and contracts to both deserving and undeserving political party operators, related persons and entities (Norman, 2022).

Chapters two, six and seven cover identity politics, the causes, reasons and persistence, and the continuing adoption of it in party politics and national development, as well as the effects of these on constitutional democracy and the rule of law, the judiciary and the administration of justice. It also looks at how the conduct affects productivity, professionalism and a collective

sense of community. Identity politics is inimical to a rational devotion to one's nation, due to the tendency of the victims of identity politics to adopt antisocial behaviour in favour of intergroup interest. The chapters will focus on the interactions between two or more individuals who are fully determined because of their respective memberships of a given political party or various social group under the umbrella of a political party, but who are also not affected by inter-individual personal relationships between the people involved, such as the rank and file of a political party (Tajfel et al., 1979, p. 33-34). The chapters rely on expansive literature available on grounded theory to discuss the motivations of people when they react to the material manifestation of identity politics. The discussion will look at the effect on their wellbeing, using an integrative theory of intergroup conflict (Tajfel et al., 1979).

This theory suggests that individuals define their own identities with regard to social groups of which they may be a part, and that such identifications may work to protect and improve self-identity through the elevation of the group. The issue of differential vulnerabilities within the group will be discussed in connection with relative deprivation theory. This will explain the factors contributing to the growth or the phenomena of identity politics in Ghana. The theory stems from sociology and was put forward in the 1930s by both Garry Runciman and Ted Gurr (Janse 2020). It explains the dissatisfaction caused by the comparison between one person's or one group's situation and another's. When people feel they are being deprived of something that is valuable to them, they organize or join social movements dedicated to obtaining the things of which they feel deprived. In plural democracies, such movements are a constant part of life but, in developing nations like those in sub-Saharan Africa, where autonomy and political expression are repressed by unaccommodating regimes and government, social movements built around group interests are opportunities for central government to demonstrate power over the social group and destroy their quest for self-identity, self-expression and a sense of wellbeing. The exception to this is if those interests collide with the political interests.

The relative deprivation theory is very important in relation to wealth distribution, redistribution of the rules of equity, fairness and level of effort. When citizens of a country feel they are being denied access to resources despite their best efforts, they engage in disputes to seek justice and claim those resources (Duclos, 2001). Runciman (1966) cautioned the use of relative deprivation theory since it belongs to social movement theory (which focuses on social, cultural and political manifestations and

consequences) and may not necessarily relate to factors contributing to wealth creation and wealth distribution. The theory is fraternal in focus and more relevant than egoistic in terms of the transformation of existing structures of social inequalities among a given community or population. Critics of relative deprivation theory have argued that it fails to explain why some people who, though deprived of resources, fail to take part in the social movements that are focused on attaining those things. Additionally, supporters of relative deprivation theory argue that many people simply want to avoid conflict and the difficulties they might encounter by joining a movement with no guarantee of a better life as a result. Relative deprivation theory does not account for people who take part in movements that do not benefit them directly (Runciman, 1966).

In discussing the causes, reasons and nature of identity politics, these chapters will rely on theories of conflict and conflict resolution, including Burton's basic needs theory, Deutsch's conflict resolution theory and the Bush and Folger conflict transformation theory. Burton (1990) proposed the basic needs theory for resolving conflicts. The basic proposition of this theory is that every conflict can be resolved if the basic needs of the people in the conflict are addressed. This can be done before the conflict further escalates. The theory provides that every conflict resolution process should first look for the basic needs and grievances of the parties. It is easier said than done but, once this is done, the conflict is prevented from becoming a protracted one. The theory also asserts that humans have needs; these needs are synonymous with their survival. Actors in a conflict are humans who have needs. They demand either "needs", that are basic and non-negotiable, or "wants", which they can do without. Therefore, if those basic needs are not satisfied, the conflict will continue. Burton theorized that, in conflict resolution, the issue of the needs/interests of the actors always arises. If the needs of the actors are left out in a conflict management and resolution process, there may be a stalemate. The conflict will be of such a character that no suppressive means can contain it. Any attempts to suppress it will lead, on the contrary, to heightened tensions, making it possible to predict a total catastrophe (Burton, 1990).

Deutsch (1983) developed a conflict resolution theory that looked at the benefits of cooperation and competition during conflict resolution. In his view, several factors, like the nature of the dispute and the goals each party aims at, are pivotal in determining the kind of orientation a party would bring to the negotiating table in its attempt to solve the conflict. In the mundane operations of political parties in office, they tend not to engage in

wide consultations when matters of national importance arise and which affect every citizen irrespective of political party affiliation or antecedence.

Two basic values come to mind: competition and cooperation. Deutsch further predicts the type of interactions that would occur between negotiating parties as a result of their disputing style and suggests these would eventually lead to mutually beneficial options for settlement. On the other hand, a competitive approach leads to win-lose outcomes. This approach is inclined to intensify animosity and distrust between parties and is generally considered destructive. Political parties are self-renewing organisms that keep rising up to positions of governance every four years, waning if providence is not on their side. By their nature, political parties are triggers for social conflicts and misalignments, although they also possess the capacity to build peace and understanding between the populace and the electorate.

Bush and Folger (1994) argued that while referring to the interest-based and the human needs approach to resolving conflict, a solution that satisfies the interests and needs of each party could be reached through these conflict transformation processes. However, if the negative attitudes that have developed in each party during the conflict are not addressed, these could serve to generate further conflicts sometime later. Whereas conflict transformation aims at a fundamental change in the attitude or behaviour of individuals, or the relationship between two or more disputing parties, human needs theory aims at satisfying the needs of the parties which constitute their survival. In his contribution to theories of conflict resolution, Lederach (1995) uses the term “conflict resolution” to refer to peacebuilding. For building peace, destructive or negative communication patterns need to be transformed or replaced by constructive or positive interaction patterns. Like Bush and Folger, Lederach stresses the need to transform the disputing parties by empowering them to understand their situation and needs, as well as encouraging them to recognize the situation and needs of their opponents. Critics of Deutsch's cooperation approach to conflict resolution argue that both cooperation and competition are essential to some extent in resolving conflict, since negotiating a desirable agreement always includes common and diverse goals. Thus, finding a balance between these two approaches is the key to successful negotiation. One major criticism raised against Burton’s basic needs theory is that it only focuses on the internal conflicts among groups in the same country or community. Burton has also not indicated whether or not internal conflict resolution could involve collaborative approaches, as in the case of regional military cooperation. The theory also seeks to present all conflicts as resolvable against the

assumption that not all conflicts can be resolved but can be managed. A major strength of this theory is that it explains the practicalities of how conflicts emerge among social groups and how to deal with them. The theory presents the opportunity for the use of diplomatic tools such as mediation, negotiation and conciliation to prevent conflicts before they escalate.

In cases where there is a need for peacekeeping interventions, the peace negotiation processes should involve the tenets proposed by the theory to achieve peace between the parties. The choice of these theories for this portion of the book may be justified due to the optimism underlying this work. Despite the level of conflict or misunderstanding between the political parties and despite the intensity of the competition to win political power, there is a need for all the members of a community to feel as though they are essential members of the political party in power. The choice of this (Burton's theory) in this research is justified because it explains the processes for addressing internal conflicts that have become characteristic of contemporary African conflicts. Agreeably, conflicts in the world today are intra-state in nature. Conflicts are specific to regions and the dynamics may not be the same. However, Burton believes that his theory is useful in resolving every conflict, even if the needs or dynamics change.

Chapters eight and nine consider how identity politics and identitarianism lead to or promote official and petty corruption in public life and how these social developments can be curtailed, or even completely stopped. This is particularly challenging since the economic burden of corruption is so huge. Specifically, Chapter Eight discusses identity politics and presidential prerogative, privilege and the abuse of office. This segues into Chapter Nine, which focuses on identity politics and endemic corruption in sub-Saharan Africa due to the lack of judicial enforcement of the law, policies and standards. Chapters ten and eleven consider identity politics vis-à-vis presidential prerogative and the abuse of public employment opportunities, or the quartermaster hypothesis that, because the government is the biggest employer in many of these African nations, the presidents are the chief allocators of wealth and public goods in that space. If the allocations were equitable and fair, no one would raise any voice of discontent. Often the allocations are skewed to favour others closest to the presidents. Chapter eleven takes over from this point and probes the nexus between national development, leadership, normative ethics and identity politics. It poses the question as to how the unfair distribution of the national wealth affect national development? Chapter twelve positions the OAU/AU in the middle of all the expectations and aspirations of the people: How to preserve

national identities, promote African integration and push for economic development while at the same time preserving national identities. The final chapter attempts to pull together the lessons learned from the other chapters and draws conclusions, while at the same time, emphasizing the need to address the issues raised in chapters ten through twelve on how domestic actors and international collaborators such as the OAU could help to re-direct development goals to benefit the populations in the respective nations.

CHAPTER TWO

THE TYPOLOGY OF IDENTITARIANISM, AFROXENOPHOBIA AND VIGILANTISM ON THE WORLD AND AFRICAN STAGES

Chapter One of this book attempts to define identitarianism in the context of sub-Saharan Africa, together with Afroxenophobia, vigilantism and other critical social issues that challenge the continent in numerous ways and cause a great deal of social misalignment. The extensive literature review will help to further explain what these concepts are about in Europe or in the Western industrialized nations and in Africa. It is also an investigation into the similarities and shared values between identitarianism, xenophobia and vigilantism, and analyses of recent xenophobic and vigilante attacks of foreigners and migrants in Europe and Africa. The themes contained in this chapter were first published in my paper under the short title, "The Axis of Hate" (2022). I have expanded those aspects of the paper which were left unexamined due to the page limitations of journal papers. It is my thesis that the European brand of identitarian ideology is vastly different from the way segregation in the south and deep south of the United States of America came about or even how apartheid was implemented in South Africa. This is supported by researchers such as Eleanor Penny (2019), Herbert Blumer (1958), Thomas J. Espenshade and Katherine Hempstead (1996) and Braam Hanekom & Leigh Ann Webster (2009).

Despite this observation, my goal in this work, as it was in the previously published paper, is to show that there are really no great differences between identitarianism, Afroxenophobia and vigilantism, although they are practiced differently in Africa compared to in Europe. While identitarianism and Afroxenophobia are two distinct types of hate crime, vigilantism or violent behaviour is the means through which either identitarianism or Afroxenophobia obtains its tortuous expressions. Vigilantism is a criminal act built on two basic requirements for the commission of crime: *mens rea* and *actus reus*. In vigilantism, all the vectors of *mens rea* and *actus reus* come into play: recklessness and negligence on the one hand and, on the