

# Exchanges of Culture, Policy, and Goods from 1492 to the Future



# Exchanges of Culture, Policy, and Goods from 1492 to the Future:

*The Americas Reach Out*

Edited by

Joshua Hyles

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The Americas Reach Out

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*This volume is dedicated to my indefatigable wife, Autumn, without  
whom much of this work would have been lost to the ether.*

*Little in life is possible without the support of those you love*

*And nothing is as sweet.*



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# INTRODUCTION

This volume is a collection of essays presented at both the 2021 and 2022 Eugene Scassa Mock Organization of American States annual conferences. The ESMOAS is celebrating its thirtieth year, and is a consortium of universities across the United States, Mexico, and the Caribbean, who participate in two annual conferences—the Collegiate Summit of the Americas (in which students compete in a Model United Nations format but focus on the countries of the Western Hemisphere and simulate the meetings of the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas), and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Moot Court Competition (in which, college students compete in a moot court format and try a hypothetical human rights case in the style of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, or IACHR).

The conferences have been wildly successful and have resulted in hundreds, if not thousands, of students who have entered the public and private sector with a greater understanding of the countries that comprise the Americas, the Inter-American system of diplomacy and relations, and the Americas' place in the world, both culturally and economically.

It is a pleasure to work with these faculty and students, who are represented in this collection from the undergraduate to the graduate, to the faculty member and field expert. The breadth of topics and range of approaches represented here is not an accident—it is meant as a reflection of the incredible complexity and scope of The Americas, and what it means to be a part of it.

—Joshua Hyles  
Executive Program Director  
Eugene Scassa MOAS

## **SECTION ONE**

### **CONSIDERING DISCRIMINATION & RACISM IN THE AMERICAS**

## CHAPTER ONE

# ECUADORIAN FOREIGN POLICY RESPONSES TO THE MASSIVE MIGRATION OF VENEZUELANS

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### **Abstract**

The economic chaos in Venezuela comes hand in hand with one of the most serious political crises in the history of the nation. Political and economic instability has encouraged the massive migration of Venezuelans to other states in the region. Although Peru does not share a border with Venezuela, this country has the second largest number of Venezuelan migrants after Colombia. Ecuador has a smaller but still relevant presence of Venezuelan migrants. I argue that as a xenophobic country in front of the presence of foreign citizens, several speeches reflect practices of securitization and rejection of the “other” in Ecuador. These practices in Ecuador promote greater control of the entrance of Venezuelan migrants, and those who are in the country, are discouraged to remain there. In this paper, I examine the causes of the economic and political crisis in Venezuela as the source of the massive migration of Venezuelans in the region. I also analyze the content of the web page of the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility to understand the relationship between migration and security, paying particular attention to the ways Ecuador securitizes migratory flows from Venezuela through its foreign policy discourses and practices.

### **Causes of the Economic and Political Crisis in Venezuela**

Mishandling of oil revenues by Venezuelan leaders is considered the main cause of the current economic crisis suffered by the Venezuelan state. Venezuela has been known internationally as one of the oil countries with the largest oil reserves. The first oil well was drilled in 1912. The oil production that began in the early 1920s and directed mainly by foreign

investors, nevertheless, was stopped with nationalization talks in the 60s and 70s. This situation did not allow for adequate development of the industry.<sup>1</sup> Due to the consequences of the period known as the *Oil Crisis of 1973*, Venezuelan oil quadrupled its price from 1972 to 1974; this international crisis took place as result of the decision of several countries of the Persian Gulf not to export oil to Western countries. The unprecedented increase in government revenues allowed the president of that period, Carlos Andrés Pérez, to promise that the country would develop economically in a few years. Pérez began to nationalize the oil industry to achieve this goal; by 1976, this sector was completely nationalized.<sup>2</sup> *Petróleos de Venezuela* (PDVSA) was the resulting company, which was in charge of coordinating, planning and supervising the oil industry. PDVSA became one of the most important oil companies in the 1980s with its purchase power, buying refineries all over the world. Particularly, in the United States, the Venezuelan state bought the company CITGO.

The process of nationalization continued to develop in successive administrations and to diverse sectors under a discourse against neoliberalism. Hugo Chávez was the first anti-neoliberal presidential candidate to win elections in the region on December 6, 1998. Before this shift in Venezuela's politics, this country had suffered two serious financial difficulties, the devaluation of the exchange rate of the 1980s and the banking crisis of 1994. These crises intensified the already complex levels of social inequality. Consequently, these events created a deep distrust in pro-status quo politicians and in the Venezuelan business sector that encouraged neoliberalism.<sup>3</sup> When Hugo Chávez was elected President of Venezuela in 1998, he promised to end corruption and poverty generated by neoliberal policies. With this goal in mind, Chávez came into conflict with the administration of PDVSA, which for the past fifteen years had been dedicated to producing as much oil as possible, regardless of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas. The outcome was, first, a constant rotation of the presidents of PDVSA and, later, a total confrontation between the Chávez government and the oil industry. Chávez used this conflict to argue that what the oil industry needed

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<sup>1</sup> Diego Restuccia, "The monetary and fiscal history of Venezuela," *Becker Friedman Institute for Economic at the University of Chicago*, July 2018, [https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/diegor/research/MFHLA\\_paper.pdf](https://www.economics.utoronto.ca/diegor/research/MFHLA_paper.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> Gregory Wilpert, "The Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in Venezuela," *Venezuelanalysis.com*, August 30, 2003, <https://venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/74>.

<sup>3</sup> Leslie Gates, *Electing Chavez: The Business of Anti-Neoliberal Politics in Venezuela*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2010.

was a complete re-nationalization because it had become too independent of the state and had become a “state within a state”.<sup>4</sup> One of the main factors in the popularity of the Chávez government, therefore, was to retake control of the national oil company PDVSA. It became imperative to utilize the abundant oil revenues, not for the benefit of a small oligarchic class as previous governments had, but to build the necessary infrastructure and invest in the social services that Venezuelans urgently needed. Within a ten-year period, the Chavista government increased social spending by 60.6%, a total of \$ 772 billion.<sup>5</sup> In addition, the Chavista administration nationalized many companies, from farms to factories, and directed oil revenues to welfare and import programs, based on high oil prices. This fact apparently had a positive effect on the economy and significantly reduced poverty and unemployment.<sup>6</sup> Noticeably, these measures had the support of leftist groups and the low-income population. The business sector and the Venezuelan right wing, conversely, continually showed their dissatisfaction with the measures implemented through several protests organized against the Chavista regime.

The administration of Hugo Chávez was not exempt from making mistakes as his predecessors did. Oil represents almost all of Venezuela's export earnings. Instead of adequately managing its natural resources during the boom years to survive price declines, Venezuela had budget deficits every year.<sup>7</sup> Between 2005 and 2014, oil prices were high. During this time, the Chavista government maintained an overvalued exchange rate that began with an increase in prices at the end of 2003.<sup>8</sup> When oil was at its peak during the Chavez regime, it reached \$140 per barrel; however, for the budget to equalize, it would have had to be \$250 per barrel.<sup>9</sup> In 2008, when

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<sup>4</sup> Wilpert, “The Economics, Culture, and Politics of Oil in Venezuela.”

<sup>5</sup> Carlos Muntaner et al., “The Achievements of Hugo Chavez,” *Counterpunch*, December 14, 2012. <https://www.counterpunch.org/2012/12/14/the-achievements-of-hugo-chavez/>

<sup>6</sup> Brook Larmer, “What 52,000 Percent Inflation Can Do to a Country,” *New York Time Magazine*. November 1, 2018, <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/01/magazine/venezuela-inflation-economics.html>

<sup>7</sup> Uri Friedman, “What It Looks Like When Populism Fails,” *The Atlantic*. June 4, 2017, <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/06/venezuela-populism-fail/525321/>

<sup>8</sup> Javier Corrales, “The House that Chavez Built,” *Foreign Policy*. March 7, 2013, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/03/07/the-house-that-chavez-built/>

<sup>9</sup> Ana Quintana, “The Troubling Situation in Venezuela,” (Tim Doescher, Interviewer). *Heritage Explains*. August 17, 2018,

oil prices fell temporarily, the president continued to spend money as he had before prices fell; he continued to spend much beyond the country's means, and did not anticipate the forthcoming economic crisis.

The negative consequences of these policies had already begun to show in 2010, beginning with growing shortages. Nicolás Maduro, who succeeded Hugo Chávez after his death in 2013, has continued with Chávez's policies: spending beyond the capacity of the country and worsening the economic situation.<sup>10</sup> The fall in oil prices in 2014 from \$115 per barrel to \$70 gave another noteworthy blow to the Venezuelan economy, and triggered in the economic chaos that persists today.<sup>11</sup> Maduro's refusal to acknowledge the economic problems along with his repression of the political opposition worsened the circumstances affecting Venezuela.

The economic turmoil in Venezuela comes hand in hand with one of the most serious political crises in the history of the nation. In the first half of 2014, Venezuela suffered a disturbing event, comparable only to the 1989 *Caracazo* and the 2002 coup against Chávez. After several electoral setbacks, the opposition took to the streets to demand the resignation of the leftist president, Nicolás Maduro. On April 14, 2014, one month after the death of Hugo Chávez, elections were held to replace the former leader. Nicolás Maduro, as interim president since the death of Chávez, was nominated as his successor. In one of the most disputed presidential elections that Venezuelans had seen since the late 1960s, Maduro was elected president of the Bolivarian Republic; only a margin of 1.59 percentage points gave him a victory over his opponent, Henrique Capriles.<sup>12</sup> This political adversary invited his supporters to protest; the protesters proclaimed they had an illegitimate president until every vote was

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<https://www.heritage.org/americas/heritage-explains/the-troubling-situation-venezuela>

<sup>10</sup> Naím, M. and F. Toro, "Venezuela's Suicide: Lessons from a Failed State," *Foreign Affairs*, November/December 2018, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-america/2018-10-15/venezuelas-suicide>

<sup>11</sup> Silvana Ordoñez, "Venezuela's Future? 'Barbarity and People Looting'," *CNBC*, December 1, 2014, <https://www.cnb.com/2014/12/01/falling-crude-oil-prices-crush-venezuelas-ailing-economy.html>.

<sup>12</sup> Juan Masullo, "Making sense of 'La Salida'. Challenging Left-Wing Control in Venezuela," in *Global Diffusion of Protest: Riding the Protest Wave in the Neoliberal Crisis*, ed. Donatella della Porta (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2017) 85-112.

counted again. During the massive protests in 2014, the government arrested, tortured and killed several protesters.

The breakdown of the Venezuelan economy and the emergence of a conflictive political scenario have motivated the opposition to carry out drastic measures and seek support from the international community. Venezuela's inflation rate at the end of 2018 reached 80,000% per year, making it almost impossible for Venezuelans to buy basic products to cover daily needs.<sup>13</sup> Poverty, hunger and some diseases, once considered almost eradicated, are flourishing. The repression of protesters is permanent. All these elements contributed to the fact that on January 23, 2019, Juan Guaidó, an opposition legislator, proclaimed himself as interim president in an effort to take power from Maduro, after the latter had been sworn into his second term of six years. The May 2018, election won by Maduro was widely disputed by many as a fraudulent re-election. Since the self-proclamation of Guaidó as interim president, many foreign governments have officially recognized Guaidó as president of Venezuela,<sup>14</sup> and among these was the government of Ecuador. The Ecuadorian President Lenin Moreno, recommended that free elections be called, with international observation, with the aim of inaugurating a new stage of democratic prosperity. Furthermore, an article in the newspaper *El Comercio* on February 7, 2019, reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility of Ecuador recognized René De Sola Quintero as Ambassador of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela before the Republic of Ecuador who was designated by the Acting President Juan Guaidó.<sup>15</sup>

## Massive Migration of Venezuelans in the Region

The massive exodus of Venezuelans, considered the largest in Latin America in the last 50 years, is not only the result of an economic crisis, but also of political chaos. According to an interview with Eric L. Olson, deputy

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<sup>13</sup> Steve Hanke, "Venezuela's Hyperinflation Hits 80,000% Per Year in 2018," *Forbes*, January 1, 2019, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/stevehanke/2019/01/01/venezuelas-hyperinflation-hits-80000-per-year-in-2018/#573c87474572>.

<sup>14</sup> Luc Cohen, "How Venezuela Got Here: A Timeline of the Political Crisis," *ABS CBN news*, January 29, 2019, <https://news.abs-cbn.com/overseas/01/29/19/how-venezuela-got-here-a-timeline-of-the-political-crisis>.

<sup>15</sup> "Ecuador Reconoce a Designado de Juan Guaidó, René De Sola Quintero, como Nuevo Embajador de Venezuela," *El Comercio* February 7, 2019, <https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/cancilleria-reconocimiento-rene-sola-quintero.html>.



director of the Latin America Program at the Wilson Study Center, based in Washington D.C., the only migration that is comparable to Venezuela would be that of El Salvador, which experienced substantial emigration in the 1980s.<sup>16</sup> Venezuelans who have made the decision to migrate have lost everything. With their savings eliminated by hyperinflation, many Venezuelans struggle to buy basic products and die due to the lack of affordable medicines. The average Venezuelan reports losing 24 pounds in the last year due to rising food prices and their scarcity.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, as previously explained, all the protests against Nicolás Maduro's regime have been repressed with excessive use of force.

Several countries in the region have received many migrants fleeing from Venezuela. Three million Venezuelans have been forced to migrate due to economic and humanitarian reasons to other countries in South America; nevertheless, there are also Venezuelans in Mexico, Central America, Europe, the United States, Canada, and the Caribbean.<sup>18</sup> Given the geographical proximity, Colombia has become the country in the region that has received the largest number of Venezuelan citizens. It is estimated that 4,000 Venezuelan migrants cross the border into Colombia every day.<sup>19</sup> At present, more than 1.3 million Venezuelans are settled in Colombia, and despite overwhelming the Colombian government and its resources, Colombia is one of the most welcoming and open countries for Venezuelan migrants. For many years, the roles were reversed, and many Colombians massively immigrated to Venezuela due to the violence of drug cartels, guerrillas, and paramilitary groups. This has led the Colombian state and its

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<sup>16</sup> “Crisis de Venezuela: El Éxodo de Los Venezolanos es el Mayor de Latinoamérica en los Últimos 50 Años,” *El Universo*, August 28, 2018, <https://www.eluniverso.com/noticias/2018/08/24/nota/6921038/crisis-venezuela-exodo-venezolanos-es-mayor-latinoamerica-ultimos>

<sup>17</sup> Geoff Ramsey, “Regional Responses to the Venezuelan Exodus,” *Washington Office for Latin America-WOLA*, November 19, 2017, [https://venezuelablog.org/regional-responses-venezuelan-exodus/?utm\\_source=WOLA+Mailing+List&utm\\_campaign=e46873c534-EMAIL\\_CAMPAIGN\\_2017\\_11\\_30&utm\\_medium=email&utm\\_term=0\\_54f161a431-e46873c534-141825293](https://venezuelablog.org/regional-responses-venezuelan-exodus/?utm_source=WOLA+Mailing+List&utm_campaign=e46873c534-EMAIL_CAMPAIGN_2017_11_30&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_54f161a431-e46873c534-141825293)

<sup>18</sup> Rebecca Hanson, “4 Charts Show Venezuela’s Worsening Migrant Crisis,” *The Conversation*, September 6, 2018, <http://theconversation.com/4-charts-show-venezuelas-worsening-migrant-crisis-102464>

<sup>19</sup> Megan Janetsky, “Here’s Why Colombia Opened Its Arms to Venezuelan Migrants— Until Now,” *Foreign Policy*, January 14, 2019, <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/01/14/heres-why-colombia-opened-its-arms-to-venezuelan-migrants-until-now/>

citizens to be comparatively more welcoming to Venezuelan migrants. Although Peru does not share a border with Venezuela, this country has the second largest number of Venezuelan migrants after Colombia. In September 2019, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) reported that there were 869,000 Venezuelans in Peru,<sup>20</sup> and the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) predicted that number would reach 1.4 million by the end of 2019.<sup>21</sup> Ecuador has a smaller presence of Venezuelan migrants but still significant. In an article published by the newspaper *La Hora* on April 12, 2019, Richard Martínez, Minister of Economy of Ecuador, during his participation in the conversation *Beyond Borders: A Look at the Venezuelan Exodus*, said that the 230,000 Venezuelan migrants who are in Ecuador represent 1.3% of the total Ecuadorian population.<sup>22</sup> However, recent data revealed by IOM reflects 330,000 Venezuelans in the country as of September 2019.<sup>23</sup> Many of these migrants use the country as transit to reach their final destination in Peru or Chile. Aware of this situation, on August 23, 2018, the Ecuadorian government activated the humanitarian corridor that allows the free, safe and orderly transfer of Venezuelan citizens who are on the northern border of Ecuador, to Huaquillas, border with Peru.<sup>24</sup> This measure lasted only five days.

Ecuador has been characterized as a xenophobic country in front of the presence of foreign citizens. Several speeches reflect practices of rejection of the “other.” For example, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, Ecuador criminalized Colombian citizens escaping from the armed conflict and requesting refugee status in the country. Another example has been the rejection of the presence of Cubans who took advantage of the measure given during the Rafael Correa administration of not requesting visa for a

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<sup>20</sup> International Organization of Migration, *Venezuela Refugee and Migrant Crisis*, November 13, 2019, <https://www.iom.int/countries/venezuela>

<sup>21</sup> Paula Dupraz-Dobias, “Worries Grow as More Venezuelans Look to Peru” *The New Humanitarian*, January 19, 2019. <https://www.irinnews.org/news-feature/2019/01/11/Peru-Venezuela-worries-grow-refugees-migrants-crisis>

<sup>22</sup> “Ecuador Invirtió 71,6 Millones en Servicios Sociales para Migrantes Venezolanos en 2018,” *La Hora*, April 12, 2019, <https://lahora.com.ec/noticia/1102235941/ecuador-invirtio-716-millones-en-servicios-sociales-para-migrantes-venezolanos-en-2018>

<sup>23</sup> International Organization of Migration, *Venezuela Refugee and Migrant Crisis*, November 13, 2019, <https://www.iom.int/countries/venezuela>

<sup>24</sup> Ministerio del Interior, *Ministerio del Interior Aclara Situación sobre Ingreso de Extranjeros al Ecuador*, 2018, <https://www.ministeriointerior.gob.ec/comunicado-3/>

stay of less than 90 days in the country, and who stayed in the country permanently. The xenophobia in Ecuador promotes greater control of the entrance of Venezuelan migrants, and those who are in the country, are pushed out of it. In this paper, I argue that xenophobia has encouraged practices of securitization within foreign policy. In the following section, I use the concept of securitization to analyze the security mechanisms used by the Ecuadorian government through its foreign policy discourse and practices to regulate migratory flows from Venezuela.

## **Ecuadorian Foreign Policy and Securitization of Migratory Flows from Venezuela**

Within the field of International Relations, securitization theory challenges classical approaches to security such as the realist state-centric perspective that equals security to military issues. The concept of securitization is associated with the Copenhagen school of security studies, which is represented by scholars such as Jaap de Wilde, Ole Wæver and Barry Buzan.<sup>25</sup> These three scholars co-authored *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (1998) which made two central contributions to the fields of security studies and international relations. First, securitization theory broadens beyond the military and political spheres; it introduces three additional sectors: environmental, economic, and societal. Second, it enhances our understanding about how and when topics become security issues. Securitization theory affirms that insecurity issues are not essentially threatening in themselves; rather, it is by referring to them as “security” issues that they become security problems.<sup>26</sup> In concrete terms, anything or anyone can become a threat if constructed as such. A topic becomes securitized only when the audience accepts the securitization as legit.<sup>27</sup> The Copenhagen school defines securitization as a speech act that has to fulfill three criteria: 1) An actor claims that a referent object is existentially threatened; 2) demands the right to take extraordinary countermeasures to deal with the threat; and 3) convinces an audience that rule-breaking behavior to tackle the threat is justified. In short, by labeling something as “security,” an issue becomes a priority that need to be dealt with extreme

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<sup>25</sup> Jonna Nyman, “Securitization Theory,” in *Critical Approaches to Security. An Introduction to Theories and Methods*, ed. by Laura J. Shepherd (London and New York: Routledge, 2013), 51-62.

<sup>26</sup> Clara Eroukhmanoff, *Securitisation Theory: An Introduction*, ed. by Stephen McGlinchey et al. (Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, 2017), 104-109.

<sup>27</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

urgency.<sup>28</sup> Scholars like Roxanna Sjöstedt (2017) claim that securitization theory adds value to foreign policy analysis.<sup>29</sup> For instance, if we apply the above criteria to foreign policy making, issues such as migration turn into a security matter that must be under control and surveillance.

In this paper, particular emphasis is given to the societal sector of securitization theory. According to the Copenhagen school, the societal sector refers to identity and the security of identity. The referent objects of security in this sector are communities that self-identify based on a shared identity.<sup>30</sup> Migration could be considered a threat to the survival and identity of a community.<sup>31</sup> In what follows, the paper analyzes the content of the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Mobility in Ecuador and local newspapers. The goal is to enhance our understanding of the *securitization of migration* by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility (actor), who asserts that the border and the Ecuadorian society (referent objects) are affected by the massive migration of Venezuelans fleeing the economic and political crisis. This claim demands to carry out emergency measures to tackle the emergent threat.

The surveillance of massive migration of Venezuelans has led the Ecuadorian government to declare a state of emergency and facilitate a humanitarian corridor. In August 2018, the Ecuadorian Government declared a state of emergency in the human mobility sector in the provinces of Carchi, Pichincha and El Oro, with the purpose of helping the unusual migratory flows of Venezuelan citizens who arrived along the northern border. The actions are based on the protection of rights for people, regardless of their migratory status. According to the Ministry of the Interior of Ecuador, the immigration control procedure is established in the *Ley Orgánica de Movilidad Humana* [Organic Law of Human Mobility], and, in the case of Venezuelan citizens, is determined in the Ecuadorian-Venezuelan Migratory Statute, which guarantees a safe, ordered and free migration. Due to border closures at the Colombian-Ecuadorian border, on

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<sup>28</sup> Rens Van Munster, "Securitization," *International Relations* (2012), <https://doi.org/10.1093/OBO/9780199743292-0091>.

<sup>29</sup> Roxanna Sjöstedt, "Securitization and Foreign Policy Analysis," *Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics: World Politics* (April 2017): 1-16, <https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.479>

<sup>30</sup> Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and Jaap de Wilde, *Security: A New Framework of Analysis* (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998).

<sup>31</sup> Jonna Nyman, "Securitization Theory," in *Critical Approaches to Security. An Introduction to theories and methods*, ed. Laura J. Shepherd (Routledge, 2013), 51-62.

September 8, 2019, the Colombian Ombudsman, Carlos Alfonso Negret, asked Ecuador to facilitate a humanitarian corridor for Venezuelan migrants, calling the Ecuadorian government decision to close the border a disrespectful measure that prevents reunification of families fleeing the regime of Nicolás Maduro.<sup>32</sup>

The securitization of migratory movements is reflected in several statistics compiled by Ecuador to monitor the type of Venezuelan population that enters its territory. An article in the newspaper *La Hora* on April 12, 2019 presented data published by the Ministry of Economy, in which is detailed that approximately 20% of the Venezuelan population in Ecuador is between 0 and 17 years old, and must be included in health and education services.<sup>33</sup> According to the Observatory of Sustainable Development (2018), Venezuelan migrants are in a productive stage, therefore, a labor integration policy would be extremely beneficial. The observatory advises that the absence of this type of policy can generate an increase in the underemployment rate, informality and salary reductions, increasing the tension between migrants and the Ecuadorian receiving community.<sup>34</sup> Therefore, from a societal dimension within securitization theory, if Venezuelans do not receive proper social services, they can become a potential threat to the Ecuadorian society.

The request of a passport and other identity documents for all Venezuelan citizens who wish to enter Ecuador, is a security mechanism used by securitization practices aimed at regularizing human mobility. At the beginning of August 2018, Ecuador declared a state of emergency in three border provinces before the massive arrival of Venezuelan migrants. This measure was announced by the Foreign Ministry of Ecuador, which noted that it seeks to prevent human trafficking and improve control of its borders. Therefore, the measure stipulates that any citizen of Venezuela who intends

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<sup>32</sup> “Colombia Pide a Ecuador y Perú Corredor Humanitario para Venezolanos,” *El Comercio*, September 8, 2019, <https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/colombia-pide-ecuador-peru-humanitario.html>

<sup>33</sup> “Ecuador Invirtió 71,6 Millones en Servicios Sociales para Migrantes Venezolanos en 2018,” *La Hora*, April 12, 2019, <https://lahora.com.ec/noticia/1102235941/ecuador-invirtio-716-millones-en-servicios-sociales-para-migrantes-venezolanos-en-2018>

<sup>34</sup> Alberto Castillo Aroca, “Venezolanos en Ecuador- Destino de Esperanzas,” *Observatorio de Desarrollo Sostenible*, July 20, 2018, <https://www.olds2030.org/2018/07/venezolanos-en-el-ecuador-esperanzas-laborales.html>

to enter Ecuadorian territory must do so with a valid and current passport.<sup>35</sup> Despite the declaration of emergency, this measure was not implemented. An article in the Venezuelan newspaper *El Universal* reports on August 25, 2018 that, due to the decision of Judge Judith Naranjo to annul the possibility of requesting a passport, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, José Valencia, indicated that Ecuador will request validation of an identity card to Venezuelans for allegations of falsification.<sup>36</sup> Despite the fact that the request for a passport has not been carried out, on January 24, 2019, an article in the newspaper *El Comercio* tells the case of Juan Rojas and his daughter Valentina, who were denied entry into Ecuador in the International Bridge of Rumichaca, in Carchi province. The girl did not have a passport and she did not have authorized permission from her mother to make the trip, because her mother is in Lima, Peru waiting for her family.<sup>37</sup> In short, decisions such as this one made by Ecuador demonstrate how securitization is implemented in the field of foreign affairs, complicating the situation of Venezuelans seeking to enter the country. The process to obtain a passport in Venezuela may take more than a year. Due to the high demand and cost of a passport, it is a document extremely difficult for Venezuelans to access.

The massive migration of Venezuelans in Ecuador is viewed as an illegitimate mobility that must be securitized through the request of criminal record as a risk profiling technique. In a different context, Robert Pallitto and Josiah Heyman (2008) examine the effects of post 9/11 security programs on mobility into and within the United States; the study shows the manifest inequalities resulting from the mobility control practices. For instance, retinal scanning and vehicle preclearance are analyzed according to the differential effects they generate in terms of risk. These differentiations suggest that individuals and groups will be identified in unequal ways as

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<sup>35</sup> Boris Miranda, "Por qué Ecuador Decidió Exigir Pasaporte a los Miles de Ciudadanos de Venezuela que Ingresan Cada Día en el País," *BBC*, August 17, 2018, <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-45227142>.

<sup>36</sup> "Ecuador Pedirá Validación de Cédula de Identidad a Venezolanos por Denuncias de Falsificación," *El Universal*, August 25, 2018, <http://www.eluniversal.com/internacional/18726/ecuador-pedira-validacion-de-cedula-de-identidad-a-venezolanos-pese-a-anulacion-de-exigencia-de#>.

<sup>37</sup> Sara Ortiz, "Migrantes que Llegan a Rumichaca Cuentan lo Difícil que es Apostillar un Documento en Venezuela," *El Comercio*, January 24, 2019, <https://www.elcomercio.com/actualidad/migrantes-rumichaca-venezolanos-documentos-ecuador.html>.

safe or dangerous.<sup>38</sup> The same can be applied in the Ecuadorian case, the manifest inequalities resulting from the request of a criminal record as a type of mobility control practice suggest that Venezuelans are identified in unequal ways (safe vs. dangerous), this request will in turn contribute to Venezuelans experiencing their mobility differently. Venezuelans' identities are impacted upon when the Ecuadorian government deploys the securitization of migration.

The securitization of migratory flows from Venezuela is reflected in the speeches and practices of the Ecuadorian foreign policy makers. The decision of Ecuador to request *pasado judicial apostillado* [criminal record check with apostille] for Venezuelan citizens was made after the femicide committed by a citizen of that nationality against his Ecuadorian partner, in Ibarra. This decision is not just another way to violate mobility rights as expressed by several human rights activists, but also reflects an exercise of securitization, the desire to control the flow of migrants and decide who has the right to remain in the Ecuadorian territory. On January 23, 2019 an article in *La Hora* included the opinion of Elsie Monge, director of the Ecumenical Commission of Human Rights against this controversial decision. In this article, Monge explains that the entire Venezuelan population cannot be criminalized, and what the regime has done is to divert attention from its inefficiency in combating violence against women.<sup>39</sup> In fact, the issue on social networks and the media was not seen as a problem of gender violence, but of nationality. The day after the femicide elapsed, the President of Ecuador, Lenin Moreno, published a tweet announcing the immediate formation of brigades to control the legal situation of Venezuelan immigrants on the streets, in the workplace and at the border.<sup>40</sup> Femicide became an excuse to deploy security mechanisms over the Venezuelan population.

Several sources from daily periodicals, *El Comercio* and *La Hora*, and the web page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility focus on the destabilization of the region, and the necessity of regional cooperation

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<sup>38</sup> Robert Pallitto and Josiah Heyman, "Theorizing Cross-Border Mobility: Surveillance, Security and Identity." *Surveillance & Society* 5, no. 3 (2008): 315-333.

<sup>39</sup> "Organizaciones de DD.HH. Cuestionan Política Migratoria," *La Hora*, January 23, 2019, <https://www.lahora.com.ec/noticia/1102217013/organizaciones-de-ddhh-cuestionan-politica-migratoria->.

<sup>40</sup> José María León Cabrera, "La Xenofobia en Ecuador Empuja a Migrantes Venezolanos a Salir del País," *The New York Times en Español*, January 28, 2019, <https://www.nytimes.com/es/2019/01/28/ecuador-ibarra-venezolanos/>.

in order to help alleviate the effects felt by the migration crisis. The magnitude of the crisis with regard to human rights was mentioned by leaders within International Organizations such as the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, Michelle Bachelet. International organizations and foreign governments are repeatedly asked by the Ecuadorian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Human Mobility to help respond to the Venezuelan crisis and participate in talks and programs to help the crisis.<sup>41</sup> The policy implemented by Ecuador allowing migrants with a visa to pass through in order to reach the third country for which they have a visa was a policy that had to be implemented with the support and cooperation of other countries.<sup>42</sup> In addition, the Ecuadorian government repeatedly emphasizes that they will not intervene in the situation militarily to solve the crisis, and that the best solution is dialog. There is hopeful language for a peaceful transition for Venezuela, but not much in the way of a commitment to solving the root causes of the crisis in Venezuela.

## Conclusions

In this chapter, I have explained Ecuador's response through its foreign policy to the current Venezuelan migration crisis. I have discussed the importance of the analysis of foreign policy from a securitization point of view. Through the securitization of migration, Ecuador has taken several measures to control the migratory flow from Venezuela. These measures hinder the massive displacement of Venezuelan citizens and consolidate a mechanism of power to control migratory flows caused by the economic and political crisis in Venezuela and discriminate against Venezuelan migrants.

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<sup>41</sup> Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Movilidad Humana 2018a; 2018b; 2018c; 2018d; 2019a; 2019b; 2019c; 2019d; 2019e; 2019f; 2019g; 2019i; 2019j.

<sup>42</sup> El Comercio 2019e; 2019f; 2019g; 2019h; 2019i.



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