How Uruguay Became a Religious Ghetto

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A Deviant Case Study Explains Secularization in Modernity

By

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To Mary Ann, Maureen, Cullen, Stephen James, Evan, Shaun Thomas and Madelyn Mary because you endured with me through project's end.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

which led to a theory able to adjudicate between a positivist empirical paradigm on one hand and a postmodern constructivist paradigm on the other. I am off and running as a critical realist.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

- *The 1890 census of the Department of Montevideo indicates that 83 percent of the population consists of self-identified Catholics, five percent are Protestant, six percent are self-identified "liberals" and six percent did not respond.[1] The census of 1908, which also included a question regarding religious/philosophical affiliation, found that in Montevideo, 63 percent of the habitants fifteen years and older are self-identified Catholics, and 25 percent are "liberal". The demographic group that revealed the greatest change was males, who between 1890 and 1908 represented a 36 point differential (80 percent in 1890 to 44 percent in 1908).[2] These changes in religious affiliation occurred in spite of the collaboration between the Commission of the National Census and the ecclesiastical authorities with regard to the design of the census questions. Monseñor Isasa exhorted faithful Catholics of the Archdiocese of Montevideo reminding them of their duty and honor to declare their Catholic identity.[3]*

- *Noted Uruguayan scholar Zorrilla de San Martin in the year 1900 observed that; "If one remembers, in 1861, there was neither a single journalistic entity nor an individual who treated the 'religious question' without manifesting their fidelity to Catholicism. There is no better witness than words to measure the revolutionary transformation of conscience that has taken place in the country in less than fifteen years."* [4]

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[1] *El Censo Municipal del Departamento de la Ciudad de Montevideo*, 1892: 364-370 (cf. *Barran, 1988).*

[2] *El Anuario Estadístico de año 1908* Tomo II: Parte III, Montevideo páginas XXVI-XXVII; 948-49.

[3] "Circular: A los Señores Curas, Venerable Clero y Fieles." 1908, September 5. *La Semana Religiosa*, Montevideo, p. 8289-8290.

[4] Cited in Arturo Ardao. *Racionalismo y Liberalismo en el Uruguay, (*1962, 276).

- *Each year during Holy Week, the Club Francisco Bilbao placed an invitation in the periodical, La Idea Liberal, in order to invite "loyal liberals" to a "Banquet of Promiscuity" held at the Pyramid Hotel: nearly in front of the Cathedral in Montevideo on Holy Friday. On this day when Catholic faithful would fast, socialists, anarchists, liberals and the rest of the anticlerical elements participated in a grand gluttony, with an abundance of wine and bar-b-que. They did this in order to taunt and mock Catholics as they left the Mass in addition to present satires and poems ridiculing Catholics.*[5]

- *José Enrique Rodó, the great Uruguayan littérateur, himself an agnostic and ardent liberal, raised profound protest to the decision of the Batlle regime to remove crosses and religious symbols from hospitals in Uruguay. In an open letter entitled, "La Expulsión de los Crucifijos" Rodó expressed consternation by the "profound intolerance" bordering on fanaticism demonstrated by Batlle. Rodó, under no compulsion to defend Catholicism, defined excessive liberalism as "eminently intransigent" and compared it to "Jacobinism" which sought to persecute and expel those who profess Catholic faith.*[6]

- *Early in their establishment in Uruguay, the Methodists and Waldensians were united with liberals, rationalists and positivists in order to limit the influence of the Catholic Church. The Methodist's newsletter encouraged all Protestants in Uruguay to affiliate with the "Anticlerical League." In little time however, secularization reached the Protestants who withdrew their support from anticlericalism when the State secularized religious holidays thus renaming Christmas "the Day of the Family", Holy Week became "Week of Tourism" and Epiphany became "Children's Day".*[7] *Names of towns and barrios with religious connotations were changed to war heroes and other*

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[5] "Para el Jueves Santo." 1894, March 12. *La Idea Liberal.* Montevideo, p. 2; "Banquete Libre-Pensador." 1894, March 26. *La Idea Liberal.* Montevideo, p. 2; "Espectáculos Públicos." 1900, April 12. *El Liberal*, Montevideo, p. 2; (cf. Barrán et al. 1996 Tomo II, 50, da Silveira 2003, Da Costa 2003, 2009; Caetano and Geymonat 1997).

[6] Open letter published in the periodical *La Razón*, July 5 1906. Reprint found in *Ariel: Liberalismo y Jacobinismo,* Rodó 1968, 67-74. See also da Silveira (2003); Santa Ana (1965).

[7] Renaming religious holidays as secular ones and replacing religious names for geographic locations is consistent with Albania where State atheism was *de facto* since 1945 and constitutionally adopted in 1976 (Martin 1978, 239).

non-religious nomenclature.[8] The Methodists periodical attributed the action of the State to an "advancing Jacobinism" and declared that the law reflected a "blind and inconceivable intolerance guided by a recalcitrant sectarianism".[9] According to the Waldensian newsletter, "the government had engaged in a ruthless war against religion by dictating restrictive laws designed to destroy all religious sentiment and the soul of the nation".[10]

- *By the 1950's German Rama's survey (1956-1958) indicates that only 10% of the population of Montevideo attended Sunday Mass (1964, 14).*

- *A composite of quantitative analyses based on religious participation in Latin America in the last decade substantiate Uruguay's status as the most secular nation in Latin America* (See Table A.1)

These data points, quantitatively and qualitatively, suggest that Uruguayan society is an outlier when considering religious intensity among Latin American societies. This study makes the claim that Uruguay became an intensely secular society as it entered the 20th century and even more so as the century progressed. Uruguay presents a continuing paradox to sociologists of religion. Embedded in a continent characterized by relatively high religiosity and religious dynamism, how is it that Uruguay became the most secular society in the region? Religious pluralism on the continent has been the focus of extensive post-war scholarship in which religious change has been analyzed for its social, political and economic significance. In spite of a religiously charged environment represented by the growth of Protestantism in surrounding nations, how is it that Uruguay has entered modernity as steadfast secular society and has experienced minimal Pentecostal penetration?[11] More importantly, what does this

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[8] Da Costa (2009, 3-4) cites over thirty such changes where for example, a town name was changed from *Santa Isabel* to *Paso de los Toros*.

[9] *La Idea,* No. 38, January 19, 1919, Montevideo, p. 1

[10] *El Mensajero Valdense*, No. 10, November 1, 1919, Montevideo, p.161. See Geymonat 2004, 121-122*; Da Costa: 2003, 3; Ardao 1962, 380.

[11] Since 1960s, Protestantism has grown from 15 million to 48 million in 2000 representing 12 percent of the continent (PROLADES 2008, Johnstone and Mandryk 2001). In spite of religious change corresponding to the growth of Evangelicalism (Pentecostalism), Uruguay has shown the lowest levels of religious pluralism on the continent (Gill 1999). By most accounts, only 3 percent of Uruguayans claim to be Protestant (Barrett, Kurian, and Johnson 2001). Uruguay

pattern of religious quiescence tell us about recent theories of secularization? Is the enduring secularization of Uruguayan society an isolated and exceptional phenomenon or does it demonstrate generalized patterns of social configuration that contribute to our understanding of secularization? [12] By secularization I mean a decline of religious sentiment based on multiple poles of measure: societal, institutional and individual commitment. This study understands secularization according to a synthesis constructed from the best definitions found in recent scholarship that includes: 1) the decline of religion in terms of a loss of faith and decrease of religious participation; 2) the privatization of religion in the face of a declining public role; and 3) the differentiation of secular spheres from religious influence, such as politics, economy and science (Bruce 2002, Casanova 1994, Tschannen, cited in Dobbelaere 1999). [13]

For sociologists of religion, the case study of Uruguay's trajectory as a secular society in which religion has little public influence raises a number of interesting questions. How and when did religion lose saliency among

has provided relatively infertile ground for Evangelical (Pentecostal) growth compared to other Latin American countries.

[12] The notion of secularization has been difficult to conceptualize and define over the last 25 years simply due to varying interpretations. A handful of researchers considers secularization to be a dogma rather than a systematic set of interrelated propositions (Hadden 1987) or simply a generalization based on limited empirical findings to bolster an implicit ideology of progress (Glasner 1977). On the other hand, numerous attempts have been made to redefine and locate secularization processes in the post-modern and post-industrial era in such a way that makes sense between empirical data and theoretical concepts (Beckford 1989, Berger 1969, Wilson 1966, Martin 1978, Luckmann 1967, Dobbelaere 1985, 1987, Bruce 2002, Norris and Inglehart 2005). Because of varying interpretations and problems associated with theorizing the concept, some have suggested the utility of a secularization paradigm or family of theories that range from decline to transformation (Bruce 2002, Gorski 2000,141). The core element that is either implicitly or explicitly expressed in either the concept of secularization or religious vitality is change. The difficulty in defining secularization may be as Casanova points out, that secularization proper, as a historical process, is "unserviceable to the social sciences (1994, 19)." Having acknowledged the complexities associated with the concept, this study embraces the notion that secularization implies a diminished empirical intensity on a societal, institutional and individual level.

[13] For a recent empirical examination of the effects of religiosity and of religious identities on a broad range of attitudes and social practices in seven Latin American countries, see J. Samuel Valenzuela, Timothy R. Scully C.S.C., and Nicolás Somma, "Creencias Religiosas, Identidades y Religiosidad" in Eduardo Valenzuela et al. (eds.), *Vínculos, Creencias e Ilusiones: La Cohesión Social de los Latinoamericanos,* (2008, 105-140).

Uruguayans? What were the factors that contributed to the decline in religious commitments and identification among Uruguayans? How did religion become marginalized among the popular sectors? Was secularization simply the outcome of a natural and inevitable process of modernization? What role did conflict between secular and religious elites play in shaping the religious consciousness of Uruguayan society? Church-state tensions in emergent Latin-American republics are well documented. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to summarize the general development of church-state relationships in the Latin American region. Understanding the broad historical antecedents that contributed to the scope of church-state relationships among modernizing Latin American societies is essential for: 1) differentiating Uruguay from the universe of cases, and 2) shaping the research question. [14]

Historical Antecedents of the Church and State in Uruguay

We know that fissures in the colonial relationship between the Spanish Crown and the Church first emerged over *el Patronato real* resulting in a loss of institutional autonomy for the Church. Multiple expulsions of the Jesuits were a significant bench mark representing state authority over the Church. Heads of States in the early formation of new republics sought to establish a policy of national patronage (*Patronato nacional)* giving the state the capacity to utilize the church as a force to legitimize the state. The aim of republican regalism was to subject the Church to the state in order to unify civil society as a whole (Serrano 2008, Lynch1984, Richards1987, Gill 1998, Mecham 1966). Liberal democratic reform emerged from intra-elite conflict between liberals and conservatives whose origins pre-date independence. Conservatives were usually represented by oligarchical land owners and liberals consisted of elite urban merchants. At stake was the expansion of commercial agriculture in response to world demand for commodity exports which led to incorporation in the international market. Hence, republican state-building and agrarian capitalist development was a significant departure from the colonial past (Mahoney 2001, Bushnell 1996). Scholars are quick to point to varying approaches to liberal reform usually coalescing around multiple axes such as: 1) constitutional /parliamentary government, 2) economic individualism /free trade, and 3) differentiation between secular and religious authority (Gould 1999, 1998). It is the third

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[14] To understand the importance of the relationship between the universe of cases and the research question, see J. Samuel Valenzuela*, Macro Comparisons without the Pitfalls: A Protocol for Comparative Research*, (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 1997).

component that is of particular interest here. Due to varying intensity and the pace by which these three poles of liberalism develop, modern states emerge under unique contexts which contribute to varying state configurations and institutional arrangements. Concerning institutional configurations, church-building and state building generally occurred simultaneously. In early modernity, the Church relied on the state's support in order to gain material privileges over sectarian movements and to press a uniform set of religious beliefs and practices among the general population. The state benefited from the relationship since moral regulation and social control provided a foundation for political stability (Gorski 2003a). The outcomes of tensions between conservatives and liberals generally determined the status of the emergent liberal-democratic republic. One of the primary disputes confronting the modern state was "the religious question;" how would the Church, representing remaining vestiges of colonial authority, be integrated into the modernizing republic if at all (Jaksić y Posada Carbó 2011, Serrano 2008)? Many liberal reformers were also the principal carriers of anticlerical legislation to limit the influence of the Church. As democratic-republican reforms advanced, political power became consolidated in the state which sought to remove religious authority from the political realm and increase authority over the Institutional Church (Jaksić y Posada Carbó 2011, 24). Liberal reformers enhanced state power over religion through clerical appointments, by establishing agencies to oversee the Church administration, and by seizing Church land. In Latin America, anticlerical initiatives tended to be more economic than social. Anticlerical legislation, in general, tended to include;

- Expropriation of Church property
- Educational reform (Revoking permission of the Church to teach in public schools, no Latin taught)
- Secularization of cemeteries relegating management to a municipal function.
- Assuming Civil Registry from the Church
- Religious tolerance – Legislative initiative establishing space for Masons, Protestants,
- Civil marriage requirement
- Closing of the convents and prohibiting religious housing and recruiting
- Expulsion of priests and nuns
- Expulsion of the Archbishop, Bishop and other ecclesiastical leaders
- Denying entry of foreign priests and nuns into the host country

- Suspension of funding for the Seminary
- Instituting divorce laws
- Disestablishment

In some cases, clergy opposed anticlerical legislation by allying with elites in order to maintain influence in areas such as education. In other cases, Church officials supported liberal reforms.[15] In each case, the pattern of Church-State tension characterized the formation of each modern republic in Latin America and ultimately shaped the character of each political regime.

Anticlericalism associated with the development of liberal oligarchical republics in Latin America should not be associated with secularization. [16] While some secularizing effects may have resulted from republican state building, the intent was not to subjugate religious authority to the temporal powers associated with the state. Rather, the objective of liberal anticlerical elites was to establish a political hegemony over the whole of

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[15] See for example the case of Francisco de Paula González Vigil, who, as a member of the liberal and enlightened clergy in Peru was a strong supporter of liberal republicanism and advocated for representative government.

[16] Sánchez (1972, 8-9, cf. Rédmond 1999) refers to state sponsored secularism as *pragmatic anticlericalism* that serves as a source change through legislation by liberal agents of who saw the clergy and the Church as a regressive institution and obstacle to social, economic and political progress thus wanting to constrain the wealth, power and influence of the institution. The target of pragmatic anticlericalism was frequently the privileged status of a clerical 'caste' that is perceived as hypocritical, immoral and avaricious; especially when viewed from the perspective of the egalitarian concept of popular sovereignty associated with the modern state (Bantes 2009). Many holders of pragmatic anticlericalism were deists or Enlightened Catholics informed by continental philosophy (Serrano 2008). These actions by the state could be interpreted according to what Serrano (2011,191-193) refers to as *Pluralistic Liberalism* in which the interest of the state was less about dismantling the public influence of the Church and more about pursuing state sovereignty and securing the right of individuals. While the concept of *Pluralistic Liberalism* originates from political philosophy, the debate is still vigorous whether or not the ideals of republican liberalism, enshrined in consensus oriented pluralism and equalitarian rights of the individual, were empirically achieved in the nineteenth century in Latin America. The exception may be Chile which developed one of the earliest and most comprehensive experiences of institutionalization of political competition and progressive inclusion of the electorate beginning in 1809; see J. Samuel Valenzuela, *From Town Assemblies to Representative Democracy: The Building of Electoral Institutions in Nineteenth-Century Chile*, (The Helen Kellogg Institute for International Studies, 2012).

civil society (Richards1987, Hale 1984, Bushnell and Macaulay 1994).[17] The principal concern of the liberal oligarchical state was not liberty or equality but material progress. Progress was defined in a positivistic sense (Bushnell 1996, Peloso and Tenenbaum 1996, Burns 1980). Hence, the state regarded the Church as an impediment to scientific progress of humanity as the Church represented a regressive institution that was irrational and anti-scientific (Anderson 2000, McMillan 2000, Bushnell 1996, Richards 1987). Although many Latin American positivists were critical of the Catholic Church, few of them supported Comte's religious thesis because they recognized that the Church, for better or for worse, was an important element in national culture and social cohesion (Espinoza 2009, Klaiber 1977, Purnell 1999).

The Church, in general, was able to secure its legal, social and political influence vis-á-vis the modern state either by negotiating directly with government officials in order to restore lost privileges or indirectly by forming an alliance with the conservative Catholic oligarchy: which invoked the Church in order to defend its own concerns (Gill 1998, Richard 1987). The Church typically achieved an alliance with elites through education and by reinforcing their own hierarchical organization (Episcopacy Conference). Distinct institutional patterns of church-state relations that emerged during the period of modern state-formation set each modernizing republic on different developmental paths (Gould 1998, 1999). In Brazil, for example, the Church welcomed disestablishment from the State when the Republic was created in1889. An episcopal letter issued March 1890 spoke of newfound freedoms under the new arrangement and that the Church had felt suffocated under the monarchy (Chesnut 2003, 30; Mecham 1966, 275). Most nations that adopted a *modus vivendi* (Venezuela, Ecuador) or Concordat (Colombia), although disestablishment prohibited the state from making the Catholic Church the state Church, Catholicism became the *de facto* state religion thus the state recognized the full authority of the Church in religious matters and guaranteed the freedom of Catholic instruction (as in Costa Rica and Guatemala). [18] Under such an arrangement, most national episcopacies

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[17] The hegemonic view of republican liberalism, particular to the researchers citied above, has been challenged recently by varying scholars who have presented a more nuanced perspective conditioned by local contingencies. These more recent perspectives will be discussed at length later in this introduction.

[18] Various attempts to achieve a *modus viviendi* in Mexico (1929, 1937) were undermined by hostile action on behalf of the state. To the degree that the Church is integrated in society has not been by virtue of a *modus viviendi,* rather by armed

were able to reclaim lost ecclesiastical privileges and, remain integrated in modern Latin American societies.

The Question at Hand

The pattern of Church-State relations that emerged during the period of modern state-formation in Uruguay set society on a path to become a relatively irreligious society by the early 1900s. While the Church was able to stand up to positivistic ideology and a state sanctioned anticlerical posture in some Latin American societies while achieving a *modus vivendi* in others, why was it not able to do so in Uruguay? Hence, the research question this study seeks to explain is: *How did Uruguayan society become extremely secular in the end of the nineteenth century such that a highly secular society endures until today*?[19] Broadly stated, among Catholic majority nations that became republics with liberal-democratic constitutions by revolution against a Catholic colonial monarchy, how did Uruguay become the most secular society in the field of Latin American societies?

The subject of this study is the secular society and how it came to be. This is a significant question because a great deal has been written in the last forty years on secularization due to the spirited debate that was initiated in the 1960s as it became clear that modernity's social reality did not conform to the theoretical expectations of early sociologists. Scholars began to rethink the relationship between modernity and religion resulting in new explanations of secularization. Classic sociologists unanimously hypothesized that secularization would result from two social processes; 1) laicization stemming from social/structural differentiation, and 2) from disenchantment rooted in expanding rationalization. Cultural pluralism was added to the mix under the assumption that competing ideas would relativize the plausibility of a totalizing religious worldview (Berger 1969, Luckmann 1967, Luhmann 1982). The debate was turned on its head by Religious Economy Theory (RET) which not only argued that religion is a rational commitment, but more importantly demonstrated empirically how pluralism can lead to religious vitality rather than undermine it. More recent explanations of secularization include existential security (Norris and Inglehart 2004), anti-religious elitism (Smith 2003) and neo-classical secularization (Bruce 2002). Presently, the debate has exhausted itself and

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conflict as in the *Cristero War*, by legal means to ameliorate the severity of certain laws or by clandestine evasions (Gomez Peralta 2012).

[19] See Table A.1 which presents a hierarchy of Latin American nation's religiosity based on multiple measures.

is at an impasse due to varying positions attempting to verify or falsify the durability of religion in modernity.

This study seeks to differentiate itself from macro-social analysis which attempts to characterize secularization as an abstract social process associated with modernity and instead seeks to explain secularization by analyzing the historical contingencies and social processes that produced a secular society (Uruguay). Shifting the burden of explanation away from abstract macro-social processes to human agency embedded in concrete and specified historical processes, this research will continue the line of research initiated by Smith and associates (2003, 2008) that emphasizes the role of contestation and conflict among human actors seeking to establish competing visions of modernity. Because this project is situated among recent studies on secularization, it is able to adjudicate among competing theories and explanatory approaches thus exposing the inadequate and reinforcing efficacious theoretical and methodological approaches among leading theories.

While this study locates secularization in the context of the modernizing state (background), the foreground is shaped by education policies which were a principal function of the modernizing state. The sub-field of education became a site of conflict and tension where anticlerical and clerical interests were played out. A consensus among state managers viewed themselves as the vanguard of social progress for a society suffering from economic stagnation attributable to rural oligarchs, mounting foreign debt, and regionalism resulting from rural *caudillos* waging periodic warfare against the liberal state. State managers perceived education as a principal means of achieving social order, unification and sustained economic growth. State managers believed that education was a *tabula rasa* upon which they could promote liberal reform and construct national development. The objective of educational reform was to produce practical and patriotic individuals conscientious of their rights and duties toward society. The principal obstacle was Catholic education; although modest and quasi-independent at the time of reform, confessional schools represented the principal competitor to state education. The Church was blamed for inhibiting the development of scientific and patriotic ideology necessary for political stability and hence, social progress. However, the church was also interested in national unity and social progress sustained by republican values and developed an alternative strategy, albeit differentiated from the state, to achieve a modern and relevant Church. A paradox unfolds in the clerical-anticlerical conflict such that state managers who sought to restructure society in consonance with enlightenment principles of individualism and equality before the law and

free-market enterprise abandoned those principles in the management of the educational field by using legislation and popular opinion to monopolize education in Uruguay.

Significance

The intellectual merit of this study is that it produces an understanding of the processes by which a relatively religious society (a Catholic majority) was transformed to a "religious ghetto" (Rodé 1964, Santa Ana 1965, Caetano and Geymonat 1997, Da Costa 2003) [20] . By analyzing historical specificity which emphasizes purposive human agency, this study seeks to show that secularization is explained by concrete social struggle and contestation between differing assumptions and beliefs regarding the construction of society. The central claim of this study is that the level of secularization achieved in Uruguayan society is to be understood as historically grounded, embedded in conflict between interest groups, and attributable to agency more than macro-social structures in a modernizing social field. This claim assumes that secularization involves a cultural, political, and psychological assault on religious people in which secular elites, occupying different social positions, are successful in establishing their definition of religion. The object of this study is to explain how anti-religious elites succeed in constructing a secular society in Uruguay by monopolizing education and marginalizing the Church's capacity to socialize future generations of not just Catholics but Protestants as well. The advantage of this study lies in its case selection which reveals secularization as a totalizing process that has endured over a century. This aspect uniquely positions this study to engage in the on-going secularization debate both theoretically and methodologically. Theoretically, this study shifts the burden of explanation from abstract macro-social processes (differentiation, rationalization and pluralism) to human agency embedded in a purposeful and intentional struggle for cultural authority and legitimacy. This study will continue the line of

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[20] To be clear, the term *Ghetto* used in the title of this study means….. members of an impoverished minority group who are concentrated, especially as a result of political, social, legal, religious, or economic discrimination. The term *Ghetto* to describe the condition of Catholics in Uruguay following the meaning above first surfaced in 1962 by Juan Luis Segundo (*Función de la Iglesia en la Realidad Rioplatense)* and followed by Patricio Rodé (1963), Julio de Santa Ana (1965), Segundo y Rodé (1969), and Alberto Methol Ferré (1969). The dysphemism is a manner of capturing the contemporary secularization of a once Catholic majority society. For clarification, see Greising, 2023.

research initiated by Smith and associates (2003) that emphasizes the role of anti-religious elites in secularization. A shift in explanation is facilitated, in part, by rethinking assumptions of modernity. Rather than assume an isomorphic and inevitable Eurocentric master narrative in which secularization is a normative outcome, this study seeks to show that diverse entries into modernity are possible. When framed as the outcome of contending social programs which seek to establish a dominant social and moral order, variant modernities are possible because each is shaped by conscious human activity in response to existential problems. Methodologically, this study will contribute insight to the existing explanations for Uruguay's secular society by analyzing the educational field in detail in a deviant case which, although embedded in Latin America, appears to have levels of secularization comparable to France. A comparative perspective will serve to reinforce the validity of some previous explanations of secularization and attenuate others. The result will be greater clarity regarding the contingent processes by which a society moves toward greater secularity.

Methodological Considerations

This research presents the study of a deviant case in the Latin American context. A deviant case study can be particularly revealing because an explanation must be developed as to why the case did not conform to a pattern or outcome established by the other cases. According to Smelser (1976, 56) deviant case analysis emphasizes exceptions to a general trend to locate previously unidentified independent variables that have implications for the outcome (Lijphart 1971, 692-693). In addition, Uruguay can show the limits of a generalized theory for secularization such as modernity theory, neo-classical secularization theory (Bruce 2002) and existential security theory (Inglehart and Norris 2004). This causes researchers to rethink theoretical applications. By analyzing a case that is paradoxical empirically, further questions and problems arise that must be considered by existing generalizing theories.

It may be argued that emphasis on a single case is a disadvantage. Criticism of single case studies suggests that they are useless because it is impossible to form generalizations on the basis of one case. However, generalizability may not be the best use of a single case study. Instead, the role of a deviant case in developing the content of theory, not the range of its applicability, may be more important. Stinchcombe (1978, 21-22) has pointed out that analogies upon which social theories are based are best formed by attempts to provide causal interpretation of a single case.

Causal interpretation of a historically contingent outcome is accomplished methodologically through 1) a logical relationship between abstract properties and 2) a narrative and description of how conjunctive events are related. Social explanations must account for both approaches of causality. Hence, the combination of both abstract properties and historical narrative necessitates the role of human agency. Focusing on human agency suggests that neither general theory nor pure description of conjunctive events will provide a sufficient explanation. Therefore, this study capitalizes on Bourdieu's field theory to constrain the selection of data and subsequent analysis which emphasizes micro-level action related to macro-level phenomenon that can explain a dimension of the secularization process that has largely been overlooked in previous secularization studies.

This study is not an exhaustive study of education in the period. This study focuses on the original writings and thought of key policy makers and ecclesiastic leaders (lay and clergy) on both sides of the conflict. Educational philosophies are an important source of data for their bearing on implemented policies and programs. In addition, legislative debates and collections of laws serve to understand motives behind the construction of certain policies and why they were resisted. Furthermore, documents preserved from the memorials of several Inspector Generals of Education provide insight regarding educational agendas, school budgets and statistical data on school expansion and enrollment; which provide some indication of popular response to public education. Collections of periodicals provide further evidence regarding how education debates were framed in order to cultivate popular support.

Establishing the Broader Context of Conflict: Liberal Republicanism

In the interest of understanding the socio-political context in which irreligious anticlericalism emerged, it is important to clarify three historical social processes which frame the modernizing state in Uruguay. The first has to do with defining Liberal Republicanism – the guiding principle in post-revolution state-building which serves as the "scope conditions", or better stated, the historical socio-political context in which the Uruguayan state modernized. Recent studies have attempted to reconsider the role of liberalism in republican state-building in Latin America thus challenging prior analysis which characterized liberalism as; 1) "an exotic transplant" from Europe lacking indigenous origins (Veliz 1980, 1994); 2) a form of patrimonial state carried over from the Spanish

colonial heritage and rooted in Spanish autocracy (Morse 1964); 3) a
climate of utopian ideas and particular policies resulting in political action
and social infrastructure (Bushnell 1996); 4) a responsible
authoritarianism in which the end of politics was to satisfy social needs
and secure national development (Hale 1984). Although somewhat
pejorative— because these interpretations understand liberal
republicanism as hegemonic and a failure— there is no doubt that the
legacy of liberalism is real and critical to understanding the historical
contingencies of emergent nationalism in Latin America. Recent studies
have tried to avoid the broad-brush strokes of prior analysis (Hale 1984,
Bushnell 1996, Stafford 1984) by focusing, not on a generic form of
Liberalism as though there was a uniform school of thought, but on the
multiple manifestations of liberal republicanism represented by the
varying contingencies of each emergent republic. Although variable,
revisionist accounts have a core value in common; that local contingencies
are the most deterministic factors in understanding how liberal
republicanism shaped nation-building (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000,
366). This means that liberal doctrines such as sovereignty of the people
and individual rights framed in a constitution were adapted and correspond
to local conditions. Hence, this has led to a corpus of revised
historiographies featuring national case studies which can be analyzed in a
comparative framework (Jaksić and Posada Carbó 2011, Negretto and
Aguilar-Rivera 2000, Adelman 2007, Guerra 1994, Valenzuela 1996,
Knight 1985).

    Revisionism has reinforced the exceptional nature of Latin American
republicanism. The two biggest problems that were unique to post-
revolution republican nationalism in Latin America was the consolidation
of national authority in a context characterized by regional fragmentation
and the institutional vacuum created by the fall of a centralist and
absolutist monarchy (Negretto and Aguilar-Rivera 2000, Guerra 1999).
This development led to tensions over the continuity of a centralist-
corporate state government and raised questions about how to implement
constitutionalism responsive to demands for political order, economic
progress, and notions of citizenship. Insipient democratic forms did
emerge such as political competition and progressive inclusion of the
electorate through sometimes less than honest elections and the creation of
public space for discussion of emergent national issues through the press
(Valenzuela 1996, Guerra 1994). These democratic forms occurred in
Latin America— drawing from continental political philosophy and the
example of the American and French institutions— while most European
countries were still under monarchical authority and hardly celebrated

elections. [21] These developments point to the necessity of understanding the rhythms of the intellectual history within each emergent republic and how they shaped political dispositions, objectives, and orientations of political elites engaged in state-building.

Implementing the republican state meant dismantling the corporatist structure of colonial order in which the Church was a major actor. This meant that Catholics in Latin American Catholic majority countries had to reconcile their revolution with the Church and Catholicism with Liberalism. The two were not necessarily mutually exclusive however, the advent of liberal reforms led to the secular state (*estado laico)* thus stimulating two questions; the religious question and the social question.[22] The former pertains to the role of the Church in republican state-building and national character and the latter pertains to the allocation of public good attributable to the Church while both contribute to the legitimacy of religion and the parameters of influence the Church will have in society. The resultant tensions and debates that emerged over the resolution of these questions in regard to the state and Church are perhaps best captured in the bifurcation of liberalism itself proposed by Ivereigh (2000). Varying assumptions and visions of liberalism held by the Church and state could result in conflict. Ivereigh has developed the concept of "monistic liberalism", which sees no distinction between the state and society; the state is the unified collective will of individuals and hence, there is no limit to the state's competence. The Church has no juridical status independent from the state; in fact, the Church is simply a department and function of the state. Ideational and social areas, in which the Church might have influence, can be monopolized by the state because the state is the source and sanction of all rights attributable to its absolute authority. In contrast, "ecumenical liberalism" espoused by learned and devout Catholics, views the state as a unifying authority over social entities of which the Church, communities and family are a part. Orthodox Catholicism rejects the notion of a state and individual dyad in favor of a multiple collectives because they existed before the State and derive rights apart from the state. Like the structure of the Church itself, consisting of

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[21] We know that Latin American intellectuals were influenced by varying degrees by the writings of Montesquieu, Rousseau, Constant, Paine, Burke, Guizot, Tocqueville, and Bentham among others (Stafford 1984, Manent 1995, Jaksić and Posada Carbó 2011).

[22] The social question emerged later in the century corresponding to the impoverishment of wage workers in the advent of industrialization precipitating Pope Leo XIII's *Rerum Novarum* in 1891 and further defining Catholic social doctrine.

multiple and diverse sodalities dedicated to promoting the common good, the state has patterned itself after a constitutional federalism and advocates for the good of all (Ivereigh 2000).

What these two theoretical variants of liberalism show is that liberalism was multifaceted and capable of co-existing with Catholicism when the state grants social space for the Church to act on its social and spiritual prerogatives. To the extent however that the liberalism can be anticlerical, the state will contend with the Church for legitimacy and cultural authority. This study recognizes the variability of liberal republicanism in Latin America, the historical contingencies that make Latin American liberalism unique in each emergent republican state, and that ecclesiastical leaders and Catholic populations in majority Catholic republics will react to liberal republicanism unevenly and manifest varying degrees of allegiance to either the Church or to the state.

Anticlericalism and the Patronato in Post-Revolution Society

We know that earlier forms of anticlericalism were expressed through *regalism* associated with Bourbon Reforms in which the monarchy sought to control clerical appointment through the *Patronato Real*. *Regalism* continued in the post-revolution era and was claimed by emergent liberal republican leaders who believed that they had inherited the right of the *Patronato (Liberal)* from the defeated monarchy. Regalism and the establishment of the Catholic Church guaranteed that Catholicism would continue to be a pillar in new republics. This also meant that in some cases, power was in the hands of liberal and agnostic politicians to make ecclesiastical appointments. In addition to controlling ecclesiastical appointments, it could be used to regulate the internal life of the Church as well as to control the Church's properties and income (Blancarte 2004, 47). Most emergent republics declared Catholicism the state religion in their constitutions and were hesitant to change the constitution lest they forfeit the right of *patronato* (Serrano 2008, 2011, Blancarte 2004). The state not only benefitted by having the capacity to diminish the Church's temporal power through a formal and legal mechanism, but at the same time, benefited from the unifying capacity of a ubiquitous Catholicism as the state sough to establish a fragile national authority over fragmented territories and disparate people. Possibly the principal characteristic of the *Patronato* was its legal ambiguity (Lida 2004, 390; Blancarte 2004,

Lisiero 1971).[23] While providing the institutional Church juridical personality on one hand, the *Patronato* could be interpreted as a means to dissolve the ecclesiastical hierarchy altogether since the Church was simply a department of the state or it could be ignored altogether. The use of the *Patronato* depended on the discretion of republican leaders (Lida 2004). Ambiguity, inherent in the Institution of the *Patronato* typically led to the cleric and anticlerical disputes that became an integral part of republican state- building in which Uruguay was unique in this regard.

An important distinction that differentiates the Uruguayan Church from other national Church narratives in the post-revolution republican state-building era is the fact that the Uruguayan Church hardly experienced post-revolution *regalism*, until 1862 (Algorta del Castillo 1984,490, Merlano 2010, 86). *Regalism* was not an issue in the post-revolution era because both the Church and the State were very weak institutionally (López-Alves 1996). The period following the revolution (1811-1817), Artigas led an armed struggle to establish a Federal League of Uruguayan Provinces (*La Liga Federal*) which challenged the hegemony of Buenos Aires and the Portuguese domination. Because the Federal League was short lived (1814-1817), Artigas had limited opportunity to engage in institution building. Montevideo was invaded by the Portuguese in 1817 and was incorporated into the Cisplatina Province of Imperial Portugal, Brazil and Algarves. The Luso-Brazilian occupation lasted until 1828. Soon after liberation, the state became embroiled in a failing economy, external conflicts with the French and British, and numerous internal conflicts which were finally resolved in the *Guerra Grande* (1843-1851). The Church on the other hand, was still undeveloped and canonically under the authority of the Prelate in Buenos Aires (Ferrari 2001, 107).

Bazzano (1993, 38) cites a second explanation why post-revolution *regalism* was mute; "The demand of the Patronato was generally carried out peacefully in the times of Larrañaga while successive governments made it a question of honor, until the conflict between the Berro administration and Mons. Vera." The "peace" and "honor" to which Bazzano referenced is related to the reputation attached to clerical support for the revolution thus creating a more collegial relationship between that generation of clergy and state leadership. The majority of the clerics in Uruguay was in favor of the revolution and supported reforms that Artigas brought (Villegas 1978, 11, Ferrari 2001,106, Bazzano et al. 1993, 22-24).

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[23] Blancarte (2004, 47) attributes the ambiguity to a lack of ideological and doctrinal clarity, exacerbated by the physical and political distance of the *Holy See* from the states that were in formation.

In fact, Artigas, the Uruguayan father of the revolution, counted *los curas de la patria* among his closest allies (Ardao 1945, 32-33, Caetano 2000, 28, Bauzá 1965a Vol.5).[24] Clerical partiality on the side of revolution can be explained partially by the fact that the properties and schools established by the Jesuits were taken over by the Franciscans when the Jesuits were expelled in 1767. Franciscans had either denied or withdrew their support for Scholastic Theology and adopted an encyclopedia of ideas generated by the Enlightenment (Diderot). The acceptance of these ideas and their integration with Catholicism is the basis for Liberal Catholicism (*Catolicismo Ilustrado*) that guided early institutional life in Uruguay (Sobardo 1968, 1969, Ardao 1962, 108). According to Bazzano et al. (1993, 23) there was neither an assembly, nor congress, nor diplomatic mission or other cultural work in which a cleric was not serving an important role in the early days of republican formation. This can be attributed to the fact that the priests in most cases were the most educated and familiar with the classic works of the Enlightenment— not because the Church was a powerful institution. The Church's contribution to early civic and cultural development is indicated by the founding of the National Library by Prelate Dámaso Antonio Larrañaga, Presbyter Pérez Castellano and Friar José Benito Monterroso.[25] As a result of the influence clerics had in the populace due to their role in laying the foundations for the new republic, Artigas never invoked the right of *Patronato* although he was keenly aware of his right to do so (Bazzano et al. 1993, 25-26). Hence, a pattern of *Regalism* was never established in the early years of the republic.

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[24] So engrained in Uruguayan history is the role of clerics in the revolution that in 1928, in anticipation of the *Centenario,* the Catholic newspaper, *El Bien,* ran an article featuring the role of the "prestigious priests" who demonstrated their patriotic zeal by supporting Artigas in the Revolution ("El Clero de Mayo" *El Bien,* Montevideo. 1928: May25, p.1.). To this day, there is a memorial in front of the National Basilica entitled *Al Clero de la Independencia* dedicated to the priests and clerics for their role in the independence movement (cf. Caetano 2000, 64-65).
[25] The contributions by the *Priests of the Motherland* to the newly formed republic were incalculable and included; 1) serving as charter members of the Constitutional Assembly; 2) directors of the *Escuela de la Patria*; 3) Larrañaga instituted the Lancaster method in all provincial schools, 4) abolishing the death penalty; 5) creating the University of the Republic; 6) initiating the Department and Chair of Philosophy and Theology (Villegas 1978). Bralich (1987, 24; 1996) points out that under the directorship of Padre Benito Lamas, the *Escuela de la Patria* flew the tri-color flag and "cultivated the ideas of democracy, liberty and republicanism".

The "religious question" was not resolved formally in Uruguay until the formation of a Legislative General Assembly in 1828; whose task was to construct a provisional government and draft a republican constitution.[26] Like most emergent republics in Latin America, the declared state religion was Roman Apostolic Catholicism.[27] A *Patronato (Liberal)* was a part of the new constitution, which among other stipulations, included the right of clerical appointments made by the Executive office with the knowledge of the Senate or Representatives. A significant outcome of the General Assembly however was ecclesiastical independence from the authority of the Buenos Aires Bishopric thus establishing a "designated" Bishopric in Montevideo to be established by the state. Pope Gregory XVI created the Apostolic Vicar of Uruguay in 1832 by naming Dámaso Larrañaga the first Vicar.[28] While designating the faculty of a principal Vicar, the Bishop seat was *Sede Vacante*, meaning that the seat was autonomous from Buenos Aires, yet at the same time waiting for the state to erect the dioceses of Montevideo, recognize the Bishopric, and construct a Seminary.

The outcome of the General Assembly and Constitution are significant for two reasons. First, it established an autonomous ecclesiastical authority in Uruguay under the *Patronato* (*Liberal*) as designated by the Constitution of 1830. Ecclesiastical patronage stipulated that the President

[26] Heavily influenced by the thinking of the French and American revolutions, the 1830 Constitution divided the government among the executive, legislative, and judicial powers and established Uruguay as a unitary republic with a centralized form of government (Merlano 2010, 92-102, Algorta de Castillo 1984, 485-87). Artículo 13 (El Estado Oriental del Uruguay adopta para su gobierno la forma representativa republicana) provided for a General Assembly composed of a Chamber of Senators (Cámara de Senadores), or Senate (Senado), elected nationally, and a Chamber of Representatives (Cámara de Representantes), elected from the departments. Members of the General Assembly were empowered to pass laws but lacked the authority to dismiss the president or his ministers or to issue votes of no confidence (Nahúm 1994). Artículo 14 (Delega al efecto el ejercicio de su soberanía en los tres Altos Poderes, Legislativo, Ejecutivo y Judicial, bajo las reglas que se expresarán) empowered the bicameral General Assembly (Asamblea General) to elect a president with considerable powers to head the executive branch for a four-year term. The president was given control over all of his ministers of government and was empowered to make decisions with the agreement of at least one of the three ministers recognized by the 1830 constitution (Nahúm 1994).

[27] Article five states; "La religión del Estado es la Católica Apostólica Romana."

[28] In 1836, the Pope conceded to the Apostolic Vicar the full administrative faculty of the sacrament of confirmation and in 1837 named the position *Patronotario Apostólico* (Bazzano et al. 1993, 40)

was empowered to; elect bishops and determine ecclesiastical benefits
(Article 81 and Article 25), [29] organize tribunals to hear ecclesiastical
causes (Article 97), [30] grant or refuse pontifical bulls and briefs (Article
98).[31] In exchange, Catholicism became the established – although tolerant
– religion of the state under presidential oath of office to "protect and
preserve". [32] Second, the *Patronato* was in effect, conditioned by the
state's fulfillment to establish the dioceses of Montevideo, recognize the
Bishopric, and construct a Seminary, since the Papal provision left the
Apostolic Vicar's position of Uruguay *Sede Vacante*— that is; contingent
on the State's fulfillment of these requirements. This outcome is not only
consistent with the overall ambiguity associated with the Institution of the
Patronato, but it became the flash point of contention when the first
conflict arose over the exercise of the *Patronato* in 1862. However, the
most important aspect regarding the history of *Regalism* in Uruguay is its
absence. Because of the state's weakness attributed to the Luso-Brazilian
occupation, external threats from the French and British, and numerous
internal conflicts which were finally resolved in the *Guerra Grande*
(1843-1851), the state turned a blind eye to ecclesiastical activity and
never enforced the right of the *Patronato*; at least until 1862. As a result,
the Church experienced a salutary effect from the state's preoccupation
with more pressing matters in that the Church was largely self-governing,
independent and autonomous from the state. For fifty years, ecclesiastical
leaders had become socialized by lax enforcement of the regulatory
function of the state and had grown accustomed to looking after their own
affairs. This does not mean that the Church became a powerful institution

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[29] Article 81 states; "The President of the Republic will make objections or
approve projects submitted by the Assembly General (…), celebrate in the same
form [*as peace treaties*] concordats with the Holy See and exercise the Patronato
including the right to retain or pass Pontifical Bulls conforming to the laws (…)".
Article 25 states; "The following cannot be elected as a representative; individuals
of the regular clergy."
[30] Article 97 states; "In addition, I will make judgments of the sentences of the
Ordinaries, knowing that if cases pertain to the law, they will be elevated to the
Tribunal of Appeals (*recursos de fuerza*).
[31] Article 98 states; "The President reserves the right to examine and make a ruling
regarding the admission or retention of papal Bulls and Briefs (*exequatur*)."
[32] Article 76 states; "The president elect, upon accepting the duties of his office,
will present himself before the President of the Senate, and in the presence of the
General Assembly, the following oath; I (name) swear by God and the Holy
Gospels, to carry out dutifully the responsibilities of the Presidency, that are
conferred on me; to protect the religion of the state, preserve the integrity and
independence of the Republic, and to faithfully observe the Constitution.