Counterterrorism and Public Diplomacy:

Cognitive Warfare

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PREFACE

Terrorism is a dangerous aspect of human civilization. Our belief systems, emotions, culture, value judgements, experiences, social environment and education help us filter the overpowering information and ideas we are exposed to. Prejudices against terrorist organizations and vulnerable populations distort perceptions and create contradictions. States often consider those who have ties of mind and heart with terrorist organizations as members of terrorist organizations. However, those who sympathize with the organization, those who share a unity of mind and heart with the organization are a vulnerable population. The reason why I use the term vulnerable population is not to exclude them and not to define them as antagonists. The vulnerable populations are neither captives nor terrorists. States assume that the vulnerable populations have revolutionary instincts and avoid answering the question of why people become terrorists. Disciplining and protecting the vulnerable populations, aggression and humiliation will further mobilize and enthuse them. Over time, there is a confrontation between states and terrorist organizations to end strategic advantages. In this conflict, the public diplomacy paradigm of loving the vulnerable masses, entering their hearts and approaching them with universal values leaves no room for irreconcilable hatred.

Currently, conventional counterterrorism models and measures are insufficient in the contemporary warfare and future strategic environment, and recruitment to terrorist organizations persists unabated. It is the cognitive domain of war that is forgotten by countries and has in fact existed for centuries. Problems cannot be solved without constructive relationships. Hard power is necessary for security, and it alone is not the solution to all problems. Many countries have been fighting terrorist organizations for years. In this struggle, there are countries with strong military capabilities and military achievements, but they have not been able to defeat terrorism. How successful are countries in cognitive warfare given the military operations and measures taken? Victory in military operations does not necessarily mean being triumphant in cognitive warfare. Why was Bolivia defeated at Chaco War, despite its military power? How did opinions change in the Tet Offensive? Why did the Hussites, with a great army, lose? How did Martin Luther succeed? Was the Oklahoma City bombing a terrorist reaction? And what was the role of

influential cognitive warfare, based on the didactic aspect of Boris Pasternak, against oppression during the Cold War?

In today's world, where terrorist organizations can exploit intellectual property unhindered, cognitive warfare requires a special kind of prowess, and the war cannot be won without conquering the mental functions of the vulnerable populations. Achieving cognitive superiority is essential to achieve national security objectives, prevent internal and external threats, protect national security interests, define the level of analysis of security and succeed in modern warfare. Cognitive warfare is a force multiplier that forms part of the strategic and tactical arsenal of integrated combined arms. Cognitive warfare is an attack on the way of thinking and thus preventing participation in organizations. For this reason, the turning point in counterterrorism is cognitive warfare.

This book on cognitive warfare in counterterrorism maps out how to engage with vulnerable populations. It proposes a multidimensional intellectual approach to enter the decision cycle of terrorist organization members and vulnerable populations, to influence perceived reality and to be superior in the battle of wills.

CHAPTER 1

WHY DOES ONE BECOME A TERRORIST?

"One man's terrorist is another man's freedom fighter."

George Galloway

We live in a world of multiple perceptions. While our experiences are formed in continuity, the alienation of people and why they join terrorist organizations are not properly understood due to the different interpretation of cause-and-effect relationships. In order to get terrorist organizations and their members to accept a given thesis, no antithesis is presented. In approaching terrorism, counter-terrorism and members of organizations, it is crucial to represent consciousness and understand the relationship between narrative-world-mind. Unless the knowledge, beliefs, and prejudices of at-risk populations, especially those associated with terrorist organizations, are removed from the brain, the question "why?" is a ruse.

There are various reasons for being drawn into terrorist organizations: There are several reasons for being drawn into terrorist organizations: Marginalization, socio-economic conditions, and a distorted view of religion and ideology are all variables in the ongoing debate. There is no single reason to explain why people can become extremely violent. Fulfilling a deep personal need, disagreement with government policies, misanthropy, not being valued or appreciated by society, feeling that one's chances of success are limited, and many other factors can lead people to violence.

Why people become terrorists is an important question, and it is not possible to define the general characteristics of terrorists. According to studies, terrorists tend to be male and between the ages of 17 and 30. Members of terrorist organizations are not particularly susceptible to poverty, lack of education, or mental illness. The most demographically salient characteristic of terrorists (within their environment) is normality. Terrorist leaders themselves come from relatively privileged backgrounds (Davis and Cragin, 2009).

There is more to the anatomy of terrorism than religious fanaticism and hatred. The social behavioral practices (the way they dress, sit, speak, etc.) of today's members and leaders of terrorist organizations are no different from those who do not support terrorism in social life. Female terrorists wearing sweatshirts, colored socks, and colored barrettes are an example of this. There are subtle differences between why terrorists are recruited into an organization and how they are recruited, and it is imperative to recognize these subtle differences. It should not be overlooked that many organizations are often led by educated individuals. Al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri was a theologian and medical doctor. According to some sources, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi also holds a doctorate in Islamic studies. Osama Bin Laden, one of the founders of al-Qaeda, is also said to have studied economics and civil engineering. It is also known that Abdullah Ocalan, the founding leader of the PKK, first enrolled in the Faculty of Law at Istanbul University in 1971 and transferred to the Faculty of Political Sciences at Ankara University in the same year. These persons are generally characterized by their lyrical influence on the organizational resistance and their power of influence on the masses. In this respect, education prepares the environment for the leader to maintain his legitimacy and to keep his base in the hierarchy, as organizations are based on values.

Many factors related to membership in a terrorist organization have been recognized and discussed. In this regard, the work of Todd C. Helmus shows numerous interrelationships. There are factors that influence individuals in heterogeneous ways, such as life histories, group experiences. However, not all issues are necessary conditions for radicalization, and "individual willingness to engage in terrorism" (Helmus, 2009, 94-95) should be assessed as thoroughly as possible.

Fig. 1-1 Individual Willingness to Engage in Terrorism

Resource: Todd C. Helmus, "Why and How Some People Become Terrorists." In Social Science for counter-terrorism Putting the Pieces Together, ed. Paul K. Davis and Kim Cragin, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2009, 95.

In the diagram, there are four factors for "individual willingness to engage in terrorism." Radicalized social groups, perceived and real rewards, passion for change, and the need to respond to grievances.

Social motives create courage in individuals, and selected targets can lead individuals to become members of terrorist organizations. These members may be motivated by a passion for change. These changes are most often related to the goals and expectations of terrorist organizations or the movements in which their members wish to participate.

Under the passion for change shown in the diagram, ideological arguments are propagated. These arguments fall into three categories: Religious Change, Single Issue Change, and Political Change. What is presented in religious change is the establishment of a caliphate and the ushering in of a golden age on earth or the belief in heaven in the afterlife. Single-issue change includes issues such as abortion, the environment, and animal rights. And political change includes anarchy and independence. Independence and anarchy are sources of motivation for terrorist organizations to spread their actions over a wide area. A passion for

innovation against religious or political domination is a clear motive for acts of terrorism, and some terrorist organizations seek to overthrow economic and political systems through the ideological underpinnings of terrorism.

Collective grievances and the duty to defend relate to problems experienced by members of a group. When people are confronted with unjust policies or actions, they are more likely to identify with a social group that they feel is being treated unfairly. This sense of identification and the desire to address these collective grievances can lead people to radicalize. The need for self-defense can further intensify the desire to respond to these grievances.

Personal grievances and the desire for revenge are also important factors in the motivation to address grievances. The text should read: "Personal attacks on loved ones or on oneself, along with the effects of PTSD (post-traumatic stress disorder) after experiencing trauma, can lead to the radicalization of individuals. Group dynamics and rewards are psychologically linked to these motivational factors. The idea of being on a mission to defend someone or take revenge for personal or collective wrongs creates a strong sense of obligation.

The perception of rewards for participating in terrorism is also an important factor. Economics, excitement, society, religion, or ideology influence behavior, and the likelihood of action increases when there are rewards for action. Individuals' focus on rewards in terms of incentives is most likely to motivate people to join terrorist organizations in terms of both actual and anticipated outcomes. For example, one of the most obvious rewards for suicide is martyrdom.

Martyrdom potential, with the good fellowship or friendships that eventually develop in a terrorist cell or organization and the social status that comes from membership, is not an indicator of mortality, but of being alive in the eyes of Allah. There is a belief that the afterlife of a martyr means access to heaven and forgiveness of sins. These are defined as rewards. The concept of martyrdom and heavenly gifts are divinely inspired motivations for the terrorist act.

The role of social status is also important in motivating members of terrorist organizations. Some rewards for terrorist participation are material in nature. In al-Qaeda, these rewards once included a steady salary (Wright, 2006) and financial support for the families of killed terrorists.

Social groups also play a serious role in radicalization. From the bottom up, prisons, fundamentalist families, violent religious conditions, and websites are dangerously influential. Group interactions have a corrosive effect on individual attitudes, beliefs, and organizational loyalties. Social groups transmit groupthink to individuals socially and psychologically, and

social interactions through networks of friends or relatives are essential for motivation.

The radicalizing influence of peer or social groups is a bottom-up phase. There is also top-down recruitment by organizations. An example of this factor is the gathering of individuals in the private homes and camps of terrorist organizations, the verification of qualifications, and one-on-one interviews. The cohesiveness of group dynamics that facilitate ideology is dangerous in motivating in-group processes and ideologies.

Terrorists are not necessarily ignorant, poor, mentally ill, supernatural, or religious. For years, it was widely believed that lack of education and poverty were the root causes of terrorism. But the evidence showed the opposite. Moreover, as noted above, the most striking characteristic of the organization's members is normality. A detailed study of the psychological profiles and biographies of suicide terrorists, interviews with their families, and interviews with imprisoned suicide bombers has led to the conclusion that terrorists are unlikely to be psychologically abnormal (Berrebi, 2009).

A sense of social alienation in radicalized social groups may also contribute to the attractiveness and power of radicalizing groups. Cognitive vulnerability is facilitated by the alienation of people who perceive themselves to be marginalized, excluded, and discriminated against.

The factors at the bottom of the diagram show social, political, and economic discrimination, other common contextual factors, and the impression of charismatic and entrepreneurial leaders of terrorist organizations. This part influences most or all of the factors shown in the diagram above. It includes many scopal factors, but also the presence of entrepreneurial and charismatic leaders.

Group processes essentially take place in one or both of two ways. They can be top-bottom recruitment strategies initiated by a terrorist organization or cell, or they can be bottom-top processes dominated by peer ties and other social influences. In the bottom-top trajectory, peer groups meet and interact in a variety of settings, including the Internet, violent religious houses, radicalized families, and prisons. Groups in top-bottom or bottom-top processes may be influential because of perceptions of social and religious alienation. Feelings of alienation in Muslim communities in Europe and the Middle East draw individuals to places where they can meet and identify with like-minded people. This alienation is likely to be fuelled by perceptions of social, economic and political discrimination (Davis and Cragin, 2009).

A study on radicalization and al-Shabaab in Somalia, which looked at people joining extremist organizations for a variety of reasons, found that 27% of respondents joined al-Shabaab for economic reasons. 1% of the

respondents stated that they joined Al-Shabaab for adventure, 1% for economic and adventure, 7% for personal reasons, 15% for religious reasons, 4% for religious and compulsory reasons, 25% for religious and economic reasons, 3% for religious and personal reasons, and 4% for religious and ethnic reasons. The study found that 13% of the respondents were forced to join. The study found that there is no simple answer to why people join terrorist organizations and that the dynamics of political and social exclusion, weak governance structures, religious and ethnic discrimination need to be considered (Botha and Abdile, 2014).

When asked why they stayed in Al-Shabaab, "belonging" was the top reason with 21%. 13% of the participants said 'belonging and money', 11% said 'fear', 8% said 'belonging and responsibility', 11% said 'sense of responsibility' and 12% said 'money'. The second highest rate is 'belonging and money' with 13%. In addition, 6% of the respondents stayed in Al-Shabaab because of 'affiliation and fear', 4% because of 'responsibility and money', 1% because of 'affiliation, responsibility and money', 6% because of 'affiliation, respect and money', 5% because of 'respect and money', and 2% because of 'fear and money'. It is emphasized that fear and economic dependence are also factors to be considered (Botha and Abdile, 2014).

Efforts to understand the different issues behind terrorist acts and the possible reasons why people remain in organizations can help prevent the spread of potentially ambiguous ideas and stem the flow of people into organizations. Parochial reactions to strong political messages and understanding organizational participation cannot answer the question of why people join organizations. The interaction of many individuals living in specific socio-economic conditions is inevitable. There are social and economic systems that cause the manifestation of social events, conspiracy theories, political movements, environmental pressures, religious rituals, and financial crises. Questions and answers about why an individual chooses to become a member of a terrorist organization help to develop science-based policies. Years of research and the findings from Somalia show that there are no common psychopathological symptoms among terrorists. Most deadly acts of terrorism have nothing to do with religious ideology. In recent years, however, terrorist organizations such as ISIS have promoted belligerent ideas that transcend cultural and national boundaries through Islamic values and the authority of revered holy figures, thoughts, and scriptures.

Freedom fighter? or terrorist? The activities of politicians and interest groups in pursuing their agendas present a dilemma in which freedom, family values, and religious doctrines can be interpreted differently. The absence of a system based on shared values can contribute to further

radicalization. As the above findings show, poverty and limited employment opportunities prevent individuals from achieving their life goals, and discrimination is a real problem for many minorities. But very few disaffected citizens or discriminated against individuals become terrorists.

Members of terrorist organizations feel resentment toward mainstream society due to real injustices and, in frustration, come into close contact with like-minded peers or charismatic leaders before turning to violence. Of course, people in the environment influence how society is perceived, because the social environment has a strong influence on beliefs and behaviors. In the 1950s, social psychologist Solomon Asch's conformity experiments showed that some people will ignore objective facts if everyone else disagrees. This similarity provides clues to the processes underlying why one becomes a terrorist. Social contacts and the dominance of the media provide a range of beliefs and behaviors. Dangerous manifestations such as extreme nationalism and denigration of entire ethnic or religious groups influence a cognitive process. In this context, media, beliefs, and social network updates reveal chauvinistic and violent ideas disguised as moral or patriotic values. In this case, the individual who is influenced by the messages and inclined to become a terrorist may move away from peaceful ways that prevent their ideas with internal role models. Therefore, it is important to study alienation from mainstream society, how people influence each other in complex social conditions, and political movements that foster anger.

Those who participate in terrorist movements based on group dynamics and ethno-nationalist origins, either on an activist basis or as sympathizers, describe their belligerence as positive social aggression within their own value judgments. In the relationship between terrorist action and instrumental aggression, terrorists do not harbor direct personal resentment against the victims of their actions. The victims of terrorist acts are also part of the system that hinders them and against which they fight. In this respect, terrorists display a professional behavior by attributing the identity of the messenger to people who do not personally offend them, whose future plans and life stories they do not know (Çitlioğlu, 2011, 213). The political process is also conducive to participation. Similarly, the use of war metaphors and stereotypes by governments in the way they view and respond to terrorism, and their threats to perpetrators or potential terrorists, can exacerbate the problem and make solutions more difficult.

People's frustrations and loss of faith also play a role in terrorist recruitment. Grievances divide people into two opposing sides, and it is important to draw terrorists into the political arena (democratic struggle).

Former Turkish Interior Minister Mehmet Ağar's call to the PKK years ago: "Instead of taking up arms in the mountains, do politics in the plains" is an example of a strategy to draw terrorists into the political arena in counterterrorism.

Is it possible for terrorists to be willing participants? Unconscious fear of death, meaning, personal significance, and fear of cultural annihilation are all possible disruptions before joining terrorist groups. Demonstrating the incompatibility between the dream of participation and real life will help prevent willful actions from escalating into violence. The belief that existing political interventions do not empower people to bring about real change, perceived social injustice, and a sense of alienation or disenfranchisement provide important insights into the processes of joining, remaining, and disengaging from terrorist organizations. Joining the organization, the glorification of the role of the suicide bomber, the decision of members to take on specific tasks, the sympathy of friends or family for the cause, the belief that adventure, social and psychological rewards are on offer, and a high sense of identity (the PKK's description of the families of people who join the PKK as the "value family") provide a sense of motivation to act.

In addition to the question of why people become terrorists, it is also important to answer the question of why people leave these organizations. The incoherence of certain kinds of ideas and messages that terrorists are exposed to may be a source of criticism in the factors that lead them to become terrorists and cause them to leave the organization. However, discovering and revealing to the public what is promised and hidden in counterterrorism strategies can also reflect the reality of participation. Terrorism is also a war of the weak. Material or political power is an instrument of oppression. Terrorist acts and governments have a dynamic interaction. During this interaction, if terrorists carry out an attack and the state uses excessive force to send a punitive message, members of the organization can use this action to create more anti-state sentiments among citizens and subsequently provide a pretext for their actions. Of course, in a paradoxical way, the motivation behind the reaction and the collectivist mentality that emerges can be linked to a sense of security and meaning in joining terrorist groups that people do not feel as individuals, shedding light on the role that motivation and collectivist mentality can play in terrorism.

Being part of a collectivist environment is a distinguishing characteristic of those willing to make personal sacrifices. Interpreting all the facts only from the perspective of the state, without taking into account the peculiarities, in order to soften the hearts and minds of terrorists and vulnerable masses, will not make counterterrorism successful.

There is no easy way to identify the profile of a potential terrorist. However, it should be kept in mind that individuals may be involved in organizational activities but may also be inclined to cooperate.

CHAPTER 2

TERRORISM

"The rain falls on the just and the unjust…"

American Indian Proverb

"Terrorism" as a unified political and ideological motif did not emerge spontaneously in response to specific instances of political violence or a series of such events (Burnett and Whyte, 2005, 2). The word "terrorism" was first used during the French Revolution (1789-1799), and the years 1783-1784 were called the *Reign of Terror* (Weil, 2004, 5). In recent years, terrorism has become one of the most controversial and commonly used words. Acts of terrorism vary across the globe, and the fact that terrorism differs between countries in terms of whether it is armed or unarmed diversifies the definitions of terrorism. As a complex phenomenon, terrorism varies in its objectives and methodology, and as its impact evolves, it becomes increasingly distinct from other forms of violence. The distinction between non-state conflict, state-based armed conflict, hate crimes, homicide, violence, and political violence poses challenges to the understanding of terrorism. As a result, the operational response to terrorism becomes more challenging in an era of meticulously planned attacks.

Today, we face the threat of a network of people who settle in certain areas, grow up, and often become radicalized in a short period of time. In the long run, the network of people, imbued with ideas that can lead to ideology and inspiration, makes terrorism functional, and terrorism, in which complex attacks are formulated quickly and efficiently, causes public concern. Terrorist attacks in the United States, Europe, and Asia, as well as continuing violence and attacks in the Middle East, expand the terrorist threat to governments, organizations, and the people who live where they occur. Terrorism, which does not involve open struggle and open warfare between non-state actors and armed forces, relies on violence and the threat of violence. Here the question arises: Does nonviolent resistance count as terrorism? And is restricting freedom of expression under the pretext of fighting terrorism counter-terrorism?

It is possible that acts of violence other than terrorism, committed for political, religious, social, or economic ideals, will not be recognized as terrorism, but rather as violent crimes. In this respect, terrorism has far-reaching psychological effects. Terrorism is one of the most serious threats to peace, human rights, social and economic development, security and stability. However, ignoring race, nationality, religion and sectarian affiliation in countering terrorism makes the motivation and legitimacy of terrorist organizations more than a serious crime and weakens measures to combat terrorism in all its forms and manifestations.

Objectively assessing the scope and scale of terrorism in terms of purpose and intent is an international challenge. The challenge is to determine when violence is used, by whom, for whom, for what outcome, and for what purpose. The definition of modern terrorism is therefore inherently controversial. The use of violence to achieve political ideals is common among state and non-state actors. Most of the definitions in use have been written by government agencies, and the definitions are systematically tied to the country's perception of the threat. However, terrorism is too big to fit into definitions, and as a major problem it demonstrates a lack of legitimacy and morality.

According to the FBI (Federal Bureau of Investigation), the domestic intelligence and security agency of the United States, international terrorism is the commission of violent criminal acts by individuals or groups organized by or associated with foreign terrorist organizations or countries. According to the FBI, domestic terrorism is the commission of violent criminal acts against ideological targets by individuals and/or groups arising from domestic influences such as environmental, political, religious, radical, social, and racial.

The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) uses Title 22, Section 2656f(d) of the United States Code to define terrorism. According to this definition, the term "terrorism" refers to the politically motivated use of violent crime against non-war objectives by sub-national groups or covert agents.

According to the United States Department of Defense, terrorism is the use or threat of violence or force against persons or property, usually with the intent to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in order to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives.

Title 18 of the United States Code (U.S.C.) "Crimes and Criminal Procedure" (113B. Terrorism / 18 U.S.Code § 2331) also defines terrorism. According to this, terrorism is an act of violence or threat against human life. Violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any other state, intimidation or coercion of the civilian population, influencing the policy of

a government by threats and tyranny, kidnapping, assassination and murder are acts of terrorism.

According to the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior's Glossary of Security Terms (Republic of Turkey Ministry of Interior, 2017):

> Terrorism refers to a state of action that causes large-scale fear and creates discouragement in individuals, while terrorism refers to the adoption of organized, systematic, and continuous terrorist acts as a method to illegally change the current situation for political purposes (p. 695).

United Nations General Assembly Resolution 49/60 (adopted on December 9, 1994) entitled "Measures to Eliminate International Terrorism" contains a provision describing terrorism. According to this provision, terrorism is the deliberate planning of criminal acts for the purpose of unlawfully inciting a state of terror in the public mind against a group of people or specific individuals for political purposes, irrespective of their political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other beliefs.

There is still no clear definition of terrorism agreed upon by the member states of the United Nations, and this is a drawback for international counter-terrorism measures. What one state calls a terrorist may be interpreted as a freedom fighter by another state, making reconciliation difficult. In recent years, tensions have arisen between Turkey and Germany and it has become clear that they have different understandings of the definition of terrorism in the context of security cooperation. The then German Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maiziére, stated that Germany did not agree with Turkey's definition of terrorism and that a Kurdish dissident could not be considered a terrorist by generalizing according to Turkey's point of view.

According to United Nations Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004), terrorism means criminal acts, including against civilians, intended to cause death or serious bodily injury, to take hostages or to incite a state of terror against a group of persons, a specific individual or the general public.

To suppress terrorism, the Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism was adopted in 1998 by the Council of Arab Ministers of Justice and the Council of Arab Ministers of the Interior in Cairo, Egypt. According to the Convention, terrorism is any act or threat of violence, regardless of its motives and intentions. Terrorism is also defined in the Convention as spreading panic among people; causing individual or collective criminality; endangering the life, liberty and security of people by harming them; causing damage to the environment, public and private facilities or property, or causing them to be occupied or seized, or endangering national resources.

According to the UK's Terrorism Act (2000), terrorism is an act or threat intended to influence government or an international governmental organization, or to intimidate the public or a section of the public. The definition can be politically, religiously, racially or ideologically motivated and includes:

- Serious violence to a person,
- Serious damage to property,
- Threat to a person's life,
- Serious risk to the health and safety of the public,
- Serious interference with an electronic system.

Within this definition, in addition to acts of violence, serious interference with the electronic system is a form of terrorism. According to the definition on the website of the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) of the United Kingdom, terrorism is a threat intended to influence an international governmental organization or to intimidate the public inside or outside the United Kingdom.

Article 1 of the European Union Framework Decision on Combating Terrorism (2002) also defines terrorism. According to this article, terrorist offenses consist mainly of serious crimes against persons and property. Terrorism is also defined as causing serious damage to a country or an international organization, compelling a government or organization to take or refrain from taking any action, seriously destabilizing or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organization.

In the 2019 edition of the NATO AAP-06 NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions, terrorism is defined as the use of violence and force to gain control over a population in order to achieve unlawful or threatened political, religious and ideological objectives, to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, and to instill fear and threat against individuals or property.

The definition of terrorism by states, international organizations, and the judiciary is the greatest challenge in prosecuting terrorists and determining the status and rights of suspected terrorists. The dilemma of which paradigm is relevant to terrorism places terrorism in a separate category that requires a special set of rules. At this point, terrorism is subjective and varies politically according to the experiences and perspectives of different countries.

There are also those who reject popular notions of terrorism as in fact a weak, ipso facto, and illegitimate strategy. These ideas are taken up as controversial issues without further research. Focusing only on these points

does not provide a definitive and coherent framework on terrorism (Neumann and Smith, 2008, 11). It will lead to a more rational and constructive approach that terrorism can happen not only to the antagonists but also to those who express these thoughts; that methods and messages aimed at creating a common perception of threat and danger should be prioritized instead of arguments that will accompany negative and different perceptions (Çitlioğlu, 2011, 92).

CHAPTER 3

FROM OLD TERRORISM TO NEW TERRORISM

"Variety is the mother of enjoyment."

Benjamin Disraeli

Terrorism is as old as the concept of the state itself. Terrorism and terrorist acts date back to the death of Caesar in 44 BC. The assassination of the Prince of Austria by a Serb, which is considered the incident that started World War I, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II by a Jew in 1881, the attempted assassination of Hitler in 1944, the assassination of U.S. President J. F. Kennedy in 1963, the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in 1964. Kennedy in 1963, the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi by a Sikh in 1984, the assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi by Tamil guerrillas in 1991, the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish radical in 1995, the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri in 2005, and the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007 are some of the attacks against heads of state and government in history. The beginning of modern terrorism with international characteristics dates back to the 1960s (Arı, 2013, 519).

From the old terrorism to the new terrorism, the attacks, damages and protection mechanisms have changed. Communication, the age of technology and the fact that terrorist organizations can be used by many states at the same time have prepared the ground for demonstrative terrorism. Terrorists who are very good at using communications and technology have emerged, and network-based warfare has also begun, with some propaganda activities, intimidation, and suppression practices by many states. In the aftermath of 9/11, diplomacy, combat formulations, and intelligence understanding were renewed. Terrorist-susceptible territories were used for international interests through demonstrative terrorism, and cultural wars were waged. As acts of terrorism have manifested around the world, Hollywood, television, and news portrayals of terrorism have once again been shaped, and attempts by organizations to protect themselves

from threats have been complicated by the nature of demonstrative terrorism. Demonstrative terrorism has not only focused on death and injury, but has also caused property and financial damage. With the attacks of September 11, 2001, the goal of terrorism has become both to make an organization's voice heard and to use an organization for international interests to get vulnerable populations to believe in a political cause.

The age of communication has made the form of organization in the fight against terrorism more contemporary, and logical measures have the potential to significantly improve the prevention of attacks, or at least the response to attacks. In this context, it has become imperative for institutions and organizations fighting terrorism to calculate how an attack might be planned.

Terrorism is constantly changing from the past to the present. In the old terrorism, the organizational structure was hierarchical, with a group center of gravity based in a country or region. There is a hierarchical command and control structure, and the area of operation is usually domestic. In old terrorism, ideals are based on nationalism and/or Marxism, and political/nationalist ideology is the source of motivation. Legitimate goals, rules of engagement, and rules of conflict are the methods, and tactics are based on limited violence.

The new terrorism is organized in the form of dispersed and unaffiliated cells rather than the traditional hierarchical command and control structure of a group based in one country or region, and the structure is network-based. The new terrorism is horizontally organized. It has an international reach and orientation, and its field of operation is abroad. Religious fanaticism is the purpose and motivation of the new terrorism, in which transnational tropism predominates. Its tactics are based on extreme violence and the use of mass destruction against civilians. For example, on July 7, 2005, London was hit by a series of bombings. Fifty-two people were killed in the attacks, which were claimed by al-Qaeda and targeted a bus station and a subway station. The attacks, which targeted civilians and were extremely violent, made headlines around the world, and for a time, interest in the Tube waned around the world. Two weeks after the attack, a similar attempted attack occurred on July 21, 2005, when police found unexploded bombs in three subway stations and on a bus. On July 23, 2005, a bomb was discovered hidden in bushes in Little Wormwood Scrubs Park.

Table 2-1 "Old" vs. "New" Terrorism: Ideal Types

	"Old" Terrorism	**"New" Terrorism**
Structure	Hierarchical; toward a center of gravity	Networked; transnational outreach and orientation
Motives	Nationalist and/or Marxist	Religious Fanaticism
Tactics	Legitimate Goals; Rules of Engagement/Rules of Conflict	Weapons of mass destruction against civilians; extreme violence

Resource: Peter R. Neumann, Old and New Terrorism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009, 29.

The old terrorism was often driven by a nationalist or separatist agenda and associated with the political situation in a country or region. The new terrorism has a very broad geographic agenda and is concerned with the global status quo and the establishment of a new religious world order. Beyond being a threat to a single state, new terrorism is a challenge to the international system as a whole (Field, 2009, 198). The new terrorism involves attacks designed to cause mass harm or injury and the possible use of weapons of mass destruction. Whereas in traditional terrorism attacks are carried out without discrimination between targets, in new terrorism the target may be specific and the intention to kill civilians indiscriminately is a reality.

Religious doctrines emphasizing conversion and apocalyptic beliefs associated with Islam are also influential in the motivational sources of new terrorism (Crenshaw, 2008, 122). In old terrorism, violence was used as a tool for a political cause. In the new terrorism, members of the organization use violence in an extremist form. For the new terrorists, violence is simple and final. In the new terrorism, al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks were not only a punishment for Catholics, but also embodied a broader strategic purpose to change the foreign policy of the United States government (Field, 2009, 203).

In contrast to traditional attitudes, organizations in the new terrorism are increasingly willing to use extreme and indiscriminate violence (Spencer, 2010a, 7). In this regard, the number of people killed in terrorist attacks has

increased in recent years. Attacks by suicide bombers are notable for the increase in civilian casualties, and indiscriminate mass attacks have long been characteristic of terrorism. This is a tactic used by both non-religious and religious groups (Spencer, 2010a, 10). Operationally, terrorist acts consist primarily of assassinations, bombings, and kidnappings. Members of a terrorist organization blow up a place, kill people, or take hostages. Each terrorist incident shows changes in these operations. What has changed over time is not the type of operations carried out by terrorist groups, but how they carry out operations against whom (Neumann, 2009, 25).

In operations, all terrorist groups, new and old, have always presented themselves as regular armies engaged in legitimate battles and representing the real authority. Before the emergence of new terrorism, terrorist groups imitated not only the discourse and ranks of traditional armies, but also their structures. Initially, many groups adopted hierarchical systems with clear lines of command and control, sometimes appointed through military ranks. Later, it was realized that traditional military structures were not suitable for organizations that needed to operate covertly because they were too easily dismantled, and many terrorist organizations adopted the more flexible cell system. Cells typically consist of a large number of members. Only the cell leader has a wider contact or connection. Thus, when members are caught, it only opens the possibility that they will betray other members of the cell, rather than affecting the entire organization. The damage from arrests or reporters is also limited (Neumann, 2009, 17).

The main attraction and advantage of the cell system is that it preserves the hierarchy of the group. Through the cell leader, individual cells are fully integrated into the chain of command. Cell members are autonomous only to the extent that the leader explicitly grants them autonomy. Nevertheless, the introduction of a cell system does not represent a qualitative change. Cells remain as old (Neumann, 2009, 17-18) as terrorism itself.

Over time, for both strategic and practical reasons, traditional organizations adopted a networked organizational structure and functioned in the new practice as a network of militants. For example, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) and Fatah often granted considerable autonomy to individual terrorist cells, with operations planned and executed prior to leadership approval (Field, 2009, 202).

Globalization has had a significant impact on the organizational differences between traditional and new groups, and the "franchise" organization that provides global power is a product of new terrorism. In this respect, al-Qaeda is an example of new terrorism. Al-Qaeda is a "franchise" organization and presents a global framework as a variable of

local struggles. Through local struggles and a global structure, al-Qaeda maintains a popular image. Al-Qaeda has three forms of structural organization (Neumann, 2009):

- Osama Bin Laden's *"spider web"* of hierarchical structure in his command center.
- The image of the *"franchise"* in which al-Qaeda acts rather than engaging in direct terrorist action. The *"franchise"* is the subcontracting and support of local groups acting on its behalf.
- The image of a *"social movement"* in which al-Qaeda would be understood not as a coherent and autonomous organization, but as a broad ideological umbrella that has no unmediated connotation whatsoever and inspires various local groups.

Another characteristic of former terrorist groups is that their structure revolves around a physical center of gravity. The geographic center of gravity may be a country, a part of a country, or a region encompassing more than one country. The goal of terrorist groups is not to shift the center of gravity of their organizations, but to maintain and strengthen them. In both old and new terrorism, it is clear that terrorist groups often travel abroad to cooperate with other countries and organizations, receive training from states, prepare attacks, and attack relevant targets (Neumann, 2009, 18).

An example of old terrorism is the Irish Republican Army (IRA). The organization, which fought against British rule, was revived in 1968 by supporting the struggle of Northern Irish Catholics against Protestants and British rule. While the political wing of the organization advocated a more moderate stance that included Catholics and Protestants, the radical wing, called the "Provisional IRA," emphasized violence and advocated a strategy that would immediately remove the British from the region. The Irish Republican Army, which established ties with organizations such as the PKK, ETA, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and the Tamil Tigers, took an active part in Luxor in Egypt and Dar-es-Salaam in Nairobi (Sönmezoğlu, 2010, 354-355). The Irish Republican Army's violence resulted in an estimated 1,800 deaths, including more than 600 civilians. On July 21, 1972, Provisional IRA bombs exploded in Belfast, killing nine people and injuring thirteen in what became known as Bloody Friday. On November 21, 1972, two pubs in Birmingham, England, were targeted by the organization, resulting in 21 deaths and 182 injuries. On August 27, 1979, the Provisional IRA assassinated Lord Mountbatten, cousin of Queen Elizabeth II's father George VI, with remote-controlled bombs on his boat

off the coast of Mullaghmore, near the border with Northern Ireland. On August 31, 1994, after 25 years, the Provisional IRA declared a historic ceasefire. On February 9, 1996, the ceasefire ended, and on July 28, 2005, the Provisional IRA announced an end to armed conflict and a commitment to the development of democratic and political programs through exclusively peaceful means.

Looking at the structure of the Irish Republican Army, it is clear that it has undergone several transformations. Initially, the organization was set up along military lines, with brigades and battalions covering each region of the province. This was the most obvious form of organization for the Irish Republican Army at the time. However, these structures proved unsuitable for this type of conflict. Members of the organization were caught in the mid-1970s as the British government put forward a long-term political and security strategy to deal with the conflict. By 1976, the Irish Republican Army report concluded that the three-day and seven-day detention orders were breaking down its volunteers; that the combination of brigades, battalions and orders created an inefficient infrastructure; that this system was known to the British; and that it was essential to reorganize and revitalize the organization (Neumann, 2009, 29-30).

An internal reform aimed at preparing the Irish Republican Army for a long war involved the reorganization of the organization's units into a cell system. These cells had four or five members and operated as far away from their home base as possible. Secrecy was paramount, and cell members were instructed not to discuss their participation in the "armed struggle" with anyone, including known Republicans and family members. The transformation of the organization, in which relations with the outside world were to be maintained by the cell leader, was never as successful as envisioned, and it was argued that some of the rural units prevented communication and that excessive secrecy weakened the social standing and spirit of the volunteers (Neumann, 2009, 30).

It is important to note that the introduction of the cell system did not involve any change in the chain of command. On the contrary, the IRA leadership concluded that the cells should have no control over weapons or explosives, and that these would be provided by regional commands as needed for operations (Neumann, 2009, 30).

New terrorism poses a tangible threat to the population at an obvious time. While the threat of new terrorism is estimated, its potential cannot be fully known. But its upper limit is a catastrophe. The 9/11 attacks in New York and on the Pentagon are the known cases. The attacks in Bali and Madrid are known to have been carried out by al-Qaeda. Although there was no attack in London, the authorities carried out a series of high-profile

counter-terrorism raids and made a number of arrests. The new terrorism places each of these events and unrealized incidents in a coherent framework. This is also the way in which terrorism is to be publicized. The ability to attack innocent people and access to WMD (weapons of mass destruction) has been generalized among terrorist groups, and all of this is integrated with a contemporary way of thinking called "netwar" or network warfare. This new terrorism provides the basis for making terrorists knowledgeable. Experts must identify the terrorist. In this way, a state can develop a strategy against the threat. With new terrorism, members of the organization are made knowledgeable, making terrorism actionable and potentially controllable (Burnett and Whyte, 2005, 6).

Once the new terrorism is informative, the mode and scale of attack, its indiscriminate targets, can be predicted and contribute to the development of a logic in political discourse. In George Bush Jr.'s 2002 address to the graduates of the United States Military Academy, he suggested that the future threat in counterterrorism would involve an enemy without large armies, without industrial capabilities, and without a nation or citizens to defend (Burnett and Whyte, 2005, 6). The fact that Tony Blair's two major speeches on the invasion of Iraq are related reveals a similar consolidation in the language of the new terrorism. In his speech to the United States Congress after receiving the Congressional Gold Medal, Tony Blair stated that threats cross borders and reverse concepts of when and how to act (2003). On March 5, 2004, Blair defended the invasion of Iraq by saying that this war was a new kind of war, that it relied more than ever on intelligence, and that a different attitude was necessary for their own interests. The need to rethink the new terrorism, the global nature of the risk of terrorist attacks, and the randomness and cunning of terrorist attacks create the rationale for the principle of precaution in the fight against terrorism. For this reason, there is a conviction that counterterrorism must take a broader view, that new terrorism is a ubiquitous threat that must be responded to everywhere (Burnett and Whyte, 2005, 6-7).

Demonstrative terrorism, which is driven by antagonism and opposing narratives, where organizational differences do not vary much, where objective moral actions are neglected by countries, where there are no terrorist organizations that set themselves up rationally, should be seen as an international part of a risk management program that is contiguous in terms of countries and establishments. Terrorism management, a method of detection based on reading monolithic oppositions as a form of real action, and security that prevents or deters current or future actions are necessary to prevent the ability of terrorists to harm people. Taking preventive/deterrent measures, preparing emergency procedures, involving

the public in the process through the media, and assessing the risk will bring a pragmatic approach to terrorism.