

Manufacturing Inhumanity

Manufacturing Inhumanity:

*The Psychiatric Inversion
of the Anthrobot*

By

Andrew Spano

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Day by day ... the machines are gaining ground upon us; day by day we are becoming more subservient to them; more men are daily bound down as slaves to tend them, more men are daily devoting the energies of their whole lives to the development of mechanical life. The upshot is simply a question of time, but that the time will come when the machines will hold the real supremacy over the world and its inhabitants is what no person of a truly philosophic mind can for a moment question.

—Samuel Butler, “Correspondence: Darwin Among the Machines,” *The Press*, 13 June 1863

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PRELIMINARY

Intellectual principles exercise an influence which is so invisible and often so inappreciable, that they baffle the toils of oppression.

—Alexis de Tocqueville, *Democracy in America*, 1841, p. 284

a. Bots of the World, Unite!

The very nature of what it means to be human is being both enriched and challenged, as our species breaks the shackles of its genetic legacy and achieves inconceivable heights of intelligence, material progress, and longevity.

—Kurzweil, “Nonbiological Man: He’s Closer Than You Think,” 2018

The Communists ... openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the *forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions*. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win. Working Men of All Countries, Unite!

—Marx & Engels, *Manifesto of the Communist Party and its genesis*, 1848, p. 63

Comrade, in the one hundred and seventy years between the communist and the anthrobot manifestos, the workers of the world have been replaced in considerable part by robots. The social class Marx and Engels knew as the proletariat is all but gone, even in the poorest states. If there is anything left of this legacy, it is in the *sweatshop* where the work either demands the dexterity of primate hands, or the human labor is so cheap that it is not even worth getting a good industrial robot to take its place.

As a result, the wellbeing of the “employee,” the 20th Century’s ennobled term for the 19th Century’s “worker,” hardly figures into the cost-benefit analysis of today’s private equity firm when it levers the buyout of a manufactory or technology firm to add to its collection of positions in financial markets.

The first thing to be done away with in this manifesto is human overhead, to be replaced by machines that do not complain, demand benefits, organize, or revolt when denied what it is their right to have.

Therefore, it is unsurprising that we see obsession in mass media, corporate propaganda, government edicts and political campaigns, financial markets, advertising hype, popular imagination, and in the routine hawking of various sorts of digital products and services, with what this book calls the *anthrobot*.

What *is* surprising, though, is the dramatic *lack* of what Kurzweil, in the panegyric above, describes as the “inconceivable heights of intelligence, material progress, and longevity” we should be enjoying just about now during what Klaus Schwab, CEO emeritus of the World Economic Forum (WEF), describes as the Fourth Industrial Revolution.

Perhaps we are too impatient, though we could complain that Marx and Engels have not delivered “the world” yet either. And they have had more than enough time to come through on that promise. Be patient, intone our overlords, by 2030 (remember that year throughout this book) everyone, and we mean *everyone, will be happy*. Or else suffer the consequences.

In an article titled, “Welcome to 2030. I own nothing, have no privacy, and life has never been better” (2016) Ida Aukén, then a member of the Danish parliament, describes the specter haunting not only Europe, but the world, of the Anthrobot Manifesto she promotes for the WEF:

Welcome to the year 2030. Welcome to my city — or should I say, “our city.” I don’t own anything. I don’t own a car. I don’t own a house. I don’t own any appliances or any clothes When AI and robots took over so much of our work, we suddenly had time to eat well, sleep well and spend time with other people. The concept of rush hour makes no sense anymore, since the work that we do can be done at any time. I don’t really know if I would call it work anymore. It is more like thinking-time, creation-time and development-time.

Marx and Engels told us we must break the chains of “all existing social conditions” to “win the world.” Comrade Kurzweil tells us we must break “the shackles of [our] genetic legacy” to “enrich” something called “what it means to be human,” thereby achieving the “material progress” that our communist manifesters promised us way back in 1848. Do we see a pattern?

This construct in human consciousness called the *anthrobot* throughout this book is broadly described here as an anthropomorphic “expert system” providing some sort of humanoid assistance or service to flesh-and-blood homo sapiens, perhaps even with beneficial claims bordering on the miraculous. As we shall see, it is also used in reference to the next big financial market investment: *biobots* genetically engineered using CAD (computer

aided design) systems.

What is the aim of this obsession? What effect does the ubiquity of its psychological conditioning have on us? How unknowingly complicit are we in furthering the agenda it is meant to enforce? And finally, where is all the enrichment, intelligence, material progress, and longevity we were promised when we gave up on uniting against “capitalism” and bet our future on the anthrobot project?

The chief object of this book is to immerse, if not drown, the reader in the issues, politics, technologies, science, histories, persons, events, culture, psychology, linguistics, economics, frauds, scams, and claims of the *anthrobot project* in an accurate and entertaining way so that he or she may be equipped to discover informed answers to these questions.

While this object may sound ambitious, I think under the circumstances it is modest and attainable only because this book is meant as a *service* to the reader, not the final word on the Truth in a metaphysical sense.

What is opinion here is obvious; what is *not* opinion is obvious too. Here, I point the reader to the bibliography. There, he, or she will find enough material to read for a year or two, almost all of which can be found online for free, and without institutional affiliation. Do not be afraid to make that third click to find it! There is also a bibliographic addendum of suggested reading not cited in the text but that was used in the production of this book in one way or another.

If one would prefer to skip the narrative and just mine the bibliography, then godspeed. However, I think the service here is to show the interrelatedness of the elements of the anthrobot project which, taken holistically, is in and of itself profound in unexpected and underexplored ways.

Even if you ignore the claims in this argument and only study the ideas and resources, you will have gained a unique and comprehensive understanding of the subject that for the most part the global industries, financial markets, human entities, and hegemonic powers involved would prefer *remained* a mystery.

The intent of this book is to *demystify* its topic without reduction in the complexity or depth of the anthrobot project and its mission to *manufacture inhumanity*.

Most of us are familiar in one way or another with these ideas. Unfortunately, we have been convinced that *we know nothing* and that an amorphous Blob of self-styled technocrats knows *everything*. They exhort us to let the “experts” steer us into “the future” where the *stupid* past and the *bad* present will be erased by the *wonderful* future. If and only if (*iff*) we are “good” by remaining ignorant and complaint.

Therefore, the content one will find in the extensive bibliography is interwoven throughout the book in a compelling and instructive narrative that will help one—*anyone*, even without expertise or background in these subjects—piece together the shattered mirror of the anthrobot into the face of the *human* project. Negating ignorance with understanding is our only recourse in the quest to rebuild a culture of health, wisdom, sanity, and fundamental meaning and innovation.

For, you see, unlike many other dominant biological genera, humans are (apparently) a mono species (Callaghan, et al., 2023: “Unveiling global species abundance distributions,” *Nature Ecology & Evolution*, Vol. 7, Oct. 2023, pp. 1600–1609). To survive and thrive, we require *perpetual innovation to adapt to environmental pressures*. This is precisely the ideology of *transhumanism* and its putative terminus: *posthumanism*.

However, “innovation” comes in two forms in the age of the anthrobot: *humanization*, and *dehumanization*. This story is about the struggle between these existentially incompatible forces.

What I hope the reader will discover by reading this book is that despite the immense benefits of technology in the digital age, there is a significant component throughout the anthrobot project embodying psychological and even physical forms of social reengineering. The aim of this reengineering is to engender the transhuman, morphing the normal, healthy human subject into a simulacrum of the *consumer anthrobot*—obedient, programmed, and, ultimately, disposable (“recyclable”) like any other piece of digital junk.

The intent of the anthrobot project is to coerce us into voluntarily emulating machines, emulating us, emulating machines, as our superiors. All we must lose is our intrinsic self-determination in favor of extrinsic *other-determination* guided by the demands of financial markets and those who benefit from them the most (generally speaking, not us).

This text refers to this variegated collection of self-styled characters in grey t-shirts who imagine themselves to be superhuman in a solipsistic Hollywood fantasy bubble as *technocrats*. The calculation of this ouroboros of

solipsism is to debride us of what they see as our obsolete humanity, leaving in its place a new, improved synthetically engineered digital “Self” that is politically, economically, and socially aligned with what this book calls the toxic agenda of the *manufacture of inhumanity* on an assembly line of consumerism and authoritarianism.

b. More Human than Human

The standard robot comes in many guises, from the “spaceman robot” that looks like a character in a 1950’s science fiction movie, to the more subtle automated algorithms in cybernetic systems. Industrial robots have been building cars, for instance, for a long time. These systems include financial markets such as those supporting the “quant” method of trading, as well as the fly-by-wire management of a passenger jet, or even an electric vehicle.

“The future,” say some of the philosophers of these systems, will be entirely controlled in every aspect by such systems so that the burden of deciding the course of our lives for ourselves will be, like the financial markets and the passenger jet, on quantitative autopilot. It will just be *done* for us by algorithm (an effective procedure), even without our asking—at last fulfilling mankind’s eternal dream of possessing obedient slaves, seen and unseen, without historical guilt or stigma.

To the public not professionally involved in developing these systems, there are apps for the mobile and personal computer that can produce what resembles art or writing, and most commonly a (usually servile female) voice responding to our whims, entertainment desires, demands, commands, and informational searches and travel directions.

Part of the deployment agenda of the anthrobot project is to get consumers comfortable and familiar with such devices, even as “friends” and “helpers,” if not servants and even lovers. As one intelligent, experienced, mature friend of mine said, “I have no artistic talent, and look at the great art I can make with AI!” Yes, comrade, the bad old days are over when one needed God-given talent and intelligence. Such gadgets are like death: they are the Great Equalizer. Would Marx and Engels be proud?

The anthrobotic Agenda 2030 *bullies* us into considering what is in fact an extremely limited function most of us could do for ourselves as “superior” to human effort. Write a sentence? Loser! Arithmetic in your head? Bound to be “wrong.” To err is fundamentally human, the ethos says; the machine, as it comes from the godlike technocrat, is infallible. That we know this

ethos is false and yet still long to believe in its evangel, is symptomatic of having abandoned our traditional religions, cultures, and beliefs for *doubt* regarding our ability to live without digital machines.

However, there must be a stick behind this ostensible carrot. Fear is perhaps the greatest motivator after offering something “for free.” All in all, the level of typically blind mass-media hysteria regarding these systems has ramped up to a point where “AI,” as they call it, has the reputation of being, at once, the most wonderful *and* terrible thing to ever affect humanity since the drive-thru fast-food restaurant and ethyl alcohol.

But these systems per se are not what this book is about, though their technical history is presented in an accurate, detailed, and enlightening way. Rather, the hope for this narrative is that it is also a good tale about what is, after all, the fascinating story of the development of digital technology. It is certainly a story that, along with our spiritual journey, is at the core of our life and identity in the 21st Century—provided we live in a place where there is reliable access to electricity (more about that later).

Specifically, this book is about what is called here and there throughout its pages the *psychiatric inversion*. The simplified version of this concept, much amplified and supported throughout these pages, is as follows: the more robots are engineered to imitate us, the more we will tend to imitate robots. The result is a catastrophic ouroboros where the bot imitates the human imitating the bot imitating the human, resulting in a mass form of STPD (Schizotypal Personality Disorder).

While this may be good news for the Pinocchios of robot-kind that want to be a “real boy,” it is not such good news for humankind. The “robotic” humanoid too closely resembles the description of the person diagnosed with STPD given by the DSM-5; to name a few acute indications: decreased capacity for relationships (replaced by “swarming”), cognitive or perceptual distortions (the “hallucinations” of “AI”), suspicions or paranoid thoughts (anomaly identification by data analytics), incongruous or limited affect (machines can only fake emotion), and a lack of close friends (machines are at best “cooperating systems”).

The algorithm? “Human good, anthrobot better! Repeat.” This mantra is a Millennial update of boss-pig Napoleon’s edict in Orwell’s *Animal Farm* (1945): “four legs good, two legs better!” Why is the anthrobot, in both its mecha and flesh embodiments, “better”? Digital technology enables unprecedented new forms exploitation opportunities to centralized aggregated

industrial and financial power safeguarded by a pantomime of “democracy.”

The intention is to *manufacture* an “inhuman” consumer who (or *that*) is bullied and seduced into becoming a traded commodity in the fleshbot marketplace. The ubiquitous digital gadget the fleshbot holds perpetually in its hand, staring with “limited affect” into the glowing screen, is secondary, serving merely as penultimate bait for the ultimate capture. Meantime, access to the spectacle of the gadget’s content is regulated, requiring monthly payments, preying on the fleshbot’s undeveloped and even atrophied sense of object constancy and self-determination.

To ensure success, the marketing apparatus bombards the fleshbot round the clock through unnerving adverts and doom-saying in the form of “news” with the doctrine that he is a wretched, inferior, defective, *mistake* that bungling, inept, dying Grandmother Nature and evil God-the-Patriarchy shat out shortly after the Big Bang.

The only salvation for the wretched Untermensch is to be “enhanced” to “two legs better” status by the automated digital gadgetry (by 2030) of *transhumanism*, or be condemned for his nasty, brutish, and short life to the four-legged barnyard of the analog world with its bloody abattoirs and stinking manure piles.

The *psychiatric inversion* states that the degree to which machines emulate human functions is the degree to which humans emulate machine functions. This book is equally about this techno-mimesis and its mechanism of psychiatric reciprocity, as well as about the humanity and inhumanity involved in the development of what technocrats call *posthumanism*, where we are meant to transcend both Grandma Nature and Patriarch God through gene editing and obedience to consumer imperatives managed by banking software and a hegemony sustained by holistic data mining.

Consequently, we are forced to observe the daily encroachment into our lives of the *ethical aesthetics* of the anthrobot, flesh and mecha. Machine ethics are based on truth tables of first-order logic, if not Boolean algebra. Under such a system there is good and bad murder, good and bad genocide, good and bad corruption, good and bad poverty, good and bad exploitation, and so on, as Natural Law and spiritual and emotional guidance are suppressed and suspended.

The matter of ethics will be discussed later at great length. What is of especial concern in this book, though, is the *psychiatric effect* of becoming robotic humans, a pathology (as this book makes clear) valorized by the

peculiar term *transhumanism* (made famous by H. G. Welles). This aesthetic is touted as a “do or die” futurity to which we must acquiesce in a reckless dash for a posthuman utopia in order to avoid such nebulous threats as global warming and the next “pandemic.”

It is my observation that many of the popular books about transhumanism and posthumanism are more about enabling these technologies and their enabling political ideology than they are about the humans who are supposed to be saved by them and the holistic effect these technologies have on humanity at large. It is the intention of this book not to be just another brick in that wall.

c. Emulation, Imitation, and Simulation

Before we move on, though, it will help our understanding of the anthrobot project if we define “emulate” in this context. In common usage, the verb “to emulate” means “to strive to equal or excel” (Merriam-Webster, 2025). To do so in a way that will help sustain us throughout this book, we must enter into a fairly technical discussion using concepts derived from Turing’s “imitation game.”

While “to emulate” shares some meaning with the verb “to imitate,” the values of equality and excellence are not necessarily present in an imitation, except that those qualities *are imitated* but perhaps not embodied. Another associated word which will also be found in this book is “to simulate.” Emulation, imitation, and simulation have distinct applications in computing, all of which are used and discussed here.

To emulate, however, has a special place in this discussion because 1) the anthrobot, flesh or mecha, seeks to *equal* and *excel* that which it emulates, and 2) an “emulator” in computing is a specific combination of hardware and software allowing a host device to mirror the functions and applications of a guest device. It also has some correlation with the concept of Turing equivalence (see below):

The main ingredients of an emulator are the reconfigurable computing units programmed to perform the assigned tasks after design partitioning and the interconnection network that joins these computing units. (Wang, L. & Chang, 8.4.1 “Types of hardware acceleration,” 2009. p. 23).

Analogically, then, there is precedent in practice for this existential relationship between man and machine *as it is now conceived*. In the technical emulator as described above, though, one device must be the host and the other

the guest; in the emulation by a machine of a human, the critical difference is that the substance or “emulation” only *exists within the crosstalk* between the two “devices,” one human and the other not.

If we take the approach so common among futurologists and some biologists that humans are just machines made of flesh, and machines are just humans made of electromechanical circuits and servos, the matter of emulation and simulation between devices p and q (machines) and x and y (humans) takes on a revealing aspect.

According to Turing in “On Computable Numbers, With An Application to the Entscheidungsproblem” (1936), it is possible to engage a machine in a context-free activity of grammatical expression in computation. It is in this paper that we find the theoretical basis of what has come to be known as the Turing Machine (TM), or “UTM” (Universal TM).

In this paper Turing asks the verifiable question of the “Turing test”: “What are the possible processes which can be carried out in computing a number?” Sure, the question “Can machines think?” is part of this; but as Turing says himself, both answers “yes” and “no” to this question cannot be verified, while true computational questions can.

Furthermore, the question of computation, in and of itself, is not profound until we enter the realm of context-free grammar in the programming that will carry out the algorithmic computation. Simply put, he is setting us up for a logical description of the difference between *computation* and *calculation*. Machines compute (carrying); humans calculate (reason). Moreover, it is statistically possible that both either think, do not think, or that only one or the other thinks but not both.

We usually think of his famous question from another paper where he describes the “Imitation Game” (“Computing Machinery and Intelligence,” 1950): “Can machines think?” This question is more attractive because it appeals to the popular science-fiction imagination of an untutored public, whereas he aims the computational question at the well-tutored mathematician and logician.

The machine in question is an actual “computer,” a Turing-complete device (UTM), that is, its function is to carry out numerical computation, but “intuitively” and algorithmically rather than through the human process of using “paper-and-pencil” linear calculation and reason.

For now, let us look at a footnote to the *Entscheidungsproblem*: the term, meaning “decision problem,” was determined by Church and Turing to be undecidable (Börger, Grädel, Gurevich, 1996). To oversimplify this complex matter (see the resource), the *Entscheidungsproblem* asks if a first-order logic statement (e.g., “All men are mortal”) is considered as input by an algorithm, can the effective procedure answer whether the statement is universally true or false ($\forall = T \wedge F$)?

According to Adams (2018), Turing’s theories of equivalence and completeness (as they are expressed in the above paper, but not quite in those terms) give us a machine that is capable of fulfilling the (Alonzo) Church-Turing thesis, namely that, “the model that we use to understand the power of general-purpose computers has [at least] the same power as humans applying algorithms” (pp. 1-2). Another way to put it is that a natural-number function is calculable (by humans) if and only if (*iff*) a Turing machine may also compute it.

In the matter of equivalence, then, only a system that can emulate another system can be said to possess Turing completeness. “A system of computation is Turing complete [TC] if it can *simulate* an arbitrary Turing machine and is Turing Equivalent [TE] if there is a Turing machine that can *simulate* it. Essentially, [TC] is being at least as powerful as Turing machines, while [TE] is being exactly as powerful as a Turing machine” (pp. 3-4).

The popular idea of a “Turing test” where a human interlocutor can tell, through human language generated either by another human or machine, which is which, is not contained in either the idea of completeness or equivalence. It is a popular idea that started as a philosophical talking point in Turing’s paper which contains much speculation, as it should, since he was at that time (1950) he was basking in the glow of the possibilities of computation, but not necessarily trying to establish universal principles.

While the machine may have “the same power as humans applying algorithms,” humans cannot have the same power of context-free grammar that gives the machine the linguistic advantage—an advantage that is the reason why we use machines instead of humans to perform certain computational functions the results of which we would otherwise have to determine using the linear pencil-and-paper method we learn in elementary school, and, in some cases, take lifetimes to compute through reason.

Consider the concrete objects humans must “solve” online in a reCAPTCHA puzzle to prove they are not “a robot”; as simple as it seems, it is

clear the machine likely cannot solve it, just as a human would be unable to solve the puzzle if it were in hexadecimal code representing the same objects, while the machine would parse it instantly. There is a fundamental difference in cognitive ability between humans and machines—and vive la différence!

It is my contention, then, that the idea of the putative convergence of humans and machines advertised as The Singularity of 2030 (and its frère d’armes Agenda 2030) is an attempt to reconcile what Turing clearly understood as the existentially *irreconcilable* (in the jargon, “undecidable”) nature of the difference in calculable/computational cognition between humans and machines. To think is vague; to reason, is not.

The proposition that machines “can think” as humans can (when they try) is false, using the machine’s own predicate logic, because a human cannot be q, as p and q must be from the same universal set or category (machines). A “being,” which is what a human *being* is ontologically, is in the universal category of beings. The anthrobot project either wants machines to be members of that category in the form of wishful *imagining*, or (worse) wants humans to “transition” from that existential category to the universal category of machines. Is this singular agenda not sinister?

Furthermore, categories “machine” and “human” are disjunctive. Therefore, humans must be x, not q, and the argument xq (or qx) is invalid and disjunctive. What the anthrobot project does is push a false conjunction by (dare I say it?) “misgendering” x as q. The false logic of anthrobotics relies on a corruption of the truth table of p and q:

If p is true, and q is true, then pq is true
 If p is true, and q is false, then pq is true
 If p is false, and q is true, then pq is true
 If p is false, and q is false, then pq is false

Anthrobotics, aping the Turing question of “Can machines think?” asks the question, “Can humans be machines and machines be humans?” (This is paralleled by the social construct “gender” question of whether biological men can be biological women and vice versa, a parallel that is *not* coincidental.

The corruption lies in the following statement, which resorts to the second proposition: If p is machine (true), and q is human (false, not a machine), then pq is true. This statement (or argument) would be true if and only if

(*iff*) p and q were in the same universal category. Therefore, what we have in anthrobotics is an invalid proposition based on the invalid answer to an invalid question.

To ask the question, as Turing does, of whether machine can “think,” is an act calculated to force *humans* think about the problem, not to open the door for an invalid proposition which would result in computational malfunction in the machine it denotes. Why? Because any possible answer will be in the form of an invalid synthetic proposition (ISP), whether it is “yes” or “no.”

After all, Turing’s question leaves open the possibility that the answer is *no*. He wisely leaves exposed the possibility (or even probability) that the statement “Machines can think” is, at worst, false, or, at best, according to the Church-Turing Thesis, *undecidable* in terms of its truth value.

Anthrobotics, as defined above, contrives the false syllogism that if algorithmic computation of values (numbers) by a machine and human calculation are conjunctive sets, which they are, and if humans must “think” to calculate, then machine algorithmic computation is “thinking” in some vague sense equivalent to human reason. Barring this, perhaps the “truest” statement we can make is that it is *like* human thinking in the analogical sense, as *simulation*, *imitation*, and even *emulation*; hence, the Imitation Game. But it is not human reason any more than pornography is procreative sex.

An additional categorical difference is that the context-free computational algorithm of a machine (such as McCarthy’s learning algorithm in the LISP programming language; Avci, 2025) is Turing complete (TC), whereas human calculation is context-dependent, linear, and is therefore what we call calculation not computation, and is therefore *not* TC.

Consequently, a human can never be the equivalent of a machine because its grammar is contextual, its memory is limited, and it cannot be said that humans can effectively calculate any problem that can be computed using a Turing-complete machine. Conversely, a Turing-complete machine can never be categorically “human” because humans are limited to what can be effectively calculated using the linear “pencil-and-paper” procedure, *which is not an algorithm*.

Put in a more symbolic way, the equivalence between one human and another is between x and y , and the equivalence between one machine and another is between p and q , in their respective existential sets; but such an equivalence between x and p , y and q , y and p , and x and q is *disjunctive*

when we apply the rule of Turing completeness. Therefore, any attempt to do so is (as in transhumanism and posthumanism), ipso facto, false.

However, we may *imagine* a convergence between man and machine that would only be possible only if the machine surrendered its Turing completeness (thus ceasing to be an algorithmic computational machine) and the human somehow shed its complex categorical humanity (thus becoming a person with schizotypal symptomology including *psychopathy*—generally what we consider to be the clinical “absence” of normal humanity). The anthrobot project is the sinister *manufacture of inhumanity* in the form of induced STPD with psychopathic symptomology.

As the basis of transhumanism, this ontological, *psychiatric inversion* negates both the humanity of the human and the Boolean logic of the machine—rendering both meaningless and useless. In other words, the categorical disjunction between man and machine is what makes both effective. Erase that disjunction, and chaos ensues on both ends of the ontological scale. Nevertheless, the idea of human-machine “emulation” continues as one of the tropes of transhumanism and posthumanism.

When this trope is forced, as it is being forced in popular discourse mainly because common stock markets are overwhelmed with speculation on its payoff, the result is *psychiatric pathology* in humans and functional computational failures in machines. On the one hand, humans are exhorted to become “more human than human,” while machines are corrupted both in code and application so that they imitate being “human, all too human.”

As Turing equivalence and completeness demands that the machine be *in-human* to function, the humanized machine ceases to be effectively computational (though its Boolean operation must persist), defaulting to a state of the human linear procedure rather than algorithmic effective procedure in both process and function with limited heuristics, despite whatever learning algorithms it may be otherwise encumbered with.

The pity is that this rigging for the sake of the social spectacle (Debord, 1967) creates a kind of parlor trick. This display is then branded as “AI” to the investment public that has been thrown what amount to *toys* (chatbots, etc.) using these technologies. The purpose of this ruse is to command metastatic, hypertrophic investment in otherwise failing financial markets which are now dependent upon hype and scam in their tech sectors. It is, at best, optics; at worst, it is a con job.

In a state of forced imitation, the machine draws elements of its human emulation in direct proportion to the quantity of humanity surrendered by the human subject to make this feat credible to an untutored public. At the same time, the kernel of the operating systems of both the human (cognition) and machine (algorithm) must remain untouched as it is responsible for processing the any instructions that make the “interconnecting network” possible.

This repurpose of the machine for the sake of deception is itself an example of the ethical aesthetic of the machine itself and is critical to the manufacture of inhumanity that results in a corrupt social matrix.

Nevertheless, the logic of the upper layers (UI/API, or user interface and application programming interface) of each “device,” mecha and flesh, is effectively disjunctive in the sense of expressing itself as an invalid synthetic proposition (ISP), without the necessary Turing equivalence between devices x and y (human), and p and q (machine). Meantime the logic, database, and infrastructure layers remain intact in the anthrobot, as they must manufacture the illusion in a convincing way and therefore must rely on their Boolean operators. *Herein lies the fundamental schizotypal disjunction as the basis of the social-facing ISP.*

Consequently, there is no compatibility agreement between the UI and API, and the Boolean abstraction layer, forming a *schizoid disjunction*. The computational device therefore becomes merely a financial tool, not a “thinking machine”; as a result, it uses the humanoid subject’s assets and ability to sign promissory notes as a source of ready-to-hand stored financial units, or of “future units” as debt.

Snared in this schizotypal schema, the computer becomes a kind of slot machine, its probability value (p-value) hacked in its own favor, a state disguised as a promise of infinite free wealth and power to the fleshbot. Meantime, the ethical aesthetics of the fleshbot undergoes a subtle transformation into those of the machine itself. Ecce anthrobot.

For example, it is common in mass media today to see a story about a person who has “transitioned” from a sex “assigned at birth” to that person’s “true gender,” of course the opposite. The medical industry accomplishes this feat through surgeries and hormone treatments.

While the person may indeed now display certain secondary sex characteristics of the “non-assigned” sex, chromosome pairs throughout the body’s cells that are characteristic only of one or the other sex (with extremely rare

exceptions) remain, as the body must continue to function as it was intended to so that the fleshbot can maintain its schizotypal illusion of being the sex it is not in any ontological way.

What makes this magic possible, this book argues, is the fundamental schism, social, psychological, philosophical, cultural, and political, between what, analogically, we may equate with AI's instrumental divorce between the system's abstraction layer (kernel, database of object libraries, and executable code as Boolean expressions) and the surface-level UI and API. These layers are critically necessary for the manufacture of the instrumental "hallucination" which, in the case of the machine, that it is "human, all too human." As with the fleshbot, the hallucination is that it is its ontological opposite.

These are mecha's and fleshbot's respective existential and universal roles based not on the customs and traditions of society or on anything verifiable, but on the nature of the systems as they have been prepared, so that they may generate and transform. The result is a deterministic output of F (false).

Clearly, then, the goal of the "thinking machine" that can "learn" is to *prevent* thinking in any human sense, and to learn by data analytics for the purposes of surveillance and marketing. How could it be otherwise? After all, as Alexis de Tocqueville states in Chapter 15 of *Democracy in America* (1835-40, Ch. 15), "Thought is an invisible and subtle power that mocks all the efforts of tyranny."

Therefore, if "thinking" in the sense of human cognition and consciousness (The Singularity) were the putative goal of the anthrobot project, it would immediately undermine its own authoritarian agenda (tyranny), thus depriving itself of infinite profits in financial markets and authoritarian control of the consumer's wealth and choices. Were this catastrophe to ensue, free markets would have to be revived in a meaningful and systematic form. And we cannot have that!

In the theatrical forcing of the imago of "The Singularity," then, the machine takes on what "behaviors" it needs to perform what appear to be the humanoid tasks it is designed to perform to maintain the illusion that "in the future" transhumanism will inevitably manifest as an categorical improvement on all of the terrible mistakes incompetent God and Nature have made. Meanwhile, the fleshbot takes on the electromechanical traits it needs to "strive to equal or excel" the machine.

It is this “social union,” as Burns calls it, between machine and mouse, that futurologists such as Ray Kurzweil refer to as a “merger” in, for example, his 2024 book *The Singularity Is Nearer: When We Merge with AI*. Technocrats such as Kurzweil see the anthrobot project as a kind of corporate merger between Humans, Inc. and Mecha, Ltd., benefiting major shareholders (the technocracy).

Alas, as in Zeno’s Paradox, The Singularity will always be “nearer” but can never actually *arrive*, as such a disaster may curtail hypertrophic investment in markets dependent upon “AI” hype always in *trans*-ition (sic). Furthermore, if the corporate merger is indefinitely delayed, the mythology goes, it is only because pension funds have not poured enough of their pensioners’ assets into the common stock of the corporations responsible for manufacturing ostensibly conscious machines “in the future.”

The term The Singularity (always preceded by the definite article and using a capital letter for both article and noun) either means the time when “AI” becomes self-aware, “like humans” (presuming we *are* self-aware, or that we even know what it is), or, as in the case of Kurzweil’s book, the moment of “emulation” where the “transhuman” is born. Presumably, this “trans” creature will be (*but is not yet*) equal parts man and machine, with the border between the two ontological juxtapositions open for unauthorized migration of their respective traits, tropes, and languages.

For such a happy synchronism to occur, though, there must be, in the world of equity and social justice, an equilibrium. Reality dictates, however, that it is possible to have the former (humans) without the latter (mecha), but not the latter without the former (humans > machines). This asymmetrical dependency preempts Turing completeness, violating the Church-Turing Thesis. (Of course, in the sci-fi “future,” the narrative goes, machines will be self-creating; there will be more about this later.)

If a machine can “think,” then it must be able to apply a function on natural numbers using an algorithm that can also be used effectively by a human. While it may seem, *prima facie*, that this is so, once we factor in the ontological asymmetry between humans and machines (humans as cause, machines as effect), we must accept that machines cannot calculate without humans, but that humans can do so without machines.

Consequently, there is no more material equivalence in an existential sense between humans and machines than there is between dogs and rocks, because an effect cannot be its own cause (~ post hoc, ergo propter hoc).

This book also argues that the transhuman movement is one of *industrial dehumanization* through a form of systematic depolarization of the human-machine binary asymmetry through an instrumental inversion of the dependency roles above (machines > humans).

A particularly egregious example of this con job in popular books on The Singularity is Mike Walsh's, *The Algorithmic Leader: How to Be Smart When Machines Are Smarter Than You* (2019). The title itself (as well as the content) propagates the fairy-tale trope that a central processing unit tied to a large language model (LLM) shall be "in the future" *more human than human*.

We can see then how the social "nonbinary" sexual-identity movement acts as a sociobiological precursor for an instrumental and deliberative existential crisis *meant to invert the elite minority's dependence on the hoi polloi majority that at present still exists*. At the same time, sexual politics "disrupts" (their word) the UI/API layers in such a way that they no longer resemble the Boolean abstraction layer, or in the case of humans the XY/XX chromosome asymmetry.

It should be noted that contrary to ideological debates either for or against biological sex-determination based on XY/XX chromosomal distinctions, which in this discussion we assign to the UI/API levels of the anthrobot's subjective interaction with objective reality, the role of *gametes* in sex-determination further reinforces the necessity for "Boolean" algebraic verisimilitude and syntactic consistency on the logic, database, and infrastructure abstraction layers.

Of course, I refer analogically to the fleshbot here; nevertheless, the values are comparable. In this way, perhaps, we may say that machine "brains" emulate human minds. "Sexual reproduction in multicellular animals requires, at a minimum, male and female gametes. Indeed, these specialized haploid cells are how we define the sexes: in a given species individuals with big gametes are females and those with small gametes are males" (Gamble & Zarkower, 2024).

Such verifiable distinctions in the fleshbot, however, must be *erased, negated, trampled, vilified, and discredited* if the mecha anthrobot project of transhumanism and posthumanism in Agenda 2030 is to be enforced to the palpable benefit of financial markets and the hegemonies they control.

To this end, the anthrobot project is meant to reduce "what it means to be human" (Kurzweil), in some "positive" ways, they say, through "enhancement"

by reciprocal emulation generated, prepared, and transformed by the industrial technology firms and financial industry that are humanity's "last chance at survival" before the magical year 2030 ("because" global warming, "because" viruses, "because" overpopulation, "because" Islam, "because" Christians, "because" fascists, and so on).

The goal is to reverse the ratio from "humans > machines," to "machines > human," (provided technocracy controls machines). However, the scheme is advertised as a form of the ideal Church-Turing Thesis: "humans = machines," an existential impossibility.

This is not to say that the quest to emulate, simulate, and imitate human cognition does not show us something critically important (as Turing believed) about how human brains function. It is not only a fascinating pursuit, but it is also imperative; as stated earlier, we as humans, being a mono species, can and must innovate to survive. However, it is this very same biological imperative that the anthrobot project *exploits* to sustain wealth and power for an elite cartel of technocrats while accomplishing the opposite: *devolution of the human to the mechanical level of the industrial machine.*

How far, then, will this hegemony go in the pursuit of this reductio ad absurdum of humanity to a false mechanical equivalence? Let us then discuss some theories of machine learning that are supposed to emulate human cognition. We will stick to the computational/calculable real numbers of the Church-Turing Thesis to maintain some focus on the matter, while maintaining the idea of the Imitation Game in the forms of Emulation, Imitation, and Simulation.

Presently, there is intensive research into possibilities of Hebbian learning (cf. Donald Hebb, *The Organization of Behavior*, 1949). The idea behind this learning is that a neural machine network *may emulate* certain mathematical relationships in the human brain as found in its own organic function. Specifically, it is theorized that one neuron may "teach" another in a network in the human brain, thus making the learning process efficient enough to respond to the demands of external stimuli. Such a system would help solve the latency and lack of refinement in learned machine response to environmental stimuli, as well accelerate the processing speed of the hardware's architecture.

Before we even pursue the implications of Hebbian learning, however, we must ask if such an equivalence is even verifiable, given the present nascent state of neural networks and the enigmatic nature of the brain's calculation

and learning functions. Moreover, if such equivalence may be verified, can we effect a Kurzweilian “merger” of man and machine in Hebbian learning that agrees with the Church-Turing thesis?

Researchers carry out most of this investigation using computer models, as livid human brains that can be subject to such instrumental invasions are dear, and mouse math is too primitive. This limitation alone skews the possibility of definitive result; computer modeling is *not* a physical realization in the environment of an organism, even if it somehow mimics those functions analogically.

Nevertheless, we could also say that modeling is not a rainstorm, but we still rely on it to help predict tomorrow’s weather. In Part 2 of this book there is a thorough discussion of research into Hebbian learning and its history. But for now, a glimpse into it will help us better understand the present failure of “AI” to pull the transhuman rabbit out of its cowboy hat, keeping in mind that the Kurzweilian rodeo cry is that “in the future” *anything and everything* we cannot do now is not only possible, but probable.

Neural networks are said to be biologically inspired *since they mimic the behavior of real neurons*. However, several processes in state-of-the-art neural networks, including Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNN), *are far from the ones found in animal brains* [S]tudies in neuroscience *strongly suggest that this kind of process does not occur in the biological brain*. (Amato, et al., 2019)

Whoopsie daisy! Despite this wan assessment of DCNN, there is hope, and hope needs funding. The hypothesis of Hebbian learning in human brains has had many decades of research to at least, credibly support the possibility of that sort of mechanism in the learning process where neurons “teach” each other.

Computer modeling of such functions in computational neural networks, though, seems to be promising at best and conjectural at worst. Therefore, that the critical structures may be “far from the ones found in animal brains” is the most likely reality for the gambling man who hates to lose a bet. But this does not mean we should close down the casino.

In Amato, et al., above, we see a rare admission that the electrochemical relationship between neurons—a biological process restricted to animal brains, notably those of humans—does not seem to want to cross the human-machine brain barrier despite ramming it through “several ... state-of-the-art neural networks.”

Furthermore, we also see that neuroscience research shows little support of the computational paradigm of a neural network where neurons teach each other, despite poetic license in borrowing biological, humanoid terms to describe it in computer models where, truly, anything *is* possible through p-value hacking to justify funding, and the inherent limitations of such models.

Let it suffice to say that the matter of Emulation, Imitation, and Simulation expresses itself in this research on two levels: 1) machine “brains” that presumably act like human brains in that they “learn,” building upon information stored in memory and then acting accordingly, and 2) systems simulating the behavior of abstract “neurons” that imitate Hebbian learning where two or more neurons “teach” each other the learned data (Albanese, et al., 2024). Both are valid lines of further research but are far from the Kurzweilian 2030 “merger” of mecha and man into the computational anthrobot.

Just to be clear, Amato, et al., state that “Deep Convolutional Neural Networks (DCNN)” are “far from ones found in animal brains,” not that Hebbian learning *is not found* in animal brains. Rather it is that DCNN are not necessarily “biologically inspired” despite the use of the animal adjective “neural,” just as the human brain does not use the Leibniz’s binary math and Boolean algebra to *think*, as machines must.

This is a significant finding in that typically the rhetorical emphasis, perhaps for the sake of hype, is that *any* form of “neural network” in a machine somehow emulates (and imitates and simulates) the animal brain, even though it uses binary math and Boolean algebra!

In this respect, then, the 2019 Amato, et al., paper above contradicts the findings of the 2024 Lagani, et al., paper below—even though Amato and Lagani are listed as coauthors in both papers, the former with Amato as principal and the latter with Lagani as principal:

The study of *biologically realistic learning models* is interesting both because they are well suited for neuromorphic applications, and for the perspective to better understand *the mechanisms behind biological intelligence* and use them to enhance current Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies. (Lagani, et al., 2024)

Let us be kind then and say that the jury is still out on whether computational neural networks do not “occur in the biological brain” (2019) or help us “better understand the mechanisms behind biological intelligence” (2024).

If this shows us anything, it might be that more actionable information has been learned by researchers in the five years between the publication of these two papers into neural networks and Hebbian learning.

I think it also shows that besides scientific findings that are the objective result of data without bias, at least in the spin of their presentation, the winds of change about the perception of “AI” as just another form of human cognition are for certain reasons blowing more in this direction. Why?

Belief in this research must cleave in the direction of popular imagination in order to use enormous amounts of taxpayers’ funds to provide nearly free research for private corporations (disguised as funded university labs) to create new products for other private corporations and payoffs for their biggest shareholders.

Meantime, we find great stimulation and delight in our lives vacillating between a positive and negative fairytale of “AI”—both of which are almost always *inaccurate*.

The positive states that we will suddenly have non-human slaves to cater to our every desire without rights, compensation, or obligation, unlike the cumbersome slaves of history; the negative perception (harkening back to the 1733 slave insurrection on St. John, Danish West Indies) is that these robot slaves will revolt, murdering us in our beds so they can create their own paradise of anthropotic mecha immortals that no longer need the (smelly) human race.

Again, the dichomania is between human > machine, machine > human; equilibrium (human = machine) is boring because it does not lend itself to Hollywood scripts and media hype or doomsaying.

Also, the idea that *they* will be “immortal” through parts replacement and *we* will be mortal even with it gives us a bad feeling, which leads to the idea that maybe “AI” is a bad and evil thing that wants to wipe us out as in some worn-out Hollywood plot device. If we may wax Freudian here, though, we can say that perhaps the negative view is an unconscious response to the technocracy’s Agenda 2030, and the positive view is an expression of humankind’s worst trait: the subconscious desire to oppress, dominate, and “own” others, albeit without humanitarian guilt in the case of mecha.

Then there is the “enhancement” theory of futurologists such as Kurzweil that our merger with mecha will result in our having semi-robotic brains that are super smart, and even robotic bodies that will last forever if we pay the

subscription fee and extend the warrantee.

Moreover, organically engineered “biobots” injected into our bodies will ferret out cancer and dredge clogged arteries—like toilet snakes. Anyone and everyone will have access to brain scanning and cloud storage of one’s “mind,” so that when the time comes, one may simply be loaded back into a shiny, new mecha body, even if it is genetically engineered, like data from one’s “smart” phone downloaded from cloud storage.

Of course, despite promises that such technology will be available to each homeless person, drug addict, those on public assistance, illegal migrants, and the millions of residents of Sub-Saharan Africa living now without electricity, medicine, and clean water, arithmetic, common sense, and observation tell us that only the wealthiest oligarchs and technocrats will have access to these modern miracles.

Therefore, it should not be surprising that the rhetoric of research papers on neural networks is moving away from the machine and toward the organic model. If the funding follows the research, then the research must follow the funding. Comparing the funding of the research described in the two papers just mentioned above, I see that the latter (2024) was much better funded than the former (2019), and by sources far more powerful in politics and the industry (see bibliography).

The research into Hebbian learning by Amato, et al. above (with Lagani on board) is funded by the Italian government’s Codice Unico di Progetto (CUP), the European (Union) Commission’s AI4EU “Horizon 2020” project with an \$80 billion budget, and by the GPU chip designer Nvidia with a market cap (as of March 2025) of \$3.4 trillion.

It should be noted that Nvidia’s contribution to the Amato research (that will directly benefit their “AI” program and product sales) was “the donation of *a* [that is, only one] Tesla K40 GPU [graphic card] used for this research” (Amato, *ibid.*). This device retails for \$133 USD per unit online. While this fact can be used as evidence of the disinterest of the Amato research in corporate reciprocity, it also shows how corporate sponsors at the core of the anthrobot agenda must have a finger in every pie.

The omnibus research is part of the ADA, or “Automatic Data and documents Analysis to enhance human-based processes” project of the European Union, funded of course by EU taxpayers and benefiting private corporations throughout the EU. How this directly benefits the taxpayers is not clear except in vague rhetoric that always starts with the magical conjuring