

The Poetics of Philosophy
[A Reading of Plato]

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By

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P U B L I S H I N G

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PROLOGUE

The Great Mystery of Being has two primary aspects, the High Priestess of my life tells me, love and death. Their intertwined aspects create one could say a text, and reading this text back to itself, with its twisting passageways, a veritable labyrinth inhabited by the Minotaur. Who is the hero? The Minotaur is half-man, half-beast, a totemic animal, perhaps, symbolizing the ancient Greek's puzzlement with their own violent impulses, their submergence within a lustful ferocity, a primal madness that drove them out of their familiar surroundings, impelling them to venture far upon the blue Aegean. There, paradoxically, they would meet themselves, monstrously familiar and unfamiliar, the strange attractor signifying the end of their predictable world. So, Theseus sets sail to meet the Minotaur, the all-devouring monster of the flower of Athens, sent to their doom because of the murder of the Cretan King's son some years previously. With the help of the king's daughter, Adriadne, smitten by him, Theseus retraces his path from out of the labyrinth after he has slain the monster. He is given a spool of thread that he unwinds. Is the rewinding of the one's travels the tale that is told, the text that becomes *written*?

Who are the characters here? Who is the monster and who is the hero? Or are they one and the same? Is the monster here is the man who would be a philosopher and Adriadne, the woman Febra, who would help him find his way back to himself? I share with the reader the words of my beloved, friend, companion, and wife: men should understand women less and love them more, and women should love men less and understand them more. Febra-Adriadne's thread is interwoven throughout the text. It is for the reader to pick up that thread and weave it back into the text that he or she is becoming.

INTRODUCTION

This work, *the poetics of philosophy*, attempts to rehear the *sound* buried under layers of accumulated interpretation. It is not a sound in the usual sense of the word, meaning, an audio signature formed by the vibration of air molecules. Rather it is what Heraclites suggested when he said:

Listening to the Logos rather than to me, it is wise to agree that all things are in reality one thing and one thing only.¹

This listening refers to the sound logic that pervades language and to which in the course of formal thought, we have become deaf. In attending to the Logos, we want to hear that most excellent sound that is no sound at all but the stillness which Plato would call the soul's *arête* (excellence, virtue, and perfection). The sound stillness of the Logos escapes the conventional ear bent only what is most audible. Rather, what is being recommended here is a hearkening, the sounding that would bend back the conventional (h)earing. In this bending back of the ear of conventional thought, we aim to recover the possibility of hearing buried under the accumulated layers of deafness – a primordial sound that abides and rests within the audio ground and whose *cultivation* is the hearing. In cultivating the grounds of thought, we attend to, to refer to that other great pre-Socratic icon of mind, Parmenides, 'the unshaken heart of well-rounded truth.' (Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀπρεμῆς ἤτορ)² In listening to the logic of well-rounded truth, we want to shake out the deafness of the ear – beginning with our own – re-hearing what stands still in the *motion* of thoughtfulness.

Our reading of some of Plato is the site of this attendance. In recalling the salient moments of the tradition to which we (re)-inscribe our membership, we cannot claim that this reading is complete, for we have not read all of the texts. But our intention is not to be an exegete of Plato's but to use his texts as a springboard for elaborating the theme entitling the work. Here, a word of caution. Our reading is non-linear, meaning that it operates more as one would expect musicians at a jam session to do. The

¹ <http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~dee/GREECE/HERAC.HTM>

² Ibid.

work is of a Dionysian soul with an analytic Apollonian bent. It is a melange of word play and exposition that defies categorizing. Its author has tried to say something of philosophical importance, which should not be taken for granted. To cite the words of Alan Bloom when discussing ‘analytic’ philosophy:

Professors of these schools simply would not and could not talk about anything important, and they themselves do not represent a philosophic life for the students.³

It remains an open question whether anything of philosophical importance has any scholarly value, at least as defined by mainstream academia and its funding agencies. In any case that is what this work attempts to do, and its adequacy must be judged in terms of its own stated objectives rather than the bureaucratic norms of organizations for which the act of thinking itself has quite possibly become, if Bloom is right, ‘academic.’

³ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Allan_Bloom

PREFACE

The essence of thought, I claim, is musical, a thought with which Alan Bloom concurs who wrote:

Music is the medium of the *human* soul in its most ecstatic condition of wonder and terror. Nietzsche, who in large measure agrees with Plato's analysis, says...that a mixture of cruelty and coarse sensuality characterized this state... Music is the soul's primitive and primary speech... without articulate speech or reason. It is not only not reasonable, it is hostile to reason.¹

To state the parameters of our argument, I shall say with what I agree and disagree. I agree with Bloom and Nietzsche calling music 'the soul's primitive and primary speech' while disagree that it is 'hostile to reason.' Certainly, music is *other* to reason. What is other is not necessarily *hostile*, however. Artistically comprehended, music is the basic crude material out of which the more formally recognized strain called 'thought' or 'thinking' emerges. Thought's primal character is musical, as much as, say, a stone sculpture's character is stone. But the sculpture is not reducible to its substratum because of the intervening vision of the sculptor, the artist who has drawn forth the possibilities inherent within the stone in order to realize that vision. The primal music of the soul is the basic matter of thought, thought, in its cognitive form, being the carving of that matter to realize the artist's vision of Being (being itself) animating the work.

Music is arational vis-à-vis formal thought, which is rational and contradictory thought, which is irrational. The stone is the arational element for which the actual sculpture is the rational form. And it would be irrational to orient to stone as say wood, for the rationality of art consists in working out the possibilities of the matter at hand in light of some vision of Being. Both stone and wood are *not* the stone sculpture but in strikingly different ways: the first is non-rational, being other to the stone sculpture, an example of *non-being* while the second is what the stone sculpture is not and could never be. To orient to stone as wood is thus irrational, this action instantiating *not-being*.

¹*Closing of the American Mind*, p. 72 found in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Closing_of_the_American_Mind.

Aristotle speaks of the *material* cause: “that from which, <as a constituent> present in it, a thing comes to be ... e.g., the bronze and silver, and their genera, are causes of the statue and the bowl.”² In a certain sense one could speak of music being the material cause of thought. However, no definitive judgement can be made because of the need to gather, as Heidegger did in his analysis of Aristotle’s four causes in his well-publicized, even if not necessarily known and understood “The Question Concerning *Technê*.”

For purposes of this text, this gathering occurs through articulating the difference between non- and not-being – melodic lines whose harmonic progression requires the scaling of thought itself in accordance with the on-going rhythm of an unshakeable heart beating out its resistance to the denigration of thought by academic philosophy. The poetics of philosophy is this *pièce de résistance*. Its outstanding character is its systemic opposition to the vulgarization of the Platonic ideal that is of a piece with its *deafness* to the music. Here I can only point to the predisposition that makes such a project thinkable, namely, its musical tone, which I shall intone as ‘memory.

This work aims to remember what much of contemporary scholarship forgets, namely, the poetics of philosophy, the details of the argument to be given in the main text. To prepare the way for a reading, the work of an introduction, I point to themes of this work inspired by that of others, notably, Jacques Derrida and his notion of *differance* and Alan F. Blum’s *Theorizing*, which, inspired by Leo Strauss, argued for the Platonic dialogue as the paradigm of social inquiry, and, preceding and being a seminal influence, Martin Heidegger’s *Being and Time*, with its notion of *Sein* and *Dasein*.

How might these distinctions apply to Plato’s work? In the *Sophist* Plato argued for *difference*, this italicization pointing not to the relations between things but between *Being* and *being*, so to speak. In particular Plato wanted to exorcise the ghost of Parmenides apparent logical straitjacketing of change. In the *Sophist*, Plato argued for the existence of *difference*, where this meant the logical possibility for non-Being, this not entailing, however, the existence of *not-Being*. Not and non-, obviously distinctions in English but applicable to a reading/translation of a Greek text, I submit, refer to the validity and reality of language. Language (*Dasein*) is non-Being (*Sein*). The categories of rest, motion, sameness, difference and being offered by Plato in that dialogue are moments of that distinction.

² <http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/320/4causes.htm>.

Non-Being is relatively real and not real. It is Being that has become other to itself by the action of the mind, the cognitive name for language body. Being is its most neutral form (neutral in relation to a host of versions which would insist upon it having definite characteristics) is nothing. The 'no-', however, leaves open the possibility for not and non. *Differance* (difference for Derrida) refers to the movement that Being makes *in mind such that its reality becomes intelligible or intellectuated*. With this intellectuation, which has a history of its own, Being becomes an social object and thus no longer, strictly speaking, itself. Before descending into the distinctions proffered by Hegel – the in-itself, for itself, and for Other, it is useful retracing this history for purposes of the present exposition. A significant moment was the transformation of thought from *phronesis*, from *breast, rib to noiesis*. The world is Homeric, the second, Platonic. In the course of which the former became reduced to practical reason. The mind (*nous*) identified with Platonic form, which Kant, under the influence of Christian metaphysics would call 'noumenal reality,' stood for a reality untouched by sensuality. Despite Plato's criticism of writing, his own forms could be conceived of as a theorization of writing, particularly its power of abstraction, its power to dislocate the appearance of reality, fixed by relations between actual things. While it was true that individual memory suffered, collective memory gained, the increase, to use a contemporary term, being quantum. Writing became the storehouse of accumulated cultural values that were less subject to individual recollection, or at least in the personal reciting manner of the Homeric Bard. Thought took a quantum leap with the new capacity for collective memory (and lest we forget) forgetfulness. The 'closed mind' of which Bloom spoke is a supreme example of the latter.

Staying with the root of phenomenon, namely showing, world reality became increasingly mediated by a host of exchange relations, under the auspices of 'writing' or, more precisely, 'the script.' That script is synonymous with exchange, at varying interpretive levels, is no accident. World reality became defined by the exchange relations fostering and reproduced by the script which, apparently, could serve as a repository for all things conceivable such that nothing became lost to *memory*. Memory, moreover, is complicit in thought and, moreover, perception. To think that something is real is to perceive it as having substance, an action that involves a host of interpretive mechanisms. To cite from one recent discussion in the literature:

Rather, it is by summarizing, constructing, interpreting, and condensing life experiences, often smoothing over the boundaries between different moments in our lives, that autobiographical memory produces any

coherent narrative sense of a personal past (compare Glover 1988, chapter 14; Engel 1999, chapter 4).³

Here the substance is the ‘self,’ and the ‘identity’ that becomes constructed and reconstructed through time. The ‘self’ is not a full-blown entity existing throughout time but a work in progress, the recollection through which that entity becomes *intelligible* as a self, meaning, the subject of a narrative. The broader term I shall use to summarize the workings of these mechanisms, which also remind me of Freud’s dream interpretive mechanisms and his mystic writing pad, suggesting that the ‘self’ is a dream image, a memory-trace. Indeed, Freud argued the repression of memory resulting in hysteria, which resulted in a definite type of ‘self’ or ‘personality’ being in the world. Memory-trace refers to the work of an entity inserting either itself or some other entity within a language system. To perceive something, for example, one’s own self, is to remember its place within a language system, an idea alluded to by Plato’s notion of *amnamnesis*. Perception, in short, is not sensation, Plato’s point in the *Theaetetus*.

That perception is, in essence, memory work, and thought, the actualization of this memory, organized by a vast system of belief structures, has consequences, namely, that there are good grounds for orienting to reality as a phenomenon. Perception is never performed (as an action) in a vacuum but reproduces a system of beliefs. In classical language, reality is a blend of perception with belief, organized by the memory reposing within a language body, a heightened awareness of which marked the movement from Homeric *phronesis* to Platonic *noiesis*.

In that unuttered and hence inarticulate sense, reality was an incipient phenomenon, but which did not become an object of understanding except when the material conditions of production were sufficiently abstract as to permit the isolation of thought, this last determined by collective memory, which became further systemized as ‘written language.’ Here, I draw from one thinker, whose texts are not directly examined in this text, but who is present nevertheless throughout it, as a sort of benign presence. His texts have implications for the constructing of the phenomenon as a theoretical object.

Jacques Derrida argued in ways that at first scandalized (and possibly still do) fundamentalist philosophers or onto-theologians, for the primacy of writing, this reversing the normal manner of perceiving reality, which subordinated writing to oral culture. Notions such as the trace,³ the text, the supplement, and *la difference*, all promoted the idea of an *inscriptive*

³ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/memory/>

and *descriptive* character to all fields of human activity reliance upon a difference that was not a difference, namely, *difference*, and which differed, delayed, (and even defaced in terms of logo-centric structures) the certainty of presence which systems that privileged oral over written form (and more generally one term of a conjugate pair over another) had previously possessed. The invention of writing, as Derrida re-wrote this phrase, is not writing as such but, echoing the Cabbalist story of the Infinite becoming reduced to the actual moment, which that tradition called *zimzum* reduction, but the reduction of writing to a particular script. It is this scriptural, if not scriptural interpretation of writing which lies at the basis of logo-centrism.

Reality-as-phenomenon is rooted in mediation, what Marx would later call a value-form, which joins memory-thought-perception. The classical name for this is *logos*. Reality is a phenomenon of the *logos* or, more plainly expressed. *Legein*, the verb whose noun is *logos*, means firstly to pick out and secondly, to speak. The perception of reality is mediated by the phenomenon of logic, and it is this mediation which gives reality its character of being-real or realness. Reality's realness is always a mediated proposition. And this not result necessarily in the reduction of reality to its mediation, even as it intelligibility is unthinkable, if not impossible outside of that mediation. The no-thingness of Being, in other words, is the *resonating* space between reality and its mediated realness. The reader will please note the italicized word *resonating*, this implying motion; a string has been plucked and set into motion, this being the basis of a musical play.

It is hearing the music from the ground up which is the overarching theme of this work, the horizon-line of its Day, and over which the blazing Logos rises and falls. Here, I return to the theme of writing. In the transition from oral to writing culture, one sense of 'music,' was displaced, music now being confined programmatically to 'what actual instruments produce.' That was the force of a definite inscription which defined writing according to the new phonetic alphabet. Those who previously 'spoke,' when speaking was synonymous with 'singing,' were the Bards, and it was the Bardic voice which became silenced by the new phonetic script. The music was not heard, in that former *acoustic* sense, although the Greeks did speak of 'the musical spheres.' But with the adaptation of the phonetic alphabet the eye became privileged over the ear, for the sake of greater collective memory, and the emphasis was placed on the 'script,' for this is what writing became.

The sort of writing which one hears, rather than reads (in this scripted way) is the music from the ground up. One can but *note* it, and in this

notion choreograph how one's own body moves to that *phenomenon*. This space resonates; it is in constant motion, this space which is the elusive Kantian 'noumenal' essence, which is no essence whatsoever in any way that is a thing, and it is the 'observation' of that space or the 'hearing' of that resonances, which is the basis of phenomenal reality and thus, possibly, the new basis for a phenomenology, that derives, however, from an ancient, if not *buried* conception passed over and ignored by the reductive writing of the phonetic script. Obviously, the meaning of 'noumenal' and 'phenomenal' would need to be re-inscribed within this re-conception of the Real.

The text as a whole elucidates these proposition, and I find myself in Hegel's position where his preface was in fact an afterthought. What to do? Let me do this by sharing with the reader this one example. As part of re-thinking the enterprise of thought, I have found it necessary to integrate the latest discoveries of science within my *corpus* of work, notably, fractal logic. Briefly stated, the details being in the text, fractal logic presents us with the generation of a fractal form based upon a reiteration of an algorithm ($x_n = (x_{n-1})^2 + c$). The generation of the form is a vibrating space, the generation being the plucking of the algorithmic string. The point here, whose plucking is the generation of this 'setting the note,' is that unity is being conceptualized as a fundamental frequency – the nothingness of Being, the algorithm – which is being plucked. Or, to show more pluck, its being is plucking, there *not* being any entity doing this. This raises interesting questions about the nature of phenomena and/or the phenomena of nature.

Traditional phenomenology, for which Hegel is the starting point, and which includes Husserl, and Pierce, no matter how much they differed between themselves, did not orient to the vibrating space of no-thingness. The space's vibrating and resonating characteristics were, in effect, *dampened* by the identity of writing with the phonetic script, the challenging (if not deconstruction) of that identity being Derrida's contribution to this debate. However, as notions of 'music of the spheres' and much more recently, string theory' have suggested, dampening was not elimination, but repression. In fact, the *Logos* was not simply the spoken word, but the *sung* word, and its meaning can only be comprehended by having an ear for its resonances. In a very ironic sense, Heraclites, he who advised us to 'not listen to him, but to the Logos,' re-incarnated the Homeric Bard. Or, he became the pre-Socratic Bard. But then there was (and Is) Parmenides, whose strictures against 'the negation of Being' has had a profound, if not traumatic effect, if not resisted, upon all subsequent thinking.

I have spoken already of Plato's recuperative efforts. As much as he provided the means for a cure, however, he also aided the disease's progression. I refer to his lauding of sight in the *Republic* and elsewhere, as the noblest of senses. Intelligibility became synonymous with 'having insight.' That this occurred at the moment when seat of intelligence moved from breast (*phronesis*) to mind (*nous*) was no accident. The dampening, and subsequent muting of the resonances of vibrating space which was (and is) the context of the *sung* word, was co-terminus with the *creation* of noietic intelligence. *Logos* lost its musical character, preserved, nevertheless, by Heraclitus 'listening.' Or the word became the mute witness of its once vibrant hearing. It is noietic intelligence which is implied by the phenomenological project, and a mind complicit with the reduction of writing to script.

I but note the shibboleth whose utterance gains one entrance into the reductionist camp: *verba volant sed scripta manet*. This is a piece that belongs to the Christian middle ages, the age of scholastic philosophy dominated by Aristotelian logic, whose originating ground was repressed. The supposed authenticity of 'writing' and its superiority over the (unwritten) word lay in its ability to control exchange. The phonetic script became the organizing locus of a multitude of exchanges that defined, moreover, the range of 'knowing.' As the above phrase suggests, truth 'remains'; it does not fly away, a sentiment voiced, to be sure by Socrates in the *Meno*, where Socrates compared ill-grounded arguments to words that fly away and sound arguments to words that do not.

To acquire an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much, like acquiring a runaway slave, for it does not remain, but it is worth much if tied down, for his works are very beautiful. What am I think of when I say this? True opinions. For true opinions, as long as they remain, are a fine thing and all they do is good, but they are not willing to remain long, and they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one ties them down by (giving) an account of the reason why. And that, Meno my friend, is recollection, as we previously agreed. After they are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge, and then they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized higher than correct opinion, and knowledge is different from correct opinion in being tied down (97e)⁴.

The word here is memory, the core of Socrates' doctrine of recollection (*anamnesis*). My own argument, and the implications for re-generating the phenomenological project, after suitably destroying its present form, is of that type. I am suggesting that Western metaphysics has become deaf to

⁴ <http://www.mala.bc.ca/~johnstoi/introser/meno.htm>

the resonances of the Word, a deafness caused by the reduction of writing to the phonetic script and the hierarchical privileging of differences that Derrida has much analyzed in his work, and which I shall not, therefore, do so here. The point here, however, which does concern me is this: the notion of ‘grounding.’ This is problematic, as this *could* refer to the ‘fixing’ of position that ‘*scripta manet*’ recommends.

To remove this confusion, let us ask this question: what does it mean to remain? The Latin *manere* signifies to remain, stay behind, to be what is left. That thought is in motion is undeniably, but that thought is not necessarily thinking is the difference that emerges when trying to ‘pin’ thought down. According to the Socratic hierarchy in the above: knowledge is higher (and different) from correct opinion because the first is tied down and the second not. What is the status of this ‘truth’ in relation to ‘one cannot cross the same river twice,’ which implies that everything is in flux? Is this hierarchy a part of what Adorno remarked in *Negative Dialectics* as the Western tendency to privilege unity over multiplicity? Didn’t Hegel say that universality (surely, not diversity) is the element of philosophy in the *Phenomenology*? One can see (if not hear) even more clearly why Derrida’s *différance* – the differentiating of difference – would be scandalous.

This ‘tying down,’ of which Socrates speaks, is linked to memory-work, which is the task of recollection. If truth is one, which is a proposition that I entertain for the moment, being in a welcoming mood, then recollection is the task of *overcoming* differences such that none remain. That move, however belongs to logo-centrism, to the form of phenomenological inquiry which identifies writing with the phonetic script and which must repress differences in order to state, if not re-find, the unity which would otherwise be lost. As Derrida remarked in *Writing and Difference*, Being is not the One or is the One necessarily itself, as Plato brilliantly exposed in the *Parmenides*. Socrates assumes in his telling of the *Logos*, some fixed properties to memory, which would guarantee the truth of the universal: ‘process of teaching rests on the permanent, innate powers of the human mind.’⁵ How can this be? How can we reconcile (if needed) Plato’s differences?

If one assumes that the one who wrote the *Meno* is the one who wrote the *Parmenides*, then we have, as Plato described in the *Theaetetus*, a conversation within the same soul. This is a theme, moreover, which has broader phenomenological implications. The mind’s permanent and innate

⁵ Ian Johnston of Malaspina University-College, Nanaimo, BC, for Liberal Studies 111 students in November 2000.

power is, Socrates strongly implies, in the *Meno*, is recollection. However, memory is selective, the word selective, I note, deriving from the Greek *legein* to pick out. Memory, according to contemporary research, consists of neural pathways that change, moreover, in time. That phenomenon can be observed at the level of collective memory, where charges of 'revisionism' are often hurled at those who would re-write history. But that history is continually being re-written can be demonstrated by the continual battle over historical interpretation, which is also (and not extraneous to) the very process of historical reasoning (while avoiding historicism).

While I am prepared to grant Socrates' (implied) point that memory is the permanent and innate power of the mind, a point that one could further substantiate by pointing to the common root of memory and mind: Memory, the word, derives from the Latin *memoria*, from *memor* mindful; akin to Old English *gemimor* well-known, Greek *mermEra* care, Sanskrit *smarati* he remembers. To remember is to be reminded of something, memory being the second mind. Moreover, I recall mind to be a language body, which is different from the brain. Mind or culture or language body name the collected relations between brains-in-bodies modifying the expression of the electrical-somatic energy reverberating in each body. Memory and/or mind are neuronal and/or cultural pathways that shift over time, the shift not being capricious because of the existing network form. Issues of network, information, and communication are discussed in detail in the text, the stating of this proposition illuminating a major structural thematic.

Given my previous discussion of the above points, (see Ross, 2006, 2007), I shall limit myself to broad points of exposition. Pathways configure a system, specifically, the articulation defining its range of movement (one can think of the how the shoulder joints allowing for the articulating of the arm or language, allowing for the articulation of thought). A system, moreover, exists in relation to an environment, a relation organized by the entropic/negentropic differential detailing the degree of order and disorder present. Entropy is the measure of disorder and negentropy (information), that of order. The stronger the memory, the more able it is to integrate both greater quantities and kinds of data, enabling it to evolve new adaptive strategies to take advantage or exploit changing conditions. This will enable the entity to sustain its motion in an environment, a path marked, say, by a learning curve. In short, by maintaining itself within that environment, the entity is able to effectively sustain its reality; in human terms, we could talk about having a requisite set of skills enabling one to find employment.

In applying this to Plato, we note his boundary-definition of being, “whenever there is present the power to act or be acted upon, even in the slightest?” (*Sophist*)⁶ The boundary of being is the articulating defining the difference between that entity and its environment, and since both entities and environments will vary, both temporally and spatially, the difference cannot be fixed. The line implied is thus always in play, which is *other* than the entity and its character. This last statement takes us further into the text, I limiting myself to the general statement of this point.

The basic idea is this: each kind of being possesses a character or characteristics that effectively distinguish it from other beings, both of its kind and not of its kind. Obviously, in relation to its kind, the distinguishing differences will be more subtle. In any case, we now have a more grounded notion of *difference* which bears no analytical relationship between two things. Or, two things only *become* different in relation to a dynamic and hence changing mechanism, based upon communications theory. The two things are an entity and its environment, but an environment could include other entities. *Difference* then emerges out of conversation, specifically, the sending and receiving of signals that denote the being in communication, communication being effective community. Both communication and community have the root *communicare* to share. Actual differences, if we take them to be the multiplicity implied the unit, and up to a point the 20th, called nature. So, *difference* emerges out of conversation, meaning the relation between speakers. Difference, then, is not *something* which any speaker possesses outside of the conversation. Potentially, one can say that beings are different, but the difference gains intelligence – real purchase power – only through participation in conversation (social life).

The (fractal) whole becomes other than itself because it becomes other to itself, and can only do so in relation to the self that becomes projected onto the scale of measure that divides that whole from itself. The whole departs from itself in becoming a part. That is measurement, the movement which compliments Plato’s *anamnesis*. There the whole becomes re-associated with itself, its wholeness theoretically restored. The whole forgotten in the midst of its departure from itself, the departure called scale of measurement, and the whole re-becomes itself from out of the recollection provoked by the same scale. Or, more precisely, forgetfulness and recollection are separated by a relationship towards the scale of measurement in question, otherwise called the mind. Will the mind *take* mind of its own activities? Will it hear the resonating and

⁶ http://www.schillerinstitute.org/transl/trans_pl_sophist2.html

quivering movement of itself shaking with its end? This pertains, neutrally expressed, to musical appreciation. To musically appreciate means to be able to hear and hearing requires unblocking the ears. The blockage here, which became pronounced in the case of Parmenides, was the denial of the musicality of the *Logos*, of its character as a sung word. This prepared the word for the logo-centrism of later metaphysics (Platonism, Christianity, historicism). Plato's later dialogues were the best the classical age could do against its own creeping degeneration, the systemic means of this spreading disease being the phonetic script.

This regeneration and degeneration makes its first systemic appearance in the overtly dialectical form called Hegel. Hegelian phenomenology hears the music from the heavens down (Absolute Knowledge), it displaying a tone deafness that verges on the absurd. I cite the most blatant example to my ears: 'To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science-that goal where it can **lay aside the name of love of knowledge and be actual knowledge**-that is what I have set before me.'⁷ In the name of love, one hears the music of the spheres, a phenomenon resonating in the intimacy of 'making love' and 'making music.' Love making is music making as this denotes the concerted playing, this scaling of the Real through facing the no-thingness of Being in the form of one's own death.

These existential propositions allow me to emphasize the phenomenological point: the hearing of the music from the ground up is the truer form of the transcendence implied by dialectical thought and realised phenomenally through the exploration of the difference between being and language. This becomes centred in the phenomenon of the being-there (*Dasein*) who is able to experience the hair breath distinction between forgetfulness and recollection - my death is closer to me than my eyelid to my eye - as the governing rhythm of its proper existence. By contrast, these isolated moments are named, according to tradition, as 'animal' and 'god.' The animal can only forget (and never remember) what being is because it has no sense of self which would objectify that and the god can only remember (and never forget) what being is because its self is Being. However, neither moment is dialectically valid because each requires the exclusion of its opposite, dialectics, by contrast being the simultaneous holding of opposites, which thus is a moment experienced neither by animal nor god but by man alone.

Dialectical thought preserves the space for the simultaneous existence of opposites, and phenomenological inquiry would clarify the relationship between opposites, the traditional metaphysical terms being 'noumenal'

⁷ [www. Marxists.org/reference/archive/phindix/.htm](http://www.Marxists.org/reference/archive/phindix/.htm)

and ‘phenomenal.’ Indeed, a line can now be drawn that will summarize this discussion, ending the introduction and bringing the reader to the main text, from Plato to Hegel. In Plato thought became explored as a systemic phenomenon through the intersection of being and thought in the person of Socrates. In him the Word became Flesh. However, it was a rear-guard action, in effect, against the assault upon non-Being unleashed by Parmenides ‘Way of Truth,’ which stripped non-being of the implied phenomenological status it held under the former truth regime of Bardic orality. The Word no longer was sung, having become an object of science *at a distance* from the body that would *examine – eye – it*. That this was a response to and reflection of the revolution initiated by the phonetic alphabet could only be half-perceived by Plato was shown by his ambivalent reception of it.

Philosophy was split into Socrates, the one who did not write, and Plato, the Socratic alter-ego, who remembered the master, but could *not openly* hear the music from the ground up, where this indirect hearing became the Platonic Form. Hegel, the product of the rationalized Platonism of the Middle Ages, it is true, eliminated the privileged position of sight in favour, however, of a script, not directly linked with the phonetic, that required the existence of, as Derrida would say, a transcendental signifier upholding the coherence of the system against the chaos implied by Being’s no-thingness. Knowledge, in short, became absolute, the Platonic Form now transplanted upon the new grounds of the mind – convergence of reality of truth and phenomenon of consciousness. Hegel’s advance was to show through expanded dialectical form, the grounds of the mind, thereby re-laying those grounds for a new understanding, for which ordinary language philosophy, Heideggerian ‘destruction’ and Derridean ‘deconstruction,’ would become the operative moments.

The *poetics of philosophy* names the program nascent at the very inception of dialectical thought, and it does so through the reinventing of phenomenological form. This remembering energizes the reinvention, and whose performance is a hearing of the music from the ground up, a hearing that is a passage way carved through the ground of fractal logic, the time signature of reality. The carving is a path-breaking, a hearing of no-thing that moves in the stillness of the proverbial two hands, clapping and shaking to the music. What is the sound of two hands clapping?

The answer resonates with the Platonic Form. The One resonates with the Many to the degree that the latter are the integral variation of the former. The first corollary is that Platonic form resonates with this integrity, and this resonance is the logical kernel of Platonic thought that

remains obscure, if not opaque to a purely visual orientation to his text. Secondly, Platonic form, its rational kernel now illuminated, exhibits the properties of fractal self-similarity. Thus, I will show how resonance, integrity of form, and fractal self-similarity are intimately related – forming a conceptual family – in both classical and contemporary scientific and philosophical thought, bringing out thinking’s musicality. To explore this claim, I shall, in conjunction with insights of contemporary science, read Plato’s works, beginning with the *Parmenides*.

UNPACKING HYPOTHESIS: NUMBERS AND RESONANCE

To unpack this hypothesis, I consider the nature of number. There are actually five kinds of number: natural, rational, integral, real, or imaginary. In using one set of numbers, we are able to ‘scale’ ‘what is there,’ as this responds or corresponds to the character of the number. In Chart Form:

Type	Example	Function
Natural	1	counting things in a set
Rational	$1/3$	relationship between sets
Integral	-1	relative sizes of sets
Real	1 kilo	measurement of continuous properties
Imaginary	$-1^{1/2}$	measurements of field properties

Explanation

Each numeric class, of which integral numbers are but one class, possesses integrity, as evinced by the distinctive objects whose counting is subject to it. Each class is different from all other classes, and yet each is the same in being a numeric class. As shown by the unique objects which count for it and which it counts – natural numbers are not terribly useful for counting electrical fields nor imaginary numbers for counting whole entities – each class is numerically real. This further implies that Number, as the grand abstraction from the class of numbers, does not exist except to say this: that which counts. The necessary generality allows us to count these different classes as instances of Number; and equally, Number only makes sense when being ‘there’ as actual numbers. The numeric form of Number thus ‘counts’ ontologically (in terms of its intelligible being) without necessarily counting anything in particular. When the counting of an

actual thing occurs, then Number per se ceases to exist and only some determinate number, belonging to a class of number does.

The numeric truth (the One) is divided among the class of numbers (the Many). If the One *were to be* One then the partiality of the parts would have to cease to be. However, who or what would do that, if not another part? So, the One necessarily (at present) remains apart from itself, Number from the class of numbers. Numeric classes, moreover, are not arbitrary; they appear to capture and delineate features of reality such one class of things (whole entities) can best be counted by one class (natural numbers) than another (imaginary). However, as the numeric classes are scales of Number, and necessarily depend upon their intelligibility their existing in some world reality, they cannot be the Real. I shall give the name structure to describe this state of affairs.

Reality is structured if the fitting of definite objects to numeric classes by which they become counted is any evidence. If anything counts for anything, a numeric class is necessarily involved. However, accountability goes beyond actual numbers, but denotes 'responsibility.' We have observed how some classes of objects responded better to some classes of numbers than others. If objects are bodies, numbers, scale of measurement, then some objects respond better to – resonate more with – certain types of music. This responsiveness is akin to the vibrancy of the relationship between class of object and class of number. Whole entities vibrate well with natural but poorly with complex numbers and vice-versa in the case of electro-magnetic fields and natural numbers. The vibrant structure of reality becomes more clearly heard with the resonances exposed by the responsiveness of certain class of objects (whole entities, electro-magnetic fields) with numeric classes (natural, imaginary). Accordingly, structure becomes defined here as the vibration that becomes heard, that is, fitted to some form of reality or is accountable. For example, the structure of whole entities becomes heard in relation to natural numbers, the structure of electro-magnetic magnetic in relation to imaginary numbers. Since we have already established that each numeric class necessarily possesses integrity, without actually being the integral One, which is divisible only by itself, and so cannot be different from itself, whereas other integrals are divisible both one and non-one (which is its proper self), each structure thus responds to what possesses integrity, which implies it having its own integrity. Structure, in short, possesses integrity, without itself being an integral. This re-affirms our earlier conclusions: reality departs from itself integrally, each departure being, as we now more clearly see, a structure. So the scaling of the Real is hearing the unfolding structural integrity which, at each point, notes the presence of 'what is accountable.'


Other investigators have argued for ‘nested levels of integration.’ In the above, this is exemplified by the different dynamics of accountability found within the nested levels of number. As J.T. Fraser argues when discussing temporal levels, ‘each stable integrative level of the universe manifests a distinct temporality and that these temporalities coexist in a hierarchically nested, dynamic unity.’¹

A distinct temporality or *horizon line*, we can add, bounds each stable integrative level of the universe. Horizon, the word, derives from the Greek *horizon kyklos* "bounding circle," from *horizein* "bound, limit, divide, separate," from *horos* "boundary." The horizon line present at each level of integrated being divides that level from other levels, thereby creating a space for the ‘accountability’ of each level. The One departs from itself in integral spaces or *intervals*, these intervals spacing out these structures possessing a dynamic unity unique to themselves, these structures being *notes*. Intervals and notes, moreover, are moments of a musical vocabulary. To this vocabulary we add another word, resonance.

Resonance refers to wave patterns. There are two types of waves: traveling and standing still. A traveling wave is producing what a wave propagating through a given medium (whether air or water, for example). It vibrates continuously from high to low, the highs and lows being crest and valleys, show below by the sine wave pattern. Moreover, when a wave from point A travels to a given point B, the wave will upon reaching point B begin returning to point A, the reverse motion called the reflected wave. Furthermore, if another wave, called an incident wave, is started at the other end, from which the first wave originated, then an interference patterns resulting the meeting of the reflected and incident waves in the standing wave pattern occurs. These standing points called nodes are formed from the destruction of the two waves meeting each other where the crest of one is equal to the trough of the other resulting in zero amplitude. There are other points along the medium whose displacement changes over time, but in a regular manner, called anti-nodes. The nodes and anti-nodes form a standing wave system.² These points vibrate back and forth from a positive displacement to a negative displacement; the vibrations occur at regular time intervals such that the motion of the medium is regular and repeating - a pattern is readily observable.

¹ Fraser, 1982, p. 1


² <http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/waves/standw.html>




Resonance refers to the phenomenon of a system's gaining of energy due to its period being an even multiple or integral of the distance between its container's walls. Clearly, the phenomenon of resonance has implications for a notion of limits. The above illustration suggests that a sound wave is a string in motion. Accordingly, I call a resonating limit a *string* with a *characteristic mode of excitation*. In musical theory, the pitch is the subjective hearing of an objective characteristic frequency. For example, the frequency of the middle C note is approximately 261.626 Hz.

In hearing the above, I note that the horizon line is the audio container for which the many found within it are the variations upon a shared frequency, the containment having two dimensions, vertical expressing changing the amplitude, this resulting in a richer overlay of tones and horizon compression changing the frequency, this resulting in sharper pitch.

H=length of horizon line



Vertical expression of amplitude
(VEA)



Horizontal compression of frequency
(HCF)

The audio horizon line evenly contains the wave length, in the above instance the ratio of wave length period to horizon line is 1, the basic integral, the variations upon thematic unity being infinite or k , and which can be produced by vertical expression of amplitude, resulting in over and undertones detailing resonance for that periodic value or horizontal compression of frequency that raises pitch. In turn that occurrence creates the basis for a different set of over and undertones for that periodic value or wave length also integrally related to the horizon line, which in both instances remains constant. The phenomenon of resonance requires that the sound wave be integrally bound to its horizon line, otherwise, the phenomenon would cease to exist, the wave length not so bound becoming out of phase with its container and soon ceasing to exist. This is the bondage appertaining to sound and, in more detailed ways, to music, as we shall elaborate.

From the above exposition we may adduce an additional property, that of self- similarity. For each wave, whether in the case of VEA or HCF maintains the basic integrity of the sound wave but in varying form, the variation determined by the dimension. Self-similarity is, moreover, a property of fractals, and this intuitively suggests that the intervals separating one realm of space containing integrally related entities within it (sound wave period vis-à-vis container walls) are intervals of fractal expansion reiterating a basic rhythmic pattern, again a point that we shall elaborate in the course of inquiry.

On the *Parmenides*

We shall now test our hypothesis by turning to Plato's text. Dividing the *Parmenides* into three sections, each of them we shall show reiterates the

theme of the One and the many in ever more elaborate ways turning upon the examination of different dimensions of the question. This division takes the form of a table of contents, Plato's original text not possessing this feature (see Appendix A).

Table of Contents for Plato's Parmenides ³	
Section	Verses
Characters' Introduction	126a-d
Forms introduction	126e-128e
All is one	
All is not many	
Form and formed thing	129-131
From, itself by itself	

So, necessarily, our reading begins with a reading, a phenomenon not surprising if one considers that the part is found in the whole. To substantiate this point, we first describe fractals and return to the above text.

Graphically,




Fig. 1 The Mandelbrot set is plotted through the equation:

$$x_0 = 0$$

$$x_1 = z + c$$

$$x_2 = (z+c)^2 + c$$

$$x_n = (x_{n-1})^2 + c$$

where

$c = bi$, a complex number.

*complex number is a set formed from a real and imaginary number.

If you look at the Mandelbrot Set's border through successively more powerful magnifications, each image would be similar to the previous, but not identical. This is called *self-similarity*. Self-similarity can be found in nature, from a single leaf to a mountain range. Indeed, unlike the 'straight

³ See appendix A for complete form.