African Mosaic

African Mosaic:
Political, Social, Economic and Technological Development in the New Millennium

Edited by

E. Ike Udogu and A. B. Zack-Williams

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TO THE MEMORY OF TAJUDEEN ABDUL-RAHEEM, 1961-2009,
A PAN-AFRICANIST, AFRICAN PATRIOT AND ACTIVIST

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The idea of the book was first hatched out at the meeting of the European Social Science History Conference in Amsterdam, The Netherlands in March 2006, where a number of these papers first appeared. Others have been specially commissioned by the editors; and an earlier version of the chapter 'No Democracy: No Development' by Professor Zack-Williams was first published in The Review of African Political Economy (ROAPE), and the editors are grateful to the Editorial Working Group of ROAPE for permission to reproduce this important and thought-provoking chapter. We are grateful to the contributors, and also Professor Onyile B. Onyile for indexing the volume and the Department of Government and Justice Studies, Appalachian State University, for its support. Our sincere thanks to the team at CPS, in particular Amanda Millar, Carol Koulikourdi and Soucin Yip-Sou for their patience and kindness in enabling the final product of the volume to be realised.

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

E. IKE UDOGU

This volume, *African Mosaic: Political, Social, Economic and Technological Development in the New Millennium* is unique to the extent that it brings together works of scholars from different disciplines and perspectives to provide strategies for Africa's transformation in this century. Globally, in terms of economic and political development, that Africa belongs metaphorically to the 5th eleven, to borrow from the vernacular of soccer, is not in question. Thus with the dawn of the new millennium, a basic concern of most students of African studies is how to move Africa higher in the current development hierarchy. It was this understanding that in part informed the assemblage of this important, timely and stimulating collection of essays—a book that will prove to be an invaluable contribution to the enormous task of moving the continent onward in this era of the "new globalization" by lawmakers, political actors, business entrepreneurs, civil society and the grassroots.

This volume is not arranged in any thematic order, indeed, the title—African Mosaic—provides the general character of the collection. Nevertheless, chapters 1 through 3 discuss the importance of democracy and its appurtenances such as human rights and development, *inter alia*, as the foundation on which Africa should construct its other forms of relation in order to be relevant in the contemporary competitive global system.

Thus, in chapter 2, "No Democracy, No Development: Reflections on Democracy and Development in Africa," Alfred B. Zack-Williams, a renowned Africanist scholar, reproduced an earlier brilliant work published in the *Review of African Political Economy*. This chapter stresses unequivocally a theoretical dogma that has generated an almost worldwide acceptance (particularly after the 1990s following the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union) that democracy and development interlace.

In order to sharpen his analyses, Zack-Williams traces in his chapter the problematic development of democracy in the region following the emancipation of Africa from colonial rule. African leaders experimented with different forms of democracy—liberal, social, participatory and consociational, among others. Uganda even dabbled with a genre of democracy that President Museveni termed no- party democracy because it tended to reduce ethnic politics and its centrifugal tendencies.

Since a number of these experiments have not worked is there, politically, an alternative to the practice of democracy in Africa? Arguably, the answer is no. The chapter analyzes the complexities that African politicos have confronted in nursing a democratic culture in the area. The perplexities flow from the assumption that many of the leaders contend that given the ethnic complexions of African societies and the competition of ethnic groups to control the apparatus of state (in order to direct resources to their ethnic collectivity) the process of successful democratic governance might be problematic. Against this backdrop a number of leaders opted for a one-party state with disastrous consequences for their polities (e.g. Sierra Leone, Guinea Conakry and Tanzania). In a real sense, many analysts wondered whether the nationalists opted for one-party rule to advance their self-interest in that that meant they could stay in power for life, or whether the non-centripetal characteristic of its multiparty democracy was the motive for this development. This chapter brings this discourse to light.

Having experimented with a number of genres of democracy, in the continent that did not work probably because the leaders did not fully appreciate the difficulty of governing the polity, many flirted with the Marxist philosophy and ideology of governance. To be sure, some leaders were seduced by Moscow's appeal to the developing nations that it took the Soviet Union such a short time to develop. If African countries that had just emerged from the yoke of colonialism wanted to develop as fast as the Soviet Union, then they have no choice but to emulate the Soviet model in order to end underdevelopment. Paradoxically, the Marxist political and economic model and experiment failed in those countries that adopted it. This development suggests that it takes much more than just copying a model for it to work. Effective democratic practice may have to take cognizance of historical and cultural specificities of a population. Accordingly, in recent discourses the supposition is that regimes that have aspired to incorporate democratic tenets and capitalism in their governance regimes and practice have prospered in terms of freedom and development

But as the area positions itself, as it were, to become an active player in this millennium, the discussions on the character of African state come to light in this essay. In truth, the state as constituted today is a problem and therefore should be deconstructed and reconstituted. Nevertheless, there are those opposed to the position of iconoclasts who argue that the state as inherited from the departing colonial powers is actually problematic. Some anti-deconstructionists further argue that the state has become a "Humpty Dumpty" for once deconstructed it might be difficult to put together. Others have contended, too, that civil society, in spite of its manifesto of good governance in Africa, is not immune or cannot be exonerated from the state's political, social, and economic problems either. Indeed, some have argued that civil society is also problematic, i.e. a problematic actor, based on its actions and reliance on foreign donors who often controlled civil society groups.

The chapter argues that while the process of democratic renewal might be tortuous [as was the case in Europe after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648], African leaders and populations see its metamorphosis as a major strategy for Africa's transformation in the 21st century—hence the chapter contends, and rightly so, that there can hardly be development in the continent without democracy!

In chapter 3, Elections and Democratization in Africa, George Klay Kieh, a scholar of international repute and a candidate in the 2005 Presidential election in Liberia, brought his practical and intellectual expertise to bear on the chapter. That elections alone do not constitute democracy is by now a truism. Therefore, African political entrepreneurs must not be deluded into assuming that all it has to do is organize occasional elections in order for the society to be labeled a democracy. In order for democracy to become *a fait accompli* in Africa, it must assume attributes of democratization. The author accentuates the attributes of democratization in a society by, *inter alia*, noting that it is a process whereby citizens imbibed and reproduced in their political actions the rules governing a democratic process. For example, when an election is perceived to be legitimate it should behoove the losing candidate to congratulate the victor while pledging his / her support for the new government. African countries are replete with instances in which the losing candidate not only refuses to concede to the victorious party, but also vows to do whatever it takes to de-legalize the government. In some cases, too, they call for a military coup—even though this development is now considered to be anachronistic. Another concern raised in the chapter is the extent to which minority groups—particularly those opposed to the government must be taught a lesson for not supporting the government by

withholding funds and development projects in the domiciliary of the ethnic minority groups. This policy stance of government does not bode well for the democratization project. The slow pace in advancing democracy and democratization in the area has its antecedent in the Cold War politics. Even with the triumph of democracy and capitalism over communism and socialism, the victorious Western powers did not sufficiently nudge African countries toward democracy and the democratization process, the chapter contends.

What is very important in the democratization enterprise is for the government and its agents not to visualize the state as an instrument of accumulation of personal wealth but as an entity whose promotion of the democratization venture could prop up development that is critical to an entire society. One salient question that chapter 2 raises, however, is: how can the democratization process be furthered if the electoral practice in much of the continent is flawed as in the 2007 Nigerian elections? What this query suggests is that the problem of electoral malfeasance in Africa must be tackled in order to advance the legality of regime.

In chapter 4, Human Rights, Political Ethnicity and the Development of Democracy in 21st Century Africa, E. Ike Udogu, a student of African studies, argues that the practice of human rights, the avoidance of the politics of ethnicity, and the advancement of democracy are *sine qua non* for moving the continent forward in this century. In a way, the chapter supplements the preceding two chapters. They collectively provide a substructure on which the volume rests. Arguably, the issue of human rights is a precursor to democracy and development, in that human rights practices could provide the enabling environment for propping up democracy, democratization, and development in society. Implementations of human rights principles could also mitigate, if not eliminate the vices of, political ethnicity. In other words, human rights transactions do not see individuals in terms of ethnic collectivity who must be demonized in the process of political and social contestations in society. Human rights doctrines support equality of individuals. This chapter discusses the import of women's rights in African society by alluding to the impressive Ugandan constitution as it relates to human rights. If stability is to reign supreme in Africa, the agents and agencies of the government—particularly the police must be well trained to carry out their function of promoting stability in society—and not be implicated in harassment, intimidation and robbery of citizens whose interests and safety they are charged to protect.

The author, in this chapter, chafes at the fact that African leaders, with a few exceptions, have had difficulties in embracing democracy and the

democratization processes with enthusiasm. This assumption is true in part because the democratic process could mean their dethronement through the ballot box for poor leadership. Uncannily, leaders would rather prefer to serve as President and Prime Minister for life. In instances in which constitutional provisions could prevent them from staying in power some have attempted to abrogate such provisions as was the successful case in Uganda and the failed attempt in Nigeria. The chapter contends that democracy is not only the game in town but also the zeitgeist; and democratization *a la* Kieh's chapter is the fundamental path through which democracy could be consolidated. The promotion of human rights, democracy and the mollification of the practice of political ethnicity are imperative to transform economic and political development in order to catapult Africa to greater heights in this country, concludes chapter 3.

Chapter 5 by John Mukum Mbaku, one of the foremost African political economists is entitled, 'Confronting Pervasive Corruption in Africa: The Issues and Challenges'. That the problematic issue of corruption in Africa has engaged his scholarship for some time is revealed in his books on *Bureaucratic Corruption in Africa: The Public Choice Perspective* and *Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups*. Indeed, this provocative chapter augments his earlier works.

Some scholars contend that corruption is *semper et ubique* (i.e. it has existed forever and everywhere). Nevertheless, corruption in African polities tends, overall, to produce a negative outcome. The complexity of corrupt acts worldwide problematizes its definition. Thus, this chapter attempts to provide a number of operational definitions to clarify its character and impact on society—especially African polities in which monies siphoned from the national treasuries and invested in North America and Europe—deny these states the much needed capital for development and rectification. In truth, it is a transformation that could uplift the society from endemic poverty. Put another way, if the late Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Sani Abacha of Nigeria, to cite only two examples, had left their loots in Zaire and Nigeria such stolen assets could have gone a long way to improving the infrastructures in these countries—improvement that is essential for moving these countries forward.

The chapter also discusses what appears to be one of the fundamental contradictions in discourses on corruption, i.e. the antinomy that corruption could improve development and it could also hamper development. The author explains the rationale for this peculiar supposition but still maintains that corruption is detrimental to African development particularly at this juncture in the continent's struggle to become a relevant player in the international economy. Generally, when a

crook steals money in California, for example, he or she is likely to invest the booty in real estate in Florida or elsewhere in America where it will provide jobs to or for Americans. When an African leader embezzles money from the national treasury, he/she invests such loots in Europe and North America that are already developed and awash with capital. In short, Africa's further economic marginalization could be exacerbated should African countries continue to tolerate Kleptocrats of the Mobutu and Abacha hues. More importantly, corruption whether bureaucratic or political, is likely to retard Africa's desire for its revival in the 21st century. Hence the author concludes by painstakingly providing a superb and new approach to controlling corruption in Africa.

In Chapter 6 entitled, 'Contemporary South African Politics and the Role of Higher Education as a Public Policy Instrument', Denise Pearson who has done substantial works in the area of Higher Education in Africa and who has served as Assistant Dean of Academics at the University of Denver, Colorado, USA, has brought her expertise on educational advancement issues in society to bear on this all important chapter. Indeed, this contribution is a revision of a research project conducted in South Africa. The paper was presented at the 24th international annual meeting of the Association of Third World Studies held at Winston Salem State University, Winston Salem, North Carolina, USA, in 2006.

That all eyes are on South Africa following the demise of apartheid in that society is a given. Post-apartheid South Africa has not only become a political and economic bellwether in Africa—particularly sub-Saharan Africa—but also a leader in the area of economic development, too. A vital question today is: can South Africa live up to the expectations of African observers and provide the leadership that Africa so badly needs for its revival in this century?

This chapter deals, among other factors, with how politics and public policy instruments impact on education and vice versa. It deals with the measures taken to address the anomaly in the education of black South Africans in order to promote the process of development in that polity since Blacks were not adequately educated in apartheid South Africa. Equally important in the chapter is the discussion relating to the suggestion that policies once implemented should not be construed to be sacrosanct. In short the efficacy of policies as they relate to achieving the desired goals in a polity should be regularly evaluated. Change is constant and the interests of policy makers vary and may clash from time to time. Therefore, the need for rationality is important as the country addresses its education policies aimed at improving the educational standard of the majority population—the Blacks.

Pearson also discusses some of the problems that exist when states attempt to control the character of the educational system at the expense of administrative autonomy. She provides some of the models instituted for improving the quality of education in the system that are useful to other African countries. The adoption of affirmative action scheme intended to address past discriminatory policies that set aside more money for white education than black majority is discussed. Most importantly, the essay provides a statistical analysis depicting the extent to which more women are graduating from tertiary institutions than men. This is an interesting and uplifting trend. Such a development suggests that given an increased level of education for women (not only in South Africa) that the burden of progress in this millennium will be shared almost equally by both genders. Such a collaborative effort can only serve as a fillip in Africa's quest for its reformation.

Life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa continues to decline while that in the rest of the world continues to improve. It is obvious that overall the healthcare system in the continent has deteriorated so much so that high government functionaries seek medical treatment in Europe—not in their own countries. Chapter 7, 'Oasis and Mirages: Emerging Spaces and Hybridization within the Healthcare system of the Spanish Protectorate in Morocco', is written by three outstanding scholars in the area of healthcare, namely Isabel Jimenez-Lucena (Universidad de Malaga), Jorge Molero-Mesa (Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona) and F. Javier Martinez-Antonio (Universite Denis Diderot). This disquisition is a revision of the paper they presented at the sixth European Social Science History Conference that was held in Amsterdam, the Netherlands in 2006.

This Chapter, in a way, highlights the sociological character of societies in which certain groups, by virtue of their influence, power, status and authority gain easy access to health care. This process of classification confers "status" and "prestige" to the various collectivities in the society. In this case, it was the role played by the colonialist Spain in Morocco—principally in the healthcare delivery system that determines, who is entitled to good health care. They promised high quality of healthcare system for "all" Moroccans (and immigrants) as indicated in the White Paper issued on the matter, but the reality was not matched with the promise, as the quality of medical care was determined by stratification issues such as, race, gender and class in the Spanish protectorate. The chapter further notes, poignantly, the policy of segregation between the colonizers and the colonized that worked to the disadvantage of the indigenous population in the area of healthcare provision and practices. By way of comparison, the colonial policies of Britain, France, and even

Portugal, were not all that different from those of Spain in Africa. The authors then argue that the clash of cultures between the Spaniards and Moroccans, exacerbated by the superiority complex of the colonizer, exacerbated the relationship between both groups. In short, what the colonizer did not comprehend (culturally), it demonized and debased as barbarism.

A special relevance of this chapter to this text is that the problems seen in the healthcare delivery system in Africa today mirrors or reflects the weakness in the contemporary healthcare delivery system. An unhealthy population faces the difficulty of production that is essential for development of a nation-state and *a priori* the continent. Put another way, if the workforce that Africa needs to generate wealth for national development lacks adequate healthcare system, such a polity is likely to lag behind in its development agenda. Thus, if Africa is to rise in this century, it must improve substantially the healthcare delivery system.

Chapter 8, 'Missing Migrants: The Absence of Women in the History of Rural-Rural Migrations from French Sudan to Senegal (1900-1932)' is written by Marie Rodet of the Institute of African Studies, University of Vienna, Austria. She brought her knowledge in archival work to bear on this essay. The chapter is a revised version of the paper that she presented at the sixth European Social Science History Conference that was held in Amsterdam, the Netherland in 2006. The author, among other factors, underscores the extent to which women and their roles in society have been marginalized in all polities from time immemorial. She stresses the need to highlight their significant contributions to the well being of families and community in general that is often missing in political, social and historical narratives. The important contributions that women have made to history, politics and development in contemporary Africa cannot be wished away; indeed, the progress women have made during the 20th century in all walks of life- in politics, higher education, culture and the arts. In politics, the number of women in leadership positions is phenomenal and growing. In Africa, we see them in Liberia, Rwanda, South Africa, Nigeria and elsewhere. In education, they excel in universities at various levels—medicine, law, administration *et cetera*. This impressive development has led some scholars to assert that the 21st century will be the century for women—men having dominated previous millennia. Accordingly, the approach to scholarship—even epistemology—and the comprehension of development in society should be, as noted in this chapter, less androcentric.

The chapter attempts to address a shortcoming in the narratives of African history that tended to marginalize the role played by women vis-à-

vis men in history. In other words, history texts (as is the case in other disciplines) suffer from what can be labeled as the "masculinization of scholarship" or "androcentric scholarship"—i.e., men wrote textbooks about men (and their great achievements) that tended to be biased toward women's achievements in history. Another important point raised in the chapter (based on archival work) concerns the significant economic inputs women make toward the sustenance of the household in the migratory patterns from French Sudan to Senegal. She finally emphasizes the positive roles that women have played and continue to play in African society that should contribute to modern or contemporary development.

It was the late President Julius Nyerere of Tanzania who once lamented that while the United States was traveling to the moon, we in Africa are having problems traveling to the village due to inadequate roads. Chapter 9, 'Development of Information Communication Technologies: Improving Access to Information Communications Technology as a way of Bridging the Digital Divide in Africa, A Brief Analysis', is written by Kwesi Tandoh, an Instructional Designer and Technology Specialist at University of Arkansas, Fayetteville, USA.

His chapter draws attention to the significance of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) to African development only to the extent that these communication technologies permeate the entire society and not just the capital cities—Pretoria, Accra, Abuja, Kinshasa, Cairo, Nairobi, Yaounde, Lome, Algiers, and so on. While noting the difficulties that Africa has had with developing a greater and wider access to ICT to African peoples in general, the chapter also notes with relief the penetration of mobile phones and the positive effects they have had on society. The author draws attention to the irregular and erratic supply of electricity that slows down mobile phone usage throughout much of Africa. That notwithstanding, African entrepreneurial spirit has led to the provision of remedies such as batteries and generators even in rural Africa to provide access for recharging this important medium of communication.

One area of concern in the chapter is the extent to which the internet is not readily available to possible users because of its expensiveness. Outside of the capital cities and other major cities in Africa, the internet is a novel—particularly in rural Africa where the illiteracy rate is high. In spite of this difficulty, however, the chapter suggests ways that this condition could be improved.

CHAPTER TWO

NO DEMOCRACY, NO DEVELOPMENT: REFLECTIONS ON DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA

A. B. ZACK-WILLIAMS

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold war and the proclamation of a New World Order by President George Bush (Cliffe & Seddon: 1990; Mohan & Zack-Williams: 1995), the question of democratic governance and political transparency has become a major item on the agenda of donors and activists within and outside of Africa. For donors the call for democracy was premised on the need to "create conditions for international capital accumulation across the world economy" (Szeftel 2000A: 302); whilst for critics of the African political order, the call was based on the belief that democracy will bring an end to dictatorship, political thuggery and economic stagnation.

In this chapter I want to look at some of the imperatives behind the recent moves towards democratization in Africa and the implications for African developmental process. I will argue that after a phase of political authoritarianism in the early post-colonial period, African governments were forced by the failure of their policies and the resulting protests from their people to create political space for multiparty competitive politics. The failure to give the people a say on how they should be governed was an important, though not the sole, factor in the crisis, which engulfed the continent in the 1980s, which in turn facilitated a democratic agenda.

Defining Democracy and Democratization

The term democracy as utilized in this paper is a minimalist one, and it refers to the process of "empowering the general population to control

decision making" (Mengisteab & Daddieh 1999: 9). As such, it is an inclusive and integrative process designed to bring various classes, ethnic groups and nationalities into the nation-state. To the extent that this process is voluntary, there is the risk that democratization can accelerate state disintegration and collapse (ibid). Many of the colonies were administered through a "bifurcated system" of colonial engagement, i.e. dividing Africans between those who experienced urban racial discrimination and those who were subject to the rural Native Authority system, and who were brought together at independence as nation-states. This was the case with Africa's most populous nation Nigeria, where "the creation of separate but subordinate state structure for natives" (Mandani 1996: 63) constituted the dualistic decentralized despotisms of Northern and Southern Nigeria. Writing on Africa as a whole Mamdani observes:

> The African colonial experience to be crystallized in the nature of the state…organized differently in rural areas from urban one that was Janus-faced, bifurcated. It contained a duality: two forms of power under a single hegemonic authority. Urban power spoke the language of civil society and civil rights, rural power of community and culture: Civil power claimed to protect rights, customary power pledge to enforce tradition (ibid: 18).

Thus, at independence in 1960, two alien political cultures were brought together to form the nascent nation-state of Nigeria. Political independence established a "neo-bifurcated system" through the continuation of decentralized despotism, empowerment of the chiefs and the demobilization of the urban and rural populace. The situation in Sierra Leone was no different, where for a long time the urban Creoles were ruled through the Legislative Council, and the rural masses via the Native Authorities. The latter were given the status as "British protected people", whilst the former were seen as "British subjects". It came as no surprise that at the dawn of independence, the "privileged" Creoles sought a judicial judgment through the Privacy Council to continue the colonial bifurcated system. The Independence constitution legitimated the decentralized despotism, by upholding 'the traditional rights' of the chiefs over their subjects and as custodians of land rights. Furthermore, the Paramount Chiefs of the various Districts were now empowered to seat in the national assembly with the aim of de-radicalizing any rural grass-root challenge to the conservative inheritors of power from the departing colonialists.

The above definition of democracy involves the ability of a people (the electorate) to choose freely on a regular basis between competing groups of potential governors to conduct the affairs of state. This involves a

periodic submission of the governors to the governed to account for their stewardship. In order for the governed to be able to make considered decisions, the institutions of state should respect not just the right of citizens to choose the government, but their social and political rights should be seen as inalienable.[1] A more elaborate functional aspect of the concept will involve the institutionalization of structures to foster both political and economic transparency and accountability. In short, democracy in this case assumes a functionalist dimension, and need to replicate the specificity of the liberal democracy, which appeared to be the *bete noir* of the African post-colonial modernizers. Democracy, to the extent that it embodies the will of the governed and the consent of the latter to be ruled will not only endorse and enhance state legitimacy, but will unleash the energy of the people for the great transformation that is so badly needed in Africa. Now for this project to be realized political institutions must uphold the rule of law, i.e. in any disputes, it is imperative that hearing be conducted by impartial persons arriving at a decision that is respected by both parties. The failure to democratize explains the growth of ethnic and religious identities and a top-down agenda imposed upon the peasantry.

As Schatzberg has noted not all moves away from autocracy can be labeled as processes towards democratization, to do this is "to confuse a normatively desired goal with a complex series of political processes whose outcome is far from predetermined" (Schatzberg: 1997). Democratization or its transition is the process that should lead a polity to democracy. Thus he observed: "Democratization…is a term used retroactively, after certain democratic thresholds have been crossed (ibid: 144)." Schatzberg took a very pessimistic view of democratization in Africa claiming that, "unfortunately, in most of Africa this has simply not yet occurred" (ibid: 114).

[1] For similar minimalist view of democracy, see, N. van de Walle, "Economic Reform and the Consolidation of Democracy in Africa", in M. Ottaway, Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead, Lynne Rienner, 1997, pp.15-42. Thus he observed: "I adopt an entirely procedural and minimal definition of democracy. Africa's post transition regimes are defined to be democratic as long as they schedule multiparty elections on a regular basis an as long as government more or less observes the political and social rights of the vast majority of the population" (pp.16).

Democracy: Is There an Alternative?

After the honeymoon of the early post-independence years, African governments without exception abandoned all attempts at constructing democratic structures and the accompanying milieu for sustainable economic development. Even the minimalist democratic structures, which were inherited from the departing colonialist, were gradually removed in the name of African appropriateness. From the decade of African independence (1960s) down to the wasted decade of the 1980s, African Governments failed to grasp the mettle of democracy. The reality is that African political leaders of both Left and Right persuasions have argued rather unconvincingly that democracy was a Western phenomenon *sui generis* and that it was antithetical to the African spirit. On the Left, democracy was equated with capitalism, and as such was a foreign ideology. On the petty bourgeois obsession with rejecting foreign ideologies, the Tanzanian social scientist and activist, Isa Shivji has warned that:

> An attempt to apply scientific theories, evolved out of an accumulation of mankind's knowledge, is dubbed as importing "foreign ideologies". And, paradoxically, this by the petty bourgeois intellectuals whose mental laziness has not allowed them even to read about these so-called "foreign ideologies" (Shivji: 1974, 17).

Shivji's diatribe was unleashed against an obscurantist bureaucratic bourgeoisie in Tanzania, nonetheless, his observation is true of similar groups the length and breadth of the continent.

It was argued, particularly by the ideologues of "African Socialism", such as Julius Nyerere, of Tanzania; Sekou Toure, of Guinea, and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana that the essence of the African is communocratic, and that it was the colonialists who by implanting capitalism *ipso facto* introduced class divisions and contradictions among African peoples. For African Socialists if the imported infrastructure was capitalist, then the alien superstructure was democracy: that system of governance, which was designed to deal with class contradictions and divisions in bourgeois societies. (Babu: 1981).

On the Right and for people like Jomo Kenyatta, of Kenya; Felix Houphouet-Boigny of Ivory Coast and Kamuzu Banda, of Malawi democracy was not only seen as alien, but it was divisive by rousing ethnic identities, thus putting obstacles to the development effort. Clearly, those who are now in formal control of the state apparatus will not concede to the existence of inequalities, class divisions and class contradictions, for in

doing so the exploiters and oppressors would no longer be foreign, and "the departed colonialists" but indigenous, the petty bourgeois itself. It is for this reason African leaders always found scapegoat in racial and ethnic minorities: Asians in East Africa; Tutsi in Rwanda; Mandingoes in Liberia; white farmers in Zimbabwe and Lebanese in Sierra Leone.

The perceived African solution to this naughty problem of political governance was the one-party state. In no time the idea of, and practices of this monolith spread through the continent like a bush fire in the harmattan. Leaders such as Nkrumah, Nyerere and Toure tried to indigenize scientific socialism by stripping it of its essence of class contradiction as the motive force in history, by substituting harmonious spirit. Kwame Nkrumah called for *Consciencism*, Nyerere imposed *Ujamaa Vijijini*, and Kenyatta called for *Harambe*. These early modernizers of Africa, unwittingly denied Africa's contribution to, and her embbededness in the project of modernity (Zack-Williams: 2004), by denying her contribution to capitalist civilization. For them, their continent was still immerse in the pre-modern, characterized by ascephalous communities that had remained untictured by market relations and immersed in a communalistic mode of production, thus denying uneven development, hybridity and cultural *difference* of pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial Africa.

For Africa's post-colonial modernizers, the juggernaut to pull the continent out of its alleged pre-modern slumber was the one party state. Paradoxically, the asphyxiating one party system was described as a democratic system, even by those such as Siaka Stevens in Sierra Leone and Kamuzu Banda in Malawi who denied citizens fundamental human rights, such as the rights to vote, free speech and freedom of association. As an ensemble of all shades of political suasions, economic social and ethnic interests, the one party system, it was argued was a better basis of governance than the competitive multi-party system that was said to be alien to the African conditions. In reality the dictatorship of the one-party state struck a detrimental blow at Africa's developmental prospects by denying the people a voice and by sapping their energy. The technocrats who were supposed to be the human engine of growth voted with their feet by leaving Africa in droves, for greener pastures and more tolerant socio-political milieu in the developed capitalist world.

The one-party state was an ideology *sui generis*. It provided camouflage for petty bourgeois accumulation and its accompanying subordination of the peasantry and other subaltern groups. The period of one-party rule was marked by the absence of free and fair elections. In many cases elections were simple political sham. Long serving Vice-

President of Sierra Leone, S.I. Koroma argued that if he did not win elections "by the vote" he would do so "by unopposed," i.e. by declaring Government's candidates unopposed; and failing that he would win 'by announcement' on state-controlled broadcasting outlets. The traditional rulers whose control over their subjects was not challenged by the post-colonial modernizers, were allowed total autonomy over their subjects provided, they delivered the votes at election time. Those who failed or were seen to be co-operating with opposition forces were promptly removed from office. By the late 1970s, many African leaders were *de facto* presidents for life (Kamuzu Banda, Felix Houphouet-Boigny Siaka Stevens) and President Jean Bedel Bukassa of the Central African Empire actually crowned himself emperor and his wife Empress.

The lifeline of the one-party state was the "shadow state" based on neo-patrimonial rule, which in turn provided the basis for widespread political and economic corruption (Reno, 1995). The fine line between on the one hand public revenue and resources, and private ownership became increasingly blurred. Political and economic transparency became things of the past. African public bureaucracies were almost at a stroke transformed into patrimonial bureaucracies, and recruitment and loyalty were to *les patrons*. Africa's modernizers were able to hold on to office, thanks to the Cold War and Super-power rivalry, which sanctioned the need for political protégées. Thus Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire can continue to raid the national treasury of his country with impunity, by justifying his rule as defender against the spread of communism, and calling on foreign troops to put down popular uprisings. The regimes in Angola and Ethiopia's Derge continued to exist, thanks to the support of the "Socialist Bloc", whilst Siad Barre of Somalia played both sides against each other by switching sides as he wished. Again in Angola, Jonas Savimbi's UNITA laid waste large track of his country in futile war, even after he had lost internationally supervised elections, apparently, no one told him that the Cold War had ended. Whilst the equally barbaric RENAMO accepted the verdict of the post-Civil War elections, this was not until most of Mozambique's countryside had been prickled with lethal landmines.

By the early 1980s, the one-party-state chicken were coming home to roost, as successive African governments started running up large balance of payment deficits triggering off widespread indebtedness. These imbalances soon constituted the eye of the storm of the African crises, with the result that scores of African Government now had to troop to the International Financial Institutions (IFIs) for aid via the structural adjustment programmes SAP). The conditionality of the Fund and Bank

helped to further expose the fragility of African economies, as it led to the impoverishment of large sectors of African society, thus unleashing social forces which now were prepared to challenge for control of the state (Mohan, et al: 2000).

Democracy and the State in Africa

By the late 1980s and early 1990s African states had arrived at a critical juncture (Villalon & Huxtable: 1998) with mounting pressures from domestic and international forces for change. This agitation for political pluralism coincided with the fall of the Berlin Wall, the end of the bipolarism and the emergence of unipolarism with the United States as the sole military hegemonic power. Former President Bush with a sense of triumphalism announced a New World Order, however for African leaders it was presumed, "business as usual". In no time credits and loans dried up as contributions from the Soviet Bloc melted away and Africa now had to compete for an ever-dwindling loan stock from western donors, with stiff competition coming from the emerging democracies of Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, international creditors such as the Fund and Bank were recalling in their loans, accumulated from the decades of profligacy of the 1970s and 1980s. Soon chronic balance of payment deficits was transformed into perennial crises as Government expenditures continued to outstrip revenues. This down turn in the economy resulted in widespread unemployment and the inability of the political leaders to finance their patron-client networks.

Whilst external pressure grew after 1990, it is important to note that the decisive pressure for democratic change came from within Africa and this was very much precipitated by the economic crisis (Haggard & Webb: 1994). The collapsing infrastructure, the deteriorating economic situations, the failing standard of living and the absence of political space to express some of these concerns led to two important developments: First, with a renewed sense of purpose, civil society started flexing its muscles resulting in widespread demand for political pluralism which various governments had ridiculed. Second, the 1980s and 1990s witnessed the rise of social movements challenging for state hegemony. These new movements differed from the challenges of the past, which were based on the activities of rogue military officers trying to put forward military interests on the national agenda. The new social movements such as the National Resistance Movement of Uganda, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia and the Revolutionary United Front were populist in nature that embarked on guerilla tactics including ceasing women and children to

fight in these civil wars. The call from all these movements and other agencies of the now revitalized civil society was a return to multi-party democracy and an end to kleptocratic rule. There was unceasing pressure for the reconfiguration of the state both internally and from donors.

As the triumph of neo-liberalism gained momentum in the development capitalist centre, the IFIs led the charge to promote liberalization in the semi-peripheral and peripheral areas. As far as Africa is concerned the neo-liberal counter-revolution took two forms: First, the grand project of *destatization* in order to promote liberalization (Ihonvbere; 2000). Second is the rediscovery of the potential function of civil society in peripheral formations. Indeed, the neo-liberal agenda has been characterized as the state-civil society debate and as 'the hegemonic ideological project of our time' (Beckman, 1993: 20).

The expressed aim of the neo-liberal project is to free the entrepreneurial potential of civil society from the omnipotent hostile state. The state is variously described as "vampire" (Frimpong-Ansah: 1991), "Lame Leviathan" (Bayart: 1993), and repressive, and as such the state itself has not been subjected to the discipline and imperative of the forces of civil society resulting in widespread inefficiency, authoritarianism, parasitism, rent-seeking and patronage (Beckman: op cit). Beckman has argued that "the neo-liberals seek to de-legitimize the state, the main locus of nationalist aspirations and resistance to the neo-liberal". However, Beckman pointed to the ideological pretensions of the neo-liberal project which seeks to conceal its own massive use of state power for the construction of civil society, as well as concealing its desire to promote capitalist development and the integration of global market by prodding the state to be more responsive and sensitive to the interests of capital and private property. On the question of the separation of state from civil society, Beckman warned that civil society does not exist independently of the state, and that, "it is situated in rules and transactions which connect state and society" (op cit: 29). For Beckman, an examination of the "public services nexus" will reveal it as the locus of a plethora of organized community interests, including professional associations and community development groups.

Chris Allen in his critique of the neo-liberal re-discovery of civil society, described the concept as vacuous and vague, and then went on to pose the question: 'who needs civil society'? Drawing attention to both the proliferation of NGOs in Africa as a form of state surrogate, and the conflation of NGOs with civil society, he concluded that "it (civil society) is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for democratic struggle…"

(Allen 1997: 336). Thus he concluded that: "apart from the grant –seeking NGOs and the academic, it is proponents of the 'liberal project' who need civil society: Western governments" (ibid: 337).

Szeftel has unleashed a sustained critique of the neo-liberal project, in particular, the effort to reduce corruption and the search for good governance. (Szeftel: 2000A & 2000B). In his view there is a clear tension between the neo-liberal attempt at destatization and the need for petty bourgeois (local) accumulation, which rests heavily on political power, and corruption is an important vehicle in this process. Like Ihonvbere (2000), Szeftel pointed out that the state remains central to overall process of reconstruction and accumulation. Ihonvbere observed: "In the struggle to rebuild the nation-state, construct identities, and build new platforms of inclusion, participation, and politics, the state remains a critical factor and actor" (op cit, p.59). Szeftel noted that whilst corruption represents a threat to the programmes and activities of creditors and donors alike, yet attempt to fight corruption in this way will involve "reducing the ability of state officials to impose political costs on business by appropriating resources for themselves" (Szeftel: 2000A, 288). Fundamentally the *raison d'etre* behind the "new intolerance of corruption" is the need to speed up the intensification of the internationalization of capital by promoting "market capitalism and the liberal democratic state as the only institutional arrangements appropriate for globalization" (ibid: 289).

In particular, the curative programme for African economic ailment, structural adjustment, is seen as an attempt to open local markets to global capital flows. In hemming in African economy and society into the global capitalist economy (Callaghy & Ravenhill: 1993), "the donor strategy creates both opportunities and problems for African petty bourgeois politicians by… (providing) new opportunities for accumulation outside the state, not least through new aid funds, privatization of state assets and some trade opportunities; but it also threatens the large proportion of the petty bourgeoisie who are dependent on the state" (Szeftel 2000A: 295). This threat comes from the conditionality (e.g. attacking patronage, and retrenchment) accompanying structural adjustment, and the privatization of state resources, a major locus of petty bourgeois accumulation. In Szeftel's view, donor's anti-corruption crusades "seldom challenge the link between corruption, on the one hand, and patterns of private accumulation and clientelist political mobilization, on the other" (Szeftel: 2000B, 428). Not surprisingly, such crusades never received more than a limited success (ibid).

For Szeftel the working of liberal democratic politics is doomed to failure for three fundamental reasons: historic nature of underdevelopment

stemming from the legacy of slavery, colonialism; the nature of the post-colonial mode of accumulation and political mobilization; and the inherent fragility of the post-colonial state. Thus he concluded:

> Historical experience made it unlikely that the market forces which had produced underdevelopment and exclusion would mysteriously reverse themselves once independence was attained. Moreover, the market and private property were associated with foreign domination and racism. Thus, inevitably, the new state was central to African aspirations. Power was to be the engine for development and for individual job opportunities and upward mobility. For many, the state was the means through which past discrimination would be redressed and private wealth promoted (Szeftel: 2000B, 431).

In short, contrary to the neo-liberal dictate, the state ought to be central in any project of economic and political transition; as those who forced Africa to sell the family silver are now doing a *volte face* in trying to deal with the crisis of central capitalism by instituting *dirigisme*. Indeed, one early attempt at explicating corruption in Africa is the argument put forward by this author (Zack-Williams 1983, and Zack-Williams & Aleimika 1981), that corruption is an attempt on the part of the governing class to suture the divide between members of the ruling class who are in formal control of the state apparatus. However, as Szeftel has warned:

> Unfortunately, the state was not equipped to bear this burden. Underdevelopment and dependence on primary exports gave it uncertain revenue base which constantly undermined development strategies. More importantly, the colonial institutions inherited by the independent state were inappropriate for the project of social renewal.

By the late 1980s democratic governance had become part of the neo-liberal conditionality of the Fund and Bank; nonetheless, it was the spread of protest against the deteriorating economic situation, which impelled protestors to call for a new political system. For example, in the early 1980s there were some twenty protest incidents each year on the continent, and by 1991 this number rose to eight-six across thirty countries (Bratton & Van de Walle: 1998). This rise in the number of protests was also quickly followed by an upswing in the number of multiparty elections held after 1991. It was argued that the poor economic performance and the growing marginalization of Africa from the global economy were the results of bad governance and a vampire state, which had not only stifle civil society, but had sapped the energy of the people and the authority of the state was now being brought into question. In the resource-rich, but economically and politically mismanaged country of Sierra Leone,

agitation for a return to multi-party rule was led by students, teachers union and members of the Bar Association who were warned by the leaders of the ruling party that they could be charged with treason for demanding multi-party elections in a one-party state.

Soon, the strengthening of civil society became a major point on the development agenda, and it was not long before various agencies of civil society were being trained for their task of taming the omnipresent state. Within a short period of time, African economy and society were under the yoke of northern Non-Governmental Agencies (NGOs), as the role of the state was severely curtailed under the ideological canons of the IFIs.

The decade of the 1990s, which ushered in a New World Order, also marked the end of the era of kleptocratic autonomy, as dictators now had to face a more vibrant civil society. Indeed, some observers celebrated a 'second liberation' (Ekeh: 1997), as dictators gave way to democrats. However, this process was not universal: in Nigeria, military strong men Abacha and Babaginda renege on their promise to return the country to democratic rule, and embarked on the Nigerian political pastime of 'permanent transition' to democracy (Beckett & Young: 1997). Moshood Abiola winner of the June 1993 presidential elections was quickly arrested and detained in solitary confinement until his death in 1997. In the then Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko continued to behave as if no one had informed him of the end of Cold War protégéeism. With no "international god-father", Mobutu was quickly pushed into exile by the popular forces of veteran political campaigner, Lauren Kabilla. In other states such as Sierra Leone, Liberia, Sudan, Rwanda and Somalia the long absence of democratic infrastructure soon took its toll as all these countries were plunged into bloody civil wars from internal social forces.

Problems of Democratic Renewal

Whilst the wind of democratic change has been blowing across Africa for well over a decade now and it has swept away many a dictator in its wake, yet it is clear that it has not taken deep roots. The trend in transition to multi-party competitive elections is not unilinear as many countries such as Ivory Coast, Guinea, Kenya and Sierra Leone experienced reverses and backslides towards one-party rule or military dictatorships. There is still a long way to go in order to consolidate democratic institutions and effect change in political culture, in order to unleash the energy of the African people for economic transformation and sustainable development. Ottaway has pointed to a number of structural obstacles in the path of democratic engagement in Africa (Ottaway: 1997).