

Sociology of Memory

Sociology of Memory:
Papers from the Spectrum

Edited by

Noel Packard

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Sociology of Memory: Papers from the Spectrum, Edited by Noel Packard

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*Dedicated to my parents,
Sandra and Brandt Kehoe
and David “Crisy” Packard (R.I.P.)*

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PREFACE

I composed this book of presentation papers at the invitation of Amanda Millar of Cambridge Scholars Publishing. Her invitation was motivated by curiosity about the Pacific Sociological Association conference session I organize, titled “Sociology of Memory: New and Old Conceptualizations of Memory, Personal or Commodity, Public or Private?” I organize this session to showcase sociological interpretations of memory in the context of a society undergoing rapid technological, social, political and environmental changes. *Sociology of Memory: Papers from the Spectrum* builds and expands upon the “Sociology of Memory” theme issue for *American Behavioral Scientist* (June 2005) I guest edited upon the invitation of Laura Lawrie, the journal’s managing editor.

Sociology of Memory: Papers from the Spectrum would not have evolved without the hard work, help, inspiration, and advice of many people, whom I wish to acknowledge. I’d like to thank Amanda Millar of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for having invited me to produce this book of sociology of memory topics. Amanda’s excellent editing work, consul and patience were invaluable in bringing this book into being. I’d like to thank Laura Lawrie for inviting me to guest edit the theme issue on sociology of memory, which this book expands upon. I wish to give a special thank you to New School professors Terry Williams, Vera Zolberg, and Jose Casanova. Likewise I wish to thank Dr. Dean Dorn, the executive director of the Pacific Sociological Association, who tirelessly organizes the association’s excellent annual conferences. The Pacific Sociological Association meetings are a “home” for my “Sociology of Memory: New and Old Conceptualizations of Memory, Personal or Commodity, Public or Private” session this year and the past seven years. The title of my conference session is inspired by New School professor Jose Casanova’s work pertaining to religions and how they historically shift between public and private spheres of society, as discussed in his book *Public Religions in the Modern World* (1994). Thank you to every author whose paper appears in this volume for your good work, for traveling to conferences, and for your patience, as it took a few years for this collection to be assembled.

An extra-special thank you goes to Drs. Svetlana Hristova, Janelle Wilson, Anika Walke, Terry Williams, Laura Lawrie, Francesco Romanello, David Sowerby, Barry Garneau and Brandt and Sandra Kehoe who helped

me bridge difficult times, when I thought I might not be able to bring this collection to fruition. A special thank you goes to copyeditor Anne Geiberger for her professional help editing the proposal and final submission package for this book and for indexing the book, all of which would not have happened without Anne's excellent copy-editing work.

Thank you to KPKA 94.1 F.M. Pacifica Radio station in Berkeley for allowing me to transcribe one of Bonnie Faulkner's *Guns and Butter* program interview "Percy Schmeiser: Monsanto Corporation and Genetic Modification." Finally, and very importantly, thank you, the reader of this collection, for spending some time with the hard-won, sociological work of the accomplished authors and speakers whose papers are presented here. These papers represent a broad spectrum of discourse and do not necessarily reflect the view of the editor, but each view adds important insights to the spectrum.

INTRODUCTION

NOEL PACKARD

For the purposes of this book, “sociology of memory” is the examination of sociological concepts about memory from various perspectives regarding memory in various forms; that is, as conceptualized and utilized by institutions as small as the family or as large as institutionalized electronic “commodity” memory or banked biological DNA “memory” of entire populations. This book is a sampling from the vast memory-related research and advances discourse into critical terrain regarding electronic and biological memory banking, while simultaneously drawing attention to the complex interrelationships between different forms of memory, be it personal, private, public, or commodity. For example, private corporations, financed with government funds, can collect banked commodity memory such as DNA or electronic data (justified in the enterprise of war contracts and national security); warfare, in turn, brings on human trauma memories experienced privately in the individual, private, body; while the war as a historical event is collectively remembered, memorialized, interpreted, and contested. This scenario depicts several “forms” of memory “overlapping” each other, such as public, political memorial; private, personal reflection; traumatic “body memories”; institutionalized, banked, commodity memory of the DNA of those who served in the military; banked electronic memory from automated “dataveillance”; and corporate or propaganda media memory coverage in news, videos, and photos of events. It is this overlapping of forms of memory from within and without the body, which this book explores as a worthy sociological and methodological approach to the study of memory in all its roles and forms in society, past, present, and emerging.

Overlapping approaches to the study of social memory are complex and multidimensional. The idea that memory ranges from a personal memory, to a history book, to a monument, to the memory inside a personal computer bank or a person’s mind, to the photos stored in cell

phones or images from robots that generate “war porn,”¹ to massive data-mining operations by corporations, to government-funded DNA banks and continuous satellite surveillance photos, raises sociological questions regarding who “owns” what kind of memory, and for what social or private purposes? Questions like these motivated me to form the “Sociology of Memory: Personal or Commodity, Public or Private Memory?” conference session and are the inspiration behind this book of presentation papers gleaned from that conference session and other conferences, even including a transcript of an interview broadcast on Pacifica Radio. This book is a snapshot of works in progress by innovative scholars analyzing a world reflecting on past traumas, while looking forward at monumental social, technological, and environmental changes. The majority of contributing authors are sociologists from universities in the United States, Europe, and Russia. These authors are Anika Walke, Sofia Tchouikina, Janelle L. Wilson, Ben Herzog, Gabriela Fried Amilivia, Svetlana Hristova, Diane Barthel-Bouchier and Dean Bond, Roberta Bartoletti, Noel Packard, Patricia Lengermann and Gillian Niebrugge, Nina Baur and *Guns and Butter* producer Bonnie Faulkner interviewing Canadian farmer and 2007 Right Livelihood Award Percy Schmeiser.

Chapter One, titled “Reconsidering the Past: Interviews with Jewish Survivors of the Nazi Genocide in the Post-Soviet Context,” by Anika Walke, presents a case where it appears that social/collective memory takes precedence over personal memory. Walke’s case study touches on elements that appear in many of the chapters: memory and its role in identity formation; the constant personal and social negotiation over private vs. social (or public) memory, or individual vs. collective memory; and ownership issues attached to various kinds of memory (personal, state, or corporation owned). Other elements include collective and personal

¹ In an interview with Amy Goodman of Democracy Now! P. W. Singer, author of *Wired for War: The Robotics Revolution and Conflict in the 21st Century*, commented on how robotic weapon surveillance images are becoming a form of entertainment. He said, “It’s not just that the public is becoming de-linked, but remember, these machines record everything that they see. And so, we have the rise of what I call YouTube war. That is, you can go on YouTube right now and download video clips of combat footage, much of it from these drones. And so, in some ways, you could say that’s a good thing. The home front and war front are finally connected. You can see what’s going on. But we all know this is taking place in sort of our weird, strange world, and these video clips have become a form of entertainment for people. The soldiers call it “war porn” (http://www.democracynow.org/2009/2/6/wired_for_war_the_robotics_revolution).

memory and its intersection with the body and official history compared with personal experience (the meaning of which may or may not be congruent with history that is enforced by power and authority).

Walke points out how personal memories and their meaning may clash with ideology or religious belief, and how experiences of annihilation, war, genocide, and abuse and the traumatic memories they generate are worked through, repressed, forgotten, denied, and (re)remembered in times of safety, healing, learning, or enlightenment. Drawn from her interviews of Jewish Soviet survivors of the German occupation of the Soviet Union in 1941, Walke uses an exemplary case study of one of her interviewees to demonstrate how these elements are intertwined in a survivor's narrative. Walke unpacks this "intertwining" process with engaging insight and skill. The case study of Elena Drapkina follows a contemporary example of human life reconstructed in the aftermath of the Great Patriotic War, when the Soviet Union was occupied by the Germans from 1941 to 1944. The Germans exterminated many Soviet Jews including Elena's family. The sixteen-year-old Elena Drapkina survived by adhering to socially accepted identity models, such as patriotic resistance fighter and productive Soviet citizen. Elena's identity adhered to what was prescribed by the state, which provides structure, support, recognition, and safety for existence. Although her family was Jewish, Ms. Drapkina presented herself as being uninterested in religion until retirement age—a time which coincided with perestroika, a period when far-reaching political and social reforms were introduced in the USSR, and the government began allowing more religious and privatized activity.

Walke's case poignantly describes a classical conceptualization of social/collective memory dominating personal memory. Ms. Drapkina thinks of herself as a Soviet citizen, and Soviet ideas take precedence over personal ones. Only after Russia changed its policies regarding privacy and religion did Soviets like Elena Drapkina begin to explore potential religious heritage. Walke resolves from her interviews that the Soviet social construction of war memory and personal reconstruction of Jewish survivors' identities in Soviet Russia are deeply intertwined. Thus, she reminds readers of the Durkheimian sociological approach to understanding memory, in which social memory determines individual modes of remembering. Walke explores changes in the social discourse occurring with perestroika, and how they affect Jewish survivors' self-identification in a post-Soviet context. Studying this process Walke sees an "opportunity to understand constructions of personal and collective memories (and their intersections) and gain insights into the challenges that an analysis of personal mnemonic narratives entails." (49) To account

for her interviewees' shifting presentations of their lives, Walke developed a methodological framework that combines methods of biographical research and discourse studies and that endeavors to interpret the meaning of a particular social context. Walke observes that in the analysis of the change in conditions comes a meaningful way to validate self-reflection.

Walke uses quotations from her interviewees that stand out memorably from the text. The text itself presents a discussion on the surface with submerged undercurrents of psychoanalytic themes. Without resorting to overt psychoanalytic techniques, Walke acknowledges the possibility of the unconscious. Consider for example Walke's description of survivors turning to religious rites in their elder years. Walke writes, "Strategies of commemoration express a (perhaps unconscious) attempt to position the murder within a specific Jewish context, an implicit context since the Jewish population of the occupied territories was singled out for extermination." (53)

Walke posits that Elena Drapkina (typifying other survivors of the Nazi genocide) recalls her life in roughly four phases that echo sociopolitical phases in Soviet, or Russian, history. Recalling the past during the last of these phases (after the breakdown of the Soviet Union) appears to determine these presentations and helps enable interviewees to emphasize ethnic or religious components that shape their perception of history.

Chapter Two, titled "Collective Memory and Reconversion of Elite: Former Nobles in Soviet Society after 1917" by Sofia Tchouikina was featured at the Fifth Conference of the European Sociological Association. It presents a sociological history of Russian noble families' integration into Soviet citizenship in postrevolutionary Russia. She describes the disappearance of the former Russian nobility from Russian society (in a mere twenty years) and their reconvergence into Soviet citizenship, where many now hold well-earned positions among the contemporary elite and intelligentsia. Tchouikina provides an inside look at the impact of social censorship on some of the most, rather than the least, privileged members of society. In the previous chapter we saw Walke's interviewee Drapkina's identity molded by the social collective identity of Soviet Russia (along with its collective memory—in a Durkheimian interpretation) in lieu of a family collective memory (with ethnic or religious overtones) to conflict or mitigate the influence of the official state-provided identity. In this chapter we see intergenerational transmission of an aristocratic character fostered not by state and ideology, but by extended families (family being something that Walke's interviewee, Drapkina, was deprived of by war and genocide). Tchouikina

conducted twenty-three in-depth biographical interviews with descendants of Russian noble families and draws on memoirs, autobiographies, letters, and dozens of interviews with other populations in Soviet society. The interviewees survived the interwar period from 1917 to 1941, during which they, along with other descendants of nobles, were labeled “former people.” Tchouikina describes how social and political suppression of the “former people” altered intergenerational communication and family memory within former noble families, and she explains how families transcended these alterations and succeeded in modern Soviet society.

Noble families responded to social censorship by adapting their social behavior in ways that conserved and protected their social capital. Tchouikina describes some techniques that descendants of noble families developed to “forget” their noble origins while adapting to and excelling in modern Soviet life. The techniques included self-censorship and speaking in code, home schooling, silence, destruction or hiding of family artifacts, cultivating an isolated and exclusive lifestyle, becoming employed in shadow economies, and disavowing noble heritage or adhering to it and living a marginalized lifestyle as a consequence. The younger generation of noble descendants perhaps suffered the most because they were raised in contemporary Russia and were discriminated against as “former people,” while at the same time they enjoyed few of the privileges that their parents enjoyed years before the revolution. The younger generation of “former people” often experienced discrimination in employment and in the academy. In the end it became advantageous to have members of the family in a diversity of employments to provide assistance through a “family network” to relatives in need (similar to the way that the “Sibs” operate, or operated, in China).

Similar to Walke’s observations regarding an increase of private questing for personal ethnic or religious heritage in Russia, Tchouikina observes a new interest in genealogy in postperestroika Russia. Now, more than in the past, Russians are curious about whether they have family ties to historic noble families and heritage. As in the previous chapter, it appears that nation-state ordained identity is no longer exclusive of other markers of identification such as ethnic, religious, or noble family heritage. In fact, Russians are enabled to invest themselves into private searches for an identity that is not just in service to the state, but perhaps promotes private and individual ways to identify themselves, independent of state support but dependent on family, religious, or cultural characteristics. For those without family, religious, cultural, or occupational status affiliations, identity and support systems could become

problematic, and then state and ideological affiliations might again surface to fill a need for identification, identity, solidarity, and belonging.

Tchouikina observes that as Russians quest for their lost noble heritage in archives and elsewhere, they have “invented” a romanticized historical portrait of nobility. The invented portrayal overlooks the sacrifices and hardships that the noble families experienced and kept hidden and silent about in the decades following the interwar period. Today descendants of nobility in Russia have more freedom to form associations and keep records of their family lineage. Now that it is popular to seek for noble ties in one’s family tree it might be that noble families feel a need to fend off “wannabe” nobles—similar to the way Native American Indians might feel about white Europeans “acting-out” as wannabe natives or seeking Indian “princesses” or tribal ties in their family bloodlines. This comparison goes further when the issue of morality is brought in. According to Tchouikina morality is considered part of the social capital of the noble family descendants and presumably it needs to be protected from the taint of popular “wannabe nobles.”

Tchouikina presents her findings and analysis in rather straightforward historical-comparative analysis. In a sense her analysis reflects the character of the people she is speaking for—a tight, closed, concise, slightly guarded, and polished analysis that perhaps could not have been written a few decades ago. In contrast to Walke’s observations regarding Soviet Jews, the former Russian nobility did not embrace the Soviet ideal identity; rather they leveraged it, working their way to positions of influence and expertise within exclusive state occupations. Former nobles distinguish themselves in character that falls close to Max Weber’s definition of status groups presented in *Economy and Society* (1978, 305–6). Weber’s criteria for a status group revolves around the idea that a status group is distinguished by a lifestyle that includes formal education and training, exclusiveness, fending off social elements that are not of elite and intelligentsia status, and abstention from manual labor, as well as other elements that fit Tchouikina’s description of former-nobility lifestyles—only under repressed conditions. Tchouikina’s paper provides insights to how family memory is altered by hostile social conditions, and yet the decedents of the former noble families maintain their status honor against the state, military and the common populace by conserving their social, cultural and intellectual capital. Rather than applying Weber’s status-group analysis, Tchouikina uses a comparative-historical approach with writing that reminds me of Marx’s style of writing. Marx is credited as the sociologist who developed the comparative-historical method, an invaluable method for understanding what we remember and what we

forget as a society, because it requires comparison, recollection, and knowledge of the past. Tchouikina's study of the "former people" provides all three, but unlike Marx, her focus is not on laborers seeking revolution, but on the censored descendants of the Russian nobility maintaining their status position within the postrevolutionary state.

Chapter Three is Janelle Wilson's paper, titled "Nuances of Nostalgia: An Essay on the Relationship among Memory, Nostalgia, and Identity," which was presented at the 2008 Pacific Sociological Association meeting, moves the discourse from the social towards the personal (specifically the body and its emotions) and back to the social. Wilson first acknowledges Durkheim and Halbwachs's European-based conceptualizations regarding memory as a social fact, and then shifts the focus to a Mead-inspired, American-based, social-psychological theoretical approach to memory. Wilson is presenting a case for nostalgia as a catalyst for remembering events from personal experience that are healing and empowering. When nostalgic we remember things that that help us make the present less painful. Wilson posits that nostalgia helps us recall the goodness of past experiences to help transcend a painful present situation; we use something from the past to comfort us. Using past experiences to promote healing enables us to be more tolerant and social with fellow humans. In the opposite direction, one might argue, we suppress or repress memories of painful experiences in order to stay in good social relations (and standing in society) particularly among people who, for whatever reason, prefer denial over openly examining the nature of hurtful experiences. Wilson also discusses how medical and psychological professionals apply remembering exercises for healing patients. The paper examines nostalgia as it hinges on psychology, emotions, medical history, and psychotherapy.

How can Wilson's analysis be applied to a sociological scenario? Consider Sofia Tchouikina's paper in Chapter Two, which describes how descendants of former Russian nobility conserved their noble families' social capital in contemporary Soviet Russia. Could it be that the former noble families were nostalgic for their former lifestyle and position in prerevolutionary Russia? Descendants of noble families strove to retain their social capital by providing their children with a "happy" childhood and "golden" youth. A happy childhood provided a home-schooled miniversion of past noble lifestyle, which taught children things that made them exclusive from the broader society, yet made them distinctly "included" in the status group of the noble family descendants. According to Tchouikina, home schooling helped prepare a contemporary generation of noble family descendants, or "former people," to be qualified for important positions in the modern Soviet elite, ruling party, and

intelligentsia. In this scenario, remembering the past is a social activity (including childrearing) that helps mend the rupture between the losses of the past and aspirations for future status. The re-creation of noble descendants (children) combined with the preservation of their families' social capital, partly driven by nostalgia for a lost lifestyle and position, resulted in a reconversion of the descendants into Soviet citizens who hold elite positions in the intelligentsia or state. The reconversion process did restore the social reintegration of the so-called former people into modern Soviet society, which is in keeping with Wilson's argument that nostalgia plays a role in helping people be more socially integrated. This assessment invites further testing and application.

Wilson's paper touches both on theoretical approaches to memory and practical applications of remembering as therapeutic for individuals and for society. Wilson introduces a theoretical approach to personal and collective memory based in the theoretical work of George Mead. Mead's approach deserves some introduction. While Durkheim and Halbwachs set a standard for sociology, quantitative methods or statistics, and the study of collective memory, Mead pioneered social psychology, helped to found the Chicago School, and established the conceptualization regarding the "I" and the "me." Mead's work with world-famous German psychologist Wilhelm Wundt (Deegan 2001, xi–xliv) shows itself in his social-psychological conceptualizations regarding the relationship of the individual to the other. Mead's famous interaction theory regarding the "I" and the "me," wherein we do not name our actions and recognize them until they are past, indicates a built-in, self-reflective, human capacity that is imperative for learning, intelligence, progress, and adaptability. Mead's approach to sociology is colored by his psychological training and emphasizes the self as a locus of memory.

Mead worked with Jane Addams and was a popular lecturer at the University of Chicago. Before his unexpected death in 1931 he was developing a theory called "sociality theory." Sociality theory is more involved than the "I" and "me" conceptualization of social interaction because it attempts to account for change, time, past, present, the "emerging," and the "novel." This theory is presented in Mead's last book, *Philosophy of the Present* (1959), which was authored posthumously from Mead's lecture notes. While reading *Philosophy of the Present* it seemed to me that Mead was developing a theory about social change that was different from Durkheim's approach regarding both collective memory theory and statistics, as a scientific way to measure social activity or change—and this theory was not necessarily a symbolic interactionism one, either. I speculated this after reading Halbwachs's work on collective

memory and comparing it to Mead's sociality theory. I knew that both these sociologists were alive at the same time, one in Paris and the other in Chicago. I found no direct reference to Durkheim or Halbwachs's work in Mead's books, and conversely no direct reference to Mead's work in Durkheim's or Halbwachs books. Further reading showed that Halbwachs guest-lectured at the University of Chicago in 1930, the same year that Mead presented his sociality theory at a conference in Berkeley, California. At this time Mead was already a well-established and popular lecturer at the University of Chicago. In contrast to Mead's popular and packed classes, Halbwachs's "Suicide" course at University of Chicago was poorly attended and dwindled to four students (Coser 1992, 6). I see no indication that Halbwachs and Mead shared any dialog during the time they were both at the University of Chicago

Halbwachs completed two dissertations. His first one was written in 1907 when he studied under the famous French metaphysician Henri Bergson. Halbwachs completed his second PhD after he joined with Durkheim. As metaphysics was losing favor in intellectual circles, Halbwachs renounced Bergson and endorsed Durkheim's sociological approach, becoming the statistician for *Suicide* (Durkheim 1897) and later writing his own books about collective memory, *The Social Frameworks of Memory* (1992) and *The Collective Memory* (1950). This shift in career meant Halbwachs renounced Bergson's more person-centered conceptualization of memory in favor of a Durkheimian social collective idea of memory, as social fact. It also meant that Halbwachs endorsed statistics as a scientific method for monitoring social change over time. Halbwachs became famous and well-published and enjoyed invitations and opportunities to teach in fine universities. In contrast, Mead did graduate work at Harvard but did not complete a PhD. Later Mead studied under Wilhelm Wundt in Germany, but left Germany before the wars. Once situated in Chicago, Mead wrote a book that made it to the proof stage but was never published, for reasons still unknown. "Mead's books," as we know them, were written by his students or colleagues, who reconstructed his writings from their lecture notes. Because Mead lacked a PhD and publications, he was beholden to his academic colleague, Dewey, to endorse him for academic positions. Mead worked with Jane Addams, who pioneered community development projects, using and developing community survey and narrative studies (which is explored in Chapter Ten). Mead was not sexist regarding women working in the social sciences; his own mother had been an educator and university administrator (Deegan 2001, xi–xliv). As Wilson points out, Mead was influenced by many of the finest social scientists of his day. Mead agreed

that conscientious objectors should be allowed to oppose war, arguing that if draftees are going to die for democracy, then the democratic right to not serve in the war needs to be maintained—otherwise there is no democracy to defend (Mead 1918). Today we might consider Mead a social activist, although I don't know if he would use the label himself, just as I don't know if Mead would call himself a symbolic interactionist, a behavioral psychologist, or a Freudian.

Halbwachs and Mead were both in the prime of their careers when Halbwachs visited the University of Chicago in 1930. Halbwachs had renounced his old professor Bergson because of his metaphysical and psychological leanings. Halbwachs had good reasons for renouncing metaphysics in order to further sociology and his career. Mead did not have such reasons to renounce Bergson's metaphysics and its psychologically oriented approach to memory. Mead studied Bergson's work, and in the preface to Mead's last book *Philosophy of the Present* (1950) Arthur Murphy wrote that Mead had been reading Bergson's work just weeks before his death. According to Murphy, Mead was interested in using Bergson's theory to further his own sociality theory. Mead began work on his sociality theory in the early 1930s, probably working on it after his wife's death (a few years before his own) and presented it as part of the Carus Lectures at the American Philosophical Association meeting at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1930. Mead's lecture notes for the conference are what constitute *Philosophy of the Present*. Mead's sociality theory, as I decipher it from *Philosophy of the Present*, is presented in my own paper in Chapter Twelve, titled "Marx and Mead in an Emerging 'Commodity Memory' Driven Society."

In Chapter Four, "Collective Forgetting': A Reflection on a Residual Expression" (presented at the 2008 Pacific Sociological Association meeting) Ben Herzog argues that as a social action there is no difference between remembering and forgetting. This would appear to be a way to address the question: "How is it that we know and not know simultaneously and collectively?" Here again, as explored in earlier chapters, is the problem of examining social facts that are inconvenient—in other words, inconvenient for perpetrators, because to admit that one is abusive is to risk guilt or consequences, and inconvenient for survivors because survivors who live with an "official" public account of their loss, which is not congruent with their own interpretation of the loss, suffer. How can that which is ignored, unspoken, taboo, repressed, and suppressed be resolved when we cooperate to ignore or forget it? Herzog looks for an account of or a definition of forgetting in the collective memory literature, and then he provides some informed analysis leading to

the conclusion that rather than forgetting, we “(re)member” and reconstruct events of the past in ways that serve our needs, and often it is the needs of the most powerful and wealthy who have the greatest influence over what is remembered—and what is ignored, overlooked, or ‘forgotten’.” Herzog writes: “Collective (re)membering is not concerned with the positive truthfulness of the denied event, but rather with the changing meanings and interpretations that are attached to it. Collective (re)membering (which is collective memory) is about power and authority, rather than laying claim to a positive truth or a normative desire.” (130).

Herzog applies his hypothesis to Israel’s 1948 war, which created the Palestinian refugees—a group of people whose true plight is often overlooked in the coverage of the war, or rather is ascribed a meaning that provides a more convenient reinterpretation of the events for those with the power and authority to ascribe meaning. Herzog examines how social facts regarding the usurpation of Palestine are ignored by media and official sources. In reading Herzog’s paper I am reminded of Schudson’s analysis of Watergate in American memory—how the Watergate scandal provided a convenient distraction to, and way to ignore, the inconvenient facts of the Vietnam War. Ignoring may come in the disguise of a media-focused distraction, sending a signal to people that it is now okay to “forget” something that is no longer acknowledged in the corporate media (a concern also in the writings of Adorno and Walter Benjamin). As Herzog acknowledges, when the social-political context changes, so does the (re)membering of past events. An example of this might be the recollections of German Nazis who “didn’t know” about the concentration camps or the extermination of the Jews during the Third Reich. For example, long after the demise of the Third Reich, Hitler’s secretary commented that she did not know about the extermination of the Jews and others, but added later that there were ways to find out about it. People participate in social lying, not just forgetting, often to protect themselves from the punishing fate of those who deviate from the official “truth.” It seems honesty and truth are sacrificed and suspended when self-preservation is imperative in the face of tyranny, despots, abuse, and torture.

Herzog argues that we should be careful about considering social forgetting as a form of social action. Perhaps it is a form of social inaction? He points out that forgetting is a powerful political or normative statement. What is done when the president claims, “I can’t recall”? Herzog warns that sociologists doing research in this area should be careful about adopting terminology from outside the discipline, which might undermine it. I would argue that adoption of terminology is not

necessary to sociology, but to ignore the vast and growing terminology of research in the broad collective memory discourse doesn't enrich the sociological discourse on memory.

Herzog's chapter raises important points and questions about the flip side of collective memory—that is, social forgetting, ignoring, and denying. Are these social actions? If so, what meaning do we make of them and how do we communicate about that which is not supposed to be discussed? What are the benefits to social forgetting? Can static social facts be forgotten? Or erased or deleted? And if so, on what basis would anything qualify to remain an unforgettable, un-delete-able truth or social fact? Living in an information and knowledge driven society that depends on computer-assisted intelligence and memory, the issues of what gets “saved” and remembered, and what gets deleted or forgotten, becomes an issue not just of collective social concern, but of private-corporate concern in conjunction with state and/or corporate interests.

In Chapter Five, titled “Remembering Trauma in Society: Forced Disappearance and Familial Transmissions after Uruguay's Era of State Terror (1973–2001),” was presented at the 2009 Pacific Sociological Association and was presented earlier at the 2006 California Sociological Association meeting, Gabriela Fried Amilivia presents her research regarding the relationship between remembering trauma and politics of denial in society. Fried Amilivia's research draws on interviews she conducted with relatives of people who were forced into “disappearance” by the Uruguayan military between 1973 and 1984. Fried Amilivia describes how family members of the disappeared (which I refer to as “missing loved ones”) changed their lifestyles and behavior after experiencing extraordinary rendition of their missing loved ones and a campaign of state terror. The Uruguayan military dictatorship that ended in 1984 was followed by a long transitional democratic period marked by a politics of denial and silencing of the human rights crimes. According to Fried Amilivia, the families with missing loved ones assume a lifestyle characterized by perpetual remembering and mourning for the missing loved one, suspended time, and untrusting and vigilant behavior in the context of what Fried Amilivia refers to as “policies of oblivion.” Fried Amilivia and her interviewees refer to this lifestyle as “vigil” and “calvary.” Vigil and calvary lifestyle behavior is transmitted to children of missing loved ones and subsequent generations within these families. Similar to the children of the former Russian nobles, or “former people” that Sofia Tchouikina describes in Chapter Two, the children of missing loved ones learn a lifestyle that sets them apart from larger society. The children of missing loved ones' households inherit socially unresolved and

contested stigmata that are difficult to transcend. There is no “golden youth” provided for children of missing loved ones. It appears that subsequent generations of families with missing loved ones assume, in a different way, the resistance efforts of their missing loved ones. This memorial and resistance lifestyle is unconsciously driven, I surmise, by suppressed and righteous anger, which is not addressed in this particular paper by Fried Amilivia. Therefore I’ll take it upon myself to qualify my observation by basing it on an assumption that where there is violation there is usually anger, and where there is anger there is also, often, fear. Hence, fear of state violation and anger about state violation contribute, I think, to the censorship of discussion about suppressed anger as a motivating and unconscious drive in the lifestyle choices of the families with missing loved ones.

Fried Amilivia’s analysis provides a contrast, or perhaps a complement, to the previous chapter by Ben Herzog. Herzog argues that to forget entails, first, remembering. Fried Amilivia’s paper seems to draw the same conclusion. Fried Amilivia argues that multigenerational vigil or calvary lifestyle behavior will not cease or heal until society and the state acknowledge and resolve the grievances of the families with missing loved ones. In other words, the Uruguayan government and society must remember the extraordinary renditions and find a social way to acknowledge and resolve the secrecy and losses of the era of state terror, before families of missing loved ones put the memories of their missed loved ones to rest and resume a more socialized lifestyle. Until the state and society acknowledge the grievances of these families, the families with missed loved ones will continue to practice a calvary lifestyle, which may appear illegal in the eyes of the state, but appears understandable in the universal realm of faith and humanitarianism. Likewise, family members of missed loved ones refuse to call their missing-loved-ones “dead” or “murdered,” because that would seem to imply, at least symbolically, that the families themselves killed their own loved-ones. And beyond that, it would indicate that the families took upon themselves the shame of the true guilty party’s assumed and suspected crimes. The families of the missed-loved ones already suffer stigma and loss, so they are resistant to succumbing to the state’s mandate of calling their missed loved ones “dead.” Regardless of the location of the missing-loved-ones, dead or alive, the missing-loved-ones’ spirits seem to live on in their, vigilant, surviving family members.

Another comparison could be drawn to Chapter Ten, “Memory and Social Change—Jane Addams’s *The Long Road of Woman’s Memory*,” by Patricia Lengermann and Gillian Niebrugge, which details Addams’s

methodology. Applying Addams narrative methodology to Fried Amilivia's analysis would move the discourse away from a discussion about multigenerational transmission of trauma memory and its accompanying behavior, towards a discussion about how that behavior manifests ultimately in social change. Hence, while Herzog's arguments present a theoretical rationale for refuting social denial (we can't forget until we remember), Addams's methodology provides a model to assess the role of remembering activity as a motivating factor in social progress and change, which is what Fried Amilivia seems to be calling for in her conclusion.

Although not overtly stated by Fried Amilivia, her analysis importantly reminds us that unresolved trauma memories can take many forms, such as being repressed, suppressed, censored, denied, or remembered in obsessive, driven, and anxious ways, which manifests in social behavior that is transferred to subsequent generations. Also, importantly, Fried Amilivia's research shows that missing-loved-ones labeled "disappeared" are not forgotten; nor automatically considered dead, as Fried Amilivia's courageous interviewees vividly reveal. The interviewees resist censorship and social pressure to forget their missing-loved-ones and label them as dead, because they are waiting for state acknowledgment that a forced disappearance and not just a "death by natural causes" occurred. Hence, households with missing-loved-ones negotiate tirelessly and throughout generations in the project of keeping their missed-loved-ones alive in memory, in opposition to social and legal pressures that demand the opposite. In Fried Amilivia's analysis and in her interviewees' narratives, we see the activity of remembering as a driving force for lifestyle, social change, and social resistance.

In Chapter Six, "What Do We Remember at the Cemetery?" which was presented at Plovdiv University ("The Memory of the City") in 2008, Svetlana Hristova takes a studied look at the cemetery, where remembering is not a censored activity, but rather an ordained one. Honoring the dead is a social activity as complex as it is ancient, and Hristova explores that intersection of physical monuments and sacred space, social ritual, "eternal legitimacy," and the remembering of people who are memorialized, as opposed to labeled "disappeared" or "former." She explores the socially accepted way we both remember and forget, people deemed worthy of recognition in the cemetery. This kind of remembering stands in marked contrast to Fried Amilivia's description of the "disappeared," who "live on" mostly in the thoughts and memories of their relatives—existing in a sense as neither dead nor alive. The same argument might be made for those who remember relatives killed in genocide. Far from being disappeared, dead people buried in cemeteries

are socially ordained with eternal legitimacy, acknowledgment, and ritualized remembering and monuments. Often, all of this is exaggerated (sometimes to the extreme) for people of high social status, for example, pharaohs; royalty; national, religious, or military leaders; icons or famous artists; and so on. Hristova compares and contrasts three landmark cemeteries, namely the Sofia Central Cemetery in Bulgaria, the Kerepesi Cemetery in Budapest, and the Père Lachaise Cemetery in Paris, complete with digital photographs of the sites. She relates the histories of these cemeteries, comparing and contrasting them. She examines how cemeteries are used as collective markers signifying a reference to a “turning point.” This point is where the living begin to reflect their loss of those who have passed on and turn to re-remembering and memorializing the dead as socially reconstructed, rarefied symbols that “live on forever” in the “elusive area of the sacred.” Negotiating this “turning point” is instrumental in prompting social forgetting of those who have passed on ultimately into “the Other World,” as the only strategy invented against Oblivion. This passage into Oblivion is not mandated by state decree as Fried Amilivia’s Chapter relates, rather it is a socially constructed process that Hristova unfolds for us. Hristova considers how memory, connected with death, is associated with the “origin” of the sacred. She uses photos of the cemetery walls and architecture to demonstrate how cemeteries are physically demarcated from the rest of the environment. The cemeteries that Hristova studies are constructed in ways that signify sanctity, a place of mourning, and nostalgia as well as healing, remembering, recreation, and sight-seeing.²

It is ironic that people who hated and fought with one another in life often are buried finally together, as Hristova points out. But different cultures offer different solutions to reconcile these conflicts at the territory of the cemetery. The cemetery, therefore, provides a place where individual identification is superseded by a universal acknowledgment of grief over the loss and human suffering. But as long as the individual mourning is culturally channeled the cemetery represents various social, religious, ethnic and national narratives. The public space afforded by the cemetery to commemorate grief and loss contrasts with the censorship of genocide and state-mandated forgetting and the suspended, unresolved status of the disappeared, as discussed in the previous two chapters. As locus of memory, the gravestones in cemeteries universally acknowledge the name of the deceased, because in all cultures namelessness is equal to

² Forest Lawn, in Los Angeles, California, is a notable American cemetery for all these purposes.

forgetfulness and signifies the real “social” death (examples of this are in Sofia Central Cemetery). Mass graves of murdered political prisoners that have accompanied so many wars, in so many countries, are as Hristova points out the nameless and forgotten, still people fight to uncover the history and the social dignity of those buried in some mass graves (Levy 2008).

In revealing the blurring boundaries between profane-sacred in the cemetery, Hristova considers how new rituals of remembering are invented, even when cemeteries have been turned into modern places of tourist attraction and cultural sightseeing (such as Père Lachaise in Paris and Kerepesi in Budapest). As tourists come to gaze upon the authentic remains and monuments of famous and beloved dead people, the cemetery is used as a sculpture park and even a site of messy commemorations that may leave unholy residues among the monuments. By comparing the history and contemporary use of these three cemeteries, Hristova distinguishes three different memory regimes, maintained at their territories: Père Lachaise represents the unification of various collective memories as national history of France during the passed two centuries, validated through the sacrifices not only of French people but of other nations as well; Kerepesi cemetery of Budapest glorifies the national unity, sublimating the dead people as national heroes and victims, all contributing for this ideal of national autonomy; while in Sofia Central Cemetery the groups memories, represented in new more individualized and diversified cultural “repertoire,” never tend to produce integrated historical narrative of the Bulgarian nation.

Hristova also acknowledges the use of media to capture the memory of the image of the cemetery—namely the digital photo. Here the idea of memory takes a different form—from a monument in three dimensions and personal reflection in thought, to an electronic image, captured by technology, of a particular site or event. Digital cameras and video recording are easier, faster and cheaper to use than ever before. The art of photography is not a recreation just for the wealthy anymore. Posing for the digital camera is an everyday activity now, not an activity just for special occasions. With Web site access 24/7 and cheap, portable electronics, people can watch each other across the globe—storing the images in electronic cyberspace storage units for as long as they pay for rent. Every digital photo and e-mail sent on the web can be scanned and become the property of private telecommunications companies, which can sell the data to governments and private companies. Entire digitalized histories of people from birth to death can be compiled and used by entities outside the person (the host) who “generated” the file. But unlike

the person (host) who generated the electronic file, the files live on forever, while the mortal body of the host dies. Electronic files of individual citizens (hosts) are kept for monitoring purposes in case of criminal activity even if there is no longer a “rule by law” nation state in existence. Electronic files for “justice” related purposes are used to argue that the memory of the mortal human is inferior to electronic memory, and therefore eyewitness testimony is not good enough to be trusted in the court and the mortal (host) is at a disadvantage in the event he or she is accused of criminal or terrorist activity. These arguments ignore the fact that electronic memory is subject to error or to “touch-ups” (in the case of photos) or to falsification and manipulation (Smith 2008), as in the case of election voting machines, which when calibrated incorrectly generate erroneous vote tallies. Digital and electronic technology makes it easier, cheaper, and faster to send photos via the Internet, whether they are photos of newborns, homemade kiddy pornography, pictures of torture victims in secret prisons³, or pictures of graveyard memorials in landmark cemeteries. Living family members of the disappeared carry memories of their missing-loved-ones in their thoughts throughout the course of their everyday lives. Families with loved ones buried in cemeteries have a designated, public space—a space beyond their own thoughts—where they can publicly express their sorrow and loss, rather than having to confine it to their thoughts and family, as described in the previous chapter. Hristova is showing us cemeteries that demand respect for the memory of the dead and sometimes, not always, command that respect. Some cemeteries have a landmark status to uphold in the gaze of the world, that idea of landmark will be expanded upon in the next chapter, to which we now turn.

In Chapter Seven, titled “World Heritage and Cosmopolitan Memory,” Diane Barthel-Bouchier and Dean W. Bond, presented at the 2006 Annual meeting of the Eastern Sociological Society, examines the use and abuse of natural and cultural sites of outstanding universal value listed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List. The World Heritage List is a list of approximately 900 historical sites throughout the world that are judged to have “outstanding universal value.” When tourists visit these sites, and when the media use these sites to symbolize the urban context within which the sites are located, a mnemonic association between the sites’ symbolic qualities and their affiliated geographical context is generated. Expanding on Levy and Sznajder’s (2002) concept of “cosmopolitan

³ Consider Errol Morris’s film, *Standard Operating Procedure* (2008) which documented the use of digital photography to record abuses at Abu Ghraib Prison.

memories,” the authors examine how the symbolic affiliations of landmarks and their environmental context combine to create globally recognized “cosmopolitan memories.” This chapter expands on an earlier article titled “Places of Cosmopolitan Memory,” wherein Barthel-Bouchier and Ming-Min Hui (2007) interpret results from a survey of New York tourists regarding their experiences visiting World Heritage sites. In the abstract for the earlier article, Barthel-Bouchier and Hui suggest that their survey results are “illustrative rather than conclusive,” and they suggest that the data from the survey seem to indicate that aesthetic cosmopolitanism “may lead” to an ethical cosmopolitanism. Barthel-Bouchier and Hui’s survey results, from interviews with wealthy, elderly tourists, leave the authors inconclusive about whether or not people who visit Heritage Sites feel responsible for preserving the sites from such threats as tourist overuse, global warming, pollution, and the encroachment of the tourist industry on the socioeconomic environment of the sites. The question concerning whether “ethical” cosmopolitanism follows “aesthetic” cosmopolitanism is one focus of “World Heritage and Cosmopolitan Memory.”

Barthel-Bouchier and Bond explain the historical development of the World Heritage List and the bureaucratic procedures used to determine whether a site qualifies to be on the list. They reflect on the kinds of “power” tourists have who visit these sites. Some tourists have the power to “gaze” over a site, along with the qualifications necessary to see, from their own cultural perspective, both the inherent quality of the site itself and the socially constructed and particular aesthetic and historical aspects of the social capital invested in the site. Barthel-Bouchier and Bond argue that the aspect of “authenticity” is what many tourists value most about such sites. Tourists want to see the “real thing” rather than view it through someone else’s presentation, cell-phone photos, or Web site. Ironically, one of the most common things that tourists do when they gaze upon a site is photograph it, to document that they actually visited the site. They often show their photos to other people, who may visit the original site as well.

Barthel-Bouchier and Bond provide an overview of theoretical approaches to the study of tourism as a historic—and now global—enterprise. They compare approaches posited by Durkheim, Hutton, Olick, Levy, Lowenthal, and MacCannell. The authors point out that traditional Durkheimian analysis of collective memory doesn’t always apply to the cosmopolitan memories represented at World Heritage sites, as many of the sites are the locus of painful, tragic, and divisive social contestation, such as World War II concentration camps. And yet, in the present, the act of tourists traveling together, conversing together about the social history