

Weighting Differences

Weighting Differences:
Romanian Identity in the Wider European Context

Edited by

Vasile Boari and Sergiu Gherghina

CAMBRIDGE
SCHOLARS

P U B L I S H I N G

Weighting Differences: Romanian Identity in the Wider European Context,
Edited by Vasile Boari and Sergiu Gherghina

This book first published 2009

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2009 by Vasile Boari and Sergiu Gherghina and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-1001-0, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-1001-2

TABLE OF CONTENTS

List of Table and Figures	vii
Acknowledgements	ix
Old Essence, New Flavors: Searching for Identity at National and European Levels Vasile Boari and Sergiu Gherghina	1

PART I: MULTI-LEVEL IDENTITIES

A Strained European Model: Is There an Identity Crisis at Play? Daniel Dăianu	20
The European Identity Crisis Vasile Boari	41
Ethnic, National, and Regional Identities: Preliminary Theoretical Considerations Mihai I. Spariosu	61
Identities and Correlation of Identities Andrei Marga	78

PART II: NARROWING THE ANALYTICAL SPECTRUM

Two Kinds of Identity Concern Adrian Paul Iliescu	96
“We Shall Bring You Our Vices”: Shifting Forms and Meanings of European Belonging in Romania and Italy Aziliz Gouez	113
The Modern Nation, Daughter of Memory Toader Nicoară and Simona Nicoară	140

The Paradox of National Identity: Its Cultural-Political Power vs. Theoretical Poverty Gabriel Andreescu	150
--	-----

PART III: ROMANIA: PATTERN OR OUTLIER?

Identity, Secularisation, State of Exception: The Romanian Case Virgil Cîmoş	168
---	-----

National Identity and Happiness: A Quantitative Study with Romanian Data Sergiu Balţătescu	184
--	-----

Romanian Diasporas: Transnational Practices and an Identity between Endurance and Hybridity Andrada Costoiu	210
---	-----

Romania and Romanians in Europe: A Historical Perspective Ioan-Aurel Pop	244
---	-----

Romania, A Borderland Lucian Boia	260
--	-----

Contributors	269
--------------------	-----

LIST OF TABLES AND FIGURES

TABLES

The descriptives of personal & national well-being variables	194
The descriptives of socio-demographic variables.....	196
Pride of being Romanian	197
I see myself as... ..	197
Requirements for citizenship	198
Pearson correlation between four variables of national identity, when controlling for gender, age, household income, instruction level	200
OLS regression models with dependent variable pride of being Romanian	201
OLS regression models with dependent variable satisfaction with life as a whole	203
Distribution of the Romanian immigrant population in the United States (states with the highest Romanian immigrant population)	225
Main social characteristics of the interviewees	231

FIGURES

A general model of the relationship between perception of personal and national well-being, national identity and subjective well-being	193
Satisfaction with life as a whole	195
Positive attitude towards ethnic diversity on a scale from 1 to 10.....	199
Evolution of Romanian Immigration in US.....	218
Romanian immigration waves to United States.....	220

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This edited volume is a collective venture shaped by multiple personalities and identities. Initiated by our idea emerged more than a year ago within the discussions held at the Centre for Political Analysis, it became reality as soon as the contributors invited to give presentations at the International Conference on Romanian Identity in the late fall of 2008 accepted our challenge. However, without the joint efforts of five other people, the project would probably be today far from printing. It is our pleasure to acknowledge the help and kindness we have benefited of during the editing process. We owe a special debt of gratitude to Dan Capostagno who complemented the quality of each chapter with careful and critique reading. His academic and linguistic advices significantly sharpened and improved the message of the non-native contributors to this volume. Alexandru Simon and Alexandru Câmpeanu, two of our best collaborators, deserve special attention for translating and commenting upon contributions. This book would have been considerably delayed without the support received from Natalia Vlas in terms of coordination, communication, and partial manuscript collection. Her efficient use of time and resources allowed our channelling on important issues and diminished the impact of small inherent deficiencies. Furthermore, the consistent referencing and checking of articles could not have been completed without the help provided by Rouța Ruxandra and her patience and attention for details.

Throughout the stages of the editing process two institutions provided crucial assistance in fulfilling our academic tasks. The Rectorate of the *Babeș-Bolyai* University and the Faculty of Political Science, Public Administration and Communication from the same university ensured the appropriate resources for the development of our project. This book would not have been possible without the uninterrupted patience and support of two persons situated beyond the academic world. Our gratitude goes to our wives for their encouragement especially in those moments when the entire project was closer to failure than to success.

The editors
May 11, 2009
Leiden and Cluj-Napoca

OLD ESSENCE, NEW FLAVORS: SEARCHING FOR IDENTITY AT NATIONAL AND EUROPEAN LEVELS

VASILE BOARI AND SERGIU GHERGHINA

Who are we? What have we been in the past, what are we now, what do we want to be in the future? What makes us different from others (alterity)? How do we perceive ourselves and how are we perceived by others? How can we keep our identity? Questions like this can surely be continued. Identity (individual and/or collective) has, for the past several decades, entered in a cone of shadow but reemerged lately as the main focus of intellectual, academic and media debates.

Identity remains a vague concept, slippery, insufficiently elaborated and defined. There are a few quests in defining identity coherently and scientifically credible. One definition that can be used is Samuel Huntington's from "Who are we?": "Identity is the perception of self in the case of an individual or a group. It is the product of self consciousness, that says I posses or we posses, as entities, certain separate qualities that differentiate me from you, or us from them" (Huntington 2004, 21). Be it individual or collective, ethnical or social, local or general, regional (e.g. the EU) or global, identity is a recurrent subject in political debates. Situated on the edge of history, anthropology, sociology, political science, and psychology it increasingly becomes a leading paradigm in the area of social sciences..

The analysts of the phenomenon find today its growing complexity towards diversified, multiple (multidimensional), dynamic identities, different but correlated hypostases of identity at individual and group level (collective identities of diverse sizes and orientations). Also there can be noted an amplification and diversification of the factors which determine and influence the dynamic of identity today. Multiple and dynamic identities have became usual phenomena nowadays. The concept of identity is an explanatory-analytical one with various facets, in any case more than we may be willing to admit at the first glance. Also identity represents a reality (a compound of real features) on which institutions,

bureaucracies, mentalities and achievements are based. Hegel once said that a nation is defined by its achievements. We could inversely say that the achievements/performances of a given nation or larger community depend mostly on their identity or on the way they perceive and assume this identity.

What is the European identity? The quest of a definition

What is Europe and who are the Europeans? How do we identify ourselves as Europeans by comparison with others, the non-Europeans? What is it understood by European identity today? What is the new Europe and what is its identity? Which are the factors that contribute to the creation of the New Europe and how do they transform themselves in the present? What does Europe want to become in the future? How do the Europeans assume their condition: the European citizenship, the European identity etc? Which is the balance between nationality and European-ness? And finally of which Europe are we talking about?

Asking questions is more important than any definition, which has the tendency to confine, close the debate on European identity. Now the debates are more important even then trying to offer answers and final solutions. According to Wolfgang Schmale, a professor of modern and contemporary history at Vienna University:

Seen from the inside, Europe possesses no identity. There is not only one Europe, but many: the Europe of the European Union (EU), the European Economic Area, the Western European Union, what remains of the European Free Trade Association, the Council of Europe, and the Europe of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO), two organisations with non-European member states. The question of identity can be meaningfully put only with respect to Europe in the form of the EU. It is true that the EU's 27 members do not come up to the current figure of 46 members for the Council of Europe, but nowhere other than in the EU can one find such a high degree of integration, i.e. of institutional and constitutional deepening and indeed intertwining. (Schmale 2008).

Many scientists, when talking about European identity emphasize solely the European Union identity. Others, for a change, think in terms of two Europes: the old Europe, traditional, and the new Europe. They cannot be separately understood. In fact, when trying to define the European identity, we have today several types of approaches (attitudes). One approach is that of the traditionalists. They consider that in order to define European identity we have to go back to its primordial sources and

especially to the Christian or Judeo-Christian inheritance, the one that shaped the true European identity.

Another approach is the constructivist one which postulates that European identity – the new European one of course – is a developing process, something that it is built now and in the future. There are two constructivists' camps. Those who emphasize on the dominance of the political factors in the construction of European identity (they are the most numerous) and those who are disposed to take into consideration the influence of other factors like economy, culture, education and even religion.

Finally we could establish an axiological approach of the problem which tries to define the identity of the new Europe by appealing to a set of values like respect for human rights, representative democracy, rule of law and freedom from an economic, spiritual and political point of view.

For some, the European identity – be it the identity of the old Europe or of the new Europe – means diversity, freedom, responsibility, tolerance. This last value is especially considered the supreme one, defining for Europe perceived as a “continent of tolerance”.

The truth is that one can see the recent rise in interest for the problem of the European identity. The phenomenon is determined not only by general factors (the ones that make it so important in the present) but also by specific ones like the EU enlargement (it has evolved from the initial 6 to 27 states today), the political factors aim to build an identity for the New Europe, the collapse of the Berlin wall and of communism in eastern Europe, the fall of the Soviet Union but especially the quest (a failed initiative) to give the New enlarged Europe a constitution and finally Turkey's request, a country perceived by many as less European if not non European at all, to begin the procedures for the EU accession.

Factors of European identity and their reconfiguration

Thomas Jansen (1999) identifies four categories of factors responsible for the formation (forging) of the European identity: the historical, cultural, social and political factors. Referring to the historical factors Jansen considers that even from medieval times the whole European political process was interconnected. Europe can be understood in the same way that nations can be defined as communities of destiny. Europe has shared for many centuries a common history, giving birth to a community of destiny. Even if individual history differs in some aspects it is still interconnected and mutually dependent. The proximity and the nature of the commonly shared experience at individual and collective

levels have generated a special relation between Europeans, which consciously or not, results in the appearance of a European identity. Even where vicinity left place to antagonisms, where proximity resulted in separation, where coexistence deteriorated into rivalry and finally into conflict, the shared experience has left a deep hallmark on Europeans as Jansen states.

As for the cultural factors, in spite of an extraordinary diversity, Jansen thinks that there was a sizeable cultural unity. This cultural diversity and the European culture itself have common roots, being the result of Mediterranean Greek and roman cultures at which continental Slavo-German cultures were superposed. The last two brought dynamism and orientation toward the future. The catalyst of the synthesis was Christianity. Anyway, Jansen considers that from a cultural perspective the European world never had doubts regarding its unity. The latter is paradoxically, or maybe not, is characterized by an extraordinary diversity.

Europe developed as a unit even on social and economic levels. In spite all differences specific to the European regions a similar model of economic development served, according to Jansen, as a basis for a social life that evolved in similar matrices on the entire continent. The main role in this evolution was played by a complex network of economic relations that led finally to the appearance of a common market, developed until World War I in spite of all the restrictions imposed by the nationalist ideology in the 19th century. The radical disruption appeared after World War II, when Europe separated into two, totally opposed economic and ideological systems, a traumatic experience after which Europe hasn't yet healed.

Finally, political factors played an important role also. The fact that Europe opened contacts with other continents but especially the way it answered to the challenges of communism gave Europe and Europeans – in Jansen's view – a new self consciousness.

Western democracies won in front of socialist revolutionary aspirations, succeeding in surpassing the economic, social and cultural crisis and keeping their attractiveness. They created a common collective security system and eventually, thanks to the European Union, a sizeable group of democratic states created a pattern of peaceful cooperation, change and unity that exert a considerable fascination over the entire world (Jansen 1999, 27-29).

Nowadays we witness a reconfiguration of those factors. Thus the traditional factors: geography, history, culture (including the spiritual variable here) have lost their importance and the first place in defining the European identity (we consider the identity of the New Europe, that of the

EU) resides in the political and possibly the social and economic ones and of course those closely related to them: the legal, administrative and institutional factors.

More recently we can notice a more and more obvious trend that takes into consideration the cultural factors but from whom the spiritual ones have been deliberately expelled and minimized. And we are talking about exactly the same factors that were once considered decisive in defining European identity. This attitude is seemingly not foreign from the decline of the religious beliefs and especially of Christianity in Western European countries.

Building the New Europe's identity

The European identity is a "natural process" as some claim (it is true there are fewer of those thinking that today) or is it in the process of construction as many more believe nowadays? The constructivist approach has found its illustration in the politicians and bureaucrats, from Bruxelles belief that the European Union can be achieved by a political construction, maybe even an elitist one that can be realized through the initiative of the bureaucrats and politicians.

This point of view is shared today by the majority of specialists in integration and European construction like Ingmar Karlson, Dirk Jacobs and Robert Maier. The first European political document destined to the construction of the new Europe is the Declaration on European identity from Copenhagen of the nine states that composed the then European community (France, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxemburg, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark). Even from the first paragraph of this document it is specified that: "The Nine Member Countries of the European Communities have decided that the time has come to draw up a document on the European Identity. This will enable them to achieve a better definition of their relations with other countries and of their responsibilities and the place which they occupy in world affairs. They have decided to define the European Identity with the dynamic nature of the Community in mind. They have the intention of carrying the work further in the future in the light of the progress made in the construction of a United Europe" (Declaration of the European Identity 1973, 127-130). In the nine states prospect, the defining of the European identity implies: the evaluation of the common inheritance, of the individual interests and obligations of the nine and the state of the unifying process inside the community; questioning over the degree of cohesion already attained by comparison with the rest of the world and the

responsibilities that come from this and the considering of the dynamic character of the European construction. It's a pity that any mention of spiritual or cultural identity and even other dimensions of identity are completely absent from the Declaration. In return, the document focuses entirely on the political aspects of European identity, referring precisely at the human rights, the economic system and the international cooperation. The Copenhagen Declaration is obviously a political document that expresses the preeminence of the political factor in defining the new Europe's identity. Other components of the identity are either minimized or neglected. The next steps in the strategy of elaborating European identity followed the line established by the document adopted at Copenhagen, even if it wasn't always mentioned. It is true; the Declaration states one idea that leaves to the future the possibility to remedy this drawback: "European identity is called to evolve according to the dynamics of the European construction" (1973, 127-130). But only lately there have been voices that called for the research of other variables, like the cultural ones, in shaping the European identity.

A second significant moment in the political construction of the European Union was the European Council Summit from Fontainebleau in 1984. With this occasion it was expressly stated that it is mandatory that the European Union fulfils the expectations of its citizens and takes measures towards the strengthening and the promotion of the identity and image of the European community with regard to its citizens and the rest of the world. An important role in the efforts of European identity construction was played by the Adonino committee, established just with the purpose to begin a campaign on the issue: Europe of the Europeans. The idea was to build a Union that was closer to its citizens. From the tangible results of the Adonino committee activity a number of symbols can be counted, between them the European flag (first raised on 29th may 1986 at Berlaymont), the European anthem (Schiller's Ode to joy from Beethoven's 9th symphony), the European national holyday (9 may, the day Robert Schumann delivered the speech that preceded the inauguration of CECO in 1950). In 1988, the European council, which has the highest level of member state representation, decided to introduce in the curricula a European dimension to certain classes like literature, history, civic education, geography, foreign languages and music.

To those mentioned we could add the introduction of the European passport, the European driving license, and other standardized symbols (even so their introduction was accompanied by irrelevant and prolonged discussions, on the shape and color of the passport, for example). In 1992 by means of the Maastricht Treaty a new concept was introduced: the

European citizenship, considered a key element in forging New Europe's identity.

In 1992, at a spiritual leader's reunion at Bruxelles, Jacques Delors, then president of the European Commission imperatively requested a "soul for Europe". His appeal did not remain without echo. Thus in 1993, at his initiative, the Notre Europe Association was founded, having as object to start researches and debates that would contribute to the unity and integration in Europe. In 2005 the Association organized a seminar in Paris on the following issue: "La question de l'identité européenne dans la construction de l'Union".

The idea of a soul for the new Europe has been found in several notable initiatives. Thus, in 2000 the series of conferences "The Soul of Europe Crossing the Frontiers of Faith" were initiated. The background of this initiative was that the construction of the new Europe doesn't have to be merely the concern of politicians and businessmen. Other voices have to be heard: women, poets, artists, theologians and philosophers, environmentalists etc. In 2004 at Berlin, a cycle of conferences: "A soul for Europe" was inaugurated wishing to draw attention on the role that culture has to have on building the new Europe. In the second Berlin conference Jose Manuel Barroso said: "Culture, then, is the keystone of the sense of belonging and of active citizenship that Europe needs. By facilitating dialogue, culture opens the way to development in an increasingly multicultural and multilingual society" (Barroso 2006). According to those initiatives European institutions have in 2007 the European agenda for culture.

The president of the European commission, Jose Manuel Barosso, has often declared that the European Union has come to a phase of history where its cultural dimension can no longer be ignored. In her speech, pronounced before the European parliament in Strasbourg, Angela Merkel, the German chancellor, whose country has just took over the presidency of the European council, spoken in her turn about the Europe's soul and of the need for Europe to regain its identity, not only political but also spiritual.

In spite of these calls and initiatives, political constructivism has proven stronger than the idea that the European integration and especially the forming of a new European identity would be natural processes, which complete themselves without or with minimal political intervention. European identity construction, by contrary, sets off from the premise that it is the work of politic-administrative factors, of political elites and bureaucracies in Bruxelles.

If the backers of constructivism virtually agree with the idea that the

European identity is an ongoing process, the opinions regarding its stage of completion today, are different. Some consider that even if decades have past since the founding of the new Europe, it hasn't yet a clearly defined identity. Thomas Jansen precisely expresses that by saying: "the absence of an identity for the young community, still without constitution, known as the European Union" (Jansen 1999, 27).

National identity and European identity

From the identity point of view, the new Europe (EU) is a constellation of 27 national states, everyone with his own identity, traditions, history and culture. To those 27 identities we can add numerous local, religious, cultural or ethnical identities. Briefly we could define the new Europe identity as an aggregation of particular identities, every one of them being stronger and prevailing over what we call today "European identity", an abstract notion for most Europeans. The proof is that ahead of everything a Frenchman identifies himself as French, a German as a German, an Englishman as an Englishman, a Romanian as a Romanian and so on. Neither of those would say that he is European.

The matter of the national-European relations, national-European identities, represents a most complex and intensely debated problem. Many arguments are carried round Heinrich Schneider's question if Europeans accept to pass from a national singular identity to a more complex one, which implies using the term us, when defining themselves as Europeans with regard to the rest of the world? (Schneider 1999, 7-8)

The relation national –European, national identity – European identity is diversely perceived and analyzed even by the Europeanists. Some, for instance, consider that the European identity construction could follow a similar route to the one traveled in the forging of the national identities, by the states that compose today's union.

Jansen (1999, 29) estimates that the member states' identity is based particularly on:

- A common language and culture or cultural and linguistic common roots;
- A common historical experience that contains even the expression of mutual antagonisms between different social sections that latter composed one nation;
- A single economic area composed by a series of interconnected economic units;
- A common need for security in front of external treats

Similar factors explain, according to Jansen, the process of

integration and the emergence of the European Union:

- The common historical experience shared by Europeans during peacetime or war;
- Common cultural bases, even if the ways of expression were sometimes different;
- The economic necessity and the practical interest that manifested over frontiers and across continents;
- Containment and self identifying towards the Soviet Union, its aggressiveness and its totalitarian system;

Those constituent factors of the forming of national states didn't equally affected all European subjects, asserts Jansen. Not everyone feels himself inspired or convinced by the arguments that impose the necessity of creating the European Union. On the other side one must observe the fact that these factors are influencing from time to time the decisions of political, social and intellectual elites. Jansen concedes and draws attention to the fact that the European Union is a young community, yet incomplete, composed mostly of old communities animated by strong feelings of separate identities (Jansen 1999, 29).

Dirk Jacobs and Robert Maier, trying in their turn to explain the vision that prevails in the construction of the new Europe and what European identity appears as a result of the process of building the European Union, consider that a central question in European Union construction is related to the way national identities can be bypassed. After analyzing the way the national identities were forged, the Dutch authors think that the problem of constructing a European identity can be rephrased in the following manner: are we in front of constructing a new "us", a new people that has European characteristics? Is the European identity based on national identities or it can be, up to a certain point, independent from them? Do we face a new ethnicity that is adapted to Europeans? One conclusion the two authors draw is that one can declare, that in daily life, popular identification with the European project is fairly low and in fact we witness to the continued significance of the national identity. A conclusion partially confirmed by opinion polls. Hereby based on the data offered by the Euro barometers, Jacobs and Maier infer that the bulk of "de jure" European citizens are in very few cases tempted to auto-define themselves as Europeans. Only 3% of the interviewed expect, in a given moment, to enjoy European identity without having a citizenship and a national identity (Jacobs and Maier 1998, 13-34).

To start with, one can highlight the problem of a new type of identity – the European identity, one that transcends the traditional shapes of national identity. But in the same time, there is a limitation of this identity

because it is largely dependent on the membership of identity and citizenship to one or another of the European member states. To be European means, in the first instance, to be French or Belgian. Through national identity, individuals can participate in the "pool" of European identity, but there is no other way to be part of that. This means that no one can become European without first having a national identity based in Europe. In other words, the new form of identity does not really transcend the national identities because it is now completely dependent on national identity (Jacobs and Maier 1998).

I would characterize the relation between national and European, between plural national identities and the European identity, as a difficult and complex relation. Theoretically we can establish antagonistic (of separation and indifference) or complementary relations between the two but in reality things are much more complex. Thus, even if many Europeanists and European statesmen perceive European identity as a trans-national, supra-national or even post-national one, in reality national identities prevail nowadays in front of the European identity, that still lives his childhood, if it is not absent altogether, as Jansen says. No one should doubt today that: "regionalism and nationalism are much more influent than pan-Europeanism" (Kung 1991). Even if it does not sound very optimistic, Europeanism should prepare itself to cohabitate, for a long time with its main opponent, nationalism.

Anyway until we can get to what some people call: a substantial and profound European-ness, a European spirit, a European conscience or a European patriotism or at least a constitutional one, it seems there is still a long way. It very much depends on the strategies of European construction and on the policies that will be enacted. On principle European Union should offer arguments and motivations that surpass those still offered by the national states. What have the national states in fact offered? They offer a sense of cohesion, unity and security for their own citizens and some other material, cultural or educational benefits. The question is if the European Union institutions can succeed in offering something more, or to better and more efficiently satisfy those expectations, that people consider legitimate and which once acquired cannot be later refused without arousing the resistance of those who once benefited from them.

Nowadays there are, and certainly there will be, numerous challenges to the European identity, nationalism being one of the most dangerous of them. A successful European identity construction will depend, without doubt, on the way the new Europe strategists will know to confront these defiances. Renouncing at the Judeo-Christian spiritual inheritance in the

prologue to the Lisbon treaty and then in the constitutional treaty itself, have proven at least an uninspired decision on the road to the new European identity. Because experience has shown and author Hans Kung, in his book *Global Responsibility*, says religion fulfils functions that nothing else can replace. It can truly be a dividing factor, but it can also be an extraordinary force in the achievement of a community's solidarity and cohesion. Personally, we consider that New Europe will find it hard, if not impossible, to survive and configure a strong identity, able to compete and surpass particular identities, that dominate today, without a solid spiritual identity (one from which nation states have fully benefited) (Kung 1991).

The Romanian Case

From an identity point of view Romania presents some peculiar characteristics:

1. To start with, it is a frontier nation with all the consequences that derive from this. Situated inside a complex identity area, a region with very distinct attitudes and mentalities, she suffered along time, diverse cultural and identity influences, coming from the East, from the Balkans or from the Western world. Situated, geographically and historically, at crossroads of great empires, as Romanians like to say, Romania suffered multiple cultural influences that shaped its identity.

2. Secondly it is a country with a complex identity structure, with multiple local, regional and ethnic identities. Along with Romanians live many other nations like Hungarians, Germans, gypsies, Ukrainians, Jews and many more, every one of them having its own culture and identity. Romanian identity communicated with all these ethnical and cultural identities, influencing and being influenced by them to a smaller or larger extent.

3. From a spiritual point of view Romania is a predominantly orthodox nation, a good aspect for some and a curse for others, like the literary critique Eugen Lovinescu. In his book, *History of modern Romanian civilization*, Lovinescu (1997) states that orthodoxy, with its eastern orientation, has slowed down Romanian modernization. The predominant Orthodox Church insisted that she be called National church and even today orthodoxy is considered by many as the most relevant identity factor. In other words when you say you are Romanian you say you're orthodox. But the Greek-Catholic church has played an important role also, especially with regard to the anticommunist resistance. Meanwhile Orthodox Church had collaborated with communism, its priests being partially state employees (priests' salaries were paid by state and believers

contributions); the Greek-Catholic Church refused any such advantages and was abolished.

4. Fourth, Romania was a member in the “real socialism” state camp and its identity and people’s attitudes were deeply distorted by the ideology and the atheist-communist propaganda. The old regime not only manufactured a convenient identity for the leadership, but eliminated from the equation any element that was not of his liking, straining history and falsifying historic truth according to the interests of the leading group. With his obsessive desire to create the “new man” the communist regime succeeded in depraving the way people think and perceive reality.

5. Finally, Romania has become a full member of the European Union since the 1st January of 2007. For Romania, as for Europe, accession to EU means a new identity experience and a new challenge. Of course, Romania comes into EU with its own identity and experiences, but also with the logical and obvious obligation, for any new member state, to participate at the construction of the new European identity.

At the elite and public levels, Romania has intensely desired EU membership, without exactly understanding, at least the ordinary people, what was it about, what obligations do we have, or what price has to be paid for this status as new EU member. Willing to see the dream come true, as soon as possible, Romanian politicians were less preoccupied to explain to the commoners what practically means to be a part of the new Europe. There were often emphasized the material advantages of the EU accession: EU funding, European development programs, the possibility to travel (elimination of visas), and the feasibility of legal work in Western developed countries with positive consequences on the people income. The ordinary citizens held the feeling that the EU accession essentially means all round benefits, but mainly profits at the material level. This is why all Eurobarometers indicate a high level of confidence in the EU, the highest in Europe for several years in a row. Moreover Romania has never rejected a European document, generally rushing to ratify them. Unfortunately, the enthusiasm shown towards the EU integration was not backed by facts, neither from the statesmen side nor from the commoners. Romanians have assumed Europeanness more like a label and a gift, without acting in practice towards Romania’s Europeanization.

Romania still has plenty of non-European things, which easily could be called anti-European: the infrastructure, the agriculture, clientelism and so on. Roads, even the ones called European, have very little resemblance with those of civilized Europe; Romania holds a unique performance, worthy of Guinness Book: in the twenty years that passed from the communist collapse the “capitalist” development has succeeded in

building only 150 kilometers of highway. As for the agriculture, it is chronically undeveloped, using medieval techniques, occupying an ageing population that has backward ways of understanding reality. Generally speaking, rural areas reflect striking civilization and mentality differences by comparison with the Western European states.

Then, there are striking differences between Europe and Romania, in the way people see things. Dumitru Draghicescu's (2006) reflection remains almost entirely valid. More than a century ago, he said Romanians are a "western nation with oriental habits". But there are good signs as well. First, many Romanians desire to belong to Europe even if, as mentioned before, not all those enthusiastic about the European status know what it means exactly. Then, the opening to European values of most intellectuals and of the young generation willing to progress. One could say that even if they don't always understand what it is about, Romanians consider themselves Europeans by birth. The proof is the obsessive repetition of two phrases after the fall of communism: "We are Europeans" and "We are a part of Europe".

Another rejoicing aspect is the decline of extremist nationalism in Romania. The PUNR (Party of Romanian National Unity) disappearance at the end of the 1990s was followed by the sequential marginalization of the Greater Romania Party and of New Generation Party, both nationalist extremist. In none of the European elections in 2007 and the most recent parliamentary elections (November 2008) they met the electoral threshold to enter Parliament. The problem that still has to be asked for Romania and Romanians is how they practically assume their European condition and their European identity.

The present volume gathers relevant works presented at the international conference: "Romanian Identity in the Context of European Identity", organized during 28-30 November 2008 by the Centre for Political Analysis from Babes-Bolyai University, in partnership with the Romanian Academy, the Romanian Television, the Italian Cultural Centre, Ratiu International Centre for Democracy, and the Transylvanian History Museum. The conference benefited from the presence of various Romanian and foreign specialists in philosophy, history, theology, sociology, psychology, political science, literature and was centered on the following core questions: Who are the Romanians? What is the essence of their identity and how has it evolved along history? What are the Romanians? Which are our primary qualities and flaws? How do Romanians perceive their Europeanness and how do they assume their European condition? With no claim to unique answers, the chapters provide a multi-layered view of what Romanian identity means in

contemporary period and how it develops in the broader European context. As most intellectual exercises, the volume raises numerous questions to be answered by further research and delves into complex issues that challenge the common sense understanding of identity.

Structure of the volume

The volume is divided in three symmetric parts: the first tackles the multi-level identities, the second narrows the analytical spectrum from transnational to national level, whereas the final discusses the particular case of Romania from various perspectives. Daniel Dăianu, Vasile Boari, Mihai Spariosu, and Andrei Marga analyze four different components of European, regional, and national identity. The European Social Model brings on the agenda the issue that most of the EU-27 member countries are under economic and social strain with policy-makers challenged to devise appropriate answers to society's ills. The current financial crisis increases the importance of such a debate. In this respect, Daniel Dăianu examines the effects of the Eastern enlargement on the current EU situation in the wider financial and economic crisis. Tackling the latter subjects from a different perspective, Vasile Boari attempts to answer the controversial question of a possible identity crisis faced by the EU. In the blooming literature covering intense Europeanization, institutionalist discourses, and internal functioning mechanisms, with scarce or no references to the spiritual and moral dimensions of the New Europe, its fundamental pillars. Consequently, Boari tests the hypothesis of the EU facing a profound spiritual identity crisis, with negative consequences upon the entire process of European identity construction.

Following the idea of a crisis at the level of European identity, Mihai Spariosu emphasizes the reference frames for viable relations between Romania and Europe, giving priority to the cultural dimension in front of political and socioeconomic aspects. In this respect, he identifies an economic-oriented Europe with alienation features that can be balanced by a secure and proud local identity, based not on mimetic, conflictive, localism or nationalism, but on spiritual and cultural traditions of the European states. In this broad picture, Romania should emphasize the human development, the education of young generations.

A similar deductive approach is used by Andrei Marga in his contribution. Starting from the Central and Eastern European transformations and emphasizing a regional approach, the chapter provides conceptual clarifications regarding the approach of identities, focusing on five inter-related issues. By defending the idea of a generative approach of

identities, Marga reveals identities' practical problems and shows transition tensions of the identities. Consequently, the chapter contributes both theoretically and empirically to the study of identities, the latter being fulfilled by the application of the multiple identities theory to specific situations, thus identifying existing correlations (not in a statistically manner).

The second part of the book reduces the scope conditions for analysis and intensely focuses in national identity with a particular focus on Romania. Benefiting of a conglomerate of thinkers and ideas, this part generates a discussion with three nuances. The first nuance is provided by the chapter written by Adrian-Paul Iliescu situated at the border of obsession and legitimate concern for identity, with a special focus on clarifying this distinction. Identity receives labels and various interpretations are separated with valuable conceptual differentiation between various phases of identity formation. The second nuance is provided by the chapters authored by Aziliz Gouez and Toader and Simona Nicoară. Gouez investigates how the new frames posed by the unification of Europe allow for the projection of new senses of belonging. The ethnographic research conducted in Italy and Romania allow the analysis of tensions and asymmetries that emerge over the last decade as a result of the intense relations. Toader and Simona Nicoară tackle the same element of collective memories and identities, delving into the issue of identity formation. The core analytical framework proposed deals with the role of the past in the present and the extent to which the national identity is a legacy based on founding values, symbols and myths, all these being preserved and handed down through the agency of social memory. The third and final nuance of this part is provided by Gabriel Andreescu's chapter on the dichotomy between cultural and political power facing the theoretical poverty in identity formation. Structurally and empirically different from the first antithesis presented in this part, Andreescu's contribution hints at a paradox of national identity comparable with that of nationalism. The social functions employed by national identity have little or nothing to do with the acts of knowing and understanding, resulting thus in an theoretical background. These are the foundations of a broader thesis in which multi-level processes of historical and political development are caused by no detectable variables with no predictable outcomes.

The third part tackles solely the particular case of Romania and starts with Virgil Cîmoș's chapter on identity, secularisation, and the state of exception. Presenting in a comparative perspective the three different phases of development, Cîmoș draws parallels between norms and

contingent actions involving each dimension and explains particular challenges in the Romanian context. Sergiu Băltătescu's contribution represents an empirical analysis in Romania that addresses the ongoing debate about the genetic and environmental causes of the variation of happiness, also known as the dispute between trait-like/state-like theories of subjective well-being. By emphasizing the heterogeneous character of national identity attitudes in Romania, this study indicates that the Romanian national attitudes seem multifaceted, and far from falling into simple distinctions such as the ethnic/civic nationalism. A similar approach belongs to Andrada Costoiu who focuses on the process of Romanian immigrants' identity formation/transformation in the American diaspora. This chapter contributes to the literature by moving beyond the differences between the first and second generation of Romanian immigrants in terms of their transnational practices and the reproducing of their Romanian cultural and political identity. Consequently, Costoiu distinguishes between the immigrants that left the country before the fall of communism and those that immigrated after the fall of the communist regime. This distinction is relevant as the two types of migrants have evolved in different contexts.

The last two chapters provide symmetrical perspectives on Romanians and their identity with two complementary perspectives. Ioan Aurel Pop has a historical study that provides insights into the development of the Romanians, their state and identity, explaining the combination of geographic positioning, Latin roots and numerous challenges faced during the entire history. In this context, Lucian Boia's chapter wraps up the discussion about development and identity and provides a comprehensive description of the main characteristics that transform Romania in a borderland in historical, political, and spiritual terms. Although the idea is not new, its reiteration in a context of ongoing transformations in the Romanian society makes it a must. The multi-level analyses, combined with detailed knowledge on the historical processes and recent facts represent an ideal specific end for the volume that incorporated the Romanian identity within the broader European context. After more than half a century, Romania made the official step into the enlarged family of the European Union. As Europe expands beyond the borders of the Brussels/Strasbourg executive and legislative, this volume seeks to understand the causes, implications, and consequences of developing the Romanian identity within a broader framework.

Bibliography

- Barroso, José Manuel. 2006. "A Soul for Europe". Conference. Berlin, 17 November.
- Declaration on European Identity. in *Bulletin of the European Communities*. December 1973, No 12.
- Drăghicescu, Dumitru. 2006. *Din psihologia poporului roman. Introducere* (On the Psychology of Romanian People. Introduction). București: Historia.
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/06/706&format=PDF&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en.
- Huntington, Samuel. 2004. *Who Are We: The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Jacobs, Dirk and Robert Maier. 1998. "European identity: construction, facts and fiction". In Maarja Gastelaars and Arie de Ruijter (eds), *A united Europe. The quest for a Multifaceted Identity*. Maastricht: Shaker.
- Jansen, Thomas. 1999. "European identity and/or the identity of the European Union". In Thomas Jansen (ed.), *Reflections on European Identity, working paper*, 1999 available at:
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/cdp/working-paper/european_identity_en.pdf
- Karlsson, Ingmar. 1999. "How to define the European identity today and in the future?". In Thomas Jansen, Ibid.
- Kung, Hans. 1991. *Global Responsibility. In search of a new World Ethic*. London: SCM Press.
- Lovinescu, Eugen. 1977. *Istoria civilizației române moderne* (The History of Modern Romanian Civilisation), București: Minerva, 1997.
- Schmale, Wolfgang. A history of European identity in "Magazine" available at
www.eurotopics.net/en/magazin/geschichteverteilerseiteneu/europaeische_nationalgeschichten_2008_05/apuz_schmale_eu_identiaet/
 retrieved at 10. 11. 2008.
- Schneider, Heinrich. 1999. The dimensions of the historical and cultural core of a European identity. In Thomas Jansen, Ibid.

PART I:

MULTI-LEVEL IDENTITIES

A STRAINED EUROPEAN MODEL: IS THERE AN IDENTITY CRISIS AT PLAY?*

DANIEL DĂIANU

Introduction

The current economic crisis has raised formidable issues for policy-making and has ushered in a new wave of collective pessimism around the world. With reference to the EU, one could say that Euro-pessimism is not of recent vintage. Rather, it resurfaced from time to time after the Second World War, even during periods of relatively rapid economic growth and low unemployment. I recall here the famous book by the late French essayist J. J. Servan Schreiber, *Le Défi Américain* (The American Challenge, 1968) that triggered a wide-ranging debate on the ability of European firms to compete with American multinational companies.

One counter-argument may be that this competition has constantly prodded top European politicians to push ahead with the European Union (EU) economic and political project. But there have also been bouts of Euro-optimism over the decades that induced fears across the Atlantic. In the 1990s, some American pundits viewed the ‘Continental Model’ as a viable alternative to the ‘Anglo-Saxon model’¹ (Albert 1993). This fear was encapsulated in the term “Fortress Europe”.

In the end, however, the world economy was viewed in triangular terms: the USA, EU, and Japan (the non-Western exception) and nothing more (Thurow 1993). One might think that there is nothing new here, for

* Part of this analysis was presented at a Policy Network Seminar in Bucharest on 7th September 2006; the text was posted on the website of Policy Network (www.policy-network.net). It was published in *The Romanian Journal of European Affairs*, July 2007. Pieces of it were presented at a seminar in Cluj-Napoca, November 2008. This updated version also includes two articles which were published by *European Voice*: "Keynes, Not Marx, Is Back" (21.10.2008) and "The Limits of Openness" (4.12.2008).