

Abhinavagupta's
Comments
on Aesthetics
in Abhinavabhāratī
and Locana

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By

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PREFACE

In the two splendid commentaries, *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* and *Abhinavabhāratī* on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Abhinavagupta sets forth his theory of *rasā*. It is rightly regarded as his major contribution not only to Sanskrit literary criticism but also to Sanskrit aesthetics as a whole.

Abhinavagupta's diversity of thought and range of knowledge sets the pragmatic background of his commentary on aesthetics. On one hand, few scholars have studied Abhinavagupta and, on the other hand, Abhinavagupta's theories are not taught as independent theories on aesthetics. Hence, Abhinavagupta remains a commentator. Abhinavagupta sets the tradition of *re-reading* and *rewriting* scriptures and thoughts. He advances from being a mere commentator to become an established decoder of available philosophy of both sect and aesthetics. For him *Adwaitvaad* (monism or non-duality) is the aim of each existence, be it human life or theory. He cleanses soul, thought, and philosophical thinking to lead to salvation and self-purification. For him aesthetics is the means to cleanse the inner conscience of the human heart.

To understand Abhinavagupta's comments on aesthetics, it's imperative to know that one must understand monism. Whether it is *Shaiv Darshan* (the sect devoted to worshipping *Shiva*) or it is *rasā* or *Dhvani*: only monism makes the individual and society *sanatana* (perennial). The two main features that create the perennial state are *tadvisheshbudhhi* (contemporariness) and *swalakshanaye* (own inherent factor). No writing or character is for *tatkalik* (immediate) purpose. The same can be written and rewritten across the ages and era. It can become eternal, not only because of the quality of the author or the reader to an audience but also because of the strength of the character or plot itself. Abhinavagupta cites the example of Rama. In each era, stories are written about Rama and still the character retains its universality and uniqueness in each plot. This is possible because of the unison of the respective audience with the character. It removes the element of dualism and links to *ananda* (pleasure). To propagate this thought Abhinavagupta propounds that *Shiva*, *Shakti*, and *atma* must be understood, respectively, as *ekatmvaad*, *bhaav*, and *abhaas*.

Abhinavagupta is in search of pleasure through *natya*. Hence he says, “*natye hi rasah na loke*.” Bharatamuni ceases at *sthayibhaav* (permanent

emotion), whereas Abhinavagupta leads the experience to *ananda*. M. Hiriyanna observes in his foreword to Dr. V. Raghavan's book *The Number of Rasas*: "The conception of Rasa, though it is here dealt with chiefly in its relation to poetry, is general and furnishes the criterion by which the worth of all forms of fine art may be judged" (p. xv). Elsewhere, too, he says, "Though the theory applies equally to all the fine arts, it has been particularly well-developed in relation to poetry and drama."

In the chapter "Rasādhyāya" (*Nāṭyaśāstra*, Ch. VI) Bharata declares: "mu hi rasādrte kaicid arthaḥ pravartate"—meaning "every activity (on the stage) is aimed at the creation or generation of *rasā*." Immediately after this statement he sets forth his famous *rasā-sūtra*, *Vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri—samyogādrasa-nispattiḥ*—that is, "out of the union or combination of the *vibhāvas* (determinants), the *anubhāvas* (consequents) and the *vyabhicāribhāvas* (transitory feelings), *rasā* arises or is generated."

Now, the ancient writers on dramaturgy, whom Bharata also follows, invented an entirely new terminology to impress on our minds the basic distinction between real life and life in the creative imagination—in the realm of literature—the real world and the world of drama. The *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, and *vyabhicāribhāvas* belong only to art and not to real life. They, however, correspond to the *kāraṇas*, the *kāryas*, and the *sahakārikāraṇas*. The *rasās* correspond to the *sthāyibhāvas* (the dominant or permanent emotions). The *vibhāvādis* are therefore called *alaukika* (non-worldly, extra-worldly, or transcendental).

The four exponents of the *rasāsūtra*—Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrīsaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanayaka, and Abhinavagupta—differ amongst themselves in their interpretation of the two words, *samyoga* and *nispatti*. They take the word *nispatti* to mean *utpatti* (production, generation), *anumiti* (inference), *bhukti* (aesthetic enjoyment), and *vyakti* (manifestation, suggestion). They understand by the word *samyoga*, it would seem, *upadya-bhava*, *jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhava*, *bhoja-bhōjaka-bhava*, and *vyangya vyanjaka-bhava* between *vibhavadis* and *rasā*, respectively. That is to say: (1) the *rasā* is what is produced and the *vibhavadis* are the cause that produce *rasā*; (2) the *rasā* is what is inferred and the *vibhavadis* are the characteristic marks or signs; (3) the *rasā* is what is to be enjoyed (aesthetically); and, finally, (4) the *rasā* is what is suggested and the *vibhavadis* are the factors that suggest the suggested meaning.

Abhinavagupta presents the views of Lollaṭa, Saṅkuka, and Bhaṭṭanayaka; each view is followed by criticism of it. Finally, he sets forth his own view in great detail. Despite the criticism of the earlier writers' views, Abhinavagupta acknowledges his debt to them before introducing his own position. He informs us that he has built his own

theories on the foundations laid by them, and that he has not (completely) refuted their views but only refined them: “tasmāt śatam atra na drisitāni matāni tanyeva to śodhitāni.”

Again, in the course of the exposition of his own *siddhānta*, Abhinavagupta accepts the views of Lollata, Shankuka, and *vijnanavādins* in a modified form: “esaiva copacayavāsthastu desadyaniyantranāt; anukaro’pyāstu bhāvanugamitaya karanāt; visayāsamagryapi bhavatu vijināvādavalambanāt.”

In view of these statements by Abhinavagupta it was thought unnecessary to deal with the views of earlier writers at length in this treatise; rather, we shall briefly refer to them and concentrate on Abhinavagupta's position in regard to *rasā-nispatti* (production or generation of *rasā*) and *rasāsvada* (aesthetic enjoyment of *rasā*), the nature of *rasā*, and other related matters.

In the two commentaries, Abhinavagupta discusses a series of questions relating to beauty and *rasā*: What is the nature of beauty? Is it subjective or objective or is it subjective-cum-objective? Is the permanent emotion itself *rasā-sthāyīeva rasah* or is *rasā* altogether different from the “permanent emotion”—*Sthāyivilaksano rasah*? Is *rasā sukha-dukkhātmaka*—that is, are some *rasās sukhātmaka* (pleasurable) and some others *dukkhātmaka* (painful)? Or are all the *rasās ānandarūpa* (characterised by bliss, perfect happiness)? And is *rasā laukika* (worldly) or *alaukikā* (non-worldly, transcendental)? Then there is the question of *sattvikabhavas* (involuntary states—*āśru* [tears], *sveda* [perspiration], etc.). Are they physical manifestations (*jada* and *acetana* in nature) or are they sentient (*cetana*) in their nature and internally. In other words, are the *sattvikabhavas* like *bhavas* (*rati* [love], *hasa* [laughter], etc.; and *nirveda* [world-weariness], *glāni* [physical weakness], etc.), or are they like *anubhavas*—the external manifestations of feeling (mental state) such as sidelong glances, a smile, and so forth—or are they of dual nature? Another important question regarding *rasā* as discussed by Abhinavagupta concerns the *āśraya* (location or seat) of *rasā*. Could *rasā* be located in the poet himself, or the character (say, Rama, Dusyanta, etc.), or the actor who plays the role of Rama, Dusyanta, and others, or the spectator himself? Further, are the *rasās* meant to provide sheer pleasure (*priti*) to spectators or are they also meant to give (moral) instruction in the four ends of human life (*puruṣārthas*)?

Naiyāyikas such as Mahimabhatta vigorously oppose Anandavardhana's newly invented *sabdāvṛtti* (power or function of word) called *vyanjāna*, which is readily accepted and defended by Abhinavagupta, and assert that the purpose for which *vyanjāna* is invented is best served by the process of inference (*anumiti*, *anumāna*). With the sole intention of enabling readers

to judge for themselves how far the criticism that Mahimabhattacha directed against Abhinavagupta is fair and just, the views of Mahimabhattacha on how *rasās* arise and how they are enjoyed by *sahridayās* are presented at the end of Abhinavagupta's exposition.

Here I take the opportunity gratefully to acknowledge my indebtedness to the works of A. B. Keith, M. Hiriyanna, V. Raghavan, J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, and V. M. Kulkarni. I am especially grateful to J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan on two of whose works, one on *Śāntarāsa* and the other on *Aesthetic Rapture*, I have freely drawn.

Neerja A
Ramanavami
15 April 2016
Ahmedabad

CHAPTER ONE

SANSKRIT THEORY OF BEAUTY

Introduction

In the West the theory of beauty, or aesthetics, or the inquiry into the character of beauty in nature as well as in art, has come to be recognised as a regular part of philosophy. Western philosophers study the problem of the beautiful in relation to the good and true. Controversies have prevailed regarding the following questions: What are the characteristics of beauty? Is it objective or subjective and must the artist (including the poet) who creates beauty also preach morality? Or is his province different from a preacher of morality? Various theories of beauty have been propounded by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Coleridge, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Croce, and others. Their philosophical discussion of these questions makes aesthetics, like ethics, an important branch of *philosophy*.

In India, however, the study of aesthetics does not form a branch of philosophy. It was carried out by a distinct class of thinkers—literary critics—who were not, generally speaking, professional philosophers. Naturally, in their works, they nowhere systematically discuss the essential characteristics of art in general and of the fine arts in particular. They deal mainly with beauty in creative literature, one of the fine arts. Further, they do not explicitly or emphatically speak of the distinction between the fine arts and the “lesser” or “mechanical” arts—the fine arts comprising architecture, sculpture, painting, music, poetry (including drama) and dance, and the “lesser” or “mechanical” or “useful” arts of the smith, the carpenter, the potter, the weaver, and others like them. According to Western critics, “The distinction which separates these two classes is based upon the fact, that broadly speaking the arts of the first class minister to the enjoyment of man, while those in the latter minister to his needs. They are both alike manifestations of the development of man; but the Fine Arts are concerned mainly with his moral and intellectual growth, and the Lesser Arts with his physical and material well-being.” Nor do they speak of the two classifications of the arts. “The first [classification] divides them into the Arts of the ‘Eye’ and the Arts of the ‘Ear,’ according

to how they respectively use one or other of the senses of sight or hearing as their primary channel of approach to the mind. Thus grouped we get the arts of Architecture, Sculpture and Painting placed in broad contrast to the Arts of Music and Poetry. By the second [classification] they are arranged with reference to the greater or lesser degree in which they severally depend upon a material basis for the realisation of their respective purpose.” Nor do they venture upon a definition of art that is applicable to all the (fine) arts. They merely attempt a definition of one of the fine arts, namely, poetry (or creative literature, as such) and investigate the source of literary beauty. Finally, they arrive at the conception of *rasā* as the first and foremost source of beauty in literature.

Modern scholars like M. Hiriyanna say “the numerous works in Sanskrit on poetics which, though their set purpose is only to elucidate the principles exemplified in poetry and the drama, yet furnish adequate data for constructing a theory of fine art in general.” And, “The conception of *rasā* is general and furnishes the criterion by which the worth of all forms of fine art may be judged.”¹ There is the other view too, expressed by some scholars in their modern writings, that in the context of other fine arts the term *rasā* is used by metaphorical extension only and the *rasā* theory is not applicable to other fine arts. Much could be said in favour of and against these two conflicting views. But without entering into this controversy let us revert to investigation of aesthetics carried on by the Sanskrit *ālaṃkārikas* in relation to the fine art of poetry (including drama), which is placed among all the fine arts “highest in order of dignity.”²

In the growth or development of Sanskrit literary criticism we discern two distinct stages: The first stage is represented by the early writers on poetics who preceded Ānandavardhana, and the second is represented by Ānandavardhana, his able commentator Abhinavagupta, and reputed followers like Mammata, Visvanatha, Jagannatha, and others not so reputed. Bhamaha, Dandin, Ubhata, and Rudrata—these early *ālaṃkārikas* are regarded by common consent as the protagonists of the view that in *kāvya* (poetry, creative literature) it is the *ālaṃkāras* that enjoy the pride of place. They were aware of the *Pratīyamanā* sense but they were not aware of Ānandavardhana’s theory that *Pratīyamanā* sense or *dhvani* is the soul—the essence of poetry. They, however, include this *Pratīyamanā* sense in their definitions of figures like *aprasūta*—*prācurisa*, *samasokti*, *āksepa*, *paryayokta*, and such like, and deal with other sources of beauty, namely, *guṇās* like *mādhurya* (sweetness), *vṛttis* (dictions) like *upānagarika*

¹ Mysore Hiriyanna, *Art Experience* (New Delhi: Indira Gandhi Center for the Arts, 1997), Ch. I.

² *Alarikarasarvasva* NS edn (1939), pp. 3–9.

(the cultured) and the like. They fail to notice the central essence of *kāvya* as their attention is concentrated for all practical purposes on its “body”—the outward expression or externals of poetry, viz. *śabda* (word) and *artha* (sense). Certain forms of these are regarded as *dosa-s* and certain others as *gunās*; they hold that what confers excellence on poetry is the absence of the one and the presence of the other. No doubt, there are minor differences in certain matters among these *ālaṃkārikas*. For instance, some like Udbhata make no distinction between *gunās* and *ālaṃkāras*. Vamana, however, makes a clear distinction between them. Dandin defines and distinguishes between the *Vaidarbha* and the *Gauda* styles. Bhamaha holds that there are not two such distinct styles. These and other such minor differences apart, these *ālaṃkārikas* reveal cognate ways of thinking. We may, therefore, regard them as, on the whole, representative of the first stage in the growth of literary criticism and aesthetics.

It is Ānandavardhana, the author of *Dhvanyāloka*, an epoch-making work, who completely revolutionised Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics with his novel theory that *dhvani* (suggestion) is the soul of poetry—the very essence of creative literature. He formulated and clearly expounded this novel theory for the first time. His statement in the opening *kārika*—“*kāvyaśyāt mādhanirīti budhair yā samannatapurvā*” is not to be taken literally. He makes this statement with a view to investing it with authority. He distinguishes between two kinds of meaning—the *vācārtha* (including the *lakṣyārtha* or *gaunārtha*) and the *vyangyārtha*, the expressed or denoted meaning and indicated meaning, on the one hand, and the suggested meaning, on the other, and holds that the expressed meaning (as well as the indicated meaning) and the words in which it is clothed constitute the mere body of *kāvya*. Together they are the outward embodiment of the suggested meaning—the outward element of *kāvya* and not its inner soul—emotion. He attempts to estimate or judge the worth of a poem by reference to this central essence rather than to the expressed meaning. The words and the expressed meaning are, truly speaking, external features, but these alone appealed to the earlier writers on poetics. They misjudged the true importance of the central essence of poetry and assigned to it a subordinate place. Ānandavardhana concentrated his attention on the suggested meaning that forms the real essence of poetry. Whatever in sound (word) or sense subserves the poetic end in view (*rasā*, *bhāva*, etc.) is a *guṇa*; whatever does not, is a *dosa*. *Dosas* and *gunās* are relative in character. There is no absolute standard of valuation for them. They are to be judged only in reference to the inner or suggested meaning, which forms the poetic ultimate.

The suggested meaning is threefold:

(1) A bare idea, fact (*vastu*), (2) a figure (*ālamkāra*), and (3) *rasā*, *bhāva*, and the like. If the earlier or older *ālamkārikas* concentrated on an analysis of the outward expression of *kāvya*, Ānandavardhana occupied himself with what this expression signifies or suggests. The expression is important to him only as a means of pointing to the suggested meaning. Ānandavardhana's theory of *rasādi-dhvani* exactly corresponds to the Upaniṣadic doctrine of *ātman*. The earlier *ālamkārikas* mistake the body (*sarira*) of poetry for its soul (*ātman*)—the externals of true poetry for its essence.

Poetry versus philosophy

The *ālamkārikas* often draw our attention to the dichotomy or distinction between poetry and philosophy. We have the oft-quoted verse from Bhāmaha on this distinction:

Even a stupid man can learn the *śāstra*-philosophy from the teachings of the teacher. But poetry is only given to the person who has imaginative [or creative] genius—*pratibhā* and that only once in a while.³

Another well-known verse, probably from Bhatta Tauta's *Kāvyakautuka*, now lost, clearly distinguishes between *śāstra* and *kāvya*, philosophy and poetry: "There are two paths of the goddess of speech: one is the *śāstra* [philosophy] and the other is *kavikarma* [poetry]. The first of these arises from intellectual ability [*prakriā*] and the second from genius [*pratibhā*]."⁴

He (Bhatta Tauta) also refers to the twofold gift of the poet, of seeing visions of striking beauty (*dariwna*) and of communicating to others through appropriate language the visions he sees. Rudrata defines *Śakti* which is synonymous with *pratibhā* as follows:

"*Śakti* is that whereby in a mind, that is free from distractions, subjects of description always flash and words that are perspicuous shine forth."⁵

Rajakkhara defines *pratibhā* as:

"*Pratibhā* is that which causes to appear in the mind [of the poet] appropriate words, meanings or ideas, *alathkaras*, diction and style [*uktimārga*] and other similar things as well."⁶ He divides *pratibhā* into two kinds: creative (*karayitri*—that with which poets are gifted) and

³ *Kavyalamkara*.

⁴ द्वे वर्त्मनी गिरां देव्या : शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।

प्रज्ञोपज्ञं तयोराद्यं प्रतिभोद्भवमन्तिमम् ॥

⁵ Rudrata, *Kavyalamkara* 1.15.

⁶ *Kavyamimamsa* (Baroda edn, 1934), p. 11.

appreciative (*Bhāvayitri*—which belongs to *sahrdāya-s*, sensitive and sympathetic critics or readers).

Abhinavagupta quotes the following definition of *Pratibhā*:

“[Creative] imagination is that form of intelligence which is able to create new things.”⁷ He further adds, “the speciality of a great poet’s creative imagination consists in the ability to produce poetry that is endowed with beauty and clarity due to the onrush of emotional thrill in the heart.” Elsewhere he defines *Śakti* in almost identical terms.⁸

The most famous definition of *pratibhā* occurs in the following passage quoted by Vidyachakravartin in his *Sampradāya Pradarshini*:

Smṛti is that which refers to an object of the past. *Matī* refers to something that is still in the future. *Buddhi* deals with that which is present and *prajña* belongs to all the three times (past, present and future). *Pratibhā* is that (form of) intelligence which shines with ever fresh delineations of pictures of the matters to be described with “*ullekhā*” or ever fresh flashes of ideas (with “*unmesā*”).⁹

Mahimabhattacharya describes the nature of *pratibhā* in a striking manner: “*Pratibhā* is that intellectual function of the poet whose mind is concentrated [or fixed] on thinking about words and meanings that are appropriate to *rasā* [to be portrayed in the poem]. It arises for a moment from the contact of the poet’s mind with the essential nature [of his own *ātman*].” And “It is that which makes the things that exist in all the three worlds seem as if they were right before one’s very eyes, and hence it is known as the third eye of Siva.”¹⁰

In brief,

Pratibhā is that power whereby the poet sees the subjects of his poem as steeped in beauty and gives to his readers in appropriate language a vivid picture of the beauty he has seen. It is a power whereby the poet not only calls up in his reader’s heart the impressions of the past experiences, but whereby also he presents ever new, wonderful and charming combinations and relations of things never before experienced or thought of by the plain or ordinary man. A poet is a seer who sees visions and possesses the

⁷ प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।—KSS (Benares edn, 1940), p. 92.

⁸ शक्तिः प्रतिभानं वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोल्लेखशालित्वम् ।—ibid., p. 317.

⁹ स्मृतिर्यतीतविषया मतिरागामिगोचरा ।

बुद्धिस्तात्कालिकी प्रोक्ता प्रज्ञा त्रैकालिकी मता ॥

प्रज्ञा नवनवोल्लेख-(पा. भे. नवोन्मेष) शालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।

¹⁰ *Vyaktiviveka* ii, pp. 117–18.

additional gift of conveying to others less fortunate through the medium of language the visions he has or the dreams he dreams.¹¹

We have dwelt on *pratibhā* for so long simply because it is regarded—if not universally then generally—as the sole cause of poetry. Whatever is touched by the magic wand-power of *pratibhā* becomes *a-laukika*, sui generis, unique; the world of beauty, the poet's creation, is altogether different and distinct from our everyday world. What renders the poet's creation unique is his *pratibhā*. In other words, creative literature whose hallmark is originality is the art of *pratibhā* (genius). And by extension we might as well say that creative literature, architecture, sculpture, painting, music, and dance are also the arts of *pratibhā*.

Pratibhā is undoubtedly, as already said, the sole cause of poetry, but to appreciate this poetry a reader who is also gifted with *pratibhā* is required. Abhinavagupta recognises this affinity of nature between the poet and the reader of poetry when he declares in the *mahgala Roka* at the commencement of *Locana*: "Victorious is the essence of speech called kavi-sahrdāya [the inevitable pair involved in all aesthetic activity], the poet, the artist, and the discerning enjoyer, the critic."¹²

Of the pair, the word *sahrdāya* cannot be easily rendered into English. It literally means "one of similar heart"—"one who is of the same heart," of like heart with the poet. It may be taken to signify a person whose insight into the nature of poetry is, in point of depth, next only to that of the poet. Abhinavagupta thus defines the *sahrdāyas* as "Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts—those [people] are known as *sahrdāyas*—sensitive spectators."¹³

We thus find the place of supremacy that *pratibhā* enjoys in the realm of creative literature, one of the fine arts, and, we might go a step further and assert, also in the sphere of all the fine arts.

Poets on the nature of beauty

Everyone is familiar with the two oft-quoted *subhāsita* type *sloka*-s: "There is nothing in the world which is inherently beautiful or ugly. A

¹¹ P. V. Kane, *The History of Sanskrit Poetics* (1951 ed.), pp. 334–35.

¹² सख्यत्वास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते ।—KSS edn (Benares, 1940), *mangala-sloka to Locana*, 4th quarter.

¹³ येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशात् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुटे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवाद-भाजः सहृदयाः ।—*ibid.*, pp. 38–39.

thing which one likes becomes a thing of beauty to him.” And “Curds are sweet or pleasant or agreeable to taste, so is honey, so are grapes and so too nectar. Of these pleasant or agreeable things that thing alone, to which he is attached, is a pleasant or agreeable thing to him.”¹⁴ Again, “What affords aesthetic repose is alone really beautiful. For, the *Asoka* trees are pleased—thrilled with rapture [and put forth flowers] by kicks [from beautiful young women].”¹⁵ And “What is not agreeable to one, one has no longing for it although it be beautiful. *Sarajini* [the lotus flower] does not indeed covet the [nectar-rayed] moon—although beautiful.”¹⁶

These poets want to drive home the truth, as they see it, that beauty is not a natural quality of things—not a physical character of things like their size or weight or movement, not a property of things independently of us. It is a property lent them by the human mind. In other words, they, it would seem, support the view that beauty is subjective. Except for the charming *subhāsita*-like *arthāntaranyāsa*s such as Bhasa’s: “Beauty gladdens every eye.”¹⁷ Kalidasa’s: “What indeed, is possibly not an embellishment to lovely forms?”¹⁸ Bharavi’s: “What is beautiful needs no external beauty-aid.”¹⁹ And, “Any change of the beautiful looks beautiful.”²⁰ Or Kalidasa’s statement in *Malavikāgnimitra*: “Beauty under all conditions develops fresh charms. In every posture, the beauty of the form is always seen at an advantage.”²¹ Or Bhartrhari’s observation in his *Śṛṅgārasātaka* (v. 40): “I truly swear that in all the seven worlds there is nothing more beautiful than *nītāmbinīs* [women with large and handsome hips] lovely women.”²² Magha’s famous line describing the nature of *ramanīyata* (beauty): “Ever new winsomeness is the essential characteristic of

¹⁴ किमप्यस्ति स्वभावेन सुन्दरं वाप्यसुन्दरम् ।

यदेव रोचते यस्मै भवेत्तस्य सुन्दरम् ॥

एवम्

दधि मधुरं मधुरं द्राक्षा मधुरा सुधापि मधुरैव ।

तस्य तदेव हि मधुरं यस्य मनो यत्र संलग्नम् ॥—*Subhasita* (anonymous?)

¹⁵ Ramacandra, *Malika-Makaranda* iii (Ahmedabad: L. D. Institute of Indology, 1983).

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, v. 4

¹⁷ सर्वजनमनोऽभिरामं खलु सौभाग्यं नाम ।—*Svapnavasavadattam* ii, p. 16 (G. K. Bhat’s ed.).

¹⁸ किमिव हि मधुराणां मण्डनं नाकृतीनाम् ।—*Shakuntala* 1–20.

¹⁹ न रम्यामाहार्यमपेक्षते गुणम् ।—*Kiratarjuniyam* IV–23.

²⁰ रम्याणां विकृतिरपि श्रियं तनोति ।—*ibid.* VII.5.

²¹ अहो सर्वास्ववस्थासु चारुता शोभां पृथति ।.

²² लोकेषु सप्तस्वपि तथ्यमेतत्

नान्यन्मनोहारि नितम्बिनीभ्यः ।

Now let us consider the view that *ālamkārikas* take of beauty.

Ānandavardhana very often uses the word *caru* for the beautiful and Abhinavagupta frequently uses *caru*, *sundara*, and *saundarya* with reference to poetry in his commentary *Locana* on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta say explicitly that what makes a poem is “beauty” and not merely *dhvani* (although *dhvani* is

²⁵ सौन्दर्यमलङ्कारः ।—*Kavyalamkarasutrani* 1.1.2.

called the essence—the soul of poetry). In the course of his *Vrtti* on 111–33, Ānandavardhana says that the suggestiveness intended by him, namely that which is a real source of beauty—that which can afford aesthetic repose (to the reader)—is not present in such examples as *gangayam ghosah*, *agnirmanavākah*, and “*mancahkrosanti*” (cots cry) because they do not possess sufficient beauty—they are not sources of beauty.

Thus what is essential to poetry is the creation of beauty. Abhinavagupta fully agrees with Ānandavardhana when he says:

Objection: How can there be a secondary use of words without suggestion, for earlier you yourself said “*mukhyani vrttim parityajya*,” etc. There is no secondary usage of words without a purpose, and you yourself have said that the function of *vyanjana* is always responsible for conveying the element in the form of the purpose (of the secondary usage). In order to answer this objection, Ānandavardhana says that the suggestiveness intended by him, namely that which can afford aesthetic repose [to the reader] is not present [in such examples as *gangayam ghosah* and *agnirmanavākah*, because they do not possess sufficient beauty].²⁶

Earlier, while commenting on *Dhvanyāloka* I.1., Abhinavagupta had already said: “*Dhvani* is essentially extremely lovely—beautiful. And this essential feature of *dhvani* distinguishes it from secondary usage. For in the examples of secondary usage like ‘the boy is a lion,’ ‘there is a settlement of cowherds on Gangā,’ there is no beauty at all.”²⁷

Again, in the course of commenting on *Dhvanyāloka* 1.13 (P. 105), Abhinavagupta notes that beauty is essential to poetry: “As for what has been said [by a critic], ‘Then the perception of beauty will be the soul of poetry,’ we actually accept this. The only dispute—between you and us—is about the name [namely, whether to call this *carutvaprātiti* or to call it *dhvani*].”²⁸

“‘Beautiful’ means ‘that which gives rise to aesthetic repose.’ In its absence the function of suggestion does not unfold itself, because, recoiling backwards, it comes to rest in the literal sense itself [i.e., it spends its power in justifying the literal sense]. It is like a man who sees heavenly wealth for one moment only, and the next moment it is gone.”²⁹

²⁶ *Locana*, p. 432.

²⁷ ‘अतिरमणीयम्’ इति भाक्ताद् व्यतिरंकमाह – ‘न हि सिंहो बटुः,’ ‘गङ्गायां घोषः’ इत्यत्र रम्यता काचित् ।—*Locana*, P. 37.

²⁸ यच्चोक्तं ‘चारुत्वप्रतीतिर्हि काव्यस्यात्मा स्यात्’ इति तदङ्गीकुर्म एव । नाम्निखल्वयं विवाद इति ।—*Locana*, p. 105.

²⁹ चारुरूपं विश्रान्तिस्थानम्, तदभावे स व्यञ्जकत्वव्यापारो नैवोन्मीलति, प्रत्यावृत्य वाच्य एव विश्रान्ते : क्षणदृष्टदिव्यविभवप्राकृतपुरुषवत् ।—*Locana*, p. 433.

These passages from *Locana* incidentally provide us with Abhinavagupta's definition of beauty in the context of poetry, one of the fine arts: "Beauty is that which gives rise to aesthetic repose." This definition could be made applicable to other fine arts as well.

Jagannatha defines beauty as follows: "Ramaniyata ca lokottarahladajanaka—jnana—gocarata." Jagannatha's view about beauty may be stated in simple language as follows: Beauty (*ramaniyata* or *saundarya*) produces non-worldly, extra-worldly (different from our everyday worldly experience) aesthetic delight. *Camatkara* or *camatkrti* is another name for this non-worldly (aesthetic) delight. This delight is directly experienced by the sensitive, sympathetic and responsive reader—spectator—*sahrdāya*. So according to Jagannatha, "Beauty is what produces aesthetic delight [when the sensitive reader or spectator contemplates on it or mentally views it or gazes upon it]." ³⁰ This definition deserves comparison with the definition of Thomas Aquinas: "Beauty is what pleases in the mere contemplation." ³¹

On the view of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta as to whether beauty is subjective or objective: A perusal of relevant passages from *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana*, it would seem, does not support either of the two views about beauty. These passages are collected here below for ready reference:

(1) Ānandavardhana declares:

"Just as beauty in women, when looked at attentively, is an altogether different thing, is the very nectar to the eyes of the *sahrdāyas*, even so the suggested sense is an altogether different thing from the conventional/denoted sense and the figurative/metaphorical sense."

Abhinava expands this idea thus:

Beauty is [certainly/truly] a different thing from [the beauty of the various/individual parts]; it is but what is revealed through the arrangement or shape or form of these various/individual parts. Beauty is not merely the absence of any defect in the parts or their decoration with ornaments. For we find the *sahrdāyas* describing a certain woman as "This one is utterly devoid of beauty even though she be endowed with limbs that are free from defects like 'being squint-eyed' [or, being one-eyed] when looked at attentively and even if she be decorated with ornaments" and, describing some other woman as: "This one is verily the moonlight oozing [or distilling] the nectar of loveliness even though she may not be completely

³⁰ अ. रमणीयता च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकज्ञानगोचरता । लोकोत्तरत्वं चाह्लादागतः चमत्कारत्वापरपर्यायः अनुभवसाक्षिको जातिविशेषः ।—*Rasagangadhara* (KM edn), p. 4.

आ. सौन्दर्यं च चमत्काराधायकत्वम् । चमत्कृतिरानन्दविशेषः सहृदयहृदयप्रमाणकः ।—*Ibid.*, p. 157.

³¹ *The Theory of Beauty* by E. F. Carr (Methuen: London), p. 6.

free from some defect or another, and may not be decorated with ornaments.”³²

Here we clearly find that beauty is spoken of as a quality of women and that it causes pleasure to the perceiver—*sahrdāya*.

Although Abhinava, when commenting on Ānandavardhana, defines beauty with reference to women, his definition can very well be applied to literary beauty also.

(2) Elsewhere, Ānandavardhana asserts that an *alamkāra* (like *upama*) is universally known as the source of beauty. All *ālamkāras* truly become so if they are used so as to be subservient to *rasā* and such like, which are the very soul (or the essence) of *kāvya*. Abhinavagupta comments on this as follows:

Upama embellishes the literal sense. However, this literal sense, when endowed with excellence by *upama* [or any other *alamkāra*], serves to suggest [*rasādi*]-*dhvani*. So truly speaking the *dhvani-atma* is *alamkārya*. The ornaments like bracelet, *keyara*, etc., when put on one's person embellish the sentient person by suggesting his particular mental condition—appropriate or inappropriate. For instance, a dead body when decorated with *almkaras* does not shine as the soul has departed from the body. An ascetic if he puts on ornaments such as a bracelet of gold, etc., becomes a laughing-stock, as in his case the mental condition of a lover is inappropriate. As far as the body is concerned the question of propriety or impropriety does not arise. It is, therefore, one's self alone that is *alamkārya* as one proudly feels I am splendidly decorated.”³³

Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta clearly point out that figures like *upama*, *rupaka*, and such like, must possess the characteristic of beauty (*cārutā*). If they are devoid of this element of beauty, they have no place in poetry. Poetry attains beauty when it embodies suggested sense in the form of *rasā*; this *rasā* consists of pure pleasure, joy, or delight and it (alone affords aesthetic repose or restful joy [*visrantidhama*]).³⁴

3. The phrase *gahgayam ghasah* (a cowherd settlement on the Gangā), is obviously, as it stands, absurd: *abhidha* (the power of denotation) gives no sense, and we are obliged to find a transferred sense (by resorting to *laksana*). *Laksana* gives us the sense of a village on the bank of the Gangā. Further, by such a phrase deliberately used in poetry there is brought to us a sense of the purity and coolness of the village. This sense is not given by either *abhidha* or *laksana* but by a new power of suggestion, *vyanjana*,

³² See *Locana*, pp. 49–50.

³³ *Dhvanyāloka* II, p. 197; *Locana*, pp. 197–98.

³⁴ *Dhvanyāloka* II, pp. 472–73.

which is derived from the poet's purpose (*prayojana*) in using the phrase. But Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta insist that mere suggestion is not enough to make a true poem. What makes a true poem is beauty; and this beauty must be such as to afford the reader aesthetic repose (*visranti-sthana*). Abhinavagupta when distinguishing *dhvani* (suggestion) from the secondary usage (*bhaktā*) observes: "There is absolutely no beauty in such secondary usages: 'the boy is a lion' or 'the village on the river Gangā.'" In these and other similar examples "the boy is a fire," "the cots cry," there may be present a slight touch of beauty. But these examples do not possess sufficient beauty—beauty sufficient to afford aesthetic repose to the *sahrdāya*. In one word, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta insist on *the creation of beauty as being vital to poetry*. Abhinavagupta notes this essential characteristic in his *Locana*: "As for what has been said [by some critic]: 'Then the perception of beauty will be the soul of poetry,' we actually accept this. The only dispute is about the name [*namni khalvayarn vivadah!*]." ³⁵

Now, *carutvaprātiti* (perception of beauty) presupposes the existence of objective beauty due to a beautiful suggested sense and its perception or cognition by a *sahrdāya*.

(4) The erotic, being the source of the greatest pleasure, is the sweetest of all sentiments:

The mental impression [*vasana, samskara*] of love, in the case of lower animals, men and gods, is permanent and accompanies their soul in its migration from one birth to another. Hence there is none who does not feel interested in the matter of love. Even an ascetic, who has renounced all worldly things is moved by a poem, imbued with love, and appreciates and enjoys it. This is why the erotic sentiment is called the sweetest. For, a person, whether wise or otherwise, whether healthy or sick, longs for the essence of candied sugar, etc., as soon as it falls on his tongue.

In another context, Abhinavagupta amplifies the idea of an ascetic enjoying a love poem by citing a striking example: "For it is not true that a man without passion must see things topsy-turvy. If he hears the sounds of a lute he does not after all think that he has heard the raucous [harsh-sounding] crowings of a crow.' This statement implies that the sounds of a lute are inherently beautiful and that they are also perceived as beautiful even by a passionless ascetic." ³⁶

(5) Following Bharata who brings in the analogy of *sādava* beverage and gourmet (fastidious eater) savouring tasty food, Abhinavagupta gives

³⁵ See chapter 1, f.n. 28, above.

³⁶ न हि वीतरागो विपर्यस्तान् भावान् पश्यति । न हास्य वीणावर्णितं काकरटितकल्पं प्रतिभाति ।—*Locana*, p. 488.

the analogy of a meat dish and a sweet dish prepared by an unskilled cook for a fastidious eater: “There is no perception or cognition of *rasā* as in a special meat dish prepared by an unskilled cook.” An objector might say, “Just as a sweet dish [*śikharini*—a dish of curds and molasses mixed with spices] prepared by an unskilled cook on account of its inherent deliciousness tastes very well, even so the said meat dish might taste delicious.” Abhinavagupta replies that when tasting the said sweet dish, fastidious eaters do not, merely on the basis of the knowledge of the sweet dish, exclaim in wonder “oh! How delicious to taste is this sweet dish!” They only say, “its ingredients, curds, sugar and spices, have not been properly mixed.”³⁷

Each of the above passages speak of a *sahrdāya* who perceives beauty that is a property or quality of things—thus attesting to the self-evident truth that it takes two, a subject and an object, to make beauty. So, according to these Sanskrit theorists, beauty is by nature subjective-cum-objective.

In other words, perception of beauty is a bipolar phenomenon: the result of the operation of a highly responsive, sensitive mind on an inherently beautiful thing. Sanskrit theorists, it would seem, support Alexander, who wrote: “Some there are, who believe beauty to be a character which belongs intrinsically to the beautiful object and is merely observed or discovered by us.”³⁸ Against this, we have the following statement by Lipps: “Aesthetic pleasure is an enjoyment of our own activity in an object.” The two views seem mutually exclusive. But they can be harmonised. “To the extent that the power to yield delight is the generic quality of objects of art, it seems to be an objective feature. But delight is an inward reality in the relisher [= the *sahrdāya*]. Beauty is objective when the beautiful object can evoke delight again and again. But the individuals who confront it should have the right sensibility.”³⁹ Disinterested relishing of the *rasā* that the poet has embodied in a poem is possible for a *sahrdāya* since there is the basic identity of human nature between individuals—here, the poet and the reader of like heart with the poet. Admittedly, sensitivity or poetic sensibility varies widely between individuals, but the reaction and experience of all true *sahrdāyas*—when they enjoy the aesthetic emotion disinterestedly—is almost identical and this proves indisputably the objective nature of beauty.

³⁷ *Locana*, pp. 496–97.

³⁸ Alexander, *Beauty and Other Forms of Value*.

³⁹ *Sanskrit Poetics: A Critical and Comparative Study* by Krishna Chaitanya, (Bombay: Publishing House, 1985), p. 55.

The nature of *rasā*

Now, the greatest source of beauty in literature is, according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, the depiction or portrayal of emotional situations that give a *sahrdāya* the aesthetic rapture of *rasā*.

The word *rasā* primarily means “taste” such as sweetness; and by a metaphorical extension, it has been applied to aesthetic experience. The point of the metaphor is that, as in the case of a taste like sweetness, there is no knowing of *rasā* apart from directly experiencing it. *Rasā* experience is predominantly emotional. It naturally differs according to the specific kind of emotion portrayed—love, sorrow, fear, wonder, and the like. *Rasā* is, however, in its intrinsic nature but one and its so-called varieties are only different forms of it due to difference in their respective psychological determinants. In its fundamental character *rasā* signifies an emotion, experienced by itself transcending the subject-object relation. *Rasā*-experience consists in an ideal revival in the reader’s mind of an emotion like the one depicted in the poem that lies latent in the *sahrdāya*. Being a revival it necessarily goes back to his past experience. This past experience serves as the centre around which the reconstruction takes place. He imaginatively reconstructs in his mind the whole situation as it has been depicted by the poet and he enjoys it. In this aesthetic experience, the reader or spectator forgets himself altogether and experiences pure joy or delight.⁴⁰

Abhinavagupta provides a philosophical foundation for this theory of *rasā*.

Reduced to its bare essentials the theory is as follows: Watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive reader [*sahrdāya*] entails a loss of the sense of present time and space. All worldly considerations for the time being cease. Since we are not indifferent [*tatastha*] to what is taking place, our involvement must be of a purer variety than we normally experience. We are not directly and personally involved, so the usual medley of desires and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond sympathetically [*hrdayasamvāda*] but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes total, all-engrossing, and we identify with the situation depicted [*tanmayiBhāvana*]. The ego is transcended, and for the duration of the aesthetic experience, the normal waking “I” [*aham*] is suspended. Once this actually happens, we suddenly find that our responses are not like anything we have hitherto experienced, for now that all normal emotions are gone, now that the hard knot of “selfness” has been untied, we find ourselves in an unprecedented state of mental and emotional calm. The purity of our emotion and the

⁴⁰ Based on *Art Experience*.

intensity of it take us to a higher level of pleasure than we could know before—we experience sheer undifferentiated bliss [*ānandaikaghana*].⁴¹

And this absorption results in the aesthetic rapture of *rasā*.

About the content of *kāvya*

In the third *Uddyota*, Ānandavardhana says: “In the province of *kāvya* where we perceive suggested sense, the notions of *satya* [truth] and *asatya* [falsehood] are meaningless. To examine *kāvya* through the well-known *pramāṇās* [means of valid knowledge] would simply lead to ridicule.”⁴² He means to say that things in *kāvya* have no place in the everyday world of space and time, and owing to this lack of ontological or physical status the question of reality or unreality does not apply to them. That, however, does not mean they are unreal. In fact, the distinction of existence or non-existence does not at all arise in their case.

Abhinavagupta elucidates this passage of Ānandavardhana by citing a dissimilar example (*vaidharmya-drstānta*):

We are not to examine these statements in *kāvya* as to whether they are true and consider whether they command us to do something as the Vedic sentences enjoining *agnistoma* sacrifice do. They simply directly contribute to giving aesthetic delight [and only indirectly to refining or influencing our character and culture of mind and heart]. It is essentially of the nature of *alaukika camatkara*.⁴³

It is evoked in a reader when a *vastu* or *alaṃkāra* or *rasādi* is/are portrayed by the poet in his *kāvya*. The *rasādi-dhvani* is given the place of supremacy as it is the source of the highest delight, next only to that of Brahma-realisation. Naturally, emotions are the central theme and content of *kāvya* according to both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, the two greatest aestheticians India has so far produced.

About the method of *kāvya*

Ānandavardhana regards *sabdarthau* (word and sense) as only the outer vesture of *kāvya* and *emotion* as its *ātman*. Now, emotions are never

⁴¹ *Sāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*, Introduction (p. VII), by J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Res. Institute, 1969).

⁴² *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 455.

⁴³ *Locana*, p. 455.

conveyed by the mere naming of them. They can be conveyed only indirectly through an appropriate portrayal of their causes and effects. This indirect method of conveying *rasās* is called *dhvani* (suggestion, suggestiveness). This method is extended to two other spheres of the theme of *kāvya*, viz. *vastu* (a fact, a bare idea) and *alamkāra* (a figure of speech). Both *vastu-dhvani* and *alamakara-dhvani* can be paraphrased but *rasādidhvani* can never lend itself to paraphrase. The beauty lent by suggested sense is the greatest *alamkāra* of poetic speech, just like the bashfulness of women.

Abhinavagupta too upholds this method of *dhvani* as propounded by Ānandavardhana. In the course of his exposition, he often draws our attention to *gopanasarasāundarya* and in one passage he compares *dhvani* to a beautiful and noble lady's breasts, partly covered and partly revealed.

This simile on account of its sheer beauty and aptness became famous in later *alamkāra* literature. At one place he makes a perceptive remark: What charm is there if the sense to be conveyed is directly or openly conveyed by the power of denotation?

Ānandavardhana boldly declares that *dhvani* [suggestion] is *kāvyaśya atma* [the soul, the very essence of poetry, creative literature]. It may present itself in the form of *vastu* or *alamkāra* or *rasādi*. He is perfectly aware of the importance of *rasādhvani*. But it is Abhinavagupta who gives it the pride of place and asserts that the other two *dhvanis* are only its aspects, and that they are not really valuable in themselves but only in so far as they lead to *rasādi-dhvani*.⁴⁴

When commenting on the word (*dhvaneḥ svarupam*) *atiramaniyam* from Ānandavardhana's *Vṛtti* he rightly observes: "By this expression he points out the difference of *dhvani* from [and its superiority to] the *bhakta* [the secondary usage]: There is hardly any beauty in these examples of secondary usages: *simho batuh* [the boy is a lion], *Gangayam ghosah* [there is a settlement of cowherds on the river Gangā]." In another passage, he explains why these and other such examples lack beauty and why they do not deserve the title *kāvya*.⁴⁵

The Objector: Thus the sentence "the boy is a lion" might constitute the soul if the form of suggestion is present in it.

The *Siddhāntin*: If so, you will have to call a jar "living," for *atrnan*, which is all-pervasive, is also present in it.

⁴⁴ *Locana*, p. 85.

⁴⁵ *Locana*, p. 37, p. 59.

The Objector: If the soul is possessed of a body endowed with various organs, and such like, then it is only called “living” and not any kind of body.

The *Siddhāntin*: If the soul of *dhvani* (suggestion) is invested with a body consisting of words and meanings that are beautiful on account of the presence of *gunās* (excellences) and *ālaṃkāras* (figures of speech) appropriate to the particular (*rasā-*) *dhvani*, then we call those *sabda* and *artha* as *kāvya* (*sabdarthau kāvyam*).

In conclusion, *carutva-pratiti* (perception of beauty) is the very soul or the essence of poetry (creative literature). This perception of beauty presupposes the existence of objective beauty due to a beautiful suggested sense and its perception by a sensitive reader or spectator. The subjective-cum-objective nature of beauty is suggested, when Abhinavagupta says in the *mangalailoka* to his *Locana*:⁴⁶ “Sarasvatyas tattvam kavi-sahrdāyakyam vijayate!”

⁴⁶ I especially acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to the authors of the following works on which I have freely drawn: J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, *Sāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics and Aesthetic Rapture*, vol. I: Text, vol. II: Notes; W. Basil Worsfold, *Judgment in Literature* (London, 1917).

CHAPTER TWO

BHARATA'S CONCEPT OF *BHĀVA*

Bharata in his *sangraha-kārika* (*Nāṭyaśāstra*,¹ V1.10) enumerates the main subjects of *Nāṭyaśāstra*, viz., *rasās*, *bhāvās*, and such like. After dealing with *rasās* he moves on to treat *bhāvās*. He mainly deals with eight *sthāyibhāvās*, thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvās*, and eight *sāttvikabhāvās*, in all forty-nine *bhāvās*.²

Incidentally, he defines *vibhāvās* and *anubhāvās*, which are absolutely *jada* or *acetana* that is “insentient”—devoid of consciousness.

Bhāva: At the outset of the chapter he informs us that *bhāvās* are so called because they suggest or manifest the *kāvyārtha*: that is, *rasā* connected with dramatic representation that is involuntary (*sattva*) and that which uses speech (*vāk*) and that which uses the body (*anga*) (i.e., gestures and bodily movements), and that which uses costume (*ahārya*), not clearly mentioned but implied. In this connection he then cites two traditional verses:

(1) A *Bhāva* is so named as it brings to the consciousness of the spectators (or causes them to experience) the *kāvyārtha*, that is *rasā*, brought forth by the *vibhāvās* (determinants) and manifested through *anubhāvās* (consequents) and *sāttvikabhāvās* (involuntary states), and by dramatic representation that uses speech (*vāk*) and that uses the body (*anga*).

(2) A *Bhāva* is so called because it manifests the emotions or internal feelings of the poet through the acting out of involuntary states (e.g., tears, perspiration, etc.) and through dramatic representation of words (*yak*), gestures, bodily movements, and facial changes (lit. colour of the face—*mukharaga*).

Bharata derives the word *Bhāva*

¹ *Nāṭyaśāstra* of BharataMuni with *Abhinavabhārati* by Abhinavagupta, vol. 1, 4th ed. (Vadodara: Oriental Institute, 1992).

² तत्राष्टौ भावाः स्थायिनः । त्रयस्त्रिंशद् व्यभिचारिणः । अष्टौ सात्त्विका इति भेदाः । एवमेते काव्यरसाभिव्यक्तिहेतव एकोनपञ्चाशद्भावाः प्रत्यवगन्तव्याः ।

from the causative of *bhn*, to be, which may be intended in two different meanings, that is “to cause to be” [viz. bring about, create, etc.] and “to pervade.” According to the first meaning, those that are brought about are the purposes of poetry, *kāvyaārtha*, that is the *rasās*. According to the second meaning, these are so called because they pervade the minds of spectators as any smell does.³

As they cause the *rasās* relating to various kinds of dramatic representation (to pervade the minds of spectators) they are called *bhāvās* by those who produce a drama (Thud, VII.3). “The word *vibhāva* has the meaning of distinct or clear knowledge. The words *vibhāva*, *kāraṇa*, *nimitta*, and *hetu* are synonymous. As words, gestures and bodily movements and the dramatic representation of involuntary states [connected with the manifestation of *kāvyaārtha*, *rasās*] are clearly determined by this [*vibhavyate anena*], it is called *vibhāva*. *Vibhāvita* is synonymous with *vijnata*” (ibid., p. 340).

Anubhāva: “*Anubhāva* is so called because the dramatic representation based on words [*vāk*] gestures and bodily movements [*anga*] and involuntary states [*sāttvikaBhāva*] causes [spectators] to experience [the corresponding emotion].” In this regard, there is a verse: “Since the *kāvyaārtha* [*rasā*] is made to be experienced by dramatic representation using speech [*vāk*] and gestures and bodily movements [*anga*], the term *Anubhāva* [consequents] is therefore used. It is connected with the flourish of hand-gesture [*sakha*] as well as the gestures of the major and minor limbs of the body” (ibid., p. 345). Now, in everyday life, *vibhāva* is not called *vibhāva* but *kāraṇa* (cause). In the same way, in everyday life *Anubhāva* is not called *Anubhāva* but *karya* (effect). These designations, *vibhāva* and *Anubhāva*, which we do not use in everyday life, are indications of the *alaukika* nature of *rasā*.

In regard to *vibhāvās* and *anubhāvās*, Bharata remarks: The *vibhāvās* and *anubhāvās* are well known (as *kāraṇa* and *karya*). They closely follow human nature. Hence their definitions are not given—not explained. This is to avoid prolixity.

Incidentally, Bharata does not limit the number of *vibhāvās* and *anubhāvās*, unlike that of *sthāyi*- *vyabhicari*- and *sāttvika-bhāvās*, which are unalterably fixed as eight, thirty-three, and eight, respectively.

yo'rtho hrdayasamvadi (NS V11. 7).

This verse, especially its *first half*, is variously interpreted:

³ भू इति (प्यन्तः) करणे धातुः । तथा च भावितं वासितं कृतमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । लोकेऽपि च प्रसिद्धम् । अहो हृत्तेन गन्धेन रसेन वा सर्वमेव भावितमिति । तच्च व्याप्त्यर्थम् ।—ibid., p. 338.

वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् काव्यार्थान् भावयन्तीति भावा इति ।—ibid., p. 336.