

Migration, Belonging and the Nation State

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Edited by

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P U B L I S H I N G

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Edited by Alperhan Babacan and Supriya Singh

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CONTENTS

Introduction	1
<i>Alperhan Babacan and Supriya Singh</i>	
Chapter One.....	7
Immigration, Nation State and Belonging	
<i>Hurriyet Babacan</i>	
Chapter Two	31
Contesting Belonging: Asylum Seekers and the Australian State	
<i>Alperhan Babacan</i>	
Chapter Three	43
Restoring the Rights of Asylum Seekers in Australia	
<i>Linda Briskman</i>	
Chapter Four	63
Crisis of Community in the Era of Mobility?	
Transnationals and Belonging	
<i>Val Colic-Peisker</i>	
Chapter Five	85
Remittances as a Medium of Relationship and Belonging	
<i>Supriya Singh, Anuja Cabraal and Shanthi Robertson</i>	
Chapter Six	105
Migration and Belonging: Brown Muslim Women's Experience in Australia	
<i>Tahmina Rashid</i>	
Chapter Seven.....	133
Abiding by Malaysia: Mediating Belonging through Cultural Contestations	
<i>Yaso Nadarajah</i>	

Chapter Eight.....	157
Beyond Divisive Nationalisms in Sri Lanka: Some New Perspectives on Identity and Democracy in the “Hybrid Island” <i>Martin Mulligan</i>	
Editors and Contributors.....	183

INTRODUCTION

ALPERHAN BABACAN AND SUPRIYA SINGH

While nationality is premised on rights and responsibilities to territorially defined states, international migration and globalisation operate across national borders. Although the international movement of people has occurred throughout history, international migration in the contemporary era is increasingly linked to globalisation and the movement of capital across the globe (Waters 1995; Castles and Miller 1998; Held et al. 1999; Castles 1999; Nash 2000). The increase in numbers in contemporary times has also been facilitated by improvements in communication and transport technology and global interconnectivity.

Although modern theories of the state presuppose a community that governs itself, patterns of economic, cultural and political global interconnections have posed challenges to the concept of the modern state (Held et al. 1999). These processes are further complicated by forced migration whereby asylum seekers, without the sanction of the host state, arrive on its shores and stake a claim to belonging under rights given to them under international law. Globalisation has also resulted in de-territorialisation as the policy choices of the state are increasingly affected by the decisions of transnational corporations.

The nation state no longer bounds the lives of migrants, particularly with the possibility of cheaper communication with family members left behind in the home country. Transnational social and cultural practices co-exist with migrants' attempts to settle in the host country. Personal and familial decisions are often negotiated in the context of what is left behind in the home country while living and experiencing the simultaneity of both locations. Elements of pre-migration culture are selectively recreated in their new environment (Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007; Hirsh 2003). Transnational migration today prompts us to reconceive the way we think of society, nation, family and home. As Levitt and Schiller (2004) say, "The lives of increasing numbers of individuals can no longer be understood by looking only at what goes on within national boundaries" (p. 1003).

Contemporary migration raises two key issues: the rights of individuals as citizens and notions of belonging and identity. Modern constructs of citizenship have been organised around a fixed relationship between the state, the territory and the citizen. Rights to citizenship are accordingly linked to belonging to a specific nation state. Within such a structure, identity, which is shaped by historical and social factors, is premised not only on self-perception but also on perception by others. Individuals and communities possess overlapping identities which are negotiated and varied across changing social, political and economic conditions and across borders (Du Gay et al. 2000). In the contemporary era, people's search for identity and certainty has resulted in belonging being contested so that new forms of inclusion and exclusion are justified. The questions of "who we are" and who "belongs" to the community have become a key aspect of post-modern societies, going to the heart of public contestations about societal issues, citizenship rights and belonging. Issues of identity have gained significance in offering explanations for social and political concerns and as a way of justifying social and cultural change (Isin and Wood 1999).

This book addresses the question: How do national frameworks of the rights and responsibilities of citizens co-exist with the transnational contexts of migration, identity and belonging? We provide theoretical and empirical accounts of the relationship between nationalism, citizens' rights and responsibilities, international migration, identity, belonging, transnational families, remittances and asylum in the context of Australia, Malaysia, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. These issues inform and shape the key policy and program responses of many governments. The book brings together debates around citizenship, nationalism and transnational family relationships with a focus on the Asia Pacific region.

In Chapter 1, Professor Hurriyet Babacan theorises the role of the nation state from a number of perspectives: (1) the question of *control*, and the nation state in establishing rules of entry and exit; (2) the relationship between the sovereignty and *security* of the nation state and immigration policies; and (3) the *incorporation* of immigrants in host countries including what citizenship rights are to be given and the role of the state in defining national identity, belonging and social inclusion. Drawing on research from Australia, Professor Babacan argues that there is a strong nexus between race, culture and nationhood and new forms of insecurity which impact upon notions of belonging and inclusion at the local level.

Dr Alperhan Babacan's chapter looks at the concept of belonging in the context of forced migration. He argues that forced migration challenges the intersecting notions of how we approach citizenship and

belonging through the questioning of issues relating to territory, a legal approach to social, political and economic rights and recognition of people's identities. Using a case study approach, Dr Babacan critically interrogates the Australian nation state's approach to forced migrants and asylum seekers over the last decade and provides some alternative notions of citizenship in the context of forced migration.

Human rights violations arising from the mandatory detention of asylum seekers have been subject to ongoing critiques from a range of commentators. Drawing on examples from the People's Inquiry into Detention, including oral testimony, Professor Briskman explores the nature of the human rights violations that have occurred, including the concept of mandatory detention itself, the practices within immigration detention facilities, and the legal and political obstructions to recognising the full humanity of those seeking refugee status. The chapter then considers the question of how rights can be restored to those who have experienced harm in immigration detention.

Dr Colic-Peisker bases her paper on in-depth interviews with an extremely mobile group of migrants and traces the link between spatial mobility and the sustainability of communities. After reviewing contemporary theories of community including social cohesion and social inclusion, the author concludes that whereas in the past communities were associated with a locality and understood primarily as "communities of place", today the understanding of communities has changed due to the communication revolution and increased social mobility. Transnational migrants have new forms of community and strong professional identities that are "de-territorialised". The author argues that the transient nature of interpersonal links in post-modern mobile societies may endanger social capital.

Chapter 5 looks at the link between remittances and belonging. Professor Supriya Singh, Ms Anuja Cabraal and Dr Shanthi Robertson present the tensions of belonging to the home country and the family left behind as well as the family and community in Australia. Tracing the reasons why migrants send money home, the authors argue that remittances enable migrants to continue to remain part of their families and communities left behind. Sending money home is a way of maintaining relationships and expressing belonging across borders.

Australia has a small population of Muslim migrants compared to Western Europe and North America. Dr Rashid highlights that over the last few years migration debates in Australia have largely revolved around Muslim women as a homogeneous group. Discussion remains focused on issues of identity, integration, a sense of belonging to Australia, hijab and

Jihad. Jihad has become a point of heightened interest, especially after numerous incidents have linked Jihad with potential acts of terrorism. Dr Rashid points out that the brown Muslim women of the South Asian diaspora remain “insignificant”. Their public presence is overlooked since they are neither “exotic” nor “erotic” like their counterparts from the Middle East or the Horn of Africa. Relying on numerous formal and informal discussions with brown Muslim women in Australia, Dr Rashid looks at their experiences of migration and belonging in Australia and how they negotiate their place both at home and in the public space.

Dr Nadarajah looks at Malaysia and considers the uneasiness of the concept of an Islamic state, which is incrementally enforced through a complicated mixture of measures for maintaining Malay-Bumiputera ethno-nationalist aspirations. Dr Nadarajah argues that the current system privileges fidelity to rulers and Islamic religious structures, which is not compatible in a modern state constituted upon notions of individual rights and fundamental freedoms. She bases her findings on a longitudinal community-based study in the epicentre of Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. In the context of the recent national elections, the author examines contestations surrounding constitutional perspectives on freedom of religion, secularism and theocracy. She examines the interpretations of the social contract underpinning the drafting of Malaysia’s constitution in 1956 and the growing impact of community mobilisation activities. Dr Nadarajah argues that these contestations provide the nexus within which Malaysians will mediate the document of destiny that was adopted as the Constitution for an inclusive community, opening up the minority perspective as a conceptual space for negotiating belonging.

Tracing the 25 years of intense civil conflict between the national government and its armed forces in Sri Lanka on the one hand and Tamil separatists fighting for an independent Tamil state on the other hand, Dr Mulligan traces the failure of post-independence nation formation and the attempt to impose the cultural identity of the majority Sinhalese on the population as a whole. Dr Mulligan argues that the domination of Sinhalese nationalism led to the development of an extreme version of Tamil nationalism in response. Sri Lankan historians have recently pointed out that both Sinhalese and Tamil identities in the Sri Lankan context are based on myths about the history of migration from India to Sri Lanka and they have taken to calling Sri Lanka “the hybrid island” in which new forms of identity emerged over a long period of history. The concept of “national liberation” has served the new nation poorly and there is now an urgent need for constitutional reform to pave the way for an enduring peace settlement. Dr Mulligan suggests that there is also a need for

rethinking identity formation from the local to the national level and for creating a civil sphere in which this complex process of community formation might be able to occur.

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CHAPTER ONE

IMMIGRATION, NATION STATE AND BELONGING

HURRIYET BABACAN

Introduction

As with many Western nations with high numbers of immigrant intake, the Australian public debates have placed doubt on:

- The levels and success of integration of newly arrived migrants and refugees
- The success or failure of multicultural policies
- The threat that migrants from different cultures and religions pose to national identity, national values and social cohesion

The cornerstone of the democratic nation state is the establishment of rights: political, social and civil. Membership in a nation state denotes both civic belonging in the political community and cultural belonging in the national community. In the political community all citizens are seen as equal. However, evidence points to the continued disadvantage, social exclusion and marginalisation which characterise Australian society. Current and past policies, programs and ideas on social exclusion have focused on exclusion from the labour market, economic exclusion (including poverty), exclusion based on social isolation, geographic or spatial exclusion, and exclusion based on institutional processes and systems. In the considerations of social exclusion/inclusion, very little attention has been paid to exclusion based on culture, ethnicity, racism and other diversity signifiers as causal factors of disadvantage. Recent social inclusion debates in Australia have not resulted in any meaningful consideration of cultural diversity as a force for inclusion or exclusion. Furthermore, the nation state has been actively engaged in the construction of Australian identity in particular ways that have denied the consideration of “ethnic identity” as a positive feature of nation building. Through the use of fear, law and order, and a neo-liberal approach, the Australian state has constructed an environment which has depleted a sense of belonging

for minorities. In so doing, it has depleted social capital in communities and social cohesion across the nation. This chapter explores the concepts of identity and belonging for minority communities in the context of globalisation and the nation state in Australia.

Global Contexts of Migration

The history of humankind is full of stories of migration; people have always moved, either voluntarily or by force. Although movements of people are taken as given, the right to travel or immigrant adaptation has never been an easy process. The geopolitical landscape of the world has been changed by globalisation, which in turn has altered the character of migration. There are now many more immigrants who traverse the world (Papastergiadis 2000). The reasons for the movement, the processes of settlement and adjustment and the reception in the host countries show great variability.

Globalisation is a broad term that refers to the interconnectedness of the world. It refers to processes that are primarily economic but increasingly social, cultural and political. Globalisation is the “global enmeshment” of money, people, ideas, images, values and technologies which now flow in a much swifter manner across the world (Hurrell and Woods 1995). Beck (2000) points out that from now on what happens on the planet is not a limited local event and that “all inventions, victories, catastrophes affect the whole world, and we must reorient and reorganise our lives and actions, our organisations and institutions, along a ‘local-global axis’” (p. 11). Giddens (1990) sees a world market for capital, commodities, labour and communications with deadly weaponry and sophisticated surveillance. The interconnectedness in the world brings with it the significant features of increasing speed and volume via travel and communication technologies and a condensing of time and space where there is global shrinkage, and messages, symbols and images are freed from spatial constraints (Held et al. 1999). The final feature is the permeability of political and geographic borders as greatly increased relations take place whether through trade and tourism or by electronic means (Beck 2000).

Migration is important in the new era of globalisation since it is a powerful force to create change through its economic, social, political and cultural impacts on both receiving and sending countries. Disparities in social, economic and demographic conditions will create enormous pressures in the world in terms of work, land and other resources (Zolberg 1989).

The global migration of people requires intricate analysis. Key features of this analysis include:

Complexity of Migration: There are complex patterns of migration and it is no longer only the impoverished who migrate. Migration is no longer from less developed countries to more industrialised ones; the patterns of immigrant movement are complex and multidirectional. New types of migration correspond to the restructuring of the economies of nation states. The proliferation in the directions of movements, the restrictions in settlement and the diversification of the identity of migrants have made the patterns of migration very complex. New forms of migration include highly skilled labour, increasing temporary migration, the contract labour to the Middle East, trade in “sex slaves” from eastern Europe, illegal immigration to many parts of the world, “bi-local” business immigrants from Asia and the feminisation of the migrant labour force (Papastergiadis 2000; Castles and Miller 1998).

Regulated Migration: International movements of people do not occur in a vacuum but are organised through infrastructures and institutions of transport, communication and regulation. Contemporary travel involves strict regulation and control. Migration processes intersect with and are constitutive of the networks of political, military and cultural relations within nation states, transnational corporations and international bodies. (Held et al. 1999; Castles and Miller 1998). Increasingly nation states have had to integrate more closely with the world economy. It is argued that globalisation undermines state sovereignty and the independent policy-making capacity of states, in that states are increasingly compelled to adopt policies dictated by transnational corporations, global entities and trading blocs. This has resulted in nation states adopting functions of control in the face of increased global movements of people. The first control function is the role of the nation state in establishing rules of entry and exit. A key focus of discussion has become to what extent nation states control their borders in the context of an intensity of effort to increase border control, to deport asylum seekers and to tighten regulations and rules of entry (Brochmann and Hammar 1999). The second element is the relationship between the sovereignty and the security of the nation state. The state has engaged in the management of unwanted immigrants and the “war on terror” (Babacan and Babacan 2007). There are clear links between international relations and domestic foreign policy and the immigration policies of nation states (Ghosh 2000). The third issue relates to the incorporation of immigrants in a host country, including citizenship rights to be given, provision of welfare support and

legal entitlements, in a climate of neo-liberal philosophies that curtail welfare rights (McCulloch 2004).

Power Relations: Globalisation has transformed the role of the nation state into an essential strategic institution for the legislative changes and innovations necessary for economic globalisation. Additionally, globalisation has resulted in the development of a homogeneous worldwide culture (Inglis 2003). Today's world has a distinctive "sameness" in fashion, food and music. This has been referred to as the "McDonaldisation" of society (Strada 2003, p. 11). Product distributors in economically advanced countries (such as the United States) use the advantages of globalisation, including global media (film, music, internet, fashion, television), to attract sales (Du Gay 1997, p. 33). The products go beyond their intrinsic qualities or uses and a product or brand becomes a statement about the person consuming it, thereby reinforcing the consumer's identity. In the process, local cultural identity is threatened because of its subjection to western cultural domination (Hong 2000). Inglis notes that the autonomy and policy-making capability of the nation state is being undermined by the moves to economic and cultural internationalisation. The power of nation states is constrained by the development of supranational political groupings (Inglis 2003, pp. 12-13). In effect, such relationships establish power relations within the nation state and result in a complex mixture of processes that act in contradictory ways (Richmond 2002). McLellan and Richmond (1994, p. 666) highlight one such contradiction when arguing that the free movement of labour and the relatively free movement of finance and capital are countered by protectionist policies, with the state acting as the gatekeeper for protecting the borders from unwanted immigrants, often unskilled people, certain groups of refugees and asylum seekers and other unauthorised arrivals. Unequal global power relations are translated, interpreted and replicated within nation states to render particular groups of people or organisations more powerful over others.

Domination and Racialised Hierarchies: Institutions, systems such as the legal system, and the labour market shape the way in which disadvantage and minorities participate globally. Cheran (2001) notes that immigration control mechanisms were instituted to regulate and manipulate the movement of people from third world countries, to restrict the migration of unskilled people and to select from the pool of highly skilled or wealthy immigrants who were suitable for resettlement (Cheran 2001). One of the consequences of globalisation and restrictive immigration policies is the exclusion from the first world of vast numbers of people from the developing world (Richmond 2002). Marfleet goes further and

states that “the key global factor precipitating the refugee crisis is the internationalisation of the state in the context of the transnationalisation of the political economy” (Marfleet 1998, p. 73).

Despite the contradictions of globalisation, there is still a privileging of certain dominant norms over others, such as the primacy of market, neo-liberal philosophies and approaches to wanted and unwanted groups of people. Social exclusion takes place within a globalised world based on socially constructed markers of biology, ethnicity, identity, “race” and culture (Mac an Ghaill 1999; Babacan and Gopalkrishnan 2008). As borders of cultural difference become more porous and/or eventually collapse, questions of culture increasingly become interlaced with issues of power, representation and identity. Underlying the struggles and conflict over issues such as multiculturalism is the conflict over the relationship between democracy, citizenship rights and culture on the one hand and identity and the politics of representation on the other.

The Nation State

Modern nation states appear to be eternal, yet they are the products of industrial capitalism that is more fluid than fixed (Ignatieff 1994). Political boundaries tend to be fluid and have changed over the years. Castles and Miller (1998) identify that the nation state brings about nationalism which is “an ideology of social unity, ‘imagined community’ ... which describes a so-called people who live within the boundaries of a nation state... Nationalism is the organisation of human groups into large, centrally educated, culturally homogeneous units, coterminous within the nation state. This is a new phenomenon, historically specific and necessary to industrialism” (p. 103). As a political doctrine, nationalism is the belief that the world’s people are divided into nations and that each of these has the right to self-determination, either as self-governing units within existing nation states or as nation states of their own. As a cultural ideal, nationalism is the claim that while people have many identities, it is the nation that provides the primary form of belonging. As a moral ideal, nationalism is the ethic of heroic sacrifice, justifying the use of violence in defence of the nation against both internal and external enemies (Ignatieff 1994). Nationalism appeals to blood loyalty, patriotism and sacrifice. It is developed around ideologies coloured with sentimentality. However, when the sentimentality is stripped, what nationalism appeals to is the sense of belonging.

The nation state is the vehicle for the unification of people within its borders with objective and subjective criteria. Ferguson (1994) argues that

shared objective traits such as languages become meaningful within the framework of subjective consciousness which in turn becomes a powerful force in shaping common objectives, especially in the context of state-determined policies of “nation building”. In this sense the nation state provides the seeds for conflict as the ideology behind nation building is that there is a uniform set of traits, values and identification within the borders of the country. The ideology behind nationalism destroys diversity and establishes structural conditions for power inequities in society. However, modern nation states have adopted a pluralism that allows for diversity and expression of different viewpoints. This establishes a contradictory set of forces in which the nation state shapes nationalism on the one hand and becomes the site for conflict based on different interest groups on the other hand (Ferguson 1994).

Misztal (1996) argues that we are all clients, citizens or consumers of the modern welfare state. The state defines the meaning of citizenship and promotes systems in which lives are led. The modern state rests on the notion of citizenship. Marshall (1992) identifies that citizenship rights include legal, political and social rights. The determination of these rights, particularly social rights, is the result of historical struggles among different groups in society. Hinde (1992) identifies that discourses on citizenship presuppose a common culture which functions both to sustain citizens’ lives and to distinguish them from citizens of other communities. The patriotic attachment to the nation in this sense is to a shared set of political practices and values. Although common values, practices and culture may be assumed or identified, there will invariably be significant minorities who do not share them. This then raises the questions in multicultural societies: What role does the nation state play in shaping ethnic identities? How is this democratic in situations where there are significant minorities?

The answers to these questions are complex. Existing nation states, in the main, have adopted the stance of reaffirming a particular national identity – one that is homogeneous and corresponds to particular understandings of the collective self. The response to globalisation has been the rise of new forms of patriotism and national identity, often sponsored by the nation state. In many instances this has been accompanied by rhetoric within state instrumentalities relating to cultural diversity or multiculturalism. The political and institutional approaches by the state towards culture, language, identity and history are crucial elements in the discourse and reproduction of national identities (Gutmann 2003).

Kenny (1999) argues that the state is a site of struggle, a contested terrain. In this respect, the state is a site of social struggle and factors such as ethnicity, class and gender become important in securing legitimacy, resources and support. The state, however, actively shapes ethnicity according to the prevailing philosophy of the time. Ethnicity can be utilised as a legitimising device and a political tactic by the state to pursue particular agendas (Wong 1994). Offe (1984) offers insight when he suggests that the welfare state is a multifunctional structure with heterogeneous political and administrative sub-systems that manages the processes of socialisation. It has to manage conflicting goals and create harmony in society. The state apparatuses establish and reproduce national and often ethnic ideologies and boundaries. Although national and ethnic divisions operate within society, it is the different access of different ethnic groups to the state that dictates the nature of hegemonic national ethos in society (Ignatieff 1994). It is in this management process that ethnic identity is negotiated. Often the smaller ethnic communities with less power cannot secure a proportional share of resources, determine their way through a maze of government activity or effectively utilise their citizenship rights (Jakubowicz 1989).

Identity and Australian Nation Building

We hear a great deal about “identity” at global, national, local and personal levels. Identity gives us an idea of who we are and how we relate to those who share a particular position and to others who are different from us. In the media, ethnic identity is often portrayed as problematic. In the global arena, national identities are contested and struggles are represented by conflicting national identities. At a more personal level, new forms of identities are emerging. For example, the traditional Western nuclear family with the male breadwinner has given way to different gender identities. Sexual identities are contested in the public arena. Often identities are portrayed in terms of conflicting, incompatible and polarised positions. The question “who am I?” has become the key element of post-modern societies and goes to the heart of social resistance and public contestation about citizenship rights. Therefore, identity matters in terms of social and political concerns within the contemporary world and as a way of offering explanations of social and cultural change (Isin and Wood 1999).

The processes of globalisation have contributed to vast numbers of people moving across more porous borders. This has made the theorisation of the relationship between identity, nationalism, race and ethnicity much

more difficult as identification has become much more complex. People have several overlapping identities that are negotiated within complex borderlines and under conditions of survival (Du Gay et al. 2000). Understanding identity is not an easy task. The notion of *self* and identity is a relatively new idea. Historically people's lives were tightly mapped out according to their position in the social order and identities were more fixed, based on hierarchy, caste or religion (Vaughan and Hogg 2002). Today, identities are more varied and have their origins in a vast array of social relationships that form or have formed the anchoring points for their lives, from close personal relationships with family and friends to relationships and roles defined by work, ethnicity, race, culture, gender and nationality.

Identities emerge within the play of specific modalities of power in each society and are the products of marking difference and exclusion (Isin and Wood 1999). Identity is two-pronged: self-perception and perception by others. The identity of self-perception is not simply imposed but can be chosen by the individual or the group and actively used within particular social contexts and constraints. The other side of identity is the perception by others. Stereotyping by dominant groups and repression can occur in society. Against dominant representations by "others", identity offers a tool for resistance. Resistance against domination politicises relations between collectivities and draws attention to power relations in society (Bulmer and Solomos 1998). Identity and indeed race are therefore socially constructed. Blackness and whiteness are not categories of essence but are defined by historical and political struggles over their meaning (Bulmer and Solomos 1998; Jayasuriya 1997).

This imposes a new regime of shared identities based on changes in production and consumption patterns, resulting in *dislocation*. Modern societies have no clear core or centre which produces fixed identities but rather a plurality of centres for identity formation. One of the centres which has been displaced is that of social class – class not only in the sense of an economic function related to the processes of production but class as a determinant of other social relations. Laclau (1990) points out that there is no longer one overarching class in the Marxian sense which shapes all social relations but rather a multiplicity of determinants of relationships. Thus it is no longer possible to argue that social emancipation will take place based on class struggle, although forces of economic globalisation are a foremost determinant of social relationships. Thus contemporary society is characterised by a move away from class-based political allegiances such as trade unions to the rise of other arenas of social conflict such as those of gender, "race", ethnicity and sexuality

(Laclau 1990). The cultural homogeneity promoted by global marketing thus leads to different and contradictory outcomes: detachment of identity from community and place; reaffirmation of national or local ethnic identities; and the emergence of new identity positions (Westwood and Phizacklea 2000; du Gay et al. 2000).

Today, the stereotypical image of the stranger as asylum-seeker, migrant or refugee through the media and other networks often precedes the arrival of migrants. This sets the scene for the context of negotiating identity. In Australia the politics of difference has been the result of exclusion and racism since white settlement. It has, on the other hand, also been a powerful tool for claiming social rights, resisting exclusion and ownership of the “other”. The dispersal of people across the globe produces identities shaped by different places. These new identities are both unsettled and unsettling in the context of the diaspora.

In contemporary post-colonial societies such as Europe, USA and Australia, both peoples who have been colonised and those who colonised have responded to the diversity of multiculturalism by a renewed search for ethnic certainties. Some previously marginalised ethnic groups have resisted their exclusion in their host societies by reasserting their identities of origin. On the other hand, among dominant groups in these societies there is also an ongoing search for old ethnic identities and the nostalgia for more culturally homogeneous states such as “Englishness” or “Irishness” in the UK, Ireland and Australia and for a return to “good old family values” or “our way of life” (Woodward 1997). The search for identity, meaning and certainty has created contestations that seek justification for the forging of new and future identities. Often these justifications take the form of bringing up past origins, traditions, mythologies and boundaries and creating new forms of *patriotism* that exclude anyone who does not conform to them. The boundaries are particularly contested at the level of national identity and the desperate production of a unique and homogeneous national identity that corresponds to the perceived territory or homeland. National identity is based on selective memory, which forms the basis of collective identity.

Fear (of difference, of loss) is at the heart of the question of identity. These fears result in the nationalist affirmation of one group over another. It is a matter of the relative power of different groups to define their own identities and their ability to mobilise these definitions through the control of cultural institutions. Tradition is not a matter of a fixed or given set of beliefs and practices which are handed down or accepted passively; it is contested in a political environment (Bulmer and Solomos 1998).

Australia has often been referred to as “the land of immigrants” as it is the product of British colonialism (Hollinsworth 2006). Since 1945, approximately 6.5 million people have come to Australia as new settlers (DIAC 2007). Race, ethnicity and immigration have been at the heart of nation building in Australia (Strattan 1998).

Contemporary Australia is a multicultural country with approximately 22% of its citizens born overseas. A further 18% have at least one parent born overseas. Approximately 40% of Australians were either born overseas or have at least one parent who was born overseas, and in recent years people from around 185 different countries have made their home in Australia. The make-up of Australia's population has changed dramatically during the past 200 years. It has gone from an almost total Aboriginal population to predominantly Anglo-Celtic by 1900 and to its present mixture of about 74% Anglo-Celtic, 19% other European and 4.5% Asian. 21% of Australians speak a language other than English at home. Australia is a multi-religious society according to the ABS Census 2006 (DIAC 2007).

Existing nation states, in the main, have adopted the stance of reaffirming a particular national identity – one that is homogeneous and corresponds to particular understandings of the collective self. The response to globalisation has been the rise of new forms of patriotism and national identity, often sponsored by the nation state. In many instances this has been accompanied by rhetoric in state instrumentalities relating to cultural diversity or multiculturalism. The new forms of patriotism operate at different levels, ranging from extreme xenophobic forms, perpetuation of racism through non-recognition of it to moderate forms of cultural nationalism. Underlying the new forms of patriotism is hostility towards immigrants and people of culturally diverse backgrounds and a definition of the nation based increasingly more on opposition to immigration. The result is a crisis between social citizenship and nationalism as the nation state increasingly discards its universalistic claims. These ideas are supported by the neo-liberal agendas. Thus the element of exclusion is growing for some groups of people while others are being included. The distinctive feature of patriotism is its capacity to exclude. This is what marks it from the old form of nationalism which tried to include as much of the population as possible (Ignatieff 1994). It is the product of fear, insecurity and discontent and is concerned with preserving differences, fuelled by the decline of the old form of nationalism and the resultant fragmentation (Delanty 2000).

In Australia, the discourses of multiculturalism provided a framework for ethnic communities to negotiate identities. However, the mainstreaming

of multiculturalism in Australia has been a government-sponsored idea and has not represented the multifarious experiences of the lives of the people (Jakubowicz 1989). Strattan (1998) argues that the multicultural rhetoric of the government-sponsored multiculturalism has been “public fantasy, a collective narrative fiction” and that the ideological representation of Australia as culturally homogeneous still remains. It is not coincidental that “Anglo-Saxon-Celtic” Australians are not considered an ethnic community although many of them have migrated to Australia over the last 200 years. The nature of homogeneity, however, is portrayed as *unity-in-diversity* which makes cultural hegemony invisible through the enabling of fixed, static ethnic categories (Bhabha 1994). The state policies of multiculturalism are not concerned with fostering cultural difference as much as they are with creating safe channels which contain difference (Strattan 1998). The project of Australian nation building requires affiliation between the state and ethnic communities. However, the state apparatus is not capable of responding within a pluralistic framework (Vasta et al. 1996). This creates tension when ethnic communities try to negotiate difference within state structures and it leads to calls for commitment and allegiance to the nation state.

Belonging Identity Nexus

Migration processes that uproot people and transplant them into a new environment are transitions that at the best of times are not easy. People create meaning out of the context in which events occur. Consequently an experience of migration always involves a strong subjective component of people’s lived experiences and their reactions to the new environment. Rapid social change results in both physical and psychological impacts that in turn determine the patterns of immigrant and refugee adjustment to their new country. The impression created by initial settlement experiences has a lasting impact on the settlement process. This includes what services are available, what attitudes exist towards the newly arrived and what government policies are in place. The settlement phase is greatly affected by the host society’s (i.e. Australia’s) reaction to the newly arrived. This situation will determine the new class stratification, political system, power relations and economic reality for newly arrived migrants. Furthermore, the level of resources, the presence of family and the existence of supportive networks are also important in determining successful settlement. The presence of the ethnic group in Australia and the support of ethno-specific as well as mainstream structures and services are fundamental in successful settlement and form the basis of the

formation of social capital that enables successful adaptation (Wooden et al. 1994; Cox 1987; Jupp et al. 1991).

Management of diversity continues to be a central issue for Australia as it grapples with the public opinion that negatively targets immigrants. Since the 1990s, migration and asylum have become highly politicised. The use of fear to bring people together against a real or imagined enemy is not a new tool in the hands of the elite. It is not restricted to use by governments; many fear-mongers and powerbrokers over the centuries and across the world, political and religious, have used fear of others to draw their in-groups together.

In particular, in the last decade, the Howard Government engaged in the politics of fear and curtailment of immigrants' social and citizenship rights (Castles 2003, p. 20) by portraying them as "exploitative" people whose aim was to "abuse" industrialised nations. Public discourses initiated by the government depicted asylum seekers as people who "abused" Australia's refugee determination process and "threatened" the Australian community. Although such constructions were (and remain) unsubstantiated, they suited the government's longer-term policy agenda. The fear politics pursued by the government have had a massive impact on race relations in Australia (Poynting and Noble 2004). Asylum seekers and refugees were depicted as criminals through their "association" with people smugglers (Shaw 2001). During the Tampa standoff, the government's labelling of asylum seekers as a "threat" or "common enemy" enabled it to powerfully and effectively draw upon nationalistic discourses (Dreher 2001; Van Acker and Hollander 2003). These negative discourses worked to de-legitimise asylum seekers, thereby ensuring that in the public arena they were not seen as "genuine" refugees who were "worthy" of Australia's compassion. Moreover, Taylor (2002) argues that the government policies led to an environment in which the distinction between asylum seekers and terrorists and the distinction between security concerns and the obligations owed to citizens have become blurred and enmeshed.

Fear, presented within this sophisticated environment, has the capability of building cohesion within the chosen members of the in-group, normally the majority, around the core value of safety (Furedi 1997). Fear of an external or internal foe can easily supplant day-to-day issues around job insecurity, changing power relationships in the workplace, increasing indebtedness, loss of social support frameworks, alienation and the sense of helplessness in the face of powerful forces. Used in this context, fear becomes an instrument of elite rule used in

various ways by political leaders because it helps them to pursue a specific political agenda and/or lends support to their beliefs (Robin 2004).

Lukomskyj (1994) argues that Australian attitudes towards immigrants reflect confusion, anxiety, scepticism, ambivalence, lack of knowledge and modern racism. The war on terror has been accompanied by a grand narrative which has been interwoven with issues relating to Australian values and national identity and fear of the “other”, and has ultimately reinforced particular types of patriotism. This is a unilateral debate, driven mainly by the nation state and aided by the media (Brett 2004). It involves the construction of Australian identity to reflect particular cultural groups and exclude others in the national interest. National identity is constructed as “a particular way of life, particular set of values represented by those who are white and of Anglo Saxon/Celtic backgrounds” (Markus 2001). The discourse of nationalism – of who is Australian and who is un-Australian – is telling. “Un-Australian” draws lines of acceptability, delineating what are regarded as reasonable, proper and decent forms of public speech and behaviour. Who is Australian, what are Australian values, who is the “Aussie battler” and what is “un-Australian” have been redefined and have had significant consequences for those who are included and those who are excluded. Regular pronouncements by key politicians and the media “license” such abuses while feeding feelings of dominance. Turner and Hogg (1987) present *depersonalisation* as a process that permits social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective action and other processes. As Wazana states, “creating such categories becomes the only way of justifying in the face of international condemnation, the acceptance of some and the refusal of others. This discourse of fairness and unfairness resonates intensely with the average citizen, which no doubt explains the government’s reliance on it. It also helps to situate the illegal refugee in a context of lawlessness and degeneracy, juxtaposed with the nation itself, seen as lawful and civilised” (Wazana 2004).

The “natures” of racial and ethnic groups and their inter-relationships are typically explained in ways that blame minorities for their own disadvantages or “naturalise” those disadvantages as if they were caused by the behaviour or values of that group. Such cultural racism exaggerates differences between groups, ignores diversity within them, and invents traits and values as an *essential* property of those groups. These commonsense explanations distract attention from the actual historical and contemporary forms of disadvantage, especially those embedded in our institutions (Hollinsworth 2006). Fear and risk have been used to create uncertainty, insecurity, and a moral panic and a social righteousness about

curtailment of rights and unjust treatment of minorities. This has had negative impact on feelings of belonging in minority communities and has depleted social capital¹ and social cohesion² within the nation. McCulloch (2004) points out that the reduction of programs by government has been replaced by the promotion of security and/or safety. Under a neo-liberal philosophy, problems such as crime or unemployment have been portrayed as problems that are engaged in by individual choice and can be solved by coercive legislation and punishment, rather than state assistance. Groups or individuals (e.g. youth, refugees, immigrants) who were once considered as being “at risk” and considered as requiring the support of the state are now portrayed as “a risk” to society (McCulloch 2004; Babacan and Babacan 2006). Citizenship rights are portrayed as a privilege rather than a right. The social consequence is that a sense of anxiety and insecurity is created among the community. Solutions to this anxiety are presented in the form of coercive legislation and a powerful political campaign which “emphasises a return through cultural renewal to a more secure – often mythical – idea of community and national identity” (Jayasuriya 2006, p. 3).

Resort to fear politics has facilitated and promoted new forms of racism in Australia (Gopalkrishnan and Babacan 2007). This impacts on people’s ability to forge relationships and friendships in the community, with their neighbours, within school communities and at work. The “old racism” in which ethnic communities were viewed as inferior has been largely replaced by a “new racism” (also termed “cultural racism”). With the advent of this form of racism, ethnic communities are differentiated as being “a threat to the cultural integrity” of the Anglo-Celtic host society (Dunn et al. 2004). Questions as to who does/does not belong to Australian society, what/who is/is not Australian are integral aspects of the intolerance to some groups and the new racism in Australia (Dunn et al. 2004). The answers to these questions have changed with time. The most recent examples include asylum seekers, Arabs and Muslims (Dunn et al. 2004). Essentially, the key element of *old racism*, the so-called “incompatibility” of different ethnic groups and their “inability” to co-exist, remains as an integral aspect of *new racism* (Corlett 2002). The overall result is social distancing and the absence of the linking or bridging capital in society that is a fundamental ingredient of social cohesion.

¹ Social capital is defined in many ways but comprises many factors such as trust, relationships, obligations and systems of mutual support.

² The concept of ‘social cohesion’ is used broadly to encompass a large number of ideas, including social capital, civic and political participation, trust, ethnic harmony, personal and national security, and peace (Colenso 2005, p. 412).

Writings on social exclusion have focused on this concept as exclusion from the labour market, economic exclusion (including poverty), exclusion based on social isolation, geographic or spatial exclusion, and exclusion based on institutional processes and systems (Young 1999). In the considerations of social exclusion/inclusion, very little attention has been paid to exclusion based on culture, ethnicity and other diversity signifiers. The discussions on social exclusion in the early 1970s related to exclusion on the basis of material or *distributional* elements such as access to social resources, to the labour market and to financial support. As power relations in social structures, institutions, systems such as the legal system, and the labour market shape the way in which minorities participate, contemporary thinking needs to focus not only on distributional but also on *relational dimensions* of stratification and a recognition of the impact of identity and culture and racism at the societal level on the nature of relationships between communities, government and others.

There is ample evidence to show that racism impacts on life chances and social inclusion outcomes. Studies indicate that the life chances of racialised minorities are adversely affected (Li 1998; Bonnet 2000). Social signification based on “race and culture” facilitates social exclusion and hinders inclusion. The findings of studies confirm that life chances are impacted in the areas of occupational status and earning, educational achievement and social integration. Although “race” and “racism” are value-laden notions and appear contrary to democratic societal values, racism can still be articulated without denouncing democratic principles and, through transformation into more palatable concerns, can become a legitimate concern (Henry et al. 2000). Furthermore, coded societal messages are perpetuated through public discourses on immigration, multiculturalism, refugees and citizenship. However, in measuring and looking at interventions to such problems, the traditional social exclusion indicators are considered in isolation from culture, race and ethnicity. Their impacts on social cohesion have, in the main, not been studied.

The welfare state has withdrawn from many of its traditional roles, presenting that the market in its unrestrained form can solve most, if not all, human problems. In terms of the nation state, adherence to a neo-liberal agenda reduces the role of governance to the bare minimum. This involves total or partial withdrawal of the state from some of its traditional roles and shifting the onus of responsibility for costs from the state to the individual. In this process, sometimes referred to as *de-stating*, nations across the world have witnessed the state divest itself of roles in the market, in the social services and even in the provision of the bottom-line safety net (Ife 2002). In effect, the state maintains itself as a glorified

policeman of internal and external security. This is against the backdrop of social fragmentation, community breakdown and social disorder in advanced economies, accompanied by rising consumerism and individualisation (Babacan 2007). The impacts of de-stating on social cohesion are significant. The roles of the state as “mediator” and in supporting immigrant integration and providing structures of opportunity for the disadvantaged in society are diminished. This, combined with a deliberate campaign of fear politics, compounds the negative impacts on belonging, adjustment and participation.

Conclusion and Ways Forward

Belonging can only occur if there is genuine “valued equal status” which is concerned with the recognition of minorities as equal, enabling opportunities and creating the conditions for utilising citizenship rights (Cushing 2003). Social inclusion initiatives need to ensure that vulnerable communities are engaged and there is strong establishment of human relationships. This can only occur through the recognition of the social and life history of ethnic communities and their contribution to their new society. The key elements of social inclusion must be facilitated by the nation state and must include access to social goods and services with appropriate resource allocation across the social contract; the empowerment of communities who are skilled and have genuine participation in the decision-making structures of society; institutional trust and building democratic governance bodies; and building understanding and bridges between people (Phillipson et al. 2003).

Feelings of belonging to the nation can occur only if we can overcome fear politics and stop being the “worrying nation” (Hage 2003) as this makes us inward looking, focusing on self and lacking in compassion for others. There is an urgent need to create a new mindset that refutes the idea that cultural diversity brings along social mistrust. This can only come about with supporting leaders who espouse such viewpoints. It also comes with a strong recognition that the other is “within us”, not out there. Strong negotiations are occurring in Australian society about many aspects of our lives, and migration and culture are central to these debates. It is the structure of opportunities that will determine whether immigrants can integrate and have a sense of belonging. Recognition and rejection of racism are important elements of the structure of opportunities.

Finally, a note on identity. Ethnicity, although a social construct, is not fixed and determined by social, economic and political conditions. Ethnicity emerges as a basis for collective action when there are clear

advantages attached to ethnic identity (Olzak 1986, p. 254). In other words, ethnicity is a resource to be mobilised in circumstances such as marginality, alienation and social discrimination (Jayasuriya 1997). Discussion of “identity politics” casts identity as a problem and it is presumed that one’s identity necessarily defines one’s politics and that there can be no politics until the subject has revealed or laid claim to his/her identity. Inherent in such positions is the failure to understand the way in which identity grows out of and is transformed by action and struggle. There is a need to understand that identities are not things we are born with but are formed and transformed within and in relation to representation. Jayasuriya (1992) introduces the idea of “dimensions” to the concept of ethnic identity: the dimensions of expressive and instrumental ethnic identity. The expressive dimension relates to the subjective and normative aspects of group membership such as language, common heritage and culture. The instrumental dimension is about the material aspects of identity such as the struggle for resources and attempts to bring about structural change in society and to claim space for belonging. It is this second sense of identity that is important in the struggle for belonging and social justice. Often the boundaries between the first and the second are blurred as groups use the expressive elements to secure recognition. Supporting this claim, McDonald notes that “the affirmation of ethnicity is largely an expression of exclusion. The children of postwar immigrants find themselves excluded by an education system and polarising urban structures, and the development of ethnic identity is part of a strategy to combat this experience... there is no sense that ethnicity is about preserving past cultures” (McDonald 1994, p. 19).

The failure to see the social justice element of ethnicity often leads to labelling by dominant groups as separatist and non-assimilationist. Action can take place to deny recognition of ethnic identity that further marginalises such groups. Taylor (1992) notes that withholding the recognition of identity, no matter how subtle or indirect, can be a form of oppression.

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