# Sudan's Wars and Peace Agreements

Sudan's Wars and Peace Agreements

Edited by

Jay Spaulding, Stephanie Beswick, Carolyn Fluehr-Lobban and Richard A. Lobban, Jr.

**CAMBRIDGE
SCHOLARS**

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Part III: Legacies

INTRODUCTION

The 2008 annual meeting of the Sudan Studies Association in Tallahassee, Florida, was memorable in two ways. Most importantly, it inspired an uncommonly rich and diverse set of papers directed toward the conference theme of "Sudan's Wars and Peace Agreements." Unfortunately, the gathering also coincided with an attempted coup in Khartoum, disruptive weather in the United States, and a variety of individual misfortunes, all of which conspired to prevent the delivery of some important papers and to deprive many would-be listeners of the opportunity to hear the latest contributions to the field of Sudan Studies. The present volume was created to help remedy the situation by gathering papers volunteered by officially accepted contributors to the Tallahassee conference. It also offers to the wider world of scholarship a benchmark in the current state of the field. Foremost in this regard must be the diversity of intellectual perspectives afforded by the many academic disciplines that participate in Sudan Studies, as conveyed by individuals whose cultural heritages are rooted on five continents. In many cases the contributors ask us to reconceptualize Sudanese realities in new terms not common to the familiar received lexicons of Sudan Studies discourse. While older rubrics of ethnicity, religion and geopolitics do retain considerable cogency, it is often found to be necessary to reason also according to new theoretical literatures that conceptualize the human experience in terms of political sociology, historical demography, gender or generation identity, ecology at both large and intimate scales, sociolinguistics, social class in many forms, cultural self-presentation through diverse modes and in many idiomatic contexts, and the resolution of conflict through the insights of formal economics and strategic game theory. Yet the contributors return repeatedly to a limited number of recurrent themes, and these the editors have chosen as an organizing rubric for the present volume. How may one speak truthfully and well about the Sudanese experience? What material opportunities do Sudanese resources offer, and how should these be allocated among those poised to benefit from them? What constraints, if any, does historical experience impose upon the living generation in forging Sudan's future? These are themes to which discussion of war and peace in Sudan repeatedly returns.

Priority must be granted to critical examination of the discourses through which Sudan Studies communicates, for these while indispensable also reveal themselves to be highly problematic. In his essay "Reflections on Sudanese Languages of War and Peace," Richard A. Lobban, Jr. acknowledges the possibility that various Sudanese cultural traditions may classify the objective behavioral realities of war and peace in terms that might prove incommensurate. Having explored the vocabularies wielded in discussion of organized violence and of conflict resolution, he concludes—with appropriate caution—that common conceptual ground can probably be found for mutually comprehensible settlements.   The sociolinguistic study of Ashraf Abdelhay, Busi Makoni and Sinfree Makoni introduces the dimension of political dominance and coercion into consideration of Sudanese language policy and usage. Out of the several attested modes of linguistic dominance and coercion afforded by Sudanese history, they choose to single out the role of British policy during the second colonial period. With a focus primarily upon the south, they find that colonial linguistic policy not only inhibited national linguistic integration on the basis of Arabic dominance, but created in the south a series of artificially reified African "languages" only tenuously linked to actual linguistic practice.

In his study "Southern Sudan and the Applicability of the Principle of Voluntary Unity" Mousa M. Elbasha brings to bear the analytical perspective and precise vocabulary of international law. He demonstrates convincingly that while the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the second Sudanese civil war may enjoy popularity in some quarters for political reasons, it is far from a legally-acceptable arrangement. It is not a constitutionally sound foundation upon which to erect a stable and peaceful Sudanese future.   Elena Vezzadini addresses the theme of "Making the Sudanese: Slavery Policies and Hegemony Construction in Early Colonial Sudan (1898-1925.)" She articulates the creation of significant cultural barriers to a common national identity in the Sudan, and the nourishing of ethnic difference and divergent class status for the benefit of the new masters of the Second Colonial Period.

The future of the Sudan is conditioned by its natural and human resources. Sam L. Laki, in "Nile Waters: Reasons for Cooperation," focuses upon the central role of the great river in determining the Sudan's position and stature in regional geopolitics. He emphasizes the urgency of formulating wise policies and building constructive relationships with all the riparian neighbors and potential rivals of the Sudan. Failures in this regard might well prove disastrous to the Sudan's foreign relations.   Mey

Eltayeb Ahmed argues that "The Comprehensive Peace Agreement does not Guarantee Sustainable Peace in Sudan." Conflicts in Sudan have often been construed in ethnic or religious terms, leading to certain forms of settlement exemplified by the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that ended the Second Civil War. Such settlements however do not address at least equally fundamental conflicts that rest upon the clash of socioeconomic interests between an insurgent class of new urban-based entrepreneurs and the majority of rural folk committed to older modes of livelihood. The Sudan offers significant opportunities for the enhancement of its human potential through improvement in the status of women and young people. In her essay "Perspectives for Peace: Gender-Specific Views from Sudan," Margaret Otto explores the role of northern and southern women in conflict resolution. She sees an opportunity to transcend past differences through a new creative focus upon improving aspects of future society. She supports the active participation of women in political and social processes, reconciliation among former disputants, and the creation of a more secure environment with a greater measure of social justice for women. Ulrike Schultz examines the meanings and significance of youthful status among Bari-speaking inhabitants of the Three Towns. She finds that the realities of urban life challenge certain aspects of received Bari culture in ways that make an orderly transition out of childhood into adult status difficult. Marriage in particular is found to be problematic. For Bari young people, and many others, the Sudanese future is a cultural frontier that must be addressed with imaginative and creative ingenuity.

Do the experiences of the Sudanese past afford pathways that link or barriers that divide? In "The Iron King: A Reconsideration of the Tunjur," Jay Spaulding introduces an era at the dawn of the modern age when the Nile valley and the western highlands of Dar Fur and Wadai experienced an age of unity under the auspices of Nubian rulers based in Kordofan. Stephanie Beswick recounts the fate of the Bari community during the transition out of independence into the First Colonial Period ("The Nineteenth-Century Rise and Fall of the Bari: War, Local Trade, Slavery, and the Destruction of the Bari.") Changes in political economy and technology precipitated the demise of the Bari polity and accompanying social and cultural convulsions. Catrien Bijleveld, Olivier de Gomme and Shanna Mehlbaum wield advanced statistical tools to calculate the number of casualties inflicted by the Second Civil War. They assemble and build upon a complex library of primary sources. ("A Very Dark Number: Estimating Direct and Indirect Mortality in Southern Sudan 1983-2005.") Randall Fegley adopts a comparative perspective in "Redivision

Reconsidered." He brings insights derived from the comparable experiences of other lands to bear upon various aspects of the Sudanese situation. Most critiques of Sudanese government since independence have found the prevailing arrangements excessively centralized; devolution however has its own set of pitfalls.

PART I:

DISCOURSES

REFLECTIONS ON SUDANESE LANGUAGES OF WAR AND PEACE

RICHARD A. LOBBAN, JR.

Introduction

This paper started as a casual reflection and was not especially scholarly in style, mainly following the 2009 Sudan Studies Association conference theme of war and peace.(1)   It just sought to explore some linguistic concepts of war and peace in some Sudanese languages for which I had dictionaries at hand. I had no *a priori* views or hypotheses and was motivated mainly by my curiosity into Sudanese linguistics. As this survey has evolved, patterns emerged about these concepts that nudged me to look more at the context and etymology. The result is incomplete, but hopefully heuristic. A basic anthropological thought, known as the "Whorf-Sapir hypothesis," suggests that if you do not have a word for something you can't think of it, or conceptualize it or act upon up it. While this idealist philosophy should be criticized on some epistemological, historical and material grounds it is this topic that is explored in some of the very many languages of war, peace, mediation and conflict resolution in the much conflicted Sudan.(2)

Islam in Africa

Since the fourteenth century, northern Sudanese Muslims start almost everything with first verse of the *Quran al-Karim.* This is the opening *Fataha* verse, and it accompanies most aspects of their lives as Muslims, with its injunction to God the beneficent and merciful and admonition to those who turn to anger and who have left the straight path. It is God who is the owner of judgment day. One could thereby say that Islam is truly a faith of peaceful surrender to the greatness of the one God. Islam had gradually entered Sudan from Egypt to the north, but the seven-centuries-long *baqt* or peace treaty with Nubian Christendom helped to slow this down greatly. It is odd that some people today think that Christians and Muslims are inherently incompatible. Later, Islam steadily entered into

Sudan from the west through savanna kingdoms and pilgrimage routes. Much more recently Islam came to Sudan from the east, ironically the closest point to Mecca and Medina. Islam never came to Sudan from the south for a variety of pre-colonial, colonial, post-colonial, administrative and political reasons.

The Muslim faith spread fairly rapidly across North Africa and into westernmost Europe for still more centuries and gradually elided into the western Sahel, but was resisted in the southern direction. Although I am freely using the modern word "Sudan", it was not the "Sudan" until Anglo-Egyptians conquered Nubia and slid 'the land of the blacks' from western to eastern Africa. Like almost all colonial borders drawn in 1884-85 in Berlin, it makes little geographical and ethnographic sense shoving some folks together who would rather be apart, while parting others who would rather be together. As for religion, one could probably not find more diversity in Africa's largest nation; there are functioning churches in the north and functioning mosques in the south.

The anthropological framework has long examined religion, particularly the way it is structured and how it functions from the ground up. This discipline also accepts official and orthodox statements about all faiths and how they are supposed to work in an ideal form. Most religions around the world have popular forms that some proselytizers like; and orthodox forms that the purists prefer. This is essentially the nature of faith. The middle-of-the-roaders in the great and minor faiths also do not mind mixing and adapting in syncretistic forms. Such are the varied cases of Islam, Christianity and other faiths in the Sudan. Sudan also had its prophetic traditions that merge with political missions of messianism, Mahdism, revitalization and revivalism, especially at times of crisis and personal and national testing. Perhaps one could argue that Mahdism led to war, but in fact it was Turco-Egyptian colonial and slave wars that really led to Mahdism. The supposed self-destruction of Mahdism needs contextualization in a policy of containment. For the rest, accommodation and equilibrium were the themes.

When the boundaries of faith are reached and the human needs are not addressed, folk Islam in Africa can venture into spirit possession and healing through the *fuqaha*, *dhikirs*, *zar* and *bori* cults and various soothsayers and coffee-cup readers. The Sufi traditions in African Islam allowed its roots to penetrate deep into the human terrain of religious brotherhoods, patron saints shrines, and *baraka*-endowed healing centers and burial places. These *turuq* in Sudan could range from the *Qadriya, Shadhliya*, to the *Tijaniya, Khatmiya* and *Sammaniya.* Folk Sufi Islam in Sudan brought popular legitimacy even when resisted by high minded

authority. These religious practices brought explanation of the unknown, social order, displaced anxiety and brought war and peace, met human needs, and calmed disturbed souls.

War and Peace in Arabic

There are at least two basic kinds of *peace* in the Arabic language with many nuances in between. The root of *slm* at the heart of Islam can mean a simple straightforward peace or calm, but it can also mean the peace of surrender. This can be your personal surrender to the greatness of God or waving a white flag when the battle is lost. Another important part of peace is the *slh* root that implies mediation, accommodation and conflict resolution. A peace-maker could be termed a *musalha.* Arabic also notes an abode of peace, *dar al-Islam* that can be contrasted by an abode of war, *dar al-Harb.* *Harb,* or war, can be a noun or a verb just as in English and likewise it can be distinguished from a raid (*ghazwa, razia*) or murder (*qtl*) just as in English where killing is defined by degrees of engagement and intent are defining from legal and political point of view. Arabic like English also has the feud (*shaqaq* and *tarr*). In short, English words are essentially parallel in all manner of motivations and contexts of deliberate or accidental killing.

Commonly it is projected that Muslims may not war against fellow Muslims, thus making this an inherent 'place of peace' but disputes about dynastic succession among *khulafa'* as well as fellow Muslims who are considered as 'back-sliders' and 'non-believers', *kufar,* away from the straight path, are excluded from this injunction by some extremists. Some orthodox and extreme thinking says that war may be conducted in *dar al-kufar.* English words for mediating also have their parallels in Arabic (*tawasat*) or basically 'to get in the middle' of things. This root, *wst,* is worked into mediation and mediator for conflicts or other types of negotiations. In the world of 'compensation', English etymology comes down to 'shared pain' or 'shared penalty' while the Arabic, *kafa,* shifts the meaning a bit to be 'made equal'. In the world of 'treaties, English assumes there is a common understanding or accord, however the Arabic, *mu'aheda*, shades this in the direction of 'making one' or 'making whole.'

In the famously misunderstood Arabic word for 'struggle' (*jhd*) its principle meaning is to seek improvement of oneself or community. However, it can also imply a contest or battle in the specific or metaphorical sense. Because of this, the word *jihad* is often projected as being parallel to 'crusade' in English as one can 'crusade' for a prosaic mission or for a holy one. A difference however is that a 'holy war' in

Arabic is most essentially a struggle for perceived improvement, while a holy crusade, *harb as-salibiya*, is a war for the cross (*salib*) so one may conclude that the English hold war to be more explicitly religious than the Arabs do. Crucifixion or to crucify (*salb, salab*) is easily understood in the Arabic language but again it has a root of the 'cross' that is not really a part of the deeper meaning of *jihad*.

But it is in the words that seek to describe 'terrorists' and 'martyrs' that a gulf appears between Arabic and English. Just as English makes a huge distinction between these two terms, so does Arabic, but the west often and incorrectly uses the wrong word with a very problematic result. In Arabic 'terrorism' is *irhab* and a 'terrorist' is *irhabi.* Overlooking for the moment that one man's 'terrorist' can be another man's 'freedom fighter,' if there is a terrorist attack, the negative and isolating word *irhab* should be used. Instead it is more likely that it would be *mujahideen* (or "*mouj*" for American soldiers in Afghanistan) or a 'struggler' this is actually a positive word in Arabic. This sends the wrong message for sure. The Arabic speaking population will not be hearing about real *irhab*, but will be hearing instead about a 'martyr' or *shaheed.* It is a *shaheed* who is 'testifying' (*yeshahd*) about his or her faith, as much as one's last 'testimony' is a 'tombstone' or s*hahad*. It should be very clear that using the right or wrong word can certainly convey very different meanings other than those intended. Machiavelli taught that war is about politics, and politics is about communication, so we certainly do need the right word in the right place.

On the topic of peace, the Arabic language and practice is very rich especially in the process of making a *sulh, hudna or 'atwa* or the route to peace making, avoiding retribution, and paying compensation *diya.* Once matters are negotiated by a mediator and hands are shaken (*'musfaha')* the steps toward reconciliation *(musalaha,* from *sulh)* is advanced to breaking bread together *(mumalaha).* Yes, the English speaking world does have counterparts but they are just not so structured or institutionalized. To further this point, western conflict resolution features individual choices and a secular outside legal system. Arab and Islamic systems stress community process for legitimacy guided by sacred traditions and by balanced insiders such as elders for mediation. One may also say that western systems are generally more adjudicative and punitive for the wider social good, while eastern systems are generally more meditative, restorative for the smallest unit where the conflict resides. This is definitely not to judge the merits of either, but only to note that they are different

War and Peace Lexicons in Other Sudanese Languages

Consider first the case of Nubians from the north, starting with the Danagla (3) Interestingly, the Dongolawi word for 'army' is *askari,* a clear loan word from Arabic as are the Dongolawi words for 'gun' (*bundug)* as well as the words for 'destroy' or 'ruin' (*harbe)* and 'gunpowder' (*barud).* Similarly; 'judgment' is *hokum* as well as 'peace' being *salam;* 'policeman' is *askar* (Arabic) or *bolis* (European.) The list of relevant loanwords from Arabic goes on, ' jail' is *sigin*; 'rebellion' is *fitna*, 'rifle' is also *bundug* and a 'witness' is *shahid*. There can be little question that the culture of the Danagla is heavily influenced by its centuries-long relations with the Arabic speaking world, especially in regard to military and governance terms and terms that relate to war and peace. On the other hand there are many Dongolawi words not inherited from Arabic for such matters as arrows, captives, slaves, murder, and peace-making (*eggwad, bewar, bewid*) as well as quarrels, battles, and wars (*gawwe, tamugid*). It is equally clear that conflict certainly existed among the Danagla before the Arab arrivals, but it is also clear that Arabic influences for such matters are very strong. For other Nubians (Fadicha and Mahas) there are quite different non-Arabic, Nubian words for 'war' or 'quarrel' (*dingi),* 'army' (*kel),* 'destroy' (*troabkir),* 'reconcile' (*g'engkir*) and 'govern' *(mou'rt).* (4) These remind us of the persistence of Nubian lexicon even amidst the heavy linguistic, cultural and pedagogical infusion from Arabic.

From the South, consider the case of the Shilluk. (5) 'Peace' in Shilluk is *mer* or *mero* while 'to war' is *liny* and 'warriors' are *mac* or *pac.* Clearly these terms have no relation to Arabic or Nubian. The relatively undifferentiated nature of *liny* can also mean 'battle', 'fight', 'conflict' and a 'weapon' is '*gi liny*'. Similarly, the word *nyak* can mean 'combat' 'conflict' or 'destroy'. One is tempted to conclude that warfare among the small compact kingdom of the Shilluk *reth* has been rather limited as judged by their limited vocabulary for military and conflict relations. Yet, the Shilluk do use the following few words: 'soldiers' *alathker*; 'murder' *maut*; 'murderer' *amoti*; 'revolver' *adhaw;* and *milo* 'salt' clearly have Arabic cognates and are linguistically exogenous. By contrast, the Shilluk vocabulary for 'conciliate' *luko* or *yomo*; or 'compensation' *kogi* or *gin muj*; or 'peace-maker' *njati dwor* is rather rich and of local origin.

For the numerous and expansive Dinka who have contiguous contact with the Nuer and Shilluk and long term hostility and military interaction with Arabs there is another story to tell.(6) First of all, the Dinka language has clear words for 'peace,' *adoor* and 'war' *tonj* as well as 'pacify' *door.* Conflict in Dinka can be rooted in a siege, trespass, rage, destruction,

insult, slaughter, repression, feud, death and defeat. The Dinka vocabulary for conflict resolution is also rich with special terms for accord, agreement, acquit, admonish, blood fine, boundary, compensation, judgment, surrender and reconcile that is synonymous for pacify. Close to the Shilluk term *man* for 'loathe' the Dinka word for 'abhor' is also *maan.* Parallel to the Arabic derived *alathker* for 'soldiers' in Shilluk is the Dinka *alathker* for 'soldier.' In other contexts, the Dinka also use *alathker* for their rendering of 'cavalry,' 'barracks,' and 'deserters.' Other exogenous words from Arabic used in Dinka include *rasas* 'bullet' and *khadam* 'servant', but Dinka have their own words for 'slave' *lony;* 'warrior' *apuruk*; 'butcher' *raan ring jac wei* and 'captive' *raan ci dom* that really equals "conquered man". The Dinka's socio-political structure of segmentary opposition, plus their longstanding military traditions for raiding, have created a rich vocabulary for conflict and war making as well as peace-making. The term *agoth* covers altercations and quarrels, while *tonj, puot, apoth, goth, keek,* and *kac thok* cover various kinds of conflicts from fights and feuds to battles. Equally there are specific and different Dinka words for aggressor, adversary, belligerent, rebel and brigand. This linguistic evidence suggests that the Dinka are much experienced in making both war and peace.

Over the millennia there were Axumite Ethiopian incursions into Sudan at Meroë and Mahdist incursions into western Ethiopia and various other battles and military experience in the long expansive or imperial histories of the two lands. This section is built on the rather simple argument that one might thereby reasonably expect a richer vocabulary for the general linguistic domains of war and peace in the Amharic language since there is a long history of both.(7) What evidence is there? First of all, Amharic like Arabic with a sweeping written tradition, has a much greater lexicon than what is available in published sources in Nubian, Shilluk or Dinka so that the linguistic 'playing field' is not at all level.

Amharic has clear and contrasting words for 'war' (*tor, toraennät*) and 'peace' (*sälam*). Without getting to all of the specific words in Amharic, the dictionary provides numerous words for conflict, violence and tension, including terms for: abhorrence, afflict, agitate, altercation, annihilate, assassinate, attack, avenge, battle capture, seize, conflict, conquer, incite, kill, murder, plunder, quarrel, raid, rebel, revenge, riot, and terror. This being the case, then there should also be many words conceptualizing conflict resolution and peace-making since no society can be eternally at war. In another tour through the dictionary we find words for accord, agreement, ally, amnesty, appease, apology, blood money, mediate, reconcile, reparation, restitution, respect, treaty, tribute, and truce. As expected the parallel vocabulary for conflict resolution was as rich as the

vocabulary for making conflict. Military terms in Amharic for such as army, armament, artillery, barracks, battle, bayonet, bomb, bullet, combat, enemy, headquarters, military, soldier and conscript are all based within the Amharic language suggesting their own military history of needing such lexicon. It is the rare military term in Amharic that has foreign influence such as 'canon' *mädf* (from Arabic) and 'machine gun' *mäträyyäs* (from French).

For marginal populations subjected to 'raid' (*wärrära*) as a source of slaves (*bariya*) there is an "ethnic group" *Barea* that still bears this name in the Ethio-Sudanese borderlands. The process of "othering" seems to be important in war to help make violent acts justifiable and acceptable. For Amhara to create the category of *bariya* or Arabs to make a *dar al-kufur* this lubricates violence. The Dinka called folks they raided upon as *Jur* or foreigners. Romans called people beyond their control and susceptible to slave raids as *ber-ber* ('twitterers') from which we get barbarians or Barabra as a negative term for Nubians, not to mention the Berber on the far side of the Atlas Mountains and Berbera in Somalia. The Nubians used a term *nogor* for slaves who passed through their lands and it may be that this passed into Latin-based languages as 'negro'. Certainly American slave history is generously filled with "othering" terminology that assisted acts of brutality and violence against our fellow citizens. This part of our history might not be so problematic to process centuries later if we had thought about it more at the time and had built relations of mutual respect, rather that mutual fear and bloody violence.

Some Observations

First some methodological self-criticism; this was an experiment as a thematic conference paper. Really, just a tentative hypothesis that suffers from available published evidence, but the more I investigated it the more it seems to have some substance and in the classic heuristic manner, I would conclude that it deserves further and more systematic investigation. Although this paper began with the concept of the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis it is after all built around epistemological idealism in which the words have *caused* the perception and effected the action, I would say that this investigation would instead, suggest the opposite, namely that the histories of these societies especially their wars and conflicts among themselves or between adversaries have necessitated the creation of special vocabularies to describe their military interactions. Thus, my conclusion is built upon epistemological materialism (i.e. science) and the words used are an effect and not a cause. Since the question about cause or effect can be answered

by good ethno-linguistic data on a historical framework, I would invite further investigation on this point as is possible. Causes must precede effects according to the basic principles of logic. But for now without data on the historical evolution of these languages I can only point to the way ahead and not to the final destination.

In these few examples those people with weak modern military histories like Nubians have a relative poor vocabulary of war making and peace-making, for those like the Dinka who traditions include cycles of raiding (negative reciprocity) there are abundant and refined words to make conflict as well as to end conflict. Those with strong military traditions for empire building such as Arabs and Amhara have the richest vocabulary for minute aspects of conflict production and as well as conflict resolution. For those who have faced Arabs as adversaries there numerous loan words from Arabic for military structures and weapons that do not exist within their own cultural and linguistic framework.

For those interested in peace-making, there are strong local traditions and vocabulary for reducing, negotiating, preventing and mediating conflict. Since peace and conflict are the dialectical, but interacting opposites, these terms can be enhanced and brought into the dialogue of peace. The local peace-making folk traditions, religious brotherhoods and Sufi practices can be used effectively to wage a lexical counter attack on war-like traditions and vocabulary. Consciousness and perceptions are deeply rooted in language and for those interested more in peace than war this may be a very useful place to start cross-cultural understanding and discourse. If we reconstruct and reformulate conceptualizations that "other" people it might be a lot harder to be violent to fellow human beings. Besides, a bad conversation about peace may still better than a good war; it is hard to think and talk about making peace while actively trying to wage or "win" war.

Acknowledgements

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THE POLITICS OF LINGUISTIC INDIGENOUSNESS IN THE SUDAN

ASHRAF ABDELHAY, BUSI MAKONI AND SINFREE MAKONI

Introduction

In this chapter we attempt to interrogate the construct of 'indigenous languages' which is embedded in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (henceforth CPA) signed between the 'south' (represented by the Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement, SPLA/M) and the north (represented by the National Congress Party, NCP) in Sudan in 2005. We show that the term 'indigenous languages' was an integral part of a colonial constructionist project that came to structure the south-north social relations and identities. Hence we aim to problematise the 'naturalised' notions of 'indigenous languages', which accompanied the reification of the idea of separate north and south Sudans, by revealing their colonial character.(1) The CPA has emerged as a historical product of both the colonial and postcolonial policies to undo their effects. This chapter builds on and draws on research which contributes to the debate on the ways in which the discourse of indigenous sociolinguistics is imagined not just in Sudan but in significant parts of Africa.(2)

The term 'Sudan' has various etymological interpretations in the literature.(3) For example, Muslim traders and intellectuals called the region south of the Sahara '*Bilad al-Sudan*' (Land of the Black) to refer to the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea, including the lands between present-day Senegal and Ethiopia. The French, on the other hand, used the label 'Sudan' to refer to the current Mali, while the British used the term 'Sudanese' to define the inhabitants of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, in intended contrast with the Egyptians.(4) An analysis of the historical trajectories of the term 'Sudan' points to the ways in which its disparate peoples have been imagined by various forces as a 'nation'. This chapter is a contribution to this analytic project by examining one of the

ideological instruments involved in the construction of identities in the Sudan: 'indigenous languages'.

As a present-day geopolitical entity, Sudan is located in the north eastern part of Africa. Sudan is the largest country in Africa (nearly one million square miles), and it is surrounded by the following nine neighbouring countries: Egypt, Libya, Chad, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Kenya, Ethiopia, and Eritrea. The Sudan is rich in the variety of its languages, cultures and peoples, each of which is part of the total heritage and contributes to the pattern of national life. The Sudan prides itself on being the 'crossroads of Africa.'(5)   The importance of the geographical location of the Sudan within Africa can be appreciated when it is realised that the country contains within its borders representatives of all the major defined African language families, except the Khoisan languages of South Africa.

The linguistic wealth of the Sudan has brought it to the frontline in the scholarship of African languages. The number of languages of the Sudan listed in the Ethnologue database is 142, of which 134 are living languages, and eight are extinct.(6) The national and official language of the Sudan before 2005 was Arabic. The current peace agreement, which ended one of the longest wars in Africa between the north and the south of the Sudan and was enshrined in the Interim National Constitution, names both English and Arabic as official languages (see Protocol of Power Sharing). Arabic is a widely distributed language in the northern part of the country due to the fact that Arabic had, and still enjoys, the status of the national and official language of the whole country, with the exception of the southern Sudan. A caveat should be added here. Although we use the names of these languages from Ethnologue, we are aware of the complexities of the process of naming, and even the very activity of categorising these linguistic resources, since in some cases the names used by the Ethnologue database are at variance with those used by speakers of those languages. We also draw attention to the fact that listing of languages, although useful in terms of exposition, overlooks the fact that individuals have a considerable number of languages which they understand but do not speak, and it points to the multilingual (and multiglossic) nature of some Sudanese speakers.

According to Francis Deng, Sudan is a country of immense racial, cultural, ethnic, and religious diversity.(7) The diversities involved in the country's composition are frequently, at the political level, referred to as falling into two main divisions, the north and the south. The north, making up two-thirds of the country in land and population, is inhabited by local tribal groups of which the dominant intermarried with incoming Arab

traders, and over the centuries produced a genetically mixed African-Arab racial and cultural hybrid. Although there are large numbers of non-Arab communities in the north, the north has been identified with Islam and Arabic language as a common system of communication. The south, which constitutes the remaining third in land and population, was ascribed an African identity in its racial and cultural composition, and is characterised by Christianity, the English language and local languages. It should be noted that this north-south broad demarcation works only at the political/ideological level but does not reflect the reality of the complex social fabrics of the Sudan. The north should not be conceptualised in monolithic and reductionist terms as a culturally homogeneous region. Rather, it is a socio–culturally heterogeneous area and its cultural and linguistic diversity is inscribed in the various social dialects spoken by the different tribal groups residing in the northern part of the country. Suffice it here to note that the current civil conflict in the Darfurian region has problematised the very political notion of the 'North' and revealed the cultural diversity of the western Sudan, which was historically framed as part of the northern Sudan.(8)

We perform a critical analysis of the social historical conditions that have led to the invention of indigenous languages out of the existing (undifferentiated) linguistic resources. In the course of doing so, we contend that the use of the technical phrase 'indigenous languages' is a politically motivated act intended to function as a metaphorical strategy of symbolic differentiation of 'African south' from the 'Arabic/Arabised north.'(9) The aim of these colonial constructs is purely ideological and pragmatic. Employing their European conceptual apparatuses, the British colonial regime invented 'indigenous languages' out of the existing linguistic resources, created artificial tribal boundaries, established 'imperial families' in the north, and constructed different racial hierarchical classifications of the populations. The process of the colonial construction of linguistic differences led to the situation where Arabic and Islam were communicated and interpreted as congruent boundary system markers in the north. The focus here is not so much on the authenticity/falsity of national identity, rather it is on the 'mode of generation of practices,' and the ways in which these practices are constructed/imagined; and the role played by language as a practice in the production and maintenance of social order.(10) A caveat should be added here. Although the main intention behind this endeavour is to show the historical reality of the notion 'indigenous languages' by situating it within the geopolitical structures that produced it, the role of local agency in these processes should not be ignored or denied.(11) So the distribution of agency in the

social construction of indigenous languages/traditions is something to be researched on the basis of further empirical and historical data. More importantly, we should be cautious of the temptation to generalise or extend the arguments made here on linguistic indigeneity to other social contexts without evidential documentation (whether textual or ethnographic).

A related goal is to make a contribution to the ways in which ethnicising and racialising discourses can be interrogated and deconstructed. Our driving concern is that, if we uncritically accept the taken-for-grantedness of the ways in which 'indigenous languages/knowledges' have been produced, our ability to transform our realities will remain severely colonialised.(12) We intend, as our ultimate goal, to demonstrate that these realities do not exist unproblematically out there in the African space, but rather they are a product of specific language ideologies.(13) During the course of analysing the historical contexts which have conditioned or shaped the north-south relation, we show that the necessary correlation of Arabic with Islam is a product of the colonial policy in the Sudan that involved the process of 'invention of traditions,' creation of tribes, and the construction of 'indigenous languages.'(14) We show that the linguistic dimension of the colonial Southern Policy provides one of the significant and meaningful social contexts for understanding the historical genealogy of the southern social struggle; hence it is revealing of the 'hidden agenda' that lies behind the colonial imagining of indigenous languages. It is our intention to indicate that the discourse of linguistic indigenousness is far from being innocent, but rather it is politically motivated. This requires a critique of one of the central constructs in institutional language planning: the notion of indigenous languages.

Before proceeding, some points concerning the scope and the organisation of the chapter should be made. First, one of the primary objectives is to perform a critical analysis of the historical conditions as well as the ideological motivations behind the colonial construction of 'indigenous languages'. Although colonial and postcolonial language policies have impacted on the whole Sudan, much of the focus in this chapter is on a longitudinal relation along the Nile and its tributaries. The reason behind this restriction is that the question of the 'national language' was/has been an arena of the longest civil wars in Africa.(15) Thus, the historical narrative of the way in which the new sociolinguistic order as foreseen in the current new language policy (Naivasha language policy[16]) was constructed should be critically considered from the perspective of the south-north relationship. Another point refers to the scope of a key temporal word used in this chapter. By the colonial period,

we mean, unless otherwise indicated, the Condominium of 1899–1956 (the Anglo-Egyptian rule of Sudan). A complete review of the language situation beyond the Condominium is beyond the limitations of this chapter, albeit an occasional mention will be made where necessary.

Second, although part of the focus in this chapter is on the colonial narrative of social identities in the Sudan, this should not be taken to imply that the pre-colonial histories are unimportant or should be ignored. A view which adopts this position is acritical. There was and still is an interaction between the pre-colonial, colonial, and postcolonial histories. This continuist perspective asserts the fact that the colonial and postcolonial orders did not occur in a social vacuum. We should also hasten to add that the relationship between the colonial and postcolonial orders of indexicality is dialectical. The British colonialism interacted with the local ethnic politics, shaping and being shaped by local language planning practices. In some 'forgotten contexts,' or rather 'subjugated knowledges;' it is the 'local/periphery' which had a shaping influence on the 'centre'.(17) The intellectual genealogy of the discipline of applied linguistics in itself is a good case in point.(18) We are hoping that a critical analysis of the colonial invention of ethnic boundaries can help us sidestep the essentialist trap of commonsensically viewing the 'northern' and the 'southern' identities as unproblematically and statically fixed or given. Conceptualising ethnic boundaries as contextually dynamic and interactively dialogic may permit us to visualise the role of the 'ideologies of linguistic differentiation' in the processes of fixing and 'naturalising' ethnolinguistic boundaries.

Theoretical background

One of the key concepts underlying the discipline of language planning is 'indigenous languages.'(19) A number of studies have deconstructed and challenged the ways in which the conventional construct of 'indigeneity' is invented/narrated/imagined.(20) In essence, these studies aim at critiquing the Western ideational representation of the 'Other'. S. Makoni and U. Meinhof rightly argue that 'much of our systematic knowledge of African societies is derived from and continues to be produced by Western sources.'(21) Z. Sardar notes that 'if Eurocentrism is intrinsic in the way we think and conceptualise, it is also inherent in the way we organise knowledge.'(22). D. Macedo states that 'colonialism imposes "distinction" as an ideological yardstick against which all other values are measured. This ideological yardstick serves to overcelebrate the dominant group's values to a level of mystification, and on the other hand,

it devalues other expressions.'(23). Sardar points out that the real power of the West (as a conceptual and instrumental apparatus) resides in its definitional power of the elements of the non-Western discourses of universe, which in turn has to accept this Eurocentric image or suffer victimisation.(24) The notion of 'indigenous languages' has been particularly problematised in a number of African contexts, since it both entails special type of local knowledge, and has significant implications for the discourse of linguistic survival and language rights.

According to Mamdani the colonial policy of Indirect Rule in Africa made a basic distinction between two types of individuals: indigenous (native) and non-indigenous (non-native).(25) Another important related classification by the colonial regime is that of 'races' and 'ethnicities'. Indigenous groups were defined in ethnic terms, non-natives in racial terms (e.g., Europeans, Asians, Hamites, etc.). Ethnicities (or tribes) were identified as 'primitive' or 'backward', while races as 'civilised' and 'modern'. Races (of non-natives/settlers) were governed through civil society which was considered the site of human rights. Hence, civil rights belonged to settlers or non-natives. By contrast, ethnicities of indigenous groups were ruled through customary law and traditions. Mamdani argues that 'if we understand civil society not as idealised prescription but as a historical construct, we will recognise that the original sin of civil society was racism.'(26) The colonial principle of Indirect Rule in Africa held that if the West had historical nations with states, then Africa was assumed to have 'tribes' with native authorities as an inevitable evolutionary stage (hence the colonial policy of 'Native Administration').(27) Although there was a plethora of customary laws, only the chief's power was validated as the 'genuine' version of such native laws. This led the reductive 'authoritarian' interpretation of native customs as 'indigenous' to be a colonial invention. In this chapter we substantiate this argument with historical data from the colonial period. It should be remarked that the way in which the term 'indigenous' is used in the majority of not just linguistic but also socio-political debates is largely ahistorical. Maurial notes:

> From its origin, the word 'indigenous' has been loaded with ideological connotations. Its coinage is inextricably linked to colonialism. Even if the term was coined from the colonisers (the outsiders), nowadays the term, as it is used by indigenous peoples, connotes plurality instead of otherness. (28)

What is required, in our view, is an acknowledged awareness of the historical genealogy and the ideological connotations of the term 'indigenous' in order to avoid any essentialisation and romanticisation.

The term 'indigenous' has acquired a synchronic life of its own. A number of specialised international and regional agencies, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and advocacy groups are devoted to the human rights concerns of 'indigenous' populations.(29) The phrase 'indigenous' people has become legally binding in international law (e.g., the ILO; UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations; Study of the Problem of Discrimination against Indigenous Populations.)(30) Let us take just one example of an international legal body which deals with the rights of 'indigenous' populations/people. The International Labour Organisation (ILO) adopted in 1957 the first binding international instrument (Convention No. 107) on the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples.(31) The ILO was founded in 1919, and as the only surviving major formation of the Treaty of Versailles, which brought the League of Nations into existence, it became the first UN specialised agency in 1946. The ILO revised Convention No. 107 with ILO Convention No. 169 in 1989. The latter came into force in 1991.(32) Convention No. 169 makes an explicit mention of 'indigenous languages' (Convention No. 107 of 1957, by contrast, used 'mother tongue' and 'vernacular language'). Article 28 in Convention No. 169 is concerned with the issue of mother tongue education for children of 'indigenous' communities:

1. Children belonging to the peoples concerned shall, wherever practicable, be taught to read and write in their own indigenous language or in the language most commonly used by the group to which they belong. When this is not practicable, the competent authorities shall undertake consultations with these peoples with a view to the adoption of measures to achieve this objective.
2. Adequate measures shall be taken to ensure that these peoples have the opportunity to attain fluency in the national language or in one of the official languages of the country.
3. Measures shall be taken to preserve and promote the development and practice of the indigenous languages of the peoples concerned.

Convention No. 169 (Article 1) provides a definition of 'indigenous peoples' upon which the above language-in-education policy should be based.

1.   (a) Tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or regulations;

(b) Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions.

2.   Self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for determining the groups to which the provisions of this Convention apply.

Consequently, the use of the term 'indigenous languages' in nation-state language policies is, at least in principle, far from desultory, since its implications are rather intertextual and compatible with the international legal discourse on the rights of 'indigenous people.' What indigenous meant socially and politically also varied considerably depending on the nature, character, and history of the nation-state, and the relationship between being a nation and state. For example, the use of the term 'indigenous languages' in the Naivasha language policy within the context of the power-sharing arrangement between the south and the north in the Sudan is far from being symbolic, but rather instrumental. It grants the south the right to external self-determination. Before proceeding it should be remarked that the terms 'people' and 'population' have different implications in international law.(33) It is generally agreed that the former emphasises the associated rights of self-determination, whereas the latter does not.(34) The ILO's Convention No. 107 of 1957 completely avoided the expression 'indigenous peoples' and used instead 'indigenous populations'. The Working Group was made to replace the term 'peoples' with 'populations' in the first draft of the 'UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples' following the opposition of, among others, the UK, the USA, and France to the use of the word 'peoples.'(35) This terminological problematic may be the reason behind the fact the ILO's Convention No. 169 not only contained both terms in its title, but also had to add the caveat that (Article 1:3): 'The use of the term peoples in this Convention shall not be construed as having any implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law.'

In the African context, indigenous languages were created through the codification of dialects by missionaries and the construction of unified standard vernaculars. These vernaculars then were used as the medium of instruction in the educational system. Current research also shows that there was considerable variation in how individual missionaries approached the task of constructing languages.(36) This process renders