Discourse Dynamics

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The brain is not a representational machine; the concept of representation has no future, the brain is a simulator of actions and an emulator of reality. (cf. Dynamic theory of the operation of the brain, Alain Berthoz.)

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CHAPTER ZERO

INTRODUCTION

0.1. Theoretical framework

Our study follows the general linguistic framework of integrated pragmatics of the French language, or the Theory of Argumentation in the Language-system, which has been developed by the French linguist Oswald Ducrot and his collaborators since 1970, and the specific theoretical framework of discourse dynamics, a theoretical approach developed by Marta Tordesillas which outlines a semantics of argumentation and enunciation.

Our general theoretical framework, the Theory of Argumentation in the Language-System, forms part of the tradition of structuralist linguistics, which was initiated by the work of the linguist Ferdinand de Saussure at the beginning of the twentieth century, and post-structuralist linguistics, which developed from the work of the linguist Émile Benveniste, among others. The Theory of Argumentation in the Language-System is based fundamentally on two significant distinguishing factors: first, pragmatic features are encoded in the linguistic system, and second, the linguistic system contains instructions on their possible uses. We will retain its strong hypothesis: Ducrot asserts that the primary function of language is argumentative and not representational, rejects any theory which maintains that the main objective of language is the representation of reality, and postulates the autonomy of language from reality, as well as the autonomy of enunciation, asserting the self-referential nature of any act of enunciation, its polyphonic character, and its position at the heart of language itself.

Our specific theoretical framework, discourse dynamics, is an innovative approach within the Theory of Argumentation in the Language-System which is thus of distinctly Ducrotian inspiration, and is an outline of a semantics of argumentation and enunciation from which Tordesillas has developed new semantic categories to describe the dynamics of discourse.

0.2. A concrete example of a descriptive grammatical category: the unsolved problem of causality

Being conscious of the necessity of formulating new linguistic descriptions that better correspond with what we know of linguistic reality, we have concentrated on a concrete example—the concepts of cause and causality, which are present in the majority of descriptive grammars. We intend to revise the classification of these concepts as valid descriptive grammatical categories, highlighting the limits of their descriptive validity on a scientific level.

We have become interested in the concept of causality present in dictionaries and grammars of the French language. Our investigations began with the intention of delimiting the concept of causality as a grammatical category, which led us to approach the philosophical concept of causality as well as the scientific concept of causality, both of which are sources for the descriptive grammatical category. We found that the concept of causality originated in pre-Socratic science and philosophy, areas in which, over the course of centuries, a complex dialectic of ideas has unfolded, no less fruitful for its complexity, which from the cognitivist point of view forms the basis for what we will call the problem of causality, a general set of issues which, in our understanding, remain unresolved. These investigations have led us to question whether the descriptive grammatical category of causality, although so popular, is scientifically valid, from the point of view of theoretical linguistics.

0.3. A concrete example of a linguistic category: discourse connectives linked to the grammatical paradigm of causality

The literature on connectives is certainly extensive, so much so that we can say that for every theoretical approach to language there is a specific description of the linguistic category of discourse connectives. This plurality is problematic if we are dealing with (and this is the position we take) a single linguistic category, discourse connectives. We have highlighted the limits of the current plurality of descriptions of this category, and this is what we refer to as the problem of discourse connectives, a problem which undoubtedly belongs to the field of linguistics as a whole and which, in the present case, we will attempt to solve as it applies to the French language, paying particular attention to discourse connectives related to the grammatical paradigm of causality (understood as causation, attainment and, consequently, conclusivity). We

will see that the problem of discourse connectives is amplified by the tenuous relevance of that grammatical paradigm.

0.4. Corpus of study

We have drawn our corpus of occurrences from the work of the French writer Simone de Beauvoir—specifically, from two of her novels, *Les Mandarins* [*The Mandarins*] (1954) and *Mémoires d'une jeune fille rangée* [*Memoirs of a Dutiful Daughter*] (1958), which are available from the database of literary texts, Frantext, and from which we have selected a total of 614 occurrences of discourse dynamics linked to the grammatical paradigm of causality, that is, those which are determined by the relation of cause/effect, cause/consequence or, in terms which conform more closely to our descriptive principles, argument/conclusion. To that end, we have identified discourse dynamics involving two connectives associated with the aforementioned discourse dynamics: 223 occurrences of discourse dynamics associated with the connective *donc*, and 391 occurrences of discourse dynamics associated with the connective *alors*.

After evaluating the lexical descriptions proposed for the pair of connectives *donc* and *alors* by the TLF, the grammatical descriptions proposed by Grevisse and by Riegel, Pellat and Rioul, and the linguistic descriptions proposed by Charlotte Hybertie within the framework of the linguistics of enunciation, we will propose a preliminary surface classification of the corpus of occurrences based on the criterion of the position of the discourse connective within the predicative structure. Appreciating the descriptive limits of the surface classification of the corpus of occurrences, we will extend the proposal to the specific framework of the outline of a semantics of argumentation and enunciation (SAE), and to the new descriptive apparatus of discourse dynamics.

From the results, we will formulate a theoretical proposal which attempts to complement, and specify, the polyphonic theory of enunciation, with the aim of coming up with a more meticulous and, if possible, more rigorous description of discourse dynamics, which will deepen our understanding of the structural configuration of enunciative polyphony.

0.5. Research methodology

Firstly, we will define the problem of causality—understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity—as our first hypothesis:

H_1 = P. CAUSALITY (the problem of causality, understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity)

Having outlined the scope of Hypothesis H_1, we will question the limits of its validity.

Secondly, we will use an *a contrario* argument to attempt to demonstrate that H_1 is not a valid hypothesis.

Thus, we will begin our study by exploring the concepts of cause and causality which appear in dictionaries and grammars of the French language, which will allow us to understand the main aspects of the problem of causality.

Of the major dictionaries of the French language, we have chosen the *Trésor de la langue française*, because it is a work of clear scientific rigour, paying as much attention to the past usage of words as it does to present usage (although the scope of the present study is purely synchronic). A dictionary with a pragmatic bent, its summaries of the usage of the terms "cause" and "causality" will allow us to establish their lexical properties, which make up what we refer to as their common meaning. Given the salience of the philosophical aspect, we will investigate the genesis of the philosophical description of causality and cause in Western thought in the pre-modern era, a period in which the debate surrounding the problem of causality crystallized, both in philosophy and science in general. We will question the validity of this general problem.

Of the major grammars of the French language, we have chosen a grammar with a traditional bent, Grevisse's *Le Bon Usage*, which acts as a descriptive grammar and a normative grammar, in addition to being a reference grammar, and which is *de rigueur* for many scholars of the French language. It makes a laudable attempt to exhaustively classify all the words in the French language. We have also selected two grammars which are more innovative, either in integrating certain linguistic perspectives into their description of the French language, as is the case with Riegel, Pellat and Rioul's *Grammaire méthodique du français*, or in developing an original grammatical discourse, as is the case with Charaudeau's *Grammaire du sens et de l'expression*. We will attempt to evaluate, within the framework of each of these grammars, the descriptive grammatical criteria associated with the concepts of both "causality" and "cause," the different grammatical categories associated with them, as well as the theoretical linguistic foundations on which they are built. This evaluation will allow us to establish the grammatical properties associated with these two terms.

Thus constituted, the lexical and grammatical properties associated with the concepts of causality and cause should allow us to cover the general problem of causality as it is represented in language, both in its common usage and its grammatical description.

Next, we will attempt to extensively assess the general problem of causality which we have just defined within the framework of French linguistics, which will lead us to formulate our second hypothesis, which, again, we will evaluate, questioning the limits of its validity:

> H_2: Given that the theory of causality is invalid within the theoretical framework of the descriptive grammar of the French language, we will show that, by extension, it is also invalid within the theoretical framework of French linguistics.

We will evaluate our second hypothesis within the general framework of French linguistics, and in relation to the general category of discourse connectives—specifically, with reference to the descriptive proposals of two linguists, Jean-Claude Anscombre and Gaston Gross, both of whom have approached this problem through the study of discourse connectives. Anscombre proposes a linguistic definition of the concept of cause, and Gross generalizes a paradigm of causality to include those relations which traditional grammars call cause, consequence, finality, concession and condition.

We will introduce the general problem of discourse connectives, starting with various descriptions of discourse connectives from different linguistic theories. We will be confronted with a descriptive plurality which is difficult to resolve, and from which two more hypotheses arise, which we will also evaluate:

> H_3: Every linguistic theory in which the theory of causality is valid is of a referential nature.
>
> H_4: Every linguistic theory in which the theory of causality is invalid is of a non-referential nature.

We will broadly outline the principal trends in pragmatics, setting out their theoretical foundations, which will allow us to come to terms with different conceptions of language, which in turn will allow us to put forward our own general theoretical framework, integrated pragmatics of the French language, or the Theory of Argumentation in the Language-System, and our specific descriptive framework, the outline of a semantics of argumentation and enunciation, with regards to the discourse dynamics of language. Both of these frameworks are situated within a non-

referential conception of language, with the implications that this position entails for the problems which have been posed: the problem of causality, or the grammatical paradigm of causality, that is, all those occurrences which are determined by the relation of cause/effect, cause/consequence, or argument/conclusion; and the problem of discourse connectives, in particular those which are involved in the paradigm of causality, those which articulate relations of causation, attainment or conclusivity. This will lead us to sketch the outline of a theoretical proposal regarding the discourse figure of the speaker.

We will present our corpus of study, consisting of occurrences of the French connectives *donc* and *alors* which we have taken from the literary oeuvre of Simone de Beauvoir, from which we will propose a classification based on the position which the connective occupies within the predicative structure, from which we will derive a structural categorization. Next, we will select a study sample which will be analyzed within the theoretical framework of the latest formulation of the Theory of Argumentation in the Language-System, the Theory of Semantic Blocks, which will allow us to specify, for a given discourse dynamic, the configuration of its argumentative potential. Using our theoretical outline regarding the figure of the speaker, our discourse algorithm, we will also specify the configuration of its enunciative polyphony.

CHAPTER ONE

ORIGINS OF THE PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY

We begin our study by examining the concepts of causality and cause, which will allow us to establish the main facets of the problem of causality—understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity—a general problem whose relevance we intend to question, since, as we will see, the majority of grammatical descriptions of the French language consider causality, in the terms we have outlined above, to be a grammatical category, following ingrained conceptual habits.

Research methodology:

We will define *in extenso* the problem of causality—understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity—as our first hypothesis:

H_1 = PROBLEM OF CAUSALITY

We will outline, within the theoretical framework of the descriptive grammar of the French language, the scope of Hypothesis H_1, and we will then question the limits of its validity.

To that end, we will develop an *a contrario* argument to attempt to show that the problem of causality does not exist and that H_1 is therefore neither a necessary hypothesis nor a sufficient one, which will lead us to conclude that H_1 is not a valid hypothesis, and that therefore the theory of causality is invalid within the theoretical framework of the descriptive grammar of the French language.

From the existing dictionaries we have selected the TLF, for its scientific rigour and its focus on pragmatics. We will concentrate on the descriptions given by this dictionary of the concepts of causality and cause, from which we will distill a set of lexical properties associated with these concepts. Next, we will investigate philosophical conceptions of these concepts in pre-modern Western thought, including their historical development. Classical thought, represented by the pre-Socratics, Plato, and Aristotle, is consolidated in Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes,

four cognitive principles which, over the course of history, were reduced to one, so that at the beginning of medieval thought, causality was conceptualized in terms of the efficient cause, or the necessary relation between cause and effect. Later, Galileo, Hobbes, and Hume, to cite a few examples, established the principle of the efficient cause as a universal law governing the phenomenal domain, a principle which forms the basis for modern thought.

We will assess the problem of causality (understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity), our hypothesis H_1, in selected grammars of the French language, those of Grevisse, Riegel, Pellat and Rioul, and Charaudeau. We will focus on the descriptive grammatical criteria associated by these authors with the concepts of causality and cause, and the different grammatical categories associated with them, which will allow us to establish the grammatical properties associated with both concepts. Next, we will contrast the grammatical properties found in each of grammatical discourses we have examined with the previously formulated philosophical properties.

This evaluation will bring us to question the theoretical linguistic foundations of the aforementioned authors. We will attempt to delineate the limits of their descriptive apparatus for the proposed grammatical categories, which will, out of necessity, lead us to attempt to formulate new descriptions which better correspond to our current knowledge of actual linguistic data.

1.1. Causality or the principle of the efficient cause

1.1.1. Causality and lexical description

1.1.1.1. Causality

The dictionary of the French language, the *Trésor de la langue française* (Volume 5: 318), defines the word "causality" as, on the one hand, the relation of cause and effect, or a causal link or connection, and on the other hand, the principle of causality, which it defines as the principle which states that everything has a cause, a principle which it illustrates with the following quote:

> "…*le principe de causalité* est le fondement nécessaire de la connaissance même la plus légère du monde, du plus faible soupçon de son existence ; et expliquer *le principe de causalité* par le spectacle du monde que peut seul donner *le principe de causalité*, c'est, encore une fois,

> expliquer le principe par le conséquence." Cousin, *Histoire de la Philosophie du XVIII siècle*, 1829, p. 224. (...*the principle of causality* is the necessary foundation for even the slightest understanding of the world, for even the least inkling of its existence; and to explain *the principle of causality* by the sight of the world, which can only give *the principle of causality*, is, once again, to explain the principle by the consequence.)

It adds that, in the field of the experimental sciences, causality is understood as the constant and necessary relation between two phenomena. It points out that, by metonymy, it is also understood as that which makes something a cause; the quality of being a cause; action.

The TLF notes that, in general, the term "causality" refers to the relation of cause and effect, and in that sense it speaks of a causal link or connection. It notes that, in the history of ideas, the principle of causality has been seen as a necessary principle for any understanding of the world. It also notes that, in the experimental sciences, it is further said that the quality of causal connection is, at the phenomenal level, constant and necessary. Finally, it notes the existence of a quality of being a cause, or that which makes something a cause, which is linked to action.

1.1.1.2. Cause

The first definition given by the TLF for the term "cause" is a matter or an issue which is the subject of a dispute or trial. The second definition for the term "cause" which it gives is that which produces an effect, a definition which is primarily connected to two ideas, the first being the idea of origin or principle and the second being that which accounts for the conditions of existence of an entity, or its nature – that which allows us to understand it. It understands origin or principle to mean that which makes objects or beings exist, which is why God is referred to as the first cause or the supreme or universal cause, that is, a cause which acts independently, itself having no cause:

> "Si Dieu est absolu, il n'est pas cause première : une idée de cause implique, en effet, une relation de cause à effet. Si cherchant à détourner l'obstacle, on suppose qu'il existait par lui-même avant d'être cause et créateur, il cesse d'être infini, car l'infini suppose tous les modes d'existences possibles, et simultanés." Estaunié, *L'Empreinte*, 1896, p. 267. (If God is absolute, He is not the first cause: indeed, the idea of cause implies a relation of cause and effect. If, wishing to avoid the obstacle, we suppose that He existed by Himself before being cause and creator, he

would cease to be infinite, since the infinite supposes all possible modes of existence simultaneously.)

It defines a second cause as a cause which is dependent on another cause, and a final cause as a cause which has its origin an intended goal:

> "Né d'une cause finale, l'univers est nécessairement imprégné de finalité, c'est-à-dire que l'on ne saurait en aucun cas y dissocier l'explication des êtres de la considération de leur raison d'être." Gilson, *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale*, 1981, p. 107. (Born from a final cause, the universe is necessarily impregnated with finality, which is to say that in no way can we dissociate the explanation of human beings from the consideration of their reason for existence.)

It connects the idea of that which accounts for the conditions of existence of an entity, or its nature, and the idea of that which allows us to understand an it, with the idea of producing or giving rise to an entity, the principle which inspires an action, understood as its motive or reason. Finally, it notes that in the experimental sciences, a cause is that which, as a constant and necessary condition, is correlated with the production of a phenomenon: "la même cause produit toujours le meme effet"—the same cause always produces the same effect.

> "[il s'agit de] saisir dans toutes les circonstances qui accompagnent la production du phénomène celle qui constitue réellement son déterminisme et qui doit être appelée sa cause prochaine." Bernard, *Principes de Médecine Expérimentale*, 1878, p. 4. (It is a matter of apprehending, of all the circumstances accompanying the production on a phenomenon, which one is in fact its determining factor, which should be called its proximate cause.)

In addition to defining a cause as a matter or an issue, the TLF defines a cause as that which produces an effect, and in that sense it connects it firstly to the idea of origin or source of existence—from which derive the first cause (the uncaused cause, or God), the second cause (which is dependent on another cause), and the final cause (whose origin is an intended goal)—and secondly to the idea of that which allows us to understand an entity, its motive or its reason. In the experimental sciences, cause refers to the necessary and constant condition for the production of any phenomenon.

1.1.1.3. Partial conclusions

From lexical descriptions of the concepts of causality and cause, we can see that they are heterogeneous concepts present in many disparate fields of study (the history of philosophy, philosophy, the history of scientific thought, the experimental sciences, theology, jurisprudence, cognitive science…). We consider each of these lexical descriptions to be a lexical property associated with the concepts of causality and cause, all of them somehow present in their common usage by speakers. By common usage, we mean that which is learned implicitly or explicitly by speakers, the fruit of the repetition of received knowledge, which over time becomes consolidated in the speakers' beliefs, until it ceases to be questioned.

A. *Lexical properties associated with the concept of causality*
i. The relation of cause and effect
ii. Cognitive principle
iii. Law governing the phenomenal domain
iv. Dynamic quality; action

B. *Lexical properties associated with the concept of cause*
i. Matter or issue
ii. Origin
iii. Source of existence
iv. Constant and necessary condition governing the phenomenal domain

Given the heavily conceptual and philosophical tenor of the notions of causality and cause, we will examine the descriptions of these concepts in philosophical thought, since, as we will see, many of the properties outlined above originated and developed in this area of study.

1.1.2. Causality and philosophical description

Causality, understood as a law of cause and effect governing occurrences in the phenomenal domain, also called causation, has established itself as a strong belief in thought driven by philosophy and science, beginning in the classical age. We will give a brief overview of the obstacles which this law, now widely believed, has faced, from its emergence in classical thought to its consolidation in modern thought.

A culminating point for the pre-Socratic thinkers as well as for Plato, Aristotle brought about the first systematization of the concept of cause in

Western thought with his doctrine of the four causes and his desire to understand causes as well as principles, a legacy revived by modernity and its positivist impulse, by thinkers such as Galileo, Hobbes, and Hume, to name a few.

1.1.2.1. Classical thought

Aristotle's doctrine of the four causes was developed from a critical examination of the writings of his predecessors, the so-called pre-Socratic naturalists (Metaphysics I, 4-10), whose thought revolved around the search for a universal substance which was the origin of all things. For some it was macrocosmic: for Thales of Miletus, it was water; for Anaximenes and Diogenes, air; for Hippasus and Heraclitus, fire; and for Empedocles, the four elements. For others it was microcosmic: Pythagoras believed that numbers were the origin of all things, while Leucippus and Democritus based their theories on atoms. These attempts to formulate a static, primitive principle for the origin of all things formed the basis for what Aristotle would call the material cause. Anaxagoras went beyond the idea of a static principle or material cause and introduced an ordering intelligence, which he considered the cause of physical and mechanical movement, which formed the basis for what Aristotle would call the moving cause (Reale 1999:25). Searching for a universal substance which was the origin of all things, the pre-Socratic thinkers postulated macrocosmic primitive principles or elements as well as formulating theories of microcosmic primitive principles such as numbers or atoms. In addition to these static principles, they also formulated dynamic ones, intangible ordering principles which caused the movement of observable objects.

The idea of the existence of a reality beyond the senses began with Plato, who aimed to explain the reason for the beauty of objects, which led him to postulate the existence of a superior cause, which as a result of being the true cause cannot be perceived by the senses, but only by the intelligence. He defined it as the formal cause, which corresponds to his concept of Forms, which are the true appearance of objects, since objects in the physical world are nothing more than a material copy of Forms and are only real insofar as they participate in the Reality of the Forms of which they are copies. Thus, Reality being external to the world as perceived by the senses, the formal cause in the Platonic sense can be understood as an extrinsic causality. Plato also defined an efficient cause, originating from the Demiurge, an Intelligence which gives shape to formless material on the basis of the Forms, which can be understood as an

intrinsic causality. Aristotle took up these extrinsic and intrinsic causalities and redefined them within his own ontology, using two major conceptual oppositions: material/form and actuality/potentiality. Material is the substance which constitutes any body, and form is the organization of the material. Actuality is the fact of having, in a given moment, one and only one form, and potentiality is the possibility of taking on any form. If Plato questioned the principle of reality, Aristotle questioned the principles of the organization and temporality of the sensory world, and thus he proposed a new articulation of the principle of causality, making reference not to an extra-sensory reality external to the dimension of time, which Plato defined as a moving image of eternity, but to organization and temporality, notions which belong to a sensory reality which integrates forms so that they become immanent.

In the Physics (II, 3 and 7) and the Metaphysics (I, 3 and V, 2), Aristotle defined a first concept of cause as a rational principle for explaining the change of state of an object. He explained that there must necessarily be a finite number of causes, and determined that, with regards to the sensory world, they were limited to four: the formal cause, the material cause, the efficient cause, and the final cause.

The formal cause is the form or essence of objects: the soul, for human beings; certain structural relations, for geometric figures; a certain formal structure, for works of art, etc. The material cause is that which an object is made of: flesh and bones, for animals; bronze, for a bronze sphere; gold, for a golden cup, etc. The efficient, or moving, cause is that which produces change or movement of objects: the father is the efficient cause of the son, the will is the efficient cause of many human actions, the kick I give to a ball is the efficient cause of its motion, etc. The final cause is the purpose or goal of the existence of an object or the occurrence of an event.

According to Aristotle, these four causes are the principles which form the basis for, condition and structure the existence of objects in the world, the first two (the formal cause and the material cause) being static principles, and the other two (the efficient cause and the final cause) being dynamic principles. Of the four causes, three (the formal, the material, and the final) are intrinsic to the objects of which they are causes, while the efficient cause is extrinsic to and distinct from the object.

The ideas of Aristotle and his doctrine of the four causes survived through the Middle Ages, and it was at the dawn of the modern age that, the material cause being taken for granted as a natural phenomenon, the formal and final causes ceased to be of interest to scientists, not being subject to experimentation, so that the doctrine of the four causes was reduced to a single cause, the efficient cause, or extrinsic causality. The

efficient cause was retained in scientific thought as an extrinsic motive agent, an idea present in the most classic definition, the principle of change and rest (Aristotle, Physics, II, 3, 1994b). In medieval thought, the efficient cause was understood as the agent which produces some change in what was conceived as a patient, upon which the cause acts *ab extrinseco*, from the outside (Bunge 1965:45).

1.1.2.2. Modern thought

The belief that the phenomenal domain is governed by a universal law known as causality, or the law of cause and effect, having been established, a belief that subsumes others (including the belief in the existence of certain primitive substances, in the existence of a primitive substance from which all things originate and the existence of substances which derive from it, and the strong belief in a primitive principle of unity which is its own origin), many learned thinkers attempt to explain causality as a law connecting all observable events.

Thinkers such as Galileo and Hobbes attempt to describe the so-called causal link, that which unites cause and effect, formulating the idea of cause as a necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event:

> "therefore that, whose presence is always followed by the effect and whose elimination always results in the disappearance of the effect, should be called cause, and no other" (Galileo 1981);

> "the cause, therefore, of all effects consists in certain accidents both in the agents and in the patients; which when they are all present, the effect is produced; but if any of them be wanting, it is not produced; and that accident either of the agent or patient, without which the effect cannot be produced, is called *causa sine qua non*, or *cause necessary by supposition*, as also the *cause requisite for the production of the effect*" (Hobbes 1966).

Using the elimination of the cause, accidents or properties, or the effect, to demonstrate the necessary and sufficient character of the causal link, both Galileo and Hobbes highlight the presence or absence of a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for the occurrence of an event and therefore defined causality as a regular process of conditionality, a necessary component of any determination (Bunge 1965:46).

Hume directly questions the *a priori* characterization of the causal link which connects cause and effect, underlying its arbitrary nature, which led him to consider observation as the sole determining test.

> "In a word, then, every effect is a distinct event from its cause. It could not, therefore, be discovered in the cause, and the first invention or conception of it, a priori, must be entirely arbitrary. And even after it is suggested, the conjunction of it with the cause must appear equally arbitrary, since there are always many other effects, which, to reason, must seem fully as consistent and natural. In vain, therefore, should we pretend to determine any single event, or infer any cause or effect, without the assistance of observation and experience" (Hume 1999:25).

He also introduces a second level of questioning by considering the mental representation of events, highlighting the process of association and identification which, in his opinion, we undergo, on the perceptive level, when we attempt to assimilate the causal link, which he defines as an arbitrary observable, to a link of conjunctive nature, and moreover of connective nature.

> "The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was connected: but only that it was conjoined with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be connected. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of connexion? Nothing but that he now feels these events to be connected in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence" (Hume 1999:100).

Hume points out two separate levels of observation, each of which brings with it a specific questioning, the first being the observable event, which is joined by a link which is arbitrary and subject to experience, the second being the mental representation of the observable event and the mental inference on which it is founded. Having made the distinction between the observable and the representation of the observable, Hume affirms that the latter constitutes the proof of the former, and then proposes a definition of the notion of cause.

> "Therefore, we may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or in other words where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed" (Hume 1999:101).

In contrast to his predecessors, Hume considers causality a universal law determined by an efficient cause whose connection is neither necessary nor sufficient, but arbitrary and subject to experience. He establishes two distinct levels of observation, the first being the observable event joined by an arbitrary link, the second being the representation of the observable event joined by a necessary inference. He succeeds in jettisoning the idea of the *a priori* postulated conditionality of the observable event in order to identify it on the representational level of the inference (where an inference is not the same thing as a causal link), transferring the problem to the representational level, which becomes proof of the observable, a new examination of what, in our opinion, is only an additional theoretical level, not sufficient proof of the existence of an observable.

1.1.2.3. Partial conclusions

The necessity of understanding the world which surrounds us and apprehending reality in its totality has led philosophers to systematize descriptions, each more complex and fine-tuned than the last, of the concepts of causality and cause. The following are descriptions of philosophical properties associated with the concepts of causality and cause.

A. *Philosophical properties associated with the concept of causality*
i. Cognitive principle
ii. Object of all science
iii. Principle of change and rest
iv. Universal law
v. Law of eventive cause and effect
vi. Necessary inference between the representation of observed events, and proof of their existence

B. *Philosophical properties associated with the concept of cause*
i. Microcosmic universal substance
ii. Macrocosmic universal substance
iii. Rational principle explaining changes of state of things
iv. Static principle. Formal cause or essence of things
v. Static principle. Material cause or that which things are made of
vi. Dynamic principle. Efficient or moving cause or that which produces change or movement of things

vii. Dynamic principle. Final cause or that which constitutes the goal of actions
viii. Causal link between two events
ix. Necessary and sufficient condition for the occurrence of an event
x. Arbitrary nature of the causal link

The philosophical properties associated with the concepts of causality and cause allow us to more clearly state the general problem of causality (understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity), whose validity we will attempt to question both as a law governing the phenomenal domain and in its representation, both linguistic and non-linguistic, as well as its status as sufficient proof. We are doing this because, as we will see later, the majority of these philosophical properties, out of conceptual habit, underlie the majority of grammatical and linguistic descriptions associated with the concepts of causality and cause.

1.2. Causality and grammatical description

When we approach the grammatical description of a language we have to take into account the fact that any grammatical description is based on a specific theoretical linguistic framework, by which we mean that it necessarily entails a specific conception of both language and the instruments used to describe it, ideas which grammarians often fail to make explicit in their grammars, but which nevertheless are important determining factors of the given description. Every grammarian develops a particular analysis of a given language based on their theoretical linguistic knowledge, but also their knowledge of the world in general, so that different grammatical descriptions each have their own particular descriptive apparatus, each of which is subject to questioning. Grammarians of a given language generate a grammatical description of that language from their knowledge of the world.

These considerations regarding the grammatical discourse, its authorship, and its effect on what we understand as language will accompany us when we examine several grammars of the French language, of which we will contrast the theoretical foundations, both linguistic and general, which will allow us to come up with an evaluative account of the concepts of causality and cause.

Of the descriptive grammars of the French language, we have selected three: Grevisse's *Le Bon Usage*, Riegel, Pellat and Rioul's *Grammaire méthodique du français*, and Charaudeau's *Grammaire du sens et de l'expression*.

We have chosen Grevisse's grammar because it is a traditional descriptive grammar, a normative grammar, and a required reference grammar for most scholars of the French language, and for its exhaustive attempt to classify all the words in the French language and explain their proper usage. And it is the fact of its being a required reference for anyone who wishes to study the French language in depth, in particular, which has led us to examine Grevisse's explicit approach to grammar, which will allow us to apprehend and question both the specific linguistic framework (which is often present on an implicit level) and the underlying epistemological framework.

We have chosen the grammars of Charaudeau and of Riegel, Pellat and Rioul because they are both descriptive grammars of a more innovative bent, from a semantic point of view as well as a linguistic one, and thus they represent, within the general grammatical discourse, a step forward from the traditional grammatical discourse of Grevisse. The attempt of these authors to distance themselves from the exclusive normativity of earlier authors is laudable, as is their attempt to integrate new general linguistic hypotheses in order to reconcile linguistics and semantics (not always with the greatest success), as well as their attempt to develop a specific heuristics, thus facilitating the interpretation of their grammatical hypotheses within a more explicit linguistic framework and a more transparent epistemological framework. Riegel, Pellat and Rioul explicitly apply certain relatively current linguistic and semantic hypotheses to their description of the French language, allowing easier access to the linguistic framework upon which their grammatical discourse is founded.

Charaudeau develops a clearly original grammatical discourse, openly questioning the descriptive limits of a grammar founded on the formal dichotomy of morphology and syntax (as, for example, traditional grammars such as Grevisse's), which he redefines as "expression" in his descriptive apparatus. His descriptive proposal is based on a new dichotomy, sense and expression, which, however, is derived from the previous morphosyntactic dichotomy through a series of logico-linguistic operations.

We will analyze the grammatical categories which each of these authors proposes associated with the general problem of causality (understood as causation, attainment and conclusivity), an analysis which will lead us to revisit long-standing grammatical debates regarding subordination and certain formal categories (adverbs, subordinating conjunctions, and conjunctive locutions), whose linguistic behaviour within the framework of the set of issues which we are concerned with is not at all easy to delimit, and even harder to define clearly; long-standing

linguistic debates about the postulation of a structure of language consisting of superimposed strata (a formal morphosyntactic level, a semantic level…); and long-standing semantic debates about the appropriateness of incorporating concepts such as formal logic, so valuable to scientific thought, into the description of language, an option which is exceedingly attractive but which, for our purposes, hardly makes things clearer.

We will question the descriptive grammatical categories proposed by these authors associated with the problem of causality, which will lead us to formulate a series of grammatical properties, which we will then contrast with the philosophical and lexical properties previously established. Questioning the descriptive value of the proposed grammatical categories (all of them, in our understanding, of a formal nature—adverb, subordinating conjunction, conjunctive locution, subcategories of the instrumental role, logico-linguistic subcategories) will lead us to assess the second problem with which our study is concerned, the problem of discourse connectives, which we will treat more extensively in section 2.

1.2.1. Grevisse's grammar of the French language

1.2.1.1. Descriptive grammatical categories; Selection criteria

In his attempt to classify all the words in the French language, Grevisse proposes dividing the words into categories or classes, which traditionally have been called parts of speech, speech being understood (and this is how Grevisse defines it) as the aggregation of words used to communicate with others. To that end, he associates the categories directly with the nature of words, a notion which he does not define, but which he does oppose with their syntactic function. He begins his attempt at classification, which he develops over nearly a thousand pages, with two basic criteria, which he chooses for their strength and consistency:

a) a morphological criterion, the variability or invariability of words
b) a syntactic criterion, the function which a word is able to receive within a sentence

Following these two classificatory criteria, he establishes eleven categories, five variable (noun, adjective, determiner, pronoun, verb) and six invariable (adverb, preposition, subordinating conjunction,

coordinating conjunction, introducer, word-sentence). We will focus on the first four invariable categories, which he defines based on the syntactic criterion, i.e. the syntactic function which they are able to receive within a sentence:

a) an adverb is able to serve as the complement of a verb, an adjective or another adverb;
b) a preposition establishes a relation of subordination between words and phrases;
c) a subordinating conjunction establishes a relation of subordination between a word (or group of words) and an utterance in which it lacks syntactic function;
d) a coordinating conjunction links words or other elements with the same syntactic function.

Of these four categories (adverb, preposition, subordinating conjunction and coordinating conjunction), he separates the category of adverb from the other three categories (preposition, subordinating conjunction and coordinating conjunction), which he calls linking words (1993:178-180). Of the four categories, we will focus on the grammatical description of the adverb and, of the three categories of invariable words which he calls linking words, the subordinating conjunction, those two categories being the most directly related to the concepts of causality and cause and our hypothesis H_1.

1.2.1.1.1. Grammatical category: Adverb

After defining the adverb as an invariable word which is able to serve as the complement of a verb, adjective, or other adverb (1993:1346), he divides it into three types, from a semantic perspective:

a) adverbs of manner, degree, negation and aspect;
b) adverbs of location and time;
c) adverbs which designate a logical relation (1993:1347).

i. *adverbs of manner*
ainsi, bien, comme, comment, debout, ensemble, exprès, franco, gratis, impromptu, incognito, mal, mieux, pis, plutôt, recta, vite, volontiers (1993:1390)