Analysing Desecuritisation

Analysing Desecuritisation:
The Case of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Education and Water Management

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P U B L I S H I N G

To my mum, Hikmet Balamir...

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PREFACE

This book is a research monograph mainly based on my doctoral research that analyses desecuritisation moves of the Israeli-Palestinian civil societies. This book applies securitisation theory to the Israeli-Palestinian case with a particular focus on the potential for desecuritisation process arising from Israeli-Palestinian cooperation/coexistence efforts in peace education and water management.

The book has two related goals: First of all, stemming from the application of securitisation theory into the Israeli-Palestinian case it is aimed to explore the limits and prospects of securitisation theory as a theoretical framework. Within this context this book reconsiders the concepts, arguments and assumptions introduced by the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. Furthermore, through the analytical framework based on the notion of desecuritisation it is aimed to contribute to the development of desecuritisation as a framework for analysing conflict resolution and peace. The secondary goal is to contribute to debates over problems and prospects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. The book thus explores the prospects for reconciliation in the Israeli-Palestinian case through analysing both desecuritising and securitising processes. Within this context, the book sheds light on the ways in which antagonistic relationships can be changed over time.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CDA	Collaborative for Development Action
COPRI	Copenhagen Peace Research Institute
FoEME	Friends of Earth Middle East
IDF	Israeli Defense Forces
IPCRI	Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information
JWC	Joint Water Committee
JSETs	Joint Supervision and Enforcement Teams
NGOs	Non Governmental Organisations
PA	Palestinian Authority
PLC	Palestinian Legislation Council
PLO	Palestinian Liberation Organisation
PNA	Palestinian National Authority
PRIME	Research Institute in the Middle East
PWA	Palestinian Water Authority
SIDA	Swedish International Development Agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United National Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
UNRWA	United Nation Relief and Works Administration

INTRODUCTION

Securitisation has been developed by a number of scholars affiliated to the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute (COPRI) as a theoretical framework to answer the question of what really makes something a security problem (Wæver 1995:54). It emerged in the context of security debates during the 1990s and in less than two decades it has become one of the most controversial approaches of contemporary Security Studies. The work of Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver and others has made a major contribution to our understanding of the dynamics of security by introducing the concepts of 'securitisation' and 'desecuritisation.'

The terms securitisation and desecuritisation refer both a scholarly tool and an effect of policy. Throughout the book the terms securitisation and desecuritisation are used to refer to a concept, an approach, a process, and a move/initiative. These various meanings are used deliberately. Mainly the concepts of securitisation and descuritisation are developed by Wæver as part of the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework. While securitisation/ desecuritisation refer to the Copenhagen School's approach to analyse securitisation/ desecuritisation processes empirically, the terms securitisation/desecuritisation moves and securitisation/ desecuritisation initiatives are used interchangeably to refer attempts which do not end up as full-fledged securitisation/ desecuritisation processes.

While the securitisation framework has made a major theoretical contribution, few attempts have been made at empirical application and most of these deal with European cases only. They also largely ignore the concept of desecuritisation. Of the few scholars who have attempted to analyse desecuritisation within the context of empirical cases, Paul Roe (2004) analyses the conditions of desecuritisation in the context of minority rights in Europe, Rens Van Munster (2004) explores the desecuritisation of illegal migration in Europe and Andrea Oelsner (2005) attempts to explain regional peace in South America through desecuritisation analysis.

The starting point of this book is a recognition of the gap between the theory and application of the Copenhagen School's securitisation framework particularly with reference to desecuritisation. It addresses the need for the securitisation framework to be applied to other cases. Here it is argued that an application beyond European-based cases will enrich the framework and so applies it to an analysis of the complex Israeli-

Palestinian conflict. This conflict, it is argued, provides an interesting case for analysing securitisation processes which have been shaped by military and political elites, and desecuritisation processes which have been initiated by Israeli and Palestinian civil societies.

The book has two related goals. The principal one is to apply the securitisation framework in general and the under-theorised desecuritisation concept in particular. Stemming from the application of the securitisation framework to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, it explores the limits and prospects of securitisation as a theoretical framework. In this way it aims to contribute to the development of Copenhagen School's desecuritisation concept as a framework for analysing conflict resolution and peace. The secondary goal is to contribute to debates over the problems and prospects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. Within this context, the book sheds light on how the securitisation framework can be better applied and also on the ways in which antagonistic relationships can be changed over time.

The first chapter explores the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory. This chapter reviews the concepts, arguments and assumptions introduced by the Copenhagen School with a particular emphasis on the notion of desecuritisation. Furthermore, based on the notion of desecuritisation, an analytical framework for analysing the desecuritisation moves of Israeli and Palestinian civil societies will be presented at the end of the chapter. Following the Copenhagen School's approach to desecuritisation the discussion will start by first analysing how particular issues are securitised in the Israeli-Palestinian context (Chapters 2 and 3), and then analysing desecuritisation itself (Chapters 5 and 6). Within this context, the chapters provide an analysis of the securitisation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as well. Chapter 2 covers the period beginning with the World Zionist Organisation's meeting in 1897 and ends with the beginning of the Second Intifada in 2004. This long timeframe is divided into four consecutive periods that cover different phases of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: from the 1897 World Zionist Organisation's meeting to the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948; from 1948 to the end of the Six Day War in 1967; from 1967 to the first Palestinian Intifada in 1987; and from 1988 to the Second Intifada in 2000. Chapter 3 then focuses on the conflict following the outbreak of the Second Intifada. In this chapter the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is explored as a securitisation process through an analysis of Israeli and Palestinian security discourses regarding the 'other' and the exceptional measures taken to deal with the threat posed by this manifestation. In this part of the book, mainly military and political leaders' statements and public speeches are taken into consideration. In the

Israeli case, members of the ruling elite - prime ministers, the foreign affairs and defence ministers and the opposition leaders - are considered to be the main securitising actors. In the Palestinian case it was quite difficult to name the securitising actors since the Palestinian leadership has been divided since the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) in 1994. As a consequence, besides the public speeches and declarations of leaders of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the various Chairmen of the PNA, the statements of Hamas and other Islamic resistance movements are also explored since these movements have appeared as powerful securitising actors in Palestinian politics.

Even though this book is primarily concerned with the analysis of the efforts to secure cooperation and coexistence between Israeli and Palestinian civil society during and after the peace process (1993–2007), earlier attempts to reconcile Israelis and Palestinians are also briefly reviewed. Chapter 4 reviews the development of the idea of reconciliation and peace, as opposed to the continuous securitisation processes, in the Israeli-Palestinian context. The analytical framework based on the concept of desecuritisation is applied in two cases, namely, peace education and water management; both of these cover important aspects of reconciliation between Israelis and Palestinians. These two cases are employed to illustrate the bottom-up desecuritisation attempts, or in the Copenhagen School's terminology 'desecuritisation moves'. Within this context, the Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), Windows, the Peace Research Institute in the Middle East (PRIME), Seeds of Peace's peace education projects, the Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information (IPCRI), Friends of Earth Middle East (FoEME), the Arava Institute for Environmental Studies and the Water and Environmental Development Organisation's water management projects are analysed.

Method

This research is an example of adaptive approach as proposed by Derek Layder which underlines the interplay between theory and empirical data. According to Layder, "the theory both adapts to, or is shaped by, incoming evidence at the same time as the data themselves are filtered through (and adapted to) the extant theoretical materials" (Layder 1998:38). By using an adaptive approach, the researcher finds the opportunity to formulate or reformulate the theory under consideration, in this case that of (de)securitisation, on the basis of empirical findings, which, in turn, contribute to the further development of the theory in question. Unlike

grounded theory, adaptive theory "attempts to combine an emphasis on prior theoretical ideas and models which feed into and guide research while at the same time attending to the generation of theory from ongoing analysis of data" (Layder 1998:19) The adaptive approach puts emphasis on the employment of prior or extant theory as well as the generation of new theory. Furthermore, the adaptive approach attempts to trace the reciprocal influences and interconnections between social activities and the wider systemic environment. Hence, an adoptive approach is considered to be the most suitable one to the application of securitisation theory in order to analyse securitisation/desecuritisations in the particular case of Israeli-Palestinian relations.

The research involves the analysis of six different corpora, i.e. political speeches/statements, primary historical documents, newspaper articles, public opinion polls, documents produced by selected civil society entities and semi-structured interviews. Bringing together a range of views has the potential to generate explanations that better capture the complexity of the case.

Since the analysis of securitisation requires the analysis of speech acts, Chapter 2 and 3 of this book mainly relies on discourse analysis of primary texts, such as declarations, agreements, peace treaties as well as discourse analysis of speeches and statements of the Israeli and Palestinian leaders. Here the analysis of text and speech depends as much on focusing on what is said, and how a specific argument regarding the existence of particular security threats is developed. The analysis is also interested in the rhetorical work of the text, how the specific issues it raises are structured and organised and chiefly how it seeks to persuade audience about the authority of its understanding of the issue. Within this context, word repetitions and repeat patterns (particularly which words having been used repetitively), content words (what kind of words having been used to refer to the other side) and the use of personal pronouncements (us/we - them/they particularly in relation to respective identity construction processes) are taken into consideration for the analysis of security/enmity discourses in these sources.

The analysis of discourse (both text and speech) in Chapter 2 specifically focuses on how ideas, practices and identities emerge, transform, have mutated through Israeli-Palestinian interactions during the period 1948-2000. The analysis of security/enmity discourse in Chapter 2 seeks to understand and describe the historical trajectory of the contemporary securitisations, which constitutes the main focus of Chapter 3. For a brief overview of security/enmity speech acts for the period of 1948 – 2000 the historical documents and official speeches and statements of Israeli Prime

Ministers and of PLO (later on PNA) leaders were studied. For this investigation Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archive (in English), Israeli Palestinian Centre for Research and Information Database and Yale University Avalon Project's Middle East Documentary Record served as the main databases. Chapter 3 deals with more recent period of Israeli-Palestinian relations by analysing the tensions between securitisations and normalisation attempts of 2000 – 2007. The discourse of this period is investigated through an analysis of declarations, statements and speeches of Israeli Prime Ministers and PNA Chairman as well as the extracts from the discourses of their opponents which are mainly provided through extracts from magazines and newspapers.[1] Major historical documents, statements and speeches of Israeli Prime Ministers and Palestinian leaders related to the Palestinian issue and peace process will be taken into consideration. During the pre-PNA period, the PLO was dominant in the Palestinian security discourse, even though the PLO leadership had developed outside the Palestinian territories. Hence, in Chapter 3 the PLO elites are considered as the main securitising actors. Besides the PLO and, after 1994 PNA elites, other fedayeen groups' like Hamas and Islamic Jihad leaders' securitising moves are also taken into consideration. The analysis particularly deals with documents, speeches and statements that refer to the key issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; that constitute the bases of security/enmity speech acts and those that contain historical conceptions, narratives about how the other side has been perceived as an existential threat. For this analysis, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' archive (in English), the Office of the Israeli Prime Minister's speech archive, the Israeli-Palestinian Centre for Research and Information Database and Yale University Avalon Project's Middle East Documentary Record were consulted as main databases.

Besides document analysis and speech analysis, a number of semi structured interview were carried out with Israeli and Palestinian academics, NGO workers and directors in order to explore interviewees' attitudes, motivations and perceptions regarding Israeli-Palestinian cooperation and reconciliation. Furthermore, a more spontaneous and unstructured talks were conducted with some NGO volunteers. The answers that were given by informants, particularly by anonymous volunteers and participants, represent the personal versions of the story written on web-sites and publicity documents. Formal interviews on the other hand were particularly effective in providing guidance for the document analysis and structuring the analysis. Interviews were also expected to go beyond the formal language of text and exploring personal attitudes, motivations and perceptions of the members of civil society who

are working on peace-building projects. It is believed that the enthusiasm, determination and commitment of these people are only be observed through face-to-face encounters.

CHAPTER ONE

SECURITISATION THEORY

The literature associated with the Copenhagen School's securitisation theory is less concerned with the application of securitisation as a framework of analysis. There have been a few attempts to apply the theory to empirical cases. Moreover, most of the empirical work on securitisation theory analyses Western European and American cases, contrary to the Copenhagen School's claim to have produced a conceptualisation of security that can escape the European orientation of International Relations in general and Security Studies in particular. For example, the securitisation of migration in Europe has generated a considerable literature (Boswell 2007, Nyers 2003; Bigo 2001a/b, 2002; Huysmans 1995). However, only a few works can be found regarding the application of securitisation theory in non-European cases (Coskun 2008, Wilkinson 2007, Jackson 2006, Kaliber 2005, Smith 2000). Given this gap between theory and application, this book aims to apply securitisation theory to an analysis of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the most complex conflicts of modern history.

The objective of this chapter is to overview securitisation theory with a particular emphasis on the notion of desecuritisation. By taking on Copenhagen School's arguments and assumptions the chapter claims to provide a more comprehensive framework to analyse (de)securitisation.

Securitisation Theory

Securitisation theory was developed by the Copenhagen School during the 1990s. The Copenhagen School refers to the work of Barry Buzan and his colleagues at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen. Buzan's book *People, States and Fear* published in 1983 and revised in 1991 constitutes the foundation stone for the Copenhagen School. Since 1985, the Copenhagen School has explored how to move Security Studies beyond a narrow agenda which focuses on military relations between states. Within this context, together with Buzan, a number of scholars including Ole Wæver, Jaap De Wilde, Morten Kelstrup, Pierre Lemaitre

and Elzbieta Tromer from the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research have developed the following concepts/frameworks: the notion of security sectors, regional security complex theory and the concepts of securitisation and desecuritisation. This group of scholars came to be dubbed the Copenhagen School by Bill McSweeney (1996). As indicated in the title of their reply to Bill McSweeney's criticism in 1997 this tag was embraced by the group and has been widely accepted to refer as the collective shorthand to the Copenhagen School of Security Studies.

To broaden up the security agenda by adding economic, political, societal and environmental security sectors (Buzan *et al.* 1998) was the first step in the Copenhagen School's reconstruction of Security Studies. The second step was to conceptualise security as a multi-level concept by introducing the regional security complex theory (Buzan and Wæver 2003). Last but not least, as a third step, Wæver's securitisation theory was integrated in the Copenhagen School's approach to security analysis. Even though there are a number of scholars involved in Copenhagen School, along with Buzan, Wæver has had the most influence on the Copenhagen School's security approach.

As Wæver claims, the aim of securitisation theory is to construct a "neo-conventional security analysis (which) sticks to the traditional core of the concept of security (existential threats, survival), but is undogmatic as to both sectors (not only military) and referent objects (not only states)" (Wæver 1996:110). According to the Copenhagen scholars, what is needed is an understanding of the cultural process of securitisation; by which actors construct issues as threats to security. Within this context, Wæver argues that threats and security are not objective matters; rather "security is a practice, a specific way of framing an issue. Security discourse is characterised by dramatising an issue as having absolute priority. Something is presented as an absolute threat…" (1996:108).

Securitisation theory is based on an interdisciplinary approach which ranges from linguistic theories to sociology. Throughout his many writings, Wæver makes references to various theoretical thinkers including John L. Austin, Jacques Derrida, Carl Schmitt and Kenneth Waltz that inspired the securitisation theory.

For the Copenhagen School, the contemporary security environment is deeply related to the politicising of an issue. Security politics is not just about underlining pre-existing threats; but also a performative activity that makes certain issues visible as a threat. Within this context, security refers to a concept that is more about how a society or any group of people come to designate, or not designate, something as a threat. It is about the process by which threats get constructed. This view thus proposes the concept of

*securitisatio*n be defined as "the discursive process through which an intersubjective understanding is constructed within a political community to treat something as an existential threat to a valued referent object, and to enable a call for urgent and exceptional measures to deal with the threat" (Buzan and Wæver 2003:491). A successful securitisation consists of three steps: the identification of existential threat(s); emergency action; and the legitimisation of exceptional measures even by breaking free of norms and rules of normal (Taureck 2006:55). For a securitisation move to be successful, a certain level of support from an audience is required. At the very least, political groups that are willing to act to secure the threatened object should be mobilised through the securitisation process.

As far as the Copenhagen School is concerned, two elements of the traditional security approach have been influential: survival and existential threat. In this sense Kenneth Waltz's reading of security has had considerable influence on the securitisation theory. According to Waltz, in international politics, albeit that there are differences in their aims and strategies, all the states have one common desire: survival (2001:203). By placing survival at the heart of their concept of security, the Copenhagen School shares a similar position to Waltzian neorealism and defines security as "survival in the face of existential threats" (Buzan *et al.* 1998:33). Buzan and Wæver define a security issue as being "posited (by a securitising actor) as a threat to the survival of some referent object (nation, state, the liberal international economic order, rain forests), which is claimed to have a right to survive. Since a question of survival necessarily involves a point of no return at which it will be too late to act, it is not defensible to leave this issue to normal politics" (Buzan and Wæver 2003:71). It is argued that securitisation rests on political choices. "Security can never be based on the objective reference that something is in and of itself a security problem. That quality is always given to it in human communication" (Buzan and Wæver 1997:246). The threat can thus be used to legitimate political action which might not otherwise appear as legitimate.

The theory of securitisation underlined two intertwined logics, namely the claim about existential threats and the legitimisation of exceptional measures. Through the securitisation process, it is claimed that a particular security issue necessitates priority over others; therefore, the securitising actor claims the special right to handle the issue using exceptional measures. Securitisation results in a confrontational mind-set. Hence, positing an issue as an existential threat requires a move from normal to emergency politics since the usual political procedures do not apply in a state of war or emergency and responses to existential threats fall outside

standard political practices. The Copenhagen School presents the exception as a deviation from normal deliberative politics but does not give a definition of normal politics. Rather, it views normal politics as being not fixed but as historically changing through action. Roughly, the Copenhagen School differentiates securitisation from politicisation whilst recognising both processes as intersubjective (Buzan *et al.* 1998:30). According to the Copenhagen School the process of securitisation is *intersubjective* since it is neither a question of an objective threat or a subjective perception of a threat. Instead securitisation of a subject depends on an audience accepting the securitisation speech act (Buzan et al. 1998, 30). The politicisation of an issue makes it a matter of public choice, which is part of the normal politics of public deliberation. On the other hand, securitisation of an issue removes it from the context of normal politics and justifies the necessity of emergency politics and leaves it to the decisive action of securitising actors (Fierke 2007:108). Proclaiming an issue to be a security threat can confer legitimacy on the methods employed by the state to protect citizens from such threats. That is to say, securitisation justifies introducing security practices and technologies, which would not be introduced under normal conditions. Moreover, in democratic polities the suspension of normal politics as a result of a successful securitisation may occur at the expense of liberal democratic principles and may lead to an erosion of civil liberties.

The analysis of securitisation focuses on "the questions of when and under what conditions who securitises what issue" (Buzan and Wæver 2003:71). As far as the question of what issue can be securitised is concerned, according to the Copenhagen School's approach, issues in sectors (political, societal, environmental and human security) other than the military may also be subject to securitisation. Social groups (ethnic, religious etc.) are considered by the Copenhagen School to be equally important as distinctive referent objects of security. Societal security, more specifically concerns "the ability of the society to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or actual threats…Societal security is about situations when societies perceive a threat in identity terms" (Wæver *et al.*, 1993: 23). In the Israeli-Palestinian case, the Palestinian political elite have extensively securitised issues in the societal and human sectors of security; in parallel, the Israeli elite has securitised issues in the political and societal sectors of security. According to the Copenhagen School, societal insecurity occurs "when communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat to the survival of their community" or more accurately the identity of their community as such (Buzan *et al.* 1998:119). Societal security

highlights the role of identity or the sense of *we-ness* in security relations. This concept has been criticised by McSweeney (1996) who argues that the Copenhagen School defines societal identity as being singular, thereby denying the fluidity and multiplicity of social identities. Michael Williams argues, however, that McSweeney's criticism misses the point of the Copenhagen School that illustrates how a securitising speech act creates the conditions for the reification of identity in a monolithic form. As Williams argues, "a successful securitisation of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity … to cast this as a relationship of threat and even enmity and to have this decision and declaration accepted by [a] relevant group" (2003:519).

Human security deals with security issues that directly or indirectly endanger human lives and human wellbeing. As in the Israeli-Palestinian case, human security may be endangered because of states' unrestrained quest for their own security. As far as the political sector of security is concerned, Buzan (1991:118) considers threats which are aimed at the organisational stability of the state within the context of the political sector. Within this context, the existence of a particular state can be the target of political security threats. Political threats are typically about recognition, support, or legitimacy. They are made to the internal legitimacy of the political unit and/or the external recognition of the state (external legitimacy). Generally, however, threats from outside are directed at a particular state's legitimacy (Buzan *et al.* 1998:144).

The idea of securitisation as a process of threat construction has drawn attention to the symbiotic relation between securitisation and the formation of collective political identities. In this regard Carl Schmitt's concept of the political is of particular importance. Schmitt's concept of the political was defined in relation to 'the other', which represents an existential threat. (Meier *et al.* 1995:33) He claims that the essence of politics lies in the relationship between friend and enemy, and the possibility of conflict. Because enmity lies at the heart of his concept of the political, Schmitt suggested that enmity also presupposes the existence of other political entities. For Schmitt, friendship and enmity provide the foundations of allegiance and solidarity. The commonality of friendship is inextricable from enmity and from the possibility of a life and death struggle with that enemy (Williams 2003:517). Schmitt's discussion of the political was the decision that constituted the unity of the political group in the exceptional situation, the face of the existential enemy (Schmitt 1996:32). According to Williams, this line of thought can be clearly seen in the process of securitisation, where a securitising actor is at its most efficient exactly because of operating 'legitimately' beyond otherwise binding rules and

regulations (Williams 2003:518). The securitising actor only achieves this status by underlining the existence of 'the other' as an 'existential' threat for two reasons: first, because security is always relational in the sense that one's insecurity/security centres on other(s') insecurity/security – the classical formulation of a security dilemma. Second, it makes little sense to speak of one's security without recognising the source of the threat, 'the other'. In the absence of 'the other' one cannot speak about security (Wæver 1997:353). In this sense, securitisation is about the process through which a state/society is consolidated *vis-à-vis* an enemy-other (Fierke 2007:112). In the following chapter, this point will be illustrated through an examination of the parallel processes of Israeli and Palestinian state/society consolidation.

Analysing Securitisations

The Copenhagen School distinguishes itself from the broader category of Critical Security Studies through its emphasis on security as a process of threat construction. Accordingly, the task of securitisation analysis is to understand how the dynamics of security work. For Buzan and others

> [o]ur approach links itself more closely to existing actors, tries to understand their *modus operandi*, … our philosophical position is in some sense more radically constructivist in holding security to always be a political construction and not something the analyst can describe as it 'really' is (Buzan *et al*. 1998: 35).

The Copenhagen School's securitisation theory rests on two central concepts: three components of securitisation, the speech act, the securitising actor and the audience, and three facilitating factors that affect the success of a securitising move (Figure 1.1). Therefore, the analysis of securitisation processes requires attention to both the components of securitisation and the facilitating factors.

Figure 1.1 Central Concepts of Securitisation Analysis

Components	Facilitating Conditions
1) Speech Act 2) Securitising Actor 3) Audience	1. The demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security. 2. The social conditions regarding the position of authority for the securitising actor (the relation between securitising actor and audience). 3. Features of the alleged threats that either facilitate or impede securitisation.

Security as a Speech Act

The main argument of securitisation theory is that *security is a speech act*. According to Wæver, security is not an objective condition; rather it is a speech act: "The utterance itself is the act. By saying it something is done" (Wæver1995:55). Wæver defines security as a *speech act*, where "security is not of interest as a sign that refers to something more real; the utterance itself is the act…By uttering 'security', a state representative moves a particular development into a specific area, and thereby claims a special right to use whatever means are necessary to block it" (Wæver 1995:55). That is to say, the mere invocation of something using the word 'security' declares its threatening nature and "invokes the image of what would happen if security did not work" (Wæver 1995:61). Thus, a specific security rhetoric which underlines survival, priority of action and urgency defines the contours of securitisation.

The Copenhagen School's conceptualisation of security as a speech act draws on John L. Austin's concept of *performative utterances*. According to Austin, performative utterances do not just describe but also create a new reality. As stated by Austin, the name is derived from the verb to 'perform', which indicates that the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action (Austin 1975:6). Stemming from this concept Wæver argues that the utterance of security is more than just saying or describing something; it is the performance of an action.

Besides Austin, Wæver also draws on insights from Jacques Derrida. Derrida is important for securitisation theory on a meta-theoretical level. Wæver acknowledges Derrida's famous claim that "there is nothing outside the text" (Derrida 1998: 158). By claiming this, Derrida points out

that meaning is only in the sentence itself, and not above and beyond that. Within this context, in securitisation analysis, the answers to how we study the context can only be given by analyzing narrative. Narrative provides the vital hermeneutic which links definitions and practices, meaning and action. Hence, it is crucial to read the context in order to understand specific security-related policies. In this sense, discourse analysis provides an analytical tool for analyzing securitisation processes. As was pointed out by Buzan *et al*. (1998:25), the way to study securitisation is to study discourse, which shows the extent to which an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieves sufficient effect to make the particular audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed.

Discourse analysis here does not claim to ascertain an actor's intentions. As Wæver states, "discourse analysis works on public texts. It does not try to get to the thoughts or motives of the actors…What interests us is neither what individual decision makers really believe, not what are shared beliefs among a population, but which codes are used when actors *relate* to each other" (2001:26-27). That is to say, securitisation theory does not mean to analyse how actors think but what they say aloud. The analyst has to work with what has actually been said or written in order to explore patterns in and across the statements and to identify the social consequences of different discursive representations of reality.

As was stated above, performative speech acts can neither be true nor false but depend upon certain conditions that can be called the 'facilitating (felicity) conditions' of security as a speech act. For a successful securitisation, two constitutive rules are required: the internal, linguistic (grammatical rule) and the external, contextual (social rule). As Williams suggests, the securitisation process is structured first "by the different capacity of actors to make socially effective claims about threats; second, by the forms in which these claims can be made in order to be recognised and accepted as convincing by the relative audience, and third, by the empirical factors or situations to which these actors can make reference" (Williams 2003:514). According to Buzan *et al*., securitisation is only possible if players follow these rules (1998:32). Hence, the following section presents the other components of securitisation as well as the facilitating factors that determine the success or failure of a securitising move.

Securitising Actor, Audience and Facilitating Factors

As discussed above, the Copenhagen School posits securitisation as being founded upon a speech act by an actor claiming to speak in defence of a collectivity and demanding the right to act on its behalf. As a speech act is one of the basic components of securitisation, by definition it is an inter-subjective communication process that requires, as a rule, at least two sides: a securitising actor and an audience. Securitisation necessitates the use and perpetual repetition of the rhetoric of existential threat by the securitising actor, which is usually the government and/or its military and bureaucratic elites. For Wæver "security is articulated only from a specific place, in an institutional voice, by elites" (1995:57). Hence, by "naming a certain development a security problem, the 'state' can claim a special right, one that will, in the final instance, always be defined by the state and its elites" (Wæver 1995:54). Therefore, securitisation is utilised as a technique of governance.

Through the articulation of danger and existential threat, the securitising actor demands justification from the audience to use all necessary means to eliminate the threat. To decide whether an issue is a security issue is not something the securitising actor can decide alone (Buzan *et al.* 1998; Wæver 2000). According to Paul Roe, securitisation is a kind of '*call and response*' process. An actor makes a call that something is a matter of security and the audience must respond with their acceptance. If there is no such level of acceptance, securitisation will have failed (Roe 2004:281). As Buzan *et al.* state "presenting something as an existential threat does not by itself create securitisation – this is a *securitising move*, but the issue is securitised only if and when the audience accepts it as such" (1998:25) However, as they note that "acceptance does not necessarily mean […] civilised, dominance-free discussion; it only means that an order always rests on coercion as well as consent" (Buzan *et al.* 1998:23 [emphasis original]). In the case of consent, through his/her ability to identify with the audience's feelings, needs and interests, the securitising actor can persuade the audience by playing with language in accordance with the audience's experience. If a securitising actor succeeds in obtaining the audience's identification with his/her security statements, some sort of cognitive and behavioural change can occur among the audience (Balzacq 2005:184).

According to Thierry Balzacq, the securitising actor can get two kinds of support from the audience: *formal* and *moral*. The more harmonious these forms are, the more likely that securitisation will be successful. Securitising actors seek moral support from respective societies which are

embodied in the form of public opinion. As securitisation is an attempt to legitimise the use of exceptional measures to prevent an existential threat, securitising actors mainly require formal backing for a successful securitisation. To illustrate this, Balzacq has given the example of to wage a war in order to rid a threat. Besides the political agents' appeal for the public support for waging a war, a degree of formal support is required. In the case of waging a war the formal approval of the parliament is necessary whether the public opinion had been persuaded by securitising actor to wage a war or not (Balzacq 2005:184-185). In most of the cases, securitising actors securitise an issue without the moral backing of the public.

To complement the speech act, securitising actor and audience triumvirate, the Copenhagen School considers 'facilitating conditions' that influence the success of the securitisation process. Inspired by Austin's concept of 'felicity conditions', these refer to: the demand internal to the speech act of following the grammar of security and constructing a plot with existential threat, point of no return and a possible way out; the social capital of the enunciator, the securitising actor, who has to be in a position of authority, although this should neither be defined as official authority nor taken to guarantee success with the speech act; and conditions historically associated with a threat: it is more likely that one can conjure a security threat if there are certain objects to refer to which are generally held to be threatening – be they tanks, hostile sentiments, or polluted waters. In themselves they never make for necessary securitisation, but they are definitely facilitating conditions (Buzan et al. 1998:33, Wæver 2003:15). Only if these three conditions are met, a securitising act has a chance to be successful, in other words a securitising actor has been able to convince her/his audience of the need to mobilize extraordinary measures.

As argued by scholars like Stritzel, "facilitating conditions offer a more specific framework for analysing securitisation than the securitisation framework as a whole" (2007:364). Buzan and Wæver introduce these conditions as important factors in understanding securitising speech acts with a particular focus on power and the inter-subjective establishment of threat (1998: 25, 31-32). In this regard, they claim that "it is important to be specific about who is more or less privileged in articulating security. To study securitisation is to study the power politics of a concept" (Buzan et al. 1998:32).

As far as the aforementioned context is concerned, the Copenhagen School's position is to assume that language is performative. Hence, a secure place can be insecure as a result of the speech act. As Balzacq