Edward Scribner Ames' Unpublished Manuscripts

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Edited By

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CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS

PUBLISHING

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This book first published 2011

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-4438-2932-3, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2932-8

Dedication

To ten years of
collaborative friendship.

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PREFACE

This volume contains the unpublished manuscripts of Edward Scribner Ames and is a companion volume to W. Creighton Peden's book *Christian Pragmatism: An Intellectual Biography of Edward Scribner Ames (1870–1958)* which was published in 2011 by Cambridge Scholars Publishing. These manuscripts are lectures, papers, and sermons delivered by Ames at various times between 1928 and 1940. A list of the unpublished manuscripts and the manuscripts themselves are located in the Library at the Disciples Divinity House, the University of Chicago and their assistance has been significant.

We want to thank Librarian Adam Bohanan of Meadville Theological Library for his invaluable help in locating the manuscripts and to Becky Bohanan for copying all of the documents. The assistance of the research staff at the Library of the University of Chicago has also been significant.

We express our appreciation for permission to publish Ames' unpublished manuscripts to Ames' granddaughter Christine Ames Cornish (who also furnished the photograph of Ames used on the cover of this volume) and to Dr. Kris Culp of the Disciples Divinity House, the University of Chicago.

Where possible, each manuscript was scanned, processed by optical character recognition software, and visually inspected to ensure that it accurately reflected the content of the original. Manuscripts that could not be scanned were entered manually and then subjected to the same visual inspection process.

Because these manuscripts are Ames' notes for lectures, papers, and sermons which he intended to deliver orally, he felt free to change, edit, and update them until the moment of delivery and many of the manuscripts contain material that was either marked for deletion or moved to another location. Also, hand-written words, phrases, and emphasis marks were inserted into the original typed manuscripts.

We have attempted to honor Ames' intent while by incorporating his editing changes into the text as we prepared these manuscripts for publication. We believe that the resulting documents closely reflect the text that provided the foundation of Ames' lectures, papers, and sermons.

The careful reader will note that some manuscripts include simple outline words, phrases, and other "key concepts" in addition to Ames' standard notes. Ames often used these prompts to extend his more formal lecture topics. The modern reader might wish that these lectures had been transcribed so that we might have more complete texts of the final lectures. One can only speculate where these visual prompts led Ames.

John N. Gaston
—Winter, 2011

EDWARD SCRIBNER AMES INTRODUCTION

By: W. Creighton Peden

Edward Scribner Ames was born in Eau Claire, Wisconsin on April 21, 1870. His father was a Disciples of Christ (Christian Church) minister who served small churches in the East and concluding his ministry in the Midwest. Ames thought of the Disciples as a farmers' religion based on his childhood experiences. He graduated from Drake University in Des Moines, Iowa, and then attended Yale Divinity School. There he came under the influence of William James and became acquainted with William Rainey Harper, who taught at Yale. At Yale he noted: "I came upon the idea that this religion had developed through natural processes from the very humble beginnings to the heights of the great prophets. This revolutionary conception displaced in my mind the idea of a supernatural, miraculously inspired religion, providing instead the more interesting and fruitful notion of a religion growing up with the life of a people and being modified by their changing experiences."[1]

After completing the B.D. and two years toward the Ph.D., Ames married Mable Van Meter, his sweetheart at Drake, in the summer of 1893. In the summer of 1894, William Rainey Harper, the new president of the University of Chicago, offered the possibility of completing his Ph.D. at Chicago. While working on his thesis, Ames took a seminar with Tufts on the writings of John Locke. He learned that the empiricism of Locke, modified and developed, was to be found in the philosophy of pragmatism. Ames found that Locke's contribution consisted "in his practical, experimental, and common-sense attitude on all questions which he discussed. It was above all a method, a method of patient and reverent inquiry, and a courageous dismissal of old traditions and superstitions which could not justify themselves in the light of practical reason."[2] In 1895, Ames stood an oral examination for the Ph.D. degree in philosophy. This was his first introduction to John Dewey, who was the new head of the department. His thesis was "The History of Agnosticism." He was then invited to become an assistant professor in the philosophy department under the leadership of John Dewey. From 1895 to 1897 he was also an

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[1] E. S. Ames, *Beyond Theology. The Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 28.

[2] *Ibid*. p. 43

Instructor at Disciples Divinity House at the University. Ames became very involved with the effort to establish Disciples Divinity House as the first theological school for the Disciples' denomination. The immediate task was raising ten thousand dollars to purchase land for the future Disciples Divinity House. Ames found fund raising very difficult.

Ames had spent the year teaching, raising money, and starting a mission church. None of these efforts provided adequate remuneration and kept Ames doing three different things at the same time. Late in the year he received an invitation from Butler College to teach, with no other responsibilities. accepted a position at Butler College, a Disciples' college from 1897–1900. He only learned after accepting Butler's invitation that W. R. Harper had planned to offer him a full position in the philosophy department. Butler was a positive experience, although it was during this period that Ames was accused of heresy. Since Disciples do not allow for a governing body higher than the local church, there was no structure for a person to be tried for heresy apart from the local congregation.

William James continued to be a dominant thinker for Ames. He realized that James had unsettled the traditional conception of a soul, the common view of God, and the ordinary conception of human nature being ruled by an unyielding determinism. James rejected the claims of any external authority and focused on the usual experiences which provided an account of truth which could be tested. The test involved acting on an idea and if it provided satisfactory results the idea is true. James' doctrine of the self provided Ames with a perspective for understanding his own experience. He had been reared in a reasonable kind of piety sheltered by traditional ideas. This became his ministerial self who placed great store in the value of preaching instead of experimenting and testing to determine "whether it would work effectively in making religion a really useful and powerful agency in conquering the world, the flesh, and the devil."[3]

Ames' other self developed after graduation from the divinity school due to exploring the fields of science and being exposed to pragmatism and the thinkers developing this perspective. He explained: "This self looked out upon a different scene. It was the scene of an evolving human race endeavoring through adventures and experiments in all directions to find its way into better conditions and fuller understanding of the meaning and destiny of its life… That was a thrilling scene. There were confusion and tragedy enough, but there was no general and complete surrender or despair."[4]

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[3] *Ibid*. p. 58.

[4] *Ibid*. p. 59.

From the understanding of two selves, Ames considered the possibility of bringing the two together in mutual understanding. On the one hand, he would apply the scientific and philosophic method of criticism and experimentation to the interpretation of religion. On the other hand, he would apply the faith, hope, and love of the aspiring self in order to get below the surface claims of religion by applying native intelligence with an increase of skill and insight. Ames suggested that if a minister could look upon the ministerial role as being engaged in a normal and reasonable job without claim to a special or mysterious call, the ministerial self could have an inner consistence with its' self, regardless of the piety or patronizing efforts of members of the congregation.

In the summer of 1900, Ames was invited to give some courses in philosophy at the University of Chicago. During the summer, the Hyde Park Disciples Church found itself without a minister and invited Ames to become their pastor. Upon deciding to accept the position, Ames had no indication of possible teaching in philosophy at the University.

In October, 1900, Ames began his pastorate at The Hyde Park Church, which was six years in existence with less than 100 members.[5] The church was a little brick building, located on the land of the Disciples Divinity House. Sermons were not the center of the life of this congregation, just as the historic churches gave little prominence to sermons. "I wanted it to be understood that this would be a free pulpit, that the denomination to which I belonged had discarded creeds, encouraged by individual liberty, and taught that characteristic religious experiences, like conversion, are capable of rational statement and have their true significance in ethical and practical life."[6] Ames stressed that the process of evolution continues in the life of the church.

Ames had little interest in traditional doctrines, like the trinity, the pre-existence of Christ, the virgin birth, miracles, and substitution atonement. He proposed two lines of evidence which he thought modern persons could entertain regarding the supremacy of Christ. One line was found in Jesus' inspiring teachings and the other in the tremendous influence of Jesus for the past two thousand years. The church is just the natural product of the religious life. All who possess religious truth have the responsibility to share it with others. Although Ames felt that the contemporary church still suffered from ascetic ideals, he believed that Christianity was entering upon the profoundest transformation since the

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[5] Nathaniel S. Haynes, *History of the Disciples in Illinois 1819–1914*, p. 160.

[6] E. S. Ames, *Beyond Theology. The Autobiography of Edward Scribner Ames.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959, p. 75.

encounter with Greek thought. In America, Christians for the first time found themselves under the influence of a democracy. The government is empirical and open to adjustments, which Ames contended should be the same for religion.[7]

Shortly after arriving at Hyde Park Church, Ames was invited to teach elementary course in the department of philosophy, which also included psychology and education. Every year he would teach one or more course on the introduction to psychology, generally following the lines of James' *Psychology.* In 1905, Ames taught for the first time a course in psychology of religion. He found an interesting problem in psychology to be the development and transformation of the Christian deity. Another aspect of the problem is that terms have been used regarding Jesus' spiritual meaning in a literal and materialistic fashion. The key to understanding the religious life is found in how one's self relates to one's associates. It is in these relationships that we encounter God, "that other and larger self in which each little self lives and moves and has its being."[8] To be unaware of the many influences of others is to lack an essential ingredient of being a real person. Ames found in the church a laboratory for cultivating and observing the processes of religion, with the university providing a place for systematic study of these processes. His experiments and systematic study were based on the premise that "we have reason to believe that the vast whole of which we are a part is responsive to what we do."[9]

Ames' career remained at the University of Chicago teaching philosophy, being Dean of Disciples Divinity House, editor of *The Scroll,* and writing books and hundreds of articles. He rose through the ranks in the Philosophy Department reaching full professor and serving as department chairman for six years, prior to his retirement in 1936 from teaching. He continued his ministry at the Hyde Park Church until 1940. He died in 1958.

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[7] *Ibid*. p. 90.
[8] *Ibid*. p. 93.
[9] *Ibid*. p. 97.

THE MANUSCRIPT LIST

John Locke. Lecture at the Art Institute, Chicago, 1928.

Imagery and Meaning in Religious Ideas. Alumni Lecture at Yale Divinity School, 1932.

The Religious Response. Sermon in the Chapel of the University of Chicago, July 23, 1934.

Man Looks at Himself. Commencement Address, Lynchburg College, 1935.

A Pragmatist's Philosophy of Religion. Lectures at the Pastors' Institute, University of Chicago, 1936.
Contents:

I. The Meaning of Pragmatism.
II. The Pragmatic View of Religion.
III. The Pragmatic Conception of God.
IV. Further Implications of Pragmatism.
V: Pragmatism and Philosophy of Religion.

The Philosophical Background of the Disciples. Paper before the Commission for the Restudy of the Disciples, 1936.

The Reasonableness of Christianity. Lectures at the Pastors' Institute, University of Chicago, 1937.
Contents:

I. The Meaning of Reasonableness.
II. Christianity and Reasonableness.
III. Rationalist and Empiricist Views of Reasonableness.
IV. Some Implications.

This Human Life. Gates Memorial Lectures, Grinnell College, 1937.
Contents:

I. Hunger and Hope.
II. Ways and Means.
III. Anxiety and Elation.
IV. The Thick Web of Life.

The Will to Believe. Lecture at Northwestern University, Oct. 1937.

When Science Comes to Religion. Lectures at the Pastors' Institute, University of Chicago, 1938.
Contents:

I. Historical.
II. Fruits of Science and Their Religious Use.
III. Unity and Scope of Science.
IV. Science and Religious Values.

Religious Implications of John Dewey's Philosophy. Lectures at the Pastors' Institute, University of Chicago, 1939.
Contents:

I. His Philosophy and Problems of Religion Today.
II. A Common Faith.
III. Scientific Method, Religious Attitudes and Values.
IV. Views of Nature, Man, God, and Ideologies vs. Theologies.

Current Philosophies of Religion. Mimeographed notes on four lectures.

What Is Religion? Sermon in the Chapel of the University of Chicago.

Training for Wisdom. Commencement Address, Transylvania University of the College of the Bible, Lexington, Ky., 1940.

JOHN LOCKE

Lecture at the Art Institute, Chicago, 1928

John Locke was born in 1632 and died in 1704. The 72 years of his life covered a period of conflict and struggle in England, both in the State and in the Church.

He was born in the reign of Charles I and reached the period of greatest productivity when William of Orange came to the throne. The political struggle was marked by the rise of the power of Parliament which transformed the monarchical government of England into a parliamentary government which developed into a democracy. It was a struggle for the rights of the people, for the larger freedom of the individual. Locke had a very definite part in shaping the new order of the state, and his ideas reached beyond his own land and helped to mold the great democracy which was rising in the new colonies of America. He actually wrote part of the constitution of the State of South Carolina.

The religious struggle was also between external authority, and the rights of individual conscience. He was a Puritan by birth, and throughout his life was deeply concerned with the development and defense of religious liberty and toleration. It was the age of Cromwell. Cromwell was the Chancellor of Oxford University when Locke entered that institution as a student. He had intended to become a clergyman but turned away from that profession because he could not sign the 39 articles of the Westminster Confession. He remained, however, an interested layman of the Church and devoted a great deal of his time and strength to the religious subjects, in the interest of a free and reasonable, a simple and a vital faith.

Such a period of social unrest and change is conducive to all forces of intellectual activity, and to the development of philosophy. Philosophy does not arise in isolation from social movements, but is generated by them. Philosophy arose in Greece, in the time of the Sophists when profound changes were taking place in the state and revolutionizing the old order. And philosophy is emerging into a prominent place in our society today, in the midst of the great industrial and social revolution now going on. Thinkers like Bertrand Russell and John Dewey in our contemporary life are of importance because they deal with scientific, moral and educational problems which involve our deepest interests.

The sale of 200,000 copies of Mr. Durant's book in our time is not due to the cleverness of the author or to the enterprise of the publishers so much as it is to the desire to find answers to living problems which emerge from our restless and troubled time. John Locke belonged to an age of great intellectual activity stirred into life by new industrial, political and religious revolutions.

Francis Bacon died just 6 years before Locke was born; Shakespeare died sixteen years before, and the influence of the great Elizabethan age was still powerful in England.

Descartes was a contemporary of Locke, and Spinoza was born in the same year.

Locke, like other great English philosophers, was a man of affairs. Like Bacon, and Berkeley, like David Hume and John Stewart Mill, like Lord Balfour, and Bertrand Russell of our own day. Locke lived in the midst of the practical streams of political and religious life, and his philosophy was the result of his effort to grapple with the deeper problems affecting human beings in these concrete relations.

Locke was nearly 60 years old when he began to publish books, and these books all reflect the active life he had led in public and social affairs.

He never married, perhaps because of ill health.

He says, "My health is the only mistress I have a long time courted, and is so coy a one that I think it will take up the remainder of my days to obtain her good graces and keep her in good humor."

He studied medicine, perhaps in order to guard his health, but never engaged in regular practice.

His occupation was really that of Secretary to the first Earl of Shaftesbury whose political fortunes and misfortunes he shared through many years. But as a private secretary he not only performed the duties of a secretary but served as physician in the household and as tutor to the children.

A glimpse of the life of a secretary in that time, even of the caliber and importance of the philosophical John Locke is given by his biographer who says:

> The modern reader, especially when he recollects Locke's intimacy with Shaftesbury, is surprised to find that he dined at the Steward's table, that he was expected to attend prayers three times a day, and that, when the Chancellor drove out in state, he was accustomed, with the other secretaries, to walk by the side of the coach, while, as "my lord" got in and out, he "went before him bareheaded."

He had a remarkable cheerfulness of disposition, a lively sense of humour, and a great power of extracting amusement from all that was

going on around him. His temper was not moody, like that of so many men of letters, but preeminently sociable. When not actually engaged in his studies he always liked to be in company, and enjoyed especially the society of young people and children. He had a happy knack of talking to his companions for the time being on the subjects which interested them most, and in this way he gained a very extensive knowledge of the various kinds of business, and of a variety of arts and crafts. To working people he was often able to give very useful hints as to their own employments. This union of conversational qualities, grave and gay, invariably made him a welcome addition to any company, young or old, gentle or simple.

The key to Locke's philosophy lies in his conception of man as a reasonable being who should not be subjected to authority, or to the mere routine of established customs and institutions. He is the founder of English Empiricism, and like all the pioneers of the modern world, as over against the medieval world, he insisted upon the value of experience, guided by reasonableness, as the means of living a satisfying and fruitful human life.

His first publication was his letter on *Toleration*. He was then 57 years of age. He had been virtually an exile in Holland after the political downfall of the Earl of Shaftesbury, and was only able to return to England after the revolution in 1688.

This letter has to do with religious toleration, freedom of religious opinion from political restraint. He had found all parties and sects, as well as the Catholic Church, disposed to persecution. He said "absolute liberty, just and impartial liberty, is the thing we stand in need of." No one is born a member of any church.

Religion lies in the individual, not in institutions. The harmlessness to society of most persecuted beliefs is another argument for toleration by the state. No man is hurt because his neighbor is of a different faith. An encouragement to variety of opinion may be advantageous to society because it tends to develop the intellectual resources of mankind and helps to discover the truth.

Limits of toleration. Argues for suppression of opinions with work for the dissolution of society or which subverts moral values. Refused toleration to a "church constituted upon a bottom that all who enter it do thereby deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince."

Refused toleration also to atheists on the ground that atheism is a denial that of reason and order in the nature of things.

The Essay on the Human Understanding. One of the great documents in History of Philosophy.

Occasion:

> "Were it fit to trouble thee," says Locke in his Epistle to the Reader, "with the history of this Essay, I should tell thee that five or six friends meeting at my chamber, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand by the difficulties that rose on every side. After we had a while puzzled ourselves, without coming any nearer a resolution of those doubts which perplexed us, it came into my thoughts that we took a wrong course; and that, before we set ourselves upon inquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were not fitted to deal with. This I proposed to the company, who all readily assented; and thereupon it was agreed that this should be our first inquiry."

Origin, Nature, Certainity – Not innate. Denies position of rationalism:

> Whence comes it by that vast store, which the busy and boundless Fancy of Man has painted on it, with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of Reason and Knowledge? To this I answer in one word, from *Experience*: In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either about external or sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by our selves, is that which supplies our Understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the Fountains of Knowledge from which all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.
>
> First, our Senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways in which those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of Yellow, White, Heat, Cold, Soft, Hard, Bitter, Sweet, and all those which we call Sensible Qualities, which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those Perceptions. This great source of most of the Ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the Understanding, I call SENSATION.
>
> Secondly, the other Fountain, from which Experience furnisheth the Understanding with Ideas, is the Perception of the operations of our own minds within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the Understanding with another set of ideas which could not be had from things without; and such are perception, Thinking, Doubting, Believing, Reasoning, Knowing, Willing, and all the different actings of our own minds, which we being conscious of, and observing in our selves, do from these receive into our Understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses.

> The Understanding seems to me not to have the least glimmering of any ideas which it doth not receive from one of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the ideas of sensible qualities, which are all those different perceptions they produce in us; and the mind furnishes the Understanding with ideas of its own operations.

Nature:

Primary and *Secondary* Qualities

Substance

Validity:

Valid when we make the ideas, when they are abstract. But only probable of reality

Tether – Experience

Soul – real when waking

Revelation – Believed in its authority

Subject to reason

Reduced religion, like matter, to *primary* and *secondary* qualities.

Opened the way to skepticism without intending to

He himself cherished the faith in which he was reared, but it is doubtful whether his philosophy of religion would of itself lead to as full a religious faith as he cherished.

Education

Interest

Reason in child - Regard stages

Do not punish

Make play of work

Aversion to old methods of Greek and Latin

Puts learning last

Vitalize interests

IMAGERY AND MEANING IN RELIGIOUS IDEAS

Alumni Lecture at Yale Divinity School, 1932

When friends meet, they greet each other with such exclamations as How do you do? Nice day isn't it? How are you getting along these days? The usual answers are, Oh, very well, thank you. Yes, it's beautiful day. The questions and the answers are familiar salutations and very seldom deliberate inquiries into health and business conditions. Generally, it would be the occasion of surprise if a friend thus greeted on the street should take the matter so seriously as to insist on recounting in detail his ailments or his latest reverses in business. Still more surprising would it be if he asked, just what do you mean when you address me as a person, and ask how I am? Do you use these words in their strict meaning, and do you therefore wish to know how I exist, whether I am a material or a psychical entity? The purposes of ordinary life are sufficiently met by the conventional exchange of customary forms, and their meaning is very real and significant but it is not the meaning of technical scientific discussions.

Nor is the meaning of such salutations anything that can be discovered in the analysis of themselves. This is evident from the fact that it makes little difference in the majority of cases whether I say, How do you do? It is a beautiful day, isn't it? or simply, Hello, George? or say nothing and only make an abbreviated military salute. The essential end is served in any of these ways, for the important thing is the friendly recognition. How important it is, however may be seen in the effects of failure to make some such sign, for then bad feeling may result. George may think he has been ignored. His friend has "cut" him. Henceforth George may act accordingly and avoid any contacts or even work against his former friend.

Instances might be multiplied to indicate that the uses of language are often beyond the forms of words, and can only be understood in the entire context of custom and mores of a people.

The forms of language reach high degrees of complexity in this practical use without discriminating awareness of the character of the forms employed, much less any awareness of the psychological or metaphysical nature of the persons and objects referred to. When a European anthropologist or philologist studies the language of a preliterate tribe he has to learn the language by ear, in actual conversations. Then he may reduce it to written form precisely as one may put in musical scores the songs of birds. The inflections and grammatical structures of the

mother tongue are still more deeply hidden from the consciousness of those who may use it with great accuracy and fineness of expression. Their meanings are related to objective activities and situations. Persons are described and recognized by their forms and features, by their skills, social positions and functions. Even with the most civilized peoples the mother tongue is learned literally before we know it and the attainment of any critical consciousness of grammar and syntax remains a dry and arduous task for school children and college students, while the vast majority of people scarcely become aware of any such structures.

Religious terms are subject to the same practical usage. They arise in the vivid life of ceremonials and other gradually, and in exceptional instances, are subjected to analysis and reflection. Particular words do not yield their meaning by word for word translation. Each one word must be taken in its context of language traits and finally referred back to the life context of the people to whom it is native. Dr. Malinowski, in a very illuminating study of, *The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages,* observes that, "We have to realize that language originally, among primitive, non-civilized peoples was never used as a mirror of reflected thought… In its primitive uses, language functions as a link in concerted human activity, as a piece of human behavior." This is illustrated from the experience of a child with the use of words. Dr. Malinowski points out that "When a child clamours [sic] for a person, it calls and the person appears before it. When it wants food or an object, or when it wishes some uncomfortable thing or arrangement removed, its only means of action is to clamour [sic], and a very efficient means of action this proves to the child. To the child, words are therefore not only means of expression but efficient means of action. The name of a person uttered aloud in a piteous voice possesses the power of materializing this person. Food has to be called for and it appears—in the majority of cases. Thus infantile experience must leave on the child's mind the deep impression that a name has the power over the person or thing which it signifies." The same is true of savages. "The meaning of a thing is made up of experiences of its active use and not of intellectual contemplation. Thus, when a savage learns to understand the meaning of a word, this process is not accomplished by explanations, by a series of acts of apperception, but by learning to handle it. A word *means* to a native the proper use of the thing for which it stands, exactly as an implement *means* something when it can be handled and means nothing when no active experience is at hand."

Here is found a key to the meaning of personification. Persons, like other objects, mean their behavior, what they do, how they act. Persons are the objects most constantly about us, upon which we are from infancy

most dependent. They are the objects most intimately bound up with our wishes and desires, most responsive to our gestures and words. Objects gain something of intimate treatment when they are closely bound up with our needs and activities. Thus the faithful horse, or dog, or a favorite tree or machine stands in such vital, recurrent relations to us that it comes to have these personal traits. The infant is immediately dependent upon the human beings around it, particularly upon the mother. "She is for him a vessel of nourishment. If therefore nutrition is given by another means… the tender feelings by which an infant responds to maternal cares are probably extended in other ministrations of food. When one see the loving attitude of a modern bottle-fed baby to its bottle, the tender caresses and fond smiles which it bestows on it, the identity of response to artificial and natural food-conveyers seems to imply an identical mental attitude of the infant. If this be so, we gain an insight into a very early process of personification of objects, by which relevant and important things of the surroundings release the same emotional response as do the relevant persons."

We have here the explanation of what persons really are in the early experience of the child and of the race. They are the objects in the environment which are most prominent for the satisfaction of needs and which therefore stand out most conspicuously in attention. They are subject to the control of speech and are vitally woven into the activities and habits of man. Persons and personified things constitute the very means of existence, of satisfaction and of emotional states. To the savage, and for all of us most of the time, persons are simply those objects about us which interest us the most and which have the most significance for our satisfactions and emotions.

They are not persons in the critical and reflective sense of psychology and metaphysics. If we refused to use the word person because it has no clear and definite scientific meaning for us, most of us would have to strike it from our vocabulary, and if we refused to address persons about us until we achieved satisfactory definition of the term, we would be more silent than deaf mutes. We simply grow up in this constant interaction with human beings and other objects about us never stopping to question what we could mean psychologically by such beings. And after we may have made a careful, reflective study of them we still continue to talk with them and count on them in various ways even though we may have concluded with the extreme behaviorists that they are not conscious beings, and have no emotions. Our love for them, our devotion to them, the importance in our lives, do not depend on metaphysical theories about them.

Persons, in practical life, even in higher cultures are just those objects and being which are personified by us, in the sense of being the objects of affections and concern, objects upon which we depend and in association with which we find our keenest satisfaction and delight.

This furnishes a basis for an understanding of the place and functions of personified objects and animals which are so prominent in religious ceremonials and behavior. It has been abundantly shown by studies of early religions that their deities are objects of this kind, objects with which the group feels itself in intimate association, objects upon which they are dependent for food, for protection against danger, for success in the hunt, and for fertility of crops and flocks. They are heavily weighted with emotional significance for they mediate the needs of the group in times of crises.

The sacred object whether of animal, plant, rice, maize, sun, river, or man is personified through use and association. It is personified in the sense of being intimately identified with the tense situations reenacted in ceremonials. It is addressed in words, and treated with awe and reverence. It is doubtful whether religious ceremonials ever transcend so personified. It is true that in later stages, as among the Greeks and the Hebrews the deified object is a human being, the kind or the son of the king. In the most spiritualized religions a potent personal expression of the God remains, that is, his name. If Judaism and Mohammedanism have transcended the use of personalities in material form, they have nevertheless retained the most primitive and persistent factor of such beings, that is, the name. In the most wide spread form of Christianity, Roman Catholicism, there remains as definite materialization of deity as it is possible to have, for the Host is held to be the very substance of God, and the highest ceremonial is that of appropriating, as in a spiritual feast, this actually present deity. Protestantism holds a different theory but enacts virtually the same ceremonial, and it is at last the ceremonial, more than any theory which expresses the essentials of religion.

Ceremonials are vivid revivals of important activities in which the fundamental life interests reach their highest intensity of expression. All the beings and objects involved in them are most alive, are most personal. The gods are the central objects, present and potent, manifesting themselves in communion and fellowship. They are as actual and real to the participants as are what we call the human numbers of the group. They are immediately experienced and felt, they are heard and seen. Or at least some one has thus felt and seen them so that no doubt exists. In this connection trances and intoxications play their roles for they are traditionally given more credence than normal experience. Even at the

present time one not infrequently hears it said of an impressive religious occasion that the divine presence was felt in the place. And we still have the divine directly expressed in holy places through a priest, by inspired words, by the sacred fire and light of candles, and by other mediums.

All such symbols, as well as the language employed, have their value in the moods and attitudes and actions they arouse. The language is not descriptive and scientific. It is evocative and emotional and practical. It is poetic and aesthetic. It cannot be turned into scientific or metaphysical use any more than the endearing speech of lovers can be scientifically and literally applied. The language of affection is not the language of matter of fact description.

One approach to an understanding of this problem has been made by the study of imagery in modern psychology. When Frances Galton, in 1860, began to question people as to their ability to recall images of the morning's breakfast table, he found to his surprise that many of his friends among the scientists did not have visual imagery of these or other objects. They were as oblivious of the colors as if they had been color blind and were inclined to regard it as a fallacy that anyone could see with the mind's eye in the manner suggested. But he found that persons in general society, a larger number of women than men, and many young people, habitually saw mental imagery, and that it was perfectly distinct to them and full of color. Many persons mentally read off scores of music when playing the piano, or mentally read from the manuscript when making speeches. One statesman reported that a certain hesitation in utterance which he had at times was due to his being plagued by the image of his manuscript speech with its original erasures and corrections.

Hunting for the eccentricities of mental imagery became a favorite sport for many psychologists and the results were surprisingly rewarding. Some individuals, who had little or no visual imagery, remembered sound with the vividness of original sensations. Others, with no ability to recall sights or sounds, had vivid recollections of movements. Studies of the motor type clarified the fact that all important perceptions, those of sight and touch with the rest, contain as integral elements the movements of eyes and limbs. "I rely in my thinking, upon visual imagery in the sense that I like to get a problem into some sort of visual scheme, from which I can think my way out and to which I can return. As I read an article, or the chapter of a book, I instinctively arrange the facts or arguments in some visual pattern, and I am as likely to think in terms of this pattern as I am to think in words. I understand, and to that extent I enjoy, an author whom I can thus visualize. Contrariwise, an author whose thought is not susceptible to my visual arrangement appears to me to be obscure and

involved; and an author who has an arrangement of his own, which crosses the pattern that I am forming in my mind, appears to me difficult and, to that extent, unenjoyable [sic]. …A writer may be discoursing in the easiest popular fashion; but if he is what I can obscure, if I cannot trance his pattern, I am baffled by him. I must then go to my friends, or to printed reviews of his work, and try to pick a patter at second hand." (Robinson. p. 299)

Here is recognition of the fact that a difference in imagery may affect meaning and condition the process of understanding. This is clear between individuals of very diverse imagery. A man habituated to motor verbal imagery, as is likely to be the ease in more abstract scientific thinking, employs a far more schematic, skeletal vehicle for his ideas than does the poet or the artist. Will James remarks that, "a person whose visual imagination is strong finds it hard to understand how those who are without the faculty can think at all". Undoubtedly many differences between theologians and philosophers rest upon these problems of the imagery involved in perception and the seeming absence of imagery in conceptual thought. Before the careful work of modern psychology in tracing variations in the sensuous thought-content, it was natural to think of the life of reason, operating with so-called abstract ideas, as radically different and sharply removed from the sphere of sense perception and memory images. And when there were other influences prejudicing the mind against the whole realm of the material, physical and bodily aspects of experience as belonging to a lower order of existence, it was not strange that imagination, with its revived impressions of sense, was assigned to the secondary and non-spiritual level. Plato's pure realm of ideas above and beyond the merely physical appeared to be the province of highest reason. This dualism has descended through the ages of problem at the heart of the opposition of the realists and the nominalists in the Middle Ages, the nominalists holding that ideas are always individual and specific and only have a representative functions with reference to classes of objects. The great Critiques of Immanuel Kant were profound efforts to reconcile these two realms of sense perception and of pure reason. The realm of sensuous experience constituted for him the phenomenal world ruled by the forms of space and time and by the category of causality. This sensuous world was also the realm of bodily wants, of desire and inclination, and the sphere of bondage to pleasure, appetite, and passion. The world of man's pure reason existed beyond the field of sense perception and imagination. In that world ruled the moral law, the august categorical imperative, in obedience to which, through conscious, autonomous volition, man attained his true freedom and fulfilled his destiny through faith. Because

knowledge always involves sense perception it could not for Kant grasp the realities of the metaphysical realm, God, Freedom and Immortality. These are pure Ideas of pure reason unmixed with the impurities of sense and imagery.

The influence of this division between the natural and the spiritual worlds has made a cleavage within man himself, between the body and the spirit, the material and the immaterial, the physical and the supernatural, between knowledge and faith. It is not my purpose here to recite the difficulties which this dualism has created in all the great spiritual concerns of life. Instead I shall undertake to point out some facts disclosed by modern psychology which may show the way to the understanding and possibility to a solution of some of the long standing conflicts of religious thought.

There are some words in which the imagery is directly related to the meaning. This is obviously the case with onomatopoetic words like buzz and hum, where the sound of the word presents immediately the thing meant. Words and expressions of this kind are favorite forms of speech with children and with uncultivated people. The child calls the dog, bow-wow, and the train choo-choo, the bell ding-dong. In the absence of the object, the word directly suggests the object, the word itself reinstates, as it were, the defining characteristic. In most words, however, there is no such direct reproduction of any quality of the thing designated. Names of objects are most frequently only arbitrary signs carrying in themselves no clue, aside from formal association, with the things intended. The word book has nothing in itself which I can discover to make it a fitting label for the thing signified. Yet by long usage the word calls up the image, it may be of the color, shape, and size, or the weight, or of the feel of its cover. But again, none of these features may be remembered, and the thought of the author may come directly to mind. Or, in a casual reference such as I am making now, the vague image of the object book may appear, or we may rest with the mere mention of the word. In rapid reading and in conversation most of the customary imagery is short-circuited and we employ a kind of mental shorthand which we seldom take time to transcribe into longhand as we may call the fuller, richer imagery which often appears when a word is dwelt upon and allowed to exfoliate the full tapestry of its color or the orchestration of its sound, or the drama of its action.

Even when the object is present in sensuous perception imagery functions to provide its meaning. When fruit is seen in a market window, it may make the mouth water. Touch and taste imagery is supplied to give full appreciation of the objects. Or, when a lady goes window shopping,

there is supplied to the distance receptors of vision the contact imagery of the texture, and the pressure imagery of the weight, and the temperature imagery of warmth. A piece of cloth of such and such appearance should have these other desirable qualities. Unless it is possible in this way to supply further definite imagery the object remains so far unknown and its meaning cannot be understood until further experience with it is gained. In such cases not only is the imagery necessary to the meaning, but the degree of the fullness and sufficiency of the meaning is related to the variety and quality of the imagery.

As we become familiar with objects the processes of thought are schematized and we deal with the objects about us with slight reinstatement of the concrete impressions which they are capable of affording. Thus in practical life the mention of chair is sufficient to make clear what kind of object is meant. If, on the other hand, we are interested in identifying a particular chair as belonging to a class of period furniture, it becomes important to study many particular features, the grain of the wood, its coloring, its proportions, the way in which its sections are joined, the polish it takes and every possible detail of its material and its finish. The question of the degree to which we bring to consciousness the sensuous impressions and imagery depends upon our interest. If a novelist mentions the fact that the hero sat in a chair, the interest is likely to be more in the hero and in his action, and the details of the chair do not come to the center of attention. We pass on with a mental glance and have no need to investigate special features. In this process of the facilitation of thinking we tend to reduce the schematism [sic] of ideas to the extreme. We depend upon type ideas which are only skeletal forms of the class of objects considered, or they may awaken only some slight image of a particular characteristic of the object designated. This schematism of thought may be illustrated by the way in which we ordinarily view a table. We neglect all the actual visual impressions of it and think of it as rectangular. If, however, an artist wishes to represent the table in a drawing he must see it from the exact angle in which it stands to his eye. In that angle it is rhomboidal or trapezoidal. But in ordinary procedure it is sufficient to think of it as rectangular and to go on to whatever practical interest we connect with it.

It is thus apparent from many facts that the meanings of ideas hold no fixed and necessary relation to the character of the definiteness of the imagery present in thought. This is true when the reference to ordinary objects of perception at the moment of their being perceived and also when they are recalled in memory. In the field of more abstract thought, as in algebra and the equations of higher mathematics the imagery is still