Categories, and What is Beyond

Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics

Volume 2

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Edited by

Gyula Klima and Alexander W. Hall

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION*

ALEXANDER W. HALL

The *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* (PSMLM) collects original materials presented at sessions sponsored by the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics (SMLM). Founded by Gyula Klima (Director), Joshua Hochschild (Secretary), Jack Zupko and Jeffrey Brower in 2000 (joined in 2011 by Assistant Director, Alexander Hall) to recover the profound metaphysical insights of medieval thinkers for our own philosophical thought, the Society currently has over a hundred members on five continents. The Society's maiden publication appeared online in 2001 and the decade that followed saw the release of eight more volumes. In 2011, PSMLM transitioned to print. Sharp-eyed readers of these volumes will note the replacement of our (lamentably copyrighted for commercial use) lions, who guarded the integrity of the body of an intellectual tradition thought to be dead, with the phoenixes that mark our rebirth. Friends of the lions will be happy to note that they remain at their post, protecting PSMLM's online proceedings at http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/.

For medieval thinkers, the distinction between intentional and extra-mental reality does not precipitate a Kantian turn to the subject. Rather, they allow that metaphysics and natural philosophy study things as they are and leave to logic the investigation of things as conceived. Within this broad scheme, there is much room for debate regarding whether and to what extent Aristotle's categories comprise an accurate picture of what types of things exist. Closely tied to consideration of what types of things exist are questions concerning how language reflects the relations that hold among these things. For instance, both substances and the accidents

* These writings first appeared in volume two of the *Proceedings of the Society for Medieval Logic and Metaphysics* (http://faculty.fordham.edu/klima/SMLM/), the colophon of which appears as an appendix to this book. The abstract of *Proclus on the Logic of the Ineffable* contained in this introduction was prepared by the paper's author, John N. Martin.

parasitic on their existence are said to be, but not in the same way.

The essays in this volume concern what types of things there are, the extent to which our knowledge of these entities is accurate, how (and whether) the semantics of analogy are competent to adjust for the difference and diversity found amongst analogates, and some ways in which these considerations bear on our ability to learn and speak of God.

Jorge J. E. Gracia's *Categories vs. Genera: Suárez's Difficult Balancing Act (Rough First Draft)* seeks to discern Francisco Suárez's views on the ontological status of the categories. Aristotle's categories or types of thing that are have been variously described as (1) mental acts or concepts; (2) linguistic entities; (3) extra-mental features or properties of the things about which we think and speak; and (4) words, concepts and properties, but in different ways. Complicating a decision on this matter, scholastic thinkers distinguish between categories and highest genera and use the same names ('substance', 'quality', 'quantity', etc.) to refer to both. To tease out Francisco Suárez's views on the ontological status of the categories, Gracia poses a series of questions: (1) What is the proper definition of categories? (2) What is the proper definition of highest genera? (3) What is the ontological status of categories? (4) What is the ontological status of highest genera? (5) What distinguishes categories from highest genera? (6) What kind of distinction holds between categories and highest genera? (7) In which discipline of learning [*scientia*] are categories studied and why? and (8) In which discipline of learning are highest genera studied and why? Cautioning that one should be very careful in the characterization of Suárez's view of categories, Gracia concludes that Suárez conceives of categories as mental dispositions whereby the logician coordinates the concepts that correspond to the relations between lower genera to the highest ones. About the genera, Suárez only says that they are real, i.e., not mental. Suárez's view then comes close to (4) above, categories can be ways of being, thinking and speaking.

In *Metaphysical Analogy* Stephen Theron develops the claim that analogy of being [*analogia entis*] is the fact and precondition of any plurality at all. Each individual is fundamentally unlike anything else with which it might be classified. The universal nature attained through abstraction is in some sense a construction of our intellect. Hence the analogy of being recognizes an analogy between the (acts of) being of the various individual beings in the world, but also an analogy between God and creation as a whole.

Being can be in many ways. Ultimately, this is what makes possible a plurality. Nevertheless, the being of God is infinite and unaffected by the coming into existence or passing away of creatures. But if created being does not add more being to God, to reality, and yet is really being, in our terms, then it is analogous being. Theron links the analogous nature of created being to Aquinas's claim that God does not know creatures in themselves but in his idea(s) of them. The divine ideas are one with God's eternal and simple being. We are not primarily in ourselves, then, but in God. Hence, notes Theron, there is a continuity of Aquinas with Cusanus, Leibniz, Eckhart and even much in later idealism.

William McMahon (along with Jan Pinborg, Sten Ebbesen and Robert Andrews) is a pioneer in the study of medieval *sufficientiae*, or attempts to produce a division of the categories according to principles that appear to yield a complete list. In *The Medieval Sufficientiae: Attempts at a Definitive Division of the Categories*, McMahon sums up what we presently know about the *sufficientia* movement. Inspired perhaps by yet unedited early thirteenth-century treatments of the *Categories*, Albert the Great seems to have penned the first medieval *sufficientia* in the late 1250's/early 1260's. Popular mainly among members of the Albert/Thomas "school," interest in *sufficientiae* fades with the ascendency of reductive or category collapsing accounts favored by the fourteenth-century terminist/nominalist movement. Despite the fact that the works of a medieval thinker sometimes present conflicting *sufficientiae*, McMahon contends that rough agreement between an author's *sufficientiae* and his other writings suggests a value to the *sufficientiae* viewed as exercises in dividing their subject into its conceptual components. As for the content of the *sufficientiae*, McMahon diagrams various medieval *sufficientiae* taken from Albert, Aquinas, Scotistic thinkers (per Suárez), and Radulphs Brito; and distinguishes between types of *sufficientiae* with reference to various ways they treat the division of accidents.

Thomas Sutton and Henry of Ghent agree that created and uncreated existence differ as the former participates in the latter and that what accounts for this participation is the limitation that creaturely essence imposes upon the perfection of the existence that realizes this essence. Nonetheless, for Sutton, the assumption that a thing's essence is really identical with its actual existence entails that the thing in question has to be God; whereas, for Henry, this implication is not valid. Accordingly, while Henry maintains the real identity of essence and existence in creatures, Sutton rejects this claim. Gyula Klima's *Thomas Sutton and*

Henry of Ghent on the Analogy of Being finds the clue to their conflicting intuitions in their semantic conception concerning the relationship between the notions of being and essence.

In *Proclus on the Logic of the Ineffable*, John N. Martin offers an informal introduction to the semantic theory in the Neoplatonic system of Proclus. It is sketched how the Neoplatonic order can be understood as ranked by scalar adjectives as understood in modern linguistics, and how Proclus's exposition, especially his use of privative and hypernegation, presuppose the syllogistic of Aristotle.

Alan Perreiah's *Skepticism and Mysticism in Meister Eckhart's and Augustine's Apophatic Theolog[ies]* develops the notion of an anthropological apophaticism that denies us knowledge of the divine essence owing to the limits of the created intellect by reviewing some themes in Meister Eckhart's "Poverty of Spirit" and "On Detachment". Perreiah then considers the extent to which Augustine's *Confessions* exhibit a similar apophaticism. While Augustine does practice an anthropological apophaticism, attendant admissions of human frailty do not motivate Augustine to an asceticism that seeks the kind of self-annihilation described in the writings of Eckhart.

William Lane Craig applies J. M. E. McTaggart's A and B theories of time to explain the relation between the eternal and the temporal in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas, concluding that Aquinas is committed to a B-theory of time that holds that the events in the temporal series have the same ontological status. That is, past, present, and future events exist. Present events exist now; past events also exist, but are 'earlier than' in time, and the future exists but is 'later than' in time. In *The Temporal's "Presentness" to Divine Eternity in Thomas Aquinas*, Jason Reed contends that Craig's treatment of Aquinas is ahistorical, forcing Aquinas into *ex post facto* categories unknown to him, offering in place of Craig's findings his own proposal on how properly to understand Aquinas's' position.

The concluding essay, Peter Weigel's *Simplicity and Explanation in Aquinas's God*, draws attention to the power of Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity to help generate and therefore determine the basic working character of the other divine attributes and the nature of the beatific vision. Produced near the end of Aquinas's career, the *Summa theologiae* renders divine simplicity the preeminent divine attribute and

the basis (1) for deriving and better understanding the divine attributes against an explanatory model where something cannot come from nothing and there simply are no "brute facts," and (2) to guarantee the intelligibility of God *in se* in the beatific vision. Hence the aftershocks of Aquinas's insight regarding the ontological primacy of divine simplicity with respect to the divine attributes echo throughout the rest of the work.

CATEGORIES VS. GENERA: SUÁREZ'S DIFFICULT BALANCING ACT

JORGE J. E. GRACIA

It is not clear what kind of answer we would get if we asked an ordinary person what a category is. If the person has had some exposure to philosophy, then most likely the answer would repeat what he or she has been told it is, but even this cannot assure us of what the answer would be. The reason is that philosophers speak about categories in many different ways. There is one initial, and rather substantial, difference between those who include a very large number of items under categories and those who include only a very small number. The first regard such different things as human, green, animal, thought, and justice, as categories; the second speak only of very general items such as substance, quality, relation, and the like. Among those who have a very broad understanding of categories are such philosophers as Gilbert Ryle. Those who speak only of a short list, such as Roderick Chisholm, are usually thinking in more traditional terms, of the kinds of things that Aristotle, the scholastics, and most early modern philosophers thought. Because Suárez is a scholastic, I shall speak only of a very limited list of items.

The disagreement concerning categories, however, does not end there. Even if we restrict our discussion to a small number of items of the sort that Aristotle regarded as categories, there are many questions that remain to be answered about them and about which philosophers disagree. For example, we may ask about the exact number of categories, for although the list is supposed to be small, authors have frequently disagreed on this. Aristotle listed up to ten categories, but gave the impression that the ultimate number was not settled at all. Plotinus and Spinoza reduced the number radically, but their views did not by any means establish themselves as definitive.

More controversial even than the number of categories is what might be called their ontological status. The main disagreement here is among four

positions. According to one, categories are linguistic entities—call them words—such as the words 'quality' and 'relation,' with which we speak about things. According to another, categories are mental acts—call them concepts—such as the concept of quality or the concept of relation, with which we think about things. Categories are also thought to be extra-mental features that things about which we think and speak have—call them properties—such as the properties of being a quality or the property of being a relation. Finally, there is a view that tries to integrate all of these three positions into one, arguing that categories are words, concepts, and properties but in different ways. Of course, these four views are not the only choices available and, indeed, I have suggested an entirely different way of thinking about categories elsewhere.[1] But these four ways are the most popular views among philosophers and the ones that were considered by scholastics. They are, therefore, the most pertinent for our discussion of Suárez, which accordingly is going to concern the issue of ontological status.

The Questions

The problem concerning the ontological status of categories in a scholastic context becomes particularly complicated because the same words that are used to refer to categories are also used to refer to what scholastics called highest genera. Scholastics generally accepted the list of categories they found in Aristotle's texts, namely: substance, quality, quantity, relation, and so on. And they also held that, corresponding to these, there are also ten genera: substance, quality, quantity, relation, and so on.

In order to have a full picture of the ontological status of categories, then, we need also to understand how they are related to the highest genera, in which ways they are like or unlike the highest genera, and the ontological status of the highest genera. Moreover, we need also to determine the kind of distinction that holds between categories and highest genera, and to **have** as clear a definition or description of both as possible. Finally, we need to establish the discipline or disciplines in which categories and highest genera are studied. Let us keep these questions separate and put them in a certain order to make them clear:

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[1] Jorge J. E. Gracia, *Metaphysics and its Task: The Search for the Categorial Foundation of Knowledge* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1999), ch. 9.

1. What is the proper definition of categories?
2. What is the proper definition of highest genera?
3. What is the ontological status of categories?
4. What is the ontological status of highest genera?
5. What distinguishes categories from highest genera?
6. What kind of distinction holds between categories and highest genera?
7. In which discipline of learning (*scientia*) are categories studied and why?
8. In which discipline of learning are highest genera studied and why?

Having formulated these questions with some precision, one would think it would be easy to proceed to give them answers. However, right at the outset we run into what appear to be insurmountable problems.

The Problems

The difficulty with questions (1) and (2), that ask for definitions of categories and highest genera, is that it is not at all clear that proper definitions of these can be given. A definition, as understood by Suárez and other scholastics, consists in a sentence with two parts, the *definiendum* which refers to the entity to be defined, and the *definiens* or defining expression. Thus in 'Man is a rational animal,' 'Man' is the *definiendum* and 'rational animal' is the *definiens*. The latter is tied to the former by a copula that explains their relation. Now, the *definiens* of a definition has two parts. One is the genus or larger class to which the entity being defined belongs, such as animal in the example given. The other part is the specific difference that sets apart the particular class to which the entity being defined belongs, which is rational in the example.

This poses a serious difficulty for the definition of categories and genera in that these are supposed to have no genus above them, for being, which is supposed to be what these categories and highest genera "divide" is not

itself a genus according to the scholastics, who followed Aristotle on this. Moreover, these categories and genera, precisely because they are the highest, cannot differ through some specific difference that sets them apart, for there is nothing beyond them that could function as such a difference. The categories and highest genera differ by themselves, something Suárez and other scholastics expressed by saying that they were "diverse" from each other, rather than "different" from each other. Man is different from cat because, although he is like cat in that he belongs in the genus animal, he is unlike cat in that he has the capacity to reason. But substance is not different from quality because substance and quality have no genus in common and there is nothing that could be used to distinguish them within a genus. The categories and highest genera are completely different from each other, that is, diverse by themselves. Substance does not differ from quality in something that it does not share with quality while sharing all sorts of other things with it; it differs from a quality completely, in that it is substance and quality is quality: Neither has anything in common with the other. In short, it does not seem possible that we can have proper definitions of the categories or highest genera, for definitions require both higher genera and also *differentiae*, and neither the categories nor the highest genera can have these. There is no genus to which substance belongs, and substance has no *differentia* that distinguishes it from other categories and highest genera.

Something similar can be said about questions (3) and (4) which are concerned with ontological status. To determine the ontological status of cat, for example, is to establish the kind of thing a cat ultimately is. By this, contemporary philosophers usually mean to identify the category in which cat fits. For an Aristotelian like Suárez, this would mean to establish whether cat is a substance, a relation, a quality, a quantity, and so on. And the same would apply to white. Determining the ontological status of white would entail trying to determine whether it is a quality (as Aristotelians thought) or a quantity (as some modern philosophers thought), and so on. Note, however, that although scholastics were very much concerned with the issue of categorization, they did not speak about "ontological status." This is a contemporary expression and therefore should be taken with a grain of salt. Indeed, the term 'ontology' did not appear in philosophy until the seventeenth century.

But here, in the area of ontological status, again we run into a serious difficulty because in order to provide an ontological categorization we need to have categories in which the thing being categorized falls. The

ontological categorization of cat is possible because we have the category substance in which cat fits. This, however, does not seem to be possible when we try to apply this procedure to categories and highest genera, for they do not have any category above themselves. A quality is just that, a quality, and so is a relation and so on. There are no supra-categories.

Someone might object to this that perhaps the so-called transcendentals could function in this way. But this is incorrect. The transcendentals, for Suárez and other scholastics, are being and the properties of being. The latter were generally identified as unity, goodness, and truth. The distinctive character of the transcendentals is that they apply to items in all categories: A substance is a being, one, good, and true; a quality is a being, one, good, and true; and so on. However, neither being, nor its properties, function as categories. Being and good, for example, are not categories in which substance and quality fit as cat and dog fit in the category of substance. They are rather on a par with substance and quality, except that, unlike these, they apply to everything.

The difficulties raised with questions (1)-(4) which we have discussed affect also question (5) and (6), because (5) is concerned with what distinguishes categories from highest genera and (6) with the nature of this distinction. And if we cannot determine what distinguishes categories from highest genera, it does not appear possible to determine the kind of distinction in question, that is, whether it is real (e.g., between a cat and a dog), conceptual (e.g., between the father of Clarisa and the husband of Norma), or merely nominal (e.g., between ‘man’ and ‘rational animal’), say, which were the most common kinds of distinctions accepted by scholastics.

Something similar applies to the last two questions posed earlier, numbers (7) and (8), concerned with the disciplines of learning in which categories and highest genera are studied respectively. One reason is that, for scholastics, the discipline in charge of a particular subject matter often depended on the ontological status or nature of the subject matter in question. They thought, for example, that logic studies concepts and their interrelations, whereas metaphysics studies being or reality. So, if we cannot determine the ontological status of categories and highest genera, how are we to decide on the discipline under which they are studied? Another reason is that sciences are concerned with definitions and, as we have seen, definitions impose certain conditions that neither categories nor highest genera can satisfy.

Clearly, the scholastics faced a serious problem if they attempted to answer the questions raised earlier. Interestingly enough, this problem does not seem to have deterred them from making claims about the answers to each and every one of those questions. The issue for us is, why? How do they obviate these difficulties?

In this very brief presentation I propose to give an answer to this question by looking at Suárez's view of categories and highest genera, for he gives explicit answers to some of the questions raised earlier and one can also gather what his answer would have been to some of the others, even if he did not address them explicitly. Once his view is established, then we shall be able to identify the strategy he uses.

What Suárez Says and Means

Suárez actually says very little when it comes to the questions raised earlier. But there are two short texts that give us enough information to form an opinion of his views on these matters. Let's begin with the shortest one:

> ...a category is nothing other than the *appropriate disposition* of genera and species from a supreme genus to individuals.[2] (My emphasis)

This text is very clear in stating what Suárez thinks a category is. Indeed, he explicitly says that a category is this and nothing else. And what is it? It is an "appropriate disposition." There are two things about dispositions that are relevant for us to keep in mind when trying to understand this text. The first is that a disposition is generally classified as a species of quality, and this entails that a disposition is required to have something it qualifies, namely a substance. After years of driving, for example, I have the disposition to engage in certain actions when I sit on the driver's seat of an automobile. I also have the disposition to hold the fork with my left hand when I eat because that is the way I was taught to use it at home. These dispositions are qualities of my mind that affect the way I act, or so the scholastics thought.[3]

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[2] Francisco Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* (henceforth *DM*) 39, 1; in *Opera omnia*, ed. Carolo Berton (Paris: Vivès, 1861), vol. 25, p. 504b: "Nam preadicamentum...nihil aliud est quam generum et specierum usque ad individua conveniens dispositio sub aliquo supremo genere...."

[3] But these examples should not suggest that dispositions are always found in minds. This is not entailed by what I have said.

The second important aspect of a disposition is that it is directed toward something. Dispositions are relational in the sense that my disposition to hold the fork in a certain way is a quality of my mind that directs me to hold the fork in that way. There is then a relation between the fork and me that is explained because of the disposition I have.

So we are entitled to ask: If a category is a disposition, where is this disposition located, and toward what is it directed? The text cited does not tell us anything about the location of the dispositions Suárez identifies with categories, but it does identify the terms of the relation in question: The disposition holds between the genera and species (such things as animal and human) to which individuals belong (such as this animal or this human) and a supreme genus (such as substance). But this is rather odd, isn't it? The oddity comes from two sides. First, in the exact nature of the relation and, second, in the fact that dispositions generally apply to sentient beings. I return to the second oddity later, but with respect to the first one could say perhaps that Suarez has in mind that categories are certain dispositions of the genera and species to which individuals belong toward some highest genus. In an example, a category is the disposition that the species human has toward one of the highest genera, namely substance.

What Suárez tells us, even if meager, also reveals something very important if we take it as a kind of *via negativa.* For, if categories are dispositions of genera and species toward highest genera, then they are not themselves genera or species. So presumably, categories cannot be at all the same thing as the highest genera. This means that, although the category substance has the same name as one of the highest genera, it is not the same thing as the genus with which it shares its name.

This is not yet sufficient, however, for our understanding of categories and highest genera in that, in the first place, we need to know where these dispositions are located—the first problem raised earlier—and we also need to know something more about what they are. Let us look at the second text to which I alluded and see if we can squeeze the answers we need out of it. It reads:

> ...a category is nothing other than the *appropriate disposition* and *coordination* of essential predicates, of which those that are predicated essentially of the individual are placed above it, in a direct line, going up from the lower to the higher; and this line, just as it does not begin but with the lowest, that is the individual, does not end but in a highest

genus....[4] (My emphasis)

In this text, Suárez repeats that categories are dispositions, but he adds another term to describe them, namely 'coordination.' A category is the coordination or, we might say, the arrangement of essential predicates. Note that in this text Suárez speaks of predicates rather than genera. All the same, I think we are on safe ground if we interpret him as speaking about genera. Why? Because the term 'predicate' was used ambiguously by scholastics, and also by Suárez. Often they meant to refer to linguistic terms (as many of us do today), but at other times they meant to refer to the denotations or connotations of those terms. 'Predicate,' then, in this context, can very well stand for what a term denotes or connotes, which for our purposes is a genus.

Now, then, we can say that this coordination of genera goes according to a pattern of essential inclusion that extends from the lowest to the highest genera. By this Suárez seems to be saying that such categories as *quantity* or *quality*, for example, are not themselves genera, but ways in which genera are coordinated or arranged, as I have suggested. Still the matter is not quite clear, for there are at least two possible interpretations of what he says. In one way, he might have in mind that the category *quantity*, for example, establishes how *big* is related to *human being*, and the category *quality* establishes how *black* is related to *cat*. The emphasis on essential predicates, however, poses a problem for this interpretation, for *black* is not related essentially to *cat.* So what could Suárez mean, then? One could argue that he means to refer only to essential predicates, such as animal and rational for human. But this does not seem right in that it would be too restrictive. I think he has in mind that the categories are the ways in which genera are essentially constituted: Categories explain the ultimate kinds of things that genera are by relating lower genera to highest genera. Thus, after all, the category *quality* does tell us something about *red*, namely, that it is the kind of thing that is a quality, that is, that it adheres to an individual in a certain way.

[4] *DM* 39, 2, 30, p. 518b: "praedicamentum nihil aliud est quam debita dispositio et coordinatio essentialium praedicatorum, ex quibus ea, quae in quid praedicantur de individuo, supra illud in recta linea collocantur, ab inferioribus ad superiora ascendendo; haec autem linea sicut ab infimo, id est, ab individuo incipit, ita non terminatur nisi ad aliquod genus summum...." The use of 'conveniens' in the first text cited and of 'debita' here do not appear to be significant. In both cases Suárez has in mind a disposition which is appropriate for something to have in accordance with its essence or nature.

Even if we accept this explanation, however, we are still lacking some key answers to our questions. For example, we still do not know where these dispositions and coordinations are located. Where is it that categories are to be found? Are they found in the world or in the mind? Are they relations among things or among concepts?

A third, most important text sheds some light on these issues. Suárez tells us:

> However, because mental concepts are about real things, and are founded on real things, [the logician also] treats of real things, although not to explain their essences and natures, but only in order to *coordinate* the concepts in the mind; and in this sense he deals with the ten [supreme] genera in order to establish the ten categories.[5] (My emphasis)

Here Suárez is concerned to tell us something about the subject matter of logic, that is, the kinds of things with which the logician deals in his discipline. And what he tells us is that the logician deals with the ten highest genera in order to establish the ten categories. So, this makes clear where we are to find the ten categories. These are not genera themselves, not are they found in the world, rather they are located in the logician's mind. Categories are dispositions in the logician's mind that coordinate genera in the way described earlier. That is, these dispositions direct the logician to establish the ways in which lower genera are related to the highest genera, thus explaining what these lower genera ultimately are and how they are related to individuals. This is one very important point made clear by this text.

The second important point is a corollary of the first. It is that categories are mental in the sense that they are the ways in which we think of the relations among genera. The ontological status of categories, then, is mental, not extra mental or linguistic. For this reason, it is the logician who properly treats of categories, for categories are ways in which concepts are appropriately arranged in the mind. However, because these concepts reflect the ways things are outside the mind, that is, the natures and essences of things in the world, the logician also deals, albeit only indirectly, with natures and essences in order to be able to introduce the

[5] *DM* 39, 1, p. 504b: "Quia vero conceptus mentis circa res versantur, et in rebus fundantur, ideo de rebus tractat, non ut earum essentias et naturas declaret, sed solum in ordine ad conceptus mentis coordinandos; et hoc modo agit de decem generibus in ordine ad decem praedicamenta constituenda."

proper order among them in the mind.

There is also another byproduct of what has been said, and this applies to the highest genera. How are these to be conceived? From the cited text as well as from others, it is clear that for Suárez the highest genera are real in the sense that they are not mental entities. This is the reason why they are studied in metaphysics rather than logic, for the metaphysician deals directly with the ten supreme genera, not with ways of arranging concepts in the mind. The purpose of metaphysics is to determine the essences of things and these are expressed by definitions that make reference to genera.

This brings us to the discipline under which the categories are studied.[6] Suárez tells us that the division into nine genera (he is speaking of the accidental highest genera, although what he says applies also to substance), is proposed not only by metaphysicians, but also by logicians in treatises on categories. However, it properly belongs to first philosophy, that is, metaphysics, rather than logic. The reason is that, whereas the metaphysician studies the ten supreme genera in order to explain their natures and essences, the logician does not have this purpose. Logic is directed toward the operations of the mind, rather than toward natures and essences, and its purpose is to establish rational ways of thinking. Logic, then, deals with the concepts of the mind insofar as these concepts can be arranged in accordance with certain rules.[7] Metaphysics, on the other hand, deals with real being.

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[6] I discuss Suárez's conception of metaphysics in "Suárez's Metaphysics: A Step in the Direction of Mentalism?" *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 65 (1991), 287-310; "Suárez and Metaphysical Mentalism: The Last Visit," *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993), 349-354; and, in an expanded version, in "Suárez y la metafísica," in Jorge J. E. Gracia, ed., *Concepciones de la metafísica* (Madrid: CSIC, 1998), pp. 101-124.

[7] *DM* 39, 1, p. 504b: "Divisio haec non solum a metaphysico traditur, sed etiam a dialectico, in ea parte in qua de praedicamentis disputat; altiori tamen magisque exacta ratione ad primum philosophum pertinet, ut ex his, quae de obiecto huius doctrinae diximus, constare potest. Dialecticus enim non considerat decem suprema entium genera, ut eorum naturas et essentias exacte declaret; id enim extra institutum ejus esset, cum dialectica solum sit quaedam ars dirigens operationes intellectus, ut artificiose et cum ratione exerceantur. Unde directe ac per se agit de conceptibus mentis, ut dirigibiles sunt per artem, seu de forma et ordinatione conceptuum, quatenus per artem tribui potest." And also *DM* 39, 2, p. 505a: "At vero metaphysicus directe et ex proprio instituto hanc tradit divisionem, ut proprias rationes et essentias rerum inquirat."

Summary of Suárez's Position

It seems that now we have the answer to some of the questions raised earlier. Suárez does not tell us anything about the first two questions concerned with the definition of categories and highest genera, and the reason is that he is aware of the problems we raised with respect to them. But what he says about categories appears to be sufficient to answer question (3) concerned with the ontological status of categories. His answer, as we saw, is that categories are mental dispositions whereby the logician coordinates the concepts that correspond to the relations between lower genera to the highest ones. About the highest genera, he only tells us that they are real, by which presumably in this context he means to say they are not mental. And this gives perhaps the answer to question (5): Categories are distinguished from highest genera in that categories are mental and the highest genera are not. But what kind of distinction is this, between mental and non-mental entities? I have no time here to elaborate on this point, but I believe it is a real distinction insofar as mental entities are considered by Suárez to be acts in the mind and as such are in reality distinct from whatever is outside the mind. Now, the answer to questions 7 and 8, concerned with the respective disciplines that study categories and the highest genera, is clear. Categories pertain to logic and the highest genera to metaphysics.

Back to the Beginning

Now that we have a summary of Suárez's position with respect to categories and genera, we can go back to the issues raised at the very beginning: Can Suárez legitimately say what he says about categories and genera, in view of the difficulties raised at the outset? Can he balance the need to understand categories "scientifically," that is, involving definition and ontological characterization, and his view of them as most general? And can he do the same with the highest genera?

With respect to categories, I see no difficulty, for Suárez claims that categories are concepts through which we think about the relations between lower genera and the highest genera. To say that they are concepts in this way avoids the difficulty identified earlier insofar as the ontological description, or even definition, of a category is not that of something like substance or quality, that is, of the highest genera. The ontological categorization of categories amounts to that of the concepts through which we think of these genera, and concepts are certainly not one

of the highest genera. A concept can be, therefore, not only ontologically characterized, but also defined. And, indeed, there is precedence for this procedure (e.g., John Duns Scotus).

When we come to the highest genera, however, matters are quite different, and here Suárez remains silent, as he should. The only thing he tells us about them is that they are real in the sense of not being mental. But this does not create the difficulty mentioned earlier, for to say this is not to categorize them either ontologically or in a definition.

One last point in parting. From what has been said, it should be clear that one should be very careful in the characterization of Suárez's view of categories. Strictly speaking, if the question asked is about Suárez's view of categories, then it is clear that he thinks these are mental entities of the conceptual sort and, therefore, that he is a conceptualist to this extent. But if one asks what he thinks substance, quality, relation, and so on are, then his view is that they are both mental and non-mental insofar as these terms refer both to categories and genera. So he comes across as someone who has a comprehensive view of substance, quality, relation, and so on, in that he accepts that these can be both ways of thinking and ways of being. Of course, I am assuming that he would also say that there are words that correspond to these and thus that they are also ways of speaking.

THE MEDIEVAL SUFFICIENTIAE: ATTEMPTS AT A DEFINITIVE DIVISION OF THE CATEGORIES

WILLIAM MCMAHON

Let me begin with a brief history of the discussion of this subject. A generation ago there was something known in Thomistic circles as a "transcendental deduction" of the Aristotelian categories (see Breton 1962, Wippel 1987). I first encountered it in the readings for a comprehensive exam at Notre Dame. It was a division of the categories according to principles which appeared to yield a complete list, with each member independent of the others. The textual basis was a passage in St. Thomas' Commentary on the Metaphysics (1950: lect.9, 891-892).

A few years later I was teaching medieval philosophy, using the Shapiro text (1964: 266-293), in which there was a translation of Albert the Great's Commentary on the *Liber Sex Principiorum*. The commentary contained a division of the categories similar to the one in St. Thomas. Still later, in 1981 I was doing a sabbatical in Copenhagen with Jan Pinborg and Sten Ebbesen. I asked them about this matter, and they showed me some more texts. Under their tutelage I edited Radulphus Brito's treatment of the subject (McMahon 1981). We then noted that these "deductions" of the categories were known as sufficientiae About the mid-80's Robert Andrews, a student of Norman Kretzmann's at Cornell, did a thesis consisting of an edition and translation of Peter of Auvergne's Commentary on the Categories. Andrews found further sufficientiae and discussed them in detail. So to date the definitive treatment of the subject is in Andrews' thesis (1988: 72-103).

Let me then sum up what we presently know about the sufficientia movement, raising what seem to be the interesting questions. For about 50 years, roughly 1260 to 1310, there was a strong interest in showing that there are ten and only ten categories. It appears to have begun with people like Albert and Thomas, is continued under those who are generally

sympathetic to their philosophical outlook, and fades away with the ascendancy of the terminist/nominalist movement.

So the first question is, who started this business, and why? We don't really know the answers, but I originally posited some, and Andrews' findings tend to confirm my speculations. My 1981 article takes note of sufficientiae by Albert (1890a: I, Ch.7; VI,Chs.1-2; 1890b: I,Chs. 1, 6), Thomas (1950:V, lect.9.891-892), Simon of Faversham (Ottaviano 1930: Q.XII, 274-275), and Radulphus Brito (McMahon 1981: 90-92). Subsequent research has added another one by Thomas (1954: III, lect.5.322; see also Wippel 1987), and ones by Peter of Auvergne (Andrews 1988: 381), Augustinus Triumphus (see Andrews 1988: 80), Walter Burley (1497: 18rA-B), and Peter Bradlay (Synan 1967: 290-291). There are quasi-sufficientiae in such works as the pseudo-Aquinas Summa Totius Logicae (1927: II, 19-21). And even in post-medieval thought, where Scholasticism carries on in such places as the Iberian peninsula, one finds discussions of the subject (e.g., Suarez 1960-66: V.Disp 39, Sec. 2.13-16, 717-720).

Let me try to place the medieval sufficientiae in a rough chronological order:[1]

Albert the Great—late 1250's/early 1260's, Thomas Aquinas—1270-72, Peter of Auvergne—c. 1275, Simon of Faversham—c. 1280, Augustinus Triumphus—1280's?, Radulphus Brito—c. 1300, Peter Bradlay and Walter Burley—1300-1310. Regarding the question of who created the first sufficientia there is a pseudo-problem, generated by Thomists who are inclined to believe that all good ideas originated with the Angelic Doctor[2]. Suffice to say that they were unaware of Albert's contribution to the subject. It seems certain that Albert's are the earliest known medieval

[1] Albert is the most difficult to date, as his commentaries are not ascribed to his period as an arts teacher, but rather to a a later endeavor to do an encyclopedic treatment of Aristotle. Glorieux (1933: I, 67) gives the probable date of Albert's *Categories* commentary as about 1262 and also provides material concerning the careers of the others. Weisheipl (1974: 375-376) states that Thomas' *Physics* commentary was done in 1269-70, while James Doig (1972: 15) maintains that Book V of the *Metaphysics* was commented on in 1270-71.

[2] According to Wippel (1987: 19-20,n.20) the article, "Kategorie, Kategorienlehre," by H.M. Baumgartner/G. Gerhard/K. Konhardt/G. Schonrich in *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie* (ed. By J. Ritter and K. Grunder), Basel/Stuttgart: Schwabe and Co., 1976, Vol. IV, cols. 722-723, "credits Thomas with being the first to attempt a systematic deduction of the Aristotelian categories."

sufficientiae, and since he was Thomas' teacher, it is probable that Thomas got the idea from Albert. In looking for common denominators among the sufficientiae (independently of content, which will be treated later), it is tempting to say that the movement is mainly among members of the Albert/Thomas "school". However, labels are somewhat gratuitous, and as Roensch (1964: vii-ix) notes, "Thomist" has a loose meaning in the late 13th century. Furthermore, scores of arts masters commented on the Categories, and the logico-semantical issues therein have little to do, e.g., with whether someone holds that there are one or many substantial forms in human nature. Hence I cannot agree with van Steenbergen's (1966:13) contention that such Aristotelian conceptions as "les categories … sont tout a fait etrangeres a saint Augustin."[3]

There may be a clue to the origins question in Radulphus Brito (McMahon 1981:86-92). Radulphus distinguishes between the "expositio antiqua" and the "sufficientia Simplicii". This suggests that the translation of Simplicius' commentary on the Categories by William of Moerbeke in 1266 is a key event in our story (see A. Pattin in Simplicius 1971-75: I, xi-xxiii). Thomas, of course, was closely associated with Moerbeke, and Albert would at least have known of him through Thomas. (see Weisheipl 1974:148-153). The late Greek author Simplicius defended the ten-category system and answered neo-Platonic objections to it. His treatment and the word 'sufficiunt' therein[4] may well be the source for the sufficientia movement. However, Albert's divisions probably antedate the Moerbeke translation, so my guess is that Albert is either the source for the "expositio antiqua" or one of its leading exponents. That may derive in some way from the *Liber Sex Principiorum* (LSP) (Minio-Paluello 1966), a treatise erroneously ascribed to Gilbert de la Porree, which supplements Aristotle by dealing more extensively with the last six categories. In attempting to legitimize these categories, whose status had previously been somewhat shaky, the LSP would seem to have provided an impetus for strict adherence to a set of ten and only ten categories. Furthermore, the sufficientia era seems to coincide with the period in which it was

[3] Not only does Augustine's *De Magistro* (1967: 20-33) manifest understanding of the categories, but also there was in the logic tradition a work entitled *Categoriae Decem* (or *Paraphrasis Themistiana*), which was erroneously ascribed to Augustine (see Minio-Paluello 1961: lxxvii-xcv). It evidently comes from the school of Themistius in the late 4th century.

[4] In his commentary on Chapters 9-10 (Aristotle 1941: 9-10. 11b15-16) Simplicius (1971-75: II, 410) says, "Quod autem genera sint praedicamenta, ipse Aristoteles significavit dicens: de praemissis quidem igitur generibus dicta sufficiunt."

fashionable to do commentaries on the LSP. Later, one notes, e.g., in Buridan (1983: 3.12.19), disdain for both. Let me speculate just a bit further by suggesting that there may be sources for Albert's divisions in early 13th century treatments of the categories, many of which are not yet edited.

In attempting to reconstruct the motives for doing sufficientiae, one encounters some curious facts. First, authors aren't always consistent; as we shall see, they sometimes present conflicting sufficientiae in their works, or distinctions in the divisions which are not employed in the substantive discussion of the categories. These considerations lead Robert Andrews (1988: 85) to surmise that "sufficientiae are to be considered as exercises in systematization and improvisation, and not as a source for theories of the categories." So the question here is whether sufficientiae have more than aesthetic/cosmetic value. I think they do and would like to comment on this matter without getting too entangled in discussing the epistemic status of medieval theories. Obviously, people who posit sufficientiae believe in the sufficiency of the ten-category system. That this is true is given indirect support by the fact that opponents of the categories either ignore or debunk the sufficientiae.[5] It is rather maddening that an author's sufficientiae don't always accord with his other statements about the categories, but there is usually a rough correlation, with some of the ideas in the sufficientiae being expanded on later. So in that sense sufficientiae have a status akin to that of "one liners", but they don't really amount to "throwaway comments.'

Furthermore, there is a sense of "science" (as meaning "knowledge" in a broad sense) here that fits the dividing of the categories. As suggested above, the idea of "knowledge" among the medievals is ambiguous, as they were fuzzy regarding the epistemic status of their views. They clearly saw that not all mainstream beliefs could be justified within a deductive science, and if pressed, would have had to concede that many theoretical statements did not even fall within a scientia quia, which argues probabilistically from facts to their explanations. There were other, less rigorous, notions of science floating about. One such is that of scientia divisiva, which is productive of knowledge by dividing a subject into its

[5] In addition to Buridan, cited above, Duns Scotus was skeptical about the categories (see 1997: 5,6.464; also comments of editors in 1997: xxviii-xxix and 1999: xxxix). In the place where one usually finds a sufficientia, the response to the question, "Utrum Sint Tantum Decem Genera Generalissima" (1999: 11.343-354), Scotus gives none, which I regard as significant.

conceptual components.[6] That may be what some were thinking of here, but there still remain a number of unanswered questions, such as those regarding the lack of overall coherence in some of the commentaries.

Turning now to the content of the sufficientiae, after the primary distinction of substance and accident the division of the accidents turns upon two main distinctions. The first is that between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" accidents. The immediate source for this is the *Liber Sex Principiorum* (LSP), although more remotely, it can be said to be in Boethius (1918: 22-24). To explain the intrinsic-extrinsic distinction I shall invoke a formulation which was suggested to me many years ago by the late Jan Pinborg: The substance of a particular is an essential property, whereas the accidents are contingent properties. But the contingent properties appear to be further divided into "necessarily contingent" and "contingently contingent" items. Essential properties can be regarded as necessary for the concept of an individual, i.e., of what it is. Intrinsic accidents are not considered necessary in this sense but rather necessary for having an image or mental picture of a particular. That is, a full blown particular as depicted via an image must be extended and hence have some size and shape, and must have qualitative characteristics such as color. But the extrinsic properties would be even contingent to the imagination, and therein lies their externality. Putting this in terms of modal logic and the semantics of possible worlds, one can say that essential properties (kinds) are necessary in the strictest sense. That is, a particular such as Socrates necessarily has an essence; necessarily, Socrates is human. He also necessarily has, as an observable physical object, certain accidents, quantitative and qualitative determinations. He necessarily (in all possible perceptual worlds) has some accidents belonging to the categories of quantity and quality, such as having a color, shape, and extension in three dimensions. But any specific accident within these categories, e.g., whiteness, being 5'6" tall, or being stout, would only belong to Socrates contingently. Furthermore, any properties within such categories as action, passion, when, or where would be "contingently contingent". Hence it would not only be contingent whether he is walking, jostled by Alcibiades,

[6] E.g., Radulphus Brito's *Commentary* on the LSP (Q.1, Ad.3, f.111vA35-40) says, "… triplex est scientia: Quaedam est collativa, et illa habet cognosci per demonstrationem. Alia est definitiva, et illa habet cognosci per definitionem. Tertia est divisiva, et illa habet cognosci per divisionem… cuius non est demonstratio, illius non est scientia collativa. Tamen eius potest esse scientia definitiva vel divisiva. Et sic est de sex principiis, ipsa enim describuntur, et in species dividitur, ergo etc.

or in the agora at a certain time, but it would also be contingent as to whether he is acting or acted upon per se, or whether he be located in space-time at all. In other words, he could be both conceived of and imagined as not being spatio-temporally located, and neither doing anything or being acted upon. Putting this yet another way, in current parlance, substance "supervenes" upon the accidents, and quantity and quality supervene upon the six principles.

Another way of looking at this is by means of the "onion metaphor"(see Adams 1985: 175). The innermost layers of a physical object, the core, is the substance. The intrinsic properties constitute the layer just beyond, while the extrinsic properties belong to the outer layers. In this format, however, the status of the category of relation is as yet undetermined. Breton (1962: 16) takes it as the median point between interiority and exteriority, using the appealing metaphor that "relation is the middle term of a kind of syllogism in action." This introduces the second main distinction governing the sufficientiae—between relational and non-relational properties. For sufficientiae may be differentiated primarily in terms of how they treat relations, and medieval Aristotelianism provides three ways of treating them: (a) as intrinsic properties, (b) as extrinsic properties, and (c) as neither.

(a) This seems to be the mainstream, or "standard" approach. Given that Aristotle considers relation along with the intrinsic properties, and the LSP separates out the last six properties as extrinsic, the inference is that items in the category of relation must be intrinsic in some way. This seems to be the position alluded to by Radulphus Brito (McMahon 1981: 91-92) as the expositio antiqua. This is the scheme presented in Diagram 1, from Thomas' *Commentary on the Metaphysics* (1950: V, lect.9.891-892). It also occurs in Simon of Faversham (Ottaviano 1930: Q.XII, 274-275), Peter Bradlay (Synan 1967: 290-291), Peter of Auvergne's commentary on the Categories (Andrews 1988: 381), and is one of two presented by Walter Burley (1497: 18rA-B). For some unknown reason, Albert's formulations aren't quite as simple as this, although some remarks of his suggest this interpretation.[7]

[7] In his *Categories* commentary (1890a: VI,Ch.1) Albert divides the modes of predication into simple and non-simple ones, and then the simple into absolute and relative ones. However, there is an apparent contradiction in the text, as it is said that simple modes "praedicat res absolutas," and it is suggested that relational predication is of that sort, but with the added qualification, "ut modus aliorum comparatus." One thus wonders whether the author is confused or the text is corrupt.