Migration and New International Actors

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INTRODUCTION

MARIA EUGENIA CRUSET

For quite a while we have been able to study old phenomena such as migration from a point of view which no doubt enhances and deepens our knowledge of both the past and the present, not only in the context of scientific knowledge, but also of the political praxis of many contemporary migrants' organizations, particularly because it lets them maintain and defend the right to continue participating in, and influencing, both their country of destination, and of origin.

These realities, which have been catalyzed from globalization and the greatest ease in mass transport and communication through the new technologies, are not something new, as is frequently thought. The studies we present in this book will be necessary to understand them not only as a photograph but also as a film, which will give us a richer and more complex vision of reality.

Recent studies on migration have been given a new focus and theoretical framework. The so-called "political dimension" of the Diasporas, and their action at the international level as agents of para-diplomacy, as well as the introduction of analysis of the trans-national character of the migratory phenomenon, allow us to dig deeply into the field of our investigations, taking us out of the narrow frame of the nation-state.

We know that the global aspect—the process—of the phenomenon of migration has been little studied, because the analytical frame of reference was the "nation-state" in its role as "receptor society," highlighting concepts like "effective assimilation," or "national integration". It was presupposed that assimilation to the receptor society necessarily implied a break with a migrant's original cultural identity, at least with reference to political matters. This was so especially in the historical moment when moving difficulties turned trips almost unidirectional.

This belief was maintained up to the mid-1980s, when migratory studies started to examine both origin and destination, asking new questions about the process of migration, incorporating relations, ties and practices that go beyond national territories. An analysis of the process of

migration, taking into account the practices migrants continue not only in the destination countries but also with respect to the relations (familial, cultural, economic, political and religious) that they maintain with their place of origin. These studies show that there is a synergy, with common objectives and agendas, between the migrant groups and those who have stayed behind.

Beginning in the 1990s, in an effort to understand these global phenomena, trans-nationalism was introduced as a theoretical framework together with the concept of Diaspora as an international actor. So, following Portes and Bach, immigration can be defined as "a process of construction of networks which depends on, and successively reinforces, social relations through space".[1] And within these networks, employment, capital, goods, services, information and even ideologies are organized between sending and destination communities.

A. Transnationalism

The advantage of the transnational focus on the study of migration is that the former is understood as a process in the social, cultural, economic and political environments. This gives a dynamic character to both the sending and receiving societies,and even to the moving itself.

The separation between sending and receiving countries turns them into communicating vessels: the communities of immigrants create ties "here" and "there", constituting themselves as transnational communities or Diasporas. The migrant, by himself, and through the institutions he creates, lives simultaneously in the sending country and in the receiving country, which raises questions about citizenship.

On the other hand, these groups create their own transnational practices which encompass the economic—e.g. the sending of remittances or favouring managerial investments; the social-civic—e.g. participation in community development; the cultural—consumption of products of origin; religious practices; and the political; thus they have goals in both their country of origin, and of destination. In short, they try to improve their quality of life in all these spheres.

Regarding the political, the lobbying and the incidence in origin and in destination are important. What are often sought are a short or medium term ends, but at other times the Diasporas are looking for degrees of autonomy (even complete sovereignty). This is particularly evident in

[1] Rodriguez Manzano, Irene. Las Migraciones en el contexto internacional. In: Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación, N°19, 2007, p.32 and 33.

those places with strong nationalist movements, and here the Diasporas turn into agents of paradiplomacy.

This implies participation in political parties, or the creation of their own parties in associations or churches, informal support networks, NGOs, etc. A political bi-directionality, very little studied up to now, is achieved.

The works we present here are from different disciplines, which undoubtedly enrich the mixture.

From Political Sciences and International Relations, Gloria Totoricagüena analyzes the Basque Diaspora as a whole, and its relationship with the homeland in particular, since the re-establishment of democracy in Spain after the dictatorship of Francisco Franco, focusing on the work done by the Government of the Basque Autonomous Community in connection with the centres of the Basque communities across the world. Cesar Arrondo complements the work by meticulously analyzing the associative Basque organization at a world level, but centring on Argentina. He describes the historical migratory process in the country and its later development up to the present day.

Ariel Gonzalez Levaggi introduces the Arab case, specifically in South America. To aid understanding of the migratory process he tells us about the reality of the Middle East and the "Arab-Israeli" conflict. Continuing this theme, Zidane Zeraoui analyses the Mexican case, its diversity, the differences within it, and great adaptability, as a host nation, to immigrants, which turns it into an interesting case for study as unusual and almost unique.

Erica Sarmiento da Silva discusses Brazil's policies towards immigrants, immigrants' fundamental characteristics and their role in the construction of the country. The Galician immigration, which she analyses more as a phenomenon of "migratory chains" than of state politics, is inscribed in this order. As to the Galicians that migrated to Argentina, Ruy Farias introduces us to the strong political and union activities that they developed on both sides of the Atlantic.

The Armenian Diaspora is among the most ancient ones. Nélida Boulgourdjian-Toufeksian studies the Argentinian case, stressing their deep ties with the homeland, and the central role of the church in maintaining them. The context of the "Cold War" and its repercussion on the community is particularly interesting.

I, myself, am the author of two works about the Irish Diaspora. The first is on the active participation by the Argentine-Irish in the "Easter Rising" of 1916. This is something acknowledged by the community in the country but little studied at a global level. The second one shows the Diasporas have acted as agents of paradiplomacy to attain political

objectives. For this we will study the Irish-American Diaspora's modality of action and degree of success in the signing of the "Good Friday Agreement" (1998) which helped end the confrontations in Northern Ireland.

With all these contributions we embrace a number of situations, both historical and contemporary, which open the field to new studies from a transnational perspective and help us to understand the problems of the migrant in the context of globalization.

NON-STATE MULTI-LEVEL DIPLOMACY AND THE BASQUE DIASPORA

GLORIA TOTORICAGÜENA

Amateur diplomats have gained significance, credibility and agency at various levels in international relations, and the traditional inter-state governmental order has a growing number of actors in today's multi-level diplomacy. Central governments, non-central governments, and non-governmental organizations intersect and interact in various ways in this multi-stakeholder environment. Non-central government activities, such as those in Diasporas, are parallel structures that attempt to accomplish via other avenues what they cannot accomplish inside the existing hierarchical structures of state-to-state relations and diplomacy. Contrary to the arguments of different authors, this article argues that non-state actors are not a threat to the state system, and have generally been involved with it, and supported it. During the present phase of globalization, states are reorganizing and restructuring their powers and responsibilities. Wolfram F. Hanrieder has argued that "it is not a new type of international politics which is 'dissolving' the traditional nation-state but a new nation-state which is 'dissolving' traditional international politics" (Hanrieder 1978: 147). He discussed the changes in diplomacy being access rather than acquisition, presence rather than rule, penetration rather than possession. The focus is no longer only on getting the attention of other states, but now also on getting economic attention in commerce and recognition in the media (Hanrieder 1978), and this serves the strategies of Diasporas well.

Today's diplomacy is a system of multi-level governmental and non-governmental interactions, and the non-state actor—such as the Catholic Church or multinational corporation—has always been present in the Westphalian system of international relations. They have been, and are, powerful influences on the system. Diplomacy is not linear and has many points of entry and manipulation, and finding the appropriate opening is essential to gaining agency. Diasporas as non-state actors operate outside

the bounds of states and territoriality; they are multi-centric and are often focused on identity politics as they search for the appropriate entry point in international politics. Which entry points for influence are most likely to be the most effective for Diasporas? Those in local politics, in central government, or those in international institutions? Are NGOs likely to be useful for gaining attention to Diaspora issues? How might academic institutions be used? The United Nations and Amnesty International?

When analyzing the Basque Diaspora, a stateless Diaspora, we can look at the characteristic forms of Basque Diaspora activity intended to influence public policy, and then separate the attempts to influence mass mobilization from those that target elite involvement. We can see intellectual efforts attempting to reshape the language of the debate about the Basque Country and its independence or autonomy inside the European Union and/or Spain and France, and to use the positive social status of Diaspora Basques to counter the negative image of "Basques as terrorists" resulting from media coverage of political violence. The January 10, 2011 ETA announcement of a permanent and internationally verifiable cease-fire affects the Diaspora as much it does the homeland, and the cautiously good news can be used to regain the positive status to open doors for trade and cultural exchange abroad.

Today, Diaspora trans-state networks exemplify a model of self-empowerment for social movements on the international stage, and we will focus on the Basque Diaspora as a relevant case study. According to the 2007 International Association of Communications and Media Research/UNESCO report,

> "The emergence of new international actors (IGOs, NGOs and dynamic partnerships, coalitions and alliances mobilized both online and offline) is giving rise to new perspectives on the conduct of foreign policy focused on the control of access and the production of cultural industries as well as on the way various publics are implicated (national, subnational, transnational, indigenous, and diasporic). Emerging modes of governance have a bearing on media and have implications for international integration for global governance in the audiovisual and related media and communication sectors"
> (UNESCO 2008: Reference number CI/EO/2008/RP/1).

Basques living away from their homeland, Euskal Herria—which includes three territories in the French state and four territories in the Spanish state—have not utilized confrontational strategies such as angry demonstrations, hunger strikes, or physical violence against persons or property in order to gain agency. They have used the media, the Internet, and their own institutional and elite contacts in order to move within

established channels. Though infrequently, they have, for example, targeted powerful individuals in central governments such as national congressional Deputies in Argentina, United States Senators, Representatives and state Governors, and well-known writers, artists, and business leaders. Basques living in New York and on the U.S. east coast organized peaceful rallies in front of the United Nations building in Manhattan in order to draw attention to Spanish dictatorial abuses of human and civil rights, and later from the Transition to democracy beginning in the late 1970s, to continuing non-democratic policies and events in Spain.

When a Diaspora's agenda conflicts with the host country's politics, they may have to change strategies and/or target a different audience, as the Basques have had to do. The post-9/11 George Bush-José María Aznar (Spanish Prime Minister, 1996-2004) alliance, and the US-Spanish relationship, encouraged Basques to bypass U.S. central government channels, those Basques in New York to organize events again at the United Nations, and those in California to go to Amnesty International for assistance and attention (Totoricagüena 2007: 250-251). Generally, smaller and lesser known and equipped Diasporas must use any open door as an opportunity to gain access to decision makers, their unofficial activities often going unrecorded. Gabriel Sheffer argues that the lack of data on the influence of Diaspora on host country and homeland politics is not accidental, and that "in most cases the problem stems from deliberate policies of homelands and host governments intended to suppress or falsify information about modern diasporism, that is, to conceal its actual impressive magnitude, rapid growth, and emerging significance (Sheffer 2003: 99). Attempting to estimate accurate counts of numbers of various ethnic groups in different countries is extremely difficult, yet not doing so allows policies of ignoring needs and demands. Demographic data has been used for horrific purposes in western Europe in the past, and today's negligence in collecting accurate information may be used still for political purposes to deny groups recognition and specific rights and privileges.

Departing Euskal Herria and Immigration to the New World

The history of Basque homeland-Diaspora relations involves centuries of emigration and outward commerce including Basque whalers trading off the coast of Newfoundland, Basque mariners and shipbuilders working as a part of the monarchies of Castile, and later the Kingdom of Spain, in their colonial quests in the Americas and the Philippines throughout the 16th – 19th centuries. Basques continued migrating as colonists and then

immigrants to the newly independent American countries, with heavy flows to Mexico, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay. Basques also sought their luck in the 19th century gold-rushes in Australia and the western United States; and with the railroad connecting the east and west coasts, they could now cross the ocean by water to New York, and then cross the continent by land in order to get to the opportunities of the American west—a much cheaper, faster and safer travel route than going the long way round by sea.

Basque associationism in the Diaspora communities emerged with their immigration in the New World. Founded in 1612 in Lima, Peru was the Ilustre Hermandad de Nuestra Señora de Aranzazu de la Nación Vascongada, whose first statutes are dated 1635. Basques in Mexico followed with the founding, in 1681, of the Hermandad or Cofradia de Nuestra Señora de Aranzazu de México; and in Madrid, Basques who had left the Basque territories for central Spain established the Real Congregacion de Naturales y Oriundos de las Tres Provincias Vascongadas in 1715. In Mexico again, the Colegio de las Vizcainas was initiated in 1732. The membership and participation in the Real Sociedad Bascongada de los Amigos del País spread throughout the Americas by the mid-18th century. By the second half of the 19th century, Basque hotels and boarding-houses were being established in Argentina and the United States, and Basque cultural associations were being founded in South America by the immigrant and first generation born in the new host country. The setting up of communication between boarding-houses helped immigrants find employment and social networks in other geographical settings. They formed socorros mutuos, or mutual benefit societies, with insurance programmes for each other, including unemployment, health, death, and repatriation benefits.

As additional immigrants stayed for longer periods of time, and eventually permanently, they built or purchased their own homes and moved away from the Basque boarding-houses. These people wanted to continue their social networks and eventually helped form the cultural associations, or Basque centres, euskal etxeak (literally, Basque homes). The next wave of Basque Diaspora associationism began in Cuba in 1868 with the establishment of an Americas network of Basque identity and cultural maintenance associations; followed by Uruguay (1876), Argentina (1877), Brazil (1881), Mexico (1907), The United States (1908), Chile (1915), and so on to today's approximately 200 entities spread throughout 22 countries. Africa and Antarctica are the only two continents without a single known Basque centre.

During these centuries, migrants maintained contact with their Basque families and homeland churches, and established commercial and business networks—just as do other ethnic Diasporas. Two Spanish civil wars in the 1800s affected and encouraged departures. In the 20th century, the homeland suffered the Spanish Civil War (1936-1939) and its repercussions both in the south Hegoalde (the southern four territories of the Basque Country in today's Spain), and in Iparralde (the three northern territories in today's France), and, of course, in the Diaspora. Thousands of refugees and political exiles fled the dictatorship of Francisco Franco (1939-1975), as did a short-lived independent Basque government, which would continue to function in exile for decades.

This Basque government-in-exile created a model for relations with Basque communities throughout the Americas, the Philippines, Australia and in Europe.[1] By involving high status Basque and sympathetic non-Basque individuals—and sometimes the actual Basque centre institutions—they used public relations and para-diplomacy to make personal contacts with high level governmental officials, as well as Catholic Church leaders in the countries where Basques had immigrated, in order to encourage anti-Franco foreign policies, trade embargoes against Spain, and a push for the removal of Franco and a return to democracy. The first President of the first autonomous government of Euskadi, José Antonio Aguirre, had Presidential offices in Paris, London and New York in the late 1930s and 1940s, and had Basque delegation offices throughout Europe and the Americas. The Basque government-in-exile returned to its main offices in the Basque Country in southern France after the end of the German occupation and World War II, and continued there during the 1950s-1970s.

The Basque Centres and Basque Government of Euskadi

Over the past century and half, these centres have generally maintained a non-partisan approach to their activities and declarations, Argentine Basque groups being the exception as the most politicized and partisan of the Basque Diaspora communities. Most Basque Diaspora organizations' activities focus on culture and the arts including dance, music, theatre, literature, sport, cuisine, and preservation of the language. Though the Basque centres have also generally claimed to be "non-political," they were heavily involved with the Basque government-in-exile (1938-1975), and, since the transition to democracy, with the recent Basque governments.

[1] See Totoricagüena 2007, and Castro and Ugalde 2004.

After Franco's death, and the subsequent return of democracy, the Basque Autonomous Community of Euskadi (one of seventeen autonomous communities which make up today's state of Spain) passed a series of laws pertaining to its Diaspora and also reached out to the Diaspora communities with the intention of increasing the frequency of communications and influencing the content of those interactions. These policies resulted in the creation of the Directorate of Relations with Basque Collectivities Abroad. This directorate was first established in 1984 inside the Basque Department of Culture, was eventually moved to the Office of the Presidency, and given its present name in 2011.

> "The General Secretariat of Foreign Action was created under the Office of the Presidency in 1990, and the Service for Relations with the Basque Centers was transferred there in order to consolidate foreign relations in one office. Doing so also served to emphasize the expected importance of international affairs. By the end of 1991, there was a clear effort to use community leaders of the Basque Diaspora to facilitate meetings between Basque government officials and those in the highest levels of host-country governments. Using these local contacts, the Basque government established political and economic ties with several hostland politicians at the national level and below. President Ardanza was received with the same protocol and prestige as a head of state while in Chile, Mexico, Cuba, Argentina, and Uruguay. He also met with then Vice President Gore and Congressional leaders in the United States…"
> (Totoricagüena 2005: 520-521).

Until the 1980s, relations between the Basque government and its Diaspora communities were mostly symbolic and cultural, though this changed with the transfer of the Directorate from the Department of Culture to the Office of the Presidency. In 2011, however, grants are still mainly made for cultural and social science research projects.

The entire Diaspora grants appropriations in 1987 totalled 5,000,000 pesetas (40,650 U.S. Dollars). Basque Government subsidies funded specific projects, such as building maintenance and renovation, cultural celebrations and promotions, language courses, expenses for travel for centre groups, dance troupes, and athletes, conferences and academic research on Basque Diaspora themes. By 2010, the Government's Diaspora budget included 1,000,000 Euros for activities and functions, and 429,395 Euros for infrastructure (a total of 1,882,500 U.S. Dollars); and the total 2010 budget for all government expenses for the Basque Autonomous Community was 10,315,200,000 Euros (14,106,099,264 US Dollars).

During the thirty years of its activity, various directors have been quite successful at separating partisan politics from their Diaspora projects.

There have not been any known *quid pro quo* programmes involving government grant funds, nor any particular pushes by employees in the Directorate to register Diaspora Basques to vote for the governing party, nor to campaign to those already with double citizenship and qualified to vote in homeland elections.[2]. There is no specific Diaspora representation in the Basque Parliament, as there is for other Diasporas in their homelands, such as in Armenia, or in Croatia—which reserves 12 out of 127 votes in her national parliament for winners of Diaspora elections.

Law of Relations with the Basque Communities in the Exterior: Public Law 8/1994

The single most influential piece of Basque parliamentary legislation related to homeland-Diaspora relations has been the passage of Public Law 8 in 1994, the Law of Relations with the Basque Communities in the Exterior, Ley 8/1994. Ley 8/1994, was passed by the Basque parliament of Euskadi in May 1994, establishing a qualitative change in the relations between the institutions of the homeland and those of the Basque communities abroad. It was described by parliamentarians as being a means of repaying "our historic debt to Basques overseas" (Sainz de la Maza speech 1994: 14). President José Antonio Ardanza also described the law as a starting point that would mark a new direction in relations between the Basque Country and Basques living around the world.

Article 1 of the law states the desire to preserve and reinforce links and to support and intensify relations between the Basque government and other homeland institutions with the Basque populations in the Diaspora. It discusses strengthening the networks which link Basques abroad with the Basque government and various academic, cultural, economic, and religious institutions in the homeland. It specifies the promotion of Diaspora projects which would spread, stimulate, and develop Basque culture and the homeland economy, and it also establishes a permanent annual budget line for Diaspora grants. However, treated separately from the Basque centres, are Basque government-funded trade missions in Chicago, Shanghai, Caracas, Mexico City, Buenos Aires, Brussels, and in

[2] In Euskadi and in Nafarroa, political parties do not actively campaign for the parliament outside of their respective autonomous communities because the Basque Diaspora vote does not make an electoral difference. It simply is not yet large enough in numbers. This differs from the autonomous community of Galicia, where in each election since the 1990s, the vote of those resident abroad has made the difference for the winning Presidential candidate.

early 2011, another planned office in Boise, Idaho.

Ley 8/1994 provides for a registry of Basque centres that are officially recognized by the Basque Autonomous Government, and it establishes the requirements for members of those centres to also register with the Basque Government and be recognized for possible benefits for individual persons. Organizations must prove that they comply with the requirements of democratic organizational structures, and the associations must request their own recognition and follow the procedures to obtain it. They must have a valid constitution filed with the judicial system of their host country, and their organizational objectives must include the maintenance of Basque culture and ties with the Basque Country, its people, history, language, and culture. Each centre is required to collect the names, birthplaces, ancestral town names, languages spoken, and citizenships held by its members.[3] Public Law 8/1994 grants to the individual members of Basque institutions that are registered with the Basque government various material benefits including, among other things, the eligibility to attend universities in the Basque Country, receipt of senior citizens' pensions, qualification for public housing in Euskadi (only the three territories Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa), and being able to apply for grants for the Diaspora community's projects.

Once a Basque centre is officially recognized by the government in Euskadi, it is qualified to receive grants and subsidies for projects and programmes. The law specifically mentions support for the operating costs of centres, maintenance of the infrastructure of their buildings, the promotion of activities and programmes related to the homeland, and economic assistance for especially needy members (Article 8, section 3). The statutory benefits specifically given to registered Basque Diaspora organizations in Ley 8/1994 include:

> A) Access to information of a public nature, with a social, cultural, or economic content; B) The right to participation in different forms of expression of Basque homeland social, cultural, and economic life that contribute to the external Diaspora projection of such; C) Treatment identical to that of homeland associations; D) The right to ask the Basque Autonomous Community to participate in activities organized by a Diaspora centre to promote Basque culture; E) Centre participation in programmes, missions, and delegations organized by Basque homeland

[3] Because of numerous complaints first from the United States Basques and later from others regarding rights to privacy and their not trusting the Spanish government and the possibility of this information falling in to the hands of right-wing Spanish parties or governments, this requirement has been relaxed and is often overlooked.

> institutions in the centre's territorial area; F) The right to request and receive advice on social, economic, or labour matters in the Basque Country; G) The right to a supply of material designed to facilitate the transmission of knowledge of Basque history, culture, language, and social reality; H) Collaboration in activities of communication centred on the Autonomous Community, such as EITB, and Euskal Etxeak, the journal; I) The right to be heard via the advisory council and to attend the World Congresses of Basque Collectivities; J) The organization of courses to learn the Basque language (Article 8, section 1 of Ley 8/1994).

Ley 8/1994 establishes a World Congress of Basque Collectivities to be gathered once every four years, following which a "Four-Year Plan of Institutional Action" is then established for the next four years. The First Congress of Basque Collectivities was held in Vitoria-Gasteiz in 1995, and this five-day event facilitated horizontal exchange amongst Basques from different countries, as well as fortifying the vertical ties between each Diaspora Basque centre and the Office of the Presidency of the Government of Euskadi. The delegates established personal friendships, their own exchanges of dance groups and athletes, and Internet communications that have evolved into institutional ties. In 2011, there were almost 200 Basque Diaspora associations in 22 different countries, and over 160 of them have been officially recognized by the Basque Autonomous Government.[4]

The law also lists specific rights for individual members of Diaspora organizations, which include access to such aspects of homeland cultural heritage as libraries, archives, museums, and cultural patrimony. The question of the principle of territoriality has been raised when determining who would qualify for these privileges: it is the taxes and government of Euskadi that are funding the benefits, which includes only the three provinces of Araba, Bizkaia and Gipuzkoa. Nafarroa, or Navarre, is its own autonomous community, and the three Basque territories in France do not have any autonomous rank in France. The Government of Euskadi has determined that anyone born in one of the seven provinces and who returns to one of the three provinces in the jurisdiction of Euskadi will qualify for these services. The members of Basque communities to whom the benefits and rights apply are defined under Article 7, section 2 of the Statutes of Autonomy: persons "who specifically request it shall enjoy the same political rights as those living in the Basque Country, if their last

[4] There are Basque centres which are newly established which have not registered with the Basque Government, or have requested registration and have not yet received their acceptance, or were registered in the past but have since dissolved as an organization.

legal residence in Spain was in Euskadi, and provided they retain their Spanish nationality [citizenship]".

The law does not distinguish among specific host country influences used in their Basque Diaspora identity maintenance in regards to content or processes. For example, as mentioned above, the Basques in Argentina are accustomed to, and are knowledgeable regarding discussions of, homeland partisan politics, while Basques in Australia or the United States much prefer cultural activities.[5] English being the language of later generation Basques living in those Anglo-colonized countries, and their consequent probable inability to follow homeland news in Basque, French or Spanish, is only one factor in the differences amongst these Basques. Defining Basque "homeland" institutions also becomes complicated when taking into consideration that there are actually three different political administrations dividing the cultural Basque Country: Euskadi is one autonomous community in Spain, Navarre is another, and Iparralde is included in the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques. As there is no Basque state, to which political administration would Diaspora individuals and institutions give their loyalty? Euskadi? Navarre? Pyrénées-Atlantiques? Like the Basque homeland, the Basque Diaspora is heterogeneous and de-centralized.

Identity and Mobilization

How does the Basque Diaspora effectively mobilize and generate domestic and international sympathizers and constituencies? What resources can and do they use? What are the issue contents of their political activities? The positive social status linked to Basqueness, has been significant in South American cultures where colonizers' and independence movement elites' surnames were often Basque, and in communities with high numbers of Basque immigrants. In Australia and the United States, perhaps in small communities with high numbers of Basques, Basque identity is recognized and appreciated; otherwise there is general ignorance about the Basque Country and its people in those two countries. Basques use their reputations as "honest," "trustworthy," "frugal" and "entrepreneurial" in order to gain access to host country politicians and

[5] In my 1995-2000 fieldwork in United States, Peru, Argentina, Uruguay, Australia and Belgium, anonymous questionnaire data from nearly 900 participants demonstrated that Basques in Argentina were significantly more interested in, and knowledgeable about, current politics in the homeland including details about the different political parties. There are Diaspora branches of three Basque political parties in Argentina, though not in the other countries.

opinion leaders in order to draw attention to non-democratic policies in Spain. They also ask for recognition and attention to the endangered Basque language and Basque culture.

Though "Basque" in South American and several North American communities generally enjoyed either an unknown, neutral, or a positive connotation related to Basque immigrants' reputation until the 1970s, violence from Euskadi 'ta Askatasuna, or Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA), negatively affected that positive reputation, and "Basque" in media reports was now tied to political troubles in Spain. In order for influential Basques living outside of the homeland to engage in promoting Basque issues in their own host communities, they had to address the negative news associated with political conflict in the Basque territories. The fact that Basques have had a positive status in their communities for so long is beneficial to lobbying efforts. Activists might consider that lobbying their governments to open their doors to the non-state Basque Government and its programmes and projects does not mean that they have to close their doors to Spain. An approach of "either/or" might be against their host country's existing policy and interest with Spain, and therefore self-defeating for the Basques. Diasporas are more successful if they use human and civil rights issues for entry into the international political scene and media attention, and not themes of nationalism, rights to self-determination or political violence, which are much more complex and require time and attention to understand.

During the 1930s-1990s Basque homeland and Basque Diaspora international political mobilization tended to highlight issues of self-determination, Spanish central government abuses of civil rights and human rights of Basque political prisoners, and the need for the Spanish central government to follow through with the negotiated hand over of powers to the Basque Autonomous Community's government. Civil rights questions regarding the closing of Basque language newspapers and the prohibiting of specific Basque nationalist political parties followed in the new millennium. Basque Diaspora initiatives extending these issues to the international scene and specifically to their own respective host country media and opinion leaders were sporadic, generally not coordinated, and usually came from individuals and not the Basque centres as institutions.

What are the typical targets for Basque Diaspora mobilization? The de-centralization mentioned above is a factor in the disparate activities and varying targets. Attempting to influence their own host country's policies toward Spain, and gaining attention in favor of Basque culture and identity, the main focus of activity has been gaining the sympathy of host country opinion leaders and politicians, and of the media outlets. The

Basque Government itself has taken the approach that deeds are more powerful than words. Their campaign to elites and decision makers has focused on the economic "miracle" of the Basque Country and its conversion from an industrial to a service sector knowledge economy, following the competitive strategies and innovation clusters models of Harvard professor Michael E. Porter.

Diaspora leaders have complained that the Basque centres and Diaspora networks are not being used to capacity, and that the Basque Government has actually only engaged them for symbolic and cultural activities, and left the serious political and economic issues to the trade missions, or their own foreign affairs secretaries. While Diasporas are versatile and ready to act, it is also true that some do so often without caring about the consequences because they are not really accountable to anyone for any actions; there are no elections to worry about, there is no civil audit. Homeland-Diaspora relations are often hampered by the homeland population's ignorance of their own abroad, and this is also the Basque case. Until 2005, there was not a single university course at any Basque Country university that had as its focus Basque emigration, Basques in the New World, Basque paradiplomacy, Basque Diaspora, etc., or any course with the Basque Diaspora as its focal point of research or study.[6] Homeland interest in Basque emigrants' lives is also often described by the emigrants and later generations themselves as lacking. In various fieldwork studies of the Basque communities in the United States, Mexico, Argentina, Uruguay, Peru, Chile, Brazil, Australia and Belgium, those emigrants who departed the homeland often report that their homeland families and friends not only do not know much about their experiences in their new host countries, but worse, they do not care, or, they show no interest.[7]

The Basque Diaspora provides an external dimension for Basque Country foreign affairs. Multi-locality itself is an agency and mobilization asset for Diasporas attempting to influence policy at various political points. Multi-locality of the Diaspora communities increases possibilities for access to many different policy-makers of differing levels and branches of government, to businesses and media outlets. Effects and opportunities of globalization are also restructuring the relationships between public and private actors in foreign affairs. Functions that used to be central to the

[6] See Totoricagüena III World Congress of Basque Collectivities Inaugural Address 2003.

[7] The Office of Relations with Basque Collectivities initiated a series of research publications titled *Urazandi: Basques Across the Seas*, 22-volume collection that describes and investigates Basque identity in the Americas, Australia, and Europe.

state have devolved or been assumed by other non-central government actors or even outsourced to private businesses. The typical diplomat, formerly an educated professional who was sent to represent a *state's* interests, might now be an individual who represents an NGO, a business, or a specific Diaspora's ideology; or a lobbyist.

Since the 1970s, the political initiatives coming from the United States toward relations with the Basque Country have arisen mainly from individuals in the States of Idaho, California, Nevada and New York. U.S. Congressmen, Secretaries of State, and legislative representatives from Idaho, a Governor and Senator from Nevada, politicians from California, and numerous influential people in New York, have publically protested, introduced legislative memorials and resolutions, or called on their elected representatives to investigate events in Spain, and used their freedom of speech—and right to protest—at the United Nations and with media leaders in order to affect U.S. relations with Spain. These efforts have generally been individual initiatives and not by U.S. Basque organizations themselves, because these centres are adamant about non-partisanship and what they deem to be "non-political" activity. Individuals will sign petitions, and individuals will testify at the legislative hearings, but the president of a Basque organization or the president of the North American Basque Organizations have rarely acted on behalf of an organization, or in their official capacities in the organization. In Mexico, Uruguay and Argentina it has been different. Basques in those countries have been involved with government relations towards Spain, have been quite partisan and political, have signed documents in an official capacity of a Basque organization, or the organization itself has been named as an actor in a petition or media report.

Where might Diasporas begin their lobbying? There are advantages to approaching the executive branch rather than the legislative branches in several countries, and especially the State Department in the US, and many Diasporas now approach their host country's appropriate foreign affairs department or ministry directly. For instance, the Jewish Diaspora at first concentrated its lobbying on the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives. Now much of the lobbying is conducted directly at the executive branch of the administration and with the various pertinent Departments. The Israeli government itself also prefers to deal directly with the executive rather than with the Congress. Calculations and strategy differ for different Diasporas, but there do need to be calculations and a strategy if successful influence is expected.

Depending on the issue, many Diasporas understand that it might be more effective to lobby at a different level, such as at the United Nations,

and to establish a relationship with the United Nations rather than to lobby at the host country's central government executive branch. During the administration of Lehendakari José Antonio Ardanza Garro (1985-1999) there were quite energetic Basque efforts to lobby the United Nations, using intimate contacts of U.S. Basques within the Mexican Delegation. The fact that Basques have no state creates disequilibrium in power and prestige, yet opens doors for numerous states to be influenced from within by their Diaspora immigrant communities.

Conclusions

The organizational structure of the Basque Diaspora is of general global de-centralization and state-by-state organization. There are federations of Basque Centres which co-ordinate activities and efforts in Argentina, Uruguay, Venezuela and North America (United States and Canada), mainly because of the large numbers of centres in each country. Internationally, though there are leaders in each country who do know each other, and regularly communicate with each other, there is no established centralized organism used to streamline programmes or to create a specific Basque Diaspora policy: not even the Basque government itself attempts to do this with its Diaspora communities. When a Diaspora is well organized, with central organizations, it is easier for the host country to follow and engage with what their communities and individuals in the Diaspora are doing. There is additional consistency and efficiency to identity politics based simply on scale, and the one-size-fits-all approach is sometimes easier politically. In some cases it is more beneficial to not have central or hierarchical organizations of the Diaspora, and to encourage a large variety and diversity in the points of leadership and activity in ideology, in geography, and in how they manifest their identity.

This de-centralization makes it more difficult for the homeland to try to control or manipulate its Diaspora, and Diasporas continue with particular and specific host country influences in their identity maintenance content and processes. English being the language of later generation Basques living in those Anglo colonized countries, and one's consequent inability to follow homeland news in Basque, French or Spanish is only one factor in the differences amongst these Basques. Defining Basque "homeland" institutions also becomes complicated when taking into consideration that there are actually three different political administrations dividing the cultural Basque Country: Euskadi is one autonomous community in Spain, Navarre is another separate autonomous community in Spain, and Iparralde is included in the French department of Pyrénées-Atlantiques. As

there is no Basque state, to which political administration would Diaspora individuals and institutions give their loyalty? Euskadi? Navarre? Pyrénées-Atlantiques?

What points of entry for influence are available to Diaspora politics? Local level, state level, international level and all the combinations with branches within governments, individual non-governmental actors and NGOs are open opportunities. Actors must also question themselves as to which is more likely to directly affect a successful outcome from Diaspora intervention; the number of people involved and supporting the issue, or the status and influence of the specific people who participate in the network? Quality or quantity, or does it depend on the particular issue and/or host country culture and political environment?

In Canada over the last few years, a very positive attitude toward the use of Diaspora organizations in establishing better relations—especially economic relations with some of the countries from which they come—has developed. The Prime Minister of Canada has visited China, Russia and Ukraine with delegations of people who come from the Canadian Diaspora organizations of those countries, and used them because of their special knowledge of the homeland and language and also because of their cultural ties. Diplomacy now clearly includes the influence and participation of citizen diplomats and amateur diplomats, as in the above example. The Westphalian system has demonstrated the inability of the state system to promote a peaceful globe. The state system has also been unsuccessful in creating a global reality of social justice, human rights, and economic and environmental sustainability. Perhaps the democratization of diplomacy, together with today's easier access to information and telecommunications, will influence the continuing development needed for ongoing democratic transformations. Immigrant and latter generation ethnic Diasporas are indeed using their own eyes to spot opportunities in the international landscape and to act to protect their identity interests.

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THE ARGENTINE BASQUE DIASPORA: ORIGIN, ROLE AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

CESAR ARRONDO[1]

The Basque

Even though their origin is uncertain, some studies say that the Basque people are submerged into prehistory and that thirty-five thousand years ago they were settled on both sides of the Pyrenees. The Basque called themselves Euskaldunak, "speakers of Euskera," or Basque language. In spite of the fact that linguists and philologists have been speculating for five centuries on the possible ties between Basque and other languages, it has not been possible to show any conclusive bond. The enigma of the language, more than any other factor, has led known writers and researchers to describe the Basque as a mysterious people.[2]

Archaeological testimonies equally show differences at the time of their interpretation, since they admit a large margin of speculation. It is clear that the Basque country today, placed on the western Pyrenees, has known human occupation since the mid-Paleolithic era or at least since seventy thousand years ago. However, if the direct ancestors of the present Basques and their culture were developed "in situ" in the Pyrenees, or if they had migrated to this region, is unknown. Some authors suggest that the Basque are direct descendants of the cave painters who left great artistic treasures in places such as Lascaux as well as in the existing caves throughout the Basque territory. Others, more sceptical on that point, date the archaeological basis of the present Basques during the period of the Pyrenean culture to around 5,000 to 3,000 BC.[3]

The Basque language has a great vocabulary of terms, many of them pejorative, and it is said that it was spoken in the Pyrenean region around

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[2] William A Douglass, Jon Bilbao and Roman Basurto Larranaga, "Los vascos en el Nuevo mundo," University of Nevada, Publications Service of the University of the Basque Country, 1986, 35–36.

[3] Ibid., 37.

7,000 BC. That they strive for a singular personality is not exclusive of the learned Basque people. The industrial workers of Bilbao, the countrymen of the mountains, or the fishermen of a coastal village share this same feeling.[4]

The Basque or Euskal Herria people cover an area of 20,664 km^2 and at present are settled in two countries: France and Spain.

Iparralde, the Northern Basque Country, is formed by three historical territories or provinces:

(1) Lapurdi, with an area of 859 km^2. Baiona is the capital city.
(2) Zuberoa, with an area of 784 km^2. Maule is the capital city.
(3) Benafarroa, with an area of 1332 km2. Donibane Garazi is the capital city.

The total surface area of Iparralde is about 2,979 km^2 and its population is approximately 300 thousand inhabitants. Its main feature, excepting the coast which is urbanised, is rural, and together with the Bearneses it forms part of the Department of the Atlantic Pyrenees in the French state.

Hegoalde, the Southern Basque Country, is formed by four Historical Territories or Provinces:

(1) Biskaia, with an area of 2,332 km^2. Bilbo is the capital city.
(2) Gipuzco, with an area of 1,997km^2. Donostia is the capital city.
(3) Araba, with an area of 3,046 km^2. Gasteiz is the capital city.

These three historical territories now form the Basque Autonomous Community (CAV), whose approximate population is 2.2 million inhabitants.

The remaining historical territory of Hegoalde is Nafarroa, with an area of 10,321 km^2. Iruña is the capital city. The total population of Nafarroa is about 500 thousand inhabitants. It has a political status of the Forum Community of Nafarroa in the Spanish State.

The Basque Diaspora

The Basque diaspora is formed by all Basques who, from different migratory processes, are found scattered throughout the world and who, in some ways, are institutionally organised. For many, the word diaspora implies the compulsory expansion found in the Old Testament, where it is

[4] Ibid., 38.