

New Hegelian Essays

New Hegelian Essays:
Seid Umschlungen Millionen

By

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PREFACE

In the case of a philosophical work it seems not only superfluous, but, in view of the nature of philosophy, even inappropriate and misleading to begin, as writers usually do in a preface, by explaining the end the author had in mind, the circumstances which gave rise to the work, and the relation in which the writer takes it to stand to other treatises on the same subject, written by his predecessors or his contemporaries. For... by determining the relation which a philosophical work professes to have to other treatises on the same subject, an extraneous interest is introduced, and obscurity is thrown over the point at issue... To help to bring philosophy nearer to the form of science... that is what I have set before me.

Thus Hegel begins his celebrated *Preface* to his *The Phenomenology of Mind*.¹ It harmonises with this present essay in the philosophy of religion specifically in Hegelian spirit, where the universal, as authentic and concrete, is identically particular, the authentically particular universal. This is Hegel's most characteristic doctrine, that of the Notion or Concept (*Encyclopaedia Logic*, 160f.), the Absolute Idea.

The Absolute Idea is the dialectical crystallisation of the concept of infinity. As such it enables speculative thinking. To deny divinity to the Absolute is to deny its absoluteness, its infinity. Infinity is that which absorbs all else, this "else" being just thereby, by infinity, nothing. The Absolute is thus separate or, viewed as in religion, "holy" as separating away all that is not itself into nothingness. It is thus anyhow God. The distinguishing feature of God, however, is personality, on account of which "God" is generally reckoned a finite and hence un-philosophical conception, a representation. But personality, like number, admits an infinite extension or intensification indifferently. So God must contain it and the Absolute must be God. It follows that if it is true that personality essentially involves relation to its other, as to other than self within self, then God, the Absolute, is a unity in the sense of a community.

¹ Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1967, p.67, J.B. Baillie's translation.

Yet it is an absolute unity, the unity or One as such. Hence any self or member of this unity is identical with each and all of the others.² This is the condition of Love as a universal because actually and concretely universal, taking Love as quiescent or acquiescent union. So God is Love, that is, not merely system but, necessarily, and hence freely, systematic unity of the infinitely differentiated. This unity, as thus perfect, is within each self as constituting it. To each self, “closer than self”, belongs this universal love-relation of Self and other, its other, brought to light in the Trinitarian representation, in first picturing, first configuring, the Absolute thus revealing itself in such pictorial thinking, such as we call “religious”, for which, however, the Absolute remains mystery, other, holy³. Devotion, as response to this holiness, is the necessary posture of individual consciousness and thus informs philosophy also.⁴ In sublating such individual consciousness, therefore, philosophy, or rather *Sophia*, which is thus *sancta Sophia*, becomes wisdom in discarding as absorbing individuality (“my thoughts are not your thoughts”), thus completing or, Hegel says, accomplishing religion, finishing and/or perfecting it. Such wisdom, of course, is not the sole property of academic professors or of the proletariat or of any other social class. It may be spoken by a man hanging on a Cross, must indeed, we shall see, be thus particularly spoken. It ultimately requires just one Word, in unity. This will mean, however, that the Absolute, far from being immobile, is the unresting uttering or going forth of that one Word, while this becoming of self in other is revealed as the very essence of Spirit. Spirit is spiration “in act” as Spirit “is community”. “Spirit is its own community” (*Phenomenology of Mind*, p.778). “Spirit is Spirit knowing its own self” and “its figurative idea is the true absolute content”. “What moves itself, that is Spirit”. Its notion arises in “the sphere of religion”. Yet the “religious communion”, in its returning “out of its figurative thinking” is not yet “fulfilled in this its self-consciousness”. It is not “aware what it is”.

The Absolute cannot be only good. It must include Evil since Being, says Hegel, is “just as good as”, no better than, Non-Being and *vice versa*. Inasmuch as they are or may be seen as an interchangeable identity their

² Cf. Daniel Kolak, *I Am You*, Pomona, New York, 2004, especially “Preliminary Acknowledgements”, pp. xiii-xxii (<http://www.springer.com/978-1-4020-2999-8>).

³ The number three is not essential to Hegel’s account of Trinity as unity in community and *vice versa*. Cp. Aquinas, *Numeri non ponuntur in divinis*, numbers are not posited in divine things. Similarly, the community is not one of separate individuals, as in “a society of animals”.

⁴ So Hegel speaks of philosophy as *Gottesdienst*.

equivalence is not restricted to a first, abstract moment of the Science of Logic. The Absolute is in fact the indifferent play between them in a proto-identity. Or, we can rather say, just this is absolute Goodness, including its negative. Hence, we hear in *King Lear*, we are as flies to the gods, they kill us for their sport. This is indeed a moment of Spirit's own play with itself, with which we ourselves must or should identify, thus sublating our conceptions of our finite self or, it is the same, sublating our finite selfhood. The God-man himself cries out "Why have you forsaken me?" and that in the very moment of victory, of impending resurrection. Or, in God's forsaking him he himself becomes God, Spirit. Spirit thus proceeds "from the Son" or, again, God is realised, incarnated, in the lowest become highest. This is forgiveness and reconciliation, many become one "in us" but, again, "as you and I, Father, are one".

At the same time as we, with Hegel, rate philosophy above religious representation, we are forced to acknowledge that a people formed in and by religion, the ancient Jews, as "a nation of philosophers" (Porphyry), here take from it, and hence from their own spiritual substance, the power and means of forging new, that is, philosophical concepts of the highest order, as appears in the development of *theologia* thereafter, shown forth already in the great Greek thinkers, which is philosophy itself. In this way its concepts are after all abstracted from and built upon immediate or sense-experience, historically, as they are developed within physiological Life as itself "the immediate Idea". That is, "the mediation of figurative thought is necessary" in order, namely, to come to Absolute Knowledge (*Phen.M.*, p.780). This is Hegel's conclusion after at length addressing the difficulties inherent in saying "evil is inherently the same as what goodness is", which means that "both are really done away with". Even for Aquinas Goodness, the Good, was no more than an *ens rationis*. The reality was Being, called good as the fundamental desire, true as the knowable, one as contrasted with phenomena.⁵

Evil and goodness meet and unite in religious figuration. So the apostle Paul says that Christ "was made sin for us", a curse even.⁶ In becoming

⁵ See our "The *bonum honestum* and the Lack of Moral Motive in Aquinas's Ethical Theory", *The Downside Review*, No. 411, April 2000, pp. 85-110; also the first three chapters of *Natural Law Reconsidered*, Peter Lang, Frankfurt-am-Main 2002, subtitled "The Ethics of Human Liberation".

⁶ Cf. Hans Küng's exposition of and remarks on Hegel's text in his *Menschwerdung Gottes*, subtitled as an "Introduction to Hegel's theological thought as prolegomena

thus he did not cease to be what he was, the “beloved son” and so on. Hegel knows this and it informs all his thought, such as his discussion of conscience under Objective Spirit, which when absolutised he finds to be wicked as contravening *Sittlichkeit* or the first principles of ethical tradition or custom which make of ethics a science, also Aristotle’s view. This view leads Hegel straight into, or comes straight out of, a discussion of angelology, recalling but not merely reproducing that substantial, richly philosophical treatise in the *Summa theologica* of Thomas Aquinas, First Part.

Hegel may well have taken inspiration for his view here from the Biblical fiction of *Job*. There God allows Satan not merely to tempt Job but to utterly despoil him or, at least, his phenomenal existence “on earth”, as we say. Yet Christians pray, “Lead us not into temptation”. This, however, confirms the thesis, that God as well leads into temptation as he blesses, and this abandonment by God to evil is often represented in religion as itself punishment for or consequence of failure in the face of previous temptations, as in the Indian *karma* theory. This however presents thought with an infinite regress in the sense of Hegel’s “bad infinite”, bad because opposed to thought. The “original sin” cannot be reduced to a totally innocent deception.⁷ The solution to this surd presents itself, in the Greek figure reaffirmed later by Nietzsche, as the self-cancelling circularity of Time or, in a word, the “Eternal Return”. This however cannot be thought of as falling short of affirmation of such a return not only of life, whether abstractly individual or in itself, but of each and any moment, yet *the same* time cannot be finally *represented* as *returning* upon itself afterwards, since it is not then the same. Hence there may be evil in God but evil as “redeemed” from its first inception, in Concept and knowledge, that is. Hence Hegel so to say deciphers it, phenomenal evil, as consequently one with the self-centredness inherent in knowledge. Since this cannot be evil in any straightforward phenomenal sense he effectively thematises or demythologises our everyday *abstract* notion of evil. This more profound, holistic view of it, he claims, was already present in religion as represented in the figure of Lucifer, bearer of light, who was, is, in fact the first and greatest of spirits. Even though he mentions his “fall” he later dismisses this concept as any kind of possible

for a future Christology”, Herder, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1970, esp. chapter V, 2 and 3.

⁷ At best it is, as essence of “what was to be”, failure of a necessary trial, as Abraham, later in *Genesis*, succeeded in his trial, accepting the pointless sacrifice as Eve refused the pointless prohibition (the fruit was “good to eat”).

philosophical notion in the case of man. So the “other” created “at once” in the place of Lucifer is itself a pictorial representation of what we have expounded above. The non-thematised view, which takes the idea of evil straight from daily phenomenal life, leads eventually to the idea of an absolute evil or unredeemed Other in perpetual dualist opposition, thus robbing God of his own infinity.⁸ This is the final abstraction of the original abstraction itself.

So it is that when we see each moment, in the Concept, in the Absolute Idea, as utterly one with as containing in itself all and each moment, as we ourselves as persons contain and are the absolute unity of all persons, and this itself is the unity of possibility and being or Act, then, in pardon, of self or (its) other, we conceive and are infinity, the thought that thinks itself. This alone, says Hegel, is “blessedness” (EL 159). It will be found that this the Notion or Concept, as con-cretising evil at its root, is one with the idea of Evil as not merely non-being but, it is the same, “sham-being”, as he calls it at EL35 *Zus.* So ultimately this conception is the same as saying, is a way of saying, that in God being and non-being are both transcended in their opposition, the very first thesis of Hegel’s logic.

The conceptions of immortality or God, we might wish to say, are non-negotiable as requirements of Reason. Without them, that is, the world is not “perfect”, McTaggart argues, at least as concerns immortality, in his *Studies in the Hegelian Cosmology* (1903). This merely corresponds to the classical “argument from natural desire”, which it thus convalidates. It lies behind Leibniz’s *logical* conception of the “best of all possible worlds”. However, both conceptions, of God and of immortality, are initially figurative, in a measure, and opinions differ as to whether rational thematisation of them can still pass under the same names or not. To appreciate this is to see that there is no call, from, say, a Christian or even a philosophical point of view, for absolute exclusion of systems denominated, often wrongly (as in the case of Spinoza, Hegel argues), atheist.

Omne ens est bonum, Aquinas taught. So if evil were a being, evil would be good, it follows. This is what Hegel is pointing out, in consideration of those, like C.G. Jung, wishing to emphasise the reality of evil. Evil is thus a “moment” of the Absolute Idea, which Hegel instances

⁸ We find this in Hannah Arendt’s account of the evils of our own or recent times, e.g. in her *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Vol. III.

as “the wrath of God”. He adds that while this is somehow an “unspiritual” way of talking it serves to bring out the abstract unreality of both good and evil taken separately and so “cancels” both of them or, better, subsumes both into the highest or total good, in affirmation of the whole Method or System of the Idea. The gods “know good and evil” but as one, in the self-known Idea. In this sense evil is only known as eliciting some greater good, goodness remaining all the while absolute in appropriation of the contradictions we call evil. The Good is Being as presented to Will, this, “the voluntary”, itself crowning Cognition while Being, as finally envisioned and hence showing itself, is normative and the only possible ground for normativity. It is disclosed as the Absolute Idea, Act thinking itself in entire and *hence* all-inclusive transcendence. This then is the Good with which Being had previously been identified, the “all in all” of universal Love or “blessedness”, harmony, absolute System, Reason.

In becoming man God finally becomes God, or what he was “all the time”, as “his own result”, as dying to any merely abstract conception of himself. Becoming, that is, belongs to dialectic exclusively before being projected as mere temporal representation in Nature. God does not become, except as eternally within himself, while “man” is a phenomenon or appearance, representation (of the rational “creature”, of Reason). This is merely Hegel’s teaching, in plasticity of concept, that the Last is really First, absolute and eternal, the End of history in every sense, last, time-destroying, eternal Act of “ungrateful Spirit”.

So Spirit, God, comes first to his perfect existence with the incarnation and finally death of “the mediator”. The identity of the latter as individual or universal is wholly indeterminate in terms of these abstract or formal divisions. This follows from Hegel’s whole teaching on the Subjective Notion, his account, in fact, of Syllogistic. This death is equally the death of the initially abstract God-figure, but also, even, of the abstractly taken Idea of the *Logic*. The logical system or method is thus self-transcendent. Only thus does it preserve each and every moment of itself, as having no existence and truth except as in the whole, which is the self-thinking Concept, not self-thought as in a past, that is, or as if lying dead and inert as a subject for anatomical science.

What is there first revealed, in Logic, is all-sufficient Act, subsuming in itself all abstract possibility as realised. Act without limit (what would limit it?) is self-consciousness in and for itself, act of all acts, simple or

perfect unity in infinite diversity, each element or aspect having the unity of all within itself as one with that unity. All is there accomplished as movement itself, unperfected act, is perfected in Act as, again, act of all acts. Freedom is identity with Act, transcending mere magic in unreserved affirmation of the factual, where what historically becomes is advance and perfection, again, of the dialectic, as each philosophy, Hegel teaches, is perfect in its time, since, in fact, there is no time, no Nature, but dialectic rather and, finally, the Speculative Concept which is Spirit, the Absolute.

This is why, ultimately, the conception, the possibility, the dream of a thing and its actualisation are the same. This applies to Substance and is, incidentally, the pure Aristotelian doctrine. It means, incidentally, that there are no merely or abstractly possible persons. Ultimately it means that only persons are. If there are computers or, more probably, dogs then these are persons. Aquinas seems to deny this in teaching that plants and animals do not “partake in the resurrection”, their absence being more than compensated for by or in “the beauty of the bodies of the redeemed”. This may equally be taken, however, as saying that dogs are not abstractly or purely dogs and so on. If we want them they will be there, if we love them, rather, they are there. For Will, as rational, perfecting “Cognition proper” as included, in Hegel’s two works of Logic, in Cognition generally, is universal (what would limit it?). That persons are sexed, furthermore, is no mere biological requirement and this teaching of Aquinas opens, brings home to us in our world of shadows, a self-reflexive vista of erotic love without limit. Only thus would love itself be freed from abstraction and unreal limit, as is proper to the Concept. Renunciation is nonetheless a genuine moment in the apprehension of this truth, of Truth. The same applies to the habitually abstract or exclusive opposition of *eros* and *agape* (charity) in general. This general principle, however, must apply equally to abstractly finite sexualisation itself. For Wisdom the outside is as well the inside as *vice versa*. “Spirit is its own community.”

Substance then is realised in Person, conceptually, as it is dialectically realised historically in person so as to be realised in persons. “I and my Father are one”. I is (hence am) “the universal of universals”. The transcendental ego of Kant, Husserl and other abstract practitioners is here either quite subverted or in its implications fully explicated, thus “saving” their own doctrines. In this way Substance becomes, is, Subject, as if coming to itself whether as concept or in actuality indifferently.

In this way Aristotle speaks indifferently of the soul as a substance (402a 23) and of the substance of the soul (402a 8). These both refer to “the *whole* living thing”, Gendlin comments. Substances “are explainable from themselves”, for Aristotle. They are their own essence or, indeed, being. Ultimately this will mean that there is just one substance⁹ with which any “other” substance can only be identical. This move will itself involve transition from Thing to Subject, from Existence to Idea and from Idea to Spirit, Mind, “setting in order all things” (Anaxagoras).¹⁰

A basic liturgical invocation begs, lays down and elicits that God has become man that man might become God. Not phenomenal man but mind, spirit, *nous*, is God, as Anaxagoras and the others, back down to the aboriginal tribe whose ancestors were said by them to have created the world, clearly saw.¹¹ For what is thus God is no longer abstractly phenomenal, but “becomes a living spirit”, as Paul said of “the second Adam”. Not Adam nor anything else was ever just Adam.

Here again the figure of “ungrateful Spirit” is central. It speaks figuratively of the actual as ungrateful. Spirit itself, however, is etymologically a figure from the blowing of the wind, something that the Hegelian distinction between figurative and philosophical language has still further to surmount. For it is just this mixing of figure and truth which he criticises in Trinitarian theology, for example, while acknowledging its necessity.

Spirit’s ingratitude lies in its forgetful climb “from shadows to reality”. Death to the phenomenal is itself eternal “life”, thought. Thus Life is and is not a figure corresponding to the category of “the idea immediate” (*viventibus vivere esse*). Every abstracted “thing”, such as the individual, is phenomenal, a partial and momentary appearance, *Schein*. The universal is concrete and, indeed, particular. In speaking of abstracted thing we

⁹ Cf. A.P. Martinich, “*Ens a se*”, *Handbook of Metaphysics and Ontology*, Philosophia Verlag, Munich 1991, pp. 243-245, esp. final paragraph on Spinoza

¹⁰ Eugene Gendlin (Commentary on *De anima*, Endnote on 402a 8-23) refers here to Fernando Inciarte’s “The Unity of Aristotle’s Metaphysics” (English version as a chapter in Inciarte’s posthumous *Substance and Action*, Ohms, Hildersheim, 2002).

¹¹ This distinction recalls the dispute between Heidegger and Sartre on “humanism”. For anthropo-psychological background (and more) see articles by Axel Randrup on Internet. Randrup’s Humean perspective is, so to say, incipiently Hegelian.

come some way towards understanding Hegel's use of or attitude to "reality". *Realitas*, and the cognate German term *Realität* (as distinct from *Wirklichkeit*) derives from the Latin *res*, meaning very much matter and thing, matter in the sense of an essentially particular conceptual content thus "materialised" (rather than literal *materia* or *hyle*, as we find also with German *Stoff*, a unity in duality of meaning, cf. *res-publica*, republic). This sense of Thing, however, is transcended in the dialectic as finally abstract, like our everyday assumptions about "reality".

This Spirit, first emerging after this death, as¹² the birth of thought, is (also) the life of the (religious, believing) community in a Christian culture, such as Hegel lived in. Even that is just therefore not yet its full manifestation, a shadow, as the Church itself is figure and sacrament, though no doubt "effective" of what it figures, sacramental theology teaches.

A becoming God, as even or especially a God that becomes, is not literally an option. The becoming is internal to the dialectical System, its unfolding from within, for which time is a figure merely. It only unfolds as being "already" perfected, as the Form is seen in hylomorphism as directing development of the material composite (otherwise why would it unfold in either case?). Soul is unchanging and even, again, the whole substance.¹³ The possibility and the actual being of Substance are the same. There are no merely possible substances. Our first apprehension of contingency, therefore, is surmounted in reflexive thought. Being, after all or as emerges "at the end", is act and *actus actuum*. Time is seen as working as well or better backwards. That is, there is no time. It gets kicked away, "for Spirit that knows itself". Time "appears as spirit's destiny and necessity, where spirit is not yet complete within itself". It is

¹² Death, that is, along with "after" and, indeed, birth are representational notions. It is thus in general a representation to say that someone or other "really died", this "someone" being itself representation in the first place. As a *general* truth this does not affect the validity of the religious statement within context. Thus Hegel anticipates throughout the "contextual theory of meaning" as found in contemporary Analytical Philosophy.

¹³ See, again, Aristotle's *Metaphysics* VII. 'Affectability is what Aristotle means by "matter"... If the soul as such also had an affectability, it would have still another body' (Gendlin). Yet the soul is "the whole substance". The Infinite, as such, has no body. This cannot mean it has to manage without a body, or without anything. Ungrateful spirit, again, kicks body away. In figure, "it is raised a spiritual body".

thus compelled by time itself, “the pure self in external form... not grasped and understood by the self” (*Phenomenology of Mind*, p.800).

So we witness the “realised End” (Hegel, EL210). Why is this so and not nothing? Because Nothing is what cannot be, since the Nothing that *is* is at once Being and so not Nothing, or both together rather, as evil good, falsity or contradiction truth (from some point of view, at some moment), the many one and this perfectly. As an old song says, “It had to be you, Wonderful you, Nobody else, Gave me a thrill, You always did, And you always will.” Being, in a word, is friendly and worth knowing. It is, in fact, by the doctrine of the Concept, closer than self, *magis amica*.¹⁴

¹⁴ “Plato is my friend but Truth is more my friend”. *Amicus meus Plato, sed magis amica veritas*. This is the sense in which Aquinas startlingly concludes that the “society of friends” is not essential, even if appropriate (*bene esse*), to eternal happiness. Identity transcends and fulfils likeness. “I am you”.

CHAPTER ONE

NO REGRESS FROM THE HEGELIAN WOOD

The reference of this title is to one of C.S. Lewis's earliest Christian apologetic works, *The Pilgrim's Regress* (1933), which refers in turn to Bunyan's seventeenth century classic, *The Pilgrim's Progress*. Lewis's pilgrim regresses or goes back from the various errors of modern times, such times being defined as those subsequent to some kind of European falling off from its Christian frame, either at or after the Renaissance, perhaps. One facet of this apostasy is seen as that very subtle one set forth, Lewis appears to think, in the Hegelian corpus, which he refers to as a "wood". By this he seems to mean this corpus is not quite a maze, but that it shares with the latter a quality of being difficult to get out of again. We shall argue, to the contrary, that Hegel's is a major and even indispensable contribution to the ongoing life of Christian self-interpretation. This we will find reflected similarly in theology, in the next generation, by J.H. Newman's *The Development of Christian Doctrine* (1845), as it is in biology and natural history by Darwinism. Hegel himself, we claim, directly reflects religious or mystical writers from Eckhart or John of the Cross to De Caussade and the later Ontologists (Gioberti, Rosmini, Brownson, Ubaghs) and many of the so-called modernists. I shall reserve a special place for the Hegelian McTaggart in my argument, which may seem to some self-defeating, since McTaggart was a self-proclaimed atheist. This however but advertises the wider sweep of the conception, according to which such atheism is a moment of a specifically Christian civilisation and culture. The Jesuit-led regress from this, plotted at Rome in the nineteenth century, under cover of loyalty to the revolutionaries of some days before yesterday (Aquinas), and to which Lewis has effectively allied himself, has been a great setback for the Christian movement in our times.

I once, over a week in 1962, heard a set of talks by Fr. Gerald Vann O.P. where he contrasted throughout medieval with "modern" Catholicism, to the detriment of the latter, mainly on account of its loss of

the mystical and/or sacramentalist point of view as applied to the whole of reality, in consequence of its having embraced a form of theological rationalism (of the Understanding rather than of the Reason, in Hegelian terms). But one cannot "go back", "restore", either the medieval or, as recently and still attempted, the "pre-conciliar" periods. Hegel offers the alternative, though Catholics (but not only they) may well prefer to find it for themselves in those same sources, their own, which Hegel so brilliantly tapped. But why not, after all, include him, as we include Lewis or Maimonides or Avicenna, in that openness of ecumenical vision championed at the last "ecumenical" Council as indeed necessary (for salvation, let us say, of the whole in the part, the part in the whole)? Viewed in this way the "Christian movement" was never "shattered" in absolute terms, as contrasted with Herbert McCabe's rhetorical but, as ever, enlightening exaggeration in using this term, but simply differentiated itself in preparation for a richer integration than before.

The field on which the battle is fought out is largely that of Christology. Hegel is clear that the Man from whom Spirit proceeds has himself become, always was and is, Spirit. He appeared merely, that is *immediately*, un-transfigured by reflection. Thus he was "found in fashion as a man", in fashion as "in a figure", from which to be, in faith, *transfigured*. Men as such, their "life-forms", are nothing other. Men or women, that is, as they appear and are experienced. The reality of a man is not a man, but something quite other, as Aristotle had already understood (see his *Metaphysics*, Book VII). So "the Second Adam became a living spirit" after, so to say, a second look, a reflection, from "shine" to essence, had occurred.

We know, if we understand the concept God, Absolute, Infinity, that the *act* of creation, and Infinity is "pure act", adds nothing to God, makes no change.¹ Really it does not occur, is but a dialectical "moment", cancelled as we learn to see finite things *in* God, in the one Idea. This is all it *can* be, a kind of foil to eternal self-realisation as accomplishment in the ever-present End, *finis*, which is, precisely, "without end". The equivocation here is superficial, as of a duality of aspect rather. That God is love means that *we* are given life and/or being, that *we* are *there*, in love's eternal self-

¹ Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* Ia 44.

loving. This is the *mystery* of creation, that, namely, it is not creation but its opposite. Creation is a phenomenal or finite notion.

The "human form divine" is just that. It is the last stage of form, form's actual possibility, as differentiated from content, the Content. The animals, after all, are already "overlapped" by us, analysed with reference to us and hence "tamed". They *are* with reference to us, moments in our self-realisation. In all "things"² the God we speak of as "in the beginning" is really manifest, and so achieved at and in the end, including all that might be possibly Other. This is the defining characteristic of Thought, to be itself in each other, the like in the unlike, as Hegel expresses at length in his study of *reflection*, of Identity and Difference, in *The Science of Logic*.

Hegel's philosophy of history, of Objective Spirit, is important specifically in this context of the whole. It can determine, should determine, how we look upon "the Incarnation". One can relate to it all that is said about hating one's life in this world. All falls into place. Here I take Lewis to task, over what he says as to a "Hegelian wood" here and in his *Surprised by Joy*. It is precisely he himself, later, who has his character ask "How can the gods see us face to face till we have faces?" These last words are the novel's title-phrase and nothing could be more Hegelian, as Lewis would have seen.

But even if Hegel's thought did not support our position in the way that it appears to do, that would be his loss rather than ours. McTaggart, taught by Hegel, expounds things more clearly, also more simply, too simply perhaps. The Jesus, anyhow, it follows, who shared our non-life, the life in this world we are told to hate, is not the real (or real-ised) Jesus, eternally trans-figured, the "Christ of faith". So he could well be ignorant of this or that, since all our knowledge, our phenomenal knowledge in this phenomenal life, is false anyway. "All judgements are false" (Hegel). "Even if we have known Christ after the flesh we know him so no more." Why did the Apostle feel impelled to say this? Partly perhaps because he had not, like all the other apostles, had that experience, which he nonetheless represents as having no permanent value.

In saying that the untransfigured, unglorified Jesus is not the real Jesus I have no intention of denying the unity of divine and human personality

² The Thing is a Hegelian category merely, between Existence and "Matters" in his Logic (*Encyclopaedia* 125).

as de-fined at Ephesus (431). Rather, I deny absolute or independent reality to life and its phenomena. No doubt all believers in God do that. Thus Isaiah judged "the nations" less than the drops on the rim of the bucket and St. Thomas rates creation as *penitus nihil*, a better formulation than the later *plura entia sed non plus entis*, as if God and Fido were univocally beings. Thought brings language to reflect it, in mystical writings as in Hegel's systematic philosophy. Further, in graduating from a philosophy of substance, perfected in Spinoza, to one of subjectivity, anticipated in Leibniz, the notion of person defined as substance, *substantia individualis in natura rationali*, is not unaffected. Already in earlier theology person became equated with relation, in the Trinity, and this may well be seen as the beginning of a more generalised vision of personality under Christian inspiration, already announced in Gospel sayings implying not mere substitution but real interchangeability or liquidity. "What you did to one of these you did to me"; "He who loves God *must* be one who loves his brother as well" (my stress). This is no merely practical requirement but states what we love in loving God, closer to each than he or she is to himself or herself.

Thus the statement, from a realist "religious" standpoint, that where the Christ of history and the "Christ of faith" are separated the latter is destroyed or denied rests upon misunderstanding. What is assumed is that faith in the Incarnation, say, means believing that the Word of God really appeared. It is not noticed that these two terms intimately contradict one another. What appears is not real. As St. Paul had said, the things which are seen are passing away but the things that are not seen are eternal, given, that is, that we are speaking of the unseen realities and not of an unqualified negativity. It is precisely "things" that are postulated.

This step, this moment of thought, is built into Hegel's "science of logic". Essence is exactly contrasted with appearance, the immediate, with Being, as resulting from Reflection and Mediation. It is thus the midpoint, the antithesis, leading to the Notion or Concept, that unitary Idea which *is* the Absolute, which alone and absolutely is. Hence Hegel agrees with Suzuki and other Buddhist thinkers that Absolute Knowledge (his name for the Idea, the Infinite, in the *Phenomenology*), is not knowledge of the mass of finite particulars and possibilities. These are evanescent, in flux, not knowable in themselves, as was well enough worked out by Plato, while nothing is possible that is not actual. For Actuality itself resolves into the Object and finally the one Idea. Thus we have the prophetic

saying, opaque to abstracted (and abstracting) Understanding, "I will not remember their sins anymore".

The reality of this appearing Word is expressed rather in the figure called the Transfiguration ("and he was transfigured before them"), where Christ shows himself, *via* metaphors of "glorious" light, as he really is and is to be believed to be. The self-emptying (*kenosis*) is just that and as such is to be believed. Hence Absolute Idealism completes faith. In believing that the man Christ is really God one negates, overcomes, the phenomenal appearance. The constant presence of *miracle* in the accounts of him is the figurative representation of this overcoming, culminating in the rising up from "the dead", from all of the dead, then and to come. Christ, that is, plays the role of, is the embodiment of, the thinker and thinking's own stance, in Absolute Knowledge. Before this he himself dis-appears, surrendering the kingdom, in the Apostle's words, to the final principle, so that that, God, shall be all in all, or that which it or he eternally is, as is shown in the Logic, thus confirming or "accomplishing" figurative religion³.

The same applies to all the fabled representations of ascensions, chariots, *last* judgements, particular or universal, and last things (*eschatia*) in general. "This is the judgement, that men loved darkness rather than light". That is, they are here corrected. True Being, concerning which one judges, is revealed to be mediated *via* the essentially unseen or, again, mediate, *viz.* Essence. In this way religion itself represents God as "light and in him is no darkness at all". Light, now, is the ultimate metaphor, among the philosophers, for Reason and Truth. It is, Hegel says elsewhere, Nature's "first ideality". As for the "last" things, they are just what is ever present as eternal accomplishment. This, indeed, is precisely the posture, the insight, of faith, that all is accomplished, the world overcome in its steadfast denial or total renunciation, in an *acosmism* not to be confused with a facilely abstract atheism.

The fact is that talk of God is less than philosophical and too easily "falls into edification". This does not mean we should erase the word as naming something false or chimerical, either to restrain people or refrain even ourselves from using it when occasion or feeling demand, always

³ On this point cf. Professor Georges van Riet's "The Problem of God in Hegel", Parts II-III, *Philosophy Today*, Summer 1967 (French original, *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, Tome 63, août 1965, pp. 353-418, complete).

aware though that we are naming the unnameable, as that *within* which things are named or, again, "appear".

Subject and object, and so on, God, nature, understanding, sensibility, etc., are uncritically presupposed as familiar and something valid, and become fixed points from which to start and to which to return. The process of knowing flits between these secure points, and in consequence goes on merely along the surface.⁴

Deliver me, *prayed* Eckhart, from speaking of God. The same insight is implicit in *The Cloud of Unknowing*.⁵ Eckhart may have added "too much", but the meaning of this is that the semantics involved are a condescension to our finite nature, only able to be *partly* corrected by a corresponding silence, as we find Wittgenstein saying at *Tractatus* 7. We need, in completion, incarnational declaration.

On this view of things the question inevitably arises, "Why Christ?" Hegel's answer, basically that of any Christian, is that he is that individual. History was bound, set, necessitated, as eternal fulfilment and its "own result", to reach its apogee, so to say, in an individual reality or, rather, in just this one. In Hegel's logic, profoundly argued for, the individual, every individual, is the universal. The proof of that is the movement's success, success of this movement of *faith*, in this man, as a transforming principle. This is Hegel's answer: the factual is normative, as the latter is also the ultimate significance of the concept of "natural law", in itself a contradiction apart from these premises. This success stands in itself in a kind of inverse, or mutually confirmatory, relation to the movement's own confidence in itself. The first generation found this expressed in the parable of the grain of mustard seed. That is the "victory over the world, even our faith." The transformation of substance into subject thus begins there, prior to its ascension into conscious philosophy.

Implied, further, is that if indeed this one is truly the divine Son, Word (of the Father), Son of Man (this title itself reveals all), then all are such sons, as I is "the universal of universals", the Idea individual, that is realised. This is laboriously worked out in representations of the mystical body, head and members, yet "members one of another" (here the figure

⁴ Hegel, *The Phenomenology of Mind* (tr. Baillie, New York 1966), p.92.

⁵ English, East Anglia, fourteenth century.

transcends itself) and so on. If, further, the Father, God, is truly to become as indeed being or having been all along "all in all" then Christ himself is transitional, a moment, truly delivering himself with "the kingdom" "so that God shall be all in all". To entertain that, in turn, implies acceptance of a final trans-identity of each with every other, as is set forth in the Synoptic preaching of substitution and co-inherence, that what is done to one is done to all and so on. This has to be taken as the final face of Love which, therefore, God is. God, that is to say, vanishes in this love, which is Reason, thought, as is declared in Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* at paragraph 159:

To think necessity... means a liberation... called I: as developed to its totality it is free Spirit; as feeling, it is Love; and as enjoyment, it is Blessedness.

This expatiation, needless to say, concludes long and continuous passages of "dialectical development", this term being arguably an improvement upon "argumentation", even for describing the Method⁶ of an Aquinas or an Augustine, here made self-conscious.

Properly *salvation* history, that is to say, consumes, overlaps or annihilates time. History becomes one with dialectic, with the dialectical method. It is a progress up a vanishing ladder, "from shadows to reality". "When I became a man I put away childish things." The Apostle offers this metaphor for the emergence, gradual or sudden, out of time into eternity. Alternatively, I, anyone, do not "live the life that I live now". Christ lives in me, he says. In other words I am united with all, all the generations, in being strictly beyond generation or any such finite notion. Absolute knowledge, that is, is ultimately knowledge of itself knowing itself, not however in a primacy of consciousness over Logic or as generating it. Logic, rather, the Concept, generates consciousness in the dialectical necessity of the Method. Similarly, eternity generates time, and hence space, as necessitating, resulting in, eternity. So with the "now" of time. The timeless instant of time is clearly both abstraction and contradiction. We can only construe the present, the "now", according to our own finite psychology. It has a certain duration.⁷ From this the absolute "now" that is

⁶ Cf. Hegel, *Encyclopaedia* 238-242.

⁷ Cf. the experiments of Rubin on this, discussed by the Danish anthropological psychologist, Axel Randrup (on the Internet).

eternal or infinite follows as including the whole series of such instants or psychological units in one. In absolute subjectivity time becomes eternity. There is no time, nor can there be, McTaggart claimed to show in a celebrated article.⁸

Meanwhile, for it is the same, the union with all loses its finitely quantitative aspect in what is an *identity* in Absolute Subjectivity or Subject. The individual is revealed as the universal and so, at last, truly undivided, no longer *praecisum*. Arbitrary fancies are overcome by thought thinking *itself*, as being what thinking is, the *end*, namely, of the individual and of all things in their eternal accomplishment as Absolute Spirit. Art and Religion are transitional forms of this "Content". Philosophy is the final and complete "form" as *one with* the Content, or with the *Sophia* which it loves. This view grounds itself in the dialectic of the One and the Many considered under "The Doctrine of Being" in Hegel's Logic. It is also the solution to the old puzzle about an infinite multitude. Infinity cancels multitude as love is consummated in new birth, of one out of two, of the pair's unity *in* one another, specifically in their opposition. Yet all that we know of birth, death, or of love is the echo in us of the universal, of the active Trinitarian relations of self and other in spirit. We, rather, *are* that echo. Hegel sums this up in the phrase "the ruin of the individual". "The living being dies, because it is a contradiction."⁹ Thus there is no self that is not other, is not precisely having the other as other and yet *having* it, as self therefore. Or, we may say, self itself is here sublated, *aufgehoben*., as, again, thought thinks itself (Aristotle), wholly and entirely. If we do not see the world, the totality, in the grain of sand then we do not see anything.

In thus *reconstructing* Absolute Knowledge, as an *ideal* plenitude no longer cognitive as on the realist and quantitative model of *omniscientia*, we negate the world of finite particulars, one outside the other. They are not known to Absolute Knowledge. It "never knew" them. We negate

⁸ *Mind* 1905, as also in other writings.

⁹ EL 221 *Zus.* This truth is not lost by the sublation of the category of Kind into Cognition. For Hegel the whole of "external" nature is a contradiction, for thought as he says, hence a "dialectical" moment. The Method too thus surpasses or sublates itself, passing over in this regard from passive to active, though they too are the same, as was glimpsed in the pre-Hegelian notion of *potentia*, power, *dynamis*.

matter in fact, as the physicists in their way have also ever been busy doing, whether by internal decomposition of its concept or by exclusion from spirit. Hence much of what we are *immediately* conscious no longer falls under the conception of an object of knowledge, but is chimerical, as may indeed be known. Chimerical, for example, would be Christ's supposed knowledge and vision of a future atomic bomb or of the coming Olympics. Yet he is identified with "the Son of Man coming on the clouds of heaven", a figure simply repeated from the Jewish *Book of Daniel*.

The question inevitably arises, at this point in faith's self-understanding, as being uncovered by exegesis, why just this phenomenal historical figure should be this Son of Man with which the first generation of Christians identified Jesus after his death and because of his death. This is hence called a or the "passion", *passio*, from the verb to suffer. He *suffered* under Pontius Pilate and "was buried". Of him, however, Pilate is recorded as saying (whether he did or not), "Behold the man!" or even "Behold man!" *Ecce homo*. The same author, John, has it said by the persecuting hierarchy that one man should die *for* all, for "the people" (*populus*), doing it *for* them and not merely "instead of" them. Hence we die *in* him, by faith, i.e. *this is* faith.

These characteristics would belong supremely to the heavenly Son of Man or "second Adam", become "a living spirit". This is what is "coming" and in which or whom all participate. Yet, by Hegelian logic, a universal must be individualised if it is not to remain abstract, abiding by itself alone. The man Jesus has been taken by one large representative movement as unique instance of such individualisation, as its actual achievement. That "his kingdom shall have no end" is only knowable by us now in faith. Now faith conceives itself to be more than belief.

The uniqueness of that individual, all the same, is determined retroactively by the success of the movement, believed in however from the beginning, that "it was not possible that the grave should hold him", whether literally or as in our immediate misperception.¹⁰ When we

¹⁰ Hegel remarks somewhere that anyone who thinks the truths of religion depend upon or could depend upon finite historical facts misunderstands everything about it. Similarly it was remarked that the knowledge (and truth?) of God depends not on how the world is but that there is any world at all (Herbert McCabe, articles on "God"). Jesus, in the Gospel, for that matter, accuses the mourners of Jairus's daughter of misperception. "She is not dead but sleepeth". Yet this need not be to deny that he raised her from the dead, as Mary and Martha's brother "shall rise

develop notions of election or grace to explain this, however, we fall back upon a *temporal* picture of *pre*-determination. Reason rather is eternal self-manifestation, the ground and actuality of all things, of Being rather. It is Absolute Knowledge. Hence it is said and has to be said that Christ lives in you, that you are the body of Christ, I in them and they in me, all members one of another. That is, they are not members at all, not parts¹¹, but each is one with all and, hence, all one with each. The face of Christ is in this sense seen everywhere; hence "there is no beauty in him that we should desire him" (*Isaiah* 53). This was or is, no doubt, the hidden vision of *communism*, a drab enough name.

So what do we say of inspiration? One cannot reduce it to mere canonicity or acceptance by the community (as Rahner at least seems to do). The truth is that this, as true, is not a reduction. Rather, it is constitutive of the community thus enabled to accept it, the inspiration, in a reading anew, in principle by anyone, of the text in question or of any "part" of it. In "fulfilling" the scriptures we constitute ourselves in accordance with them. This indeed is the point of the quasi-magical fulfilments we find in the Gospels and elsewhere. Such accounts, as themselves inspired, are bound to be fulfilled over again, as in fact the whole of time is a figure of self-fulfilment, of eternal self-accomplishment or Realised End, Spirit. In this way philosophy itself fulfils the religion that has ever inspired it. Canonicity is the passive recognition of this actual, ever renewable inspiration, blowing where it will.¹²

As inspiration is reception by the Church, the community of faith, even so is this reception itself the divinity of Christ. As many as *received* him received the power to become the sons of God, runs the Prologue to the fourth Gospel. This faith, a reception, is what "overcomes the world". It is a determinant intellectual principle, sublating the dichotomy of theory and praxis. It is also fundamentally a *Trinitarian* reception, within Trinitarian life, that is to say. The factual is normative, for thought and life, though the latter is the "immediate" idea merely, indifferently. The fact is that Christ was thus accepted, endorsed by an Empire and subsequent

again", though maybe smelling badly meanwhile, Martha fears. For himself too what is "not seen" is eternal, what we know (*scimus*, Easter *sequential*). So, those who have not seen "and yet" believe are not merely believing those, if any, who have seen. Or, "seeing is believing".

¹¹ Hegel, nonetheless, distinguishes members from parts:

¹² For a study of how this develops see Laurent Guyénot's "Jesus as Elijah's Apostle", *The Downside Review*, October 2003, pp.271-296.

expanding culture. He can however only be normative as a norm, of spirit or of humanity indifferently. Here the first Trinitarian *processio* takes form. As Word he becomes Reason's self-revelation, the *logos* of *logos* as of logic, Absolute Idea, man, not this or that man, a male, walking the roads of a bygone Palestine. Christ is sublated in his reception, in, *that is*, faith. "Even if we have known Christ after the flesh we know him so no more".

What is prefigured in Christ actively prefigures, as enabling, our universal reception of one another, each having the whole unity within himself or herself as Subject. Subject, however, is always and can only be Absolute Subjectivity. There cannot be a contingent subject. Hence a subject cannot receive a salvation or completion that is exclusively external. Equally, God, the Absolute, Spirit, is never a finitely external principle. It drives us on from behind as much as it leads us on or "goes before". Here the Trinitarian processions are completed in the mutual ex-spiration of Spirit which is reflected in in-spiration. Ourselves too we should not know "after the flesh". This, in fact, as realised, is the first motor of the other, more specific stance, as a kind of "proto-evangelium" as they say.

In confirmation or at least support of these developments as genuine development (of doctrine) I cite the following:

In Roman Catholic seminaries... it is now common teaching that Jesus of Nazareth did not assert any of the messianic claims that the Gospels attribute to him and that he died without believing that he was Christ or the Son of God... Jesus knew nothing about the Trinity and never mentioned it in his preaching... Jesus had no intention of breaking with Judaism in order to constitute a separate Church (*qahal*). Rather, he restricted his mission to Jews and called on his disciples to repent, to celebrate the dawning of God's kingdom, and perhaps to expect the imminent arrival of an apocalyptic figure called the 'Son of Man', whom Jesus never identified with himself... Shortly after he died, his followers in Galilee came to believe that God had vindicated Jesus, now miraculously alive in heaven, by designating him the future Son of Man... Jesus the proclaimer of the kingdom of God became the one proclaimed, soon to appear in glory.¹³

¹³ Thomas Sheehan, reviewing Hans Küng's *Eternal Life*, in *The New York Review of Books*, 14 June, 1984. This passage is derisively quoted by Michael Dummett in his "A Remarkable Consensus", *New Blackfriars*, October 1987, pp. 424-431. The paper typifies a general trend of "Christian realism" well exemplified in

I mentioned McTaggart at the beginning here. We should not be distracted by his "atheism", since it represents a mere verbal quibble as to the appropriateness of the name "God" for the Absolute, the Idea which is the Absolute, as reached by the Ontological Argument in earlier days. All McTaggart's arguments on this point can be found in Hegel, who nonetheless continues to speak repeatedly of God¹⁴, as did Spinoza, concerning whom Hegel comments that his system, far from being atheism is rather one of a-cosmism. It finds the cosmos to be nothing in comparison with God. That the generality seem unable to take this seriously is not much to their or "humanity's" credit, he remarks.

C.S. Lewis for his part, with whom we began, writes that he had "been trying to defend" realism (in 1922) "ever since I began reading philosophy". One "accepted as rock-bottom reality the universe revealed by the senses." But then he came to see that

I must admit that mind was no late-come epiphenomenon; that the universe was, in the last resort, mental; that our logic was participation in a cosmic *Logos*.

This position he saw as insulating him from the "nuisances" of religious conformity or "Theism". It enabled him "to get all the conveniences of Theism without believing in God."

The Absolute Mind - better still, the Absolute - was impersonal, or it knew itself (but not us?) only in us, and it was so absolute that it wasn't really much more like a mind than anything else. And anyway, the more muddled one got about it and the more contradictions one committed, the

Christopher Butler's *Why Christ?*; DLT London 1960. For an attempt to impose such a philosophical realism, as if presupposed to revelation, we might cite Paul VI's document "Credo of the People of God" from the immediate post-conciliar period. I suggest, rather, that what we have to do with here is not a "preposterous" suggestion of a "well-known literary convention" (Dummett) by the seminary professors. It is the history of an original challenge to "understand spiritual things spiritually" (St. Paul) that, quite naturally, has not always been met down the ages. Thus that a Son of Man was to come at the end of the age (*aeuum*) or ages means philosophically that Spirit, accomplished end (pure act), is active always, concretising that eternal accomplishment of all things which we call God, Spirit, the Absolute. Ultimately, man is much more or other than (phenomenal) man, a merely zoological category after all.

¹⁴ Cf, Georges van Riet, *op. cit.* (at Note 3, above).

more this proved that our discursive thought moved only on the level of "Appearance", and "Reality" must be somewhere else. And where else but, of course, in the Absolute? There, not here, was "the fuller splendour" behind "the sensuous curtain". The emotion that went with all this was certainly religious. But this was a religion that cost nothing. We could talk religiously about the Absolute: but there was no danger of Its doing anything about us. It was "there"; safely and immovably "there". It would never come "here", never (to be blunt) make a nuisance of Itself. This quasi-religion was all a one-way street; all *eros* (as Dr. Nygren would say) steaming up, but no *agape* darting down. There was nothing to fear; better still, nothing to obey.¹⁵

Two distinct points are made together here, that Hegelianism is difficult or muddling (he does not say "muddled") and that it costs less than "a religion". It may be that "the English Hegelians", some of them, made a religion of it, yet Hegel himself clearly distinguishes religion (and art) from philosophy as an imperfect from a perfect form of "the Content".¹⁶ That things are supposed to "cost" is a familiar Kantian theme of "respect" for the law. Yet love is represented as the easiest and most delightful thing and true philosophy is precisely love. It is not however come by easily, as Lewis's own experience of getting muddled shows. His was, after all, an uncommonly acute mind.

In fact in abstracting the realm of grace and spirit from normal reality, following upon the isolation of "sin" as a limitless negativity, the exclusively (or abstractly!) religious mind unconsciously prepares the way for a genuine malformation of reality we might call atheism proper. The organic connection of things in absolute mind is the first or prime casualty. Religion has to yield to philosophy, to *sophia*, since this is and has been, after all, its main fruit.

¹⁵ C.S. Lewis, *Surprised by Joy*, 1955, Collins (Fontana), London, 1978, pp. 168-9. Lewis refers to Anders Nygren's classic from Uppsala, *Eros and Agape*, an extremist Lutheran rejection of any form of Christian mysticism as a "way" to God.

¹⁶ See especially the section on Absolute Spirit (following after Subjective and the Absolute Spirit) at the very end of the third part of Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences*, "The Philosophy of Spirit".

CHAPTER TWO

HEGEL ON REVEALED RELIGION

“It seems to me carelessness, if, after we have been confirmed in the faith, we do not exert ourselves to see the meaning of what we believe.”¹ To appreciate Hegel's account of revealed religion one has to see it in context, that is, one has to see it in context of the tradition of religion understanding itself as revealed. This, however, has a special meaning for Hegel in terms of his general logical and metaphysical philosophy. For religion to be revealed, he urges, just means for it to be understood as revealed, in a sense to be given to this last term. There is nothing conceivably behind that, no revelation-in-itself as distinct from how it is known and thought by subjectivity, by us. By "us" is understood the continuous tradition of what he takes to be the paradigm instance of revealed religion, namely Christianity (following on Yahwism-Judaism), whether or not including this or that variant or what is taken (by some or all) as a variant.

I will preface my analysis, therefore, with an account of how revealed religion appeared to Thomas Aquinas, in its capacity as a revelation. Thus I take him as representing the classical tradition, in terms, for example, of the predecessors he acknowledges, the Scriptures, namely, Paul and John, later Augustine, John of Damascus (*De fide orthodoxo*, "On the Orthodox

¹ Anselm, *Cur Deus Homo?* C.1100, literally, "Why is God Man?" A term for "became" or even "becomes" is not found in this classical title, as it is in the body of the treatise.. The passage is quoted at EL77, Footnote One (Wallace translation), in rebuttal of Jacobi's doctrine of an exclusively immediate knowledge of absolute truth which Hegel labours to show is "reactionary" and very or purely "abstract". The truth lies rather in "the self-affirming unity of immediacy and mediation", discussed, he says, in "the second part of Logic, the Discussion of Essential Being" (EL65). The whole of EL63-78 would require exposition and commentary as supplement to the present chapter and the positions here taken up. We might say, anyhow, that what corresponds to religious faith taken formally in philosophy is rather "speculative principles" than "immediate knowledge". Cf. EL82 *Zus*.