New Frontiers in Latin American Borderlands

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6a y 8a: 6a y 8a Secciónes (Ultramar, Capitanías y Gobiernos Militares), sixth and eighth sections (Overseas, Captaincies and Military Governments): classification of Spanish military records in the Archivo General Militar, Segovia, Spain.

AGM-S:	Archivo General Militar de Segovia, Spain
AHN:	Archivo Histórico Nacional, Madrid, Spain
Cdre.:	Commodore
Doc.:	Document
FO:	Foreign Office
Leg.:	Legajo or bundle of documents
PRO:	Public Records Office, Kew, United Kingdom
SU:	Sección Ultramar, section for Overseas Spain
TNA:	The National Archives of the United Kingdom
UNESCO:	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

LESLIE G. CECIL

> By definition, the boundary marks the beginning and the end of a community . . . boundary encapsulates the identity of the community and, like the identity of an individual, is called into being by the exigencies of social interaction. Boundaries are marked because communities interact in some way or other with entities from which they are, or wish to be distinguished. (Cohen 1985, 12)

Approximately 500 years after the first borderlands were being constructed in Latin America to distinguish the indigenous population from their colonizers, boundaries are still being created in Latin America. Although borders still exist, the reasons for their construction and maintenance in the current global world have expanded. Today Latin American borders include the traditional political borders, as well as more non-traditional borders reflected in art, gender, and social programs. "What began as a line on a map became a space of evolving and multiple meanings and forms" (St. John 2011, 3).

Often the goal of the creation and maintenance of a border, whether political or social, is for one entity to establish hegemony over another. The process of control varies depending on differences in socio-political complexities of the cultures involved as well as natural resources, transportation routes, and ideology. Borderlands can be territorial zones (lands, social policy, or ideology) that have a dominate primate center and are essentially extensions of the state in terms of social, political, religious, and commerce centers (Lewis 1977). These types of boundaries are intended to create divisions between "Us" and "Them;" however, many times those boundaries create binational citizens actively participating in trade and exchange of goods and ideas (St. John 2011). Additionally, border towns (and resulting twin cities) may play a major role in revolutions (*e.g.*, the Mexican Revolution) because the political factions within the cities can control access to lands and the flow of goods from

one country to the other. Because of this kind of interaction, change (political and social) occurs constantly along borders due to their fluidity and many times the established border or social distance between the opposing cultures or ethnicities may change positively or negatively.

Cultures on either side of the border may struggle with questions of identity. The majority of borders are established by political entities that do not reside in/on the borderlands and they may not understand the ramifications of the artificial line that they have drawn on a map. In the United States and Mexico, border towns are not only divided by a political boundary, but also create class and legally-mandated ethnic divisions that exist only because of the border. This political line creates two nation-states and identity confusion because previously coherent towns are now divided into two different towns and cultures. "The history of the boundary line has shown that the border can mean many things—a customs and immigrations checkpoint and a divide between political and legal regimes, but also a site of transborder exchange and community formation and a place that people call home" (St. John 2011, 208).

Borderlands also can be thought of as mental and spiritual spaces as well as physical ones (Anzladúa 2007). In these instances, art is often used as a tool to illustrate spaces and bring awareness of borders (as well as events happening on or as a result of the border) to a larger audience. While art reflects cartography, intertwined and changing spaces, gender, social injustices, and (inter)national identity, the viewing patron may take away what was intended by the artist as well as her/his own interpretation of the piece situated in her/his specific social and political context, thus providing both the intended understanding as well as the possibility for unintended interpretations.

Social programs can highlight the inequalities between cultures and/or ethnicities thus creating borders (and stereotypes between the haves and the have nots). In some cases, people classify themselves (or are classified by others) based on economic, cultural, and social resources that are focused on consumption resulting in socio-economic classes (Bourdieu 1984). The perpetuation of the differences in the socio-economic classes and the difficulty of advancing from one level to another (but the unfortunate ease of falling from one level to another), establishes and perpetuates the border between classes. As a result, many ethnicities that comprise the lower socio-economic classes suffer from the lack of (or inability to access) social programs that could aid in their economic and social advancement and the blurring of these types of borders. However, for employment and welfare, education, housing, violence prevention, and youth development programs to be effective in blurring social and

economic borders, beliefs and stereotypes of those administering the programs as well as those benefiting from the programs must be addressed so as to attempt to eliminate the "Us" versus "Them" dichotomy (Brand and Glasson 2004, 120).

Because borders, and the concept of borders, are constantly changing, the chapters in this edited volume present a reexamination of the more traditionally defined political borders as well as those that are constructed by the human body, art, and social policy. The chapters naturally separate into four general topics: 1) traditional transnational borders, 2) borders and the gendered body, 3) borders as depicted in art, and 4) borders and social programs.

The first group of papers emphasizes the more traditional topics of political borderlands: petroleum production in Mexico and the borders it produced (Galan, Chapter 2), ethnic borders in the context of the Mexican Revolution (Gauthereau, Chapter 3), and the changing function of the borders in Cuba from 1868-1878 (Carlson, Chapter 4). Galan contextualizes the rise of petroleum production in Veracruz, Mexico within the Mexican Revolution. The importance of Mexican oil production, and the potential economic gain from it, in the early 1900s spread out of Mexico to the United States and England. Galan discusses that because of the increased international interest in Mexican oil and the Mexican Revolution, Mexican rebel groups, such as the *Felicistas* (followers of Félix Diaz), arose to protect the local interests in the state of Veracruz.

Américo Paredes' novel, *George Washington Gómez*, is the setting for Gauthereau's (Chapter 3) discussion of Texas Mexican identity along the U.S.-Mexican border during the Mexican Revolution. As a result of the Texas Revolution and the Mexican American War, the U.S.-Mexican border was established arbitrarily dividing families and lands creating transnational spaces and identities. Gauthereau employs the characters of *George Washington Gómez* to illustrate that the long held collective memories of borderland Mexicans and their fears and frustrations of revolutions and assimilation have resulted in the current Chicano movement.

Carlson (Chapter 4) addresses the borders, and the reasons for those borders, established in Cuba during the Ten Years' War. East Cuba (the area of Guantánamo) was seen as a hinterland and Caribbean frontier because of its location, the inability of Spain to exert social and/or political control, and because of its late occupation. While Spain attempted to control the area, the Creole population, an infusion of French colonists fleeing the Haitian Revolution, slaves, filibusters, and separatists rose against Spanish control. Carlson describes that Spain, in an attempt to maintain what control they had, constructed a fifty mile-long fortified line

separating east (primitive) from west (civilized) thus laying social and political claim on the civilized part of Cuba.

The second group of papers addresses how established borders can define the human body or the perception of the body. These two papers also address the topic of the female gender that is often ignored or stereotyped in border studies (Ruiz and Tiano 1987). Henderson-Espinoza (Chapter 5) addresses how the body is considered borderland space because it is raced, gendered, classed, and sexed creating many intersections or borderlands. The introduction of the term *queermestizo* demonstrates that the concept of the body has multiple states of being: complicated, unstable, and changing. Using Anzaldúan Thought and Theory, Henderson-Espinoza demonstrates that the body is a borderland that occupies temporal and intersectional spaces that are permeable and not static.

The female body is also the topic discussed by Ordaz (Chapter 6). She investigates the killing of females in one of the most notorious border towns in Latin America, Ciudad Juárez. Ordaz uses the term femicide to describe these killings because the bodies of the victims may be found wearing another person's clothes, mutilated or strangled, and/or raped, and because the killings reflect social, political, and gender violence. While the vast majority of these crimes against women in Ciudad Juárez go uninvestigated, activists, art, and film are ensuring that victims of femicide are not forgotten by actively situating them in the social and political consciousness of Mexico and the United States.

The third group of papers illustrates how artistic expression, current and Prehispanic, aids in the exposure and definition of borderland space and place. Visual elements from and about borders demonstrate space fraught with contested political, ethnic, and mythological divisions. Longacre (Chapter 7) employs five digitally-produced images by Alma Lopez (*1848: Chicanos in the U.S. Landscape after the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo*) to address the social and racial divisions in the Chicano-U.S. ethnic border. Lopez's works incorporate archival documents, historic maps, Catholic and Aztec traditions, and family photographs to address Chicano/a experiences within the mythologized U.S. national identity and events. Longacre suggests that by incorporating multiple scenes in any one of the five images, the viewer is confronted by and informed of the topics of xenophobia, immigration, citizenship, and Chicano social status that have not changed since the inception of Manifest Destiny.

Works by Chicano and Chicana artists Malaquias Montoya, Jacalyn Lopéz-García, Delilah Montoya, and Consuelo Jiménez Underwood and Betty A. Davis (and their assistants) memorialize the political, social, and

economic ramifications of the U.S.-Mexico border (Leimer, Chapter 8). Employing social, political, and environmental scenes, Leimer describes the works as visual representations of an open wound (Anzaldúa 2007), borderland dangers, the potentiality of a homeland, and the inevitability of the human spirit.

Rhodes (Chapter 9) describes how contemporary dance companies such as the Ballet Hispanico of New York are crossing traditional borders to create original movements and themes based in Hispanic heritage. Tina Ramirez, the founder of the Ballet Hispanico of New York, saw that Hispanic school-age children were loosing their heritage and decided that there was a great need to reconnect them with their heritage through dance. Rhodes explains that Ramirez's influences, goals, and her work to expand the company have resulted in a new repertoire that is as diverse as Latin America while still incorporating classical dance traditions.

The final paper in this section (Bernatz, Chapter 10) demonstrates that the ancient Maya also used art to signify borders. In this case, Bernatz illustrates that God L, the Classic-era Earth Lord, can also be interpreted as occupying the borderlands above and below the earthly plane. As the Earth Lord, God L is associated with wealth, caves, water or rain imagery and may determine the release of the water from the sky, agriculture and its resources, and warm sweat baths. As such, God L occupies the underworld realm, but can cross the border to the above-ground world.

The fourth group of papers addresses borders and social programs. These kinds of borders separate groups of people based on economic status and/or education. Dodd (Chapter 11) illustrates the social and economic borders that divide the citizens of Rio de Janiero. While Rio de Janiero prospers from the economic growth resulting from oil, gas fields, the 2014 World Cup, and the 2016 Olympics, *favelas* (illegal tenements) comprise a large section of the city. Dodd discusses the dialectical opposition found in the favelas—while some are famous with travel companies offering tours, they are run and funded by drug money with the ever-present threat of violence. Because of the widening social and economic border in Rio de Janiero and drug gang violence, the government of Brazil is introducing various social and educational programs to combat the problems faced by the citizens of the favelas and narrow the border between the ultra-rich and the ultra-poor.

Education is another social program that can create and reinforce borders among different ethnic groups. While students are educated in the classroom, parental involvement in education also affects the educational experience of both the student and the parent(s) and can widen the gulf among various ethnicities (Olson Beal, Chapter 12). Employing a case

study of parental involvement from a foreign-language immersion magnet program in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Olson Beal assesses the importance of race, language, school, and culture on the educational experience. While there are determining factors for parental involvement, when outside social and economic boundaries are blurred from the subtext, parents become more involved in the education experience and all involved feel more of an ownership in the educational experience.

While the chapters in this edited volume are diverse, they all emphasize that where borders and borderlands exist, they are not stable and static, but fluid and contested space(s) where political, social, educational, and economic categories are blurred and compromised (St. John 2011, 5). Borderlands intersect and overlap as do the ethnicities and cultures that are defined by these borderlands.

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CHAPTER TWO

THERE WILL BE BLOOD: OIL, REBELS, AND COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE GULF OF MEXICO BORDERLANDS, 1900-1920

FRANCIS X. GALAN

In 1914, a group of Mexican rebels gathered together in the hills of Cordoba, Veracruz and formed a social organization called the *Club Jabalí Cazadores* ("Javelina Hunter's Club") to protect a traditional way of life in the countryside of southeastern Mexico (Galán Callejas 1988, 1). In April of that same year, President Woodrow Wilson dispatched U.S. Marines from Texas City, near Houston, Texas, to the southern Gulf of Mexico for what turned into a six-month American military occupation of the Port of Veracruz (Knock 1992, 27-29). While U.S. troops prevented a German shipment of weapons to Victoriano Huerta's government, members of the Javelina Hunter's Club sought the right to bear arms and conservation of the natural environment as the violence of the Mexican Revolution and oil-field fires threatened the region (Galán Callejas 1988, 1).

Most images of the Mexican Revolution, however, call to mind Pancho Villa's daring cross-border raid upon Columbus, New Mexico two years later and General John J. Pershing's punitive expedition against Mexico's most infamous "bandit." Indeed, scholars have generally focused their attention upon agrarian revolts in the North and South (Katz 1998; Knight 1986; Womack 1969).[1] In the shadows of massive peasant movements lie the counterrevolutions of various generals in the Mexican Gulf states seeking restoration of the old order under Porfirio Diaz, while foreign oil companies sought generous concessions they had grown accustomed to receiving during his 35-year rule known as the *porfiriato* (Brown 1993; Henderson 1981). This essay examines the rise of petroleum production in Mexico and how it brought various foreign interests and rebel factions into

the lesser-known conflict for control over oil revenues, leaving one group of professionals from southern Veracruz to join the counterrevolution in the hope of progressive reform and broader appeal through linkages with *zapatistas*, the largely indigenous supporters of popular southern rebel leader Emiliano Zapata. It also adds to the work of historian Myrna Santiago (2006, 61), who argues that during the years 1900-1920 oilmen from the United States and Britain quickly wrested control of the tropical rainforest in northern Veracruz around the Port of Tampico from the indigenous population and *hacendados* or Mexican landowners of large estates.

In September 1910, as Porfirio Díaz celebrated Mexico's centennial anniversary of independence from Spain, his country had experienced a profound economic transformation with the assistance of foreign capital and integration into the global market economy. According to historian Juan Mora-Torres (2001, 88), this rapid growth over the previous two decades was based upon an extensive railroad network, exports of natural resources from mineral ores in north-central Mexico to oil in southeastern Mexico, as well as tropical goods. Overall foreign investment in Mexico totaled more than a billion dollars during the Porfiriato.[2] However, industrialization concentrated heavily in the North as the city of Monterrey, in the border state of Nuevo León, became the industrial center of Mexico while many peasants in the countryside lost their lands to development.

Unbeknownst to Díaz, an opposition candidate for the November presidential election named Francisco Madero, whom Díaz had imprisoned, escaped and fled to San Antonio, Texas, where he secretly devised his revolt in Mexico under the Plan of San Luís Potosí. Hailing from a wealthy family in the northeastern border state of Coahuila, Madero became the "martyred Apostle of Democracy" less than two years after he delivered the nation from the Díaz dictatorship (Knight 1986, 490; Mora-Torres 2001, 87-89). But, what effect, if any, did the oil-producing Gulf coastal region have upon the Mexican economy and how did *veracruzanos* respond to Madero's rebellion in the North?

Oil in the Gulf of Mexico Borderlands

Foreign investors backed Mexican oil drilling as early as 1876 in the state of Veracruz the same year Porfirio Díaz came to power. Major finds did not occur until the 1890s when British oilman Weetman Pearson explored the Isthmus of Tehuantepec. Meanwhile, the global demand for lower-grade crude oil skyrocketed with the recently perfected gasoline

engine in Europe and the more powerful internal combustion engine named after inventor Rudolph Diesel. In January 1901, the Spindletop boom near Beaumont, Texas, due east of Houston along the northern Gulf of Mexico, spurred renewed American interest for drilling the southern Gulf of Mexico in Veracruz together with improved transportation into the interior of Mexico through the San Luis Potosí connection to the Mexican Central Railroad (Hart 1987, 145-146).

Various Anglo-American companies increasingly became active in Mexican oil production and landholdings in Veracruz. The first notable was the Mexican Petroleum Company, which California oilman, Edward L. Doheny, and his fellow partners, established for the development of fields near Tampico and began supplying fuel for locomotives of the Mexican Central. According to historian John Mason Hart (1987), this consortium obtained tax exemptions and land concessions, including oil rights from Díaz's government, as stipulated in the mineral laws of 1883 under which the Mexican nation surrendered subsoil resources. Doheny purchased a half-million acre tract of land south of Tampico, where he initially began oil drilling in the late 1880s. The first American-owned well blew at El Ebano on May 14, 1901 where oil-field production developed into gushers, which Hart notes "dwarfed per-well production in the United States" (Hart 1987, 146). By 1905, the Mexican Petroleum Company supplied the Mexican Central with 6,000 barrels daily.[3]

The Standard Oil Company, through its subsidiary Waters-Pierce, also supplied the Mexican Central with fuel and received generous concessions from the Díaz government. In 1904, Waters Pierce claimed 90 percent of the national illuminating oil market and all gasoline consumption with profit margins that reached 600% (Hart 1987, 146). An oil contract, drafted the previous year between the governor of the border Gulf state of Tamaulipas and the Mexican attorney for Waters Pierce Oil Company, obligated the latter to install a new factory in addition to its refinery in Tampico for extracting paraffin from crude petroleum. Waters Pierce had to invest 100,000 pesos and in return was granted an "exemption from payment of taxes for 50 years upon its invested capital" and also exempted "seven years from the payment of both state and municipal contributions" for all capital invested in "its present refinery or new factory" (Arguelles and Villalobos 1903, Articles I and VIII). However, it was not exempted from contributing to schools. Interestingly, Waters Pierce was caught selling lower grade oil as premium quality fuel and it so upset Díaz that he canceled Standard's railroad contracts in favor of the British Pearson Trust, which owned the Mexican Eagle Company (Hart 1987, 146).

Porfirio Díaz also imposed new taxes on Standard Oil's petroleum products while offering inducements to the British Pearson Trust for the development of new oil fields at Tampico. The Pearson Trust soon provided two-thirds of the illuminating oil consumed on the Gulf coast. Greater competition for Mexico's internal market from Doheny to new players, such as the Houston-based Texas Oil Company, which also acquired landholdings in Veracruz, and Lord Cowdray (formerly Sir Weetman Pearson), contributed to the decline of Standard Oil's profits from 90 percent in 1903 to 40 percent by 1910 (Hart 1987, 147). Díaz in turn angered Standard Oil and Rockefeller interests over his government's nationalization of the Mexican Central and placement of British Pearson interests on the new "Mexican" board of directors of the National Railway System. The final straw came with Díaz's exclusion of Standard Oil from mineral concessions in the Mexican Gulf states and cancellation of its distribution contracts while promoting its competitors (Brown 1993, 50; Hart 1987, 146-147, 156, 247-248).

Meanwhile, the success of oil production and other minerals in Mexico discouraged reform of any kind during the porfiriato. Although Mexico exported crude oil to the United States, it continued importing refined petroleum products for domestic consumption and the railroads. Furthermore, the zones of economic growth in Mexico were limited to those areas directly involved in production, leaving the surrounding areas troubled by land displacement and poverty. The oil companies also employed well-paid foreign technicians, geologists, and foremen from Louisiana, Texas, and Oklahoma, while crews of domestic laborers were paid very little and aspiring Mexican professionals simply could not compete against their foreign counterparts (Hart 1987, 156). The state oil concession described earlier included a stipulation that Waters Pierce "always maintain the character of a Mexican company," but that "any or all of the persons who compose their company may be foreigners . . . subject to Mexican laws of the state and Republic" (Arguelles and Villalobos 1903, Article V).[4] For Mexican oil workers and would-be capitalists in Veracruz, Mexico's problem lay not only in its lack of political and social progress, but in the structure of oil contracts and conservation, not oil exploration itself.

Rebels and Counterrevolution in the Gulf of Mexico Borderlands

Madero's rebellion against Porfirio Díaz brought greater instability to Mexico's oil-producing region as federal troops encountered various bands

of armed men. In 1911, for example, rebels followed the rail line from Tuxpan in northern Veracruz into an oil camp at Furbero, named after British oilman Percy Furber, and burned railway bridges along the way. Telephone wires were cut to the camp at Potrero del Llano No. 4, an oil field belonging to the Mexican Eagle Oil Company made famous the previous year when it came in as a gusher under the work of American geologist Everette Lee DeGolyer, Sr., whom Lord Cowdray had just hired two years earlier from Oklahoma. Cowdray responded to the initial outbreak of violence by taking out a fire insurance policy on 2.5 million barrels of oil per year at a premium of 2.5 percent and suggested to the Mexican landowner, who received substantial royalties from Mexican Eagle, to organize its defense (Brown 1993, 203).[5] Indeed, foreign-owned properties throughout Mexico were subjected to destruction. Díaz resigned his presidency, at long last, by late May 1911 in the aftermath of the "Battle of Juarez" on the U.S.-Mexican border; fearful that continued fighting could only lead to greater lower-class participation and radicalism of revolutionary forces reminiscent of the French Revolution. Díaz lamented rather prophetically, "Madero has unleashed a tiger! Now let us see if he can control it!" (Hart 1987, 245, 249).

Problems for oil-camp security continued soon after Madero became president of Mexico as his program of constitutional liberalism faced several revolts beginning in 1912. In August, armed "bandits" attacked an oil camp in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec where the Pearson Trust had their first successful drilling years before. The Mexican Eagle Oil Company protested to Madero's government and asked for protection. Since Mexican Eagle and other oil companies were in the process of expanding their pipeline and transportation facilities, they were not about to abandon construction, figuring that it was actually more costly not to get rid of their oil (Brown 1993, 203-204; Knight 1986, 388).

In October 1912, Gen. Félix Díaz, the former dictator's nephew, led around 1,000 rebels in an unsuccessful coup against Madero at the Battle of Veracruz (Henderson 1981, 53-54). According to historian Peter Henderson (1981, 46-47, 50-56), Félix Díaz had tried the democratic process that year as a member of the Chamber of Deputies, or lower house of congress, with his own plan based upon mild land reform and labor legislation that was too little too late, and a progressive republicanism borrowed from the United States that lost credibility since Madero had already begun reform. When Félix Díaz appealed to President William Howard Taft for support of his coup attempt, Madero's government portrayed him as a "tool of the imperial giant." Mexicans in Veracruz and neighboring Oaxaca, many of them *criollos*, openly committed themselves

to rebellion under Félix Díaz, whom the authorities arrested and transported to a military prison in Mexico City.[6]

That same year also witnessed the rise of Emiliano Zapata who championed a peasant movement in the southern state of Morelos and became one of the first major revolutionaries from 1910 to renounce his allegiance to Madero (Henderson 1981, 40; Knight 1986, 244). By February 1913, Félix Díaz managed to remove Madero from power during the so-called "Tragic Ten Days" in Mexico City with the support of Gen. Victoriano Huerta, who had turned his back against Madero and then upset Díaz afterwards by establishing himself as the new president of Mexico (Henderson 1981, 72-80). These southern rebellions raise further questions over the nature of relations not only among foreign governments and business interests with the new Huerta dictatorship, but also the significance of oil production in Mexico during World War I and the resistance of the Felicistas (followers of Félix Diaz) to northern rebels in the oil-producing Gulf region (Brown 1993, 180-183).[7]

Petroleum production in the southern Gulf of Mexico proved so lucrative that it increasingly drew attention of foreign governments and rebels over the centralization of power in Mexico City and control over oil revenues as the most violent stage of the Mexican Revolution coincided with the outbreak of war in Europe. According to historians Linda Hall and Don Coerver (1984), entrepreneurs, engineers, geologists, and skilled workers from the American Southwest continued to pour into the Mexican Gulf Coast despite the ongoing revolutionary violence. They helped Mexico's oil production become 25 percent of the world's oil supply by 1921. Hall and Coerver (1984, 230) state that "oil money was a significant factor in financing the Mexican Revolution, in the form of taxes, forced loans, and outright theft; the oil fields were located close to the Gulf Coast, and thus foreign employees were in a position to be supported morally and practically from outside the country or to be evacuated in an emergency."[8]

Furthermore, Mexican oil production figured heavily in the strategic interests of allied governments during World War I, especially with the major shift from coal to oil propulsion undertaken by the U.S. and British navies. Winston Churchill, as First Lord of the British Admiralty, recognized distinct advantages of oil over coal. The stakes became highest following the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria on June 28, 1914 and Churchill's belief that Germany renewed its intention upon expansionism as its goal, following the previous attempt of a German gunboat to enter the North African port off Morocco's coast three years earlier. The greatest difficulty, however, was obtaining a militarily and

politically secure oil supply as Churchill had pushed for conversion before the supply problem had been solved (Hall and Coerver 1984; Yergin 1991).[9] Mexico became one such possibility if only the revolutionary violence could be contained.

The pending arrival of a German ship at the Port of Veracruz in the southern Gulf of Mexico during April 1914 alarmed President Wilson of Huerta's attempt to obtain weapons following the American embargo that closed off sources of arms supply from the United States. Both British and American oil companies had mounting difficulties with Huerta in power, especially over the issue of taxation and legitimacy of his own government. By then, the Texas Company, which made its first Mexican investments in 1911, followed by Gulf Oil and Magnolia, which had purchased over 400 acres in Tampico, raised the stakes in oil activity in Veracruz ever higher (Hall and Coerver 1984, 231). On May 1, 1915, W.A. Thompson, Jr. of the Texas Company wrote to U.S. Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan: "the oil field in Mexico is gusher country" (Brown 1993, 197). Thompson had also expressed his concern over the danger of unsupervised wells filling up storage pits and "spreading over the lands and streams" (Brown 1993, 197) in the aftermath of President Wilson's military intervention in Veracruz and increased revolutionary violence. Oilmen had images of Mexicans looting the oil fields, runaway wells catching fire, and the destruction and burning of oil camps (Brown 1993, 197; Knock 1992, 25-27).

The six-month American military occupation of Veracruz from April to November 1914 evidently bolstered the revolt of the so-called "Constitutionalists" under the leadership of Venustiano Carranza, who hailed from the same state of Coahuila as the martyred Madero. While Constitutionalist rebels in fact looted some mules and automobiles from the oil camps, the refineries were largely untouched and Mexican oil field workers prevented the overflow of wells. Meanwhile, President Wilson made an exception in the sale of arms to constitutionalist troops hoping to persuade Huerta to resign, flee into exile, or call for Presidential elections. Republican Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts criticized Wilson as being "directly responsible" for the ensuing civil war in Mexico. Theodore Roosevelt also blamed the Wilson administration for the civil war and said the United States should have either recognized Huerta or established a protectorate over Mexico. Huerta, however, eventually abdicated power in July 1914, fearful that the fighting would only worsen without any hope of returning to power later. By October of the following year, Wilson granted Carranza's Constitutionalists recognition as the de facto government of Mexico. In return, the American government wanted

a commitment from Carranza that the oil-producing region be a neutral area (Brown 1993, 27-28, 81).

The flow of oil and security of the Mexican Gulf region became even more significant with the entry of the United States into World War I in the spring of 1917. Commander James Richardson, an oil expert with the U.S. Navy, testified at the Senate Public Lands Committee in Washington which debated the country's oil facilities and fixed oil prices during the war. Richardson stated (*New York Times* 1917, 1): "does anyone believe that if it depended on getting oil from Mexico we would not get it!" Senator Frank B. Kellogg, however, expressed doubt since he was concerned about German influence in Mexico. Commander Richardson added (*New York Times* 1917, 1): "in Mexico, there are wells we can get control of that will produce 1,000,000 barrels of oil a day . . . all we need do is protect the wells and pump the oil out." U.S. Secretary of the Navy, Josephus Daniels, who urged an oil survey and government regulation of the petroleum supply for the war, remarked that "oil is the basis of war operations in these days, and our war needs must not be denied. We can't run our war airplanes, our submarines, our destroyers, without oil. In fact, we could not get to the front at all, with our fighting men, without oil" (*New York Times* 1917, 2).

Meanwhile, Felíx Díaz remained the only viable alternative whom the oil companies preferred as Mexico's president to return order and stability in contrast to more radicalized northern rebels. The Felicistas were led by a number of generals, including Manuel Peláez and Constantino Galán, each protecting local interests in the state of Veracruz. General Peláez became particularly adept at playing off the oil companies in exchange for protection, extorting money and services from the oil camps. At times it appeared he was independent of Félix Díaz, unsure whether the latter was even bankable anymore. General Galán actually sought an alliance through his correspondence with Emiliano Zapata hoping to link with the latter's popular movement in the South and, like other Felicistas, realized the need for reform that never came under the Porfiriato. In fact, a number of Zapatistas eventually joined Féix Díaz, such as Pedro Gabay and Pafnuncio Martinez, who became high-ranking officers in the Felicista army called the Reorganized National Army, under a reform plan that seemingly became more progressive and attractive to the land-hungry poor. Although Zapata himself cooperated militarily with the Felicistas, he remained against a formal alliance and ultimately distrustful of their true goals (Hall and Coerver 1984, 231; Henderson 1981, 128-129, 130, 209n11).

President Wilson's pro-Carranza policies stung the Felicistas, especially since the U.S. president had insisted before his military intervention of Veracruz upon the right of Mexicans to control their land and mineral resources moving Mexico toward democracy and freedom from outside control. In theory, Wilson moved away from his predecessors "dollar diplomacy" and believed in limits to supporting American enterprise in foreign countries (Link 1979, 8-10). The Felicistas also mistrusted northern rebels, like Carranza, because they might gain control of the Presidency, usurping private and communal landholdings in a government bid to nationalize the oil industry. Indeed, they portrayed Carrancistas as Bolsheviks since the Constitution of 1917, under Article 27, stated that subsoil rights were inalienable and belonged to the nation. Oil companies thus feared confiscation and continued backing Félix Díaz in the revolution. Besides, local Carranzistas also treated many Veracruzanos badly, which only drove them into supporting Félix Díaz. The Felicistas in turn portrayed themselves as champions of the American war effort in World War I, even though President Wilson prohibited arms shipments to war-torn nations (Henderson 1981, 131, 135-136).

The Felicistas greatest triumphs occurred in the state of Veracruz with the circumvention of the U.S. arms embargo through middlemen, either in Cuba or Guatemala, transporting weapons to Veracruz where Félix Díaz centered his personal activities. Henderson (1981, 138-139) states that among Díaz's able subordinates were Generals Gabay, Martinez, Galán, and others who "bore the brunt of the fighting, since Díaz himself lacked military prowess." However, they lacked the manpower to take the major cities and instead were more successful in rural areas and small towns. Gabay and Martinez blew up trains as these passed by, looted the boxcars and executed the military escorts. In one instance, Gabay distributed Singer sewing machines from a boxcar he captured and delivered these to the poor families of the area, such that similar acts of charity endeared them to locals like some romanticized Robinhood figure. The strength of the Felicistas, however, peaked in 1917 to early 1918 as Carranza forces under capable generals, such as Manuel Lárraga from San Luís Potosí, captured or killed off rebel leaders. By 1919, Emiliano Zapata was killed, signaling the end of Zapatista revolt in the South and the Felicistas soon thereafter (Henderson 1981, 136, 138-140).

Conclusion

For Gen. Constantino Galán, what began as the Javelina Hunter's Club he co-founded to preserve traditional hunting lands in the mountainous

countryside of the oil-producing Gulf region turned into the revolutionary violence that cost him his own life in April 1920. He remained defiant to the end as official military records indicate he "died of natural causes" while on a campaign near the hacienda of Santa Inés in Veracruz (Muro and Ulloa 1997, 1014).[10] According to his niece on the other hand, Constantino was assassinated by poisoning when he stopped to eat.[11]

Further investigation into transoceanic and transcultural ties from the northern and southern Gulf of Mexico, including the lives of those foreigners and Mexicans who lived, worked, and fought in the oil fields of Veracruz, may deepen our understanding of the first great social revolution of the twentieth century, the rise of big multinational companies, incipient Mexican progressivism, and conservation in Mexico, which may otherwise forever remain in the shadows of Villa, Pershing, and Zapata in the public memory of the Mexican Revolution and the shared history with Mexico bounded by land *and* sea. The pursuit of "El Dorado" in Mexico became a contest for "black gold" in the struggle for justice, land, and liberty throughout the Mexican Revolution and beyond.

Notes

1. See also, Juan Mora-Torres (2001, 3) who notes that the Mexican Revolution began along the U.S.-Mexican border region where industrialization was most intensive, lending "a strong correlation between the rapid spread of capitalism and rebellion." I have coined the term "Gulf of Mexico Borderlands" to draw attention to the fact that the United States and Mexico have shared this transoceanic region longer than the current land border in the American Southwest and is overlooked by transnational histories of both countries.
2. See also, Emily S. Rosenberg (1982, 55) who notes that the American and British governments pressured Mexico into converting to the gold standard to bring greater stability to the international monetary system.
3. See also, Rosenberg (1982, 24) who states that "as American firms consolidated and moved into the world, foreign sources of supply became increasingly important."
4. This collection (Draft Contract) contains at least ten other contracts with similar stipulations for oil exploration and pipeline construction in Tamaulipas, Veracruz, and Chiapas.
5. For the most recent biography on DeGolyer, see Houston F. Mount, II (2008).
6. Henderson notes that Félix Díaz, who had served his uncle as Chief of Police in Mexico City, resigned from the military in August 1912 and chose to attack Veracruz because that was where Porfirio had successfully launched his movement in 1876. Félix Díaz, however, did not have the support of the commanding Mexican naval officer at the Port of Veracruz as he believed; see also, Brown (1993, 204).

7. American business interests in Mexico were unable to convince newly elected President Woodrow Wilson to recognize Huerta's government. Wilson stood firmly in favor of constitutional democracy for Mexico, not some bloody dictator who was suspected in the assassination of Madero. Meanwhile, British interests, particularly Lord Cowdray, of the Pearson Trust who was an old friend of Porfirio Díaz, had bet upon Gen. Félix Díaz assuming power. Failing this outcome, the British government and other European countries recognized Huerta's presidency and pressured Wilson to follow suit. Without recognition from Wilson, however, Huerta was unable to secure loans in the United States as the Mexican economy continued to decline and the *peso* kept losing its value. Huerta turned to Europe and secured a loan worth 20 million British pounds sterling via the Bank of Paris of which Lord Cowdray contributed three percent. In 1913, Cowdray estimated total foreign debt and investment in Mexico around 230,400,000 pounds sterling with more than three-fourths of the loans coming from railway bonds, banks, oil, and mining companies. Despite these loans, Huerta sought to increase government revenue by doubling the stamp act and increasing the import tax by 50 percent, which he forced his "friends" in the foreign business community to pay; see also, Henderson (1984, 151-176).

8. U.S. participation in the Mexican oil industry rose from 39 percent of a total investment of $52,000,000 in 1911 to 61 percent of $820,000,000 ten years later. U.S. imports of Mexican oil also increased from 0.8 percent of U.S. domestic production in 1911 to 14 percent by 1919. Yearly Mexican domestic oil production increased from 3,634,080 barrels in 1910 to 157,068,678 in 1920, modest figures when compared to the initial Spindletop boom, which produced 18,000,000 barrels in its first year and comprised 20 percent of U.S. production in 1901. However, the boom in the United States played out as the oil companies looked harder at Mexico's fields; see Hall and Coerver (1984, 229-231).

9. First, oil allowed higher speeds and greater quickness in getting up to speed. Second, in terms of operation and manning of naval fleets, it allowed a greater radius of action while allowing refueling at sea, on calm waters, without occupying a quarter of a ship's manpower as in the case of coal. It also reduced the number of fire stokers, which Churchill argued avoided "weakening the fighting efficiency of the ship perhaps at the most critical moment in the battle" and making it possible for "every type of vessel to have more gun-power and more speed for less size or less cost" (Yergin 1991,153-156); see also Hall and Coerver (1984, 230).

10. Telegram, General Agapito Barranco, Chief of Sector 6, to Subsecretary of War with report from Lt. Genaro Pedroza, Chief of Detachment in Zuchilas, April 11, 1920, Coscomatepec, Veracruz, in Luis Muro and Berta Ulloa, *Guía del ramo revolución Mexicana, 1910-1920, del archivo histórico de la Defensa Nacional y otros repositorios del gabinete de manuscritos de la Biblioteca Nacional de México* (México, D.F.: El Colegio de México, 1997), p. 1014, entry no. 12,195, author's translation. There are five previous entries for battles where Constantino Galán was involved, according to these national defense records (entry nos. 9807; 9880; 9981; 12, 142; and 12,143); see also, Henderson (1981, 142).

11. Oral history, *tía* Rosa, Dr. Enríque M. Galán Dobal Family Papers.

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