Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity

Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity: Critical Cases

Edited by

Scott H. Boyd and Mary Ann Walter

CAMBRIDGE SCHOLARS PUBLISHING

Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity: Critical Cases,
Edited by Scott H. Boyd and Mary Ann Walter

This book first published 2012

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-4438-3910-8, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-3910-5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PREFACE

Several years ago, at a conference in Salzburg, Scott Boyd and Paul Reynolds decided to form the Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity Network in an attempt to bring academics as well as other intellectuals and thinkers together in an interactive community. This network currently has at least one physical meeting every year, but rather than being derived from a particular discipline or focused on a fragment of the whole, it is open to anyone of any rank who wants to participate and discuss the annual topic. The meeting is structured in such a way that participation means spending all day and all evening with the other attendees. Papers are not the focus of our meetings, though they are often the catalyst and occasionally the by-product of four days of discussions occurring at all times of the day and evening. We consider our gatherings an intense interdisciplinary academic immersion with an occasional happy hour to refresh the conversations.

This book is one of many projects to result from our discussions within the network during the last year. Most of the authors attended the annual meeting in 2011, and each responded to our call to contribute a book chapter based on their current research. We offer our thanks to each one of them for taking the time to contribute to what we hope will be the first of many publications to come out of the network. We would also like to thank all the participants, past and present, for their support of the Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity Network. We would also like to thank Paul Reynolds and John McSweeney for their time in reviewing various types of submissions and helping to organise our events and discussions, and Özlem Ezer Boyd and Ben Walter for their help and patience. Lastly, we would like to thank Middle East Technical University–Northern Cyprus Campus for their hospitality and on-going support of this project.

INTRODUCTION

SCOTT H. BOYD

Any book, whether theoretical or empirical, that purports to deal with difference and solidarity, is one that enters the discussion *in medias res*. For both the natural world and the world of human culture are caught in tensions of difference and unity that have continued unabated since before humanity developed the ability to reflect upon and record these tensions. But it is in the reflections, the broad archives and continuous productions of human culture, where humanity's fundamental gyre of contradiction is revealed: the awareness of our existence as individuals necessarily dependent upon or determined by other individuals for that existence. Perhaps such an obvious truism does not need restating, but it is important at the beginning of this book to acknowledge that the cases presented here offer no overall resolution to this contradiction, nor should they. What each author does is construct their own theoretical framework, derived from their own disciplinary and personal biases, within which to describe interactions between individuals and their communities. These biases, of course, include definitions and assumptions derived from assorted disciplinary precedents regarding culture, difference, and solidarity. More importantly, their works reveal, for our reflection, descriptions of processes of differences and solidarities within specific contexts, with each example acknowledging implicitly or explicitly the necessary paradoxical entanglement of the two.

One means of disentangling the paradox has been to move beyond essentialism, illusions of objectivity, and single paradigms. But we need to be ever cautious about emphasising difference and multiple paradigms as a means to overcome various forms of oppression or discrimination. A strategy of using difference to empower is a close relative of using difference to subjugate; by using difference as a means to unite in sameness and constructing solidarity against an "other." As Anselm Min writes, "we are indeed living in an age of difference, but what the age calls for, paradoxically, is not reification or absolutisation of difference but its sublation…into solidarity, not the solidarity of the same but the solidarity of the different" (Min 2005, 824). Not all the authors included in this

volume would agree, yet the purpose of this book and those yet to come on this issue, is to simultaneously call into question existing suppositions regarding our observations of this tension and bring to light both problems and solutions that are extant in the ongoing processes of negotiation between difference and solidarity.

Therefore, the research presented here should not be considered as evidence for a particular theoretical argument that will allow these cases to serve as points in an ongoing negotiation between competing socio-political or cultural theories regarding difference and solidarity. The works here stand on their own, but they do not stand alone. The chapters in this book are predominantly derived from extensive field work on the part of the authors, and the common denominator that unifies them in solidarity is place. The reader should consider taking them as interconnected moments representing individuals negotiating with perceptions of their personal, social, and political identity, and in some cases, the contrary, the political perceptions of the individuals and the cultural communities they construct. In some chapters it is the negotiation between immigrants and a local population already established (chapters 4 and 6); immigrants and negotiation of sacred places (chapters 1 and 2); immigrants and discovery of the sacred within the secular (chapter 3); political management of diversity in place (chapters 5 and 6); politics and the place of grief (chapter 7); or negotiation of cultural processes in contested place (chapters 8 and 9). These works have been chosen because they are points analysing continuous processes of socio-cultural and individual relations, people negotiating those systems, and what Bourdieu called the "ensemble of invisible relations" (1989, 16).

Somewhere performing in this "ensemble" are both solidarity and culture. Though the word "solidarity" is modified by the word "social" in the title of this book, it is not meant to be exclusionary of other types of solidarity. It simply is intended to acknowledge solidarities beyond the private sphere and intentionally decamp the term from the socio-economic theories within which it commonly resides. Instead the term has multiple uses in the chapters here that are interrelated with one another. Sally Scholz describes solidarity in her book *Political Solidarity* as describing some "form of unity that mediates between individuals and the community and entails positive moral duties" (Scholz 2008, 5). Even though Scholz uses the word "unity" here, as I have above, unity in relation to humans and human activity (culture) may occur by chance. Solidarity occurs by intent. As such it generally has embedded within it ethical components. These components more specifically occupy the next levels of solidarity, according to Scholz, including "social ontologies, moral relations, and

corresponding obligations" (Scholz 2008, 6). To account for occasions of a negative solidarity, Scholz considers a third level she calls "parasitic" solidarity, a type of solidarity which lacks the more "positive duties" of other solidarities (Scholz 2008, 6). Subsumed within these broad descriptors are additional definitions that derive historically from positivism and early social and economic theories, a soil in which the perennial blooms of definitions and debate are continuously nurtured.[1]

Culture, however, lacks the solidity and purpose of solidarity unless it is controlled or grounded, easily becoming an "amorphous, indescribable mist which swirls around society members" (Fine 1979, 733). The "package of largely unacknowledged assumptions, loosely held by a loosely outlined group of people," which describes cultures, may at first seem antithetical to the construction of difference, which requires intentional distinctions (Spivak, 2006, 359). But this is where our book finds itself, trapped between the perception of cultures as static and cultures as dynamic and evolving (Spivak 2006, 359)[2]. In either case, what is often overlooked is that difference is a product of distinction made by an observer or observers both recognised and unrecognised. The foundation of identity, leading to perceptions of difference or similarity and the construction of the other, unity, and solidarity are all descendants of the process of distinctions. Indeed, differences are perceived as a fundamental function of individual identification which encourages (autonomically or not) the continual process of distinctions and our observations and expressions of those distinctions. Distinctions and recognition balance the formation of identity of the individual and groups. In short, as participants and observers in culture, we are unified by the process of distinguishing, an awareness of which can lead to a solidarity derived from the construction of difference.[3]

---

1. For this book it is not necessary to undertake a discussion of the history of solidarity. However, for additional reference, Kurt Bayertz's book, *Solidarity* (1999), contains significant historical information regarding the term. My allusion to fertile ground was intended to bring to mind chapter VI of Auguste Comte's *A general view of positivism* (1972), and Emile Durkheim's *The division of labor in society* (1984). Of course, the preparation of our soil would not be complete without Richard Rorty's *Contingency, irony, and solidarity* (1989).

2. As Spivak writes, "Both disciplines study culture; the first [Anthropology] studies the culture of others as static and determining, the second [Cultural Studies] the culture of one's own group—as dynamic and evolving" (2006, 359). This is a brief summary of a winding path from Edward Tylor (1920) to Raymond Williams (1976) to Stuart Hall (1980).

3. For further information on distinctions and the epistemological and ontological implications, see René Descartes, *Principles of philosophy* 1:60 (1988); Spencer

What does this have to do with the research in this book? There are two common points that connect the works presented in this book. One of them is varying notions of place, and the other, obviously, is difference. While each author chooses to delve into concepts of identity or not in relation to the general issues of difference and solidarity that are presented in their research, what is intentionally left out is the fundamental issue of being that precedes the construction of individual and group identities. I am proposing that we consider the research and results of extensive fieldwork presented here as deriving from initial ontological acts of distinction that simultaneously unify us and link us in solidarity. For my point of view, I would hope that any notion of solidarity gleaned from the research here would be towards one of inclusiveness regarding both the role of community (the communitarian view point) and any kind of Kantian universal (the liberal viewpoint) culminating in multiple solidarities of difference.[4]

As indicated before, all nine chapters in the book have place, whether regarding immigration, migration, settlement, or disputed place, as one of the foundations of the examined situation. The first six chapters deal primarily with cultural difference and social solidarity in relation to immigration or migration. Beginning with Mary Ann Walter's *Babel in Church and Mosque: Community Construction in the Gulf States*, the focus is on examining the multilingual nature of society in the Gulf States via an analysis of the use of language in religious institutions. She concludes that partly due to the religious use of Arabic and linguistic nationalism, there is a "language accommodation asymmetry" regarding the Muslim and Christian institutions' willingness to adopt the use of immigrant languages in religious services.

David Stoop, in his chapter *"We or Sharia:" Anti-Muslim Racism and Right Wing Extremism in Germany*, looks at a contested issue regarding the perceptions of an immigrant and citizen population that has long simmered between one of integration, assimilation, and/or guest status. However, it is not the status, language, or origins that are the concern of Stoop's research, but rather the social disruption stirred up to various degrees by far right groups in Germany, with both foreigners and Islam as

---

Brown, *Laws of form* (1972); and more recently, Niklas Luhmann, *Theories of distinction* (2002).

4. Like the tensions between difference and solidarity, this discussion continues at varying intensities. There is no one place to start (though Immanuel Kant's *Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals* (2002) is certainly one of the richest places), but Daniel Bell's *Communitarianism and its critics* (1993) and John Rawls' *Political Liberalism* (1993) generally demonstrate the different positions.

the catalysts. Subsequently, Stoop discusses the extended layers of misinformation that is produced and how it contributes to the idea of ethnopluralism that allows far right groups of varying intensity to cooperate toward a common goal.

In a subtle reversal to Stoop's chapter, Glenda Ballantyne, in her chapter *Tradition and Transformation in Alevi Collective Identity in Australia*, examines how minorities within immigrant communities reconstruct cultural traditions. In this case, according to Ballantyne, the Alevi community in Australia have been attempting a revival of their communal traditions, yet have been criticised for inventing traditions that were previously suppressed or absent within the community. With regard to the politics of recognition she argues that "overreliance on the idea of the invention of tradition obscures important aspects of the revival."

Complicating place and issues of cultural difference and social solidarity even further, Agnieszka Bielewska in her chapter *From Diversity to Uniformity: The Different Forms of Polish Community in Manchester, UK*, demonstrates how "changes in place perception shifted the nature of migration experience and impacted the migrants' expectation toward their ethnic community." By examining and comparing World War Two immigrant Poles to Manchester with post-European ascension Polish immigrants to the same city, she reveals the impact that processes of globalisation have had on "place, space, mobility, and the nature of the migration phenomenon itself."

Martin Hicks shifts the focus from immigrants and their interactions with the systems they encounter during and after immigration to the legal systems put in place to promote cultural diversity. In his chapter, *The Challenge of Interculturalism: Insights on the Bouchard-Taylor Commission and Multiculturalism in Québec*, he examines the Canadian model of multiculturalism that many European nations have adopted and some critics now claim has failed. Noting that since the 1988 passage of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act, the province of Québec has been particularly dissatisfied with the outcome, Hicks analyses the results of the Bouchard-Taylor Commission appointed by the Québec government to examine "accommodation practises related to cultural differences." The results, published in 2008, recommended "interculturalism" as an alternative, which some European countries have since adopted. Hicks argues that, at best, interculturalism is a fine-tuning of Canadian multiculturalism and "does not offer a new solution to their problems in dealing with immigration and cultural diversity."

Staying within Canada and keeping to issues between citizens and the state, Alexia Bloch examines what understandings of citizenship travel

along with immigrants when they immigrate. In her chapter, *Multiculturalism, Meanings of Citizenship, and Post-Soviet Russian Speaking Immigrants in Vancouver, Canada*, Bloch examines the post-Soviet and late Soviet immigrants' conceptions of the citizens' relationship to the state and their expectations and understanding of citizenship and multiculturalism in Canada. According to Bloch, though there is a perception of a Russian language-based community in Vancouver, there are rather multiple communities. She concludes that "in spite of claims to the contrary, shared origins, a common language, and common cultural practises may be insufficient to lead to mobilisation as a new immigrant group."

The last three chapters of the book deal with issues within the Republic of Turkey. These chapters were included to provide a specific focus on issues within a country that sits on the border of the European Union and is increasingly active in global political and economic affairs. Like most other nations which promote a single national identity, but are made up of different ethnic or religious groups (even if they no longer self-identify this way), Turkey has lingering internal tensions regarding armed conflict, displacement of peoples, migration, and shifts in borders.

The chapter by Burçu Şentürk, entitled *Invisibility of Common Sorrow: Families of Deceased Combatants in Turkey's Kurdish Conflict*, is a particular poignant analysis of reactions and interpretations of families to the death of a loved one in armed conflict. Şentürk's research is based on interviews with families on both sides of the conflict who have lost combatants in the decades-old uprising. The relationship of the families to the state, religion, and social-cultural expectations provides the frame for a comparison of concepts such as martyrdom in relation to Islam and the state.

Eylem Özdemir's chapter, *The Transformation of Cultural Diversity Into Divided Urban Communities in the Case of Mersin, Turkey*, focuses on the multiple sectarian and ethnic cultural identities in the Turkish Mediterranean city of Mersin. Özdemir questions and articulates cultural difference within the context of a modern city by predominantly focusing on the Kurdish families who have been migrating to the city from the conflict zones of southeastern Turkey over the last several decades. Özdemir analyses the processes of ethnic identification and the relationship between the ethnic groups and the political systems of city and regional government. This includes interviews with both the perceived majority and minority groups as well as representatives from civil government and non-governmental organisations.

The book ends with an example of what Seçil Dağtaş refers to as the survival of cultural plurality in the city of Antakya, Turkey. In her chapter,

Tolerated Identities: Secularism, Religious Pluralism, and Nationalism in the City of Antakya, Turkey, Dağtaş uses the specific case of the Antakya Choir of Civilizations in an analysis of how "plurality is incorporated into symbolic representations of 'religious difference.'" Because of Antakya's position as a historical cross-road for different ethnic and religious peoples, as well as languages, the formation and continuation of a group dedicated to preserving and performing music significant to those who make up that plurality, is an example of intentional solidarity formed from cultural difference. It is significant that the people of a city forever caught in the crossfire of conflict, from the passage of Alexander to its independence from Syria in 1937, can come together through music, both sacred and secular, in agreement and respect for each other's musical expressions. This last chapter may come very close to representing what Anselm Min referred to inclusively as "the solidarity of others" (Min 2005, 847).

References

Bayertz, Kurt. 1999. *Solidarity*. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

Bell, Daniel. 1993. *Communitarianism and its critics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Bourdieu, Pierre. 1989. Social space and symbolic power." *Sociological Theory* 7(1):14-25.

Comte, Auguste. 1972; 1865. *A general view of positivism*. A selection from brown reprints in sociology. Dubuque, Iowa: Brown Reprints.

Descartes, René, and Blair Reynolds. 1988. *Principles of philosophy*. Studies in the history of philosophy. Vol. 6. Lewiston, NY: E. Mellen Press.

Durkheim, Emile, and W. D. Halls. 1984. *The division of labor in society*. New York: Free Press.

Hall, Stuart. 1980. *Culture, media, language: Working papers in cultural studies, 1972-79*. London; Birmingham, West Midlands: Hutchinson; Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies, University of Birmingham.

Hall, Stuart, and Paul Du Gay. 1996. *Questions of cultural identity*. London: Sage.

Kant, Immanuel, Thomas E. Hill, and Arnulf Zweig. 2002. *Groundwork for the metaphysics of morals*. Oxford philosophical texts. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Luhmann, Niklas, and William Rasch. 2002. *Theories of distinction: Redescribing the descriptions of modernity*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Min, Anselm K. 2005. From difference to the solidarity of others: Sublating postmodernism." *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 31 (7) (11/01): 823-49.

Rawls, John. 2005. *Political liberalism.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Rorty, Richard. 1989. *Contingency, irony, and solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Scholz, Sally J. 2008. *Political solidarity*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

Spencer-Brown, G. 1972, 1969. *Laws of form.* New York: Julian Press.

Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 2006. Culture alive. *Theory, Culture & Society* 23 (2) (Mar): 359-260.

Tylor, Edward B., and Harry Houdini Collection. 1920. *Primitive culture : Researches into the development of mythology, philosophy, religion, language, art, and custom.* New York: John Murray; G.P. Putnam's Sons.

Williams, Raymond. 1976. *Keywords: A vocabulary of culture and society*. London: Fontana.

CHAPTER ONE

BABEL IN CHURCH AND MOSQUE: COMMUNITY CONSTRUCTION IN THE GULF STATES

MARY ANN WALTER

The smaller Arab Gulf states–Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Kuwait–are uniquely linguistically diverse societies, with the highest percentages of migrant residents in the world. Qatar is at the top of the list, with 86.5 percent of its resident population made up of international migrants, according to the Migration Policy Institute (2010). It is followed by the United Arab Emirates at 70 percent, and Kuwait close behind at 68.8 percent. Bahrain's population having barely reached one million, the cut-off for inclusion in this report, its place in the list is not reported. However, other sources give an international migrant presence of roughly 50 percent (Arabianbusiness 2010), a precipitous jump downwards which would still place it at number four in the list.

This wave of migration exploded in the post-war period, along with the exploitation of oil resources. By 1970, resident non-nationals were equal to the number of citizens, and by the end of the decade, more than doubled them (Cordesman 1997). At first, the group was dominated by migrants from other Arab countries. However, non-Arab Asians (with lower salaries) soon began to predominate numerically, accounting for approximately 75 percent of migrants in Qatar (Winckler 2000). Franklin (1985) mentions Indians as the largest migrant group in Bahrain, with additional substantial communities of Koreans, Thai, and Filipinos. Migrant work permits in Abu Dhabi in 1980 were issued to citizens of India (20 percent) and Pakistan (17 percent) in greatest numbers, trailed by other Asian countries (Choucri 1986). Indonesian migration is substantial, and nearly a quarter of Sri Lankan women had worked abroad in the Middle East by 1997 (Gamburd 2000, Sabban 2002). More recently, the

African presence is on the rise, particularly from Ethiopia (Sabban 2002, Terrazas 2007) and Nigeria (Adepoju 2004).

The overwhelming predominance of non-citizens in these countries is a politically sensitive matter–so much so that the demographic information on which these percentages are based is not always reliable, and the percentages may actually be even higher (Winckler 2005). Authorities have responded to the perceived threat posed by migrants to native Gulf Arab national identities in a number of ways. Citizenship is exceedingly rarely granted. By 1997 in the United Arab Emirates, only 8 percent of citizens were naturalised migrants, and even stricter limits on naturalisation were introduced thereafter (Kapiszewski 2001). Other countries' policies are even stricter, for example Kuwait's, which a decade ago accepted only 50 new citizens a year, with naturalisation limited to wives of male citizens, and only after a probationary period of at least 10 years, loss of original citizenship, and revocation in the case of divorce (female citizens lose their own citizenship status if married to non-citizens).

Housing of nationals and non-nationals is quasi- or officially segregated (see Al-Ostad 1986 for a detailed look at Kuwait), and certain types of workers are accommodated in dedicated settlements, for example construction workers in barracks near work sites. These tend to be divided along ethnolinguistic lines in a fashion reminiscent of the *langue* divisions of crusading knights' orders. Thus instead of the linguistically-based divisions of the Knights Hospitallers into Provence, Auvergne, France, Italy, Aragon, England, and German–groupings which determined administrative units and also defensive, residential, and dining arrangements–Eelens and Speckmann (1990) report of a Saudi hospital that separate canteens existed for Indian, Korean, Sri Lankan, Filipino, and European/American employee groups. Labour camps such as Sonapur outside Dubai house up to fifty thousand co-national workers, and are named accordingly with words from the different national languages. Such arrangements are facilitated by large-scale contracts with particular international companies who import their labour force as a whole.

However, despite what some residents may have wished, such segregation between nationals and non-nationals has never been complete, and never can be as long as household servants remain widely employed and housed within the private homes of Gulf nationals. A citizen's household without a resident maid is extremely rare (already only 38 percent of Kuwaiti households by 1987, according to Gamburd 2000), and quite often the residence also employs a chauffeur, gardener, nanny, and additional maid(s).

Such household employees are not only in close contact with Gulf citizens, they are largely isolated from other migrants or access to alternative social networks. Trade unions are prohibited in the Emirates, Qatar, and Bahrain–all the smaller Gulf states except Kuwait, which allows them but places stringent restrictions on participation by non-nationals. Other forms of association are also restricted. Kapiszewski (2001) writes that, "for nationals, any expatriate non-contractual ties with the country are obviously unwelcome." Also unwelcome are ties between migrants which might lead to protests or labour unrest.

These general restrictions on association are buttressed by restrictions on movement placed by the employing families. Foreign maids report close control by employers, typically couched in paternalistic terms as necessary for the protection of their dependents and their virtue. Opportunities for socialising are limited in part by long working hours, with days scheduled from 6 am to 11 pm, and no days off provided (Gamburd 2000, Sabban 2002). Household employees are frequently forbidden to leave the house unsupervised (Gamburd 2000, Shah and Menon 1999, Sabban 2002). One-third of Gamburd's research subjects reported never being allowed to leave the house at all, supervised or not, and that telephone use also is forbidden, at least for communication with other co-nationals (2000). Eelens and Speckmann (1990) report encountering employment contracts stipulating that asking permission to go out is forbidden, even for the common exception of church attendance.

Approved outings for maids include doing the grocery shopping, taking household children to parks, school, and medical appointments, and taking out the garbage (Sabban 2002). Gamburd (2000) also mentions garbage disposal as a highlight of a maid's day, a rare chance to converse with maids in neighbouring houses, and the timing of which is purposely coordinated in order to afford such chances.

Workers' isolation is of course compounded by the language barrier between the maids and their employers, with language adjustment uniformly identified as a major difficulty in working in the Emirates in Sabban's (2002) survey of domestic workers. Overall, Sabban writes, the dominant feature of the environment for domestics is isolation: physically, psychologically, socially/culturally, "and in all aspects of human existence." Attending religious services, therefore, is an escape hatch for many migrant residents in these countries–almost the only outing allowed them, and non-income dependent. Migrants therefore have a strong incentive to form and maintain such communities, so that the array of religious groups reflects the composition of the Gulf's cosmopolitan migrant communities.

This empirical study examines the multilingual nature of these societies, through the lens of their religious institutions. Such an approach offers, 1) a quantitative method of estimating the presence of linguistic and ethnic groups, which is otherwise difficult to determine due to the political sensitivity and restricted distribution of reliable demographic information, 2) a look at how religion supports and sanctions linguistic community formation in the Gulf, and, 3) a look at how language mediates migrants' experience of religion.

I conclude that Muslim and Christian (primarily Catholic) groups display a *language accommodation asymmetry*, in which Muslim institutions are far less willing to accommodate migrant languages, due partly to the religious role of Arabic and partly to local linguistic nationalism. Within the Christian context, a consistent prestige hierarchy of language use is shared throughout the Gulf states.

Mosques

Official labour policy in the Gulf countries favours Muslims. This preference is likely to be motivated at least in part by an assumption that Muslims may have some previous exposure to the Arabic language. In any case, Muslims are sought after to the extent that widespread passport forgery exists on the part of aspiring workers, with the substitution of identifiably Muslim names (Gamburd 2000, Terrazas 2007). Muslim women pay recruiting agencies less for job placement, given the higher demand for them; on the other hand, employers pay nearly double prices to the agencies for such women (Gamburd 2000).

Cordesman (1997) writes that 95 percent of migrant workers in Qatar are Muslim, with the ethnic distribution of 40 percent Arab, 18 percent Pakistani, 18 percent Indian, 10 percent Iranian, and 14 percent other. He cites CIA estimates that in the United Arab Emirates, South Asian and "other" migrants outnumber those from other Arab states by more than two to one, and are also 96 percent Muslim. However, these estimates are bound to overstate the percentages of Muslim migrants, given inflation from false claims of Muslim status by some migrants. The U.S. State Department's 2008 report on religious freedom cites a figure of at least 9 percent Christian resident population in the Emirates.

In spite of the presence of Muslim migrants, however, ties between mosques and migrants appear relatively weak. Rather than accommodating to migrant languages, most mosques offer lessons in Arabic instead, befitting its status as a sacred language. These lessons focus on archaic, Qur'anic Arabic, which is of little use in day-to-day contexts in the Gulf.

These language courses are also sometimes conducted in the medium of English, rather than major migrant languages, thus making them even less accessible–for example, those offered by the Dubai Islamic Information Centre.

This centre stands out regardless among mosques and Muslim centres with respect to multilingualism; it employs preachers in Chinese, Russian, Urdu, Malayalam, and Tagalog. In contrast, the Fanar Qatar Islamic Cultural Centre also offers free (Qur'anic) Arabic lessons–but only a single weekly sermon [*khutba*] that is not in Arabic (an English one). A bilingual Arabic/English email inquiry by the author regarding language issues elicited only an automated reply–*in English*–the single phrase "Hi with Fanar!"

Elsewhere in Qatar, Muslim communities using languages other than English are similarly hard to find. A major resource for finding them around the world is the website www.islamicfinder.org. This site lists fourteen mosques for Qatar. Of these, only one–the Masjid Markaz Abu Hurairah–seems to be multilingual to any extent. It hosts gatherings in English, Urdu, and Tamil, in addition to Arabic. This clearly corresponds to the large labour groups coming from Pakistan (Urdu) and southern India and Sri Lanka (Tamil). The Qatar Indian Islahi Center, an association of Malayalam-speaking Keralan Indians, presumably also uses Malayalam extensively, though its website is solely in English.

The islamicfinder.org listings of mosques in the United Arab Emirates are much more extensive, containing eighty-six entries. As seen for other mosques and centers, English predominates in their web presence (admittedly on an international and English-dominant website)–only one listed its information solely in Arabic. Of the eighty-six mosques, fifteen include some Urdu language offerings (17 percent). The typical offering is a once-weekly religious lesson, on some day other than Friday, the main Muslim holy day of the week. Several of these lessons are led by the same man, who visits the different mosques on different days of the week. Only one mosque offers Urdu language occasions more than this (Abu Hanifa Al-Noaman Mosque, in Ajman).

As for resources in languages other than Urdu, only two places provide them. First, the Hor al Anz mosque in Dubai offers a weekly lesson and sermon translation into Malayalam as well as Urdu. Second, Al Huda, in Sharjah, provides written and cassette materials in English, Hindi, Malayalam, and Bengali as well as Urdu. However, there are additional organisations based in the Emirates which employ Malayalam, at least: the Kerala Islahi Centre, the Indian Islahi Center, the Indian Islamic Centre, and the Indian Muslim Association.

Insofar as additional non-Arabic languages are used in Gulf mosques, then, Urdu predominates. It is followed by Malayalam, and isolated offerings in Tamil–both Dravidian languages, spoken primarily in the two southernmost Indian states of Kerala and Tamil Nadu, as well as the Sri Lankan homeland of many migrants. These findings parallel the nationality-based statistics available from other sources, but in a more fine-grained way. Specifically, the role of Malayalam (and Tamil to a lesser extent) demonstrates that within highly multilingual India, more migrants are coming from the southern region.

In sum, mosques predictably function primarily in Arabic. However, English is used as the main language of public relations, for both national and non-Arab Muslim community groups. The Arabic courses they offer are patronised mostly by culturally curious Western expatriates, rather than non-Arab Muslims or likely converts. Language accommodation is minimal. A weekly lesson and perhaps sermon in Urdu is the extent of it, even in the largest mosques. Mosques catering specifically to non-Arab language groups do not seem to exist, or at least are not easily identifiable. Languages other than Urdu are hardly involved, though Muslim community organisations using Malayalam are active.

Churches

In the approach to one of the Gulf's few churches, the atmosphere is more festive than reflective. Visitors, mostly women, throng around the outside, spilling into the streets. They sit in small social groups, styling each other's hair and enjoying each other's company. Some have brought snacks and tea to share–some are selling them, or other small trinkets. It's clear that most intend to stay all day, or as much of it as possible, and that it's a wonderful time. A day's worth of Sunday services attracts thousands.

Clergy on occasion express frustration at this "loitering," and the clearly social rather than spiritual motivation for church attendance (Eelens and Speckmann 1990, Longva 1999). However, participants have good reason to make the most of the opportunity to break the barriers of isolation otherwise imposed on them, and the effect produces large and active congregations.

The oldest and largest of the Gulf Christian congregations is Kuwait City's Catholic Holy Family Cathedral, with a congregation estimated at fifty to sixty thousand. According to their website, a resident priest for Kuwait first arrived in 1948, joined by a second in 1951, and the current building was completed in 1957, with funds from the Kuwait Oil Company, and permission from the Kuwaiti government. Its establishment

is commemorated by plaques on the building in both English and Arabic. Its long-serving Bishop Micallef, at the cathedral until 2005, was Maltese and fluent in Italian and English as well as Arabic. The current bishop is also Italian and fluent in Arabic, having published articles in the language, as well as in English (Kuwait City's Catholic Holy Family Cathedral).

The congregation's size is indicated by the number of Masses offered, which totals twelve on Fridays (the weekly holiday) and ten on Sundays. Mass offerings are heavily dominated by English, which accounts for twenty-four services each week–twelve on the weekend (Friday-Sunday) and three daily on the other four days of the week.

The national language, Arabic, is used for four services each week. These cater to Coptic Christians from Egypt, Maronite Christians from the Levant, primarily Lebanon, and Latin (Roman Catholic) Christians of the Middle East, respectively, with the fourth Arabic service not specifically designated for any of these groups. The number of Arabic-language services decreased by one (from five) as of spring 2010.

The next most frequent service language is Malayalam, which accounts for three weekly Masses. These too cater to different confessions–Latin, Syro-Malabar, and Malankara Christianity, respectively. Tamil is used for two services weekly–an increase from only one, as of spring 2010. Like Tamil, Konkani is used for two services each week. Konkani is spoken along the western coast of India, and as an Indo-Aryan language is unrelated to either Malayalam or Tamil.

Languages used once-weekly in church services include Tagalog, the major language of the Philippines; Sinhalese, the Indo-Aryan language of Sri Lanka; and Bengali, another Indo-Aryan language spoken in Bangladesh and India. Bengali is another new addition as of spring 2010, as are French and Italian, also offered once-weekly. Korean was introduced on a twice-monthly basis at the same time; on the other hand, Polish, once used on an occasional basis, is no longer mentioned.

Figure 1-1 shows the distribution of languages used each month in a pie chart. Languages listed in the key proceed clockwise from the top around the chart.

The language hierarchy appears not only in the number of services, but in their timing. Thus on Friday, the main day for church services at the cathedral, English occupies three of the four prime slots in the morning. Arabic, the second most common language, fills the fourth. Friday afternoon and evening are filled with the assorted other Asian languages, with one recurrence each for English and Arabic, at the end. Saturdays are essentially European days, with lots of English plus the French and Italian services.



Figure 1-1 Monthly language use in Holy Family Cathedral services, Kuwait City.

In some ways, the picture is rather similar to the language distribution used in mosques. In both sets of religious institutions, English and Arabic top the list of languages used (though with a reversal of their prominence). Urdu, a language used primarily in Muslim Pakistan, is of course missing from church schedules. However, the next most common languages are Malayalam and Tamil, for both types of institution. The main difference is that unlike mosques, churches also accommodate a long list of other, relatively minor languages.

The list of church service languages also parallels the list of common migrant languages given by Sabban (2002), which reads: (Hindi), Malayalam, Konkani, (Punjabi), (Urdu), Bengali, Sinhala, Tamil, (Farsi), Tagalog. Languages in parentheses are used mainly by non-Christian populations and therefore are unsurprisingly absent from the church set. However, the others are all attested, and in the same order of use.

Kuwait is the home of three other parish communities in addition to the cathedral. Their services employ a similar spectrum of languages. The parish at Ahmadi is even more anglocentric, being the oil business center. Its weekly offerings include fourteen English Masses (74 percent), two in Malayalam, and one each in Arabic, Konkani and Tagalog. Salmiya parish

likewise offers eighteen weekly Masses in English (78 percent), plus two in Malayalam, and one each in Konkani, Tamil, and Tagalog. In the newest parish, however, Jleeb al-Shuyoukh, Malayalam services outnumber English (ten versus seven per week), with Tagalog and Konkani each used for one per week.

Catechism classes are offered in English (three groups), Arabic (one group), and French (one group). This subset makes it clear which linguistic groups are most able to have accompanying dependents in the Gulf with them. Group baptisms are slightly more diverse, being offered in English, Malayalam and Konkani. Filipinos are offered a dedicated pre-baptism class (presumably held in Tagalog) but are expected to participate in the English baptisms.

Mass offerings and sacramental ceremonies are partly constrained by the linguistic abilities of the clergy. Parishioner-organised prayer groups, however, are subject to no such constraints. Prayer groups exist for all of the language groups named so far. Several are composed solely of Filipinos. Here, too, Africa makes its first appearance. The African Catholic Community of Kuwait conducts its meetings in English.

As for elsewhere in the Gulf, the largest Christian community in Qatar is centered in the Catholic Church of Our Lady of the Rosary (http://www.rosarychurchqatar.com). Maintaining a continuous presence since 1970, its current building dates only from 2008, and had fifteen thousand in attendance at its first Mass. The church estimates that 90 percent of its congregation comes from India. Its clergy are also primarily from India–eight out of ten, with one Filipino and one Lebanese also in residence. Its services are linguistically distributed as shown in figure 1-2.

Compared to the Kuwait data, Tamil and Konkani slip slightly, while Tagalog gains. Bengali and Korean are missing in Qatar, while Urdu and Spanish are added. However, the overall picture is remarkably similar. The top three languages are the same–English, Arabic, and Malayalam, in that order. English far and away leads the pack, accounting for roughly two-thirds of Masses in both countries. The other languages consist of a diverse set of Asian languages–mostly the same across countries–with a small set of other European languages rounding things out. These have a presence disproportionate to their numbers, given the greater wealth of the European expatriate community.

The church's parish council also specifically designates representatives for the following communities: Konkani (2), Malayalam, Filipino, Sri Lankan, Tamil, Urdu, Indonesian, Arabic, African, Korean, Italian, French, and Spanish.



Figure 1-2 Weekly language use in Church of the Holy Rosary services, Doha, Qatar.

Bahrain's Sacred Heart Church (Catholic) also offers primarily English-language Masses. Filipino (Tagalog) and Konkani are used twice weekly, and Arabic, Malayalam, Tamil, French, and Italian/Spanish once each. In contrast to Kuwait and Qatar, then, Arabic and Malayalam have moved down the list in favour of Tagalog and Konkani. Sacred Heart's list of community organisations and prayer groups includes ones specific to the Filipino, Konkani, Bengali, Tamil, Urdu, and Sri Lankan communities.

The United Arab Emirates hosts a larger number of Catholic churches, each full to capacity. (At least 33 Christian churches are known to exist in the country, including other denominations, according to the U.S. State Department's 2008 report on religious freedom). Saint Joseph's Catholic Church in Dubai estimates its congregation at 100,000, while a worshipper at Saint Mary's Catholic Church in Dubai reports standing room only at a church with a capacity of 1,700, and estimates the attendance at 2,500. These churches show a similar pattern of language use to those seen so far, with English in the lead, the same list of Asian languages in use, and typically a catch-all African English-language group.

Protestant churches are scarcer on the Gulf ground in general. Most consist of at most a few hundred members, versus the thousands found in

Catholic churches. These congregations often meet in private homes or rented rooms, rather than dedicated buildings. One exception is an evangelical church building in Abu Dhabi, which is home to twenty-one different congregations. However, its opening celebration attracted only 2,500 attendees.

The Protestant churches are dominated by (North) Americans, employ English almost exclusively (though the Mormon church has a Filipino contingent offering catechism in Tagalog; Bushman 2009). Meeting times and places are difficult to discover except through personal contact with church members. For example, the Gateway International Church in Dubai, though it does maintain a public webpage, says only to send an email in order to be told service locations and times.

As for non-Christian groups, two Hindu temples exist in Bahrain, but are the only ones in the Gulf. Dubai is home to two temples shared by Sikhs and Hindus, and a request for a Buddhist temple is pending (U.S. State Department 2008).

To sum up, despite the temptation of "playing Muslim" for better job opportunities, as well as some difficulty of access for domestic workers, (Catholic) churches are besieged by worshippers in the Gulf. The churches share a highly diverse set of languages in a patterned hierarchy. English tops this hierarchy in terms of both number of services, and the prestige and convenience of their timing slots.

It is important to note that the English services do not cater solely to native English speakers, or congregants from Anglophone countries–far from it. In the crowds of worshippers to be seen both inside and outside of churches, English is scarcely heard except from the clergy. One worshipper, who visited Saint Mary's Catholic church in Dubai in 2007, attended an English-language service and estimated an attendance of about 2,500 (for a church officially seating 1,700). In her estimation, the congregation was 60 percent Indian, 35 percent Filipino, and 5 percent "other." As a white woman in the company of a Lebanese woman friend, she claimed to be stared at and made to feel unwelcome by the other attendees (Anonymous, 2007).

Why so much English, when so few of either the congregation or clergy are native English speakers? Its status as an international language of both communication and prestige makes itself felt here. English is a language of authority, and church representatives are able to claim authority for themselves when and by using it.

In addition, it seems to be a case of "the more languages, the more English" (de Swaan 2001). Even with their international assortment of clergy, the churches cannot hope to meet the demand of every linguistic

community. English is employed as a maximiser, just as it is in the African prayer groups, which also use English as their group language. Longva (1999) notes that the use of English as a common language intensified in the Gulf along with its "Asianisation." This process can only be expected to continue as the migrant population becomes even more diverse.

English as a commonly comprehended language cannot be the whole story, however, given the diversity of English-service attendees observed both by the author and the anonymous worshipper. Firstly, it testifies to the fact that the service itself (and its language) is less important to attendees than the chance to go–to escape the isolation of their home lives.

Secondly, English appears to be a draw all on its own. This points again to its prestige, and the fact that access to English is an independent motivator for both Gulf work and church attendance. Along similar lines, Gamburd (2000) reports that the basic one-week pre-departure training given to Sri Lankan domestic workers includes basic language training in English as well as Arabic. Most ethnolinguistic community schools also use English as a medium of instruction, regardless of the community's native language.

As for other languages, Arabic and Malayalam consistently top the list. Other languages consistently used are Tagalog, Konkani, Tamil, Sinhala, and Bengali. The last four enable a more fine-grained characterisation of the Indian migrant community's origins. Korean is an additional Asian language occasionally employed. Finally, a smattering of Romance languages appears in the largest congregations.

The Language Accommodation Asymmetry

Muslim and (Catholic) Christian communities differ in their doctrinal stance on liturgical language choice as well as in their accommodation of multilingualism. I argue that the former explains the latter, with additional input from Gulf nationals' nationalist feelings.

The Second Vatican Council of the Catholic Church concluded in 1965–coincidentally, a time closely aligned with the establishment and growth of the Church in the Gulf. One of the many major changes wrought by the Council was the abolition of Latin as the liturgical language of the Church. Latin may still be used in Tridentine Masses, but is no longer obligatory. Instead, use of any language in liturgy is permissible. (Some groups still do use other traditional liturgical languages, such as Syriac by Levantine Maronite Christians, who are recognised by the Catholic church. Members of these groups typically attend Arabic-language Catholic services, with perhaps the inclusion of some Syriac liturgy). Most

Catholics today take this flexibility for granted, and have never experienced a Latin Mass.

This stance toward liturgy is a major difference from Islam, in which the Arabic language has special and sacred status. As the language in which the Qur'an was revealed, Arabic has been chosen above all other languages for Muslims. The Arabic of the Qur'an is ineffable and untranslatable: translations are not considered still to be Qur'ans themselves. It is the language of the Prophet Muhammad, the international Muslim community, and paradise. One hadith exhorts Muslims to "love the Arabs for three reasons: because I am an Arab, because the Qur'an is in Arabic and because the inhabitants of Paradise speak Arabic." (Hadiths are stories about the words and actions of the Prophet, authenticated by transmission histories to the extent possible, and usable as part of the basis for juridical decisions in Islamic law. This one is not authoritatively authenticated, but nonetheless widespread). The Muslim profession of faith, prayers, and call to prayer are all performed in Arabic and only Arabic.

This difference between (Catholic) Christianity and Islam motivates the two major differences between their religious and linguistic practices observed in this article. The first difference concerns the use of English. Both mosques and churches in the Gulf use English heavily. However, mosques' use of English is almost only external–used for outreach to potential converts, language education, and general public relations such as website materials. Internal use of English goes only so far as an English-language sermon at most once a week in some mosques, and its instrumental use in Arabic-language education for foreigners. This speaks to the profile of convert that is wanted, if any–ones who already command English, and presumably, the economic and political power assumed to be associated with it.

Use of English by mosques also lays claim to universality and authority in a way that Arabic use in this day and age may not, despite Islam's own claims to universality for itself and the Arabic language. Thus English use is an important component of Muslim self-presentation in the Gulf, which for better or worse is already in so many ways English-dominated. Kapiszewski (2001) quotes Abdullah Mograby, head of the Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, that "it is becoming virtually difficult or rather painful for a UAE national to obtain basic services or attend to basic daily needs if he or she cannot speak English….Promotion of a bilingual society is dangerous and runs against the national interests and security of the UAE." This quotation highlights the ambivalence toward English felt by Gulf nationals, as well as its

prevalence (though Hindi and Urdu are also mentioned in the full quotation). Similar sentiments are frequently expressed in local newspapers. In a recent example, Hundley (2010; himself an expatriate) refers to Arabic as being in danger from both English and from a mixed English/Arabic/Asian language. The creole currently developing in the Gulf has itself been the object of linguistic study (Smart 1990).

In sum, although the use of English in the Gulf is highly charged, it continues in the Muslim religious domain as elsewhere, both as a practical matter and as a means to assert universality and authority. However, its use is mostly limited to external self-presentation. Insiders in the Muslim community must be prepared for an Arabic-only environment, by and large. This is unsurprising, given the language's special status in Islam. Churches, on the other hand, use English internally fully as much as externally. Prayer service offerings not only include but are over half composed of English. Without a religious imperative regarding use of a specific language, English is tolerated and even demanded by members of the congregation.

Due to its utility and status, then, English is tolerated in mosques and churches both. In mosques, for migrant languages other than English, only Urdu receives some accommodation, and to nothing like the same extent. This cannot be because Muslim migrants with other languages are lacking, given the existence of non-mosque-affiliated Malayalam Muslim organisations, and the presence of other large Muslim groups such as Indonesians, Nigerians, Sri Lankans, and so on. Rather, it must be that only Urdu speakers are so overwhelmingly represented as to absolutely require accommodation. Thus while Muslim (citizens') preference for Arabic usage in mosques is strong, it can be overcome in the case of these two languages. Why not a linguistic free-for-all, then?

I argue that the lack of other languages' use in mosques stems not only from a religious preference, but also from the nationalist feelings of Gulf citizens. The experience of other languages replacing Arabic in the homeland of both them and of Islam is, or would be, a powerfully affecting one. This is especially true for a population that already feels under siege from migrants (Longva 1999) and is attempting to cope with that by both legislative and cultural means. The feeling of native culture in danger of slipping away is apparent in newspaper rhetoric and in the formation of invented traditions such as camel racing (Khalaf 2000; though even its performance relies on migrant jockeys). How much more so when the use of the Prophet's language in the Arabian Peninsula itself is infringed upon?