

Turkey–EU Relations

Turkey–EU Relations:
Power, Politics and the Future

Edited by

Kenan Aksu

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For Aylin and Seyhun İdil Aksu

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Map of Turkey and Europe (from Wikimedia Commons)

INTRODUCTION

A HISTORICAL BACKGROUND TO TURKEY-EUROPE RELATIONS

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Introduction

This book aims to focus on the current state of the European Union (EU)-Turkey relations and the impact of these relations on both the EU and Turkey. Therefore, it is crucially important to understand the background of Turkish-European relations before moving on to Turkey-EU relations of the present day. This chapter will outline the history of Turkey-Europe relations.

Turkey's intention to be a European country dates back many centuries. At first, the Turkish Europeanisation process was introduced in order to stop the Ottoman Empire's rapid decline. Since the initial attempts made by the Ottomans, Turkey's "Europeanness" has been debated amongst the European elites and especially the leaders. Today, the Christian Democratic end of the European political spectrum continues to query the validity of Turkey's claim to be European, an outlook that could yet derail Ankara's bid for EU membership (W. H. Park 2005, 131). Clearly, it is still a major question as yet to be answered by members of the European Union, since Turkey is pushing for full membership into the European Union (though note that as of 2012 Turkey has lessened its efforts).

The debate concerning Turkey's EU membership, as Akcapar writes "may recall the characterisation of the Schleswig-Holstein question in the Nineteenth Century by British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston. When asked what Palmerston thought of that problem, the cunning politician responded that there were only three people who ever understood it: One was dead, the second one was in the lunatic asylum, and he himself was

the third person, but had forgotten it” (Akcapar 2007, 11). If you asked any European citizens, most of them would not even remember the Schleswig-Holstein question, and perhaps most would not even think that once it caused such a big problem in Europe. Looking from this perspective one can argue that one day Turkey’s EU membership will be remembered in much the same light as the Schleswig-Holstein question. Many supporters and opponents of the argument have already passed away, and we entered a new era, in terms of Turkey-EU relations, during the new millennium. However, we cannot understand the current public stance in Europe towards Turkey without seeing the underlying historical reasons.

According to the Turkish historiography, the Turks of Anatolia came from the same roots as the European Huns: from the northern and northwestern borders of China. Therefore, the Turks who celebrated Attila the Hun (AD 406–53) as a national hero came to Europe during the Fourth and the Fifth centuries AD, with the departure of the Huns from Central Asia due to a great draught which pushed almost all Turkic tribes away from their *yurts*.

Their prominent leader Attila made his name after devastating attacks on European tribes during the first half of the Fifth Century. His motive was not in any way religious. He wanted to reach the end of the world and rule everyone who lived in it. His horsemen terrorised Central Europe as well as some parts of Western Europe, including France. First, Germanic, Alan and Frank tribes were defeated. Then he pushed many other European tribes into their current locations, attacks which shaped the modern European map. His damage was so great that he is known in Western history and tradition as the “*grim flagellum dei*,” or “the scourge of God.” Many novels, poems, paintings and epics in Europe were inspired by Hunnic, and therefore Turkic, influence, such as Raphael’s painting in the Vatican “The Meeting Between Leo the Great and Attila,” Nibelungen of Germany, where Attila is recorded as Etzel (Kafesoglu 1995, 74–80).

As noted by the infamous Byzantium historian Priskos, after the Huns, other Turkic tribes, such as the Sabars, Hazars (it is perhaps interesting to note that this was the only Turkish tribe to accept Judaism as their religion; and as a result many nationalist Turks consider the Holocaust the destruction of the Turkic Jews in Europe), Kypchacs, Kumans, Pechenegs, and Bulgars, settled around Eastern Europe and the Balkans. They later integrated with the indigenous populations of Europe (Ahmetbeyoglu 1995, 10–72; Kafesoglu 130–195).

Apart from the ethnic mixture between Europeans and the Turks over many centuries, the Turkish language, being part of the Uralic-Altaic

language family, shares the same roots with the current Finnish and Hungarian languages (Fortescue 1998, 51–52). Due to close ethno-cultural interaction between them, the pre-Islamic Turks and the Europeans had already exchanged many ideas and created a common understanding of certain things before the arrival of the Muslim Seljuk and the Ottoman Turks.

When the Turks accepted Islam, the advancement or the conquest motive (the so-called *Kızıl Elma*—the red apple)¹ towards Europe changed from looking for good grazing land for their animals to jihad for Allah. The interaction then had a different form. Therefore the consequences also became different. This time Turks wanted to take over the land to convert the people to Islam and force the Islamic civilisation into the “nonbeliever” lands. The first interactions between Muslim Turks and Christian Europeans took place in the battlefields during the Crusades. The first Crusade was proclaimed by Pope Urban II in November 1095 in Clermont, near Lyon in France (Freely, Jem Sultan 2005, 118). The immediate cause of the first Crusade was Byzantine Emperor Alexios I's appeal to Pope Urban II for mercenaries to help him resist Turkish advances into Byzantine Empire territory. In 1071, at the Battle of Manzikert, the Byzantine Empire was defeated, which led to the loss of all of Asia Minor (modern Turkey) save for the coastlands. However the first Crusaders were defeated by the Seljuk Turks (Maalouf 1984, 3–18). Then many more Crusades followed one after another until the 1270s. However none of them properly managed to stop the Turkish advance into Byzantine territory. During the Crusades, the hatred between the two religions deepened. The complex history of confrontations between Christians and Muslims has practically made a genuine dialogue between civilisations impossible, but still we cannot underestimate the socio-cultural exchanges between the two civilisations during the Crusades. Europe's relationship with the Turkish Ottoman Empire (1299–1922) was marked by long intervals of hostility and warfare. This forms the basis of Europe's deep-rooted hostile image of Islam, an image that incidentally reinforced the construction of Europe's own identity (Zürcher and Linden 2004, 45). During the Ottoman Empire, the relationship between Europeans and the Turks developed on a different scale, especially after the fall of Constantinople and the collapse of the Byzantine Empire in 1453. The Byzantine Empire stood between the

¹ It is the ideal in the Turkish mythology, since prehistoric times, that they were created to run the world and they should seek for the end of the globe, which they believed was where the sun set. Therefore the Turkish move was always from east towards the west.

Muslims and the Christians, thus becoming the last standing castle defending European Christianity against the Turks. According to John Freely, when he heard the news of the fall of Constantinople to the Turks in 1453, Holy Roman Emperor Frederick III broke down in tears and shut himself away in his quarters to pray and meditate. Pope Nicholas V issued a bull calling for a crusade and condemning the Ottoman sultan as “a son of Satan, perdition and death” (Freely, *The Grand Turk*, 2009). Again Pope Pius II called Sultan Mehmet II “a venomous dragon whose bloodthirsty hordes threatened Christendom” (Freely, *The Grand Turk*, 3).

Again, later on, when Turkish Prince Cem, the younger son of “the Grand Turk” Mehmet II, was kept as a captive to be used against the Ottoman Sultan in France in 1484, Pope Innocent VIII addressed an encyclical to all the Christian princes of Europe, warning them of the danger that the Turks posed to the Church and Western civilisation in general. He urged the Europeans to come together against the Grand Turk, “the enemy of the faith” (Freely, *ibid.* 127). These accounts clearly show how the Europeans must have thought of the Turks by the end of the medieval period.

During the Sixteenth Century, the Turkish advance towards Europe carried on through the occupation of the Balkans, Hungary, Romania, Moldavia and Crimea. When Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, in the Battle of Mohacs, defeated the united European armies in 1526, the Europeans believed that the end of the Christian era in Europe had come. They were proven right by the news that Suleiman was preparing his army for the invasion of Vienna in 1529. However the siege of the capital of the Habsburgs Dynasty was unsuccessful. Failing in their efforts, the Turks carried on occupying other parts of Eastern Europe.

A century later in 1683, when the Turks were at the gates of Gyor near Vienna, all Europe hummed with the news of their advance, and it was realised that the days of reckoning were at hand. However, as John Stoye says, “The Crescent moon (of Islam) climbs up the night sky and the Gallic cock sleeps not!” This was a famous saying in Germany (Stoye 2007, 3–6). In the end, the Turks were defeated and it was the last major attack by the Muslim Turks towards Western Christendom. Realizing the disastrous outcome of the possible loss of Vienna to the Turks, old enemies of Europe came together to form an allied Christian army to throw the Turks back. This defeat was the first major sign of the decline of the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed at the end of World War I.

After the failure of the second siege of Vienna, the Turks’ weakness in warfare technology and science was exposed, and they did not pose as much a threat to Europe as before. However, socio-cultural interactions

carried on even during war times. There were great exchanges between the Turks and the Europeans in cross-cultural marriages, architecture, weaponry, fashion, literature and many other aspects of life. The infamous folk stories in Rochechinard and Sassenage, in France, about the great love of Turkish Prince Zizim (Cem) and La Belle Helene can be seen as one example of the cultural interaction between the Turks and the Europeans during medieval times. This love story has even influenced an ancestor of Stendhal to name his novel *Zizime, Prince Ottoman, amoureux de Philippine Hélène de Sassenage*, after the Ottoman Prince Cem (Freely, *ibid.* 115).

Especially on the Turkish part, while Islamic scientific culture dominated up to the end of the Eighteenth Century, Western European scientific and technical knowledge penetrated Ottoman space through translations and other means from the Sixteenth Century onwards. The new knowledge from the West gradually became established in the Nineteenth Century with the modernisation of the army and use of the European model of administration in government and education (Gunergun 2007, 192).

The negative opinion often held of Ottoman civilisation is usually based on judgments made in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth centuries, when the state was in a period of obvious decline. During the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, relations were generally about the Ottoman Empire's Europeanisation reforms and the European countries' plans to take a share of the empire as it was declining.

During the Nineteenth Century, there was competition among the great powers of Europe such as France, England and Russia to take as big a portion from the collapsing pie as possible. They called this "race for the Ottoman Empire" *the Eastern Question*. Knowing the plans about its existence, the Ottoman Sublime Porte used this rivalry and played one power against another to survive for another hundred years. These politics came to their fruition during the Crimean War in 1856 when the British and the French empires sided with the Ottomans in order to defeat the Russian Empire.

However this friendship did not last long as the Turkish Empire decided to befriend the new great power of Europe — the German Empire — thanks to Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha (Aksu 2007, 53). As a result the Ottoman Empire entered and lost World War I with Germany between 1914 and 1918. While Germany was forced to sign the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June 1919, the Turks were also forced to sign the Treaty of Sevres on 10 August 1920 (which did not take effect as Turks carried on fighting with the Greeks and signed another treaty in 1924 called the

Treaty of Lausanne). With the abolishment of the monarchy in 1922 and the creation of the modern Turkish Republic in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal, Turkey decided to face westward. Kemal carried on the reforms of the Ottoman sultans in terms of westernising the country. Finally in 1926, the Republic of Turkey was declared as a *secular state*, where religious and state affairs were separated. Following that, the Latin alphabet replaced the Arabic alphabet and they adopted the Swiss civil code. Many other reforms were made to make Turkey a European country during Kemal's (later on Atatürk) time as a president.

Turkey stayed neutral during World War II until almost the end of it. Finally, just before the war finished, Turkey symbolically entered the war with the Allied Powers, thus making its choice against the Axis Powers. This was a choice that kept Turkey in the side of the Western powers until now, as the Cold War followed World War II and Turkey joined NATO to stay with the United States and its allies against the Communist Soviet Union.

With the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1958, Turkey's relationship with Europe took another turn. As can be seen from the aforementioned summary, Turkey had been part of European affairs since the Medieval Ages. It had very close relations with European countries before and after World War II as well. Turkey first applied for an associate membership of the EEC in July 1959, shortly after the EEC's creation in 1958. The EEC responded by suggesting the establishment of an association as an interim measure, leading to full accession. This led to negotiations which resulted in the Ankara Agreement on 12 September 1963. As a result Turkey's official relations with the EEC started when an Association Agreement (or the Ankara Agreement, as it is commonly known in Turkey) was signed in 1963 between Turkey and the EEC. This was the first preliminary step on the path to full membership (www.euroactive.com). The agreement, which was going to be in force from 1 December 1964, had three stages (Ceyhan 1991, 23):

- a preparatory stage
- a transitional stage
- a final stage (Official Journal of the EC, No:C113/4, 1973)

Although the association agreement did not mention democracy, human rights or even politics (Smith 2003, 111) during the signature ceremony, the president of the commission, Walter Hallstein, strongly suggested that in the future Turkey was going to be a full member of the EEC. He said:

“Turkey belongs to Europe. One day the final step will be taken as well. Turkey tied its destiny and future to the European Community” (Rupp 2001, 1)

The Ankara Agreement “determined to establish ever closer bonds between the Turkish people and the peoples brought together in the European Economic Community” (ibid.). The same agreement also recognised that “the support given by the European Economic Community to the efforts of the Turkish people to improve their standard of living will facilitate the accession of Turkey to the Community at a later date” (ibid.).

Article 2 of the Association Agreement stated that in order to attain the objectives of this agreement, a customs union would be progressively established between the European Community and Turkey (ibid.). According to this agreement, the Customs Union was going to be established within no less than twelve years. The Association Agreement was supplemented by an Additional Protocol, which was signed on 23 November 1970 and came into force on 1 January 1973, establishing a timetable of technical measures to be taken to attain the objective of the customs union within a period of twenty-two years (ibid.).

However, EEC-Turkey relations did not work out well during the 1970s and almost the entire 1980s due to a variety of reasons such as military interventions in politics and Turkey’s interference with problems in Cyprus.

As a result of political and economic crises, the 1970s are considered, like the 1990s, as troubled and lost years for Turkey (Morris 2005, 2). There were the first student demonstrations and deadly clashes between opposition groups; then financial crisis and weak governments brought chaos and hardship. The army’s intervention was therefore welcomed by the Turkish public to end the chaotic atmosphere and gave the army even more confidence to think that they were the guardians of the secular republic and that the people were behind them. By the end of the 1970s, Süleyman Demirel’s government was in charge, but economic and social hardship were significantly rising. However, some bureaucrats such as Turgut Özal were working very hard to find out the core roots of these problems.

Turgut Özal was working in the State Planning Organisation (SPO) for the Demirel government. During his time in the SPO, Özal realised that Turkey needed to re-organise its economic structure according to the rules of Western economies. In January 1980, a package of economic stability measures known as the “January 24 Decisions” was adopted, to overcome the worsened problems that had emerged in the late 1970s (Mango 2004, 79). In addition to restoring the Turkish economy, the “January 24

Decisions” also introduced radical changes in economic modeling and preferences. With those decisions, Turkey switched its economic policy from “import substituting industrialisation” to “export-led growth strategy” which brought about the introduction of liberalisation in financial markets and more emphasis on foreign trade. In this context, the import regime was liberalised to a great extent, export-promoting incentives were initiated, and supply and demand systems in foreign exchange markets were put into practice (<http://www.hmtokyo.jp>). Thus the Turkish Lira became a convertible currency. Previously a Turkish citizen could be arrested if he/she carried foreign currency. Now people could open dollar accounts at home or abroad (Mango *ibid.*). The Turkish Lira was allowed to float in a controlled monetary environment (www.hmtokyo.jp).

Nevertheless, before these decisions gave any fruit, the military coup d'état of the 12 September 1980 took place. The high command of the armed forces suspended the constitution, dissolved parliament and all political parties and substituted itself for the government (Mango 2004, 80). All political leaders were imprisoned and later on banned from active politics. As a result, the EC first decided to curtail and then in 1982 completely freeze its relations with Turkey. The EC was expecting the army to respect human rights, treat political prisoners well and transfer power to the civilians as soon as possible. Relations were gradually normalised after the restoration of a civilian government in 1983.

The National Security Council (NSC) of Kenan Evren declared the goals of the military intervention as “to stop the fighting between brothers to prevent a possible civil war, guard the secular republic and to re-establish the lost state’s authority.” He also clarified that Turkey would follow the grand rule of westernisation during his time while promising to transfer the power to civilian authority as soon as calm was established. About a week after the military intervention, a new government was formed on 20 September 1980 and Turgut Özal was chosen as the economy minister as well as the deputy prime minister (Mango *ibid.*, 82). This was a clear sign that the army was also happy with the new model of market economy.

Finally, when the army chiefs felt confident that any political party they supported would win the elections, the election date was announced for 6 November 1983. During these elections, political parties supported by the military regime could not gain much support. Conversely, the newly established Motherland Party of Turgut Özal, which had a conservative program and contained many politicians with different political backgrounds, won the elections with an overwhelming majority.

Relations between Turkey and the EEC were gradually normalised after the restoration of a civilian government in 1983.

However, the army's control over civilians, human rights violations and Greece's fearsome opposition to Turkey's membership delayed progress. However, by the end of 1986 relations between Turkey and the EEC became normal. Under Özal's leadership, Turkey was trying to apply for full membership. However, West Germany opposed the freedom of labour which was, according to former agreements, supposed to be given to the Turks in 1986. Again Greece was blocking any rapprochement between Turkey and the EEC in terms of bureaucratic meetings to discuss Turkey.

On the other hand Portugal and Spain's accession to the EEC encouraged Turkey to carry on with the reforms expected by the EEC. Finally, on 16 September 1986, the EEC-Turkey Joint Committee met, thus reactivating the process of the relations which had been almost completely frozen since 12 September 1980. After that, Turkey fastened its reform programs and organised a mass campaign within and outside the country to prepare Turkey to apply for full membership into the community. However, leaders of European countries such as Helmut Kohl and Margaret Thatcher were warning Turkey not to rush its application. They were (especially Germany) mainly worried about the freedom of labour and a mass migration of workers from Turkey to their countries. Of course political bans on former politicians and human rights violations were also commonly mentioned in their rhetoric. On the other hand Özal, who strongly argued that Turkey had always been part of Europe because European civilisation was born on its territory (*ibid.*, 89) (referring to the ancient Anatolian civilisations), was determined to make the application while Leo Tindemans, Belgian's foreign minister, was the president of the EEC's Council of Ministers. He was known to be rather friendly towards Turkey. Disregarding the advice of the German Chancellor Kohl that neither Turkey nor Europe was ready for it (*ibid.*), on April 14 1987, Ali Bozer, Turkey's minister in charge of relations with the EEC, officially handed to Leo Tindemans Turkey's request for membership in the ECC, under article 237 of the Treaty of Rome (Gokbunar 2008, 5) rather than according to the Ankara Agreement (Palabiyik and Yildiz, 75). The decision was taken despite objections from the Greek government, but Tindemans, the president of the Council of Ministers, insisted that the Treaty of Rome required the twelve EC countries to refer every new application to the commission for study (<http://www.etcf.org.tr>). Özal was proven right about the Belgian minister. Mehmet Ali Birand, a prominent Turkish journalist, thanked the Belgian foreign minister in his columns by

stating “We should thank Tindamans for the EEC’s decision” (Birand, *Milliyet*, April 29, 1987).

Turkey-EEC Relations after 1987

On 27 April 1987, in Luxembourg, the foreign ministers of the twelve European Community countries agreed to refer Turkey’s application for EEC membership to the commission for a protracted study of the problems involved (<http://www.info-turk.be/>). This reconfirmed Turkey’s eligibility, given that the EC had turned down a similar application by Morocco on the grounds that Morocco was not a European country (Warning 2006).

The commission was not convinced. After taking two years to examine the Turkish application, it adopted its opinion on 18 December 1989 and the council accepted it on 5 February 1990. It concluded that

“Even though Turkey has a legitimate reasons to become a member, at the present time, Turkey and the community cannot be easily integrated” (Mango, *ibid.*)

The Commission gave both economic and political reasons. It also noted “the negative effects” of the dispute between Greece and Turkey and “the situation in Cyprus” (Regular Report from the Commission on Turkey’s Progress Towards Accession, 1998). However, it promised to reassess the Turkish application for full membership in the future by stating

“The opinion states that the Commission does believe, however, that the Community should pursue its cooperation with Turkey, given that country’s general opening towards Europe. The Commission also considered that the Community has a fundamental interest in intensifying its relations with Turkey and helping it to complete as soon as possible the process of political and economic modernisation.” (Ibid.)

Özal was disappointed but not surprised. As it put off Turkey’s accession to an indefinite future, Europe had at least recognised that Turkey was eligible for membership. Özal’s finance minister, Adnan Kahveci, on the other hand, analysed the result differently when he spoke to Andrew Mango by stating that “the reason we applied for membership was to attract foreign investors who would be more likely to come to Turkey if they believed that we abided by European business rules and practices” (Mango, *ibid.* 89–90). On 5 February 1990, the Council adopted the general content of the Commission opinion and asked it to make

detailed proposals developing the ideas expressed in the opinion on the need to strengthen EC-Turkey relations.

On 7 June 1990 the Commission adopted a set of proposals called “the Matutes Package.” The package was purely designed to contribute to the modernisation of Turkey’s economy and to allow Turkey to move as close to the community as possible. It proposed the completion of the Customs union by 1995 (Arikan 2003, 72). It also included completion of the customs union, the resumption and intensification of financial cooperation, the promotion of industrial and technological cooperation and the strengthening of political and cultural ties. This package was not approved by the Council (Regular Report 1998).

When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 many people thought Turkey would lose its significant geostrategic position for the West as the buffer zone between the Communist world and the Capitalist Mediterranean. However, the energy resources of the newly independent Turkic states of Central Asia assured Turkey that it would remain an important country for the Western world, especially the United States. Even though many people complained that Turkey would be the Trojan Horse for American policies in Central Asia and perhaps in future in the EU, Turkey became an important actor in the region (<http://www.wilsoncenter.org>). With the intelligent policies of Turgut Özal, the end of the Cold War did not really push Turkey away but rather positively effected relations and brought it closer to Europe.

Furthermore, the lack of confidence after the Cold War was lessened with Turkish involvement in the first Gulf War against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, as Turkey actively participated in liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi invasion. The end of the Gulf War did hurt the Turkish economy badly but allowed Turkey to ask for American support for the policies it pursued in Central Asia and in Europe. As a result the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline received full American support.

On the other hand, Turkish domestic politics did not vary much from those of the 1980s. For decades, elites of “white Turks” were indisputably in charge of politics, business and especially the military. And throughout most of the 1980s and ‘90s, as global forces began to change the lives of ordinary people beyond recognition, the “system” remained resolutely the same (Morris, *ibid.* 5). Özal, who was trying to change the way Turkey functioned, from politics to economics and from social life to the army’s position, died unexpectedly on 17 April 1993 (Mango 2004, 93).

The heavy presence of the military in civil politics especially worried the EU far more than any thing else, as it was definitely against the values and norms of Western democracy. However, the military’s position in

Turkish politics is complicated and very different from other examples of similar situations such as in Greece and Spain, as the army in Turkey sees itself as the guardian of the Secular Republic, and whenever secularism is threatened the army feels a duty to protect it. However, this attitude is contradictory to the European Union's understanding of democratic values and norms. Therefore, although the EU wants Turkey to be a secular and modern state, it does not want Turkey to be modernised through the hands of the military. Among the Turkish people there is a huge majority supporting the democratisation process and who wish for Turkey's EU membership. In no other candidate countries have these two topics been so closely interconnected. The European norm here is that armed forces are unambiguously subordinate to the lawfully elected government-in-office and the armed forces' leadership has no voice in public affairs beyond its professional domain (Greenwood 2005, 3–4).

As explained above, the army's presence in Turkish politics was very heavy and it did not satisfy the conditions set out by the Copenhagen criteria. As a result the EU and Turkey could not have any closer relations in the first half of the 1990s. However, the Customs Union, which was one of the main goals of the 1963 Association Agreement, was finally established with the Turkey - EU Association Council Decision 1/95 of 6 March 1995 (Palabiyik and Yildiz, 76).

Turkey-EU Relations after 1998

On 4 March 1998, following the request of the Luxembourg European Council, the European Commission adopted its Communication on a European Strategy for Turkey. The main elements of the pre-accession strategy for Turkey included the approximation of legislation and the adoption of the *acquis*. The Communication also contained initial operational proposals for implementing the strategy. The strategy was welcomed by the Cardiff European Council, which was held on 15 and 16 June 1998, where it was felt that the Communication

“taken as a package ... provides the platform for developing our relationship on a sound and evolutionary basis” (<http://europa.eu/legislation>)

The Cardiff European Council of 1998 welcomed the Commission's confirmation that it would submit its first regular reports on Turkey's progress towards accession at the end of 1998. The Report on Turkey's Progress Towards Accession, published in November 1998, followed the

same methodology as that used for the opinions on the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEECs).

Finally, the groundbreaking event for Turkey-EU relations took place during the Helsinki summit in December 1999. There, the European Council gave Turkey the status of candidate country for EU membership, following the Commission's recommendation in its second Regular Report on Turkey. This was a major achievement for Turkey as it had been rejected from being a candidate country in the 1997 Luxemburg summit.

Even though it was perceived as a cunning American policy to use Turkey to reach the former Soviet Union Republic's rich energy resources, the US support for Turkish candidacy cannot be underestimated as the US president Clinton visited Turkey and Greece after the 1999 earthquakes that killed more 20 thousand people in North-western Turkey, including its financial capital Istanbul. The Turkish earthquake was followed by the Greek earthquake where the two nations helped each other with determination during their worst natural disasters, forgetting the ongoing political crisis between them. Earthquake diplomacy calmed the tensions between the two, who were on the brink of a war on many occasions such as in 1987, 1995–96 and finally 1998. 1999 was a watershed in Turkey-EU relations, as the new millennium for Turkey started with a "real" and conceivable hope for it to become a full member of the EU.

The years between 2000 and 2012 have been seen by many scholars as transformative years in Turkey's history in terms of political, economic and social developments. In the 2000s, the push for the membership of the EU strengthened. As a result, reform packages were passed one after another, trying to bring Turkey ever closer to EU norms and regulations by enforcing democratisation in almost every aspect of life. For example, in this respect capital punishment was abolished even though the majority of the people were in favour of it.

While democratisation was taking place, economically Turkey was also doing much better than most of the other countries in the world, as it moved from being the 26th largest economy in the world to being the 16th biggest by 2011. Additionally, politically, Turkey's sphere of influence expanded significantly and it started acting like a regional power which dedicated itself to human rights, peace and democratisation.

When Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's moderate Islamic, Justice and Development Party (JDP; in Turkish "Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi"—Ak Parti or AKP) came to power in 2002, progress towards Europeanisation gained momentum in Turkey. However, some experts see the JDP as trying to take over the role of the army as the sole secular-modernising power, in order to get rid of military's traditional heavy presence in

Turkish politics. These analysts think that the JDP is not trying to modernise to get Turkey into the EU but in fact, the party is using EU support to keep the generals quiet while working towards Islamisation of Turkey.

However, others see the JDP as the only political party after Özal's Motherland Party that truly wanted to modernise Turkey in line with the EU standards. They claim that it is impossible to bring democracy to a country when the military is considered superior to civilians. These writers also claim that Turkey's good relations with the Eastern world do not mean that Turkey is becoming an Islamist country. They argue that it is becoming a regional power and every regional power has multi-dimensional politics.

As mentioned above, under the JDP, EU-Turkey relations developed much faster than anyone could anticipate. The Commission reported that Turkey had successfully fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and therefore should be given a go-ahead with the negotiations. This was a major breakthrough after the 1999 Helsinki Council, which recognised Turkey as an EU candidate country on an equal footing with other candidate countries. On 17 December 2004, the European Council defined the conditions for the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey. The European Commission recommended that the negotiations should begin in October 2005 but also added various precautionary measures. EU leaders agreed on 16 December 2004 to start accession negotiations with Turkey from 3 October 2005 (<http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/>). The Austrian People's Party claimed that Turkey would cost as much as "the recent accession of all ten new members and [that] someone needs to explain this to our citizens" (*Der Spiegel*, August 21, 2005). The German Christian Democratic Union offered a privileged partnership status, a less than full membership. Despite all these negative efforts, EU accession negotiations, which are conducted over thirty-five chapters, were officially launched on 20 October 2005 with the analytical examination of the EU legislation (the so-called screening process). The screening process, which is the first phase of the accession negotiations, was completed on 13 October 2006. During this process, 66 Turkish delegations held explanatory and bilateral meetings with European Commission officials in Brussels. At the explanatory screening meetings, the European Commission briefed Turkish delegations on the EU acquis for each chapter and at the bilateral screening; Turkish delegations explained Turkey's level of alignment with the relevant acquis under each chapter. Thus, by comparing the EU acquis with Turkish legislation, the level that Turkey reached concerning the adoption, enforcement and effective implementation of the abovementioned acquis was identified (<http://www.mfa.gov.tr>). Although everybody was fascinated to see how relations between Turkey and the EU had progressed

very fast, we cannot say the same thing as of May 2012. Now, Turkey-EU relations are almost frozen due to a variety of reasons. These reasons vary from the Cyprus issue to human rights violations, problems with the current jurisdiction system in Turkey, and anti-Turkish sentiments in Europe, especially in France with former President Sarkozy and in Germany with Chancellor Merkel.

In 2005, the majority of the Turks supported EU entry, but support is rapidly falling. The length of time it takes with the negotiations, and the anti-Turkish speeches of major European leaders have raised some concerns in Turkey, and members of the public have started thinking that the EU “does not want anything good for Turkey.” This of course reduced the support for EU membership among the people from 70 percent plus in 2004 to as low as 30 percent in 2008 (Inalcik, *Today's Zaman*, April 25, 2008).

Although support for EU membership has gone down, when we talk about significant developments in Turkey during the last decade, people cannot underestimate the significance of the EU's role. Removal of capital punishment, improvements in human rights records, noteworthy developments in education, progress in transportation (especially aviation and railways) and technological industry, increase in trade, tourism and agriculture, removal of the army's presence from civilian politics and increasing income from exports will be remembered as major positive aspects of EU policies in Turkey.

On the other hand, the EU also benefits from this long-lasting relationship as Turkey protects the eastern borders of the EU and helps Europe tackle international terrorism, drug smuggling, human trafficking and immigration. By increasing its GDP from \$4,000 to \$13,000 per capita within only a decade, Turkey became one of the main trading partners of the EU. Moreover, with its huge young population, vast farming land, great historical past and major tourist attractions, Turkey is an asset for the EU. Turkey is a cultural bridge between the East and the West. A stable and democratic Muslim Turkey is a role model for other Muslim states, in terms of getting rid of dictatorships as seen during the Arab Spring. Turkey's growing influence in the region, its will to take part in peacekeeping missions and negotiations, and trying to become an energy corridor for Europe makes Turkey of even greater importance for the EU. Therefore EU-Turkey relations can be seen as a model relationship and therefore, they are immensely important for both parties as they are mutually beneficial. Besides the EU and Turkey the rest of the international community also benefits from this relationship as Turkey is seen as a model Islamic democracy that can get along with mostly Christian Western countries including those of the EU and the United States.

Therefore, once the leadership of both the EU and Turkey overcome small issues and give up using the Turkey-EU debate in domestic politics as a tool to gain support, they can perhaps focus on the big issues such as Cyprus and their human rights records. Knowing the background will help us understand the roots of some issues surrounding EU-Turkey relations.

Proceedings of the Bosphorus Research Center's (BORECE) first international symposium in London (at SOAS, 10 December 2011) helped us in bringing this book together. The readers of this book will surely benefit from it as the articles inside are written to high academic standards.

The first chapter is on the EU Counter-Terrorism Plans and is by Jennifer Lang. In this chapter Lang looks at three areas of EU policy which are either a major part of Counter-Terrorism (CT) strategy or that have been impacted upon by perceptions of terrorist threats and an overall prioritisation of security. All three sections will look at a range of examples from EU member states, while also looking specifically at the impact on Turkey. This chapter will also highlight the areas of cooperation between EU and Turkey in terms of counter-terrorism.

The second chapter by Jrde Shiu is entitled "Clash of Civilisations or the Empire Strikes Back? The EU's Responses to the Ethnic Crises over Cyprus, Kosovo and Georgia." In this paper, through the analysis of the role of the European Union in the ethnic conflicts that plagued Cyprus, Kosovo and Georgia, the author suggests that the logic of empire, with all its distinct traits, can be discerned. This chapter also studies Turkey's position in these conflicts, especially regarding the Cyprus issue.

The third chapter, written by Fatma Nil Doner, is titled "Transition Under SAP and CAP: Future Scenarios for Agriculture in Turkey." Here the author explains the possible impacts of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in Turkey on farming families (with reference to policy lessons to be learned from structural adjustment for the last three decades in Turkey).

Chapter Four, titled "Change in Turkish-Egyptian Relations After the Victory of the Justice and Development Party" by Agata Biernat, focuses on Turkey-Egypt relations. Here Biernat discusses the Arab Spring and the impact of Turkey's growing role in the Middle East on Turkey-EU relations.

Chapter Five, titled "Satire of Islam: Past and Present," is written by Hakki Gurkas of Kennesaw University. Here Gurkas writes that religion and religious signifiers have always been ridiculed by irreligious and secular people in history, often from the protected position of popular culture. He says that satire of Islam and iconic signifiers of Islam was neither a first in Denmark nor exclusive to European, non-Muslim artists. It took place in the Muslim world too. This chapter therefore explores this process through a series of cases of Muslim and non-Muslim productions

of satire of official Islam and lastly discusses the politicisation of religious satire in recent Turkey-European Union relations.

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CHAPTER ONE

EU COUNTER-TERRORISM PLANS: IMPLICATIONS FOR TURKEY

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“Strategic Commitment: To combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights, and make Europe safer, allowing its citizens to live in an area of freedom, security and justice”

—European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy (2005)

Introduction

The European Union (EU) has been engaged in the fight against terrorism as far back as the 1970s, triggered by attacks at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. However, it is undeniable that since the attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September 2001, and even more so following the Madrid and London attacks of 2004 and 2005 respectively, the EU has accelerated plans to combat the increasingly transnational terrorist threat to its member states. The 2003 European Security Strategy outlines the fact that Europe is no longer susceptible to large-scale aggression from other states but instead is becoming both a target and a base for terrorist networks that are global in scope, advising that “concerted European action is indispensable” (p. 3). The 2008 Implementation Report on the Security Strategy re-emphasises the threat of terrorism to the EU and outlines programmes such as the 2004 Hague Programme, the 2005 Strategy for the External Dimension of Justice and Home Affairs, and the 2005 EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy, all of which are based on “respect for human rights and international law” (European Council, 2008a:4).

The EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy follows a four-pronged approach: preventing radicalisation and recruitment of potential terrorists, protecting potential targets, pursuing terrorists, and responding to the aftermath of an attack (2005:3). Although these aims are stated in the context of the Strategic Objective quoted at the beginning of this paper, it is debatable to

what extent the promotion of justice, democracy and opportunity for all has been pursued and is even compatible with maintaining a secure European Area. While the EU has grappled with a debate over what kind of power it will be (or already is), there has been a contradiction between normative objectives such as the promotion of human rights and democracy and actual practice, which has often fallen short of the rhetoric. EU Counter-Terrorist (CT) strategy is arguably the area where this contradiction is most visible.

The history of modern terrorism shows that a democratic government has never been toppled by such tactics; however, it remains at the forefront of U.S. and European threat perceptions and has in the past resulted in significant changes such as a new government in Spain following the Madrid bombings. In the United States, policy has become militarised whereas the EU has turned to defensive measures based on policing and intelligence. The shift in methods of terrorism of a variety of religious groups who have used increasingly lethal tactics aimed at causing high numbers of fatalities has contributed to a new securitised agenda across EU member states¹ replacing an agenda to promote justice, democracy and opportunity.

External to the EU but seeking a route in, Turkey faces a range of terrorist threats domestically, from al-Qaeda operatives to Kurdish radicals. The ability of terrorists to thrive in the country is largely a result of its geographical location and porous borders, as well as the black market through which identity documents are easily traded (Jenkins 2008). Terrorism in Turkey has historically had a significant impact on domestic politics leading to a military intervention in 1980. This effect on the civil-military relationship has continued into the present and will be discussed in more detail. From 2009, Turkey has moved to increase cooperation with EU countries in the field of counter-terrorism and has looked to member states such as the UK for assistance in the area of socio-economic investment, aimed at countering the challenges in this area that have provided foundations for recruitment and radicalisation. More specifically for this paper, the process of Turkey's accession to the EU heightens domestic tensions but also presents opportunities in the fields of political reform and solving the Kurdish issue, which remains Turkey's biggest internal terrorist threat (Aybet 2009, 4).

This paper will look at three areas of EU policy that are either a major part of CT strategy or that have been impacted upon by perceptions of the terrorist threat and an overall prioritisation of security. The legal

¹ For a full overview of the changing nature of terrorism, see Hoffman, 1998.