Discourses of Space

Discourses of Space

Edited by

Judit Pieldner and Zsuzsanna Ajtony

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INTRODUCTION

SPACE AND THE HUMANITIES: DISCURSIVE PRACTICES

JUDIT PIELDNER AND ZSUZSANNA AJTONY

In the decades of the recent past, especially ever since the emergence of the *spatial turn* in several scientific discourses, special attention has been paid to the surrounding space conceived as a *construct* created by the dynamics of human activity, resembling the symbolic space representations of arts.

The notion of space assists us in describing the most varied spheres of human existence. We can speak of various physical (topological, geographical), metaphysical (mythical, sacred), social and cultural (historical, local, global, ethnic), communicative (linguistic, textual, contextual, narrative, relational) spaces, as structuring components providing access to various literary, linguistic and social phenomena, thus promoting the initiation of a cross-disciplinary dialogue.

On the 30th and 31st of March 2012, the Department of Humanities in Miercurea Ciuc of the Sapientia Hungarian University of Transylvania, Romania, hosted an international conference entitled "Discourses of Space" to create a fruitful forum of discussions for those interested in these areas of research. The conference primarily encouraged investigations carried out in the above-mentioned research fields. The papers presented covered a wide range of topics related to space: intercultural and interethnic spaces; linguistic, textual space formation; the narratology of space, spatial-temporal relationships, space construction in literature and film; space in contemporary art; inter-art relations and intermediality, spaces of cultural memory; nature and culture; cultural geography; cross-cultural connections between the East and the West, Central and Eastern European geocultural paradigms; the relationship between geographical space and cyberspace; and relational spaces.

This volume contains a selection of essays that were born following the vivid discussions during this conference, but several articles were also

requested by the editors to extend the range of the topics and viewpoints that this selection covers. Among the authors of these essays several young researchers are enlisted who work on their PhD theses or on their post-doctoral projects but prominent scholars in the field have also added their own contribution. Some of the studies have been published or are under publication in the journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae, Philologica* (http://www.acta.sapientia.ro/acta-philo/philologica-main.htm).

The book has been structured to cover three main domains where discourses of space have been investigated by our authors. Thus Part One entitled *Shakespeare and the Poetics of Space* discusses the relationship between the poetics of space and three Shakespearean plays (*Macbeth, The Tempest and Hamlet*). Drawing especially on one Shakespearean text to be investigated in particular, and on some philosophical texts on space and time as theoretical background, Géza Kállay's essay *"Where the Place?": Meanings of Space and Place in Shakespeare's Macbeth*,[1] attempts to show how difficult it is to talk about time without spatial metaphors and how space serves as a device to make time 'real.' It also demonstrates how space becomes dependent on time: in *Macbeth*, the significance of a dramatic moment can hardly be established without some specific reference to how that moment fits into the spatial sequence of the plot, and how this effects the formation and disintegration of the character who is in a certain spatio-temporal situation. It is argued that one aspect of Macbeth's tragedy is that he tried the "spatial impossible," inseparable, as usual, from time: he wished to move, to go *and* remain in place at the same time.

Marcell Gellért's analysis *"The Baseless Fabric of This Vision" – The Poetics of Space in The Tempest*[2] continues the discussion of another Shakespearean play from a spatial perspective by attempting to survey the great English playwright's "new world" of the stage in search of creative correspondences between the diverse devices of a dramatic reform "bodied forth" in *The Tempest.* The spatial analysis of the play confirms the view that Shakespeare's dramaturgical experiments in his concluding romance aim at rehabilitating the mythical stance of drama through (re)domesticating the fantastic on the stage endowed with creative spatial, temporal and instrumental agencies. The analysis investigates Shakespeare's innovative strategies in the play to see how he deploys the combined forces of the stage's art in the new genre to legitimise the

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[1] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 14–33.
[2] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 34–42.

fantastic for dramatic use to reopen the mythical dimension for the theatre through dissolving the limited topical and spatial confines of the Renaissance stage. Focusing mostly on the spatial aspects and constituents of the *Tempest*-world it approaches the play as a pioneering piece of the stage's spatial redefinition, a topical dramatic eutopia where the abstract, utopian space of humanistic ideas, theological, ethical, phenomenological and social conceptions is turned to shape and gains local habitation through dramatic implacement. The inquiry pays distinguished attention to the poetic qualities of space as instruments of passage between the spheres of fact and fiction, place and space, the natural and the artistic, i.e. the dialectical twin domains of Prospero's magical realm.

The last essay dealing with Shakespeare's plays in Part One was written by Balázs Szigeti entitled *"The Play's the Thing" – The Dramatic Space of Hamlet's Theatre*.[3] It investigates the use of the dramatic space in the drama. The tragedy is observed with the method of "pre-performance criticism," which first and foremost makes use of the several potentials a play contains and puts on display *before* an actual performance; it offers, also in the light of the secondary literature, various ways of interpretation, resulting from the close-reading of the play and considers their possible realisations in the space of the stage both from the director's and the actor's point of view, including the consequences the respective lines of interpretation may have as regards the play as a whole. *Hamlet* does not only raise the questions of the theatrical realisation of a play but it also reflects on the ontology of the dramatic space by putting the performance of *The Mousetrap*-play into one of its focal points and scrutinises the very interaction between the dramatic space and the realm of the audience. An intriguing part of the essay is the discussion of the process how Hamlet makes use of his private theatre and how the dramatic space is transformed as *The Murder of Gonzago* turns into *The Mousetrap*-performance.

Hamlet is the topic of the following study as well, this time from a cinematic perspective. Starting from the space constructing specificities of the Elizabethan emblematic theatre (the absence of realistic illusion, temporal and spatial relations expressed by the dramatic text itself), Judit Pieldner's essay *Space Constructions in Adaptations of Hamlet*[4] investigates cinematic space, namely the significance of horizontal and vertical space division, the creation of symbolic/stylised/abstract, realistic and simultaneous spaces, the role of scenery in expressing states of mind

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[3] The text was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 59–75.
[4] The text was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 43–58.

and in conveying ideological messages in particular adaptations of *Hamlet*, created in various moments of film history, directed, among others, by Laurence Olivier (1948), Grigori Kozintsev (1964), Tony Richardson (1969), Franco Zeffirelli (1990) and Michael Almereyda (2000). An approach to the adaptations of *Hamlet* from the viewpoint of space construction completes the existing thematic, stylistic and generic typologies and highlights those films which, through the exploration of (meta-)cinematic space as a powerful means of creating meanings in the language of the film, go beyond cinematic realism and initiate an intermedial dialogue with the spatial purport of the Shakespeare text and with the (meta)theatrical specificities of the Renaissance *Theatrum mundi*.

Part Two of the book incorporates essays structured around the topic of *Space and Identity, Space and (Inter)Mediality*. Here – as compared to the previous part – the perspective is enlarged, opening the discussion to the relationship between further literary texts and space. Thus in the first part of this chapter the connection between physical (geographical) space and the identity or alterity of (literary) characters is scrutinised. Thus Zsuzsanna Ajtony's study entitled *Space and Identity in G. B. Shaw's Plays – a Pragmatic Approach*[5] discusses the verbal representations of Britain and Britishness in G. B. Shaw's plays. The essay considers the spatial revolution defined by Carl Schmitt (1997 [1954])[6] as a source of attitude change developed within the British cultural space towards their own island and the Continent. Verbally overt and covert aspects of the British space are considered in a series of selected Shavian plays, discussing the attitude of Shaw's characters towards their island and their fellow-islanders, their verbal behaviour as defined by the cultural and historical space in which they exist. The Shavian text is considered as a micro-sociolinguistic corpus on which the characters' verbal behaviour is investigated.

Another geographical space, this time the African continent, is the focus of the next essay of this chapter with the title *The Image of Africa in Doris Lessing's The Grass Is Singing and J. M. G. Le Clézio's The African*[7] written by Kata Gyuris. The author approaches the spatial image of Africa discussing the above-mentioned two novels as representations of the experience of living on this continent as a non-native citizen. The characters of both texts approach the infinity of the African space from

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[5] The text was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (2), 2012: 296–309.
[6] Schmitt, Carl. 1997 [1954]. *Land and Sea*. Washington: Plutarch Press.
[7] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 188–199.

very different angles: while Lessing's South Rhodesia is presented as a vast barren land, Le Clézio's South Africa is a wild and luscious terrain holding new opportunities. The openness of space both enables and restricts the characters in different ways. These clashing images eventually culminate in the appearance of physicality and violence, which are prominent motifs in both novels. However, while in *The African*, this violence becomes significant as a liberating presence hidden in the endless space, in *The Grass Is Singing* violence emerges when the protagonists feel trapped by the unconquerable enormity of the land.

Travelling and movement as signs of freedom and independence are the main topics of the following essay in this chapter written by Tamás Demény entitled *Space, Travel, Freedom: A Comparative Reading of African American and Hungarian Roma Narratives*.[8] It draws an interesting parallel between African American life narratives shaped by the traditional structure of slave narratives, revolving around a well-directed movement from the South to the North in search of freedom and Roma life narratives backgrounded by the traditional travelling lifestyle. The study discusses the works of twentieth-century African American autobiographers who use the motifs of movement and travel to emphasise the continuing lack of freedom, while others self-consciously reject this structure to claim their freedom in different ways. In a similar way, there are also Roma life narratives which reject the images of travelling and claim their space and belonging within the majority society's structures.

The British cultural space – this time in comparison with the French one – is invoked in Júlia-Réka Vallasek's *Spaces of Alterity in the Works of Julian Barnes*. Her essay presents the way French places appear mainly through cultural references in Barnes' fictional and nonfictional work (*Metroland, Flaubert's Parrot, Talking It Over, Cross Channel* as well as the essays collected in *Something to Declare* and *Nothing to Be Frightened Of*). The second part of the essay focuses on the way England and the stereotypes of Britishness are presented in the works of Julian Barnes from an ironical perspective. Through the use of irony and cultural allusions the space of the other and the space of identity become one and the same.

Closely related to literary representations of different geographical and cultural spaces, the second part of Chapter Two also comprises studies that focus their attention to medial and intermedial spatial relations: film, theatre and contemporary arts. These essays revolve around issues like the

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[8] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 169–187.

spatial relations that exist between different forms of art, whether the borders between these can be transgressed and how they amplify each other's voices; as the result of the post-modern age, the emergence cyberspace is also investigated in relation to geographical space.

József A. Tillmann's essay, as its title *The Sublime in Contemporary Arts*, also suggests, brings the sublime to a more palpable distance highlighting its different manifestations in different art forms of today. He claims that *the sublime* (elevated, lofty, supreme), a concept introduced to the philosophy of arts in the 18th century by Edmund Burke, today appears to be realised in *the technologically sublime*. For our post-*Star Wars* generations the metaphysical has become more and more physical. Tillmann finds the highest expressions of the contemporary sublime in movies (Stanley Kubrick, Ridley Scott), science fiction (Arthur C. Clarke, Ian M. Banks) and techno/ambient music (Brian Eno). Music is special among arts as it has always been the expression of *harmonia mundi* (best seen in the works of Steve Reich). In visual arts, Burke's theory of the sublime had a crucial influence on the work of Barnett Newman, who, based on a peculiarly American tradition, chose as his theme the inexpressible. In our age of living in "consummate remoteness from God" the *Skyspace* series of James Turrel (*Space that Sees* in Jerusalem, *Roden-crater* in New-Mexico) focuses our attention on the remarkable qualities of space and light – light that is scientifically inscrutable and irreducible.

How one form of art can interact with another without annihilating it, how borders between separate art forms are crossed, and how each form of art, present in their own materiality, amplifies the voice of the other, and how meaning and signification is formed as the accumulative effect of word, image, and music – these questions are addressed in the following article of this chapter signed by Csilla Bertha and entitled *Interart Representation in the Künstlerdrama. Word, Image and Music in Contemporary Irish Plays*.[9] Theatre as a "hidden magnet" (Kandinsky) and a "hypermedium that incorporates all arts and media" (Chapple), proves to be a most natural space where conventionally distinct medial forms of articulation can exist and operate together. It is particularly true of different forms of art in the *künstlerdrama*. In this light, the study discusses three contemporary Irish plays – Frank McGuinness' *Innocence* (1987), Thomas Kilroy's *The Shape of Metal* (2003), and Brian Friel's *Performances* (2003), which foreground a painter, a sculptor and a composer protagonist.

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[9] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 2 (1), 2010: 26–42.

In the next essay the topic of this chapter returns to filmic representations of space through an imaginary dialogue between two giants of the cinema. Gazing through phenomenological lenses Ruxandra Berinde's essay entitled *Entering the Room. Spatial Metaphors as a Dialogue between Tarkovsky and Bergman*[10] traces a possible dialogue between the Russian director Andrei Tarkovsky and the Swedish director Ingmar Bergman established through the spatial metaphors in their films. Taking into account that the two of them never met, nor spoke directly, albeit contemporary and highly praising each other's works, Berinde's study lists the fragments of indirect verbal interaction between the two, arguing that some of the gaps in their dialogue were filled through the communicative functions of spatial imagery in their films. Transgressing the factual absence of communication, these spatial metaphors, understood as visual phenomenology of lived space, position the two artists in a state of silent, yet crystalline dialogue, all the more profound in its silence and revelatory to the common nature of architectural and cinematic language.

The surprising encounter between the 'old' medium of the printed word and the Internet, the new medium as well as the very essence of the Internet, originally designed to link several incompatible systems constitute the topic of the following essay *Lost and Found. Concepts of Geographic Space and Cyberspace in Talking about Jane Austen in Baghdad* written by Hajnal Király. *Talking about Jane Austen in Baghdad* is an e-mail correspondence between the British BBC journalist Bee Rowlatt and Iraqi university teacher of English literature May Witwit during the war in Iraq. The subtitle of the book, 'The True Story of an Unlikely Friendship' is not only referring to the relationship between two women with different cultural backgrounds. The two women "inhabit" the cyberspace through cultural references they both share, discussing about books which often mirror their relationship. In this respect, two references become especially emblematic: *A Tale of Two Cities* by Charles Dickens and Jane Austen, a name triggering extensive intertextual and intermedial networks mostly related to female identity. These two intertexts, without being overtly interpreted in the email correspondence, appear to be paradigmatic in mapping up an underlying discourse on 'real (geographic) space' which, although fragmented, cannot be completely eliminated and the cyberspace, creating communities and places ('Good old places') which sometimes are not possible in the geographic space. The study proposes to extend this dialectics through an overview of key concepts like

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[10] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 209–223.

space/spacelessness, place/placelessness, authentic place/inauthentic place, private space/public space in a case study of this book, documenting an unusual intermedial transfer (the new medium becoming the content of the old), a transition from 'my space' to the 'public space' and the creation of an 'authentic place' where the new life of May Witwit begins.

Part Three entitled *Space and Culture, Cultural Geography* continues the discussion on the consequences of the spatial turn in literature and other art forms initiated in the previous parts by shifting the reader's attention to more abstract spaces. Based on current theoretical background, the essays in this section consider issues such as the notion of cultural space, inherently related to physical/geographical spaces mentioned earlier; chronotopes (Bakhtin); heterotopias (Foucault); historical and fictional topography present in both fiction and film; spatial practices articulated by Michel de Certeau.

In this line, the first article in this chapter is Róbert Keményfi's *The Notion of Ethnic Space. Sacred Ethnicity and Territory*,[11] continuing the discussion on cultural spaces initiated previously. The revival of ethnic conflicts in Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has brought about the emergence of scientific investigations concerning the territoriality of nationality problems. The author claims that benefiting from the experience of the past and being aware of the political dangers of the present, the branches of science that explore issues of nationality do not endeavour to proclaim the immobile state of ethnic territorial structures (in Central-Eastern and South-Eastern Europe) and historical continuity. Their objective is not to serve separatist political decisions but to analyse their effects. The study addresses such topics as territory and ideology, territory and minority and the concept of the "sacred" related to ethnic space, organically connected to the issue of nationalism.

Pál Kelemen's essay on *The Epistemology of the Arbour. On the Intersection of Nature and Technology in Adalbert Stifter* makes an attempt at discussing Stifter's "Gartenlaube," an essay almost forgotten therefore rarely subjected to close reading, published in the first issue of an Austrian journal of the same title. The *arbour* as an architectural construct has been made into the "Biedermeier" symbol of intimacy, withdrawal to inwardness, and aesthetisation of everyday life by scholars of art and literary history. Opposing this widely popular and accepted discourse, Kelemen's study situates the *arbour*, this unique *architectural construction*, along with literary texts making it their central figure, as a

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[11] The text was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 3 (2), 2011: 123–133.

special kind of place which is not to be considered as a symbolic expression of any privacy or intimacy. Thus an unorthodox reading is required to point out the formation of the *arbour* as a product of interlacing nature and technology, as well as to carefully examine the impact it has on human self-reference made possible by the special spatial experience in it. The arbour, so goes the main thesis, has an extraordinary epistemological status. Following the cultural history inherent to the arbour this study demonstrates the literary consequences of the aforementioned unique spatiality of the *arbour* in texts of Brockes and Stifter.

Katalin Sándor's essay entitled *The 'Other Spaces' of Exile in Dubravka Ugrešić's The Museum of Unconditional Surrender*[12] investigates the way heterotopic spatial and cultural experiences shape the concepts of space and the spatial practices of exile, as well as their narrative representation in the Croatian writer's novel. Following Foucault's approach, heterotopic spatial experiences can be described by the localisability and at the same time the in-betweenness and the placelessness of space, by its relational aspect and by the capacity of heterotopias to juxtapose in a single real place several spaces that are in themselves incompatible. In Ugrešić's novel the museum, the zoo, and the flea-market can be identified as heterotopic spaces which are not ontologically given, but are constituted by spatial, discursive and corporeal practices. This essay examines how the subject experiences not only the otherness of the Other, but also his/her own disquieting ambivalence in the discontinuous spaces and heterotopias of exile. The author also reflects on the question whether the text functions as an act of critical re-mapping with both aesthetic and ethic consequences.

Zoltán Kékesi's essay on *Trauma and Simulacra: Cultural Geography, Memory, and Hybrid Identities in Omer Fast's Spielberg's List* explores the relationship between the topography of the historical event and the topography of the fictional story, as well as the relationship between the cultural geography of the city (Andrew Charlesworth), the local memory of its inhabitants and the global memory of the Holocaust as it has been fashioned by Omer Fast's *Spielberg's List*. For his video installation *Spielberg's List* (2003) Berlin-based Israeli artist Omer Fast recorded interviews with Polish inhabitants of Krakow – all of them having worked previously as extras in the movie *Schindler's List* (1993). Director Steven Spielberg had used Płaszów, the site of a former concentration camp in

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[12] The text was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Philologica* vol. 4 (1), 2012: 224–232.

Krakow, to build up the setting for his story of Oscar Schindler. Besides the interviews, Omer Fast's installation shows sequences shot in Płaszów ten years after the filming, occupied by the 'authentic' remnants of Spielberg's fictional setting. At the same time, it analyses the matrix of identification of the Polish extras with German and/or Jewish protagonists and examines their perception of Płaszów as a simultaneously historical and fictional topography.

A covert but distinct line of thought in some of these studies is the cultural/medial representation of Central Eastern Europe and the Balkans as the simultaneous spaces of home and foreignness, of cultural in-betweenness, sensed also by some of the authors as Europe's inner colonies, but also – as a recurrent element from the previous chapter – as spaces that influence their inhabitants' behaviour, implying the idea that space is also the embodiment of the people living in it.

In this respect Mónika Dánél's study entitled *Surrogate Nature, Culture, Women – Transylvania/Romania as Inner Colonies in Contemporary Hungarian Films*[13] examines a group of films which take place in Romania, in Transylvania: stories of murders, incest, self-jurisdiction are implanted into the geographically and culturally localised nature and they are represented as the nature of the respective culture. From the angle of the chronotopes of geographical culture, postcolonialism itself becomes a problematic term, in this way the author identifies here a specific local version of the colonising logic. The colonial relationship between the own and the other is transformed into the foreignness, the otherness of the own, thus the Balkans are represented as Europe's inner colony, its Wild East. The arriving white man does not conquer a foreign virgin land, on the contrary, the homecoming male heroes make attempts to recapture the mother earth. However, the mothers, women are surrogate ones, raped or voluntary whores. If the female protagonist becomes a traveller, then this means transport: they are transported to the West, where their homeland becomes their stigma, and this empowers the Western males to hire them. The author of the study regards the term surrogate borrowed from Jacques Derrida – simultaneously bearing the duality of the organic and the foreign – as being suitable for grasping a special version of colonialism, proliferating nowadays, in which nature, culture and woman respectively, localised in Romania, are represented as surrogates of foreign (male) conceptions.

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[13] The article was first published in the international peer-reviewed journal *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae: Film and Media Studies* vol. 5, 2012: 107–128.

The topic of Eastern Europe and the Balkans is revisited in Éva Bányai's study on *Space Concepts in a Geocultural Context – Ádám Bodor: Sinistra District.* The novel mentioned in the title of the study has become one of most frequently interpreted literary works of the Hungarian prose of the nineties. The variety of character names and the analysis of toponyms specific of the textual spaces of Ádám Bodor's prose mobilise various interpretation strategies; the name conglomerate gives the opportunity for the reader to analyse different cultural and linguistic presumptions from a geocultural point of view. In *Sinistra District* the space is formed by boundaries, resulting in an open and enigmatic textual space. There is a correlation between Sinistra, the area and the people populating it: space influences people's behaviour – that is why they become citizens of Sinistra –, what is more, the people living there create the Sinistra district, they spatialise it through their internal and external relations: it is their own embodiment. Thus, the Sinistra District can be localized due to chronotopic coordinates, but at the same time it can be read as an ambiguous, floating place, as the result of the space constructing potential of language, displaying the universal patterns of a relational, intercultural borderland.

Last but not least, Kornélia Faragó's article entitled *Relational Spaces, Active Spatiality* discusses the meanings of relational spaces in poetic and narrative constructions, based on considerations related to the spatial turn. It makes reference to several theoretical issues, from the idea of chronotope developed by Bakhtin to spatial practices articulated by Michel de Certeau. Spatiality and temporality are analysed within the framework of the spatial dynamics of the novel. The article pays special attention to the experience of alterity and to its meanings in the context of spatiality.

As this brief survey of the essays collected in this volume may have indicated, the authors contributing to it have ventured into very diverse representations of space. The approaches range across various discursive practices related to space, outlining the shifts and displacements concerning existence and identity in the continuously changing, restructuring, always transitory, in-between spaces.

We invite a wide range of academic readership including scholars, researchers, PhD, MA and undergraduate students to engage in this fascinating scientific research collected in this volume, related to literature, art, film, media studies and cultural studies and enjoy reading the latest research gathered therein.

The Editors: Judit Pieldner and Zsuzsanna Ajtony

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

PART I

SHAKESPEARE AND THE POETICS OF SPACE

"Where The Place?":
Meanings of Space and of Places
in Shakespeare's *Macbeth*

Géza Kállay

"*Where are we at all?*
And whereabouts in the name of space?"
James Joyce: *Finnegans Wake* (558)

1. The Weird Sisters: *when* and *where*

1 Witch:	When shall we three meet again? (1)
	In thunder, lightning, or in rain? (2)
2 Witch:	When the hurlyburly's done, (3)
	When the battle's lost, and won. (4)
3 Witch:	That will be ere the set of sun. (5)
1 Witch:	Where the place? (6)
2 Witch:	Upon the heath. (6)
3 Witch:	There to meet with Macbeth. (7)
1 Witch:	I come, Graymalkin! (8)
2 Witch:	Paddock calls. (9)
3 Witch:	Anon! (10)
ALL:	Fair is foul, and foul is fair: (11)
	Hover through the fog and filthy air. (12) [*Exeunt.*]

"When shall we three meet again?" (1.1.1.) – the First Witch (Weird Sister) asks, this sentence also being the very first sentence of Shakespeare's *Macbeth*.[1] This question (as preparation to say farewell,

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[1] Throughout this paper I quote *Macbeth* according to Muir (1979). References to the play are according to act-, scene-, and line-numbers in this edition. I also follow Muir (who follows the Folio of 1623, the only available "original" source of the play) in calling the Weird Sisters "Witches" in the above speech-headings but only there. The term "witch" must be handled with caution because it decides about the "ontological status" of these obscure creatures too soon: cf. Nicholas

perhaps) containing two time-adverbials ("when" and "again"), is followed by three options, underscoring the "trinity" of the Weird Sisters, the number three, not without mythological significance. The three possibilities are still in the interrogative mood, and they might be read as referring to both space and time: "In thunder, lightning, or in rain?" (2), i.e.: 'are we going to meet *when* there is thunder, lightning, or rain?' or: 'are we going to meet *where* there is, or will be, thunder, lightning, or rain?' The Second Sister answers with an implied statement where only the adverbial clauses of time are explicit: "[we shall meet] When the hurlyburly's done, / When the battle's lost and won" (3-4). The "hurlyburly," as the editor's gloss indicates, is "uproar, tumult, confusion" (Muir 1979, 5). In my reading, it is a kind of 'tohu va bohu,' a pre-creational, pre-conditional state where nothing is yet clear or decided. *Tohu va bohu* (in fact *tohu va vohu* in the Genesis story), originally means something like 'without form,' 'void,' 'chaos and utter confusion.' Things and persons should have space, place and a stretch of "narrated-dramatised" time in order to come out of the initial chaos: the Weird Sisters are preparing the stage and plot-time, the "where" and "when," for the drama to be performed. However, from the conversation of the Weird Sisters, it is not clear whether the respective time and place of "thunder, lightning and rain" (i.e., a storm) and the 'end' of the "hurlyburly" coincide or not. The terminal point of confusion ("when the hurlyburly's *done*") might serve as a kind of corrective alternative to the possibility of meeting in a storm. So the implied answer might be paraphrased as follows: 'yes, we shall meet in a storm, which is also the end of confusion and void,' or 'no, we shall not meet in thunder, lightning or in rain; we'll rather meet when the uproar and tumult, in fact the battle is over' (the parallel syntactic structures: "When… when…" and even the continuing rhymes, help us to identify "hurlyburly" as "battle").

Moreover, the word *done* sinisterly pre-echoes one of the key-words of the play: for example, Macbeth at the end of the dagger-monologue says: "I go, and it is done" (2.1.62), i.e., 'I will go into Duncan's bedchamber, and I will kill Duncan, and then it is over.' Lady Macbeth, in turn, will

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Brooke's interpretation in the Introduction to the Oxford edition of *Macbeth*: "They call themselves the Weïrd [sic!] Sisters, and Banquo and Macbeth refer to them as such; the only time the word 'witch' is heard in the theatre is in l[ine] 6 of this scene [in Act 1, Scene 3], when the First Witch quotes the words of the sailor's wife as the supreme insult for which her husband must be tortured. 'Weird' did not come to its loose modern usage before the early nineteenth century; it meant Destiny or Fate, and foreknowledge is clearly the Sisters' main function. But the nature of their powers is still ambiguous" (Brooke 1990, 3).

comment, before Macbeth comes back after having killed Duncan, on the scenario with: "Alack, I am afraid they [the body-guards of Duncan sleeping in his room] have awaked, / And 'tis not done" (2.2.9-10) but Macbeth, with bloody hands, enters with the famous words: "I have done the deed" (14). Later, when his wife urges him to go back to Duncan's chamber and "smear / The sleepy grooms [the bodyguards] with blood" (2.2.47-48) he says: "I'll go no more. / I am afraid to think what I have done" (2.2.48-49). Lady Macbeth, re-enacting the murder-scene in her sleepwalking, in Act 5, Scene 1, will exclaim (even echoing the First Weird Sister's "I come, Graymalkin"): "There's knocking at the gate: Come, come, come, come, give me your hand. What's done cannot be undone" (3.1.56-58). When the Lady is already dead and Macbeth is practically alone in his castle to face his enemies, he remarks: "I 'gin [begin] to be aweary of the sun, [I am bored by daylight] / And wish th' estate o'th world [the structure of the universe] were now undone" (5.5.47-48). This can also be paraphrased as: 'I am tired of even the sun shining at me, and I wish God had not created the world.' How anything should, and can be "done" at all is of central significance in the play, and I will return to this question shortly.

The battle is spoken of as if the Weird Sister did not know *who* is going to win and lose, and we of course have no idea yet of even the opponents: right now, this is a 'battle in general,' a 'battle as such.' Yet with this formulation ("lost and won") a future-oriented idea of relativity is introduced as well: after all, it is a general truth that in a conflict, what is winning for the One, is always losing for the Other. The Third Sister, making her first contribution now, foretells at least the approximate time of the end of he battle, and from her words we also learn that – in a play, where a good half of the action, especially the middle of the play, takes place at night – it is most probably still daytime: "That will be ere [before] the set of the sun" (5), to which neither of the other Sisters objects.

Rather, the First Sister starts to negotiate place: "Where the place?" (6), also breaking, with a half-line, the smoothly rhyming series of couplets heard so far, precisely when it comes to talking about *place*. In the discourse of the First Sister, we are, even syntactically and prosodically, dropped out of the series of sentences, hitherto exclusively discussing time, onto a certain *place*. The relation of space and place is severely complicated – not only in the play but in any discussion – and another goal of mine will be to talk about some aspects of this relation. For the time being, I define *place* as a distinctive region of space, a determinate spatial volume which a concrete object or body could, at least in principle, occupy (cf. Rosen 2012).

The Second Sister responds to "Where the place?" with: "Upon the heath" (6) and this rather vague specification of space is further narrowed down with the help of a place-adverbial coming from the Third Sister: "*There* to meet with Macbeth" (7). The sentence, because of the infinitive ("to meet"), is definitely future-oriented, and it brings the proper name "Macbeth" into play for the first time in the play. The fact that after "meet" the preposition "with" is present, suggests that this is a pre-arranged, future encounter, at least on the part of the Weird Sisters (and it will later turn out that Macbeth, indeed, was *not* expecting it, at least not *then* and *there*). Yet, most importantly, "there to meet with Macbeth" ties place and time to an *event*: *meeting* not only with one another, but with the future protagonist of the play as well, in their circle. The Sisters will meet "with" Macbeth in Act 1, Scene 3, yet it is curious that at this initial moment they – like the letter Lady Macbeth receives from her husband and reads upon her first entry onto the stage (cf. 1.5.1-14) – do not mention Banquo. Is this because Banquo will be there anyway but is not worth talking about? Is he a negligible factor? Or will he be an (unpleasant) surprise for the Sisters?

What remains from this very brief scene of not more than 12 lines is resolution: the First Sister says: "I come, Graymalkin!" (8): Graymalkin – as the footnote informs us (cf. Muir 1979, 4) – is a grey cat. This could be the name of one of the Sisters present, but the Second Sister's upcoming laconic statement: "Paddock [i.e.: a toad or frog] calls" (9) makes the reader uncertain: is it so that one of the Sisters – most probably the Third – is called "Paddock" (as such weird creatures were indeed able to take the shape of toads or frogs, just as much as cats, cf. Muir 1979, 4), and now she has started to move and she is calling the others? Or does "Paddock" refer to a fourth Sister (or some kind of persona) whom the Second Sister can hear calling all of them? There is an overall uncertainty, perhaps even a "hurlyburly" here as regards the exact reference of proper names. For the sake of symmetry, the next in line to speak, the Third Sister should perhaps utter a name as well, but she only provides us with a time-adverbial "Anon!" (10) (i.e., 'in a short time,' 'soon,' originally meaning 'in one,' i.e., 'immediately'). And what is the purpose of Greymalkin's implicit, and Paddock's explicit, "call"? Are the Weird Sisters summoned for a specific purpose? Do they have some obligation to fulfil? Or has this first meeting been their "recess," a "time of recreation" and they are called "home" as children are called home by their parents from the play-ground when it is time to go home? How playful are these Sisters, in the Folio of 1623 sometimes called "weyward" ("wayward," i.e., 'erratic,' 'capricious,' 'unreasonable' [cf. Muir 1979, 14, and Crystal and Crystal

2002, 490]), later reciting chants which can also be performed as a round-dance? How serious are they when they confront Macbeth and Banquo? How serious are they when Macbeth visits them, at the beginning of Act 4?

In the light of the play, I find it noteworthy that the Weird Sisters are summoned without either they, or someone else (Graymalkin, Paddock) giving the definitive purpose of the call. As if still another (and, perhaps, still *another*…) call were necessary to clarify why they have to go now. This is worth considering because later for Macbeth each goal attained will by itself entail a new goal to be attained: neither being something with a proper name (such as the "Thane of Cawdor," or "the King"), nor being somewhere (in or out of Duncan's bedchamber, on the throne, at the banquet, in front of Hecate, fighting alone against his enemies in his castle) will mean a "promised end." What Macbeth will lack is a sense of a 'real' ending: each "ultimate goal" will turn out to be an "interim goal," the ultimate one remaining shrouded in obscurity. The plot suggests to its protagonist that when Lady Macbeth says: "I am afraid […] 'tis [the deed, the killing of Duncan is] not done" (2.2.9-10), and when she says "What's done cannot be undone" (3.1.58) she is right, on both occasions. For it is never done. Goals are always deferred, nothing is *really* accomplished, nothing is ever finished, nothing is ever over; whatever there is, it flows on, like Duncan's, "the old man's" "blood." Lady Macbeth will even ask in the sleepwalking scene: "Yet who would have thought the old man to have had so much blood in him?" (5.1.33-34).

One way to sum up Macbeth's tragedy is to say that for him what is done cannot be undone: it is past remedy. However, at the same time, whatever is done, still remains *undone* also in the sense of 'unfinished,' as if significant action with a real purpose had fallen out of time, as if time were rattling along as an empty shell, without any content: "Tomorrow, tomorrow, and tomorrow / Creeps in this petty pace from day to day / To the last syllable of recorded time…" (5.5.18-20). What is done cannot be altered, or changed: the regret, the remorse, the despair is there but it will, and has to, remain undone, in the sense of remaining open, like an open wound. The problem is not only that something is over but also that nothing is ever over. What I am interested in, in this paper, is precisely some of the spatial and 'place-al' consequences of this temporal aspect of the play.

Then comes the much interpreted, proverbial couplet (so the lines are rhyming once again), spoken by all the three of them, as a kind of chant: "Fair is foul, and foul is fair: / Hover through fog and filthy air" (11-12). The references to "fog" and "filthy air" (already filthy, perhaps, because of

the blood, the smoke and the dead bodies of the battle, on the literal level of meaning) are most probably specifications of the immediate surroundings, but how are we to read "Fair is foul, and foul is fair"? The opposition of "fair and foul" is a commonplace in the language of Shakespeare's time but their identification, their making the 'equal' is not.[2] Further, both – rather straightforward – qualities may be interpreted ethically just as much as aesthetically, yielding the following, at least two possible paraphrases: 'good is bad and bad is good' or: 'nice is ugly and ugly is nice.' Yet the identification of these binary oppositions makes that kind of relativity explicit which was implied in "lost and won": not only is it a matter of perspective whether anything or anybody is good or bad, beautiful or repulsive but there is a serious crisis, an overall deflation of values which makes distinctions futile and nonsensical. Not only are time and space (including, it seems, especially the future) under the circumspection of the Weird Sisters but the possibility of translucency, of distinguishable qualities has been heavily compromised for all agencies in the play: we may recall, in Act 1 Scene 4, King Duncan's interrupted reflection on the man who was Thane of Cawdor before Macbeth got this title: "There's no art / To find the mind's construction in the face: / He was a gentleman on whom I built / An absolute trust—" (1.4.12-15).

It is precisely any kind of "absolute" (as opposed to the 'relative,' the 'relational,' the 'partial,' the 'fragmented') that looks impossible in the play. To appreciate what the Sisters stand for even further, we may also remember how Macbeth, upon his first entry onto the stage, echoes the key-words of the concluding, general statement of the Weird Sisters: "So foul and fair a day I have not seen" (1.2.36). Macbeth, at this first, initial stage has not yet identified *foul* and *fair* as the Weird Sisters have done; for him, the two qualities are still in a kind of 'conjoined juxtaposition,' yet with the acknowledgement that they may operate, qualifying "day," simultaneously: not 'foul *is* fair' but 'foul *and* fair.' He may not have seen such a foul *and* fair day because the battle, by nature, was ugly and appalling, but victory was sweet and beautiful, so, indeed, even the winner is a kind of loser, a witness to awe-inspiring and repulsive things. Before Macbeth utters this sentence, we see the Sisters for the second time; the scene (Act 1, Scene 3) opens on the note of place: "*Where* hast thou been,

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[2] Cf. for example the words Brabantio addresses to Othello: "O thou foul thief, where has thou stow's my daughter? […] Whether a maid […] Would ever have […] Run from her guardage to the sooty bosom / Of such a thing as thou?" (1.2.62-71) and, in turn, the words of the Duke of Venice to Brabantio: "… noble signior, / If virtue no delight in beauty lack, / Your son-in-law is far more fair than black" (1.3.288-290); quoted according to Ridley (1986). Cf. also Brooke (1990, 95).

Sister? / Killing swine. / Sister, *where* thou?" (1.3.1-3), and the story the
First Sister tells about the sailor's wife, the sailor and the "tempest-tost
bark" (1.3.24, 25) indicates a considerable (though not absolute) control
over space as well.

To conclude the first scene, and to entice Macbeth to step into the
magic circle, the Weird Sisters, singing and dancing "hand in hand," wind
up the "charm" (cf. 1.3.31, 36). The Sisters' circle is often taken to be
standing for the ultimate (and absolute) space of the theatre: the stage
itself. I take the relativity of "fair is foul and foul is fair" – especially
through the aesthetic connotations of these words – as the play's invitation
to see time as something which "hovers through," which 'lingers
uncertainly as,' and which 'melts' into, space, as the Weird Sisters do: into
"fog and filthy air." Thus *time* becomes a phenomenon which is suspended
as, and is constantly 'translated' into, space and place.

It is by working my way through space, "carving out my passage" (cf.
1.2.21) through sites of place in *Macbeth* that I wish to draw some more
general conclusions as regards discourses of space. Reading *Macbeth* is
not only to narrow a hopelessly vast field down into a more manageable
arena of space-discussion; it may have further significance. If – in line
with Duncan – we consider Shakespeare to be a 'gentleman on whom we
may build absolute trust,' and this trust consists in the hypothesis that a
poetic-dramatic genius presents, in his text, space and place in a highly
original manner, we may hope for some substantial insights precisely from
the poetic-dramatic texture of his play which, of course with due caution,
can be formulated on a more comprehensive and abstract level and,
therefore, in a conceptual manner. In other words, I will read the particular
story of a particular character in a literary piece in hope of some more
general, philosophical insights – this is, as far as I can see it, one of the
advantages of reading literature and philosophy together.

2. The universalist and the personalist accounts of space, place and time

If, indeed, time is envisaged as "dynamic," "transient" and "flowing,"
and space as "static," "permanent" and "fixed," then it seems we are
revisiting some of the most fundamental and initial problems from which
Greek philosophy, and, thus, our Western thinking originated: the problem
of the relationship between permanence and change, sameness and
difference, identity and relativity, determinacy and indeterminacy,
synchrony and diachrony, necessity and contingency. One of the most
puzzling philosophical queries of the Western tradition has been how we

can talk, simultaneously, about specific, individual phenomena – about "each thing" – and about classes, sets of things, also appearing in the philosophical literature as "universals," "types" (as opposed to particular tokens), "sortal or general concepts." How can I talk about both "the table" or "tables" in general, and about "this (very) table" (in front of me) in particular? Particular things will always differ from each other (even two eggs will not be totally alike) and it was the temporal aspect of difference, as one of the *causes* of difference, which was first emphasised especially by Heraclitus (~ 535 – ~ 475 BC) at the dawn of philosophical speculation: everything will be in constant flux, in constant motion (cf. Kirk, Raven and Schofield 1995, 181-212). The Sophists famously followed Heraclitus, and claimed that because everything is changing all the *time*, and there will always be a difference between things even with respect to themselves, no knowledge is possible at all: both the thing I wish to describe, and I who try to describe it, change so much even within the very short time it takes to name the thing, that the thing will not even "deserve" the name (and the more lengthy description even less so). It is equally well-known that Plato wanted to solve the question by 'stopping' the constant flux. He proposed that our ability to intelligibly talk about a particular thing and to grasp it conceptually, in other words to create classes, universals, types, sortal concepts, into which we can put particular things in order to interpret them, is possible because our by nature "general" concepts are "backed up" – in a highly complicated and here not further analysable way – by Forms (Ideas) that correspond to our concepts. Forms cannot be moved out of their place because they are fixed in the space of "real" Reality: Forms are unmoving, eternal and absolute. Thus, ultimately, it is Forms that make thinking and (certain) knowledge possible, since they resist movement and, therefore, time. Time, and the particular "amidst" time, was trapped in space, assigning a fixed place to another, generic (universal, typical, sortal) form of the particular (cf. especially Plato, *Cratylus*, 437d-440e and the *Republic*, 514a-526e).[3]

Thus, the relationship between time and space raises, in variously profound ways, some of the most fundamental puzzles of Western thinking. It is not only because of Plato's enormous influence on the subsequent philosophical tradition that we may see why any discourse about space is bound up with talk about time, and vice versa. When, e.g.,

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[3] I give the references to Plato's works according to the so-called "Estienne" (or "Stephanus")-pagination, which is internationally used. An excellent and famous English translation of Plato's oeuvre is Hamilton and Cairns (1982), where *Cratylus* was translated by Benjamin Jowett (421-474) and the *Republic* by Paul Shorey (575-844).

to observe something, I fix a thing, I fix it in space and assign it to a certain place: place, as defined above, is a determinate region of space, a "here or there." This way place appears to be the space the particular object occupies and if it does not move, we may talk of a "concrete, fixed place," whereas we usually think of time as, nevertheless, "going on," as "passing by" (somehow "around," "above" or "under," or wherever) the object which is fixed in this or that specific volume of space. It is true that we do not experience space or place "separately," i.e., independently of the object: it is precisely the object that "cuts out" place, a "piece of space" – as Michel Foucault would say – for us (Foucault 1986, 27 qtd. in Casey 1993, 317). But we "experience" time separately "even less," since it is one of the "duties" of time never to stop but to go on-and-on, in an ungraspable manner. If I put an object down, and then lift it up, I can touch the "place" (the "ground") it has occupied. But how could I ever "touch" the time, the "while" when it was there?

The most ardent proponent of the view that time and space, although directly "invisible," are necessary, unconditional and always already present determinants of anything we experience was Immanuel Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason.* He called space and time "pure forms of intuition" (Kant 1956, B 66)[4] meaning that it is an anthropological fact about human beings that they arrange and order everything they perceive in space and time; space and time are initial "aspects," or "frames" we simply cannot get rid of, and according to which, and in which, we envisage all phenomena; three-dimensional space, and time as the fourth dimension (and no "more" dimensions are possible) are in the mind as categories of apprehension and understanding, and they are our most fundamental and direct relations to the world (cf. Kant 1956, B 37-73).

Kant's theory of space (and time) involves the famous "Copernican turn" Kant congratulated himself on most: thinkers should turn the tables on the world, and should not adjust themselves to the world; rather, they should allow the world to mould according to the boundaries the human being discovers in herself (cf. Kant 1956 B xix-xxiv). Thus, Kant's theory of space and time has become a highly original account also in terms of presenting a special "blend" of what we may call the "cosmological" (or "physicalist," or "objectivist") theory of space (and time) on the one hand, and the "personalist" (or "psychological," or "subjectivist") theory of

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[4] I follow the international practice of giving references to Kant's work by using the pagination of the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (originally from 1787), widely called as the "B-text". The standard English translation of the *Kritik der reinen Vernuft* is Kant (1956), the quote above can be found on page 66.

space (and time) on the other.[5] For Kant, space and time are in the mind, it is a genuinely "inner" and human category (and limit). At the same time, neither space nor time is "subjective" in the sense that each of us would have a different apprehension of them; on the contrary, they are objectively *there*, in each mind, as an anthropological necessity. In cosmologist space-talk such questions are discussed as whether space is not more than a bundle of *spatial relationships* between material things – as Leibnitz held –, or whether space – as Newton argued – should rather be considered as having *real existence*. For Newton, space is a *genuine entity*, a "vast aetherial container without walls, in which everything else that exists lives and moves and has its being" (Van Cleve 2009, 74).[6] Talk about space not as personal experience or orientation but as "space in the universe," as "space in the world" which would exist even independently of human beings, involved discussion of the possibility of void, of "empty space," and also of geometrical issues, including Euclidean versus non-Euclidean geometries. Since the modern revolution of physics at the beginning of the 20th century, space and time have been found to be inseparable, and, thus, have been discussed as "spacetime," giving rise to a new discussion of cause and effect relations, of the "asymmetry" between the past and the future,[7] and even of entropy. The philosopher is interested in these – resolute and sometimes bitter – debates to draw some conclusions as regards fundamental metaphysical issues about cause, effect, determinism, and so on, from a field that seems, at least for some thinkers, to be independent of human relations and subjective perception, since geometry and physics have long had the reputation of disciplines where the "laws of nature" would hold even if no humans were present in the Universe.

Others, either convinced that any talk about space and time is hopelessly bound up with human agency anyway, or that we should rest

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[5] It was Paul Ricoeur, who, in his *Time and Narrative,* introduced the respective terms "cosmological conceptions of time" (such as, e.g., Aristotle's) versus "psychological theories of time" (such as, e.g., Augustine of Hippo's). The first is concerned – in Ricoeur's words – with "the time of the world," the second with "the time of the soul" (cf. Ricoeur 1988, 12-22). I think this distinction can be applied to theories of space as well.

[6] See further Sklar (2009, 569-574) and: "Space is, in Newton's famous remark in the *Opticks* [sic!] 'God's sensorium', the organ through which God is omnipresent in the world" (Rutherford 1999, 436).

[7] "We remember and have records of the past, but not of the future. We take causal influence to proceed from earlier to later events. We think of the past as 'fixed' and unchangeable, but of the future as 'open' and indeterminate in nature" (Sklar 2009, 573).

satisfied with a more modest program, have tied the discussion of space –
and time, too – to openly "personal" interpretations, where the initial point
of departure is the way we ordinarily conceive of space as everyday
beings. This does not mean that a personalist philosophical account would
concentrate only on extreme and exclusively idiosyncratic views of space.
Personalists – mostly, as far as I can see, those working on the problem of
space from the phenomenological point of view – also wish to generalise
and "transcend" their particular accounts. They tend to treat themselves as
examples – as sort of "metonymical samples," standing for many others –
whose introspective insights might find resonance in a lot of other people.
Where personalists differ from cosmologists most, I think, is that a
personalist acknowledges her findings to be the result of conscious
reflection on what initially is private experience, originating in an act of
consciousness (or, as the Anglo-Saxon tradition prefers to say: in an act of
the mind) of her own. A personalist thinks of the experience of space,
always already *as reflected* experience which would simply not exist
without the observer's consciousness, without her "inner world." This
goes back to the "father" of phenomenology, Edmund Husserl, whose
revolution in philosophy was precisely marked – among other feats – by
considering only those properties of things real which can be experienced
in everyday life (cf. Hammond, Howarth and Keat 1991, 5). Consequently,
it does not come as a surprise that instead of space, personalists prefer to
talk about place, or even of commonplace (the latter including Maurice
Blanchot, for instance).[8] Gaston Bachelard, who is rightfully celebrated for
having re-annexed place for existential philosophy and for the appreciation
of literature, in his famous *The Poetics of Space* grudgingly remarks that
philosophers boast that they "know the universe before they know the
house," while what in fact they never forget and, thus, genuinely know are
"the intimate values of inside space" (Bachelard 1964, 5 and 31), the
"house of their own," which is their personality and very existence.
Edward Casey, in his *Getting Back into Place,* a groundbreaking study in

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[8] Cf. Maurice Blanchot: "Man does not want to leave his own place (*luogo*). He
says that technology is dangerous, that it distracts from our relationship with the
world […]. Who is this man? It is each one of us. [...] This same man suffered a
shock the day Gagarin became the first man in space. […] In these cases we must
pay heed to the man in the street, to the man with no fixed abode. […] It is
therefore necessary, up there, for the man from the Outside to speak, and to speak
continuously, not only to reassure and to inform us, but because he has no other
link with the old place than that unceasing word, which […] says, to whoever is
able to understand it, only some insignificant commonplace, but also says top this
to him who listens carefully: that truth is nomadic" (Blanchot 1996, 269 and 272).