The Making of Modern Portugal

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P U B L I S H I N G

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

INTRODUCTION

UNMAKING MODERN PORTUGAL

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National histories and introductory syntheses on peripheral countries published in the centre – like the present volume, a collection of studies on modern Portugal in English – usually respond to a state of ignorance about those countries and assign themselves the task of filling a gap. In the present case, however, Portugal is not exactly unknown outside the country, and is certainly not *Terra Incognita* in foreign, namely British and North-American universities. In fact, we can go as far as to suggest that most people in a country such as the United Kingdom are able to identify images of Portuguese history, geography and culture – or at least one of the three. From recognizable historical moments (especially related to its former Empire), through some key names in literature (perhaps cinema) and famous sportsmen, all the way to tourist destinations, to most people Portugal's image, while not necessarily familiar, is far from exotic.

Moreover, Portuguese studies in British and North-American academia are surprisingly lively given the country's size and its standing in the world. In this sense, this book cannot claim to introduce a new topic or open a new field. This does not mean that more studies and publications in Portuguese studies would not be welcomed, nor does it suggest that there is no need to chart and explore new areas, although such a need is valid to Portuguese studies both outside and inside Portugal. The point, however, is that Portugal has been deemed relevant enough to require a theoretical background – produced both by Portuguese and foreign intellectuals and academics, along the lines of colonial and post-colonial theory – to frame the country's historical narrative in a rather prominent place in world history. This *conceptual* inscription of the role of Portugal in the development of the modern world was far from obvious, or predictable.

Most theories trying to come to terms with the Portuguese case within the world-system tend to situate the country and its history somewhere in-between the seemingly better defined positions of centre and periphery.

This took a number of different forms throughout the twentieth century, of which the two most influential are probably Gilberto Freyre's Luso-Tropicalism (more than half a century ago) and Boaventura Sousa Santos's deployment of the concept of semi-periphery (in the last decades), both situating the case of Portugal in a larger context, although through different narratives and indeed opposing methodologies and worldviews – not in the least because whereas Freyre provided a powerful narrative for Portugal's *exceptionality*, Sousa Santos's work is one of our best tools to think the country's *specificity* within a larger frame. In fact, the former is an attempt to distinguish the Portuguese Empire from other European forms of colonialism – and ultimately establish an identity for that Empire's most important colony, Brazil, as a multiracial society – by insisting on the willingness of the Portuguese colonizer to miscegenate with the natives from its overseas territories. And, according to Freyre, it was precisely Portugal's in-betweeness in relation to Europe and Africa, which meant it shared the traits which supposedly characterized the peoples of both continents, that allowed for this singularity.

Sousa Santos's use of the term *semi-periphery* in relation to Portugal opposes such identitarian crystallization, by discussing the country as a specific case within the capitalist world-system. From this angle, Portugal should be seen as being in-between the main centres of capitalist exchange and industrial production, on the one hand, and the peripheral colonies – or the Third World, in the second half of the twentieth-century –, on the other. This rather singular status would put Portugal in a paradoxical position as both colonized (by England, before any other central Empire) and colonizer. Although Boaventura Sousa Santos's aim is not to search for an identitarian originality – unlike Freyre's Luso-Tropicalism – it is not difficult to imagine how renewed theories of Portugal's unique place in the world can easily spring from the paradoxes of semi-peripheral in-betweeness.

Such a position – both geographical and theoretical – has a direct impact on the images, and research, produced about Portugal both at home and abroad. In fact, if we look at the syntheses on Portuguese history and society produced or published in English, for example, it is apparent that what has caught the interest of scholars – and presumably of readers – has precisely been what distinguishes Portugal from other nations: sixteenth-century maritime expansion and Empire – up to the colonial wars in the twentieth-century –, and the most dramatic moments in Portuguese modernity, such as Fascism and Revolution. It is hard to imagine how it could have been otherwise. Indeed, Portugal's weight in the course of modern world history is negligible outside of these moments.

And yet, this may be precisely what makes the approach to modern Portugal the reader will find in this book interesting to both those who specialize in Portuguese studies and history and those to whom Portugal only rings a few, very recognizable, bells, such as the names of Vasco da Gama and Salazar (or maybe Camões and Saramago), or events like the Carnation Revolution. For what the reader can expect to find in *The Making of Modern Portugal* is a portrait of a dynamic society, rather than a stable historical entity, whose formation is in fact strikingly close to the historical processes other modern societies went through. This is arguably an opportunity to redeploy the most traditional questions of identitarian inquiry (*what's the place of Portugal in the world?*; *how is Portugal's identity distinctive?*) in terms of the proximity and similarity – i.e., through comparatism – between the Portuguese case and the modern histories of countries in its vicinity. In other words, this book is not meant as a critique of a scholarly body of knowledge traditionally focused on what distinguishes Portugal but rather an attempt to complement that existing corpus by going beyond the most recognizable events in Portuguese history – which, in this case, means charting the country's social structures and historical dynamics in greater detail.

The Making of Modern Portugal constitutes the main output of a collective research project on the making of State Power in Portugal during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The project, funded by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia [Portuguese Science and Technology Foundation, FCT], entailed a series of initiatives, from conferences, workshops and meetings with project members to other publications. The book's direct antecedent was a conference held in London in May 2011 – co-organized by the Birkbeck Institute for the Humanities of the University of London and the Institute for Contemporary History of the New University of Lisbon –, where the majority of its contributors had the opportunity to present and discuss their work.

The conditions provided by the project's funding to work collectively for three years emerge here as more than just a practical aspect in the making of this book, as it had a decisive impact on its final outcome. In fact, only this opportunity to meet, discuss and develop ideas and research collectively could enable the combination of so many different historical contexts and methodological approaches within a single coherent work. In this sense, *The Making of Modern Portugal* does not present a linear narrative or offer a unified thesis about its subject. Instead, what the reader may find here is a map of tensions, an articulation of different perspectives, combined within a single set of problems, and framed by a

shared commitment to problematization and a common engagement with interdisciplinarity.

None of the twelve contributors would have been able to draw such a map and produce those articulations single-handedly. More than on modern Portugal as such, each one of them specializes in specific fields of historiography and the social sciences. This is, in part, another consequence of the impact produced by FCT on academic research in Portugal during the last two decades and of the ways in which it opened its debates to wider scientific communities. The problems under discussion in each chapter can thus be said to engage with the theoretical debates of different disciplines and research fields internationally *as much as* with the specific questions raised by the subject within Portuguese historiography and social sciences.

It is important to stress these material aspects of the book from the outset because the quantitative and qualitative transformation made possible by FCT in the Portuguese research environment since the 1990s produced a dramatic change in the nature of historical and social knowledge in and about Portugal. In the particular historical and sociological fields discussed in this book, the debates have opened up conceptually, rather than along the internal logic of the country's particularism and national identity. Moreover, a book like this seems to prove that the time of all-encompassing syntheses produced by individual intellectuals is over. Any such syntheses now have to be collective and any form of coherence rests on interdisciplinary consistency, i.e., on method, rather than on a stroke of genius capable of encapsulating the whole of Portugal under a single narrative or concept, however ingenious it may be.

On the other hand, if historical and social knowledge now seems to be more comprehensive, that should invite us to establish more nuanced relations between the different disciplines and society as a whole, rather than trying to come up with new, even if better informed, *Histories of Portugal*, whose shortcomings are familiar enough: linear chronologies and an object (the Nation) all too well defined within its frontiers. In other words, the change brought about by this epistemological shift, of which this book is just an example, implies a radical turn that may allow us to go as far as saying that Portugal – as that stable entity with a specific identity – has ceased to exist, or is in the process of being unmade, and that the priority is now to study particular historical circumstances and specific social conditions.

Both the structure of *The Making of Modern Portugal* as a whole and each chapter's internal organization can be better understood as a consequence of this research context. For the book, following the project's

initial plan, is based on the intersection of two different sets of problems articulating each author's specific field of study with a collective overview of Portuguese modern history. This allows for a *double reading* of the work. On the one hand, each author discusses a different aspect of social modernization or a specific political structure with nothing *distinctively Portuguese* about it: population, police, empire, technology, bureaucracy, social knowledge, rural life, education, church, nationalism, communism and economy. These topics, addressed in each of the twelve chapters, are best understood as part of debates beyond modern Portugal. The reader can focus on the way different chapters engage with different disciplines (e.g., studies on population, education, nationalism studies, etc.).

On the other hand, however, the reader may also want to follow the thread weaved by the twelve chapters as a whole. The book, as previously suggested, does not provide a linear narrative or a coherent picture of Portuguese modernity. More than a comprehensive overview, then, all contributions to *The Making of Modern Portugal* share a common approach to their different objects whereby key institutions at work in the country's modern history – some of those deep structures that constitute society and determine politics – are seen as dynamic processes, traversed by internal struggles. More specifically, each chapter equates State power and politics as the organizing dynamic around which all other phenomena revolve, directly or indirectly. Accordingly, rather than trying to describe stable structures, the book narrates processes of institutionalization that reproduce some of the most important aspects in the evolution of Portuguese society and politics during the last two centuries, as well as the inner tensions of that historical process usually known as modernity, through the perspective of State formation, as shaped by conflict.

At this point, interdisciplinarity becomes more than just an eclectic approach, bringing different research methods together, to become a coherent practice in its own right. What is at stake in what appears, at first sight, a simple procedure – the opening of the State to its historical dynamic, the politicization of apparently stable social structures – is in fact the outcome of an intense dialogue between practitioners from different branches of historiography, sociology and political science, and one with decisive consequences in the emergence of a new narrative of modern Portugal, with a more nuanced articulation of change and permanence, structure and politics, or, to put it in the terms of a fundamental divide in the epistemological debates in the social sciences, between synchrony and diachrony. The book's method can be synthesized as an attempt to analyse different State forms as parts of the social structure, which each chapter then articulates with the political dynamics taking place within that same

social structure and simultaneously contributing to the transformation of the State.

What is shared throughout the book – what the book can present in the mode of a *narrative*, but also as a tracing of narrative's limits – is the notion that if the power exerted by State institutions constrains the evolution of social structures, the latter's dynamic contributed to shaping the form of State power in the first place. To open the past of these institutions to the historical dynamic and the social tensions surrounding them may allow us to show that the State's robustness is more precarious than it seems, caught in the ever-changing tug-of-war between institutions and society. This approach constitutes a double critique of both synchronic analyses of State structure (naturalizing the logic of institutions) and diachronic political history (naturalizing political agency).

More decisively, the structure of *The Making of Modern Portugal*, as suggested above, will hopefully contribute to the critique and discussion of traditional national histories organized along linear chronologies and monist political narratives and of social analyses heavily reliant on identity and often insulated from external contexts. The book's structure and the objects it deals with will therefore establish a dialectics between what can only be understood within specific contexts – State formation as a response to historical situations and social conditions – and the obvious relations with similar objects and processes occurring in the same period but in other geographical spaces and under different social conditions.

To open Portuguese history and society to their inner tensions and external contexts is thus both simple and decisive: for while it merely recognizes the obvious – the affinity between the country's modernization and a wider world history –, the obvious can here be used to frame the historical and sociological narratives about modern Portugal from a new perspective, simply and briefly synthesized as follows: *while there is nothing particularly exceptional about Portugal, Portuguese society did go through specific historical processes throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, of particular relevance inasmuch as they are easily recognized as being part of a wider context*.

In short, to frame modern Portugal as a case study will contribute to de-naturalize those linear *Histories of Portugal* constantly in search of the country's true identity and destiny. To focus on the *making of* political situations and social circumstances may thus allow us to *unmake* the dramatizations of identity. This does not mean that the history of modern Portugal was without drama, and to ignore it would elide a key element of Portuguese society during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, one without which the stories told in these different chapters would remain

virtually incomprehensible: Portugal, as every other European country during the same period, experienced a sharp awareness of being, on the one hand, a singular geographical entity with a distinguishable history, as well as, on the other hand, part of modernity, i.e., a historical period – and historical process – defined by an ideology of progress and by a belief in permanent political, economic and social development. But to recognize the historical effectiveness of a period's temporal self-consciousness does not necessarily mean to treat those ideas as temporal categories of historical narrative. Similarly, it is possible to recognize a country's geographical self-consciousness (the way it sees itself as a country), without falling into geographical determinism.

In other words, to distinguish between a concrete perception (shared by many Portuguese in the last two centuries) and a rule ingrained in the historical process probably constitutes the kernel of this book's critical approach. In fact, it can be suggested that what dramatizes Portuguese historical narratives is the inability to draw that distinction between a widespread social aspiration to progress and progress as a historical law. As a result, Portuguese historiography seldom manages to avoid a gap between what society was and what it felt it should be. This gap is what makes the perception of modern Portugal so dramatic and, as such, it constitutes a historical and social phenomenon in its own right: the persistent and widespread narrative defining Portugal as backward, pervading all kinds of discourse and giving shape to the country's *political unconscious*, must be treated as a constitutive aspect of its modern history. It should be said that the idea that Portugal was lagging behind in the processes of modernization throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was, in itself, the recognition that Portuguese society was indeed part of that wider historical process. However, by narrating modernization as a linear and necessary process, historiography itself contributed to the formation of an ideology of progress following ideal examples (England, France, Germany and the United States – depending on the historical context) against which a small and peripheral country like Portugal would always be bound to fail.

Portugal's modernity could never live up to the expectations raised by the narratives of, for example, English economic development, French political freedom, or German cultural enlightenment. And yet, the dominant narratives of the country's modern history were shaped by this teleological burden of historical determinism: political history narrates the succession of political regimes as a continuous road to freedom, whereby constitutional monarchy (1834-1910) overcomes absolutism, a process accelerated – or decelerated, from a conservative perspective – by the

Republic (1910-1926), interrupted by the New State's dictatorship (1926-1974) and resumed by post-revolutionary parliamentary democracy (1976-…); economic history organizes its narrative along the development of capitalism, a process within which the dictatorship's corporatism and the 1974-75 revolution's socialism necessarily appear as *reactive* or *strange*; finally, in cultural history the gap between the ideal model and the material conditions of Portuguese society gave way to a pervasive feeling of discomfort, which fills national identity with images of authenticity, roots and originality, on the one hand, and modernization and universalism, on the other.

One of the most striking consequences of the narratives of the different branches of historiography is to transform the long twentieth-century New State's dictatorship into an alien parenthesis in the overall narrative of historical modernity. Those narratives, however, impose their rule over the whole of the historical period by forcing political regimes to act as the true accelerators of modernization and tinging their emergence (and leaders) with the halo of messianism. The consequences of this are twofold. On the one hand, all historical phenomena take place as if there was no society, that is, concrete social conditions, in-between the initiative of individual agents and singular events. On the other hand, an enormous burden is placed over the State as the guarantor of – or, again, from a conservative perspective, an obstacle to – progress as historical necessity.

This book's contribution to the knowledge about modern Portugal can thus be seen as an effort to break with the narrative of modernization, freedom and national autonomy in its many different aspects, rhythms and tensions, and to include these disparate historical processes in a broader history. Still, given all sets of combinations *The Making of Modern Portugal* brings forth, one might be tempted to ask what new narrative about modern Portugal can we expect to get at the end of the book? Probably not a very coherent one. And yet, after reading these twelve chapters, one is left with a clear picture of a long-term, permanent effort by the State to govern its territory and population, a process through which State institutions never ceased to develop – as slowly, unsatisfactorily, frustratingly as it may have been – their techniques of government, forms of knowledge and control, that modern contradictory process where progress is paired with violence. The permanence of such an endeavour, one could go as far as saying, is the key aspect of this history, with the proviso that one must include its shortcomings as a constitutive part of it – and the general feeling of frustration, the acute awareness of the gap between models, ideals, discourses and aspirations, on the one hand, and

social conditions and historical contexts, on the other, that seems to pervade all these narratives, must also be given its proper historical place.

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The book's narrative follows a somewhat chronological sequence from long-lasting processes of control and government (population, police, empire, technology, bureaucracy), through specialized forms of knowledge and institutions (the emergence of social sciences, State planning of rural life, education, the Church) to discourses both reinforcing the norm (nationalism) and in a conflictive relation with it (communism), all the way up to a specific event (a revolution), whose break retrospectively gives a sense to the period's social and economic development.

This structure critically reviews some of the key problems in the dominant narrative of Portuguese historiography and social sciences: the economy as a last instance cause; a chronology mainly organized along the succession of political regimes and institutional history; the isolation of institutions, ideologies and other sets of ideas and discourses. Simultaneously, the focus on the State in historical and social context will help relativize its status as a power apparatus, by stressing internal struggles, (political) shifts, (historical) failures, and (social) contradictions. In sum, modern Portugal emerges from the State, but it is *made*, i.e., it has agents, intentionality, and plurality. The dynamic presupposed in the process of *Making of* is, in this sense, what is properly political in this approach.

The book starts with a chapter narrating the long history of passports as an example of those same two levels of analysis this introduction is trying to come to terms with: a double marker of internal State policy to control its population and of society's relations with the world outside. In it, Victor Pereira introduces a set of key problems the reader will later find in subsequent chapters: the gap between the power of centralized State institutions – their material presence across the national territory –, and the efforts to effectively control the movements of the population. The problem of passports had a direct relation with several aspects of the country's economy and State as it responded to the need of controlling the work force, making it available as rural labour, for military drafts or to colonize the Empire. The contradictions between these different "uses" of the population are especially apparent in the long liberal nineteenth century: in fact, the ideology of liberalism often found itself at odds with the political practices of liberal governments, not only because of the State's inability to fully control the territory as a whole, but also due to the

contradictory interests of the economic elites, namely the agrarian drive to fix the rural population to the land versus the call for migration from urban industrialization. The arrival of authoritarianism (1926-1974) opens an opportunity to retrospectively clarify the long trend of liberalism and its shortcomings and contradictions, when it reversed the liberal project by coercively keeping populations within the limits of the national border and socio-economic origin. Autocracy, after World War II, brings about another contradiction, for whereas State ideology and repressive practices try to isolate the population, external pressures to leave (European economic development, the colonial wars, etc.) escalate.

The same historical process – a history of modernization through its shortcomings, or, the narrative of the gap between political aspirations and material policies – continues in chapter 2, where Diego Palacios Cerezales aptly argues that the difficulties to cover the territory with a police force are not only a good illustration, but indeed a cornerstone, of the whole process. The chapter's thesis is intriguing and can perhaps be summarized in two closely connected elements. First, the presence of a police force would have been an indispensable tool to collect tax and, subsequently, develop all sorts of modernizing projects. Secondly, the absence of such a police force not only disabled the State as a tool of development but it also short-circuited the creation of bonds between citizens and the State, thus preventing the birth of a true civic culture. The difficulties felt by both constitutional monarchy in the second half of the nineteenth-century and the Republic between 1910 and 1926 (mainly due to local resistances by landowners and political *caciquismo*), thus trapped the State in a vicious circle: low budgets did not allow for the creation of a police force, while without a strong police force it was impossible to collect the necessary taxes for the deployment of more police (and other forms of State presence in the territory). Historically, the failure to create a liberal police never allowed the constitution of a true 'public service'. When the police finally took hold of the whole territory, under twentieth-century authoritarian New State, it was already in the form of 'political control'.

The historical period of the New State, and particularly the post-World War II context – with the rise of the Third World as a historical subject and the emergence of liberation movements of decolonization – reveals a similar paradoxical combination between the shortcomings of State governance and the history of the Portuguese Empire: for it was only under the a dictatorial regime, and in the dramatic context of the Colonial Wars (1961-1974) – i.e., under a militarist policy – that the State finally managed to control its colonial territories in Africa and set basic colonial institutions to organize the also recent occupation of settlers. Here, too,

this particular history goes back at least to the beginning of the liberal State in the first half of the nineteenth century. As Miguel Bandeira Jerónimo shows in chapter 3, the administration of Empire and the particular *making of* the colonial State interestingly experienced similar difficulties to those faced by State power in the metropolis: the inability to have more than a feeble, superficial (i.e. coastal) presence in the vast colonial possessions limited the Portuguese empire to a *de jure*, rather than *de facto*, situation. As in the previous chapters, we are confronted with a similar gap between political plans following those of the great colonial powers and the territorial presence of Portuguese colonialism, similar obstacles to implement a comprehensive tax system (with comparable political consequences), and a similar historical coincidence between the late emergence of effective State power and authoritarianism.

The concept of technological disuse, deployed by Bruno Cordeiro in chapter 4, takes the large spectrum perspectives over State, development and territory to a more focused, and thus more nuanced, or dense, aspect of the question: street lighting in Lisbon from the mid-nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. State impact over the territory may here seem less political, but it clarifies some aspects with important implications in the country's conditions of government. To start with, it suggests that lighting was a process of governing the night. But it also shows that the capital was an exception within the country's modernization process, as rural regions and smaller urban areas were experiencing very different rhythms of technological progress. This creates a problem for the standard narrative of *the making of the modern country*, as Lisbon tends to be seen as the synecdoche of Portugal as a whole. Furthermore, it goes on to show how the city itself was uneven, with different levels of technological transformation evolving according to the discrepancies between centre and periphery. The history of the State thus becomes something very different from a linear process of growth and modernization, however slow and filled with obstacles. The disparities between different State practices reflect a complex system of spatiotemporal differentiation dividing the country into multiple layers, whose interconnectedness contributes to reinforce the gap between modern aspirations and accomplishments.

Chapter 5 inverts the perspective offered by previous chapters, from the centrifugal drive to act over populations and territories, to the centripetal practices, images and discourses produced by the State or on the State itself, from liberalism to authoritarianism. Joana Estorninho de Almeida uses bureaucracy and the images of civil servants to identify and describe a process through which the State becomes an autonomous site of social practices and classes in its own right. The chapter offers a detailed

description of the making of the mechanisms creating the modern State/bureaucratic culture through which still another contradiction can be grasped: that between the open resistances to bureaucracy from all walks of society along with the generalized perception of the inevitability of bureaucratization. The weight of State institutions in social life was so crushing that the forms of representation of bureaucracy and its servants can be read as a metonymy not only of social modernization but also of the country's political history as such. The forms used to represent bureaucracy, more generally, and the images of public servants in particular, can in this sense be seen as a projection of the changing status of modern politics due to its dependence on a growing public sphere and the development of photography and other spectacular forms of mass media. In short, the evolution of State representation from nineteenth century liberalism to the authoritarian New State follows the same hierarchical trends one can find in politics itself, whereby the State becomes publicly identified with its most recognizable leaders rather than its anonymous middle-rank functionaries.

Other aspects of the history of State development as the narrative of an autonomous, self-referential set of institutions and practices continue to be explored in the following chapters. In chapter 6, Frederico Ágoas gives a close description of the emergence of the social sciences as a State practice in Portugal. In fact, the origins of social inquiry in the country drew from scientific methodologies and were developed within academia, but were initially sponsored by the State and designed for State purposes. In particular, the use of sociological inquiries and the early development of sociology as a discipline in the beginning of the twentieth century can be simultaneously described as still another combination of modern practices and as a tool of modernization – following the model of foreign countries experiencing processes of industrialization and urbanization – with the specific requirements of a country whose economy was heavily dependent on agriculture. Here too the history of the drive to assemble information on territory and population can be narrated in the context of the passage from nineteenth-century liberalism to twentieth-century authoritarianism, a narrative where the most conservative political regime coincides with the major leap in the constitution of modern forms of government. The dictatorship, with its conservative ideology about how the country was and how it should remain, used inquiries mostly to modernize the forms of government of a traditional society, rather than, as elsewhere, as a response to social and economic modernization, i.e., urbanization and industrialization. In other words, and closely following the tendency already visible in previous chapters, the specific form of Portuguese

modernization is a compromise between foreign models and the specificities of the social structure.

The twentieth-century long authoritarian experience can in this sense be seen as a form of *conservative management*: a combination between the forms of governmentality inherited from liberalism and conservative politics. The case of internal colonization described by Elisa Lopes da Silva in chapter 7 is a good example of this: the project to redistribute the rural population across the territory, moving people from the North to the South was, on the one hand, a suitable display of a vigorous technology of power, while its failure – for it fell through in its application – brings to the fore various forms of rural resistance as well the shortcomings of the Portuguese State – the gap between perceptions and accomplishments other chapters have insisted upon assumes here the form of a reflection on the limits of State power. The project in itself is significant inasmuch as it shows the weight of rural life in Portugal well into the twentieth century. So, while the constant persistence of plans for agrarian and social reform throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries encapsulates the most decisive political problem of Portuguese modernity, the specific project of internal colonization institutionalized by the New State was yet another example of a modern technique of government deployed in the name of social conservatism: the project to redistribute population in order to rationalize the resources of the territory (with properties in the North deemed too small, and estates in the South too large) through the promotion of family farms, an endeavour to not only optimize agricultural production but also to reproduce agricultural labour force, could then be used to substitute the ongoing proletarianization in the South by the creation of landowners.

In Chapter 8, Jorge Ramos do Ó stretches the narrative of governmentality to the limit, by showing another key aspect of modernization – education – as a privileged site of social control. As before, the dictatorship emerges as the mere pinnacle of the historical formation of the liberal subject. What, according to liberal ideology (especially with the Republic), represented the main tool of emancipation and citizenship, can here be seen as the constitution of biopolitics and the perfect laboratory for new technologies of power. The chapter focuses specifically on secondary education to show how high schools became sites of an intensive production of discourses about its population. As with the inquiries on rural life analyzed in chapter 6, all aspects of the life and subjectivity of students were submitted to close scrutiny. Reports of all kinds gradually covered more areas of life and the more society became measurable and describable the more written discourses spread and colonized existence.

Domination is here equated with writing, which, again, gives a more nuanced idea of how State power and political violence looked like, especially in the twentieth century and under the dictatorship. And yet, these technologies of power were to a large extent autonomous from the nature of political regimes and the context of social and economic development at each historical stage. In this sense, power and control here seem to reach a point where State institutions as such combine with semi-autonomous *ideological State apparatuses* in the full constitution of modern power.

Traditionally, the church – whose relation with the modern State is recreated by Diogo Duarte in chapter 9 – was the ultimate producer of ideology and power in a religious country like Portugal. In fact, the technologies of power used in modernizing areas like education or the social sciences necessarily clashed with the Catholic Church, an institution already in place, deeply ingrained in the country's society and culture, and closely involved in its politics. More specifically, modern forms of biopolitcs seemed to have found a challenging opponent in the church's dense territorial presence and firm control over souls. This would explain the high level of conflict between this particular institution and the State throughout all political regimes of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This is an important point, as it shows that the situation of the Catholic Church in Portuguese society was consistently dramatic during the whole period, suggesting that the Church had a problem with modernization as such, rather than a particular regime. By situating the religious question within the making of the modern State, Duarte manages to de-dramatize the relations between the Church and the Republican regime while at the same time expanding political struggle beyond the State (indeed, beyond all institutions), by arguing that there is no cause to speak of a *religious war* in the period between 1910-1926, as the clash between State growth and traditional society and its institutions (popular and institutional anti-clericalism, the nationalization of Church property as aspects in the history of the Portuguese modern State) was intrinsic, although not exclusive, to the liberal process of social modernization, in its attempt to control population and consciousness. At this point, it may be possible to start thinking about the role of the State in the making of national identity and its specific forms political ideology.

Like in any other process of national modernization, the making of the Portuguese State involved the constitution of forms of national consciousness ultimately shaped as nationalist ideologies. As Luís Trindade argues in chapter 10, Portuguese nationalism – the discourses defining the country and its people and narrating its history – replicates the

tensions at play in the by now already familiar gap between the country's self-image and the processes of slow but constant urbanization and industrialization from the late nineteenth century to the mid-twentieth century. Moreover, nationalism, as the dominant ideological form in Portuguese modernity, embodied the basic divide in the country's social structure and the most decisive transformations occurring in its territory. In view of the frustrating experience regarding the development of an African Empire and modernization in a European context, early twentieth-century Portuguese nationalism defined Portugal as intrinsically rural. Simultaneously, as the country was becoming urbanized and city streets exerted a mounting political pressure, nationalism characterized the Portuguese as a people of peasants. Here too the dictatorship, and the figure of its leader, come as the climax of an earlier process, by combining the most modern mechanisms at its disposal (the technologies of mass politics and mass culture) to insist on traditional forms: the more urban the country was, and the more it was defined by urban institutions (especially in the cultural sphere), the more it was invited to see itself as rural and pre-modern.

From a certain perspective, the narrative of the making of the Portuguese modern State, from nineteenth-century liberalism to twentieth-century authoritarianism and revolution, is interrupted in the last two chapters. This is either because a counter-ideology is shown as an alternative to the dominant forms of nationalism (the case of communism) or because an event radically questioning the relations between State and society occurs (the 1974-75 revolution). And yet, as José Neves shows in Chapter 11, Portuguese communism may have questioned the class structure of the State, but did not fully escape the nationalist frame through which power relations unfolded – let alone the need for the State as such. Communism can then appear as the *Other* in the relationship between the State and dominant national narratives in two ways: as a critique of existing State forms and as an alternative form of State. In the case of the Portuguese Communist Party, this led to a refusal of a key idea in authoritarian nationalism – that, because of its Empire, Portugal was not a small country – with an alternative negation that kept the same discursive structure of the nation intact: 'Portugal is not a poor country'. The Communist Party thus plays the role of a special actor, in between society and the State, during the dictatorship and the revolutionary process. It aspires to represent an alternative State within those social groups (the workers in general and the proletariat in particular) left outside the "authentic" Portugal of dominant nationalism, while at the same time

holding on to a belief in the development of the modern State (and the ideology of progress) in a Nation of workers.

To end a book mainly focused on structures and based on fairly long periods with a revolution, spectacular and decisive as it may be, does not necessarily mean to fall under the spell of a history of events. The revolutionary period of 1974-1975, however, emerges here as more than just a closing to the book: as a social revolution, distinct from a *coup d'état* dethroning the dictatorship, it represented a moment of profound and radical questioning of social structures (not least since it also represented the end of the Imperial State) and an attempt to use the State to empower those historically left outside its formation – roughly those same social classes represented by communism as described in Chapter 11. To analyse, as Ricardo Noronha does in the last chapter, one of the most controversial processes within the revolution – the nationalization of the banking system – may also be seen as a narrative strategy: by challenging private property, the revolution tried to subvert the foundation of the liberal system and bourgeois society inaugurated in the nineteenth century, and a narrative of such an event can thus provide a new, retrospective, intelligibility to the whole process of *The Making of Modern Portugal*; the history the revolution allows to come forth (and tries to subvert) thus becomes, very distinctively, that of a close allegiance between the State and the country's bourgeoisie, the formation of an oligarchy ruling over a system based on low wages, and one where the main economic, social and political transformation in modern Portugal, the shift from agriculture to industry (and from rural to urban society), was always dependent on the private interests of the dominant classes.

This last episode in all its aspects – the end of the colonial war, socialist revolution and decolonization–, thus casts a retrospective light over the rest of the book, working as a confirmation of the extent to which what happened in Portugal throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was always heavily dependent on, and closely articulated with, international actors, tendencies and events. The 1974-75 revolution emerges, then, as a negative symbol, for its density and strength as a political event necessarily appears as an excess in a narrative of modernization and State formation characterized by the development of forms of discipline and control. The consequences are both historical and methodological: the event as an exceptional moment may not be representative or even decisive, but it is also what allows us to identify the norm and read the long-term logic of modernity and its social order.

CHAPTER ONE

THE PAPERS OF STATE POWER: THE PASSPORT AND THE CONTROL OF MOBILITY

VICTOR PEREIRA

Introduction

John Torpey is one among many authors to have proposed a gloss to the definition of the State put forward by Max Weber. The renowned German sociologist defined the State as a 'human community' that claims 'the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force' (Weber 1946, 78). Drawing on that definition, Torpey calls attention to the fact that 'States have successfully usurped from rival claimants such as churches and private enterprises the "monopoly of the legitimate means of movement" – that is, their development as States has depended on effectively distinguishing between citizens/subjects and possible interlopers, and regulating the movement of each' (Torpey 2000, 1-2). Control over population mobility is a pivotal element in the process of State-building. According to James Scott, the 'State has always seemed to be the enemy of "people who move around"' (Scott 1998, 1). Indeed, individuals move to flee from the State, and the latter, in turn, aims to sedentarize the population so as to guarantee two elements that are indispensable to its formation, expansion and defence: taxes and soldiers (Tilly 1985). The peasants studied by Scott move to non-State spaces, the mountain areas, where agents of the State are rare and where it is easier to evade State control (Scott 2009). This movement goes against the grain of the State's actions, which are geared towards settling populations, given that a stable population is more easily governed and exploited.

From the perspective of the "penetration" of society and its control by States, John Torpey chronicles the history of the passport, the document that has become essential for thousands of individuals to move across

borders but also within their own countries. In China, to this day, population mobility, and more specifically that of Chinese peasants, is strictly controlled by authorities within the frame of the Hukou system, which includes various types of permits. The passport is part of the written identification documents that were created and imposed on populations by States aiming to exercise 'domination at a distance' (Noiriel 2006, 20). State agents wanted to ascertain the exact identity of individuals who fled the clusters of inter-knowledge of peasant societies. Passports issued by States from the sixteenth century onwards, and particularly from the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Denis 2008), partook of a will to surveillance of the population, the latter being henceforth expected to carry papers to be presented to public authorities. By way of these papers issued by the bureaucratic apparatus, the State, along with its agents, knowledge and instruments, carries out a 'colonization of the life-world' (Noiriel 2005), imposing the State's presence at the heart of all social relations (Bourdieu 2012), thus eliminating or restricting other forms of social regulation.

The State's penetration by means of papers (passports, identity cards) met with various and powerful forms of resistance, to be sure, but it was just as much met with adherence. As some works by Foucault have suggested, the State – and, more generically, political domination (Hibou 2011) – does not operate strictly by way of violence and repression but also by building on the populations' desires, resorting to 'insidious leniencies' (Foucault 1975, 360) and fulfilling a 'desire for the State' (Hibou 2011, 79). In Portugal, violence and adherence were intertwined in the exercise of State power, just as resistance was used by the State to strengthen itself. In the case of passports, resistance was strong: suffice it to recall that for extended periods, the majority of the population left the country without a passport. Some border villages specialized in the smuggling of individuals. To leave the country without a passport was part of the peasant 'moral economy', according to which the State had no right to prevent strategies for the reproduction of agricultural property (Silva 1998). If the purpose of this document was to control population mobility and subject it to the interests of the social strata that had the most influence over political power, both centrally and locally, it further legitimated itself in the name of protecting the population.

On the one hand, the documentation needed to move was supposed to protect populations from drifters, bandits or other population groups perceived as dangerous. Accordingly, a large portion of the legislation in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries concerning passports stipulated that anyone could ask a stranger to produce their papers and, if they had none,

they could report them to the authorities. This disposition did not result simply from a supposed "State weakness" in the nineteenth century or from the scarcity of police forces outside of the two major cities in the country. It was also a way for populations to protect themselves from strangers, a means of drawing a line – indeed, a frontier – between "us" and "them", "nationals" and "foreigners". Passports also offered protection to nationals abroad, allowing them to identify themselves, to prove their nationality and seek assistance from their State of origin. Foreigners being, in most countries, individuals with limited (political, social and, at times, even civic) rights, protection afforded by the State of origin is, in certain configurations, primordial (Dufoix 2010).

On the other hand, the demand for a passport was presented by the State in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries as a way of protecting emigrants from smugglers, from ship crews, and from future employers abroad. The passport was then, allegedly, synonymous with a sheltered journey, a safe and well-paid job upon arrival, consular protection, etc. This perspective sprung from a paternalistic view of the popular classes: described as gullible, uncritical, and easily manipulated. The authorities, following this line of reasoning, merely wanted to protect emigrants from themselves. Emigration was depicted as both an illusion and a mistake, a trap which only the naïve would ever step into. However, this reactionary rhetoric – in the sense given to this term by Albert Hirschman (Hirschman 1991) –, grounded on the notions of the perverse, futile and risky nature of emigration, elided the misery prevalent in Portugal at the time, the exploitation of rural and industrial wage labour, local oligarchies, the lack of political and trade union freedom. It also occluded the weakness of the State's intervention in the well-being of the populations (health, schooling, social security; a feeble intervention when compared to the social measures taken in Germany and the Scandinavian countries, which were also predominantly agricultural, to limit emigration towards the end of the nineteenth century (Kuhnle 1981; Khoudour-Castéras 2008)) and the scarce presence of the Portuguese State abroad, close to the emigrant populations. In short, the discourse of protection over a rash people boiled down, to a large extent, to a form of legitimating practices and apparatuses that curtailed the population's freedom so as to defend the interests of employers (medium and large rural landowners and, later on, small and medium industrialists that employed a peasant labour force).

Following in the footsteps of Torpey, in the present chapter we will sketch a history of the State's penetration in society by way of the imposition of the passport, its uses as well as the forms of resistance this process was faced with. We shall see how passport control was articulated

with various means of governing populations – *governmentalities*, in Foucault's phrase – and came to be an essential instrument in the exercise of power.

The passport in the times of mercantilism

One of the earliest references to a passport in Portugal occurs in 1645, five years after the Restoration of independence from Spain.[1] A charter by King João IV prohibits 'any person, of any rank, quality and condition whatsoever, to leave this Kingdom without a permit or passport signed by me'. Anyone who failed to comply would be subject to 'the penalty of banishment and, what is more, will lose any estate, goods and honours they may hold in the Kingdom'.[2] The wars of Restoration, in Portugal and in its overseas territories, led the king to hold fast to a population that was extremely reticent to participate directly in the Kingdom's "liberation" from Castilian rule (Costa 2011). But this law should be seen beyond this contextual aspect, as part and parcel of a wider movement in European governmental practices. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, European kings – and also Asian monarchs (Mengin 2005, 279) – multiplied laws to prevent the emigration of their subjects. According to Saskia Sassen, in the reign of Louis XIV, Colbert 'made it illegal for residents to leave France and went so far as to institute the death penalty for those leaving illegally' (Sassen 1999, 12).

Mercantilist thought, dominant at the time among governing elites, despite their heterogeneity (Spector 2003), sees international trade as an extension of war and the population as the main source of a country's wealth. This translates into the formula: the more subjects a king has, the more powerful he is. If the king loses subjects to another sovereign, he grows weaker. By losing subjects, he loses workers – at times skilled workers –, soldiers, prestige and might within an international system where States are in permanent confrontation (Tilly 1985), whether in war or in the plane of international trade, perceived as a zero-sum game at the time. Hence, departures not authorized by the monarch are seen as treason: the loss of a resource that makes the enemy stronger. In 1655, Severim de Faria states: 'The greatness of kings lies in the multitude of the people, and a scarcity of subjects breeds the prince's lack of reputation'. For Faria, 'it is clear that wherever there are plenty of people there will be plenty of agriculture, plenty of arts, plenty of trade and plenty of soldiers, which are

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[1] Between 1580 and 1640, Portugal was under the rule of the Spanish crown.
[2] Charter dated 6 September 1645.

the four things on which the greatness, the power and the happiness of a Kingdom are built' (quoted in Cardoso 1997, 69). A numerous population is, firstly, synonymous with military might. Secondly, an abundant population is a source of added fiscal revenue.[3] Lastly, a capable population is seen by mercantilists as a source of wealth, since it ensures an abundant labour force and, consequently, a sizeable agricultural production. Michel Foucault has described this logic of 'mercantilist governmentality', anchored on the low cost of an abundant labour force (Foucault 2004, 70-71). Through access to cheap cereals, cities can be supplied at a low cost, keeping workers' wages at an equally low level. And it is thus that products become competitive at the international trade level. It becomes possible, then, to export and import gold, the core element of the king's wealth, to which the subjects' interests are to be subjugated. As we can see, this mercantilist system is based on an abundant labour force, on its sedentariness as well as on the control over its mobility. A control – or, at least, the attempt to control – that the passport will render possible. However, between the law and its enforcement there is often a chasm. And that is as true in seventeenth century as in the centuries to follow. To paraphrase the sociologist Michael Mann, the State may pass laws in an authoritarian mould (despotic power, in Mann's formulation) but the State does not possess the infrastructural power – compliant agents and efficient instruments – to enforce its will (Mann 1984).

As will happen with a large portion of the legislation from the eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries that prohibited and punished illegal emigration, the 1645 charter will be reiterated in subsequent years. This reiteration, oftentimes accompanied by an increase in the length of prison sentences, was a sign of the half-hearted commitment of the administration, of the resistance of the population, of the guile of smugglers and carriers. Rather than accepting emigration and facilitating access to passports, laws punished clandestine departures even further.

The chief limitation of the plethoric legislation on passports is its imprecision with regards to the various modalities for obtaining the document. Its issue by the king, by way of the secretariat of State, is arbitrary. Furthermore, it can only be obtained in Lisbon, a testimony to the ongoing centralization process. Those who wish to try their luck in the Brazilian *Eldorado* that emerges towards the end of the seventeenth century have to find their way aboard a ship, and count on the crew's complicity.

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[3] On the question of fiscal revenue within the Portuguese modern State, see chapter 2 in this book.

The desire to control the mobility of the population becomes even more pressing during the consulship of Pombal, with the creation of the Intendência Geral da Polícia da Corte e do Reino [General Intendancy of the Police of the Court and Realm] in June 1760. Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo (later to become Marquis of Pombal) aimed to emulate the 'police States' that had been created in France and in the German States. In these States, the Police, perceived as 'the necessary means for maintaining the peaceful order of the political community and fostering its strengths with a view towards the happiness of all' (Sennelart 2001, 475), tends to 'dissociate itself from justice, and to transform itself into a technology for the management of the material interests of society' (Sennelart 2001, 476). Indeed, Pombal's law aims to separate 'contentious justice and the police of the Court and the Realm'.[4] This administrative reform is aimed at securing public order, rationalizing and tightening the government of the population and enhances the nation's wealth. One of the key concerns of the text is the war against idleness, debauchery and vagrancy: 'because the destitute beggars, when they have the age and bodily strength to be of service to the Kingdom, are the soil of a host of disorders and a scandal to all cautious people'.[5] To beg for alms one needed a permit, which was granted only to those physically unfit for work.[6] Once able-bodied beggars were put to work, and idleness and delinquency quashed through both pre-emptive and punitive action on the part of authorities, the wealth of the Kingdom, its reputation and the well-being of its population were bound to improve. This repressive action went hand in hand with an in-depth knowledge of society, the knowledge deemed necessary for a more efficient government of the population.

A large portion of the articles of the law of June 1760 lay out the exact knowledge the administration was expected to acquire on the population and its movements. Foreigners and nationals that visit Lisbon are expected to communicate their arrival within twenty-four hours of their entry into the city. Ship captains that cross the harbour-bar into Lisbon must also keep a passenger manifest, to be handed to the General Intendant. Anyone who enters the Kingdom should make their presence known and present 'passports or personal letters of legitimation'. Travellers are expected to inform the magistrate before whom they appear as to where they come from, what they do, where they are heading and which route they will take. The magistrate then gives them a bill of entry, which lays out the

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[4] Law of 25 June 1760.
[5] Idem.
[6] On the consistent will to repress 'false beggars' see Castel (1995).