

Russia in Transition

Russia in Transition:
Regional Integration, Media Censorship
and Culture Institutes

Edited by

Feng-Yung Hu

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P U B L I S H I N G

Russia in Transition:
Regional Integration, Media Censorship and Culture Institutes,
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PREFACE

The book entitled “*Russia in Transition: Regional Integration, Media Censorship and Culture Institutes*” is an attempt to discuss the context of transition in the period of the last two decades in Russia, and give the panorama of Putin’s ruling ideology in national and social development by examining his regional policy and media policy diplomatically and domestically. Russia is trying her best to be a modern and civilized country where problems hindering the purpose might still exist. Nevertheless, it is impossible to ignore the fact that Russia is becoming a normal and new style country in the post-Cold War world and has showed her influence on international agenda. It is time for us to re-examine the country with a new idea and conception to face her in the globalized world.

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia as the successor of the USSR suddenly lost the geopolitical superiority and dominant position both in Central Asia and in Southern Asia. In the 90s of the last century, president Yeltsin focused his efforts on democratization and liberalism, establishing the free economic market institutes, and this provided an opportunity for Russia to process the political and economic transformation in order to enter the system of the Western world.

From the new millennium, Vladimir Putin and his administration created a national strategy toward the Asia-Pacific region and this strategy is reflected in his foreign policy conducted in CIS and the Far East region of Russia under cooperation and competition with China. In Chapter One, the author tries to analyse the perspectives and problems of SCO to stress that Russia will strengthen her efforts in energy strategy, broadening markets, and establishing security mechanisms, and this will challenge China’s status in SCO where Russia and the Central Asian countries have completed economic and military integration as a whole space. The Russia-China relations will have an influence on US rebalancing policy because China’s territorial disputes in the Asia-Pacific region have aroused tension, and this uncertainty will challenge US power in this region. US-China competition makes Russia become a balancer. The Russia-China-US triangle of relationship might decide the future world map concerning

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and fighting against terrorists.

In Chapter Two, the author tries to understand the role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region (APR); how Russia looks at North Korea's threat and uses her possible influence on regional stability. The author assumes that Russia will keep her traditional foreign policy to solve the regional problems and conflicts. The positive approach toward Kim Jong-un's regime is to restart the Six-Party Talks negotiation through Russia-China's improved mutual constructive partnership. In the process of resuming multiple talks, the United States and the Western European countries might still play crucial roles in persuading Kim to give up provocation and to go back to the talks. Russia might play the role of insisting on a peaceful solution and reducing nuclear technology use. China might have more influence in her soft power and traditional military power on North Korea. Nevertheless, resuming the peaceful talks and maintaining the North-eastern Asian region will still be processed in the cooperation and negotiation under the framework of understanding among Russia, China, and the United States of America.

In Chapter Three, the authors try to stand in the Russian position to understand the psychological aspect of the Russian people facing the strong trend of globalization. In the period of the USSR, the new world information and communication world were established by Russia supporting the developing countries. After the collapse of the USSR, the world came to be dominated by the US-led Western countries. Russia tries to resume its influence by calling for the multiple polarity of the globe, and this idea is supported by China. This cooperation between China and Russia might change the world order again, and this might threaten US traditional interests in Asia, Africa, and South America. The author finds that the political convergence and conflict between Russia and the United States is becoming a more vivid trend in the process of globalization in Putin's ruling era than economic and cultural function in Yeltsin's era.

In Chapter Four, the author tries to explain the role of Russia in the Asia-Pacific region. This strategy might be fulfilled by developing the Far East region of Russia with the geopolitical superiority in North-eastern Asia and the oil-exporting potential in this region. This idea might be carried out to strengthen Russia's influence in Asia through her broadening energy market here. The energy strategy is based on the good relationship both with Central Asia but also with China simultaneously. Russia's Asia-Pacific strategy is reflected in consolidating her role in SCO and BRICS.

Russia-China relations and influence are discussed in the first chapter of this book. The perspective of Russia's Asia-Pacific strategy is connected with the Far East development in different areas.

In Chapter Five, the author expresses that media control and news censorship have been coming back, under Putin's regime, concerning national security issues. The idea is realized by the nationalization of media ownership, the ideology of national security connected with ethics (privacy, human lives, psychology, etc.), and the social responsibility of media. Putin regards terrorism as the most dangerous element in his ruling period. The liberalism and professionalism of the media, which had been formed in Yeltsin's regime, would challenge Putin's ruling ability. Putin and media elites have a consensus in professionalism and enterprises for development, but disagreement on how to define the boundary between national security and press liberty to protect human rights and civil society. Therefore, how to limit liberalism and keep professionalism is the compromise between Putin's administration and liberal media elites.

In Chapter Six, the author finds that the Beslan hostage crisis changed media ecology entirely, and media law became the fighting grounds between the government and media. The author attempts to explore the relationship between the Russian state media (television as the main governmental ideological control institute and entertainment tool for the majority audience) and Putin's administration. The author finds that the state television played the role of reducing the pressure of people's doubt in crisis and this helped a lot for Putin to solve the problems and complete the rescue job. Putin's media policy is to control the state media and establish the state media image in the public view. This would help Putin control the public opinion in the policy-making process or in any kind of crisis condition. The freedom of the press might concede to national security under the conception of ethics and social responsibility of the media.

In Chapter Seven, the authors analyse the controlling institutes and the supporting point to conduct control and management. The authors find that completing the will of Putin and shaping the ideology for Russian national development determined the media ecology. Thus, the authors aim to discuss Putin's intention in building nationalism as the new ideology instead of democracy and liberalism. How to control media ownership to propaganda his ideology is an important job for consolidating his power. The commercial media is the bridge and mediator among the government

structures and nongovernmental organizations. The central government takes use of the central and state media to control the local autonomies in Russia. Therefore, Putin needs state media to complete his central management under his ruling will. The vertical control (ownership, technology, printers, management of personnel, budget, etc.) remains a vivid characteristic in Russia.

In Chapter Eight, the author uses advertising as the study object to reflect the traditional mentality of the Russian people. The cultural and psychological differences among the regions determined how the Russian people looked at the function of advertisement as the positive cultural and social institutes in their daily life. The author wants to stress that Russia might still be far from civil society; however, the Russian people might have a hope to see the coming of civil society through the media's social function. The social function of advertisement might be a new direction in Russia because in the past decades, in the Russian mind, advertisement was regarded as a commercial monster and evil from the capitalist world, having a negative image in the Russian world. After the collapse of the USSR, the Russian advertisement market became fast-growing. Because of the state media, television might attract most of the advertisement market. The author has a tender hope to see that advertisement should take the social responsibility for not only selling products, but also building the right conception of a new idea of civil society to protect human rights. So the role of media and advertisement still has creativity and potential, playing the role of cultural institutes for improving the living standard of the public in Russia.

In the conclusion, while discussing the reforms and changes of Russia in the past decades, we could look forward to seeing a much more positive role that Russia could play in the world system, and not using the hostile attitude toward the world which was shaped in the Cold War. Nevertheless, how Russia should participate in the international community is still a long road and this needs to be observed and analysed. Peace and stability is the long-term goal of humanity, which will never die. As Shakespeare said in his poem:

*“From fairest creatures we desire to increase,
That thereby beauty's rose might never die.”*

Finally, the author would like to take this opportunity to express her gratitude to the following fellows for their kind promotion and support in the author's recent research activities and international events: the

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PART I:

**REGIONAL INTEGRATION
AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY**

CHAPTER ONE

REGIONAL INTEGRATION: COOPERATION OR COMPETITION? IMPLICATIONS FROM SHANGHAI COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (SCO) — THE PROSPECTS AND PROBLEMS IN CHINA-RUSSIA RELATIONS WITH A US FACTOR¹

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In the last decade, China-Russia relations might be examined in the framework of SCO for pursuing their geopolitical, economic and military interests in the trend of regional integration for both China and Russia. After the Soviet Union's disintegration, these two countries are seeking more positive cooperation for their national security, bilateral trade, counter-terrorism actions, balance of US unipolar power, global participation and governance for a broader range to improve their domestic development simultaneously.

With the importance of the Asia-Pacific region in the world economy and the escalation of wars under the uncertainty of North Korea's nuclear weapons threat with other controversial territorial disputes in East China Sea and South China Sea, China turned out to be the centre and target of the US implementing a rebalancing² policy toward the Asia-Pacific region in solving these problems. The situation in this region is complicated, for

China is rising to become the regional hegemony, and this will challenge the traditional power of the US regional system. China is constructing the conception of a “Chinese dream”³ as the ideology of national growth. China was concerned that America’s renewed focus on its alliances in Asia might be aimed at China and disturb the “Chinese dream” of national rejuvenation.⁴

Simultaneously, the role of Russia becomes more and more important in the world system and regional governance⁵. After the global financial crisis, the EU was severely impacted by this and Russia started to focus her eyes on the Asia-Pacific region for the broader market, but at the same time consolidating the traditional sphere in Central Asia as the continuity of her foreign policy. China-Russia’s economic partnership shows their influence on regional development. While Russia is conducting the Asia-Pacific strategy as part of her ‘double-headed eagle’ Eurasian policy by establishing a Eurasian Union⁶ modelled as the European Union, Russian influence will be an active factor for China in rebalancing the relationships with the United States. This study is to discover the meaning of SCO for regional integration and its influence on the regional security for the Russia-China-US triangle of relations as well.

Regional Integration for China and Russia

In the regional integration studies of the 70s, the regional organization⁷ was the focus and was studied as the necessary approach for understanding integration in the region. Countries based on the regional organization are working together to achieve the goals of economic, political and military cooperation. Regional integration is the process by which two or more nation-states agree to cooperate and work closely together to achieve peace, stability and wealth. Usually integration involves one or more written agreements that describe the areas of cooperation in detail, as well as some coordinating bodies representing the countries involved⁸.

So, the oneness of unity for states might be regarded as an effective and beneficial way to cooperate. China is isolated by her neighbouring relationships geopolitically and ideologically. SCO members have their common boundaries and need to establish a mutual trust mechanism to maintain their boundary security and develop the boundary trade for better contact and military reduction. Therefore SCO is the most important

regional security organization for China to maintain his internal and external stability. Russia might have more ambitions to build her Eurasian space for her national demands. SCO has its function of collective security. Collective security is more ambitious than systems of alliance⁹ security or collective defence for establishing an international collective organization for their common interests regionally and globally.

Obviously, China and Russia play more and more important roles in the Asia-Pacific region, where the United States is implementing a rebalancing policy under the Obama administration. At the end of the Cold War, the normalization process was realized by the negotiations between Gorbachev and Deng Xiaoping after the ideological fighting and boundary military conflicts in 60s and 70s. The state level relations were more important than the regional interactions. Since the Soviet Union's disintegration in the early 1990s, the two countries have for the most part acted on the basis of shared interests—particularly in maintaining stability in Central Asia, whose energy supplies are vital for both countries' economic development.¹⁰

After Putin took the presidency in 2000, resuming the former control in Central Asia and balancing the westernized foreign policy toward the East have been the priorities for the Russian Federation. With the strengthened potential influence of the Asia-Pacific countries on the world, how to accelerate the function of the neighbouring regions between the Russian Far East (RFE) and Chinese North East (CNE) has been put on the agenda, especially after the 2008 global financial crisis. Since Putin has returned to the Kremlin in 2012, the tendency of Russia to consolidate the integration in the Central Asian region and broaden the influential sphere in the Asia-Pacific region will complicate the future Russia-China-US relations and other multiple relations concerning the competition of these powers and rebalance among them. With the rise of China, how she will change the regional system in this region has an impact on other national interests and security. China-Russian relations might be the power of equilibrium for the US with their alliances. Therefore, the future perspective relations between Russia and China deserve to be explored prudentially.

Despite the fact that Russia and China have contradictions, the SCO and their energy monopoly has disturbed the balance in Asia. Obviously, China's rise has changed the traditional balance in Asia after the Second World War and this has aroused suspicion and difficulty to integrate with

other countries. Reducing economic dependence on China has become a common concern for many countries, and this will challenge China's economic growth in the future. Therefore, China must think of regional level development as the engine of the whole country's economic growth and national development. Russia also needs to think about the Far East to be the frontier for integrating Russia into Asia. Economic issues become the prominent factors at a regional level instead of immigrant issues between Russia and China.

Russia is a trans-regional great power with some vital national interests in many regions. In addition, Russia is China's biggest neighbour state. Thus, in terms of region, some strategic overlap cannot be avoided between Russia and China. Among these strategic overlap regions, at least three regions are closely linked with China's national security. The first strategic overlap region is North-east Asia. Some complicated and sensitive international issues are sparked in this region, such as the North Korean issue, the Sino-Korean-Japanese historical issue, a series of disputed territory issues, and so on. The second strategic overlap region is Central Asia, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. Strategic overlap regions between Russia and China are also impacting China's political security.¹¹

At the regional level, the development of economic and other ties between the contiguous Russian Far East (RFE) and Chinese North East (CNE) has lagged behind breakthroughs at the national level. The improving state level relations have been complicated by fluctuations in interregional relations. Economic cooperation and regional development are more prominent, while Chinese migration and associated problems are much less prominent.¹² Economy issues of trade and investment are the central concerns in both countries' media coverage. In both Chinese national and regional media coverage, the first frame emphasizes a combination of Russian natural resources and land, and Chinese expertise, labour, goods and capital. The predominant frame in both Russian national and regional newspapers is the idea that economic cooperation between Russia and China is a necessity for the development of the country's economy.¹³

The second salient issue is law and order, which represents the unofficial economy. The Russian national media emphasizes increasing law-enforcement cooperation between China and Russia, particularly

regarding international organized crime and terrorism, whilst discussing illegal migration into Russia as a serious problem for the country generally. In contrast, China stresses the hard-working of the Chinese workers in RFE.¹⁴

The third issue is the regional one. Both sides emphasize that the regional cooperation in the contiguous RFE and CNE is beneficial for both countries because it acts as the engine of economic growth in both countries. The forth concerned level is related to state interaction. China's media pay more attention to the traditional friendship, which is based on increasing military cooperation and the final demarcation of the Eastern border. The Russian media pay more attention to the military cooperation and confidence-building measures than the border demarcation and territory concession. Therefore, it seems that Russia regards mutual trust and cooperation mechanism building as the preconditions of selling weapons and national resources, however, China focuses more on the concrete benefits which can be obtained by money. The conclusion showed that the treatment of RFE – CNE relations as a priority area in the strategic partnership between the two countries is encouraging. However, whether the document will serve to level regional expectations about cooperation and substantially improve the potential for regionalism in the RFE – CNE in the long term remains to be seen.¹⁵

Traditionally, China relies on Russia to dissolve the international isolation, and this ideological, physiological and geographical intimate relationship easily makes China seek help from Russia. Nowadays, Russia's attitude toward China in terms of selling weapons and resources deeply influences the balance and stability in Asia. From time to time, China regards the Sino-Russian relations as the cornerstone of maintaining stability and security in Asia. In other words, framing the strategic and constructive partnership between Russia and China is the protective umbrella for China to face the pressure from the United States concerning of territorial disputes in the Taiwan straits, East China Sea and Southern China Sea. Undoubtedly, Russia to some degree plays a supporting and crucial role for China in the face of the American containment in the Asian Pacific region. The island disputes between Japan and China in the East China Sea also irritate China into raising its military proliferation.

Japan is another external problem to worsen China-US relations. Russia's Siberia-Pacific and Sakhalin energy strategies might have the

effect of irritating the China-Russia relations. Russia has her own strategy, and the exploration of energy and pipeline building might need to find accord with this strategy. China has no choice but to diversify her energy resources. This problem is more severe in Japan. With little in the way of domestic production of fuel, raw materials, or timber, Japan is more dependent than other major industrial nations on imports of these commodities. The rising energy and raw material prices turned Japan's near-complete dependence on imports of these products into a source of painful costs¹⁶. But Japan's reliance on energy import might require it to strengthen and improve its relationships with Russia. This means that Russia's role as the regional mediator in the East-northern region is strengthened time by time.

The influence of China is her soft power of economic growth. China is well ahead of Russia and India in the degree of its engagement in the global economy, including the realm of trade and investment flows. Thus, it understandably desires to play the role of the engine of the Asian economy, as well as becoming an "active growth factor" in the global economy as a whole. At the same time, however, China may experience problems in the future as it tries to consolidate positions in global economic relations. It has vulnerable areas, like a scant resource base, together with a lack of affiliation with any integration-minded regional groups. Thus, one may expect to see a marked increase in China's efforts to eliminate or minimize those problems.¹⁷

The motivation of economic factors and energy privileges make China and Russia go together easily to conquer the competition in geopolitical interests. Since the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) was founded in 2001, the SCO has essentially functioned as a Chinese-Russian condominium, providing Beijing and Moscow with a convenient multilateral framework to manage their interests in Central Asia. The bilateral defence relationship has evolved in recent years to become more institutionalized and better integrated. Nevertheless, the two governments also remain suspicious about each other's activities in Central Asia, where their state-controlled firms compete for energy resources. Russia plans to continue transforming the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), which excludes China, into Central Asia's primary multilateral security institution. Russian plans to create an EU-like arrangement among the former Soviet republics could irritate Beijing because such a development could impede China's economic access to Central Asia.¹⁸

Collective Security and Civilization Difference

The function of collective security was proposed to avoid a large-scale war happening due to the “Idealism¹⁹” theory which shaped the world system after the First World War into the “Realism” theory which was adopted after the Second World War. Realism is an international relations theory which claims that world politics is driven by competitive self-interest²⁰. After the Second World War, the two military defence system camps between the US-led NATO and USSR-led Warsaw Treaty Organization divided the world into bipolarity. After the Cold War ended, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization disintegration, the world became unipolar under the military actions of NATO beyond the UN system, according to Russia and China’s proclamation concerning the 1991 Persian Gulf War. To balance the power, the new collective security organization might meet the demands of national defence and regional security both for Russia and China.

Collective security is an approach for striving for maintenance of peace, in which participants assent to any breach of the peace as the concern of all the participating states that will result in a collective action.²¹ The concept of “collective security” forwarded by men such as Michael Joseph Savage, Martin Wight, Immanuel Kant, and Woodrow Wilson, is deemed to apply interests in security in a broad manner, to “avoid grouping powers into opposing camps, and refusing to draw dividing lines that would leave anyone out.” The term “collective security” has also been cited as a principle of the United Nations, and the League of Nations before that.²²

As a matter of fact, the concept of collective security has a long history of development, albeit in different forms and as such it is not a recent creation. The treaties of Westphalia signed in 1648 to end the wars among the European states, the League of Nations that was established following the end of the First World War, and the United Nations that was established following the end of the Second World War, were basically intended to stop the recurrence of wars that were evident prior to the signing of the treaties. In the earlier treaties such as the Westphalia Treaty, attempts were made to avert future wars by proposing the recognition of territorial integrity and sovereignty of states and equal recognition of religions. In the 20th century, the treaties that were signed following the end of the two major world wars tried to come up with permanent organs

that were mandated to safeguard peace and security. The principle upon which these organs were formed was that of collective security.²³

According to Morgenthau (1948), Organiski (1960), and Neuhold (2000), the following are the main prerequisites:

1. The first important requirement is that the collective must have overwhelming military capacity when compared to the country or the group causing the threat. The collective must be able to demonstrate that the aggressor will face defeat if they resort to force to change the existing system or order. This implicitly means that any state that has the potential to outweigh the military capacity of any collective must not be left out of the collective security system.
2. The members of the collectivity must refrain from taking any unilateral action without the authorization of other members unless the action relates to the basic right of self-defence. This principle of collective security is intended to act as a check on the likely excesses of particular states against others. The challenge to this principle has however been the elusive interpretation of what constitutes the right to self-defence and the frequent manipulation of that understanding to sanction unilateral actions by powerful member states in a bid to defend their interests.
3. The final principle of collective security is the aspect of genuine international solidarity, which implies the demonstration of international oneness. States would then make decisions on the basis of international good and sacrifice national interests so that the common good is realized. This structure of collective security will therefore require material and human resources so as to ensure its objective.²⁴

Some assume that collective security might be challenged by terrorism and other threats beyond the traditional conception of security. International security asks for more participation of non-governmental organization. International security consists of measures taken by nations and international organizations.²⁵ International security cooperation usually takes one of two forms. A classical collective security organization is designed to promote international security through regulating the behaviour of its member states. A defensive security organization is designed to protect a group of states from threats emanating from a challenging state or group of states. Both forms of security cooperation bind states to act in concert with respect to threats presented by other states. The emergence of non-state actors such as terrorist or extremist

organizations challenges traditional forms of collective security. Threats from political extremism, terrorism, and outlaw organizations have grown in visibility during the past decade in the countries of Eurasia.²⁶

In this climate of a shared sense of common threat from non-state actors, and on the background of perceived encroachment from the sole remaining Superpower, the United States, the Eurasian countries returned to the bargaining table. In these circumstances a number of security organizations already in nascent form, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures, and the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), were rapidly expanded and further institutionalized to address the new security challenges.²⁷ After the collapse of the USSR, Russia lost the protection of the collective security system of the Warsaw Treaty Organization and how to establish the new unions with the former Soviet Union States became the imperative missions in the first decade of the post-communist era.

By accounting for the deleterious effects of globalization (non-state actors) on world security, Huntington also contributes to our knowledge by updating realism. The title of the book, after all, does not just consist of *The Clash of Civilizations*, but *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. Global politics is increasingly replicating the patterns of diversity and plurality found in domestic politics, with “one crucial difference.” It is all a question of shifting from the chaotic realm of sub-state actors to state actors, moving away from the anarchic state of affairs left by the collapse of Communism. Interestingly enough, one of the best illustrations of how this arrangement would work can be seen in his handling of the Muslim world. This includes protection for their values.²⁸

“Globalization is a process that encompasses the causes, course, and consequences of transnational and trans-cultural integration of human and non-human activities.” It is the process of international integration arising from the interchange of world views, products, ideas, and other aspects of culture. Put in simple terms, globalization refers to processes that increase world-wide exchanges of national and cultural resources.²⁹ Advances in transportation and telecommunications infrastructure, including the rise of the Internet, are major factors in globalization, generating further interdependence of economic and cultural activities.³⁰ Globalization is the

vast conception and force which makes the world more interactive and dependent. One of the concerned issues is the cultural or civilization conflicts which could damage the traditional ethics and moral principles in a certain community with strong religion. Regional integration is to avoid cultural and religious difference, and to build a common cooperative space for better development.

Collective security is to achieve the goal of common interests and security under the conception of regional integration and international security, but neglects the cultural and religious differences which might lead to the conflicts of civilization indicated by Huntington. After the collapse of the USSR, the passive impression exists both in Russia and China around the ideological difference, boundary disputes and illegal trade. Therefore, Yeltsin and Jiang Zeming were anxious to repair bilateral relationships. The “Shanghai Five” cooperative mechanism occurred in this distrusting and unfriendly atmosphere, which began from the ideological debate between Mao and Khrushchev. However, these two countries’ leaders, Yeltsin and Jiang Zeming, have a good personal friendship and this helped improve the bilateral relationship and consolidate the Central Asian region, which suffers from economic and terror crises.

Despite Russia and China historically having boundary disputes, Chinese philosophy had a great influence on Russia’s writers and philosophers in the 18-19th centuries, and Russia had influences on Chinese intelligentsia in 19-20th centuries. The Cultural interaction can improve the relationships between these two giant countries with ancient civilizations. From 2007, with the promotion of Russia’s *Russkiy Mir* foundation³¹ and China’s Confucius Institute³², these two countries started to hold the Russian National Year in China and the Chinese National Year in Russia, and under this cooperation framework the governmental departments and media enterprises from both countries started to cooperate. The “cultural cooperation and exchange” might avoid cultural conflicts and colonization.

Ideological differences and military confrontations in Soviet time reduced bilateral trade and increased the defence budget. Due to the boundary demarcation and disarmament, Russia and China intended to establish a long-term negotiating mechanism, and SCO was established initially for resolving these disputes, then gradually developing toward

active cooperation in many areas such as conducting military operations for anti-terrorism, improving trade and economic relationships to achieve bilateral trade up to the amount of the symbolic index. Therefore, SCO is anticipated to be based on establishing the mutual trust among these countries. With Putin's Asia-Pacific strategy and China's new leadership, SCO will play a more and more crucial role in controlling world energy supply and international military intervention to increase their power in global governance such as in the UN Security Council. It shows that after the global financial crisis the western countries need to take Russia and China's opinions into consideration, and the relationship between Russia and China in SCO has aroused more and more attention from the outside world.

The collective security conception has been deepened in the Cold War period when the world was divided into two parts and bipolar military confrontation was formed. However, after the collapse of the USSR, the Cold War ended and the geopolitical sphere has changed a lot with the whole crisis in Russia. Russia started to consolidate the Central Asian region as her most important Eurasian foreign policy after the liberalization and democratization process in the post-communist era, and improve the relationship with China in the second ruling period of Yeltsin. Russia's Asia-Pacific strategy was almost formed after Putin returned to Kremlin, but SCO plays an important role in establishing the mutual trust and communication between Russia and China in the past decade. After the global financial crisis and the US withdraw from Iraq and Afghanistan, it seems to be that SCO plays a more and more important role not only in regional security for anti-terrorism and drug criminals, but also in the energy trade. The author attempts to analyse SCO from Russia's political and strategic thinking to see China's challenges and US factors in balancing the Sino-Russian relationship. This study examined the Russian attitudes toward the SCO and China's possible responses to them.

When talking about the historical disputes on borders between Russia and China, it reminds the bilateral people of the existing problems of national security and national interests with cognitive difference. Both China and Russia have acknowledged that they need to put their disputes aside and strengthen cooperation with each other in order to compete with the United States after the collapse of the USSR. Regional relations between China and Russia decide their competitiveness in the world. They must not fall into the quagmire of fighting in an ideological or geopolitical

area and lose their directions and strategies for the long-term national development. History gives them lessons to learn. For meeting the demands of the rising powers, these two countries need to cooperate with each other economically and strategically. How to improve the process of regional integration and improve the long-term relations between China and Russia is the consideration of regional collective security to achieve their global participation and governance for their domestic national development, as well as to promote the living standard and social welfare via national strategic proposals for both China and Russia.

The Short History and Organizational Framework of SCO

The SCO, initially a “constructive partnership” in 1994, which was based on the bilateral Sino-Russian security cooperative arrangement and gradually developed into a multilateral framework for strategic partnerships, was upgraded to a strategic partnership in 1996, when the “Shanghai Five” was founded (with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). These states (and Uzbekistan, which became a member in 2001) together with China and Russia allied together to establish the SCO, which was designed to address the issues of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Mongolia (2004), India, Iran, Pakistan (2005) and Afghanistan (2012) are the observer states. Belarus, Sri Lanka and Turkey (2012) are the dialogue partners.

SCO's predecessor, the “Shanghai Five” mechanism, originated and grew from the endeavour by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to strengthen confidence-building and disarmament in the border regions. In 1996 and 1997, their heads of state met in Shanghai and Moscow respectively and signed *the Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions* in Shanghai and *the Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions* in Moscow. The topics of the meeting gradually extended from building up trust in the border regions to mutually beneficial cooperation in politics, security, diplomacy, economics, trade and other areas among the five states. Subsequent annual summits of the Shanghai Five group occurred in Almaty (Kazakhstan) in 1998, in Bishkek (Kyrgyzstan) in 1999, and in Dushanbe (Tajikistan) in 2000.

On the fifth anniversary of the Shanghai Five in June 2001, the heads of states met in Shanghai and signed a joint declaration admitting Uzbekistan as member of the Shanghai Five mechanism and then jointly issued the Declaration on the Establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. The document announced the upgrading of the level of cooperation to more effectively seize opportunities and deal with new challenges and threats. In June 2002, the heads of SCO member states met in St. Petersburg and signed the SCO Charter, which clearly expounded the SCO purposes and principles, organizational structure, form of operation, cooperation, orientation and external relations, marking the actual establishment of this new organization in the sense of international law.³³

The structure of SCO is the framework of functioning which could be divided into three parts: intergovernmental mechanism of annual summits of state heads, governments heads (Prime Ministers), meetings of heads of ministries or departments; permanent organs of Secretariat and Regional Counter-Terrorism Structures; nongovernmental institutions: SCO Business Council, SCO Interbank Consortiums and SCO Forums. From table 1 of the structure of SCO, it is possible to divide the organization into two parts or functions: affairs and security. The leaders' summits help promote the directions. The SCO Organizational Structure Chart can be illustrated as per Table 1 (over).³⁴

From the SCO documents, we can see that the SCO time and again is becoming a more functional and effective intergovernmental organization. However, the SCO is influenced by the international situation and Sino-Russian relations. On June 16–17, 2004, the SCO summit, held in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and the staff of the Executive Committee of the Regional Counter-Terrorism Structure (RCTS) was established and headquartered in Tashkent, where the US built a K-2 Karshi-Khanabad airbase after the September 11th terrorist attacks, but withdrew after the 2004 Velvet Revolution in Georgia. Russian leaders have not hidden their desire to drive the United States out of Central Asia. Moscow, for instance, was instrumental in getting the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to adopt an early July resolution that called on the United States to set a deadline for withdrawal from air bases in both Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In making the call, Russian officials contended that Afghanistan is stabilizing, thus eliminating the strategic rationale for the continuing presence of American forces in Central Asia.³⁵

Table 1: The Structure of SCO




Table 2: Annual Summit of SCO (Documents)³⁶

SCO Documents of Annual Meetings of States Members and Heads of Governments	
Annual Summit	Important Documents and Action Agendas
2001 Shanghai, China	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Statement of the Heads of Governments of the Member States of Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2. Declaration of the Creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 3. Shanghai Convention 4. Joint Statement of Heads of State of the Republic of Kazakhstan, China, Kyrgyzskov Republic, the Russian Federation, Taiikistan, Uzbekistan
2002 St. Petersburg, Russia	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States 2. TIME CHART relationship Shanghai Cooperation Organization with other international organizations and states 3. Statement of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 4. Declaration of Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 5. Charter of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 6. Joint Statements of the Foreign Ministers of States Parties to the <u>Shanghai Cooperation Organization</u>
2003 Moscow, Russia	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2. Joint Communiqué of the extraordinary meeting of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO Member States 3. Declaration of Heads of States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
2004 Tashkent, Uzbekistan	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Joint Communiqué of the Council of Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of Shanghai Cooperation Organization 2. Tashkent Declaration of Heads of State of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 3. The Regulations on Observer Status at the Shanghai Cooperation Organization

2005 Astana, Kazakhstan	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Protocol on Establishment of the SCO-Afghanistan Contact Group between the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan⁹ 2. Joint Communiqué of the meeting of the Council of Heads of Government / Prime Ministers / SCO 3. Declaration of the Heads of State of the Shanghai cooperation Organization 4. Joint Communiqué meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers - the Shanghai cooperation Organization
2006 Shanghai, China	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. 1. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 2. Declaration on the Fifth Anniversary of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
2007 Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2007 2. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of Heads of Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3. Bishkek Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 4. Treaty on Long-Term Good-Neighbourliness, Friendship and Cooperation Between the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization 5. Memorandum of Understanding between the Secretariat of the SCO and the CSTO 6. Informational Announcement for the meeting of the Council of foreign Ministers of SCO Member States
2008 Dushanbe, Tajikistan	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2008 2. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3. Dushanbe Declaration of the Heads of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Regulations on the Status of Dialogue Partner of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
2009 Yekaterinburg, Russia	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Chronicle of main events at SCO in 2009 2. Joint Statement on fighting against infectious diseases in the region of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation 3. SCO Joint Initiative on increasing multilateral economic cooperation in the field of tackling the consequences of the global financial economic crisis 4. Joint Communiqué of Meeting of the Council of the Heads of Government (Prime Ministers) of the SCO Member States