

Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity

Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity:
Solidarities and Social Function

Edited by

Scott H. Boyd and Mary Ann Walter

CAMBRIDGE
SCHOLARS

P U B L I S H I N G

Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity: Solidarities and Social Function,
Edited by Scott H. Boyd and Mary Ann Walter

This book first published 2014

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2014 by Scott H. Boyd, Mary Ann Walter and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISBN (10): 1-4438-5549-9, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-5549-5

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface	vii
Introduction	1
Paul Reynolds	
Solidarities	
Chapter One.....	14
Three Forms of Nineteenth Century Working Class Solidarity and Their Current Relevance Lawrence Wilde	
Chapter Two	30
Parrhesia and Solidarity: Rethinking the Politics of Difference with the Final Foucault John McSweeney	
Chapter Three	48
Difference, Solidarity and Non-Identity: A Negative Dialectical Approach towards Identity David Christopher Stoop	
Chapter Four	58
Solidarity through Practice? MacIntyre's Revolutionary Aristotelianism: A Marxist Reading Paul Reynolds	
Chapter Five	77
The Social Function of Postcolonial Literary Theories Zuzana Klímová	

Social Function

Chapter Six.....	98
Social Cohesion in Israel: Differences between Migrants and Minorities	
Sibylle Heilbrunn, Leima Davidovich and Leah Achdut	
Chapter Seven.....	112
Practising Solidarity: Sharing Across Difference	
Claire Farrugia	
Chapter Eight.....	136
Negotiating Boundaries of Integration into “New Societies”:	
The Question of Neighbours and Foreigners	
Simona Zavratnik	
Chapter Nine.....	153
Urban Transformation and Voluntary Displacement: The Case of Ege	
District in Ankara, Turkey	
Burcu Şentürk	
Contributors.....	169
Index.....	173

PREFACE

This book is the second in a series that arises from the activities of the Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity Network, an international network formed in 2010 by Scott H. Boyd at Middle East Technical University—Northern Cyprus Campus, and Paul Reynolds at Edge Hill University in the UK. Part of the mission of CDSS is to promote international collaboration and exchanges of perspectives and research in the sometimes contradictory, sometimes conflicting areas of social differences and diversities and social cohesion and solidarity. In the context of a world where religious, nationalist, ethnic, gender, and political differences (amongst others) appear prominent and deeply contested, strategic attempts at social solidarity, such as multiculturalism, are open to critical questioning. The network seeks to develop international linkages to encourage learning from different bodies of scholarship, knowledge, and arguments that might provide for fruitful dialogues as to the balance and consistency of solidarity and difference in the democratic societies we seek to participate in making. Whilst the network has no formal political affiliation, many of its members have very broadly similar values in seeking to advance thinking that respects difference and diversity and explores how it can be juxtaposed with solidarity in democratic and communal ways rather than through authoritarian and oppressive strategies based on hierarchy, prejudice, pathology, inequality, and injustice.

The hope is that by promoting collaborative international research and creating spaces (in text, conferences, workshops, or seminars) for exchanging knowledge and perspectives, fruitful dialogue and critical thinking can be encouraged. Though it is an academic network, it seeks to provide argument and evidence that may also provoke thinking and action in the political domain. As a network it has a particular interest in encouraging diverse academic voices. This involves constructive intellectual dialogues from different parts of the globe, and the support and encouragement of younger researchers as the future thinkers of solidarity and difference on a global stage.

This book is one of a number of initiatives from within the network since its inception. Most of the authors attended the second annual conference in 2012, and each responded to our call to contribute a book chapter based on their current research. All contributions were taken

through an editorial process, and additional contributions were commissioned where they enrich the collection. The collection is not, as such, a conference proceedings volume. It arises from the conference as starting point for sharing research, ideas, and points of view, but the priority of the editors and the network leaders is to produce texts that stand alone as contributions to scholarship in the area.

We offer our thanks to each contributor for taking the time to contribute to this text. We would also like to thank all the participants, past and present, for their support of the Cultural Difference and Social Solidarity Network, and particularly those whose comments on the original papers enriched their final forms. We would also like to thank Paul Reynolds and John McSweeney for their time in reviewing various types of submissions and helping to organise our events and discussions, and Özlem Ezer Boyd and Ben Walter for their help and patience. Lastly, we would like to thank Middle East Technical University–Northern Cyprus Campus for its hospitality and on-going support of this project.

INTRODUCTION

PAUL REYNOLDS

Solidarity has a curious absent presence in social theory and analysis. Whilst the concept of solidarity would seem to be a critical feature in any form of collective community, organisation, or association, it is often used as either a descriptor or a characteristic of competing models of social cohesion and communality in society. It is regarded as a characteristic of societies or communities to be aspired to, rather than a central explanatory concept. Social and political theorists of society have used other concepts and ideas that do the work of providing the conceptual basis for explaining the way societies work and how they change. Lawrence Wilde observes:

‘Solidarity’ seems to have been confined to the realm of rhetoric while serious theoretical work has concentrated on other aspects of political association such as democracy, nationalism, community, multiculturalism and human rights. In essence, solidarity is the feeling of reciprocal sympathy and responsibility among members of a group which promotes mutual support. As such it has subjective and emotional elements, and this helps to explain its conceptual neglect.... (2007, 171)

Yet as a characteristic of contemporary societies, solidarity is often elusive and subject to contestation, requiring constant remaking, particularly in the contemporary context of social diversity, political and religious difference, and the development of more subjective and diffuse cultures, identities, and “lifeworld” conditions. For much of the political and intellectual focus on solidarity is based on how a solidarity that is not composed of oppression, police enforcement, and exclusionary values can be composed alongside patterns of social and cultural diffusion and diversity. Mason (2000), for example, subsumes these challenges within the broad question of how communities foster belonging as a normative commitment, which stresses how shared moral, cultural, and political values and a sense of belonging within a community are critical to any notion of solidarity in society. Turner and Rojek (2001, 68), in contrast, subsume much of their debate on solidarity to considerations of theories of power and social order and the necessity of a focus on “the non-contractual ele-

ment of contract (that is common values, collective sentiments) which underpins everyday reciprocities and relations.” This alternate focus on normative commitments and moral values or politics, order, and the distribution of power is a central axis for studies that focus on solidarity. Hence much of the best work that engages the idea of solidarity is necessarily trans-disciplinary, including philosophical, legal, social, cultural, and political dimensions.

This is not to claim an easy contradiction between solidarity and difference. Audre Lorde (1997) observes that “it is not our differences that divide us. It is our inability to recognise, accept, and celebrate those differences.” However, the characteristics of social cohesion and social diversity have often given rise to contested politics and struggles for liberty, rights, and justice. This is particularly the case where identities or interests in society make their claims to recognition, rights, and economic redistribution where they are denied under the extant social and political settlement. Davina Cooper frames the political tension well when she observes:

[Diversity politics] goes beyond the conditional liberal promise bestowed on minorities of toleration, providing their differences are kept from affecting others. . . . The space of diversity politics is one in which social diversity is valued and celebrated. . . . The space of diversity politics raises questions and embraces diverging opinions about the desired place of collective identities within society . . . is a new hegemony worth seeking or are all hegemonies however radical they appear in theory, disastrous to the pursuit and maintenance of a freer, more enabling society? (2004)

Solidarity as an idea is both critical to understanding social and political cohesion and the balance of cohesion and diffusion that emerges at any given political moment from whatever social, cultural, political, and economic order and whatever moral and political discourses are engaged. Yet it has often been assumed, or subsumed, in debates around identities, social divisions, and the exercise of power in making order in contemporary society, and so is insufficiently theorised in itself.

If Wilde’s “feeling of reciprocal sympathy . . . responsibility . . . mutual support” is the essence of solidarity, it is clear that solidarity works at different levels and different contexts. Solidarity is both a characteristic of any society, community or association, yet also a quality of relationships at social, community, and interpersonal levels. Social identities and interests seek to represent solidarity in their political struggles; social institutions have solidarity as a necessary feature of their operation; communities have solidarity as a feature of their capacity to have shared moral and political commitments and draw lines of inclusion and exclusion; and

social relations are measured and understood in part by the solidarity they engender. Solidarity covers a range of relationships, from political affiliation, commitment, and participation to identification, recognition, and cultural engagement, through to interpersonal constructions of intimate and emotional relations. Crow (2002, 1), one of the most common primer texts on solidarity, neatly frames his discussion with theoretical concerns around order, function, and division and balances of change and continuity; solidarities from family through community to political organisation; and solidarities deconstructed into causes, contexts and consequences in seeking to present a general understanding of “how people strive to come together and act as a coherent and united force” that illustrates the range of relationships and dynamic debates around solidarity.

Whilst these different articulations of solidarity are important to disentangle in their specificity, solidarity has common threads across these different levels. It speaks to some form of communality, whether through political ideology, moral values, tradition, orthodoxy and culture, or shared interests and identification. Also, importantly, as the title of this volume suggests, it is a central *social function*. The functionality of solidarity has been central to its use in social theory and philosophy, and provides some of the central tensions in exploring the concept of solidarity.

Wilde (2007, 2013 and in Chapter One below) provides a comprehensive genealogy of the concept of solidarity, and shows that in a sense, the earliest sociologists showed considerable awareness of the importance of solidarity in understanding social cohesion at times of substantial social, economic, and political change. Solidarity emerges as a conceptual expression of moral and social cohesion in nineteenth century French social theory, most prominently in the work of Emile Durkheim. For Durkheim (1984), solidarity is tied to the idea of a functional society, where social institutions function to maintain moral boundaries that signify shared values and belonging. Durkheim used the distinction of organic and mechanical solidarity to assert that forms of solidarity, composed through changing social institutions, varied in different forms of society with different divisions of labour—agrarian or industrial. Regardless of that diversity, solidarity remained a necessary feature for the function of those societies. Durkheim’s concern was that the organic social binds and common moral values produced by social institutions in agrarian societies were more subject to failure in industrial societies where social and community interdependence was more estranged (or anomic). The division of labour under capitalism brought pressure to bear on social institutions to carry and propagate shared values and promote shared experiences. The

failure of social institutions to adapt to these new social conditions produced anomie and the disintegration of solidarity.

Durkheim's solidarity is a solidarity for a functional society, where the assumption of Durkheim's science is that social progress is being decoded and functionality is a necessary good in any social collective. This has been the prevailing paradigm within which solidarity has been seen: promoting coherence over division without necessarily questioning whether solidarity is necessarily to be valued in itself, or whether solidarity is being promoted in conditions of inequality, oppression, and injustice. Hence despite its socialist roots, solidarity has been a somewhat conservative concept in sociological analysis, necessarily exploring change as measured against functionality or patterns of dysfunction in social systems.

It is perhaps this association that saw the decline of focus on solidarity in conflict-based theories of Marxism or feminism, where failures in the maintenance of solidarity are often a property of emerging social divisions that cause social and political dysfunction to effect structural change. Strategies for social solidarity are viewed with suspicion for their apologia for existing social ills and their focus on retaining the existing functions in society and the institutions that facilitated them. Particularly with the post-Second World War scepticism for the enlightenment project and social progress as a given, the conservative association of solidarity with functionality went against the eruptions of post-modern and identity politics.

In the context of the family, for example, the functions of the reproduction of labour, patriarchy and gendered division, authority relations, heteronormative sexuality, and moral and social conservative culture values all became subject to criticism and resistance where radical positions outlined the terms of oppression, exploitation, inequality, and injustice they could involve. From these struggles, since the 1960s, has emerged more diverse family forms that reflect rejections of these functions—though the family as a form still retains functional elements in how people express their belonging and relate to other social institutions. What has changed is that functionality, whilst still critical in the political and policy debates, is set against the politics and cultural specificities of diverse populations, often with difficult outcomes, as the attempts to develop multicultural politics in Europe have to some extent illustrated (see Hasan 2010, Parekh 2000, and Taylor 1994 for a representation of the debates).

Solidarity is a critical feature of the integrity, social, and moral capital as well as the political stability and legitimacy of any society, both as a social function and beyond that as a principle, idea, objective, or critical concept. Hence this text seeks to both explore questions of solidarity in

both contemporary conceptual and empirical studies, and in doing so emphasize its importance in social analyses.

Studies of solidarity give rise to a number of important questions about how the concept is understood and articulated, the first being the general question of a solidarity for what. In particular, what forms of social system are social institutions charged with producing solidarity for, and are they desirable social systems? A combination of pernicious ideology, appeals to nationalist fervour, racist moral boundaries, and the utilisation and enhancement of the policing functions of the state to crush dissent produced solidarity in Nazi Germany. This is certainly not a strategy for solidarity that would appeal to many. There is the question of solidarity as functional to what form of community, with what levels of in/equality, in/justice, or oppression/freedom. The balance of solidarity that is necessary for social functions might involve a trade off with levels of undesirable characteristics such as injustice.

Secondly, what priority has solidarity? How far is solidarity a social priority? Solidarity is not a uniformly understood or desired property, and neoliberals, for example, would see solidarity in minimal terms in relation to participation in the market and social institutions that encourage a general sense of order and community. This is very different from the notion of solidarity as an expression of shared values and resources, and participative politics and cultural sharing.

Thirdly, through what mechanisms does solidarity occur and what social institutions promote solidarity? There are clearly traditional structures that do so, such as religious institutions, but what about other and more recent social institutions, such as the mass media or the World Wide Web and social networking?

Related to the mechanism is the means. There are questions of whether solidarity is achieved through ideological or repressive means, by social and political institutions that seek to encourage participation and recognition or conformity and hierarchical order.

Lastly, do we consider solidarity as position and/or strategy and/or goal? Discussions of solidarity often conflate three understandings of how solidarity is conceived: as the communality and shared values of particular identities and interests and how their exercise of solidarity represents their politics within wider society; as strategic politics that seeks to bind together a collective approach to social, cultural, and political change; and as the goal of a society that is considered healthy, inclusive, and empowering to all its component populations.

These sorts of questions speak to a form of solidarity that is constituted on a social and community level, as this introduction has observed,

solidarity spans the social and cultural, the “lifeworld.” Private and intimate contexts within social institutions such as family, religious organisation, public leisure and entertainment, and the urban setting and public spaces offer considerable “lifeworld” practices that bind people together in their everyday experiences. Solidarity in the big picture of ideological representations, hegemonic strategies or the workings of social and cultural institutions, are only effective in the context of their impact percolating into the intimate lived experience of people.

For Wilde (2013), these private and intimate contexts of solidarity in relationships like love and friendship serve to augment notions of collectivity, community, civil society, and public life. The value of this insight is that it cautions against always assuming a big picture or top-down dynamic when solidarities percolate from intimate spheres of association and through organisation and association within the civil strata. In the last thirty years, much of the debate around solidarity in society has been around what mechanisms produce what level of solidarity and what level of individual commitment is the best balance in mature economies.

In a number of different forms, from libertarianism through conservative republicanism to “new” social democracy, neoliberal politics have pushed back the frontiers of the public and the collective, through the mechanisms of individuation, privatisation, the commodification of social life, and consumerism as the principal dynamic in social life. Under such ideological and political regimes, solidarity is found in the limited notion of self-interest extended to family and intimates, and crucially in participation in markets that provide goods, services, and experiences and representative architectures that bring people together under a competitive yet communal ethos to defend liberal freedoms and conservative traditions. These traditions retain the fundamentals of a liberalism that has forgotten its enlightenment roots for a crude utilitarian parody that supports economic life as “civilization.” They are porous to new ideas and particularly new sciences and technologies, but only insofar as they further reinforce privacy, individuality and market benefits or leave minorities in the margins. What this leaves is a simultaneous framing of politics towards individuated subjects whilst acknowledging the power of globalisation and the growth of an interconnectedness, particularly amongst global business and financial interests in the twenty-first century (this is explored in De Beer and Koster 2009).

The power of neoliberalism is that it has colonised or dissolved much of the language and culture of social democratic and socialist politics. Collectivism is consigned to history by its association with the “failed” projects of communism, socialism, and traditional statist social

democracy, though this general malaise has arguable exceptions, for example in Chavez's Venezuela. For those on the left, a viable, feasible, and persuasive idea of solidarity around collective values is essential to revivifying debate around the public and the civil in contemporary politics. The agenda for scholarship into the different dimensions of solidarity is thus fertile and in need of critical thinking.

The Text

This book seeks to explore different dimensions and cases in considering solidarity as a social function and bring to the fore the critical value of the concept of solidarity in understanding contemporary societies. The first section focuses on solidarity itself, and begins with Lawrence Wilde's exercise in retrieving the origins of the concept of solidarity in French social thought in the nineteenth century and exploring their contemporary relevance. Identifying solidarity as a product of early engagements between socialist and Christian thought, Wilde explores three competing models: Pierre Leroux's ethico-inclusive model, a more radical redemptive model advocated by Louis-Auguste Blanqui, and the class struggle model that emerges in the work of Marx and Engels. Wilde's argument is that solidarity has become subsumed within the dominant and traditional Marxist model of class politics and has not surmounted the problems he identifies of an inability to account adequately for the failures of Stalinism and policing regimes as a consequence of actually existing communist revolutions in the twentieth century, and for the diversity of social divisions and identities in its focus on class determinations. Wilde is drawn towards a radical humanist politics in which collective solidarity on national and global levels is central, and argues that a return to Leroux's ethico-inclusive account of solidarity would be a valuable contribution to theorising social and political change.

John McSweeney takes a different approach to theorizing solidarity, through a critical discussion of the later Foucault's augmentation of his concerns with a critical politics of difference with a politics of *parrhesia*, which focuses on the truth teller and, in this context, the act of telling the truth about difference. McSweeney sees Foucault's elaboration of a notion of care of the self deriving from cynicism and providing a reframing of his politics of difference to sustain socio-political solidarity. The combination of the aesthetics of the care of the self and the speaking to truth of *parrhesia* leads to a politics that uncover the pernicious effects of ordering structures in society and offers the possibility of solidarity in the act of recognising difference through shared experience of how that difference is

experienced as difference, and as subjectivities that are demystified and therefore understood. This is a solidarity of being outside of formal structures in order to change them and recognise the value of that common experience in relation to injustice, regulatory regimes and social ordering that produces hierarchy and “othering.” For McSweeney, the enterprise of truth telling and in doing so expressing care for self and other together is a fruitful basis for a contemporary solidarity.

David Stoop draws from a different intellectual tradition, the critical theory of Theodor Adorno. Stoop’s focus is on the problems of any conception of solidarity that seeks to account for the identitarian logic that underpins reconciliation between difference and solidarity in initiatives such as multiculturalism. This identitarian logic neither recognises criticisms of its own traditions in identity representation, nor accounts for the material contexts within which solidarity struggles are played out. Stoop explores Adorno’s concept of non-identity and his negative dialectics as a means for opening up a space for a different, non-identitarian notion of difference and solidarity. Stoop is clear that this exploration does not produce an easily translated analysis into a politics of solidarity, but sees value in the critique of alienation and objectification, instrumental reason and the structuring principles of contemporary societies that Adorno offers. From a different position to McSweeney, the shared experience of oppression is central to the prospects for solidarity that respects the autonomy of the individual.

In my chapter I draw from another intellectual tradition, that of Alisdair MacIntyre and his rearticulation of Aristotelian virtue ethics, to explore the value of solidarity ingrained in the practice of politics as a means of developing solidarity. Despite the dissonances between MacIntyre’s pessimistic response to the amoral banality of modern capitalist societies, features of his philosophy provide the prospects for a disciplining of current radical and Marxist politics. He draws out and focuses on the necessity of recognising the importance of practices as collective activities, the problems of institutional organisation and bureaucratic and managerial logics, and the importance of understanding traditions of politics and values and being wary of abstractive logics as guides for political thought and action. I offer this in a provisional essay, which seeks to put solidarity at the centre of radical and Marxist theory and politics, but also to anchor it and concrete processes and activity through the importance of practice as a foundation for politics.

Finally for this section, Zuzana Klímová turns from social analysis to literary theory to explore the social function of postcolonial literature in the 1960s and the second decade of the twenty-first century. Klímová’s

analysis is of postcolonial literature's rearticulation of the aesthetic function of literary creation. Central to postcolonial literature is the notion of counter-discourse against colonial and imperial truths and representations and particularly the impact of such traditional readings in producing "others" in prejudicial and pejorative forms. Klímová writes against the traditional apolitical reading of literature and locates postcolonial literature as a counterpart to political struggles and the assertion of political independence. Klímová traces the development of postcolonial literature over the last six decades and its articulation of an aesthetic politics that has an impact on the emergence of a postcolonial world and creates the space for debates as to how postcolonial literature attacks, but sometimes is contradictory in sustaining, the colonial past within its discourse. Klímová's chapter is less explicit in its discussion of solidarity but has an important contribution to debate in thinking about the different mechanisms by which solidarity is produced, and focusing upon the literary dimension.

The first section provides different theoretical approaches to the conception and exploration of solidarity, and approaches that depart from the traditional and dominant perspectives within which debates about solidarity take place. Their particular focus and critical thinking are valuable in themselves, and also add to the extant literature and encourage broader and new approaches to thinking about solidarity. The second section, sub-titled "social function," seeks to explore particular cases in which solidarity is constituted. The cases are remarkable by their diversity in global location, level of association, focus on cultural, political and policy contexts, and different approaches to analysis. As such, they provide a diverse set of cases from which different aspects of the problems of making and remaking solidarity can be explored.

Sibylle Heilbrunn, Leima Davidovich, and Leah Achdut provide a case study of Israel in exploring questions of solidarity. Writing against European sociological conceptions of exploring the tendencies to the collapse of solidarity and social cohesion through migration, globalisation, and modernising processes, they point to a distinction in looking at solidarity in Israel. Focusing on immigrant populations from the former Soviet Union and Ethiopia and the extant Palestinian population, they explore how the three populations experience the processes of social cohesion, using surveys and official statistical sources. Their research shows variance in the levels of social cohesion and the interrelationships and "trade off patterns" that these populations are subject to and experience. This exploration of social cohesion provides evidence that the migrants from the former Soviet Union are most integrated and the Palestinians least so, and joins a significant body of literature that challenges current Israeli

political strategies in respect of solidarity and managing difference within the Israeli state.

Claire Farrugia provides a different and far smaller case study, that of the African Village Market in Sydney, Australia. The market provides a space for communal meeting, social enterprise, and the fostering of community. This community provides the material for an ethnographic study that explores the meaning making of solidarity within the African diaspora. Farrugia emphasizes the practice of solidarity through sharing practices within the market that bind the community together. Within the context of reducing public funding for such spaces, Farrugia explores the complex interrelations between the practising of solidarity alongside the recognition of differences within the African diasporic community as a means of recognising the value of such a space.

Simona Zavratnik moves from an example of solidarity made constructively within community to the complexities of solidarity and identity in the Slovene context. Zavratnik looks at Slovenia's management of migration and incorporation of different ethnic minorities, and particularly at how these approaches deal with the contentious issues left from the conflicts that emerged in the former Yugoslavia (of which Slovenia was a part) in the 1990's. The focus of this analysis is on how statehood and the emergence of a distinct national identity challenged migration and ethnic diversity, particularly in respect of immigrants deemed to be "less desirable." Broadening the case within the context of European trends and data, Zavratnik suggests that public perception is an important variable in how states respond to migration and ethnic diversity, raising the issue of the relationship between a political responsiveness to public opinion *contra* the formation of public opinion by which states seek to maintain their power and conception of social cohesion.

Finally, Burcu Şentürk explores how state action can dissolve the solidarity in a community. Focusing on urban policies in Turkey, Şentürk focuses on the slum dwellers of the Ege district in Ankara, and how they were formed by migration from rural areas as the economy modernised. These slum districts are characterised by homogenous political orientation, lived experience, and ethnic and religious identities. The similarities, collective needs and struggles of this emergent community reinforced their solidarity, but are then eroded by strategic policies that seek to redistribute slum dwellers to other parts of the city and fragment the political polarisation of the development of these communities, and the impact of urban reformation projects. This eroded the sense of community solidarity and the politics of communality that solidarity produced.

These cases provide apt illustrations of the importance of solidarity as a social function and how solidarity is in various ways made or challenged. They have in common a clear understanding that social solidarity is inherently political (Scholz 2008), and whilst solidarity is not only produced by the state, the state in direct and indirect ways makes important contributions to the maintenance or erosion of solidarities in society and community as well as interests and identities in society.

This modest contribution to scholarship signposts some of the fertile possibilities for thinking about solidarity in the twenty-first century, whether measuring the value of existing ideas and strategies, such as multiculturalism, or exploring what new forms of social and cultural institutions might produce solidarity, such as new information technologies, or exploring whether cosmopolitanism or other concepts should now take up the running in opening the imagination to the possibilities of society where belonging, shared commitments and political, economic, and cultural resources coincide with the space to be different in diverse social forms, organisations and constructs.

References

- Cooper, Davina. 2004. *Challenging Diversity: Rethinking Equality and the Value of Difference*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Crow, Graham. 2002. *Social Solidarities: Theories, Identities and Social Change*. Buckingham: Open University Press.
- De Beer, Paul and Koster Ferry. 2009. *Sticking Together or Falling Apart?: Solidarity in an Era of Individualization and Globalization*. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press.
- Durkheim, Emile. 1984. *The Division of Labor in Society*. London: Mac-Millan.
- Hasan, Romy. 2010. *Multiculturalism: Some Inconvenient Truths*. London: Politicos.
- Lorde, Audre. 1997. *Our Dead Behind Us: Poems*. London: WW Norton and Company.
- Mason, Andrew. 2001. *Community, Solidarity and Belonging: Levels of Community and their Normative Significance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*. Houndsmill: Palgrave.
- Rorty, Richard. 1989. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Scholz, Sally J. 2008. *Political Solidarity*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Taylor, Charles. 1994. *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*. Edited and Introduced by Amy Gutmann. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Turner, Bryan and Chris Rojek. 2001. *Society and Culture: Principles of Scarcity and Solidarity*. London: Sage.
- Wilde, Lawrence. 2007. "The Concept of Solidarity: Emerging from the Theoretical Shadows?" *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 9:171-181.
- . 2013. *Global Solidarity*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

SOLIDARITIES

CHAPTER ONE

THREE FORMS OF NINETEENTH CENTURY WORKING CLASS SOLIDARITY AND THEIR CURRENT RELEVANCE

LAWRENCE WILDE

The concept of solidarity was first developed by the French social thinker Pierre Leroux in *De L'Humanité*, published in 1840 (Wilde 2013, 20-22). It was one of a cluster of terms, such as “socialism” and “communism,” which emerged, first in France and Britain and quickly elsewhere, to express the hopes of the rapidly growing working class for a more just social order (Bestor 1948, 259). The association of solidarity with socialism became common in France in the 1840s, culminating in the emergence of *Solidarité Républicaine* in November 1848, the first mass socialist party which had over 350 branches with 30,000 members within months. It won over two million votes at the legislative assembly election of May 1849, with 200 deputies adopting the title of *démoc-socs*, or social-democrats (Pilbeam 2000, 190-1). It was not until much later in the century that the concept of solidarity came to be adopted by sections of the liberal bourgeoisie. Emile Durkheim brought it into the realm of academic social science with the publication of *The Division of Labour in Society* in 1893, while Léon Bourgeois, leader of the Radical Party, popularised a liberal appeal to class reconciliation when he published *Solidarité* in 1896.

In this chapter I identify three forms of solidarity advocated by various nineteenth century socialist movements, with “socialist” used in a broad sense to cover all the doctrines and movements that combined firm rejection of the capitalist economic system with a commitment to some form of egalitarian and democratic alternative. They all acknowledged the need for some form of united action against the prevailing social system, but there were distinct differences when it came to identifying the groups that were to be mobilised, the scope of their activities, and the nature of their social goals. The first three sections will look critically at each of the forms in turn—the ethico-inclusive, the redemptive, and the class struggle

perspectives—while the concluding section will consider their impact on twentieth century politics and their possible relevance for social struggles of today.

Ethico-Inclusive Solidarity

The concept of solidarity developed by Leroux can be characterised as “ethico-inclusive” because it demanded social and political inclusion and was expressed in explicitly ethical terms. In Book 4 of *De L’Humanité* Leroux conceived the “mutual solidarity of humans” as the alternative to the shortcomings of the Christian virtue of charity. Rather than helping others out of duty to God without enquiring into the reasons for their misfortune, people ought to express the love of God through embracing their fellow human beings in mutually supportive relations (Leroux 1985, 157-72). While acknowledging the positive contribution of Christianity to morality in the past, he argued that the time had come for a new religion of Humanity in which the love of God was expressed as love for the God in ourselves and others (Leroux 1985, 158 and 165). Although Leroux condemned the enslavement of workers in the new industrial system and declared the bourgeoisie, with its rampant individualism, to be “the enemy,” he opposed violent revolution and consistently supported peaceful agitation for social, economic and political reform (Bakunin 1976, 96). This model of solidarity associated the needs and aspirations of the working class with the common good of the whole society. The workers were conceived broadly as all those who laboured to make a living, including independent urban workers and poor peasants. In this conception, the demand for social inclusion followed the spirit of the great French Revolution of 1789 with its appeal for “liberty, equality, fraternity.”

Although Leroux was wary of specifying the forms that the socialism of the future might take, it is possible to form a clear picture of the guiding principles of the ethico-inclusive form of solidarity, outlined in France by Leroux and other socialists such as Louis Blanc, and by some leaders of the Chartist movement in Britain such as James Bronterre O’Brien, Ernest Jones and Julian Harney (Maw 2008, 201-26; Claeys 1987, 158-62; Thompson 1998, 111-30). They denounced the exploitation that flowed from an unregulated market economy, and demanded the full social and political inclusion of the urban and rural working class. The organisation of working class solidarity varied, including producer and consumer cooperatives, craft-based trade unions, and political agitation for assistance for workers and for full democratic rights. In France, the most specific plan for an alternative to competitive capitalism was the system of “social

workshops,” first set down by Louis Blanc in *L'Organisation du travail* in 1839. These were to be state sponsored cooperatives in which the solidarity of the workers in each workshop was to develop into solidarity between all the workshops in the same industry, culminating in a wider solidarity between all the various industries in the country (Blanc 1841, 84). Blanc called his vision for the future socialist society “a vast system of solidarity” (Blanc 1841, 142). Crucially, the workshops would be the vehicle to give substance to the demand for the right to work, which proved, as shall see, too dangerous for the propertied classes to tolerate. The commitment to peaceful change meant that the proponents of this model of solidarity often sought the cooperation of those in positions of power and influence, in the somewhat naïve belief that the development of more cooperative social system would be accepted as the rational course of action. In the 1845 introduction to *L'Organisation du travail* Blanc explicitly addressed his work to the rich, appealing to them that the cause of the poor was also “your cause” (Sewell 1997, 235).

The Chartists addressed their demands for democratic rights directly to Parliament by presenting three massive national petitions between 1839 and 1848, only to be met with disdain. Although this mass movement had a “physical force” element to it, the large majority of those involved pursued reforms within legal limits. Indeed their respect for observing legality was shown when the sole Chartist Member of Parliament, Feargus O'Connor, withdrew his motion to discuss the last great Chartist petition in 1848 when the House of Commons administrators cast doubt on the validity more than half of the four million signatures (Roberts 1999, 112-3). At the same time the last great national demonstration of 80,000 Chartists passed off peacefully at Kennington Common in London, but in the months that followed almost 300 leaders were arrested and imprisoned, and the movement collapsed (Thompson 1984, 328-9).

The ethico-inclusive model of solidarity consistently exhibited an ethical commitment to social inclusion. We have seen that Leroux grounded his commitment to social solidarity in an egalitarian interpretation of Christianity, while Blanc described socialism as “the gospel in practice” (Blanc 1966, 257). This Christianity was not that of the established churches, which they regarded as corrupting the liberational essence of the religion, but it built on the moral intuition of those educated in the Christian tradition. There was also a tradition of non-Christian “deistic” religion among followers of Charles Fourier and Henri de Saint-Simon that argued for social justice (Pilbeam 2000, 39-53). This was developed further by Auguste Comte and his “religion of humanity” and was influential in the development of social liberalism as well as Durkheim’s commitment to

social solidarity (Durkheim 1968, 62-63; Wernick 2001). In the Chartist movement, as Dorothy Thompson has pointed out, it is clear from speeches and writings that most Chartists were Christians “of one sort or another” (Thompson 1986, 260). Even in the secular socialist tradition, inspired by cooperative thinkers such as Robert Owen and William Thompson in the 1830s, a strongly moralistic rhetoric was employed to claim justice and entitlement for the working class (Claeys 1987, 64-5).

The commitment to internationalism was also typical of the ethico-inclusive model of solidarity. Leroux himself argued, in an address to his fellow printers in 1851, that solidarity should be rooted in workplace associations that would transcend national boundaries, introducing “the true human society” which “makes all men solidary while rendering them free” (Sewell 1997, 274). This internationalism was an important feature of early socialism, marked by the formal establishment of The Society of Fraternal Democrats, comprising members from a number of European countries, in 1846. Its programme, formulated by the English socialist, Julian Harney, declared that “our moral creed is to receive our fellow-men without regard to country, as members of one family—the human race, and as citizens of one commonwealth—the world” (Braunthal 1967a, 66).

In both Britain and France, however, the commitment to peaceful political progress placed the socialist leaders and their movements in jeopardy at times of political crisis. The suppression of the Chartist movement in Britain set back the development of independent working class political activity for over 30 years. The French case is perhaps more instructive for understanding the difficulties faced by those who preached a peaceful path to socialism. The revolution of February 1848 ushered in a Provisional Government that included Louis Blanc, and a somewhat watered-down version of his national workshops was introduced. Although the majority in the Provisional Government intended the workshops to be little more than a temporary act of charity to rescue workers from destitution in a time of particularly severe distress, the wording of the decree itself conveyed a radically different message. As William Sewell notes, the decree established the workshops not on the basis of charity but on the solemnly proclaimed right of all citizens to labour. The workers were convinced that it had established the right to labour as a fundamental right of man (Sewell 1997, 246). It appeared that a major step had been taken towards the triumph of the principle of solidarity over the principle of charity. However, the general election in April returned a conservative majority and Blanc was removed from the new government, which, on June 21, decreed the dissolution of the workshops. Thousands of workers in Paris took to arms in a rebellion that lacked leadership and clear goals, and in four days of

fighting approximately 1500 workers were killed and 12,000 arrested and imprisoned (Sewell 1997, 272). The violent suppression of the workers' uprising was followed by closure of many socialist clubs and publications, and eventually by the abolition of universal male franchise. Nevertheless, this was not the end of the ethico-inclusive approach to solidarity. Despite this, *Solidarité Républicaine* continued to attract members and electoral support, but the state intensified its repression. Most of the social democratic leaders were arrested at various times during the Second Republic and many of them fled France even before Louis-Napoleon assumed total control in December 1851. The new dictator immediately imposed a ban on all socialist and labour organisations that was tightly enforced until the late 1860s. This quickly led to the marginalisation of the ethico-inclusive model of solidarity.

Despite the difficulties of pursuing peaceful tactics in the face of acute economic exploitation and political oppression, one outstanding example of ethico-inclusive working class solidarity deserves mention. This was the support of British cotton workers for the anti-slavery movement in the American Civil War, which involved an enormous self-sacrifice. When the Civil War broke out in 1861 the Northern states set up a naval blockade to prevent the slave-owning Confederacy from exporting its principal product, cotton. As almost 80 per cent of the cotton imported into Lancashire and Scotland was from the Confederacy, mass unemployment and poverty soon developed. Nevertheless, the workers campaigned hard to prevent the British government to break the blockade and effectively declare war on the USA, which it was urged to do by the cotton owners and other manufacturers. They also pleaded with President Lincoln to make the freeing of the slaves the goal of the conflict. Thanking them for their courageous support, Lincoln noted that they could have secured work and food if the blockade had been broken, but "they could not allow their instinct to override their conscience" (Foner 1981, 88).

Redemptive Solidarity

The redemptive approach to solidarity viewed the existing social order as totally oppressive and corrupt, and sought deliverance through complete revolutionary transformation. The leading advocate of this approach in France was Louis-Auguste Blanqui, who spent a lifetime gathering disciplined groups of conspirators together, including many years in jail as a result of his insurrectionary activities (Braunthal 1967a, 46-7). Blanqui saw the role of these revolutionary groups as inspiring the proletarians - workers and peasants alike—"the desire to redeem themselves from

servitude” (Blanqui 1832a). This redemptive urge, spontaneous and explosive, rejected the idea of building mass movements of workers in trade unions or legal political parties. In practice, the solidarity developed in this model was primarily that of the small, disciplined revolutionary group, aiming to create a solidaristic society after the forces of oppression had been destroyed. Typically, these groups were high on apocalyptic rhetoric and low on the details of what forms the transition to “freedom” might take. This conspiratorial approach was by no means restricted to France, gaining support among opponents of the highly authoritarian Russian state (Venturi 1983) and also in Italy and Spain (Woodcock 1977, 307-75).

The followers of Blanqui were the major political force at work in the great rebellion that produced the Paris Commune of 1871 (Braunthal 1967a, 153-5; Horne 2002, 290-303). The solidarity of the Commune rested on a shared sense of the betrayal of Paris by the government of the new Third Republic, the injustices of the past, and a conviction that a more just society could be created without privileged elites. The Communards were to pay a high price for their defiant stance. After ten weeks of independence, between March 18 and May 28, the Army of the national government marched from Versailles to destroy the Commune, slaughtering an estimated 25,000 people in the process (Horne 2002, 418; Edwards 1972, 158). Many others were exiled and not allowed to return to France until the amnesty of 1880. As Robert Gildea has commented, the repression handed to the workers “a founding myth of the heroism, martyrdom and promised redemption of the working class that trumped all others” (Gildea 1996, 44). The ferocity of the state suppression of the revolutionary working class was decisive in marginalising appeals to a social republic forged out of compromise with the ruling class (Sewell 1999, 275-6). Working class solidarity in the early years of the French Third Republic expressed itself in revolutionary rather than reformist terms, for despite the extension of representative democracy, militant workers were unwilling to trust parliament and the state.

In Europe as a whole, anarchism became the principal vehicle for the redemptive model of solidarity. One of its leading proponents, Mikhail Bakunin, committed himself early in his career to the idea of sweeping away all institutions of power in order to achieve freedom, famously declaring that “the passion for destruction is a creative passion, too!” (Bakunin 1973, 57). The redemptive nature of his conception of solidarity is well illustrated by his response to the defeat of the Commune, in which he pledged his commitment to a liberty that would “shatter all the idols in heaven and on earth and will then build a powerful new world of mankind

in solidarity, upon the ruins of all the churches and all the states” (Bakunin 1973, 262). After talking about the massacre of the Communards as the crucifixion of “humanity itself,” he promises that the coming international revolution, “expressing the solidarity of all peoples, shall be the resurrection of Paris” (Bakunin 1973, 264-5). Bakunin rejected what he termed “Marxian solidarity,” arguing that it was “decreed” from top down, but he extolled the watchword of solidarity as “the confirmation and realisation of every freedom, having its origin...in the inherent social nature of man” (Bakunin 1973, 284-5).

The determination of the anarchists to maintain their anti-authoritarian purity was such that they abstained from constitutional politics and from trade union activity that restricted itself to bargaining for better pay and conditions. This was to prove decisive in limiting the effectiveness of anarchism as a movement, leaving the major organisations of the working class in the hands of reformists or Marxists. In practice, the political abstentionism of anarchism did not lend itself to the development of solidaristic mass movements, with the important exception of Spain (Woodcock 1977, 335-375). However, besides the solidarity within and between anarchist groups, attempts were made to reach out to other groups pursuing socialistic goals, and Bakunin and his followers played an important role in the First International between 1868 and 1872. It represented thousands of workers from across Europe and North America, and had some notable successes in supporting labour struggles (Braunthal 1967a, 113-6). However, from the outset it was beset by doctrinal, tactical and organisational differences. In the aftermath of the repression of the Commune it looked likely that the groups preaching political abstentionism would gain a majority in the General Council, and Marx engineered the relocation of the Council to New York and effectively ended the brief but spectacular life of the International (Braunthal 1967a, 116-94). The anarchists continued to hold International Congresses, but their strength diminished as masses of workers began to organise in socialist parties that were willing to engage with existing political institutions. When the Second International was inaugurated in Paris in 1889, the old differences between anarchists and socialists quickly resurfaced. At the Zurich Congress of 1893 a number of Marxists proposed that future membership of political organisations be restricted to those committed to political action, which meant that “the workers” parties should make full use of political and legal rights in an attempt to capture the legislative machine and use it in the interests of the working class and for the capture of political power (Braunthal 1967a, 251). The motion

passed, effectively excluding the anarchists, and the decision was upheld three years later at the London Congress.

Perhaps the most significant mass movement embodying the idea of redemptive solidarity was revolutionary syndicalism, which developed among craft-based trade unions in France in the 1890s and reached a dominant position in the national labour federation, the CGT (*Confédération Générale du Travail*), between 1902 and 1912. At its height the unions embracing revolutionary syndicalism totalled no more than 400,000 members, but its militancy was formidable and its fierce hostility to all forms of political practice was unremitting (Ridley 1970, 63-79). Its dual purpose was to promote workers' immediate interest through industrial action, and, more importantly, to pursue the final emancipation of the proletariat from the despotism of capitalist democracy by means of the general strike. Typically, there were no details of what the transformed society would look like in the event of a successful general strike, and the growing acceptance of the pursuit of reforms as the only practical way forward led to a dissipation of the revolutionary purity of the movement (Ridley 1970, 153-5). The clearest expression of revolutionary syndicalism's apocalyptic commitment was George Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*, first published in 1906, in which he extolled the virtues of the "terrible nature of the revolution" and "its character of absolute and irrevocable transformation" (Sorel 2009, 154). For Sorel, the proletariat's task was to prepare itself for "the great battle," not to make plans for the post-revolutionary society. The workers should concentrate on the sole aim of "expelling the capitalists from the productive domain" (Sorel 2009, 161). His defence of revolutionary violence eschewed all ideas of social reform or reconstruction; the myth of the general strike was sustained by the emotional power of redemption.

The dangers of an approach that condemned representative democracy as corrupt and was deliberately vague about its social goals quickly became apparent. The French movement provides alarming examples. For a number of years before the outbreak of the First World War Sorel associated with extreme right wing monarchists, taking nationalistic, anti-Semitic and anti-democratic positions, and although he tired of this line by 1914, his work was later appropriated by sections of Italian fascism (Wilde 1986). One of Sorel's followers, Georges Valois, deserted the anarcho-syndicalists to join the extreme Right, founding the first fascist group in France in 1925 before swinging back to syndicalism (Ridley 1970, 236). Another friend of Sorel, Hubert Lagardelle, who once defended revolutionary syndicalism as the only way forward for the working class in debate with Emile Durkheim (Lukes 1973, 542-6), became an adherent of

Italian fascism in the 1920s. He served in the Vichy government in France as Minister for Labour in 1942-43, creating a fascist charter of labour with the slogan “Solidarity, Duty, Sacrifice” (Ridley 1970, 237-238).

The Class Struggle Approach

The “class struggle” approach to solidarity was first advocated by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels in the *Communist Manifesto* of 1848. They portrayed the development of history as a succession of class struggles, culminating in the final clash between the bourgeoisie and the working class, or proletariat (Marx and Engels 2010a, 67-8). In this view, the proletariat did not refer to all oppressed groups but only to those workers who depended entirely on selling their labour power (Marx and Engels 2010a, 77-9). They might make alliances with other groups such as peasants or the self-employed, but it was their historic task to win the battle for democracy, seize state power, and, by taking production into social ownership, create a classless society free from oppression and exploitation (Marx and Engels 2010a, 86). Communists were not supposed to form a separate party opposed to other working class parties, but were to offer leadership in the struggle against the bourgeoisie, while recognising that this was always an international struggle (Marx 2010a, 79-80). In practice, this meant supporting the emerging trade union movements and working class political parties and campaigns while always pointing to the ultimate goal of taking production into social control. In his work with the First International he invoked solidarity as the “basic principle” of the movement, arguing that “we will only be able to attain the goal we have set ourselves if this life-giving principle acquires a secure foundation among the workers of all countries” (Marx 2010c, 325).

In Marx’s lifetime the working class formed a majority of the population only in Britain, and nowhere was full political democracy achieved. Marx argued that it was entirely possible for workers to achieve their goal “by peaceful means” in countries with liberal political institutions, but it would require revolutionary force to achieve democracy in those that did not permit legal opposition (Marx 2010, 324). In the years following Marx’s death in 1883 Engels reiterated the strategy of democratic struggle where possible and clandestine organisation where necessary (Wilde 1999, 198-200). Socialism could be won only through the mass mobilisation of the working class in political struggle and the seizure of state power. Furthermore, to replace capitalism as an international system, “united action of the leading civilized countries” was one of the first conditions for success (Marx and Engels 2010a, 85). By the time of Engels’ death in 1896,