A Divided Hungary in Europe

A Divided Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks and Representations, 1541-1699

Edited by

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Szymon Brzeziński and Áron Zarnóczki

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PREFACE

A Divided Hungary in Europe: Exchanges, Networks, and Representations, 1541−1699 is a three-volume series, which is the result of the collaboration of 29 scholars engaged in the study of the history of early modern Hungary and Europe. The work has been initiated and conducted by the research programme "Hungary in early modern Europe," financed by the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA), and headed by Professor Ágnes R. Várkonyi at the Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest.[1] Our fundamental purpose was to provide state-of-the-art knowledge of early modern Hungary in a European context for an English-speaking audience. The title of the series may sound self-explanatory, but in the case of early modern "Hungary," one needs to make a number of precursory remarks.

The medieval Kingdom of Hungary, which included Croatia in a personal union from the beginning of the twelfth century, gradually fell apart under Ottoman pressure after the fatal battle of 1526. This tragic battle, fought on the plain of Mohács, where even the young King Louis II lost his life in the swamps, meant the end of the large, independent kingdom, founded by King Saint Stephen in the year 1000. More directly, it led to a civil war between the parties of the new national king, John Szapolyai (1526–1540), and the Habsburg king, Ferdinand I (1526−1564), who had contractual rights for ruling the kingdom. Before Buda was captured by the Ottomans in 1541, Saint Stephen's Kingdom had already been in the process of falling into three territorial-political units: "Royal Hungary"—the legal heir of the Kingdom of Hungary—under the Habsburgs, which continued to include Croatia; Transylvania and the eastern strip of the country (called Partium),[2] which soon had to give up

[1] The research programme was hosted by the Department of Medieval Early Modern History at the Eötvös Loránd University of Budapest. We gratefully thank the support of the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA, no. 81948) in financing this book project. We would also like to express our gratitude to Professor Ágnes R. Várkonyi, who guided this research programme with wisdom and discreetness.

[2] The so-called Partium (*Partium Regni Hungariae, Partes adnexae*) comprised the northern and eastern parts of the Kingdom of Hungary, which became connected to the Principality of Transylvania after its formation, without being a formal part of it. The territory originally (in 1570) consisted of the counties Bihar, Zaránd,

pretences to the crown, rapidly developing into an Ottoman vassal state; and finally the areas that fell under Ottoman occupation with a frontier that continued moving mainly at the expense of "Royal Hungary."

Transylvania, adopting the ambiguous status of a semi-autonomous Ottoman satellite state, at the same time became a secondary repository of Hungarian political traditions and a bastion of the Protestant churches, hence a permanent embarrassment to the Habsburgs. What remained of Hungary proper on the north-western part of the former kingdom, however, was unable to withstand Ottoman pressure without continuous Habsburg support. The resources of this land were in a great part consumed by military expenses, apparently more than was the case in the new Principality of Transylvania.

Although Hungary as one of Europe's significant powers ceased to exist, the fiction—or ideal—of a unified country survived during the more than 150 years of Ottoman rule. This was also reflected on most of the maps prepared of Hungary, which kept ignoring the Ottomans and insisted on a medieval vision of the land. (The map on the cover of this book, distinguishing between "Hungaria Turcica" and "Hungaria Austriaca," is one of the few exceptions.[3]) Naturally, in nourishing the idea of a glorious past state, the principal actors were the ruling class, held together by common legal-political traditions and cultural heritage. Nonetheless, the unifying forces of cultural and religious practices and institutions were significant also at lower levels of society, especially among the learned. The churches in divided Hungary disregarded political fragmentation. Protestant churches and Catholic missionaries alike were free to organise themselves in "Ottoman Hungary," becoming the major cohesive forces of the area.

In legitimating this project that treats the parts of "divided Hungary" altogether and places the question of cultural exchange in its centre, one might easily overemphasise cohesive forces and a common territorial-historical consciousness. This is certainly not one of our goals. The fact that Buda was reconquered in 1686 and the Ottomans were entirely expelled from Hungary by 1699 should not influence our interpretation of past events in a deterministic way. By the second half of the sixteenth century, Transylvania was already a distinct, independent principality—indepen-

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Kraszna, Máramaros, Middle Szolnok, but underwent numerous changes in territorial range due to the Ottoman expansion an struggles between the Habsburgs and Transylvania.

[3] This map of the "Kingdom of Hungary" drawn by the Dutch cartographer Joan Blaeu and dedicated to Ferenc Nádasdy, lord chief justice of Hungary, also indicates a part of Transylvania ("Transylvaniae pars").

dent at least of the Habsburg Monarchy—and was considered, and desired to be considered, more and more as such abroad. Moreover, Transylvania had been and remained different from the rest of "divided Hungary" in many respects. This was most apparent in its political structure, in the curious system of three nations—the Hungarian nobility, the Saxons and the Székelys—represented at the Transylvanian Diet, and in the proportionally greater power and wealth of the prince, whose election was nonetheless controlled by the Sublime Porte. Aristocratic landowners were considerably poorer here, to the point that we can hardly speak of the check of the estates in Transylvania. Needless to say, "Ottoman Hungary," integrated administratively into the Ottoman Empire, was even more different than Transylvania in regard to the Kingdom of Hungary, both in its political-economic system and cultural life, which were dominated, at least in the major cities, by an Ottoman presence, which added a further element to the cultural life of the territory, one unknown in the other two divisions of Hungary.

This is not to say that individual parts of "divided Hungary" were not themselves fragmented and heterogeneous—something that was far from exceptional in early modern Europe, but nonetheless deserves to be emphasised. The lands of the Holy Crown of Saint Stephen were populated by a great number of ethnically, linguistically, culturally and religiously different groups, some of them enjoying political autonomy, like the population of Croatia—most of them Catholic Slavs—or the Lutheran Saxons in Transylvania, and some lacking any political recognition, like the Orthodox Romanians spread out in Transylvania. Besides heterogeneity, we should also stress the lack of a real capital, that is, a political centre with a royal court and a university. In the Kingdom of Hungary, political life was organised in the shadow of the Viennese imperial court, which attracted few Hungarians (unlike in the eighteenth century). Higher education gained impetus with the establishment of the Jesuit University of Nagyszombat (Trnava)[4]—on the western edges of the country—only in the seventeenth century. It was primarily the aristocratic courts and city schools that made up for the lack of a political, cultural and educational

[4] In referring to place names in historical Hungary, there is no good solution that equally satisfies all researchers of the Carpathian Basin. Since each country (Hungary, Slovakia, Ukraine, Romania, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Austria) which shares parts of the Kingdom of Hungary have their own historical traditions in the use of place names, while English-language publications vary in usage and concur only in a very few names (like the use of the German name Pressburg for Bratislava/Pozsony), we have decided to stick to the Hungarian tradition and mention the present version of place names in parentheses.

centre. In the case of Transylvania, the princely court could only periodically compete in importance with the major cities such as Kolozsvár (Cluj), Nagyszeben (Sibiu), or Brassó (Braşov).

Despite fragmentation, heterogeneity and the continuous pressure of the Ottoman Empire, war-ridden "divided Hungary" saw a surprising cultural flourishing in the sixteenth century and maintained its common cultural identity also in the seventeenth century. This could hardly be possible without intense exchange with the rest of Europe, which has been the principal subject of our research programme.

This series of volumes approaches themes of exchange of information and knowledge from two perspectives: exchange through traditional channels provided by religious/educational institutions and the system of European study tours (Volume 1: *Study Tours and Intellectual-Religious Relationships*), and the less regular channels and improvised networks of political diplomacy (Volume 2: *Diplomacy, Information Flow and Cultural Exchange*). A by-product of this exchange of information was the changing image of early modern Hungary and Transylvania, which is presented in the third and in some aspects concluding volume of essays (Volume 3: *The Making and Uses of the Image of Hungary and Transylvania*). Unlike earlier approaches to the same questions, these volumes intend to draw an alternative map of early modern Hungary. On this map, the centre-periphery conceptions of European early modern culture will be replaced by new narratives written from the perspective of historical actors, and the dominance of Western-Hungarian relationships are kept in balance with openness to the significance of Hungary's direct neighbours, most importantly the Ottoman Empire.

The invited authors of the volumes comprise key historians interested in questions of cultural history. The majority of them are Hungarian, working for academic institutions with a keen eye on both archival and printed sources. One of the goals of the volumes is to make their work known to a foreign language public in a coherent framework, dealing with some of the key questions that set the cultural and intellectual horizon and determined the image of early modern Hungary.

The editors

ZONE OF CONFLICT—ZONE OF EXCHANGE: INTRODUCTORY REMARKS ON EARLY MODERN HUNGARY IN DIPLOMATIC AND INFORMATION NETWORKS

SZYMON BRZEZIŃSKI

The history of Hungary in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries has been for a long time regarded as a series of catastrophes. The Kingdom of Hungary broke up under Ottoman expansion and for over one-hundred-and-fifty years became an area of Habsburg–Ottoman military and diplomatic rivalry. The whole Carpathian Basin was perceived therefore as a "battlefield" and the whole period was traditionally described as a "Turkish age." There are of course some valid reasons behind this view: no doubt the geopolitical contest decisively shaped the country's place in early modern Europe. The scope and consequences of this shaping were much discussed in historiography and involved such fundamental questions as the historical "backwardness" of the region or the long-term influence of this period on the region's history. For a long time, from the perspective of Hungarian historiography, the main question raised involved the permanent struggles against the Ottomans and Habsburgs and attempts to overcome the partition of the country.

This volume wishes to make a contribution to this period in a different way. Its aim is to highlight the history of exchanges in early modern Hungary on the field of diplomacy and contemporary "international relations," usually viewed through the perspective of conflicts. A closely related topic is the question of information flow in contemporary politics, which gained substantial scholarly attention in the last decades. Both of these perspectives give adequate insight into the more active role of actors who shaped the international standing of Hungary and Transylvania. Thus we hope to add some new aspects to the Western and Eastern dimension of Hungarian

diplomatic entanglement between the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.[1] A role of the "country-between" meant being not only an area of periodically renewed conflict, but also being a region of intensive mutual exchange, an area connected in diverse ways to current European and sometimes even extra-European affairs.

We find it useful to regard the topic in a multifaceted approach present in the cultural history of politics and diplomacy. This attitude has proved to be an effective tool in more recent scholarship. The "new diplomatic history" concentrates on aspects of political history only occasionally handled in a more traditional approach, like the information market and brokerage, the role of gifts, gestures and clothing in diplomacy, the cultural role of dynastic marriages, envoys and diplomatic missions.[2] On the other hand, much discussed in recent historiography on early modern Europe are the concepts of "cultural transfer" and "cultural exchange," which result

[1] Several recent works on early modern Hungary and Transylvania in context of Habsburg–Ottoman conflicts and state-building processes: G. Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy in the Sixteenth Century*, trans. by T. J. DeKornfeld and H. D. DeKornfeld (Boulder, CO. 2009); *The European Tributary States of the Ottoman Empire in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, ed. by G. Kármán and L. Kunčević (Leiden 2013); *Europe and the "Ottoman World": Exchanges and Conflicts*, ed. by G. Kármán and R. G. Păun (Istanbul 2013); *Frieden und Konfliktmanagement in interkulturellen Räumen. Osmanisches Reich und Habsburgermonarchie in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by A. Strohmeyer and N. Spannenberger (Stuttgart 2013); *Osmanischer Orient und Ostmitteleuropa*, ed. by R. Born and A. Puth (Stuttgart 2014); Á. R. Várkonyi, *Europica varietas, Hungarica varietas, 1526–1762. Selected Studies*, trans. by É. Pálmai et al. (Budapest 2000). On achievements of Hungarian Ottoman studies, see D. Géza and P. Fodor, "Hungarian Studies in Ottoman History," in *The Ottomans and the Balkans: A Discussion of Historiography*, ed. by F. Adanir and S. Faroqhi (Leiden 2002), 305–350.

[2] H. Schilling, *Konfessionalisierung und Staatsinteressen. Internationale Beziehungen 1559–1660* (Paderborn 2007) (Handbuch der Geschichte der Internationalen Beziehungen, 2); J. Watkins, "Toward a New Diplomatic History of Medieval and Early Modern Europe," *Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 38, 1 (2008), 1–14; K. Urbach, "Diplomatic History since the Cultural Turn," *The Historical Journal* 46, 4 (2003), 991–997; *Geschichte der Politik. Alte und neue Wege*, ed. by H.-Ch. Kraus and T. Nicklas (Munich 2007); *Diplomacy and Early Modern Culture*, ed. by R. Adams and R. Cox (Basingstoke 2011); *Internationale Beziehungen in der Frühen Neuzeit. Ansätze und Perspektiven*, ed. by H. Kugeler et al. (Hamburg 2006); *Diplomatisches Zeremoniell in Europa und im Mittleren Osten in der Frühen Neuzeit*, ed. by R. Kauz et al. (Vienna 2009); *Wahrnehmungen des Fremden. Differenzerfahrungen von Diplomaten im 16. und 17. Jahrhundert*, ed. by A. Strohmeyer and M. Rohrschneider (Münster 2007).

also in wide-ranging approaches.[3] Still, these approaches are not yet characteristic for most of the historiography on Central and Eastern Europe, and just recently have started to be more widely applied in studies on early modern Hungary.[4] Thus there has emerged a reasonable need to present such research to the international audience and so to better an understanding of the very complex historical matter.

The chronology present in the title requires perhaps little explanation. Both dates indicate the significant events connected to the Ottoman conquest and its end, and, therefore, to the beginning and conclusion of a specific political situation in the Carpathian Basin. The starting point is the capture of the Hungarian capital, Buda, by Süleyman I in 1541—a date commonly considered the beginning of the triple division of the country. The closing point was set in 1699, the year of the Treaty of Karlowitz (Sremski Karlovci), ending the wars between the Holy League and the Ottoman Empire which led to the retrieval of most of historical Hungary. The period under consideration is then that of Ottoman rule in Hungary and of its geopolitical consequences, including the creation and existence of the Principality of Transylvania.

"Hungary's history in the early modern era can only be understood within a European historical context"—states Péter Tusor in his chapter in this volume. This opinion is shared by other authors as well. A feature of the research presented here is that it is based on archival materials from across Europe. Thanks to that wider perspective, the concrete phenomena

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[3] *Cultural Exchange in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by R. Muchembled and W. Monter, vols. 1–4 (New York 2007); *Kultureller Austausch. Bilanz und Perspektiven der Frühneuzeitforschung*, ed. by M. North (Cologne 2009); *Cultural Translation in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by P. Burke and R. Po-chia Hsia (Cambridge 2007); *Well-Connected Domains. Towards an Entangled Ottoman History*, ed. by P. F. Firges et al. (Leiden 2014); H. Droste, "Diplomacy as a Means of Cultural Transfer in Early Modern Times," *Scandinavian Journal of History* 31, 2 (2006), 144–150.

[4] For some references, cf. I. Fazekas, "Die Frühneuzeitforschung in Ungarn. Ein Forschungsbericht," in *Geteilt – Vereinigt. Beiträge zur Geschichte des Königreichs Ungarn in der Frühneuzeit (16.-18. Jahrhundert)*, ed. by K. Csaplár-Degovics and I. Fazekas (Berlin 2011), 15–64. Cf. also the volumes: *Türkenkriege und Adelskultur in Ostmitteleuropa vom 16. bis zum 18. Jahrhundert*, ed. by R. Born and S. Jagodzinski (Ostfildern 2014); *Identitás és kultúra a török hódoltság korában* [Identity and culture in the age of the Turkish conquest], ed. by P. Ács and J. Székely (Budapest 2012); research by Péter Erdősi: P. Erdősi and J. B. Szabó, "Ceremonies Marking the Transfer of Power in the Principality of Transylvania in East European Context," *Majestas* 11 (2003), 111–160; and Pálffy, *The Kingdom of Hungary*.

of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century Hungarian history can gain a more general sense and serve as comparative material for international scholarship. This approach, although seemingly quite obvious, can be considered an achievement of more recent historiography on early modern Hungary and is particularly valid for the studies on information flow, communication and diplomacy. Several recent edited volumes on information flow contain substantial studies on espionage, military and diplomatic networks of the Habsburg and Ottoman empires.[5] Closely related is research on early modern media, circulation of news on Hungary and its connection with political decision-making, as in the studies of Nóra G. Etényi.[6] Our volume presents similar results in the chapters by Noémi Viskolcz, Mónika F. Molnár and Dóra Kerekes.[7] Concentrating on mechanisms of information gathering, Gábor Kármán provides an overview of the development of the Transylvanian diplomacy in the first half of the seventeenth century and the country's growing entanglement in European affairs.

The concept of exchange had an impact on borderland studies, a field well established in the last decades and with significant results regarding the Habsburg–Ottoman frontier and borderland.[8] That approach has proved

[5] *Információáramlás a magyar és török végvári rendszerben* [Information flow in the Hungarian and Turkish border fortress systems], ed. by T. Petercsák and M. Berecz (Eger 1999); *Információáramlás a kora újkorban* [Information flow in the early modern age], ed. by L. Z. Karvalits and K. Kis (Budapest 2004). For international research, cf. *News in Early Modern Europe: Currents and Connections*, vols. 1–2, ed. by S. F. Davies and P. Fletcher (Leiden 2014); *News and Politics in Early Modern Europe (1500–1800)*, ed. by W. Koopmans (Leuven 2005); G. Ágoston, "Information, Ideology, and Limits of Imperial Policy: Ottoman Grand Strategy in the Context of Ottoman-Habsburg Rivalry," in *The Early Modern Ottomans. Remapping the Empire*, ed. by V. H. Aksan and D. Goffman (New York 2007), 75–103.

[6] N. G. Etényi, *Hadszíntér és nyilvánosság. A magyarországi török háborúk hírei a 17. századi német újságokban* [Theatre of war and publicity. News of Turkish wars in Hungary in 17th-century German newspapers] (Budapest 2003); *Portré és imázs. Politikai propaganda és reprezentáció a kora újkorban* [Portrait and image. Political propaganda and representation in the early modern age], ed. by N. G. Etényi and I. Horn (Budapest 2008). See also the chapters in vol. 3: *The Making and Uses of the Image of Hungary and Transylvania*.

[7] Cf. her monograph: D. Kerekes, *Diplomaták és kémek Konstantinápolyban* [Diplomats and spies in Constantinople] (Budapest 2010).

[8] Cf. *Hungarian–Ottoman Military and Diplomatic Relations in the Age of Süleyman the Magnificent*, ed. by G. Dávid and P. Fodor (Budapest 1994); *The Ottomans, Hungarians and Habsburgs in Central Europe: The Military Confines in the Era of Ottoman Conquest*, ed. by G. Dávid and P. Fodor (Leiden 2000); *Ein Raum im Wandel. Die osmanisch-habsburgische Grenzregion vom 16. bis zum 18.*

also fruitful in the research on religious life, as for example missionary endeavours.[9] Hungarian church history, an area of study significantly developed in the last two decades, has offered a variety of studies on relations between the Holy See and local ecclesiastic authorities—a specific kind of religious, but also diplomatic and information network.[10] Protestant networks also have gained attention in recent scholarship.[11] Both of these topics are covered in this volume, in the chapters of the third section. Péter Tusor, in his chapter, offers a complex view of the connection between church and dynastic politics in the European background, as he formulates a new interpretation of the circumstances of Péter

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Jahrhundert, ed. by N. Spannenberger and Sz. Varga (Stuttgart 2014); *Zones of Fracture in Modern Europe: The Baltic Countries, the Balkans, and Northern Italy. Zone di frattura in epoca moderna. Il Baltico, I Balcani e l'Italia settentrionale*, ed. by A. Bues (Wiesbaden 2005); G. Ágoston, "Where Environmental and Frontier Studies Meet: Rivers, Forests, Marshes and Forts along the Ottoman-Hapsburg Frontier in Hungary," in *The Frontiers of the Ottoman World*, ed. by A. C. S. Peacock (Oxford 2009), 72–79; M. Koller, *Eine Gesellschaft im Wandel. Die osmanische Herrschaft in Ungarn im 17. Jahrhundert (1606–1683)* (Stuttgart 2010).

[9] *Frontiers of Faith: Religious Exchange and the Constitution of Religious Identities 1400–1750*, ed. by E. Andor and I. Gy. Tóth (Budapest 2001); A. Molnár, *Le Saint-Siège, Raguse et les missions catholiques de la Hongrie Ottomane 1572–1647* (Rome and Budapest 2007), I. Gy. Tóth, *Politique et religion dans la Hongrie du XVII^e siècle. Lettres des missionnaires de la Propaganda Fide* (Paris 2004). Other works and editions by A. Molnár and I. Gy. Tóth: I. Fazekas, "Die Frühneuzeitforschung," 60–62.

[10] P. Tusor, *Purpura Pannonica : Az esztergomi "bíborosi szék" kialakulásának előzményei a 17. században* [Purpura Pannonica : the "Cardinalitial See" of Strigonium and its antecedens in the 17th century] (Budapest and Rome 2005); *Erdély és a Szentszék a Báthory korszakban. Kiadatlan iratok (1574–1599)* [Transylvania and the Holy See in the age of Báthorys. Unpublished documents, 1574–1599], ed. by T. Kruppa (Szeged 2004); *Erdély és a Szentszék a Báthoryak korában. Okmánytár II (1595–1613)* [Transylvania and the Holy See in the age of Báthorys. Documents II, 1595–1613], ed. by T. Kruppa (Budapest 2009); *Jesuitische Frömmigkeitskulturen. Konfessionelle Interaktion in Ostmitteleuropa 1570–1700*, ed. by A. Ohlídal and S. Samerski (Stuttgart 2006).

[11] G. Murdock, *Calvinism on the Frontier: International Calvinism and the Reformed Church in Hungary and Transylvania* (Oxford 2000); *Calvin und Reformiertentum in Ungarn und Siebenbürgen: Helvetisches Bekenntnis, Ethnie und Politik vom 16. Jahrhundert bis 1918*, ed. by M. Fata and A. Schindling (Münster 2010); I. Keul, *Early Modern Religious Communities in East-Central Europe: Ethnic Diversity, Denominational Plurality and Corporative Politics in the Principality of Transylvania (1526–1691)* (Leiden 2009); P. Shore, *Jesuits and the Politics of Religious Pluralism in Eighteenth-Century Transylvania: Culture, Politics and Religion, 1693–1773* (Aldershot and Rome 2007).

Pázmány's nomination as Archbishop of Esztergom in 1616. Bálint Keserű, in his chapter, revises the paradigm of confessionalisation regarding Transylvania at the beginning of Habsburg rule in the late seventeenth century and examines the careers of Transylvanian Protestants in Vienna.

Beyond an attempt to interpret early modern politics and diplomacy in terms of cultural transfer, the chapters gathered in this volume share also another common characteristic: the role of individuals in the creation, maintenance and development of diplomatic and information networks. It corresponds with an actor-centric diplomatic history as a part of the cultural history of politics.[12] This is the case of a once much-discussed assassination of the French diplomatic agents Rincón and Fregoso in 1541, analysed here by Megan K. Williams. The incident affected the early modern discourse on diplomacy and became a commonplace, but the Hungarian context of the mission was lost.[13] The cultural role of a single diplomatic mission as well as its place in the grand strategies and alliances of the age is a matter of the chapter by Pál Ács. He comprehensively highlights the broad context of the mission of István Kakas to Persia (1603), a Transylvanian in imperial service. Dóra Kerekes focuses on the role of interpreters in seventeenth-century Habsburg–Ottoman relations, taking into account the linguistic and cultural interferences. Her chapter is then closely linked with current research on translation and interpreters as specific factors in early modern diplomacy and cultural exchange in relations with the Sublime Porte.[14] Mónika F. Molnár presents the activity of Luigi Ferdinando Marsigli, an agent, expert and diplomat, who played an essential role in the Habsburg ordering of reconquered Hungary in the late seventeenth century. The persons taken into consideration mostly combined the roles of diplomats, spies, political or military advisors and career-seeking entre-

[12] Cf. D. Riches, "Introduction," in *Protestant Cosmopolitanism and Diplomatic Culture: Brandenburg–Swedish Relations in the Seventeenth Century* (Leiden 2013), 1–8.

[13] Cf. E. Pujeau, "L'affaire Rincone-Fregoso (1541) révélatrice des tensions de l'époque. Ou attentat à la frontière," *Studies and Materials of Medieval History* 29 (2011), 39–57.

[14] Cf. also T. Krstic, "Of Translation and Empire: Sixteenth-Century Ottoman Imperial Interpreters as Renaissance Go-Betweens," in *The Ottoman World*, ed. by C. Woodhead (New York 2012), 130–142; G. Kármán, "Translation at the Seventeenth-Century Transylvanian Embassy in Constantinople," in *Osmanischer Orient und Ostmitteleuropa*, 253–280; P. Ács, "Tarjumans Mahmud and Murad: Austrian and Hungarian Renegades as Sultan's Interpreters", in *Europa un die Türken in der Renaissance*, ed. by B. Guthmüller and W. Kühlmann (Tübingen 2000), 307–316.

preneurs. There is much reference to scholarship on political and cultural brokerage in the early modern period.[15]

The role of individuals in information networks is analysed from a different angle in the chapters by Tünde Lengyel and Noémi Viskolcz, gathered in the second section of the volume. Both show examples of seventeenth-century Hungarian aristocrats and principal statesmen of the country who developed their own system of providing news and distributing information: György Thurzó and Ferenc Nádasdy.[16] While Lengyel sees the activity of Thurzó in the larger context of his artistic patronage and estate-building policy, Viskolcz provides details on information networks and associates it with the intellectual profile of the patron. Both networks, being useful tools for some time, finally failed as they proved to be limited to the person, and not to the family or party, and did not prevent a political collapse (as in the case of Nádasdy). However, both cases offer valuable material for the connection of the elites in the Kingdom of Hungary with the European news market and cultural trends.

Diverse in scope and source material, the chapters published in this volume are intended to give insight into current research and broaden the historiographical perspective on early modern Europe. The evidence they deliver in matters of diplomacy and information flow contradict the view of an isolated country. According to this results, sixteenth- and seventeenth-century divided Hungary appears not only as an area of conflict, but of multiple and fascinating exchanges. We hope that this approach proves to be inspiring for future research.

[15] *Your Humble Servant: Agents in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by M. Keblusek et al. (Hilversum 2006); *Double Agents: Cultural and Political Brokerage in Early Modern Europe*, ed. by M. Keblusek and B. V. Noldus (Leiden 2011); *Emissaries in Early Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700*, ed. by B. Charry and G. Shahani (Farnham 2009).

[16] For another example, cf. I. Hiller, *Palatinus Nikolaus Esterházy. Die ungarische Rolle in der Habsburger-Diplomatie 1625 bis 1645* (Cologne 1992).

I.

HUNGARY AND TRANSYLVANIA IN THE EARLY MODERN DIPLOMATIC AND INFORMATION NETWORKS

RE-ORIENTING A RENAISSANCE DIPLOMATIC *CAUSE CÉLÈBRE*: THE 1541 RINCÓN-FREGOSO AFFAIR

MEGAN K. WILLIAMS

On 3 July 1541, French diplomatic agents Antonio Rincón and Cesare Fregoso were ambushed by imperial soldiers as they travelled across Northern Italy en route to the Ottoman Porte. The diplomats' entourage, arriving dishevelled at Fregoso's wife's estate near Mantua and at the apartments of the French ambassador in Venice several days later, reported that Spanish-speaking men-at-arms, poorly disguised as local fishermen, had sprung out of boats concealed by branches along the banks of the River Po near Pavia. In the ensuing melée the diplomats' fates were uncertain. Initially, the French and their allies hoped that condemnation of the attack and the retaliatory arrest of imperial subjects might compel the diplomats' safe return. By mid-July, however, it became clear that both had been killed in the ambush's initial fusillade. Although Emperor Charles V disclaimed all foreknowledge and responsibility, it was soon widely believed that he had ordered the attacks.[1] Within a year, his rival Francis I of

[1] *Correspondance politique de Guillaume Pellicier*, ed. by A. Tausserat-Radel (Paris 1899), 1:338, 345–353, 366–370, 440, 573 [hereafter: CGP], partially extracted in *Négociations de la France dans le Levant ou correspondances, mémoires, et actes diplomatiques des ambassadeurs de France en Constantinople… I: Négociations sous François I^er^*, ed. by E. Charrière (Paris 1848), 1:493–510; *Mémoires de Mess. Martin du Bellay…*, ed. by R. du Bellay (Paris 1569), 9:273^{v}–276^{r} [hereafter: MMB]; J. Zeller, *La diplomatie française vers le milieu du XVI^e^ siècle d'après la correspondance de Guillaume Pellicier… ambassadeur de François I^er^ a Venise (1539–1542)* (Paris 1881), chs. 6–8. Milan governor Marquis del Vasto's 7 July account: *Calendar of Letters, Dispatches, and State Papers relating to negotiations between England and Spain*, ed. by P. de Gayangos (London 1877), 6.1:169 [hereafter: Sp.Cal.]. Emperor's disclaimers: Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 171–172; *Correspondenz des Kaisers Karl V*, ed. by K. Brandi (Leipzig 1845), 2:315; "Correspondencia de Carlos V con el Marqués del Vasto," ed. by Duke of Alba, *Boletín de la Real Academia de la Historia* 88 (1926), 85; "Avis sur la réponse a faire de la part de l'empereur à une gentilhomme française" [Milan, Aug./Sept.

France had invoked the assassinations to launch one of the sixteenth century's most ruinously expensive, and ultimately inconclusive, wars.

The diplomats' assassinations rapidly became a Renaissance *cause célèbre*. The affair was fiercely disputed in historical treatments of Charles V's reign, and dominated nearly all juristic treatments of diplomatic immunity for the next century and a half. Indeed, the Rincón-Fregoso affair was frequently the sole "modern" illustration of violated diplomatic immunity in sixteenth- and seventeenth-century treatises on diplomacy, tucked between classical *exempla* cribbed from Thucydides or Cicero. It was so often rehearsed in such texts that Garrett Mattingly, in his 1955 *Renaissance Diplomacy*, labelled it history's "most famous violation of diplomatic immunity in transit."[2] Despite its notoriety the affair has remained largely a footnote, typically presented as yet another incident of Valois–Habsburg rivalry suitable for slotting into familiar narratives of the emergence and consolidation of the Western European state, residential diplomacy and international law. Yet an examination of the ways in which the affair has been used and transmitted suggests a much more complex story reaching from Blois to Buda, Valladolid to Vilnius, or Como to Constantinople.

Contemporary reactions to the Rincón-Fregoso affair suggest that its important legal and political ramifications cannot be fully understood without their broader context. Twentieth-century historians writing on the affair often lacked access to the full and extensive range of sources it had produced. More important for our modern understanding of the affair, however, is that its broader Hungarian–Ottoman context had largely disappeared far earlier, in the course of the affair's transmission between 1541 and 1699. This essay first examines immediate reactions to the diplomats' assassinations. It suggests that the affair's sixteenth-century significance lay in its challenge to universalising constructs in contemporary discourse, constructs such as diplomatic immunity in transit under the law of nations and in the service of the Christian Commonwealth—to which latter the Hungarian–Ottoman conflict was central. In subsequent treatments of the affair, however, this essay argues that key early modern historical and juridical texts shifted their focus from the universal issue of violated diplomatic immunity in transit to the domestic issue of the diplo-

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1541], in *Papiers d'État du Cardinal de Granvelle*, ed. by M. Ch. Weiss (Paris 1841), 2: n. 137. Cf. Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 172, cf. 181. Rumours of the emperor's involvement were given further credence when he stood godfather to del Vasto's son Carlos in August.

[2] G. Mattingly, *Renaissance Diplomacy* (New York 1955; repr. 1971), 272.

mats' alleged treason. As a result, the affair's reframing as a domestic political dispute came to elide a divided Hungary.

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The 1541 assassination was only the most dramatic and final of a 20-year series of imperial attempts to silence Antonio Rincón, considered by contemporaries as one of the most active and adroit diplomats of his era, and certainly one of those most inimical to the Casa d'Austria.[3] Sources agree that Rincón was born in the Castilian wool-trading entrepôt of Medina del Campo, though they differ as to the reason he entered French service around 1522. According to the older literature, Rincón served in the Spanish armies in Italy prior to taking part in the 1520–1521 Comuneros uprising, whereupon he, like a number of other *comuneros*, fled to France. While several of Rincón's relatives were indeed punished in 1522 for their roles in the revolt, the story which Austrian historian Gerhard Rill teased from the archives tells a more complicated tale.[4] These sources suggest that in autumn 1521 Rincón was not in Castile but organising soldiers and transporting artillery in Hungary as a secret agent of Charles's brother Ferdinand and sister-in-law Anna. If true, this explains his familiarity with Hungarian magnates such as John Szapolyai, then governor of Transylvania, or Buda castellan János Bornemissza, during his subsequent eastern embassies in French service. At some point in spring 1522, his salary grossly in arrears (though most Habsburg servants suffered arrears in 1522), and perhaps disgruntled at having been denied a desired military command in Charles's Italian summer campaign, Rincón left Habsburg service. Soon thereafter, as Rincón confided to a former colleague, French

[3] J. Zeller, *Quae primae fuerint legationes a Francisco I in Orientem missae* (Paris 1881); I. Ursu, *La Politique orientale de François I^er^* (Paris 1908); V.-L. Bourilly, "La première ambassade d'Antonio Rincon en Orient (1522–1523)," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 2 (1900–1901), 23–44; id., "Antonio Rincon et la politique orientale de François I^er^ (1522–1541)," *Revue historique* 113 (1913), 64–83, 268–308; M. Holban, "Autour de la prèmiere ambassade d'Antonio Rincon en Orient et de sa mission auprès du voyvode de Transylvanie Jean Zápolya (1522–1523)," *Revue roumaine d'histoire* 23, 2 (1984), 101–116.

[4] G. Rill, *Fürst u. Hof in Österreich. Von den habsburgischen Teilungsverträgen bis zur Schlacht von Mohács (1521/22 bis 1526)*, vol. 1, *Außenpolitik und Diplomatie* (Vienna 1993), 13–19. Motive: J. G. de Sepulveda, *Rebus gestis Carolus V*, in *Opere* (Madrid 1780), 2:157–158. Rincón claimed to have received permission to enter French service in June 1522: Sp.Cal. 2: n. 437; A. Rodriguez-Villa, *El emperador Carlos V y su corte según las cartas de don Martin de Salinas (1522–1539)* (Madrid 1905), 44; G. Rill, *Fürst und Hof*, 1:15–16.

agents at Venice persuaded him to enter French service in return for a generous annual pension of 500 scudi.[5] By autumn 1522, Rincón had reappeared in Buda and Vilnius in the service of Charles's rival Francis, his reports a bizarre patois of Spanish, Italian and Latin.[6] The Habsburg brothers only learned of Rincón's transferred loyalties in March 1523; taking the betrayal personally, they subsequently "pursued him with a mortal hatred." Rincón's former colleagues labelled him traitor: the corpulent Castilian was "ex angelo factum diabolum" in the words of the castellan of Buda, or "diabolicus proditor" in those of Ferdinand's Hungarian ambassador, who called for his capture.[7] Rincón escaped to become one of the central authors of Francis's eastern anti-Habsburg politics, as historians Jean Zeller, Ion Ursu, or Victor-Louis Bourrilly have detailed. Without his diplomacy throughout the 1520s and 30s, it is unlikely that an anti-Habsburg alliance between Hungarian royal claimant John I Szapolyai and Francis would have been signed in 1528, nor a political and commercial alliance between Francis and the Ottoman sultan in 1535.

This Franco–Ottoman alliance wavered in 1538, as the sultan learned of the June 1538 entente between Francis and the emperor at Aigues-Mortes (Nice) which left Charles free to turn his full might against Ottomans. The repercussions of the Nice treaty compounded those of the February 1538 rapprochement between Charles's brother Ferdinand and Ferdinand's Hungarian rival Szapolyai at Várad (Oradea). When Rincón returned to Constantinople in spring 1538, therefore, he found himself compelled to

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[5] Haus-, Hof-, und Staatsarchiv (Vienna) [hereafter: HHStA], Grosse Korrespondenz [hereafter: GK], 25a, f. 155$^{r–v}$. Rincón's finances: *Catalogue des actes de François I^{er}* (Paris 1887–1908), *ad indices*. Benefice for brother Francesco (d. 1552) after Rincón's March 1539 request: A. Petit, "François de Rincon, abbé de Bénévent 1540–1552, et ses tentatives de réforme," *Bulletin de la Société archéologique et historique du Limousin* 60 (1910), 258–280.

[6] HHStA GK 25a, f. 155$^{r–v}$; *Acta Tomiciana*, ed. by S. Górski et al. (Poznań 1857) [hereafter: AT], 6:n. 170–171; Rincón to [Bonnivet], Venice, 14 Apr. 1523, Archives Nationales de France, J964 n. 20 (Magyar Nemzeti Levéltár Országos Levéltára [National Archives of Hungary], Budapest, Mikrofilmtár, microfilm X5196/F6); V.-L. Bourrilly, "Première ambassade"; M. Holban, "Autour."

[7] "Cesar mortali odio Ip[sa]m… p[er]seq[ue]bat": Transylvanian voivode Szapolyai to de Burgo: HHStA GK 25a, f. 61^{r}. Ferdinand described Rincón as "factus a fidelitate nostra alienus et profugus" [1528]: HHStA, Staatsabteilungen, Polen [hereafter: Polonica] I/1, f. 37^{r}. "Dolebitis de illo homine ex Angelo factum diabolum": GK 25a, f. 46^{r}; ibid., 67^{r}, 69^{v}, 89a^{r}, 90^{r}; "miror q[ue] ex fideli sit fact[us] ta[m] mal[us], De[us] p[er]dat eu[m]": GK 25b, f. 8^{r}; cf. AT 6: n. 216.

reassure a sceptical Süleyman of Francis's continuing regard for the Franco–Ottoman alliance.[8]

Then in July 1540 Szapolyai died, reopening the vexed issue of the Hungarian succession. Ferdinand sent an embassy led by Rincón's one-time colleague and friend, the dexterous Polish magnate Hieronymus Łaski (1496–1541), to the Porte to obtain Süleyman's agreement to Ferdinand's accession, while a leading Hungarian faction sent their own embassy to affirm the royal claims of Szapolyai's infant son.[9] Though Łaski arrived in Constantinople with hunting dogs, falcons, cloth-of-gold and offers of substantial pensions in exchange for peace, Süleyman saw Szapolyai's death as opportunity to secure his conquest of Hungary. He rejected Ferdinand's claims to the Hungarian succession, and placed Łaski under house-arrest while he prepared a military offensive against Ferdinand for the following summer. In November 1540, bearing news of Łaski's arrest, Rincón departed for France to exhort the French monarch to declare simultaneous war on Ferdinand's brother the emperor.[10]

To protect himself from imperial interception en route, Rincón travelled under the protection of Ottoman chiauses to Ragusa, in an armed Venetian convoy from Ragusa to Venice, and, disguised as a barber-surgeon or monk, from Venice via the Swiss cantons into France. At the sultan's request, and out of gratitude for Rincón's assistance in mediating a peace between the Signory and sultan in October 1540, the Venetian Senate fur-

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[8] Charrière, *Négociations*, 1:384–488; Ursu, *Politique orientale*, 106–124; V.-L. Bourrilly, "Antonio Rincon."

[9] Łaski was ordered to Constantinople on 8 July 1540, but illness (and marshalling gifts) delayed him: *Urkunden und Actenstücke zur Geschichte der Verhältnisse zwischen Österreich, Ungern, und der Pforte im 16. und 17. Jahrhunderte*, ed. A. v. Gévay (Vienna 1842) [hereafter: Gévay, *Urkunden*], 3.2:74, 87–99. The Hungarian embassy, led by Chancellor István Werbőczy, was sent on 24 Aug. to obtain the sultan's approval of the Duke of Orleans as king should Szapolyai's son die young, thus maintaining Hungary in alliance with both France and the Porte. Rincón distributed rich gifts to secure favor in French and Hungarian undertakings: Charrière, *Négociations*, 474–475, 478; CGP, 1:183; HHStA Staatenabteilung, Türkei [hereafter: Turcica], Karton 5, Konv. 1, f. 139–142.

[10] Łaski's relation: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 2, f. 75–117 (Gévay, *Urkunden* 3.2, 1–64; AT 14:107–128). Rincón's: Charrière, *Négociations*, 462; CGP, 1:207; HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 2, f. 3^{v}; Rincón to the Constable, 20 Sept. 1539, in *Lettres et mémoirs d'estat des roys, princes ambassadeurs et autres Ministres sous les Règnes de François I^{er}, Henri II et François II (...)*, ed. G. Ribier (Paris 1666), 1:473. Łaski initially hoped that Rincón, who bore his letters to Venice, might intercede for his release: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 1, f. 137^{r} (Gévay, *Urkunden* 3.2, 101).

nished Rincón with an escort of three hundred men-at-arms and fifty arquebusiers, led by the Genoese exile and condottiero Cesare Fregoso (1502–1541).[11]

By 5 March 1541, Rincón had returned safely to the French court at Blois. He found Francis livid at the emperor's perceived failure to honour earlier assurances regarding the disposition of the duchy of Milan, and eager to entertain renewed military actions. Consequently Rincón, having arranged an eastern ally in the coming war, was feted as the hero of the hour and granted additional honours and incomes before being dispatched back to Constantinople with new instructions.[12] Accompanying him was, once again, Cesare Fregoso, now carrying French credentials for Venice.

On his return, Rincón stopped at his seigneurie near Lyon to take care of long-neglected private affairs, giving the imperialists in northern Italy time to prepare his capture. Arriving at Turin, Rincón was attacked by a painful rheum. Since he had spent longer in Lyon than intended, and to minimise the discomforts of riding, Rincón and Fregoso decided to travel by the shorter, rather than the safer, route to Venice—by boat along the Po. Although they claimed the protection of the 1538 Nice treaty, neither Fregoso nor Rincón departed without misgivings. So that the diplomats could travel incognito, Rincón confided his papers and wife to his colleague the Piedmontese governor, Martin du Bellay, and took elaborate precautions to conceal his route. Rincón's suspicions were justified; from their crossing into Italy, the pair were closely tailed by imperial spies.[13]

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[11] G. Brunelli, "Fregoso (Campofregoso) Cesare," in *Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani* 50 (Treccani 1998). Precautions: Zeller, *Diplomatie*, 244; Ursu, *Politique orientale*, 122–123. Cf. Charrière, *Négociations*, 1:462–467; Alba, "Correspondencia," 82, 107; CGP, 143; Ribier, *Lettres*, 1:523; Gévay, *Urkunden* 3.2, 116, cf. 102, 113, 118; *III. Pál Pápa és Farnese Sándor Bibornok Magyarországra vonatkozó diplomácziai levélezése* [Diplomatic correspondence of Pope Paul III and Cardinal Alessandro Farnese on Hungary], ed. by L. Óváry (Budapest 1879), n. 111. Imperial ambassador at Venice allegedly sent ships to seize Rincón at sea: *Correspondance politique de MM. de Castillon et de Marillac*, ed. by J. Kaulek (Paris 1883), 271 [hereafter: CPM], and informed del Vasto: HHStA, Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 2, f. 3^{r}, cf. f. 7^{r}–8^{r}, 42^{v} (Gévay, *Urkunden* 3.2, 133).

[12] Zeller, *Diplomatie*, 246–247; Ursu, *Politique orientale*, 128–130; CPM, 277. His star rose as that of Montmorency, who promoted imperial politics, fell: R. J. Knecht, *Renaissance Warrior and Patron* (Cambridge 1996), 385–391.

[13] CGP 1:345. Precautions: P. Giovio, *Pauli Iovii novocomensis episcopi nucerini historiarum sui temporis libri XLV* (Romae 1558) [hereafter: Giovio, *Historiarum*], 40:476. Giovio blamed Rincón for insisting on the Po route; du Bellay (who met the diplomats on 2 July) Fregoso, "n'estimant le Marquis de Guast homme qui eust voulu faire vne telle acte, que de faire assasiner les ambassadeurs d'vn tel Prince

Ambushed on 3 July, their half-buried bodies were not discovered until October—allegedly returned to the site after the fact.[14]

Contemporaries reacted with shock to the news. Upon hearing of the ambush, French ambassador at Venice Guillaume Pellicier "fainted and fell behind a chest in his parlour, and came to his senses only with much difficulty"—as his imperial counterpart, with some sympathy, reported.[15] Upon reviving, Pellicier, du Bellay and their colleagues immediately strove to ensure that the affair was widely condemned. Fregoso's formidable (and formidably well connected) wife Costanza Rangoni also dispatched a spate of letters demanding her husband's release, and subsequently denouncing his assassination. Although the imperial governor of Milan whose soldiers had attacked the diplomats, the Marquis del Vasto, initially denied all knowledge of the incident, Pellicier and du Bellay rejected his disavowals as "nothing but fiction and lies"; they held the emperor responsible.[16]

In France, high-ranking imperial noblemen and the emperor's uncle were imprisoned in retaliation, while the imperial ambassador was placed under house-arrest.[17] Within days of the ambush, Pellicier also sent an express messenger to the Porte, advising Süleyman to detain Habsburg ambassador Hieronymus Łaski. On 18 August, Rincón's secretary at Niš reported that Łaski and his servants had been thrown into the tower at Belgrade. There Grand Vizier Rüstem-pasha, "on account of the enormity of what the imperialists [*li di Carolo*] have done to the ambassador Antonio Rincón," constrained Łaski to write to Ferdinand "demanding that his brother Charles immediately release the ambassador Rincón."[18] Although Łaski defended Rincón's assassination as a lawful response to the Spaniard's temerity,[19] Rüstem threatened "that all which has been done to the ambassador or his companion will be visited equally upon you and your companions," and that the sultan would take "revenge for such presump-

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treschrestien que le Roy": MMB 9:274^{r}. Their papers, sent separately, reached Venice safely.

[14] CGP, 1: 345–353, 440, 573; Giovio, *Historiarum*, xl:476; MMB 9:273^{v}–274^{r}.

[15] Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 171.

[16] MMB 9: 275^{r}; CGP 1:354; Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 169.

[17] George of Austria (1505–1557), natural son of Maximilian I. Noble prisoners released in October, George several months later, at papal insistence: Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 197; CGP, 365, 415.

[18] CGP, 1: 352, 355, 364–366, 402, 414–415; Rüstem-pasha to Łaski (in V. Maggi to Francis), Belgrade, 18 Aug. 1541: CPM, n. 362–363. Cf. "van des Rinkhon gefenkhnuss waiss man Jm leger auch": N. von Salm and S. von Herberstein to Ferdinand, 4/16 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f. 33^{v}.

[19] Giovio, *Historiarum*, xl:242.

tion" in the "destruction of the kingdom of Charles and of your patron," Ferdinand. Yet Łaski, gravely ill, made a poor hostage. When Ferdinand's embassy to Süleyman in mid-September requested Łaski's release (adding that "this detention shocked other [princes] greatly"), the sultan acquiesced.[20] Having sworn an oath to leave Habsburg service, Łaski was freed shortly before Süleyman's entry into Buda on 20 September 1541. Three months later he lay dead at Cracow, ostensibly of poison.[21]

Though dismayed by Łaski's release, French diplomats continued to decry the assassination in courts across Europe.[22] Solicited by the French, a dismayed Pope Paul III conceded that assaulting an ambassador constituted a grave breach of the law of nations, and might legitimately be avenged.[23] Reporting these efforts, Pellicier wrote to Rincón's secretary that

> this shameful and most bitter case […] has disturbed not only all Italy but all of Christendom; and there is no one who doesn't mourn the crime committed against two great and much-loved servants of His Majesty, and [its] betrayal of all justice and law—not only the *jus gentium* but also divine and human law.[24]

The *jus gentium*, or law of nations, to which Pellicier and Paul III referred, was in early sixteenth-century usage that universal law which gov-

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[20] HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f. 31^{r}. French reaction: "icelluy Grant Seigneur avoit licentié le seigneur Laski, qui est bien au contraire de la promesse que avoit esté faicte par cy davant": CGP 1:445–446.

[21] Łaski fell ill on 15 July: Gévay, *Urkunden*, 3.2:65; Süleyman to Ferdinand, c. 26 Aug., 12–21 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5 ,Konv. 3, f. 4^{v}, 43–44; Łaski to Bavarian Dukes, 23 Sept. 1541: *Correspondenzen und Aktenstücke zur Geschichte des Verhältnisses der Herzöge Wilhelm und Ludwig von Bayern zu König Johann von Ungarn*, ed. by K.-A. Muffat (Munich 1857), 525; Łaski to Ferdinand, 23 and 28 Sept. 1541: HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 3, f. 48^{r}, 53^{r}. Death: ibid., f. 63–64; Giovio, *Historiarum*, xl:242–243. Fear of poisoning by border-pashas averse to peace: Łaski's remarks on Ferdinand's instructions, Gévay, *Urkunden* 3.2, 70.

[22] Du Bellay: *jus gentium* "*bound* [Venice] *to ask for reparation of so gross an insult as that offered* to the two ambassadors of France"; the senators, concerned to maintain relations with both sultan and emperor, responded, "[h]ad Rincón been taken by the Emperor's order no truce would have been broken on his account, for he is an archtraitor and a bandit": Sp.Cal. 6.1: n.171; cf. HHStA Turcica, Karton 5, Konv. 2, f. 71^{r}. Cf. CGP, 1:345–376; Charrière, *Négociations*, 1:501–7,516; MMB, 9:273^{v}–276^{r}.

[23] "Il papa fa dimonstracion d'esserne molto scandalisato": CGP 1:364–365, cf. 355, 368; CPM, 326; Sp.Cal. 6.1: n. 171.

[24] CGP, 1:356.