The European Union and the Challenges of the New Global Context

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Edited by

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FOREWORD

The book investigates the new challenges confronted by the EU as an international actor in the context of the latest economic and political developments, with particular attention to common foreign and security policy; development-aid policy; EU sanctions in the post-Soviet space; preferential trade agreements; external relations of the EU; international aspects of the monetary policy of the ECB; capital flows and the boom-bust cycle in the emerging Europe; and macroeconomic modeling of the relationship between the EU and the rest of the world.

To the existing literature in the field of the EU's foreign and security policy - now at the top of the EU's agenda - the book intends to add a thorough up-to-dateness to include all the recent tense evolutions. The respective chapter offers an historical survey of the main stages of the construction of a foreign and security policy and of the developments of the ESDP and then of the CSDP, showing the EU's efforts to assert its role and identity on the international scene. The same chapter intends an attentive analysis of the EU's response to recent security challenges: the popular revolt in Tunisia; Egypt's political turbulences; crises in Libya; the Syria civil war; Iran's nuclear program; and the Ukraine crisis, as the greatest test for the EU's common foreign and security policy.

As regards the development-aid policy, besides providing a synthetic chronology of this policy and an appraisal of the EU development cooperation effectiveness, the allocated chapter shows how globalization has brought opportunities but also threats that transcend frontiers; it presents an aspect not fully considered in relevant literature – that of the new global competitive context in which emergent donors like China, India, and Brazil, challenge the traditional Western donors.

The chapter "EU sanctions in the post-Soviet space" analyzes thoroughly the harder instruments that complement the toolbox of the EU "soft power" polity, including a specific typology of restrictive and coercive measures.

Keeping the post-Soviet region as a focus point, preferential trade agreements - as a key element of the EU external trade policy - are analyzed in the next chapter, using the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA), with Georgia as a case study and emphasizing not only its benefits but also its costs.

The reconfiguration of external relations of the EU is also seen in our book in the light of the following current events: the last waves of the EU enlargement and potential enlargement in the near future; shifts in transatlantic negotiations in the post-crisis period; and responses to the uprising in Arab countries and to the Ukrainian conflict.

The EU responses to the new global context are also examined through a detailed description of the non-standard monetary policy measures, adopted by the ECB, in the context of the financial and sovereign debt crisis, along with the associated international use of the Euro.

The penultimate chapter of the book investigates monetary policy responses in a volatile financial global context, and in respect of the massive capital inflows and outflows in emerging Europe over the period 2000-2013, paying a special attention to the exchange rate regimes adopted in these countries.

Our approach is concluded by proposing a macroeconomic model in which the EU constitutes a block "against" the rest of the world, but also creates a two country model by itself, made up of Eurozone and non-Eurozone members. Thus far, there are no macroeconomic models describing such a situation.

This book was realized with the collaborative scholarly effort of researchers from five European countries (Romania, Switzerland, Poland, Spain and France), and is a publication included in the Ad Personam Jean Monnet Chair Project (EACEA Decision n. 2012-2825/001-001), coordinated by the book editor Ileana Tache.

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CHAPTER ONE

CHALLENGES OF EU'S FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY IN A RAPIDLY CHANGING WORLD

ILEANA TACHE

Summary

This chapter examines a field of external EU policies which, unlike other areas such as trade, enlargement, neighborhood policy, development assistance, and humanitarian aid, is not yet a deeply integrated process. Through an explorative policy analysis of the main stages of the construction of a European Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and of the recent developments of European Security and the Defense Policy (ESDP) as an integrant part of CFSP, the chapter aims at identifying the shortcomings in reaching entire consensus among the member states and the reasons for the limited global impact of this policy.

The EU's priorities, instruments, partnerships and strategies - linked to security and defense - are scrutinized, highlighting some of the key issues raised in contemporary literature. The emerging security issues are also analyzed with a perspective on their intractability and challenges for the relevance of the pacifist principles promoted by the EU. The EU's efforts to adapt to the fluid, evolving security agenda of recent years, and the mixed record in confronting the Arab Spring, Iran's nuclear ambitions and the Ukrainian crisis, will be attentively considered.

Introduction: The main stages of the construction of a European foreign and security policy

The founding Treaty of Rome of the European Community does not mention the idea of a common foreign and security policy, and makes no

reference to a military dimension. The beginnings of the European integration took place under the Marshall Plan and US sponsorship, so that consultations on foreign and security policy developed under NATO's larger framework. The Marshall Plan shaped the future of Europe, even if the economic recovery was already under way; it contributed to impeding the spread of communism in Western Europe, and the stabilizing of the international order, to favor development of political democracies and free market economies. NATO offered a solid structure for opposing the Warsaw Pact, signed on 14 May 1955 by the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and East Germany. Even the Schuman Plan for the European Coal and Steel Community – the greatest gesture toward French-German rapprochement - was launched in 1950 as a response to the US insistence, in order to assure a supranational umbrella for resources used in the arms production.

At almost the same time, a plan for the European Defense Community (EDC) was proposed by the French Prime Minister René Pleven, following the American call for the rearmament of West Germany. The EDC was to include West Germany, France, Italy and the Benelux countries, but it never came into effect, failing to obtain ratification in the French Parliament. The Gaullists opposed the plan - considering the EDC as a threat to France's national sovereignty, and the Communists as well - because of the tying of France to the capitalist US. Meanwhile, the death of Joseph Stalin, and the end of Korean War, faded the concerns about a potential conflict.

The foreign policy cooperation went on under President de Gaulle's challenges both to the US hegemony and to the supranational ambitions of the EEC. The Fouchet Plan, proposed by de Gaulle in 1961, was conceived by Christian Fouchet - France's ambassador to Denmark - and was intended to create an intergovernmental alternative to the European Communities. This attempt to keep a balance of power in France's favor was never implemented, being received with a lack of enthusiasm from the other Community states. In the context of the British application to joining the EEC, and the Atlantic partnership called by President Kennedy, the Fouchet plan was undoubtedly a challenge to the US leadership and was an attempt to subvert NATO's power.

In the Hague summit of 1969, the European leaders decided to look more closely at foreign policy and in 1970 agreed to promote European political cooperation (EPC) for coordinating foreign policy stances. However, no laws were adopted on foreign policy; each country acting independently, and the voting rule for most decisions being unanimity. The EPC had a strictly intergovernmental character and was overseen by

foreign ministers within the Council of Ministers. It was to receive formal recognition much later, in 1986, with the Single European Act.

After de Gaulle's departure in 1969, foreign policy consultations among EEC members (organized separately from NATO's framework) represented a concession to the French, who wanted a more autonomous European foreign policy.

The creation of the European Council in 1974 helped coordination in the field of foreign policies. But policy cooperation was marked by divergent reactions of the Western European states, such as in the case of the Arab-Israeli War of October 1973, escalating into a new Franco-American confrontation. Cooperation in the field of foreign and security policy was very often spurred by external events, which revealed shortcomings and inadequacies. The most suggestive examples are indeed the Middle East problems; always a subject for transatlantic dispute.

The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a Western Europe of "civilian power". According to Duchêne (1973) - one of the most famous scholars of civilian power in Europe - the EEC should continue to remain as a civilian group, long on economic power and relatively short on armed forces. This idea corresponds to the general orientation of the early 1970's, when the significance of military power was diminishing at the same pace as economics were growing. Twitchett (1976) also argued that the European Community impact on the international arena had been via diplomatic influence and trade, rather than via military power. This is the reason why security and defense issues could not be put on the European agenda, Western Europe emphasizing diplomatic, rather than coercive, instruments during this period.

However, some external events renewed efforts to promote cooperation in the field of foreign policy. The Iranian revolution of 1979 caused ripples well beyond the Middle East as the new regime began alienating once close Western allies. In the Khomeini era, the US foreign policy toward Iran would shift from one of total commitment to one on the defense, embedded in Iran's rampant anti-Americanism (Pauwels, 2011). Then, the Polish crisis of 1980-1981, associated with the emergence of the Solidarity mass movement, created a drift of the US foreign policy and caused serious European concerns. During the same period there was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a watershed event of the Cold War, marking the only time the Soviet Union had a military intervention outside the Eastern bloc. The Soviet move determined a sharp US and Western Europe criticism, accompanied by numerous measures to compel Moscow to withdraw.

The foreign and security policy restated again its importance, with the German unification and the anti-communist revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, and other international developments. The EU enlargement became then one of the most significant and difficult challenges facing Europe in the post-cold war interval. Not only did enlargement threaten to disturb the internal order of the EU, but the newly resulted external borders might create new divisions on the European continent. This was to be followed by a radical transformation of the EU strategic priorities. At almost the same period, in 1990-1991, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait revealed quite different positions of the European Community members. France and the UK largely contributed with troops and warplanes; Germany kept its stance in rejecting "power politics"; other states like Spain, Portugal and Belgium had small military contributions; while Ireland stayed neutral. It was precisely on that occasion that Belgium's foreign minister, Mark Eyskens, famously stated that the European Union is "an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm"[1]. Even though this depiction fails to acknowledge the EU's structural power, and the more subtle ways in which it exerts power in the international realm (Bossuyt, 2007), it stressed once again - and recognized the need - to formulate a common foreign and security policy. Additionally, the European responses were at odds with one another during the prolonged Yugoslavian crisis (1990-1998).

A key development in the EU efforts - to realize its own defense capability and peace-making operations - is represented by the "Petersberg Declaration", adopted at the Ministerial Council of the Western European Union in June 1992. On that occasion, the Western member states expressed their readiness to make available to the EU, and NATO, military units from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces. The Petersberg tasks were designed to avoid any confusion between the defense roles of individual EU states, NATO, and the EU acting as a single entity. They cover humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping operations, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. This spectrum was to be expanded by the European Security Strategy in 2003. The remit of the EU's fledging rapid reaction is based on the Petersberg tasks.

The Maastricht Treaty (signed on 7 February 1992 and entered into force on 1 November 1993) finally established the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) as a replacement for the EPC. Unlike the EPC, the CFSP brings for the first time an explicit political and military-defense

[1] *The New York Times,* 25 January 1991.

component of the European project. The CFSP became one of the three pillars of the EU, the other two being the European Community and Justice and Home Affairs. Of course, this pillar was a shared competence with the member states, but the mere re-affirmation of the broken initiative of the EDC is much more significant than its inter-governmental character.

The main objectives of the CFSP, as set out by the Maastricht Treaty, are presented in Box 1-1.

The two new instruments introduced by the Maastricht Treaty, in order to implement the CFSP, were:

- common positions to establish systematic cooperation on a day-to-day basis and,
- joint actions to allow member states to act together in concrete ways based on a Council decision as to the specific scope of such actions; the EU's objectives in carrying them out; and (if necessary) the duration, means, and procedures, for their implementation.

Box 1-1: Maastricht Treaty's objectives of the CFSP

- To safeguard the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the European Union;
- To strengthen the security of the Union and its member states
- To preserve peace and strengthen international security in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the Helsinki Act (which created the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; a forum for all the nations of Europe as well as the United States and Canada)
- To promote international cooperation
- To develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

The EU achievements of the CFSP in the early 1990s are obvious, as emphasized by Ginsberg (1997) and Holland (1995), but given that the CFSP represented an intergovernmental pillar, there was no way of enforcing member state compliance with these provisions.

The European Commission's Opinion (1996) "Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement" recognized that, unlike other areas such as trade policy, economic assistance, development aid and humanitarian action - where there is already a coherent single policy toward the outside world - the CFSP is still at an early stage in its

development. The objective of a clearer identity on the world scene was formulated and meant to be achieved through:

- bringing together the various strands comprising foreign relations into a single effective whole, with structures and procedures designed to enhance consistency and continuity;
- improving the common foreign and security policy at all stages of its operation;
- establishing a proper European identity with regard to security and defense, as a constitutive part of the EU common foreign and security policy.

The Maastricht Treaty's provisions in the field of the CFSP failed during the Bosnia-Herzegovina war, with its terrible massacre of Srebrenica in 1995. Since then, European leaders realized the necessity of sometimes using military force while promoting a pacifist system of international relations.

However, in the words of Dinan (2005), the lessons of the Yugoslav debacle were not sufficient to weaken the ramparts of national sovereignty in the foreign policy field, nor did member states interpret them uniformly. Bradford (2000) even speaks about Europe's failure to devise and implement collective security measures during the dissolution of Yugoslavia, and concludes that the Western EU is not a realistic alternative to NATO in the "post-post-Cold War era". The same author states that the Dayton Agreement on Bosnia-Herzegovina (considered a "dishonorable peace") illustrated that the Western European ability to formulate and implement a CFSP still was far too meager in the absence of the American leadership.

As a consequence, the Amsterdam Treaty, signed on 2 October 1997 and entered into force on 1 May 1999, identified four policy instruments for improving the CFSP (see Box 1-2).

Box 1-2: Policy instruments of the Amsterdam Treaty for the CFSP

- *Principles and guidelines* (adopted by the European Council) to provide general political direction;
- *Common strategies* (adopted by the European Council) to provide an umbrella under which the Council could adopt joint actions and common positions by qualified majority voting (except those with military and defense implications). Common strategies would set out "the objectives, duration, and the means to be made available by the Union and the member states" in areas of mutual interest;

- *Joint actions* (adopted by the Council) were refined to address specific situations requiring "operational action", including a revised list of their possible contents. The Council could request that the Commission submit proposals to ensure the proper implementation of joint actions.
- *Common positions* (adopted by the Council) were also refined to "define the approach of the Union to a particular matter of a geographical or thematic nature"

A distinctive feature of the Amsterdam Treaty was the introduction of the position of High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, which was occupied by Javier Solana for ten years - given his experience as secretary-general of NATO and Spain foreign minister.

The Treaty of Nice signed in 2001 also significantly enhanced the importance of CFSP as a pillar of support for future European Union development.

The European Security Strategy (ESS), entitled "A Secure Europe in a Better World" - adopted by the European Council of 12-13 December 2003 - provides the conceptual framework for the CFSP. The split between EU countries over the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 highlighted the need for a common strategic vision to enhance internal cohesion at the Community level. The five key threats identified by the ESS are: terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. The ESS, which is the first ever declaration by EU member states of their strategic goals, also calls for preventive engagement to avoid new conflicts or crises, a priority being the security in the EU's neighborhood – the Balkans, Southern Caucasus and the Mediterranean.

When, in early 1999, the Serbian president Slobodan Milošević placed his forces in Kosovo, EU leaders realized the necessity to stop another humanitarian disaster. In June 1999, the European Council - held in Cologne, Germany - decided to give the EU the means and capabilities to assume its responsibilities regarding common European policy on security and defense. So the European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) was born, as a "sui generis" security concept, distinguishing itself by two specific characteristics: a) a comprehensive understanding of security policy in reference to its available tools, and b) a comparatively narrowly defined political mandate focusing on international crisis and conflict management.

The UK and France were the leaders of the ESDP implementation; being the only countries prepared to send military forces beyond Europe for more than United Nations' peace keeping interventions.

The ESDP is actually an integral part of the CFSP, consisting mainly of a 60,000 member rapid Reaction Force that could be deployed at 60 days' notice and sustained for at least one year. This force was conceived to complement, rather than compete, with NATO and could only act when NATO had decided not to be involved in a crisis.

The EU enlargement with the Central and Eastern post-communist countries brought greater diversity and limited capabilities on the agenda of the CFSP. Undoubtedly, the enlargement contributed to a more stable situation on the European continent and was a significant achievement in the field of the CFSP (as thoroughly described by Keukeleire and MacNaughten, 2008), but the foreign policy priorities of the CEEC's were still determined by their immediate neighborhood; these countries being less interested in global affairs.

Two examples illustrate quite different positions of some CEEC's. In the Iraq crisis of 2003[2], which undermined the credibility of the EU as an international actor, the EU showed three points of view: 1) supporters of the US (the UK, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain and the CEEC's); 2) opponents of the US intervention (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany and Greece); and 3) countries with a neutral position (Finland, Ireland, Portugal and Sweden). The CEEC's attitude in this regard – with the support of a US led intervention - contributed to strengthening the tension between European integration and Atlantic solidarity (Maracz, 2008). Another example is the Kosovo conflict, when Romania[3] and Slovakia did not agree with Kosovo's independence[4]; probably to avoid a precedent for separatist tendencies among their Hungarian minorities.

For the whole Union, the above examples even made some authors like Chari and Cavatorta (2003) to wonder if the Iraq war was killing the dreams of a united EU, while Gordon and Shapiro (2004) - after a detailed dissection of the rift between the US and Europe - demonstrated that a new transatlantic partnership is both necessary and possible for the common security. In recognizing Kosovo's independence some weaknesses of the

[2] Iraq war was provoked by the concern at the ambitions of Saddam Hussein and at the possibility that Iraq was concealing aspects of its weapons mass destruction program from UN inspection teams.

[3] In Romania's case, a mention has to be made: in April 2013, following a resolution of the EP which urged all EU members that had not recognized Kosovo to do so, Romania's Prime Minister Victor Ponta stated that his country must follow the EU's lead.

[4] Kosovo's independence was not recognized by Cyprus, Greece and Spain as well, in the latter case due to concerns about perceived implications regarding the own issues with independence movements in the Basque Country and Catalonia.

EU were revealed; one of the greatest strengths of the EU, that should not be forgotten, is its historical role in exorcising the demons of nationalism in Europe.

Trying to emphasize the implications of enlargement for the wider European periphery, the European Commission advanced proposals for a broader European neighborhood policy, which materialized in a framework of cooperation for the states around the EU's Eastern borders. As expressed by Giegerich and Wallace (2010), this was in effect a common foreign policy, but defined and managed through civilian instruments.

The Treaty of Lisbon had important implications for the CFSP/ESPD. A key innovation was the replacement of the "Union Minister for Foreign Affairs" by a new "High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy", who will be double-hatted as a Vice-President of the European Commission, and will be supported by a European External Action Service. In the institutional setting, a further novelty is created by the new permanent President of the Council who will chair the European Council and ensure the external representation of the Union in issues concerning its common and security policy, without prejudice to the powers of the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

Another notable change is the introduction of a mutual assistance article which reads like a mutual defense clause, in that it states "if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power". There is also a mutual solidarity clause introduced, following the terrorist attack in Madrid.

The above historical survey can be completed with the synthetic chronology of the EU Common Foreign, Security and Defense Policy supplied by Box 1-3.

Box 1-3: Chronology of a Common EU Foreign, Security and Defense Policy

March 1948: Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK sign the Brussels Treaty of mutual defense.
April 1949: The US, Canada and ten West European countries sign the North Atlantic Treaty.
May 1952: The European Defense Community Treaty is agreed by the six ECSC member states. It would have created a common European army, and permitted West Germany's rearmament. In August 1954, the French National Assembly rejects the Treaty.

October 1954: The Western European Union (WEU) is created on the basis of the Brussels Treaty, and expands to include Italy and West Germany. West Germany joins NATO.
October 1981: Measures approved in the London Report include the crisis consultation mechanism: any three foreign ministers can convene an emergency EPC meeting within 48 hours. In meetings with third country representatives, the presidency can be accompanied by the preceding and succeeding presidencies (the *troika*).
October 1984: The WEU is reactivated, as WEU foreign and defense ministers agree to meet regularly.
February 1986: The Single European Act (SEA) is signed, and contains Title III on the EPC. The EPC can discuss the "political and economic aspects of security".
February 1992: The Maastricht Treaty is signed, replacing the EPC with Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Council of foreign ministers will decide Common Positions and Joint Actions, and the QMV can be used to implement the latter.
June 1992: The Petersberg Declaration states that the WEU will engage in humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping, and crisis management tasks, including peacemaking ("Petersberg Tasks").
January 1994: The NATO summit agrees that the NATO assets can be used by the WEU and endorses the concept of "Combined Joint Task Forces".
October 1997: The Amsterdam Treaty is signed, and contains several reforms of the CFSP pillar. QMV is to be used to implement the European Council Strategies, and member states can abstain from decisions. A high Representative for the CFSP is created.
December 1998: Franco-British declaration on EU military capability at St. Malo.
June 1999: The Cologne European Council agrees that the EU should be able to undertake the Petersberg Tasks, replacing the WEU.
December 1999: The Helsinki European Council sets the headline goal for the common European security and defense policy.
July 2001: European Union Satellite Centre is established, in order to support early warning and crisis monitoring functions of the CFSP and the CSDP. The Centre becomes operational on 1 January 2002.
March 2002 – June 2003: Convention on the Future of Europe drafts a constitutional Treaty creating a European foreign minister; a European external action service (EEAS); a European armaments, research and military capabilities agency.

November 2003: EU foreign ministers reach agreement on permanent structured cooperation in defense (battle groups); a mutual assistance clause; creation of an EU civil and military planning cell within the EU military staff.
June 2004: The provisions agreed since 2002 are incorporated in the draft constitutional Treaty, and many are implemented without Treaty ratification (excepting the foreign minister and the EEAS).
June 2007: The European Council agrees a negotiating mandate for a new reform Treaty, which retains the constitutional Treaty's provisions on foreign relations (the post of foreign minister being renamed High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.
December 2009: The Lisbon Treaty enters into force.
March 2012: For the first time, the Foreign Affairs Council activates the EU Operations Centre to coordinate the on-going CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa.

Current developments of the ESDP

The expansion of the EU policies, in the security and defense aspects, have so far had limited impact on global security, but the EU's potential to respond to crises anywhere in the world shows an increasing tendency.

The evolution of the ESDP was spurred on by the Kosovo conflict in 1999, which starkly demonstrated that European governments still lacked the military wherewithal to provide security in their own region (Payne, 2003).

The military operations of 2003, in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (CONCORDIA Mission), marked the effective beginning of the ESDP. The core aim of CONCORDIA was, at the explicit request of FYROM government, to contribute to a stable and secure environment.

Under the framework of the ESDP, the EU supported the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)[5] in its security sector reform and thus contributed to the promotion of peace and stability in Africa. One of the main drivers of conflict in the DRC was its plethora of valuable minerals and resources; the Congolese government being unable to control the entirety of its territory. The EU's military operations in the Congo (developed in 2003 and 2006) contributed indeed to putting an end to the escalation of conflict, but some cleavages appeared between France and

[5] The underlying acts of this mission were Council Joint Action 2005/355/CFSP of 2 May 2005 (EUSEC DR Congo) and Council Joint Action CFSP of 12 June 2007 (EUPOL DR Congo).

Germany. While France was willing to deploy its military forces in 2003, for Germany it was difficult to adopt this unequivocal position in 2006, as it was always constrained by its past and was responsive to a public extremely critical about military actions. The German-led operation in the Congo was successfully conducted, but it provoked a clash *and* sharp exchanges between Javier Solana and the German Minister of Defense Franz Josef Jung, so that the Franco-German engine looked ill-suited to carry on with the EDSP. Brummer (2006) identifies a similar gap between France and the UK: France emphasizes a strategic approach whereas the UK pursues a more tactical/pragmatic approach, which stresses best value for money - not to mention the differences between the two countries concerning the role of the US and NATO. All these different views continued to throw-up barriers for the satisfactory function of the ESDP.

Nevertheless, the intervention in 2003, in the Congo (ARTEMIS), was the EU's first ESDP operation to be deployed outside Europe and was carried out without NATO assistance. As described by Giegerich and Wallace (2004), the EU participation in the military operations of the Congo and Macedonia showed that the EU was "not such a soft power".

In the Lebanon war of 2006, between Israel and Hezbollah, the EU took the decision to decline a military operation; on this occasion it was a commonly agreed position. There were two determining factors leading to this stance. The first one was the unwillingness of France, the UK, or Germany to act as a lead nation, and the second consisted of the potential for the mission to escalate into open hostility. While in the Congo the EU peacekeepers were kept away from the most violent areas, however the Lebanon mission called for the deployment of the EU peacekeepers *to* the most violent areas, but no EU country had the political capital to support such a high-risk military operation. Even though the EU missed an opportunity to enhance its credibility as a security provider, the EU governments created this time an interesting and unprecedented mechanism for control (Gowan, 2007). A special strategic cell was created at the UN headquarters to direct the operation. This cell ultimately reports to the US Secretary-General, but nineteen of the twenty seven officers in the cell were initially seconded from member states of the EU, allowing thus significant control to the respective European governments.

The evolution of the ESDP was indeed accompanied by cooperation with the UN. Gowan (2009) illustrates a close relationship with some examples. Of the 23 ESDP missions launched between 2003 and 2009, 15 have been deployed in countries where the UN has a peace-keeping or peace-building mission. All EU missions in Africa have involved direct or indirect cooperation with the UN - ranging from military support (as in the

Democratic Republic of the Congo) to parallel efforts to sustain the African Union (AU) in Darfur. The EU naval operation off the coast of Somalia (Atalanta) has taken place in parallel with the UN support to the AU peacekeepers in Mogadishu, and has protected the UN aid shipments. The EU-UN cooperation has also taken on unexpectedly complex forms in Kosovo and Georgia.

A novel aspect of the ESDP and the EU's role, in conflict resolution, was brought about by the Russia-Georgian war of August 2008. With the accession of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, and the associated extension of the EU's borders to the Black Sea, stability in Georgia became extremely important for the Union's interests. Georgia's disputed territoriality mirrored major risks for European security.

The EU failed to impede the outbreak of the conflict, but its role in conflict resolution in Georgia has been paradoxically enhanced in the aftermath of this event. As Bardakçi (2010) observes, the pullout of the OSCE monitors from South Ossetia on December 31, 2008 and the UN Observation Mission (UNOMIG) from Abkhazia on July 15, 2009 - due to the veto exercised by Russia on the grounds of the refusal of these organizations to recognize the breakaway regions - resulted in the EU becoming the only international body, with observers, in Georgia. This was indeed a positive development in the EU's role in conflict resolution. However, an increasingly confident Russia and the lack of a coherent strategy for the Eastern Neighborhood was a barrier on the way to promoting solid EU visibility in the region. In general lines, the Georgian case demonstrates, once again, that the ESDP development was realized through various exogenous shocks.

The ESDP was replaced by the CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) - a name change introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon - which represents a cornerstone in the development of this policy field, bringing both continuity and innovation. Dedicating a new section in the founding Treaties to this policy, the Treaty of Lisbon emphasizes the specific nature of the CSDP, which still forms an integral part of the CFSP. Under the CSDP framework, the following new tasks were added to those that already existed[6]:

- joint disarmament operations
- military advice and assistance tasks
- tasks in post-conflict stabilization.

[6] Humanitarian and rescue tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management.

In the CSDP implementation, the Treaty of Lisbon acknowledges the potential intervention of multinational forces, which are the result of the military alliance between certain EU member states and their decision to combine capacities, equipment, *and* personal strength. The main "Euroforces" are presented in Box 1-4.

Box 1-4: The main "Euroforces" acknowledged by the Treaty of Lisbon

- **Eurofor,** regrouping land forces between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal
- **Eurocorps,** regrouping land forces between Germany, Belgium, Spain, France and Luxembourg
- **Euromarfor,** regrouping maritime forces between Spain, France, Italy and Portugal
- The **European Air Group,** regrouping air forces between Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom.

The Treaty of Lisbon extends the Petersberg tasks and introduces the new concept of a collective defense obligation. The establishment of a Permanent Structured Cooperation, and of the European Defense Agency, strengthens the EU's capacity as a military actor. In addition, the so-called "group of the willing clause" removes the possibility of a veto because, according to this clause, if some member states intend to participate in a mission they may be tasked by the Council with the protection of the Union's values and interests.

Despite all these innovations, which aim to gradually establish a common European defense, the CSDP remains a fundamentally intergovernmental issue, and the financial means for external missions are provided by the EU member states. Defense still remains a national, rather than a European, undertaking. The relative ineffectiveness of the CSDP lingers in the reluctance of the EU member states to give up control over national defense issues. The voting system in the CSDP is unanimity, meaning that the agreement of all the states is necessary for the launching of a mission. The EU military missions have been limited in scope, and the failure of the EU to compensate for the increasing national incapacity (coupled with the austerity of recent crisis context) constitutes a "defense deficit" for the European security interests.

Solutions exist for all these weaknesses, as suggested by Menon (2013). In his opinion, what will be required is a willingness to submit

national defense policies to European authority more increasingly than ever before. Depriving member states of the veto, right in the military interventions area, would accelerate defense decision-making. European level procurement would ensure interoperability and foster economies of the scale and creation of a common European Defense Equipment Market. So the most efficient way to solve the "defense deficit" would be the communitarisation of armaments, with national agencies replaced by supranational institutions.

A window of opportunity can also be brought forward by the institutional decisions made in 2014; with the European Parliament elections; the establishment of a new European Commission; and a new EU's High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.

The EU response to some recent security challenges

This section deals with the latest security issues - analyzed from a policy perspective - and discusses feasible interventions. Each case requires, not only reexamining current EU strategy, but also identifying alternative strategies for assuring European security.

Popular revolt in Tunisia

Tunisia displayed an illusionary stability until the 2010 events. The popular revolt goal was in ending the authoritarian rule and in the overthrowing of President Ben Ali, which was achieved on 14 January 2011. Events in Tunisia triggered all the Arab unrest across North Africa and the Middle East.

The viability of the present Tunisian government is questioned by the opposition because reform processes are slow, and the general feeling of uncertainty remains high. As regards security, there is little trust in the Police Force, because it has a bad reputation linked to its previous loyalty to President Ben Ali. Security issues have in some circumstances become a matter for religious communities; in that religious activists are being called on to maintain security (Eriksson and Zetterlund, 2013).

While the large and spontaneous mobilization of Tunisians has achieved success in ending Ben Ali reign, it remains unclear whether the near future will bring genuine political reforms essential for stability, or whether continuing instability will affect other countries in the region.

A radical rethinking of EU policies towards the region is called for; the bottom line of which should be to halt lenient EU policies towards countries that are not implementing serious political reform, despite their

proven willingness to cooperate in the fight against terrorism, illegal migration and broader geostrategic objectives (Ayadi et al., 2011).

The EU moved swiftly to support the transition in Tunisia. Political support is illustrated through regular visits, Council Conclusions, and High Representative Declarations. An EU-Tunisia Task Force meeting was held in September 2011 and produced an impressive list of assistance projects.

The "EU's response to the Arab Spring: The State-of-Play after Two Years"[7] reaffirms that EU-Tunisia relations are based on three interrelated "M's": money, market and mobility. Mobility is especially problematic due to its interrelatedness with justice, security and defense issues. With the increasing violence in many other North African countries, the EU is not expected to take quick steps towards easing the entry to the EU of Tunisian residents and those in transit. Discussions with a view to a "Partnership for Mobility" on migration and security are ongoing.

Egypt's political turbulences

Inspired by the popular revolt in Tunisia, massive protests erupted in Egypt in early 2011. The social, economic and political situation in Egypt produced a significant impact on neighboring countries. The revolution in Egypt had indeed a broad spillover in the Arab countries. In terms of regional security, Egypt remains a pivotal state in the Middle East and North Africa, enjoying good relations with Israel and close collaboration with the United States.

The euphoria which emerged from the Arab spring, and the collapse of the Hosni Mubarak regime on 11 February 2011, has been replaced with a period of political and social polarization; increasing violence and economic stagnation.

The stability in Egypt is part of the comprehensive EU security strategy in its immediate neighborhood. The Southern Mediterranean region is an area that the EU sees as essential for its security and prosperity. In the wake of the Arab Spring of 2011, the EU re-launched its ENP to express its solidarity with those calling for democracy. An EU-Egypt Task Force was launched in November 2012[8].

This crisis revealed some challenges confronted by the EU. In Egypt's highly debated situation it was the US that played a central role, while there was a lack of independent European policy. The fall of Mohammed

[7] See www.eu-un.europa.eu/articles/en/article_13134_en.htm

[8] This is similar with the EU-Tunisia Task Force, which is in place to coordinate European and international support intended to help Tunisia as it makes the transition to democracy and restarts its economy.

Morsi in July 2013 was a development strongly supported by the US, and President Barack Obama. Referring to Egypt's unsustainable crackdown, Dworkin and Michou (2014) emphasize a long-term vision for European policy. In this sense, the temptation for the EU to accept Egyptian authorities' actions at face value should be avoided, because they are not likely to lead to stable politics or an improvement in security. In the Egypt situation, the EU also faces competition from other outside powers. While the European countries are eager to continue cooperation with Egypt on security and other areas, the Gulf States, and Russia, stand ready to provide alternative sources of financial and diplomatic support, as well as security cooperation and the export of weapons. Another problem is that the political groups that best represent the vision that Europe would like to advance are too weak to play a major role in the near future.

The crisis in Libya

Libya's armed conflict of 2011, between forces loyal to colonel Muammar Gaddafi and those seeking to oust his government, offered a mixed picture in which European countries (France and the UK) were at the head of military actions; but Europe was not - due to a lack of member states will, fear, and restrictions from the UNSC Resolution 1973[9]. During the vote of this Resolution, the noticeable German abstention (attributable either to German reluctance to use force, or to the lack of political will from northern member states to invest in the Mediterranean), emphasized a division within the EU over a security issue.

The EU did not distinguish itself among the intervention leaders, although Libya is one of the close neighbors, and Mediterranean and Arab countries represent an important region for Europe's stability. Libya's case, where only French and British leadership assumed action, demonstrates once again that the EU is leaning less towards a body of coherent security response and more towards a return to bilateral action.

The EU took indeed several measures to prevent an escalation in the crisis, such as humanitarian effort and the opening of an EU office in Benghazi, which brought more efficiency to EU actions and represented a *de facto* recognition of the Libyan National Transitional Council (NTC).

However, Libya's crisis provides three key strategic lessons for Europe (Biscop, 2011): 1. The EU's challenge to carry out its own vital interests,

[9] This Resolution formed the legal basis for military intervention in the Libyan civil war, demanding "an immediate ceasefire" and authorizing the international community to establish a no-fly zone and to use all necessary means to protect civilians.

because nobody else will protect them; 2. the necessity of thinking and acting strategically, meaning to prioritize the regions where EU interests are essential and act accordingly; and 3. achieving the right capabilities, because - in the military realm - European capabilities remain deficient.

The Libyan conflict proved indeed that the EU might be required to take military action if no other means can work, but of course this does not mean a militarization of the relationship with the Arab Mediterranean countries. It can be part of a comprehensive approach to the Mediterranean, including: assistance; economic and technical cooperation; fair trade; and trade access opportunities. All these measures can help North African states to rebuild their economies, put them on a sustainable path, and create more security in the region.

Civil war in Syria

One of the most pressing challenges in the EU immediate neighborhood is Syrian civil war. In this particular country, over the past three years, more than 100,000 Syrians have lost their lives in the escalating conflict between forces loyal to President Bashar al-Assad, and those opposed to his rule. The bloody internal fighting has destroyed whole neighborhoods and has forced more than nine million people to abandon their homes. What began as another event of the Arab Spring uprising against an autocratic ruler, has mushroomed into a brutal proxy war that has drawn in regional and world powers.

Since violence and repression broke out in Syria in March 2011, the EU has not only called repeatedly for an end to attacks, but has also suspended other agreements intended to forge a closer relationship with Damascus. Following the EU sanctions in November 2011, the EIB stopped all disbursements for loans and technical assistance contracts with the Syrian state.

The regional crisis in Syria proved again, that in comparison with other fields of European politics, the EU's defense and security policy is highly susceptible to differences among the member states. The EU opposed sending arms to Syria, but the heads of the European states could not reach an agreement on the revocation of the arms ban against the opposition. France and the UK announced that they would consider a unilateral abrogation of the agreement by sending arms to the Syrian rebels. On the other hand, an unexpected consequence for Europe's foreign policy was highlighted. Major European states' (like France and Germany) opposition to the US-led Iraq war, of 2003, was replaced by the most explicit European support to the US policy towards Damascus. François Hollande