

ChiMoKoJa



# ChiMoKoJa:

## *Histories of China, Mongolia, Korea and Japan—Volume 1*

Edited by

Frank Jacob

Cambridge  
Scholars  
Publishing



ChiMoKoJa: Histories of China, Mongolia, Korea and Japan—Volume 1

Edited by Frank Jacob

This book first published 2015

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

Copyright © 2015 by Frank Jacob and contributors

All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner.

ISSN: 2058-3117

# CONTENTS

Chapter One.....	1
The Russian East Asiatic Company and the Volunteer Fleet after the Russo-Japanese War: The Case of Russian Transatlantic Liners <i>Yukimura SAKON</i>	
Chapter Two.....	17
MacArthur's Legacy: Japan and the Early Cold War <i>Frank JACOB</i>	
Chapter Three.....	41
Did Japanese Women Get "Strong"? Gender and the State during the U.S. Occupation of Japan <i>Masako ENDO</i>	
Chapter Four.....	73
Chen Chu: A Cosmopolitan Leader for Human Rights and Democracy in Taiwan <i>Doris T. CHANG and Richard KAGAN</i>	
Chapter Five.....	101
Reviews	
Contributors.....	109



# CHAPTER ONE

## THE RUSSIAN EAST ASIATIC COMPANY AND THE VOLUNTEER FLEET AFTER THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR: THE CASE OF RUSSIAN TRANSATLANTIC LINERS

YUKIMURA SAKON

### Introduction

This chapter discusses Russian liners transporting Jewish emigrants from the Russian Empire to the United States at the beginning of the twentieth century. Over the past few decades, a considerable number of studies have been conducted on the history of migration or diasporas in the modern world. Studies focusing on the identity of emigrants or immigrants, including their daily lives, reveal how a people's identity is created in a new nation and how this leads us to reconsider the framework of a nation's identity; or else what constitutes a nation's identity. However, little attention has been given to issues surrounding the transportation system, such as ships and railways, which made mass immigration possible in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Therefore, this chapter concentrates on issues surrounding shipping companies during this period.

According to Dirk Hoerder, a famous specialist in migration history, 35 million Europeans left for North America and 8 million for South America between 1815 and 1939.<sup>1</sup> At that time, one of the leading shipping companies sailing on the Atlantic Ocean was the Hamburg-American Line (Hamburg-Amerikanische-Pakettfahrt-Aktien-Gesellschaft,

---

<sup>1</sup> Dirk Hoerder, *Cultures in Contact; World Migrations in the Second Millennium* (Durham, London: Duke University Press, 2002), 331–332.

HAPAG). Directed by Albert Ballin, it transported not only emigrants from Germany and Austria-Hungary, but also Jewish emigrants from the Russian Empire. Prior to the Russo-Japanese War, no shipping company provided direct services between Russia and America. Although the Russian Volunteer Fleet and the Russian East Asian Steamship Company (REAS) opened new lines between Libava (present-day Liepāja), Latvia, and New York after the war, the former stopped the route to New York two years later. In this chapter, I will discuss two reasons for this withdrawal of service: passport issues and a government subsidy.

Studying the first issue helps to understand the circumstances of Jewish migration. As John Torpey describes, prior to the First World War in Western Europe, passports were considered “useless paper barriers to a world in prosperous motion,”<sup>2</sup> and consequently, passport requirements fell away. This situation made mass migration in Europe possible before the First World War. For the second issue, government subsidy to Russian ship associations at the beginning of the twentieth century has so far never been studied. Through an analysis of the subsidy, I will focus on the Russian authority’s policy on shipping and foreign capital in relation to their competition with Japan after the Russo-Japanese War, and I will try to reveal which liner was important from a political viewpoint for Imperial Russia, which had lost part of its influence in East Asia due to the war against the Japanese Empire.

The Russian Volunteer Fleet was established in the aftermath of the Russo-Turkish War in 1878 as a patrol boat; however, in practice, it carried soldiers and settlers from Odessa to Vladivostok, as well as exiles to Sakhalin, and Chinese tea to Odessa.<sup>3</sup> It is obvious that the Volunteer Fleet helped Russia advance into East Asia, especially considering the aftermath of the First Sino-Japanese War (1894/95). For instance, in 1901, the fleet transported 28,000 soldiers,<sup>4</sup> making 23 round trips to do so.<sup>5</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport; Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92.

<sup>3</sup> For the history of the Volunteer Fleet, see M. Poggenpol’, *Ocherk vozniknoveniia i deiatel’nosti Dobrovol’nogo flotaa za vremia 25-ti letnego ego sushchestvovaniia* [Report on the establishment and activities of the Volunteer Fleet for 25 years] (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia A Benke 1903); V.P. Biankin, *Russkoe torgovoe moreplavanie na Dal’nem Vostoke (1860–1925 gg.)* [Russian shipping trade in the Far East (1860–1925)] (Vladivostok: Dal’nevostochnoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1979).

<sup>4</sup> Poggenpol’: *Ocherk vozniknoveniia i deiatel’nosti*, 237.

<sup>5</sup> Hara Teruyuki, “Taigan kōro to taigan bōeki. Nihon kai wo hasamu Nichi-Ro



Nonetheless, little is known about the history of the Volunteer Fleet after the Russo-Japanese War, since most historians believed that the Fleet was no longer a significant means to connect the Russian Far East with European Russia following the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railway in 1904. Actually, as will be shown below, worry about competition with the railway encouraged the Volunteer Fleet to launch the Transatlantic Line. Although this is not the chief concern in this chapter, it is necessary to remember that the Volunteer Fleet made 25 round trips in 1913, according to its guidebook.<sup>6</sup> One of the main tasks of the Volunteer Fleet after the Russo-Japanese War was the transportation of tea.<sup>7</sup> In a 1913 trip to Vladivostok, its ships carried 2,374,611 pood<sup>8</sup> of tea from Shanghai and 312,474 pood from Colombo. Moreover, it carried 325,900 pood of sugar from Odessa to Vladivostok, 95,400 pood of rails from Nikolaev (present-day Mykolaiv, Ukraine), and 70,200 pood of cement from Novorossiysk.<sup>9</sup>

In taking up the topic of the Volunteer Fleet's Transatlantic Line, we cannot neglect its competition with the Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company, which entered the line between Odessa and Vladivostok in 1900, and opened its own Transatlantic Line in 1906. Although less of its history is known than that of the Volunteer Fleet, the case of REAS will help us to understand the role of foreign capital in the Russian economy at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Below, I will first present the history of REAS, and then summarize the situation of Jewish migration and Russian Transatlantic Liners. After that, I will shift the emphasis to Russian shipping policy in East Asia, and then reveal the shipping issues that existed between "West" and "East."

---

kaiun no rekishi kara" [Across the Sea of Japan: A history of Japanese-Russian maritime transportation and trade], *Roshia Kenkyū* [Russian studies] 25 (1997), 81.

<sup>6</sup> *Dobvol'nyi flot. Srochnye reisy: 1913 g.* [The Volunteer Fleet. Regular lines. 1913] (St. Petersburg, 1913).

<sup>7</sup> For the history of the tea trade in Russia at the end of nineteenth century and the beginning of twentieth century, see Stuart Thompson, "Russia's Tea Traders: A Neglected Segment of a Still Neglected Entrepreneurial Class," *Culture, Theory and Critique* 24.1 (1980), 131–163; Sakon Yukimura, "19 seiki kōhan kara 20 seiki shotō ni kakete no Roshia no chabōeki. Kisen tonō kanren wo chūshin ni [Russian tea trade and shipping at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century]," *Sravu Kenkyū* [Slavic studies] 59 (2012), 61–90.

<sup>8</sup> An old Russian measure of weight, equivalent to 16.38 kilograms.

<sup>9</sup> *Dobvol'nyi flot. Statistika dvizheniia gruzov i passazhirov.* [Volunteer Fleet. Statistics of cargos and passengers]. 1913. Table 24; 1914. Table 2.

## **The launch of the Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company**

The East-Asiatic Company, the parent company of the Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company, was founded in Copenhagen in 1897 by Hans Nils Andersen, who managed the company's transport of Thai teak to Europe from 1884.<sup>10</sup> In an appeal dated April 12, 1899, from the East-Asiatic Company to Minister of Finance Sergei Witte, the aim in establishing the Russian East Asiatic Steamship Company was explained as follows:

The aim of the foundation of the company is mainly concerned with the possibility to open new markets, in anticipation of – thanks to the proper policy of the Ministry of Finance – inevitable forthcoming growth of Russian industry and prosperity of trade through exports, especially from Russian Baltic ports [...] [the] company's organizers are thinking that with the gradual increase in ships of the Volunteer Fleet, and with the completion of the Trans-Siberian railway as well as the railway in Manchuria, the cargos for the State will be gradually transferred to private cargos.<sup>11</sup>

I would like to emphasize two points here. The first is the original goal of the company to connect the Far East to the Baltic Rim, and not the Black Sea region. Andersen had shown Witte the plan to link the Far East to the ports of the Baltic Sea and the North Sea in March of 1899,<sup>12</sup> although in practice, REAS linked Vladivostok to Odessa. In the first year, its ships made five round trips.<sup>13</sup> The second point is that the establishment of a new seaborne company was related to Witte's expectation that railways and commercial shipping would encourage economic development and the expansion of new markets for Russia. On May 7, 1901, Witte actually insisted that the Volunteer Fleet be gradually transformed from a

---

<sup>10</sup> Karen A. Snow, "Russian Commercial Shipping and Singapore, 1905-1916," *Journal of Southeast Asian Studies* 29.1 (1998), 47; Akira Suehiro, *Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855-1985* (Tokyo: The Center for East Asian Cultural Studies 1989), 60.

<sup>11</sup> Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi istoricheskii arkhiv in St. Petersburg (Russian State History Archive: further, RGIA), f. 95, op. 3, d. 1006, l. 37.

<sup>12</sup> RGIA, f. 95, op. 3, d. 1006, l. 4.


<sup>13</sup> RGIA, f. 95, op. 3, d. 1006, l. 129.

battleship under the Navy into a shipping trade company in order to open up markets in the East for Russian industry.<sup>14</sup>

At the end of the nineteenth century, there were two chief Russian ship associations: the Russian Steam Navigation and Trading Company, established in 1857 to promote the Black Sea shipping trade, and the Volunteer Fleet. While the total displacement of merchant ships registered with the United Kingdom was almost 7,200,000 tons in 1900, the total displacement of Russian ships at the time was only 364,000 tons (see Figure 1).

**Figure1: Merchant Ships Registered in 1900**

Source: Brian R. Mitchell: *European Historical Statistics 1750-1970*. London: Macmillan 1975. pp. 620-623.



Witte, therefore, attempted to develop Russian transportation networks in both land and maritime areas in opposition to the British Empire, and in 1899 permitted the entry of two Danish-affiliated shipping companies into the line between Odessa and Vladivostok: REAS and the Northern Steamship Company, of which the parent company was the Danish-Russian Steamship Company in Copenhagen.<sup>15</sup> On August 11, 1899, the

<sup>14</sup> RGIA, f. 1153, op. 1, d. 113a. (1901 g.) l. 113–134ob.

<sup>15</sup> As space is limited, I will not take up the history of the Northern Steamship Company in detail here. For its history, see Sakon Yukimura, “Hoppō kisen shoshi. [The brief history of the Northern Steamship Company],” *Roshiashi Kenkyū* [Russian Historical Studies] 91 (2012), 23–37.

founders presented Witte with a petition establishing the Northern Steamship Company. They discussed the following:

In spite of the development of Russian foreign trade, very few Russian ships took part in the transportation of goods, as foreigners managed almost all Russian seaborne cargos. Since the damage to Russian trade that is caused by such a condition is very clear, we need to aspire to create our own commercial shipping company.<sup>16</sup>

These two petitions for the establishment of new shipping companies demonstrate Witte's commercial policy. Nevertheless, other Russian ministers could not understand his intention to reinforce shipping services by introducing foreign capital and changing the character of the Volunteer Fleet. Finally, Witte was removed from the position of Minister of Finance in March 1903.

After the loss of its guardian, REAS – as foreign capital – was criticized for harming Russian shipping, in spite of the company's statute that more than three of its five directors and at least one of every two candidates must be Russian.<sup>17</sup> One critique concluded that (1) REAS certainly caused the damage to the Volunteer Fleet, (2) wholly Russian stockholders of REAS could only receive a dividend of 9 percent in 1901, and (3) almost all crews were Danish.<sup>18</sup>

In 1904, REAS and the Northern Steamship Company talked about merging, perhaps because they could not make enough profit alone. However, this plan was not realized.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, its Danish parent company planned to sell stocks in REAS to the Russian government.<sup>20</sup> Although their response is unknown, it is clear that it was not the government but Albert Ballin, the director of HAPAG, who purchased the stocks, in order to establish a community of interests with the Russian Company.<sup>21</sup> After the Russo-Japanese War, REAS, under Ballin, launched new lines on the Atlantic Ocean and the Sea of Japan.

---

<sup>16</sup> RGIA, f. 95, op. 3, d. 1027, l. 1–2.

<sup>17</sup> *Ustav Aktsionernogo Obshchestva "Russkoe Vostochno-Aziatskoe Parokhodstvo"* [The statute of the Russian East-Asiatic Steamship Co. Ltd.] (1899), 34.

<sup>18</sup> RGIA, f. 95, op. 3, d. 1006, l. 177–179ob. Unfortunately, the author and date are unidentified.

<sup>19</sup> RGIA, f. 95, op. 4, d. 1432, l. 12–12ob.

<sup>20</sup> RGIA, f. 95, op. 4, d. 1432, l. 3–4.

<sup>21</sup> Bernhard Huldermann, *Albert Ballin* (London/ New York/ Toronto/ Melbourne: Cassell and Company, 1922), 101.

## **Jewish Emigrants and Russian Transatlantic Liners**

Directors of both the Volunteer Fleet and REAS feared the Trans-Siberian Railway would reduce the significance of lines between Odessa and Vladivostok. In 1903, directors of the Volunteer Fleet presented the government with a plan to open the new line between Odessa and New York to carry emigrants from not only Russia but also Italy. They expected the new line would put them in debt, as they did not count on a subsidy. However, they also emphasized that such problems did not hinder them from starting the project, which they believed would undoubtedly bring benefits to the state.<sup>22</sup>

Changing the port from Odessa to Libava on account of an objection placed by the Russian Ministry of Inner Affairs,<sup>23</sup> the Volunteer Fleet opened a new line between Libava and New York in 1906. REAS opened the same line. HSPSG's pool (see below) immediately reduced the fare in opposition.<sup>24</sup> As a result, the Volunteer Fleet abolished the line within two years. Other factors contributed to the abolishment of the line, particularly passport issues surrounding Jewish emigrants.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, emigrants from Russia made up about 20 percent of all emigrants to the USA each year. More than 50 percent of emigrants from Russia in 1906 were Jewish; more than 20 percent were Polish; while only 2.5 percent were Russian. Additionally, as Figure 2 shows, more than 60 percent of Jewish immigrants in America came from Russia.

---


<sup>22</sup> RGIA, f. 1284, op. 190, d. 368, l. 5ob–6. Moreover, in 1907, at the meeting held in the Libava government office, the representative of the Volunteer Fleet referred to the possibility of opening a new line to Argentina in the near future. Latvian State Historical Archive, f. 48, a. 1, l. 48, l. 57.

<sup>23</sup> RGIA, f. 573, op. 13, d. 15949, l. 1–1ob.

<sup>24</sup> RGIA, f. 98, op. 1, d. 1208, l. 73.

## Figure 2: Jewish Immigration to the United States, 1881 to 1910

Samuel Joseph: *Jewish Immigration to the United States from 1881 to 1910*.  
New York: Columbia University 1914, p. 93.



Prior to the October Revolution of 1917, many migrants left Russia for America through Germany without passports. In 1885, Prussia decreed that every migrant who came across the Austrian border had to carry at least 400 Marks (100 Marks for a child). The German shipping companies objected to this decree, insisting that few migrants possessed such amounts. Consequently, most migrants began to circumvent Prussia. As a result, after 1887, ticket holders for the HAPAG or North German Lloyd could pass without having to prove they had 400 Marks.<sup>25</sup> In 1892, expecting an increase in migration from Russia, Ballin concluded a pool agreement with the Holland-America line, the Red Star line, and the Lloyd.<sup>26</sup>

Hamburg was well known as one of the ports from where many Russian Jews left for New York. In 1904, 43.7 percent of emigrants through

<sup>25</sup> Tobias Brinkmann, “‘Travelling with Ballin’: The Impact of American Immigration Policies on Jewish Transmigration within Central Europe, 1880–1914,” *International Review of Social History* 53 (2008), 467, 470.

<sup>26</sup> Tobias Brinkmann, “Why Paul Nathan Attacked Albert Ballin: The Transatlantic Mass Migration and the Privatization of Prussia’s Eastern Border Inspection, 1886–1914,” *Central European History* 43 (2010), 61–62.

Hamburg were from Russia.<sup>27</sup> As Figure 2 shows, in the 1880s Jewish emigration from Russia to the USA increased. Although in 1891 and 1892 the numbers jumped radically on account of a cholera pandemic in Russia, the reinforcement of quarantine in European ports regulated the inflow of migration from Russia in the 1890s.<sup>28</sup> After 1899, however, the number increased again.

There were loopholes in Russian law that helped make Jewish migration to America possible. At that time, emigration was unlawful in Russia. Even those who had a foreign passport were required to return to Russia after five years.<sup>29</sup> Nevertheless, the Russian government, hoping Jews would leave Russia, tacitly permitted them to immigrate to other countries. According to a 1912 survey, only 25 percent of emigrants leaving Russia had passports.<sup>30</sup> Although the Ministry of Trade and Industry began to draft the emigration bill in 1906, it was not submitted to the Duma until June 1914.<sup>31</sup> The Russian authorities avoided grappling with passport issues until they were faced with a rise in peasant emigration to both North and South America on the eve of the First World War.<sup>32</sup>

Because the Russian government demanded the Volunteer Fleet and REAS obey the law, passengers on these ships had to carry passports. According to the report from the Volunteer Fleet to the Ministry of the Navy dated February 21, 1908, 258,000 people migrated from Russia to

---

<sup>27</sup> A. Fedochenko, "Pereselencheskoe dvizhenie cherez Gamburg i Bremen v 1904 godu" [Emigration movement through Hamburg and Bremen in 1904], *Sbornik konsul'skikh doneseniï* [The consular reports] 3 (1905), 195.

<sup>28</sup> Brinkmann, "Travelling with Ballin," 464-465.

<sup>29</sup> Rzhhevskii, "Ob organizatsii Dobrovol'nym flotom perevozki emigrantov v Severo-Amerikanskii Shtaty. I" [The organization by the Volunteer Fleet to transport emigrants to USA. I.], *Russkoe sudokhodstvo* [The Russian navigation] 310 (1908), 64-65; S.Ia Ianovskii, "Russkoe zakonodatel'stvo i emigrantsii" [Russian legislation and emigration], *Zhurnal Ministerstva Iustitsii* [Journal of the Ministry of Law] 4 (1909), 98, 110.

<sup>30</sup> N.L. Tudorianu, *Ocherki rossiiskoi trudovoi emigratsii perioda imperializma (V Germaniiu, Skandinavskie strany i SShA)* [The studies in labor emigration in the period of imperialism (to German, Scandinavian states and USA)] (Kishinev: Shtiintsa, 1986), 134.

<sup>31</sup> Hans Rogger, *Jewish Policies and Right-wing Politics in Imperial Russia* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986), 185.

<sup>32</sup> Vadim Kukushkin, *From Peasants to Labourers: Ukrainian and Belarusian Immigration from the Russian Empire to Canada* (Montreal/Kingston/London/Ithaca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2007), 55-60.

America in 1907, with the Volunteer Fleet carrying only 22,000 people<sup>33</sup> and having a huge balance of payments deficit, as shown below. Although the Volunteer Fleet and REAS petitioned the authorities about the obligation to carry passports, the Russian government did not want to address this.<sup>34</sup>

Finally, on May 30, 1908, directors of the Volunteer Fleet petitioned the Russian authorities to discuss the future of the Transatlantic Liner, which was showing major losses.<sup>35</sup> Therefore, delegates from the Ministries of Finance, Trade and Industry, Interior Affairs, the Army, and the Navy had a meeting on May 23, 1908, at which they concluded that the Volunteer Fleet's Transatlantic Liner should be abolished. During these proceedings, they connected the abolishment to the Volunteer Fleet's new service in the Far East:

To avoid impending financial disorder of the Volunteer Fleet, and considering it is under an obligation to the government to manage regular lines on the Sea of Okhotsk, along the banks of the Kamchatka, the Tatar Strait, between Vladivostok and Tsuruga, Vladivostok and Shanghai, it is necessary to abolish the regular line between Libava and New York completely.<sup>36</sup>

In spite of the government's decision, however, the Volunteer Fleet still did not abandon the Transatlantic Line. In 1910, the Volunteer Fleet established the "Joint Line" with REAS, Ballin having already returned his stocks to the Danish firm. The performance of the Joint Line run by REAS was improved by the transportation of cotton and machinery for agriculture from America to Russia, based on the contract with HAPAG's pool.<sup>37</sup> After the outbreak of the First World War, however, four out of seven ships owned by REAS were commandeered by the Russian Navy. After the October Revolution, all REAS ships were sold to the United Kingdom.<sup>38</sup>

---

<sup>33</sup> RGIA, f. 98. op. 1. d. 1208. l. 62.

<sup>34</sup> The Russian government rejected the proposal of the Russian shipping associations to allow the agents to sell emigration cards at the borders. RGIA, f. 98, op. 1, d. 1208, l. 104.

<sup>35</sup> RGIA, op. 98, op. 1, d. 1208, l. 168–173, 191–193.

<sup>36</sup> RGIA, f. 1276. op. 4. d. 376. l. 1706.

<sup>37</sup> Tudorianu, *Ocherki Rossiiskoi trudovoi emigratsii*, 158–159.

<sup>38</sup> Nippon Yusen kabushiki gaisha chosabu [The research department of Nippon Yusen], *Sekai teikisen kaisha. Sono kigyō bunnseki to kōro keiei* [World's shipping companies. The analysis of companies and management of lines] (Tokyo:



## Competition on the Sea of Japan after the Russo-Japanese War

The Russo-Japanese War bankrupted the Chinese Eastern Railway's Steamship Company, which had sailed to the ports on the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk from Vladivostok since 1899.<sup>39</sup> Thus, to compete with Japan, the Russian government had to recruit a new shipping company to operate coastal shipping in the Russian Far East. The Japanese victory over Russia in 1905 led Russian leaders to be cautious of Japan and China (Qing Empire). For example, in 1907 (or possibly 1908), Prime Minister Peter Stolypin wrote to Vladimir Kokovtsov, Minister of Finance, saying:

After the Russo-Japanese War, the situation on the periphery changed radically. On the one hand, we came into close contact with Japan, a vigorous and enterprising neighbor; on the other hand, an awakening China and the reorganization of the Chinese administration and army now force us to urgently ascertain the significance of the frontier and its colonization.<sup>40</sup>

They believed that Japanese superiority in shipping would threaten the Russian position and interests in the East. As a result, in April of 1906, the Ministry of Trade and Industry decided to entrust the task to REAS, which was the only applicant.<sup>41</sup>

The government granted a yearly subsidy of 750,000 rubles to the 4<sup>th</sup> and 5<sup>th</sup> lines,<sup>42</sup> while the subsidy to the Volunteer Fleet's line between Odessa and Vladivostok was 600,000 rubles. However, in April 1907, the Ministry of Trade and Industry suggested to Stolypin and Duma that the Ministry would not renew the contract with REAS, but instead sign a new one with the Volunteer Fleet from June 15, 1907, giving the latter's lower estimated cost as the reason.<sup>43</sup>

---

Nanayō sha, 1959), 278.

<sup>39</sup> For the Steamship Company of CER, see N. Rzhevuskii, "Morskoe parokhodstvo obshchestva kitaiskoi vostochnoi zheleznnoi dorogi" [Seaborne steamship company of Chinese Eastern Railway], *Russkoe sudokhodstvo* 249 (1903), 65–109.

<sup>40</sup> RGIA, f. 1276, op. 3, d. 61, l. 3ob.

<sup>41</sup> RGIA, f. 1276, op. 2, d. 311, l. 34–39.

<sup>42</sup> RGIA, f. 1276, op. 2, d. 311, l. 38ob.

<sup>43</sup> RGIA, f. 1276, op. 2, d. 311, l. 138–146.

While it is unclear whether the Ministry's reasoning was correct, it is clear that the Ministry was on its guard against REAS,<sup>44</sup> in addition, in 1906 the governor of the Maritime Oblast (province) expressed his disapproval of REAS's business in the Russian Far East, calling them "the foreign shipping company."<sup>45</sup> In 1909, in an article titled "Our Shipping" in the magazine *Russian Shipping*, the author called REAS a "quasi-Russian" shipping company.<sup>46</sup> The term "quasi-Russian" clearly indicates REAS's unstable position in Russia at that time.

After REAS withdrew from East Asia, to focus its energies on the Transatlantic Line, the Volunteer Fleet, in January 1908, demanded a subsidy of 850,000 rubles per year, the same as the previous year, for the new line in the Russian Far East. This offered the Ministry of Trade and Industry the opportunity to cancel the contract.<sup>47</sup> As a result, the government again granted a subsidy of 850,000 rubles. This episode shows that by granting a subsidy, the government encouraged the Volunteer Fleet to provide new services in the East.

We will now look at the Volunteer Fleet's report of its final accounts. The "Western Line" deficit was certainly conspicuous. A breakdown of the main expenditures shows the following: the cost of equipment was nearly 460,000 rubles, fuel was 277,000 rubles, and the New York branch was 100,000 rubles. As Figure 3 shows, in 1908 the Volunteer Fleet had sunk the furthest into debt in its entire history, so it seems natural it would have abolished the Transatlantic Line for financial reasons.

However, it is necessary to consider the effect of the government subsidy. In 1908 the government granted a subsidy of 600,000 rubles to the "Eastern Line," 850,000 rubles to the "Express Lines," 77,000 to the "Tatar Strait Lines," and 220,000 rubles to the "Northern Lines,"<sup>48</sup> but it did not grant a subsidy to the "Western Line." Without a subsidy in 1908, the deficit of the "Express Lines" surpassed that of the Transatlantic Line. By 1910, every line launched after the Russo-Japanese war was in debt. In

---

<sup>44</sup> For example, RGIA f. 1158. op. 1. d. 360 (1911 g.) l. 5.

<sup>45</sup> Russian State History Archive of the Far East in Vladivostok. f. 702. op. 2. d. 717. l. 79.

<sup>46</sup> E. Sagovskii, "Nashe sudokhodstvo" [Our shipping], *Russkoe sudokhodstvo* 321 (1909), 149-150.


<sup>47</sup> RGIA, f. 1276. op. 2. d. 311. l. 253.

<sup>48</sup> Northern Lines aimed to help the development of the Okhotsk region, as it carried many salt fishes from Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky to Vladivostok. *Dobrovol'nyi flot. Statistika dvizheniia gruzov i passazhirovo*. Table 30.

contrast, by 1914 and 1915, the directors of the Volunteer Fleet were discussing plans to reopen the Transatlantic Line after the Great War.<sup>49</sup>

### Figure 3: The balance of Volunteer Fleet

Source: Dobrovol'nyi flot. Statistiki dvizheniia gruzov i passazhirov 1914 g. Table 40.



In 1909, the Russian consul in Hong Kong reported that the line between Vladivostok and Shanghai transported very little cargo, since Russian post offices in China only accepted letters (and not parcel post or magazines) going to Manchuria and Siberia. Meanwhile, Japan launched a service between Dairen and Shanghai and tried to expand the route to Europe and South America. Moreover, German and French shipping companies carrying post were making inroads.<sup>50</sup> As described by the Russian consul, the Volunteer Fleet was lagging behind other countries in the post business in East Asia at the time. From a different viewpoint, however, this meant the Volunteer Fleet's East Asian lines were not designed to be profitable, but to prevent the development of Japanese shipping business.

The Russian shipping strategy did not change after the outbreak of the First World War. Although in 1915 the number of ships serving "Express Lines" decreased from five to two, the Ministry of Trade and Industry insisted on keeping both the Vladivostok-Shanghai and Vladivostok-Tsuruga lines. They were determined not to let go of routes between

<sup>49</sup> RGIA, f. 98, op. 1, d. 1630, l. 58–60, 86–87ob.

<sup>50</sup> RGIA, f. 98, op. 1, d. 1190, l. 34–36.

Russia and Japan, nor to let Japanese enterprises fortify their position in this service.<sup>51</sup>

In fact, Japanese shipping policy was similar to Russian policy. In 1896, Shichihei Oya launched a service on the Sea of Japan with the permission of the Ministry of Communications, and in 1903, his company merged with Osaka Shosen Kaisha (though he withdrew from the shipping business in 1907). Research shows that Japanese shipping lines on the Sea of Japan were very tight.<sup>52</sup> For routes managed by Japanese shipping companies between Vladivostok and some Japanese ports, however, Japanese leaders were interested much more in the political effect of these lines than in financial results.<sup>53</sup> Russo-Japanese shipping competition at the turn of the century was therefore an exercise in diplomatic tactics.

## Conclusion

There were two reasons why the Volunteer Fleet withdrew from the Transatlantic Line. The first was passport issues. The Russian authorities, demanding that the Volunteer Fleet obey the law concerning passports, tacitly permitted Jewish emigration without passports through western frontiers, while the understanding that passports were “useless paper barriers” in Western Europe aided emigration to the United States and increased business for German shipping companies before the First World War. This double standard from the Russian government discouraged the Volunteer Fleet’s Transatlantic Line. The second reason was a government subsidy, which clearly demonstrates the intention of the Russian authorities. They wanted the Volunteer Fleet to support Russian supremacy in the East and left the less important line (in their viewpoint) to REAS. This was because they considered the Volunteer Fleet to be a “genuine” Russian shipping association and REAS to be a “quasi-Russian” foreign affiliated company. The directors of the Volunteer Fleet, however, persisted in their support of the Transatlantic Line, as shown by their discussions about reopening it.

---

<sup>51</sup> RGIA, f. 1276, op. 11, d. 596, l. 1–3ob.

<sup>52</sup> Fumoto Shin’ichi, “Kokusaiteki kankyō kara mita kōro keisei” [The Establishment of Lines from International Perspective], in *Kindai tōhoku Ajia no tanjō. Kokyōshi eno kokoromi* [The emergence of modern Northeast Asia: An attempt to describe transnational history], ed. Sakon Yukimura (Sapporo: Hokkaido University Press, 2008), 61–82.

<sup>53</sup> Katayama Kunio, *Kindai Nihon kaiun to Ajia* [Modern Japanese shipping and asia] (Tokyo: Ochanomizu shobō, 1996), 314.

In conclusion, it is clear the Russian Empire attached greater importance to the political effects of shipping than to profits, and moreover that the development of Transatlantic Liners was connected with the competition in shipping between Russia and Japan in East Asian waters.



# CHAPTER TWO

## MACARTHUR'S LEGACY: JAPAN AND THE EARLY COLD WAR<sup>1</sup>

FRANK JACOB

### Introduction

Robert B. Textor was correct when he stated that the occupation of Japan by the United States was the “most ambitious occupation the world has seen since the emergence of the nation-state,”<sup>2</sup> and the consequences are still visible today in Japanese daily life. The impact was amazing: during the seven years from 1945 until 1952, the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP) and his staff not only changed the surface of the country; they fundamentally affected the whole of Japanese society, its politics, economics, and education. The occupation was criticized by Japanese anti-American writers in the 1970s and 1980s for various reasons. For example, even though the Japanese Constitution was the greatest success of this period, Article 9 prohibited Japan from establishing an army or navy.<sup>3</sup> The constitution reflected the achievements of an occupation that had been generous towards the Japanese people and very successful from an American point of view.<sup>4</sup> Japan became important

---

<sup>1</sup> This chapter was also published in Frank Jacob, ed. *Peripheries of the Cold War* (Würzburg: Königshausen&Neumann, 2015) and is available here thanks to the permission of my publisher.

<sup>2</sup> Robert B. Textor, “Success in Japan – Despite Some Human Foibles and Cultural Problems,” in William M. Leary, ed., *MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader* (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 277.

<sup>3</sup> Etô Jun, *Wasureta koto to waurerareta koto* (Tokyo, Bungei Shunju, 1979) and Shimizu Ikutaro, *Sengo o utagau* (Tokyo: Kôdansha, 1980).

<sup>4</sup> Manfred Kittel, *Nach Nürnberg und Tokio. „Vergangenheitsbewältigung“ in Japan und Westdeutschland 1945 bis 1968*, Schriftenreihe der Vierteljahrshefte für

in the early part of the Cold War, the worldwide “battle for hearts and minds,”<sup>5</sup> because the war did not remain cold in Asia. This fact has recently inspired Immanuel Wallerstein to challenge the labeling for the Asian region.<sup>6</sup>

One essential point was that, regardless of whether the Cold War was cold or hot in Asia, ordinary people<sup>7</sup> were not convinced about either system or ideology. However, in the case of Japan we can trace the importance of the imagination of a new order, as personalized by one man: Douglas MacArthur, the “latter-day shogun,”<sup>8</sup> who ruled Japan for about five years. He was appointed because the American people wanted a national hero, even though President Truman did not like his personality. Along with Montgomery, Rommel, and Patton, MacArthur advanced to the status of a symbolic hero, even though his image was rather simple.<sup>9</sup> The general in “khaki trousers, brown leather air force jacket, and officer’s cap liberally emblazoned with scrambled egg, dark glasses and corn-cob pipe jutting arrogantly from his mouth”<sup>10</sup> became a well-known figure in the Asian Theater. This image was strengthened by 12 biographies published during the war and descriptions of his heroic fight for the Philippines.<sup>11</sup>

---

Zeitgeschichte, Vol. 89 (München: Oldenbourg, 2004), 316.

<sup>5</sup> Liu Hong and Michael Szonyi, “Introduction: New Approaches to the Study of the Cold War,” in Liu Hong, Michael Szonyi, and Zheng Yangwen, eds., *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 1.

<sup>6</sup> Immanuel Wallerstein, “What Cold War in Asia? An Interpretative Essay,” in Liu Hong, Michael Szonyi, and Zheng Yangwen, eds., *The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), 19 and 24.

<sup>7</sup> Benjamin Ziemann, “Situating Peace Movements in the Political Culture of the Cold War,” in Benjamin Ziemann, ed., *Peace Movements in Western Europe, Japan and the USA during the Cold War*, Frieden und Krieg: Beiträge zur Historischen Friedensforschung, Vol. 8 (Essen: Klartext, 2007), 11.

<sup>8</sup> Textor, *Success*, 258.

<sup>9</sup> Russel D. Buhite, *Douglas MacArthur: Statecraft and Stagecraft in America’s East Asian Policy* (Lanham et al.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2008), 68; Robert Harvey, *American Shogun: MacArthur, Hirohito and the American Duel with Japan* (London: John Murray, 2006), 305.

<sup>10</sup> Mark Felton, *The Final Betrayal: Mountbatten, MacArthur and the Tragedy of Japanese POWs* (Barnsley: Pen and Sword Books, 2010), 40.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid., 43. One example for the early accounts about MacArthur’s role in the Pacific War is Frazier Hunt, *MacArthur and the War against Japan* (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1944).



After Japan's decision to surrender, it was MacArthur who accepted it and immediately started his own agenda, because he saw the opportunity for a well-prepared staging area in Japan. He thought he was destined for the ambitious Japanese Occupation project, for which he was responsible as SCAP and Allied Supreme Commander of the South-West Pacific Area (SWPA). MacArthur had already experienced ongoing frictions over supreme leadership with his antagonist in the theater of war, Admiral Nimitz, as well as British officers, who were prohibited from accepting a Japanese surrender before MacArthur could personally receive that declaration in Tokyo. Due to this "overarching ego" and "conscious[ness] of his own image,"<sup>12</sup> many British POWs remained in Japanese hands longer than necessary, becoming victims of MacArthur's addiction to fame and glory.

His landing at Atsugi air base in Japan was a masterpiece of dramatic bravura that Robert Harvey claimed was an act "of absolute foolhardiness."<sup>13</sup> At all costs MacArthur wanted his first step on Japanese soil to be where the kamikaze pilots had left Japan to meet their destiny, and he wanted to do it before the marines or the navy. On August 30, 1945 he achieved this goal<sup>14</sup> when he landed at Atsugi airbase as a passenger on the *Bataan* C54 aircraft. During the war, MacArthur never underestimated the Japanese forces and possible assaults even in cases of a Japanese retreat;<sup>15</sup> he simply eliminated the danger from his mind and flew into the lion's den. His entry into Japan almost alone and unarmed was one of his greatest coups.<sup>16</sup> The Japanese had known about the general and his command for a long time.<sup>17</sup> Even with the emperor's declaration to end the

---

<sup>12</sup> Felton, *Betrayal*, 41.

<sup>13</sup> Harvey, *American Shogun*, 307.

<sup>14</sup> Buhite, *MacArthur*, 69.

<sup>15</sup> "International, Australia: The authorities in the MacArthur's office warns to underestimation of the Japanese marine transport," without date [presumably 1944], in National Archives of Japan (subsequently NAJ), Cabinet, Intelligence Materials, Various Reports and Records/Information obtained by monitoring American domestic broadcasts, A03024987900; "International, News on Japan: A spokesman of MacArthur makes complaints to increased power of Japanese air force," 9 March [presumably 1944], in NAJ, Cabinet, Intelligence Materials, Various Reports and Records/Information obtained by monitoring American domestic broadcasts, A03024955500.

<sup>16</sup> Theodore Cohen, *Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal* (New York: The Free Press, 1987), 62.

<sup>17</sup> "International, Italy: MacArthur being appointed to be the Commander-in-chief of the Southeast Asian district," 20 September [presumably 1942], NAJ, Cabinet,

war, it was uncertain whether the military was willing to surrender to the man who had lost the Philippines to the Japanese forces some years before. But MacArthur arrived unarmed, as a conqueror who did not need to fight, because he could already claim victory. Nobody knew if a guerilla war would start, so what John Gunther called “the greatest gamble in modern history,”<sup>18</sup> proved a successful start for MacArthur’s rule in Japan.<sup>19</sup> When MacArthur and his men travelled to Yokohama, their way was lined with 30,000 Japanese soldiers with their backs to the general. They did this partly to honor his victory, but mainly to protect him from military men who were unwilling to surrender to a foreigner.<sup>20</sup>

The history of Japan’s Occupation is the history of MacArthur, who in just a few weeks was able to personalize the occupation and claim all ideas, plans, initiatives, and decisions concerning Japan as his own.<sup>21</sup> He was a soldier who took over the heart of civil administration; even more decisive was the fact that the new ruler of Japan was a “complex individual.”<sup>22</sup>

His ruling style has been widely discussed. Because he used it to “impose [...] democracy like a dictator,”<sup>23</sup> many biographers have focused on his “imperious personality,”<sup>24</sup> calling him “American Viceroy,”<sup>25</sup> “Caesar of the Pacific,”<sup>26</sup> or “proconsul of a defeated nation, military dictator of 75 million people.”<sup>27</sup> MacArthur remained the focus of historical research about the Japanese Occupation for decades, until the 1970s when historians first began to evaluate the connection between the occupation policy and the Cold War. Because the general was the personification of

Intelligence Materials, Various Reports and Records/Information obtained by monitoring American domestic broadcasts, A03025223200.

<sup>18</sup> John Gunther, *The Riddle of MacArthur: Japan, Korea and the Far East* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1951), 1.

<sup>19</sup> Masuda Hiroshi, *MacArthur in Asia: The General and His Staff in the Philippines, Japan, and Korea* (Ithaca/London: Cornell University Press, 2009), 193.

<sup>20</sup> Harvey, *American Shogun*, 308; Masuda, *MacArthur*, 193.

<sup>21</sup> Buhite, *MacArthur*, 72.

<sup>22</sup> Justin Williams, Sr., *Japan’s Political Revolution under MacArthur* (Athens: The University of Georgia Press, 1979), 263.

<sup>23</sup> Gunther, *Riddle*, 9.

<sup>24</sup> Buhite, *MacArthur*, 72.

<sup>25</sup> *Ibid.*, 67.

<sup>26</sup> Gunther, *Riddle*, 1. See also William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur, 1880-1946* (Boston: Little Brown, 1978).

<sup>27</sup> Harvey, *American Shogun*, 306.

American rule in Japan, it seems natural to focus on him and his leadership style.<sup>28</sup> MacArthur, who ruled like a foreign shogun in Japan, was responsible for the course of U.S. Occupation policy from 1945 until 1952, which had been challenged by both personal and geostrategic factors. I will provide a detailed description of MacArthur's shogun-like rule in order to analyze the influence of the emerging Cold War in Asia. By doing this I hope to achieve a more reasonable explanation for the developments in Modern Japanese History during the early Cold War, and to emphasize the importance of the Asian periphery in a period where most Western eyes were only willing to look at Central Europe.

### The American Shogun

The Potsdam Agreement, signed on August 2, 1945, had already declared the Allied position on Japan. There would be an occupation after the war, and the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC) had already started to prepare plans for this project during the war that would later prove highly valuable to MacArthur.<sup>29</sup> In the United States, the topic was discussed by the so-called "China crowd" and "Japan crowd." The members of the first group, mainly researchers from the Institute of Pacific Relations, asked for a harsh occupation policy and the abolition of the imperial court, saying that Hirohito should be treated as a war criminal. The representatives of the pro-Japanese group, assembled by Joseph C. Grew (1880-1965), former ambassador to Japan and director of the Office for Far Eastern Affairs, instead wanted a reconstruction of Japan and the preservation of traditional Japanese institutions, especially the preservation of the emperor.<sup>30</sup>

MacArthur did not trust any of them, because he "viewed [...] men who had a special knowledge of Japan and the Far East [with suspicion],"<sup>31</sup> especially when they were civilians. The general was not yet thinking about occupation; he was making plans for invasion. Operation Downfall was intended to end Japanese rule in the Pacific by invading Japan from two directions. The first assault, called Olympic, would reach

---

<sup>28</sup> Michael Schaller, "MacArthur's Japan: The View from Washington," in William M. Leary, ed., *MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader* (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 287-288.

<sup>29</sup> William L. Neumann, *America Encounters Japan: From Perry to MacArthur* (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1963), 294; Buhite, *MacArthur*, 68-69.

<sup>30</sup> Neumann, *America Encounters Japan*, 295.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*

Kyūshū on 1 September, 1945; the subsequent assault, Coronet, was to be at Honshū on 1 March, 1946.<sup>32</sup> The objective was “the early introduction of occupying forces into major strategic areas, the control of critical ports, port facilities, and airfields, and the demobilization and disarmament of enemy troops.”<sup>33</sup> The detailed plans never came to fruition, because Hirohito accepted the terms of the Potsdam Agreement and was

prepared to issue his commands to all the military, naval, and air authorities of Japan and all the forces under their control wherever located to cease active operations, to surrender arms, and to issue such orders as may be required by the Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces for the execution of the above-mentioned terms.<sup>34</sup>

On 15 August, 1945, Hirohito declared the war was over and addressed his subjects directly for the first time. He wanted to end the fighting and start the occupation as peacefully as possible, telling the Japanese people:

Beware most strictly of any outburst of emotion which may engender needless complications, and refrain from fraternal contention and strife which may create confusion, lead ye astray and cause ye to lose the confidence of the world.<sup>35</sup>

MacArthur also realized that the war was over, and gladly stated:

I thank a merciful God that this mighty struggle is about to end. I shall at once take steps to stop hostilities and further bloodshed. The magnificent men and women who have fought so nobly to victory can now return to their homes in due course and resume their civil pursuits. They have been good soldiers in the war. May they be equally good citizens in peace.<sup>36</sup>

MacArthur turned from invasion to occupation planning, and the Manila Conference was the first step to addressing post-war Japanese questions.<sup>37</sup> Finally, MacArthur entered Japan in the way described above. He started the occupation in a rather insecure fashion, because the American troops

---

<sup>32</sup> General Staff MacArthur and Department of the Army, eds., *Reports of General MacArthur: The Campaigns of MacArthur in the Pacific*, Vol. 1 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966), 395.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*, 444.

<sup>34</sup> *Tokyo Nippon Times*, 9 September 1945.

<sup>35</sup> General Staff MacArthur, *Reports*, 445.

<sup>36</sup> GHQ, AFPAC, Press Release 15 Aug 45 cited in *ibid.*, 446.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 447-449.

were greatly outnumbered. Nobody knew if the emperor's control could calm the radical forces, and just a few days before the general's landing in Japan, kamikaze pilots had asked to continue the fight for the defense of Japanese soil. MacArthur ignored all these factors, and ultimately his "calculated risk had been well taken."<sup>38</sup> The peaceful start of the occupation was really a "happy surprise"<sup>39</sup> for the Americans and the Japanese. The Japanese recognized their position and knew that it would be better to cooperate with the SCAP instead of sabotaging them. They signed their official surrender on board the *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay on 2 September 1945, and MacArthur probably regarded himself "as a second Perry, charged with the opening of Japan."<sup>40</sup> He felt his decisions would determine the fate of Japan and its people in the coming years.

What was "nominally an Allied enterprise" soon became "exclusively American"<sup>41</sup> and finally became MacArthur's policy exclusively. The general was directly responsible for many important decisions, which influence Japan's legacy even today. Justin Williams Sr. is correct in stating that "he left his stamp on the Japanese bureaucracy, the Emperor institution, the feudal aristocracy, the Diet, the family, religion, freedom, disarmament, education, the legal system, farm tenancy, labor."<sup>42</sup> Even though there had been official plans for the occupation policy, actually stating most of the things MacArthur finally decided,<sup>43</sup> and even though MacArthur received clear orders, like directive JCS 1380/15, he personalized his rule, selling everything as his own idea.

Directive JCS 1380/15 was clearly stated as one of the post-war aims:

You will require the Japanese to establish a public agency responsible for reorganizing Japanese business in accordance with the military and economic objectives [...]. You will require this agency to submit, for

---

<sup>38</sup> Ibid., 453.

<sup>39</sup> Kazuo Kawai, *Japan's American Interlude* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 1.

<sup>40</sup> Masuda, *MacArthur*, 195.

<sup>41</sup> Kawai, *American Interlude*, 16.

<sup>42</sup> Williams, *Political Revolution*, 267.

<sup>43</sup> Robert E. Ward, "Presurrender Planning: The Treatment of the Emperor and Constitutional Changes," in Robert E. Ward and Sakamoto Yoshikazu, eds., *Democratizing Japan: The Allied Occupation* (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1987), 37-38.

approval by you, plans for dissolving large Japanese industrial and banking combines or other large concentrations of business control.<sup>44</sup>

But this document was top secret, which provided MacArthur the chance to act as though everything surrounding the dissolving of the *zaibatsu* was his own decision. It also made him the shogun of Japan, able to decide about the state of the Japanese economy.

MacArthur went even further, actually believing that all these ideas were his own. Flying to Atsugi, he dictated his aims for Japan, almost congruent with the plans already formulated during the war. His aims were to: 1. Destroy Japan's military power; 2. Create a representative government; 3. Establish women's suffrage; 4. Release political prisoners; 5. Free the peasants; 6. Provide freedom for the labor movement; 7. Establish a free and liberal market in Japan; 8. End police repression; 9. Allow a free Japanese press; 10. Provide liberal education; and 11. Decentralize the country's power structure.<sup>45</sup> To achieve these ambitious aims, MacArthur began his work and immediately produced countless orders with the result that "[t]he flood of directives to the Japanese had become so immense that I doubt if anyone could have kept track of all of them."<sup>46</sup> But not all orders or directives were congruent with the official policy. However, far away from Washington, MacArthur used his powerful position to create the Japan *he* desired.

There is one major area where MacArthur dominated the decision process: the future role of the emperor. It was the general who was responsible for the preservation of the imperial institution, because in contrast to the Japanese communists, who like the "China crowd" wanted to abolish this antiquated symbol and see Hirohito in front of a judge, MacArthur desired to use the emperor to rule Japan. He was willing to utilize a technique that had been used by former shoguns for centuries

---

<sup>44</sup> Cohen, *Remaking Japan*, 354.

<sup>45</sup> Hata Ikuhiko, "Japan unter amerikanischer Besatzung," in Arnulf Baring and Masamori Sase, eds., *Zwei zaghafte Riesen? Deutschland und Japan seit 1945* (Stuttgart/Zürich: Belser 1977), 204; Hata Ikuhiko, "The Occupation of Japan, 1945-1952," in William M. Leary, ed., *MacArthur and the American Century: A Reader* (Lincoln/London: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 320; Masuda, *MacArthur*, 205; Reinhard Zöllner, *Geschichte Japans. Von 1800 bis zur Gegenwart* (Paderborn et al.: UTB, 2006), 385.

<sup>46</sup> William J. Sebald with Russel Brines, *With MacArthur in Japan: A Personal History of the Occupation* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1965), 78.