English Studies from Archives to Prospects

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Volume 2 – Linguistics and Applied Linguistics

Edited by

Irena Zovko Dinković
and Jelena Mihaljević Djigunović

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

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This book first published 2016

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-4438-9076-6
ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9076-2

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PREFACE

The Department of English Studies at the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences in Zagreb has, on the anniversary of its founding 80 years ago, provided this opportunity to examine its extant archive of research, both to lend an ear to the challenges of the present moment and to offer an agenda for future scholarship. Inspired by the issues raised in the humanities, the editors and authors who were invited to participate in this project offer a selection of views on developments in the field of English Studies today.

The writings in this volume examine a wide scope of linguistic and applied linguistic issues, many of which have undergone significant changes over the past few decades. The linguistics section contains two parts. The first deals with several topics that have been the focus of linguistic debate since its early days: the multifaceted issues of negation, gender, and quantifiers as universal features of human language, and metaphor and metonymy as its two fundamental poles; and the ever debatable notion of grammaticalization, and the role and importance of native speakers in linguistic study. These issues are approached from diverse theoretical standpoints, providing an insight not only into the diachronic perspective, but into the current state of affairs. The contributions in the second part include topics that have seen major growth in the past decades, such as language corpora and corpus analysis, new trends in lexicography, and the rise of English as a new lingua franca. Finally, this part is devoted to the development of translation studies, in view of the method of contrastive analysis as an important segment of linguistic study, and of the nature of the knowledge needed to translate between languages and cultures.

The third part of this volume encompasses topics in the field of applied linguistics, focusing on the learning and teaching of English as L2, and including contributions which cover a range of areas in which intensive theoretical and empirical research is currently being undertaken. The contributions relate to three levels of second language acquisition and teaching processes, which are researched in contemporary applied linguistics: the language level, the L2 learner level, and the learning context level. These levels interact in individual contributions, underscoring the complex and dynamic nature of learning and teaching

English in today's globalized and digitized world. Crosslinguistic influence, a recurring topic in several chapters, is dealt with in the framework of “third language acquisition” and through considering the interactive spoken discourse of learners of English at different proficiency levels. The chapters focusing on L2 learners report on research into factors such as individual learner differences, like learner age, attitudes to English, and learners' perceptions of hybrid learning environments. The learning context emerges as a key variable in all chapters in this section, but is particularly prominent in the chapter that considers cultural elements in English language textbooks. Contributions in this section of the volume present insights based on quantitative and qualitative studies, and engage with topics from both synchronic and diachronic perspectives.

This book does not claim to be an authoritative statement; instead, it seeks to provide an outlook on disciplinary explorations, offering views that argue for the continuing relevance of linguistic and applied linguistic knowledge.

—The Editors

PART I.

NEW PROSPECTS FOR OLD ISSUES

CHAPTER ONE

AN EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO ENGLISH GENDER FROM A GRAMMAR-BASED PERSPECTIVE

LAURE GARDELLE

1. Introduction

As the linguistic knowledge of a community evolves so do its grammars, which are the repository of that knowledge. Over the centuries, what used to be modern description thus becomes the archive of a past era. The claim made here is that it is important that these should not be forgotten: they help the modern linguist remember that descriptions are not set in stone, but are the result of major evolutions and influences, and liable to further changes and innovations. This holds even for categories whose main characteristics might seem relatively straightforward today, which is what the present study wishes to illustrate through the example of English gender. Analyses are based on a corpus of 34 grammars of English: 1 for the late 16th century;[1] 5 for the 17th; 2 for the 18th; 16 for the 19th; 9 for the 20th; and 1 for the 21st (full references are given at the end of the chapter).

Today, gender as it relates to English is commonly thought to have the following characteristics (Huddleston and Pullum 2002):

1. English has gender;
2. it has three genders: masculine, feminine and neuter;
3. gender is not a fixed property of some nouns. For instance, *bull* can be used with *he* or *it*;

[1] Bullokar (1586), which was "generally regarded as the first extant grammar of the English language", as stated by Gwosdek (2013, viii) in the preface to Lily's Grammar.

4. gender selection relies partly, but not solely, on sex, so that a male, e.g. a bull, can be referred to as *it*;
5. the parts of speech that carry gender are chiefly the personal pronouns *he*, *she*, *it* (and their derivatives) and the relative pronouns *which* and *who*.

A study of older English grammars, however, shows that not a single one of these characteristics has been permanent in descriptions:

1. The existence of a gender category was rejected by some 20th century grammarians (Kruisinga and Erades 1960; Leech and Svartvik 1994) as well as by some recent cross-linguistic studies (Aikhenvald 2000; Creissels 2006);[2]
2. The number of genders in English grammatical descriptions varies from 7 to 2 between the 16th and early 20th centuries (7 for Poole [1646]; 6 for Bullokar [1586] and Jonson [1640]; 5 for Howell [1661]; 4 for Miège [1688] and Nesfield [1924]; 2 for Ash [1760] and Bain [1873]; and 3 for many grammarians, as early as Gil [1621]). Mid-20th century structuralist grammars define a much higher number of gender classes—10 for Quirk et al. (1985), and more recently, 4 for Biber et al. (1999, 312): masculine, feminine and dual (e.g. *the doctor* can be found in association either with *he* or *she*), all subsumed under the label "personal/human", and "non-personal/neuter" (e.g. *the house* is used with *it*);
3. Until the turn of the 21st century all descriptions define the gender of English *nouns*, but Huddleston & Pullum (2002, 488) consider that English nouns do not themselves carry gender;
4. In many 19th century grammars, gender is defined solely with regard to sex, as in Morgan (1814): "[g]ender is the distinction of the male sex from the female";[3]
5. Regarding parts of speech that carry gender, while all grammars include *he* and *she*, some reject *it*; others include *I/you*, the relative *that*, interrogative *who* and *what*, adjectives, or compounds in -*body* and -*thing* (e.g. *somebody*, *something*).

[2] In general linguistics, some researchers (Creissels 2006; Aikhenvald 2002) reject the existence of a gender category in English, because it exhibits characteristics that set it apart from mainstream gender systems, but Corbett (1991, 169) ranks it among "pronominal gender systems".

[3] See also Murray (1834), Walker (1839), Brown (1851), Sweet (1898), and Nesfield (1924) for England; Lynde (1821), Ingersoll (1832), Hamlin (1833), Covell (1853), Curme (1933) for the US; and Greenleaf (1823) for Canada.

As the analysis of all five aspects would reach far beyond the scope of a single study, the present contribution will focus on the last one—the identification of the parts of speech that carry gender. Its aim is twofold: to contribute to a better knowledge of older grammatical descriptions of gender, and to identify some factors that influence theorization and its evolution. The study will move from one part of speech to another, from those most commonly found in the corpus to the least-mentioned.

2. Nouns

Since the earliest descriptions, and except for one grammar (Huddleston and Pullum 2002), gender has been regarded as a property of *nouns*. In other parts of speech, it is an indication of concord, or agreement, with the noun, like case or number.[4] Until the turn of the 20th century, gender classes were defined solely in reference to sex. Thus the earliest grammar in the corpus (Bullokar 1586), heavily influenced by Lily's Latin grammar and its seven genders (but relying on meaning as well as grammatical agreement), establishes five genders for English substantives,[5] according to whether they "mean" [*sic*] male (masculine gender), female (feminine), both (double gender), neither (neuter), or either (doubtful gender, e.g. *swine*) (Bullokar [1586] 1977, 11). While the number of genders is a matter of disagreement,[6] the idea of a correlation between gender and sex is shared by all grammarians, and from Murray (1795)'s massively influential grammar to at least the mid-19th century many,[7] both in England and North America, make it a definition of the category. This definition opens the section on gender in the chapter devoted to nouns; for instance, "Gender is the distinction of nouns, with regard to sex" (Murray 1795, 47). This correlation of gender with sex leads a few grammarians (in the corpus, only Quackenbos [1869],

[4] In the first grammars, "nouns" is a broad category that groups together substantives and adjectives. Later, this category takes the narrower sense it has today.
[5] In addition, Bullokar has a sixth gender class, *common of three genders*, for adjectives—see the following.
[6] Jonson (1640) describes 6 genders, Poole (1646) 7, Howell (1661) 5, Miège (1688) 4, Wallis (1688) 3, and Ash (1760) 2. In the 20th century, while 3 genders is the norm, some grammarians deviate: Nesfield (1924) and Biber et al. (1999) establish 4 genders, while Quirk et al. (1985) define 9 "gender classes".
[7] Such as: Walker (1839), Brown (1851), and Lowres (1863) for England; Morgan (1814), Lynde (1821), Ingersoll (1832), Hamlin (1833), Covell (1853), and Quackenbos (1869) for the US; and Greenleaf (1823) for Canada.

although Brown [1851, 244] mentions the existence of a debate at the time) to consider that there are only two genders in English, as there are two sexes. Nouns for inanimates are then described as "destitute of gender", with a shift in the conception of gender from a grammatical property of a part of speech to a strictly meaning-based distinction that concerns only a minority of nouns.

The turn of the 20th century heralds a major change, as attention is paid to cases of discrepancy between gender and sex. The first grammar that mentions them (in the corpus at least) is Bain (1873), although this only indicates the existence of "a few exceptions", without giving examples. Sweet (1898, 53) writes more forcefully that "gender and sex don't always agree", although he retains the traditional definition of gender as "the expression of sex-distinctions by means of grammatical forms" (Sweet 1898, 52). Jespersen (1942, 174) is the first to explain at length that gender "cannot be defined as the grammatical expression of sex", as in a number of languages, they are largely unrelated. To him, Modern English has lost gender, although a "triple" division remains in personal pronouns, as well as a distinction between "a two-sex word and a no-sex word" in relative pronouns. Instead of "gender", therefore, his grammar describes "how sex is indicated in English" (Jespersen 1942, 179), both for nouns and pronouns. For instance, *father*, *bull* and *he* indicate "male sex", or *reader*, *eagle* and *who* indicate "both sexes" (Jespersen 1942, 179).

The 20th century also sees a concern for gender variations, which pose a theoretical difficulty: can there still be agreement, the core criterion for gender, when a noun, e.g. *bull*, can be found with anaphoric pronouns, e.g. *he* and *it*? This leads a few more grammarians to deviate from the mainstream description of English as having three genders. One position is that of Kruisinga and Erades (1960) and Leech and Svartvik (1994), who do not use the term "gender" at all. For instance, Kruisinga and Erades describe "uses of *he*", "uses of *she*" and "uses of *it*". Quirk et al. (1985) retain gender but, making agreement their starting-point, redefine the gender classes according to the agreement patterns they license. They find not three classes, but nine. For instance, "higher organisms" (e.g. *ship*) form a gender class because they are compatible with *which* and *it/she*; and *doctor* belongs to the "personal/dual" gender because it is compatible with *who* and *he/she*. This approach, however, is counter-intuitive in that the number of gender classes does not correspond to that of gender markers (*he*, *she* and *it* only provide a three-fold distinction, *wh-* relative pronouns a twofold one). A third path is proposed by Huddleston and Pullum (2002, 484–89), who retain the idea of gender as a "system of noun classes differentiated by their agreement patterns", as do studies of general linguistics (Corbett 1991; Aikhenvald 2002), but reject the idea that the nouns themselves have gender. They define "single-gender", "dual gender" and "triple gender nouns", but insist that the labels only mean that the nouns are *compatible with* anaphoric pronouns of one, two or three genders respectively. Indeed, gender agreement in English is of a looser kind than that found in highly grammaticized systems (such as French or German), and only requires compatibility of features between the anaphor and the antecedent. Huddleston and Pullum's (2002) grammar is unique in rejecting gender for nouns without rejecting the category altogether for English.

In conclusion, the study clearly shows the influence of theoretical backgrounds on the evolution of grammatical descriptions, whether it be the Latin model, the idea that nouns substitute for substances, the correlation between gender and sex (which, in its most extreme application, led grammarians to consider that there are only two genders in English), or the definition of gender in general linguistics. Moreover, even though Bullokar (1586) himself stated that it is mainly the pronouns (rather than the nouns) that overtly mark gender in English, the 20th century seems to see a shift in importance from nouns to pronouns in the description of gender, with some grammars rejecting gender, or gender in nouns. Similarly, it is worth noting that pronouns (especially personal pronouns) are the sole focus of several studies specifically devoted to English gender (Morris 1996; Gardelle 2006; Siemund 2008).

3. Personal pronouns

For third-person singular pronouns, grammatical descriptions that acknowledge the existence of gender in English are quasi-unanimous: apart from Quackenbos (1869, 55), all consider that *he*, *she* and *it* carry gender, masculine, feminine and neuter respectively.[8] In descriptions that establish more than three genders, these three are always given first, thereby constituting the core of the system. This consensus is in keeping with the fact that third-person singular pronouns are the only ones that display a three-term gender alternation in their morphology.

Regarding the other persons, five 19th century grammars include *I*, *we* and *you* among gendered pronouns. One of them is English (Brown 1851), and four are American (Ingersoll 1832; Hamlin 1833; Covell 1853; Quackenbos 1869). Some excerpts are as follows:

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[8] For Quackenbos (1869, 55), as previously mentioned, *it* is "destitute of gender", as English has two genders, corresponding to the two sexes.

> *I* and *thou*, and their plurals *we* and *ye*, are sometimes masculine: as, *I am the man, thou art the man*; sometimes feminine: as, *I am the woman, thou art the woman*; hence they may be called of the common gender;[9] but as the first and second persons are supposed to be known as to their sex from their being present, it is not necessary to notice the gender. *I* and *thou*, when they are used instead of nouns naturally neuter, are still masculine or feminine, because their nouns are, by a figure of speech (Hamlin 1833, 27).

> The personal pronouns of the first and second persons are equally applicable to both sexes; and should be considered masculine or feminine, according to the known application of them. The speaker and the hearer, being present to each other, of course know the sex to which they respectively belong; and, whenever they appear in narrative or dialogue, we are told who they are. In *Latin*, an adjective or a past participle relating to these pronouns is varied to agree with them in *number*, *gender*, and *case*. This is a sufficient proof, that *ego*, *I* and *tu*, *thou*, are not destitute of gender, though neither the Latin words nor the English are themselves varied to express it[10] (Brown 1851, 295).

> The simple personal pronouns are:
> I, first person, masculine gender if a male is denoted, feminine if a female.
> Thou, second person, masculine gender if a male is denoted, feminine if a female.
> He, third person, masculine gender.
> She, third person, feminine gender.
> It, third person, destitute of gender (Quackenbos 1869: 55).

The emergence of this idea of gendered first- and second-person pronouns in the 19th century is the result of a new conception of personal pronouns: although their function as noun substitutes had been well established since Dyonisius Thrax (2nd century BC), in the course of the 18th century "substitute" was reinterpreted from "standing for" distributionally to "substituting for" (Michael 1970, 321). The turning point is thought to be Lye's (1671) statement that "a Pronoun is a word put for a noun and supplying its stead" (Michael 1970, 320; Adamson 2007, 1). As a pronoun was a noun substitute, it had to carry the same

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[9] Hamlin, like all grammarians who define 4 genders for English, considers the common gender to be that of nouns that allow *he* or *she* depending on the context (e.g. *servant*).

[10] In Brown's declension tables (1851, 286), *I* is said to be of "any of the genders"; *they* is part of the declension of "HE, of the THIRD PERSON, masculine gender", similarly of "SHE, of the THIRD PERSON, feminine gender", and of "IT, of the THIRD PERSON, neuter gender".

grammatical features. This emphasis on agreement culminated in Murray's fifth rule of syntax, which is also mentioned in the five grammars previously cited:[11]

> Pronouns must always agree with their antecedents, and the nouns for which they stand, in gender and number. (Murray 1795).

What is interesting here is that these five grammars do not derive the presence of gender from facts (there is no actual alternation in forms), but from linguistic theory (pronouns should agree in gender with nouns because they are noun substitutes).

It should be noted that Murray actually contradicts himself: despite the word "always" in his rule of syntax, for personal pronouns he states that "[g]ender has respect only to the third person singular of the pronouns, *he*, *she*, *it*" (1834, 61) [12]. This inconsistency enables him to take facts (the lack of morphological alternation) into account. Similarly, three grammarians from the same period as those cited above explicitly reject the idea of gender for first- and second-person pronouns—Greenleaf (1823, 23) in Canada; and Walker (1839, 12) and Mason (1873, 33) in England—but they also provide a theoretical explanation for the facts. This account is the same in all three grammars, and illustrated by the following:

> Pronouns are the class of words most nearly related to nouns; being, as the name imports, representatives or substitutes of nouns. Accordingly, they are subject to the same modification with nouns, of number, gender, and case. But with respect to gender, we may observe that the pronouns of the first and second persons, as they are called, *I* and *thou*, do not7 appear to have had the distinction of gender given them in any language; for this plain reason, that, as they always refer to persons who are present to each

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[11] On the same grounds, Brown (1851, 245) regards *they* as carrying gender. He also appeals to the rule of precedence, according to which the masculine is more worthy than the feminine, and the feminine is more worthy than the neuter. Hence the following analysis: "If one say, 'Joseph took the young child and his mother by night, and fled with them to Egypt', the pronoun *them* will be masculine; but let 'his' be changed to 'its', and the plural pronoun that follows will be feminine. For the feminine gender takes precedence of the neuter, but not of the masculine, and it is not improper to speak of a young child without designating the sex."

[12] Brown (1851, 295) criticizes this inconsistency: "OBS. 3—Many English grammarians, and Murray at their head, deny the first person of nouns, and the gender of pronouns of the first and second persons; and at the same time teach, that, 'Pronouns must always agree with their antecedents, and the nouns for which they stand, in gender, number, and person' (Murray 1823, 111; Rev. T. Smith 1837, 60)."

> other when they speak, their sex is commonly known, and therefore needs not be marked by a masculine or feminine pronoun (Greenleaf 1823, 23).

In the 20th century, theoretical advances on anaphora and deixis lead grammarians to consider that first- and second-person pronouns are not anaphoric, but deictic, so that there is no agreement with an antecedent (Huddleston and Pullum 2002, 425). Again, theory and facts therefore converge. Quirk et al. (1985, 341), though, retain the idea of gender: "The first and second person pronouns are inevitably of personal rather than nonpersonal gender." Their position may be seen to reflect the hesitation, mentioned in the previous section, between gender as a strictly grammatical category characterized by agreement with an antecedent noun (which should not include first- and second-person pronouns), and gender as a category based primarily on reference, expressing the distinctions between humans and non humans (or animates and inanimates), and males and females.

4. Relative pronouns

Relative pronouns do not appear to be specifically mentioned in relation to gender until the 19th century, and even then gender is not always posited explicitly (although it is not explicitly rejected either). Murray (1808, 90) states only that "*[w]ho* is applied to persons, *which* to animals and inanimate things". This is the dominant approach in the 19th and early 20th centuries.[13]

The grammars that do specify "gender" for relative pronouns propose two different treatments. The first is a maximalist application of the agreement principle, as with personal pronouns: all relative pronouns, including *that*, are said to carry gender. This description is found in only two grammars[14] (i.e. fewer than for the maximalist approach to gender in personal pronouns), both of them American:

> [*Which* is] the neuter gender of *who*. *That* is really a relative and has all the genders in both numbers (Morgan 1814, 74).

[13] For example, Quackenbos (1869, 62) and Curme (1931, 229) for the US;,and Cobbett ([1819] 1984, 80), Walker (1839, 13), Brown (1851, 297), Bain (1873, 24), Mason (1873, 37), and Poutsma (1914–1917, 966) for England.

[14] Ingersoll (1832, 60) may have also had this approach in the UK, as he states an agreement rule but provides no examples: "RULE XI: *Relative pronouns agree with their antecedents in person, number, and gender*."

> *Who* is used instead of persons, and it has two genders, masculine and feminine. [...] *Which* is used instead of animals and inanimate things; as, *this is the horse which won the race*; *this is the tree which produces no fruit*. It may be in the masculine, feminine, or neuter gender. [...] NOTE—The pronouns agree with the nouns they represent, in person, number, and gender. [...] *That* is used to prevent too frequent repetition of *who* or *which*. Hence it may be of the masculine, feminine, or neuter gender; as, *the greatest man that ever lived, has had misfortunes*; *the hum-bird that was sipping dew from the flower, has flown away*; and *this is the flower that drops* (Hamlin 1833: 29).

The second approach, which, too, begins in the 19th century (Lowth 1838, 168; Lowres 1863, 140), considers explicitly that gender is only carried by *wh*- pronouns. For instance, Lowth states:

> *Who* is appropriated to persons; and so may be accounted Masculine or Feminine only; we apply *which* now to things only; and to irrational animals, excluding them from personality, without any consideration of sex: *which* therefore may be accounted Neuter (Lowth 1838: 168).

In the 20th century, the idea of gender in relative pronouns spreads, with facts (a two-term alternation) leading some grammarians to create labels that establish a two-term contrast. Quirk et al. (1985, 366) thus use the labels "personal" and "non personal", which they also apply to *he/she* vs. *it*. Huddleston and Pullum (2002, 498) use the same terms, but do not apply them to personal pronouns, for which they distinguish only between *masculine*, *feminine* and *neuter*. Their terminological distinction is again explicitly based on facts: as there are occasional discrepancies of use (e.g. *which* co-occurring with *he* for the same referent), the two gender systems might not be similar.

To conclude on relative pronouns: as with personal pronouns, the maximalist approach is found to disregard linguistic facts (there is no morphological gender alternation for *that*) in the name of the rule of syntax. The low number of grammars that explicitly use the term "gender" can seem surprising, especially as relative pronouns inflect for gender in Latin, the model language for the first grammars of English. This may be partly due to the focus on the distinction of sex in descriptions of gender, a distinction which is absent from the *who/which* alternation.

5. Adjectives

Today, the idea of gender for English adjectives seems outdated, if not absurd. Yet it is found in some of the early descriptions (Bullokar 1586;

Jonson 1640; Poole 1646), as well as in one 19th century grammar (Morgan 1814). In these descriptions, the gender of adjectives makes a gender class of its own (in those grammars, there were thought to be 6 to 7 genders in English), labelled *common of three* because an adjective is compatible with any substantive. A typical description is that of Jonson ([1640] 1972, 57):

> Sixth is the *Common of three Genders*: by which a *Noune* is divided into *Substantive* and *Adjective*. For a *Substantive* is a *Noune* of one only gender, or (at the most) of two. And an *Adjective* is a *Noune* of three Genders, being alwayes in the infinite.

This account is a consequence of two theoretical traditions. One is the description of Latin gender by Lily, whose *Grammar of Latin in English* formed the basis of early descriptions of English[15]. Lily specifies seven genders, one of which is the *common of three*:

> The [gender] common of three is declyned with *hic hæc* and *hoc*, as *hic hęc et hoc felix* (Lily [1542] 2013, 162).

The other theoretical tradition is the classification of adjectives as *nouns*, along with substantives, rather than as a distinct part of speech. As stated in Jonson's ([1640] 1972) grammar, the gender *common of three* carried by adjectives was taken to be the defining feature that distinguished them from substantives within the class of nouns (Dons 2004, 48).

Not all early grammars mention gender for adjectives (Greaves 1594; Gil 1621), but, as stated at the beginning of this section, the idea is found in one American 19th century grammar: Morgan (1814), which from Rule 6 (extract [1]) derives a declension table for adjectives (Table [1]). Note that Morgan (1814) is maximalist for relative pronouns, considering that the relative *that* marks gender.

> (1) RULE 6: Adjectives, adjective pronouns and participles agree with their nouns in number, case, gender, and person: as, 'He is a good man.' 'This book.' 'She is a loving mother.' (Morgan 1814: 201).

[15] After a proclamation by Henry VIII in 1542, Lily's became the only authorized grammar in schools, and dominated the teaching of Latin until the 19th century (Gwosdek 2013, vii).

Table 1. Declension of Adjectives (Morgan 1814: 88)

	Singular			*Plural*		
	Mas.	*Fem.*	*Neu.*	*Mas.*	*Fem.*	*Neu.*
Nom.	good	good	good	good	good	good
Poss.	good	good	good	good	good	good
Obj.	good	good	good	good	good	good

To conclude, the idea of gender for adjectives can again be regarded as an example of theory (adjectives as nouns, the Latin tradition) preceding and prevailing over facts (the lack of morphological variation).

6. Innovations: quantifiers

Two 19th century grammars are uniquely innovative in the boundaries they establish for gender markers. Doherty (1841, 39) regards *one* as carrying a gender called *indefinite*[16]. Greenleaf (1823, 24), too, includes *one*, as in, "[b]oth were once mine, but I have parted with <u>one</u>", and, generally, all pronominal adjectives (*one*, *other* and quantifiers) when used as pronouns. To him, they carry gender, but also case, number and person. As these terms are anaphoric, this description is most likely a consequence of the rule of agreement between pronouns and their antecedents.

More recently, Quirk et al. (1985, 341) regard the indefinite compounds in -*body*, -*one* and -*thing* (e.g. *somebody*) as carrying personal (*somebody*) or nonpersonal (*something*) gender. In two other grammars, this contrast—which is largely reference-based—is mentioned, but not explicitly referred to as gender: Biber et al. (1999, 312) merely note a "personal v. neuter" distinction in these pronouns, and Huddleston and Pullum (2002, 423) describe a "personal -*body* and -*one*" and "impersonal -*thing*"[17]. The inclusion of indefinite compounds among gender markers

[16] For nouns, Doherty (1841, 32) acknowledges three genders in the grammatical tradition, but states that there "should be" a fourth, indefinite gender as well, for "things of which the gender is unknown, or of which it may be necessary to speak in an indefinite manner, without regard to sex." This innovation is based on ways of distinguishing sex: i.e. on referents.

[17] In Huddleston and Pullum (2002), mention of these indefinites is not referenced under "personal gender" in the subject index. Biber et al. (1999, 312) simply state that the personal vs. neuter distinction "extends to other pronoun groups" than personal pronouns, namely relative, interrogative and indefinite pronouns.

requires further research. Cotte (2012, 26) shows that from a grammatical rather than reference point of view these compounds, like personal and relative pronouns, establish a general categorization and exhibit morphological alternation. On this basis, he also includes interrogative pronouns (*who* vs. *what*).

7. Conclusion

The present chapter has shown how much grammatical description can evolve, even for what is sometimes considered a relatively straightforward category. First, it established a number of factors in the evolution of grammatical descriptions, notably the theoretical debates and tenets of an era, concerning gender as well as related domains. When gender is unanimously defined in terms of its correlation with sex, it is necessarily regarded as reference-based, which favours theoretical evolutions such as descriptions of a two-gender system; when variations are established, a search for new theoretical models is favored. The corpus also suggests the influence of nationality: American grammars seem more likely to conform to existing rules than English ones (hence a seemingly more widespread maximalist approach to agreement). But this overview also stresses the lack of consensus among grammarians of a given era: a grammar is not just a repository of common knowledge; it takes a stance. For example, in the early grammars (late 16^{th} and early 17^{th} centuries), there is no consensus as to the number of genders. Later, different grammarians take different approaches to the shared syntactic rule of agreement between pronouns and their antecedents, while today, Huddleston and Pullum (2002) adopt a unique position among grammars when they reject the idea that nouns carry gender. These are not strictly individual positions, in that they are informed by linguistic research and contemporary debate, but including such positions in a grammar—giving them the status of authority—is an individual initiative.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, this overview of grammars shows that the category of gender in English is problematic, and some questions remain today. Should indefinite compounds be included among gender-marking items? This question holds for other words too, among them interrogative pronouns (Cotte 2012, 26) and *they*. Sklar (1988, 411) posits that in sex-indefinite references to humans, *they* marks gender agreement rather than agreement in number, as evidenced by the contrast between (2) a. and (2) b. below. Although both antecedents mark a plural notional number, *they* is acceptable only for human reference. In this use, *they* indicates gender-indefiniteness, which could be regarded as a form of gender marking.

(2) a. Everyone looks dirty, don't they?
b. Everything looks dirty, *don't they? (→ doesn't it?)

This issue poses the more general question of the exact boundary between gender (a grammatical category characterized by agreement between a pronoun and its antecedent) and the ways in which the language differentiates between humans and non-humans, and between sex (males vs. females) and absence of sex. Working in general linguistics, Aikhenvald (2000, 21) rejects the existence of gender for English, in favour of what she calls *animacy-based distinctions*. This concept is used to describe, for example, the fact that *da* + *preposition* (e.g. *damit*, *darauf*) is used only for inanimates in German, or that *ça* is not used in direct reference to a person in French. To me, there *is* gender in English, because there is agreement, though English gender is an uncommon pronominal system with a relatively loose agreement (as described by Corbett [1991] and Huddleston and Pullum [2002]). I would include the personal *he*, *she*, *it* and relative pronouns *who* and *which*, but not the interrogative *who/what*, *one* or *-body* and *-thing* compounds, because they differ from the others in one respect: they do not have prototype organisation. They *denote* a person or thing, rather than having these as their prototypical representatives and being used for other referents as well. This could be an indication that they mark *person-based distinctions*, to paraphrase Aikhenvald (2000), rather than gender proper: that they have not undergone the same degree of grammaticization. Conversely *he* is used mostly for human males, but is also found with other extended values (e.g. to express familiarity with an object); similarly, in relative pronouns, there is variation between *which* and *who* for animals, depending on the speaker's point of view on the referent. The validity of this position, however, will need to be assessed by further research.

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CHAPTER TWO

NEGATIVE POLARITY ITEMS IN CROATIAN: A CASE OF SYNTACTIC AGREEMENT

IRENA ZOVKO DINKOVIĆ

1. Introduction

Negation and its many aspects have been studied and debated relentlessly in linguistics for decades, and within many theoretical frameworks. However, the study of this unique and universal feature of human language—the possibility to say that something is not—has proved elusive, appearing to leave almost as much unexplained as it succeeds in explaining. With the exception of a few sporadic papers—see Menac (1953), Vince (1977) and Mihaljević (1997)—negation has been widely neglected in the Croatian linguistic tradition, gradually coming into the spotlight only in the past ten years or so, mostly under the influence of vast literature on the matter in English, or due to general interest in its diachronic development in Croatian (Kovačević 2012; Zovko Dinković 2013). Contrasting negation in Croatian to that in English has provided a remarkable insight into the similarities, as well as the striking differences, that exist between the two languages. One such issue (which is still being debated because of its complex nature that intertwines syntax, semantics and pragmatics) is that of negative polarity items (NPIs)— items whose distribution is limited primarily to negative contexts and specific syntactic environments such as interrogative, conditional or comparative clauses, with inherently negative expressions like *doubt* or *forbid*, or in the scope of expressions such as *few*, *rarely* and *seldom*, which are then said to trigger or license negative polarity items. NPIs differ from one language to another in number, type and distribution. Therefore, key issues related to negative polarity items are the attempt to determine the common—mostly distributional—properties of these items in various languages, their connection to lexical meaning, and the reasons why specific items are sensitive to polarity, while others are not. Linguistic theories have dealt with these issues primarily within negative sentences because, as Hoeksema (2000, 117) puts it,

> All languages have negation as a central part of their grammar. It is not known whether all languages have negative polarity items, but so far all the evidence suggests that polarity sensitivity is equally universal […] The literature does not mention a single candidate for the status of a natural language with a completely polarity-insensitive vocabulary. Artificial languages, on the other hand, such as programming languages or first-order logic, typically have negation, but no polarity sensitivity. This suggests that polarity sensitivity is not logically necessary, but a deeply ingrained feature of natural language.

2. Theoretical background

In the early days of generative syntax, Klima (1964) was, in his seminal work on negation, the first to systematically study the distribution of the indefinite pronoun *any* and its affirmative counterpart *some* in various constructions, although it was already known that *any*, as a negative polarity item, had a strong tendency to appear not only in negative, but also in interrogative and conditional clauses. Klima was therefore forced to abandon his initial idea that the appearance of NPIs in a certain syntactic environment depended on the presence of a Neg morpheme in the deep structure of a sentence. Instead, he introduced the notion "+affective" as a "grammatico-semantic feature", and said that a certain environment was affective if it allowed the appearance of NPIs (Klima 1964, 313). Although such an interpretation is evidently circular and cannot explain either the notion of negative polarity or the distribution of NPIs, Klima's study of the relationship between the meaning and distribution of expressions such as *any* and *some* was crucial to a better understanding of the scope of negation[1] in many subsequent (and not necessarily generative) syntactic theories. Actually, his definition of the relation "in construction with"[2] is a predecessor of the condition of "c-command"—one of the key rules of contemporary generative theories and

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[1] The scope of negation starts from the negative word and spreads to the right of the clause, triggering the appearance of NPIs such as *any*.

[2] "A constituent […] is 'in construction with' another constituent […] if the former is dominated by (that is, occurs somewhere lower down the branch of) the first branching node […] that dominates the latter." (Klima 1964, 279)