Foreign Intervention in Civil Wars

Foreign Intervention in Civil Wars

By

Jung-Yeop Woo

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE

FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CIVIL WARS

1.1 Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, civil wars have received greater attention. The sheer number of international conflicts is not comparable to that of internal conflicts. As Gleditsch et al. (2002) note, among 225 general conflicts in the world from 1946 to 2001, 163 conflicts can be identified as internal conflicts. They (Gleditsch et al. 2002) argue that internal conflict has been the dominant form of conflict since World War II. As internal wars have become more serious both in intensity and duration than interstate wars, scholars and practitioners have tried to determine the influences of domestic, regional, and international factors on the initiation, duration, and termination of civil conflicts. Civil wars have become the most important subject for scholars of international relations, since the effects of those civil conflicts have not been confined to those states alone.

International law, norms, and institutions have traditionally banned intervention in the internal affairs of states. The United Nations Charter specifically indicates that domestic issues are not the jurisdiction of the organization's reach. Historically, when foreign states intervened in other states, they sought to provide extraordinary justification on the basis of security or to embed intervention in an organized system of competition, as during the Cold War.

The legitimacy of intervention has always been the subject of heated debate. Let us consider the example of Vietnamese intervention in Cambodia in 1979. In early 1979, Vietnam militarily intervened in Cambodia and overthrew the Pol Pot regime. Vietnam did not try to gain legitimacy by claiming that in intervening they were exercising some right to humanitarian intervention (Akehurst 1984). Instead, Vietnam denied that its forces had entered Cambodia and said that Pol Pot had been overthrown by the Cambodian people.

There was a Security Council debate on this matter. The Soviet Union, which backed Vietnam, argued that Pol Pot had been overthrown by the Cambodian people and, thus, not by Vietnam. Vietnam's allies—including Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, and Poland—supported this argument. Almost all of the other states that took part in the debate said that Vietnam had acted illegally by intervening in Cambodia's internal affairs. Several of these states also mentioned that the Pol Pot regime's massive human rights violations should be condemned. Nevertheless, those states did not attempt to support Vietnam's intervention, instead arguing that those human rights violations did not give Vietnam the right to overthrow that regime. As Akehurst (1984, 97) notes, "Not a single state spoke in favor of the existence of a right of humanitarian intervention."

As seen in the above case, even though sovereignty and non-intervention in domestic affairs of states are the most fundamental principles of the current international system, many cases have been observed in which third-party states became militarily involved in civil wars.

According to Reagan (2000, 21), who defines internal conflicts as "armed combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities," there have been 140 civil wars from WWII to 1994. Out of those 140 civil wars, 90 conflicts have included at least one instance of third-party involvement. Hermann and Kegley (1996, 440) also contend that foreign military intervention is "arguably the most frequent type of military force in use and under debate today." It was not an overstatement when, in 1975, Little (1975) argued that intervention was already a major feature of the contemporary international system. Pickering and Kisangani (2006, 363) contend that "as major wars have declined in frequency over recent decades and the efficacy of costly and time-consuming economic sanctions is questioned, foreign military intervention seems to have become a sine qua non of modern statecraft."

In recent history, we have observed that intervention by third-party states has generated widespread discussion and intense debate in both the domestic political arena and the international one. Foreign military intervention, let alone the legal and ethical debate over humanitarian intervention, has brought the issue into the international and domestic political arena.

Decisions by government leaders to militarily intervene in a foreign country's civil war, such as the US's decision to involve itself in Vietnam, have inspired sharp divisions not only among politicians but also among ordinary citizens. The Vietnam conflict set an example for both the

military and policymakers, demonstrating that they should avoid future foreign military quagmires.

Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 1974 still has a lingering effect on Turkey's diplomatic relationship with other EU member states. The European Commission has proposed that the 25 heads of state freeze discussion on 8 of the 35 agreements that Turkey and all the EU members have to sign unanimously as part of the accession process. Three of these frozen chapters directly involve Turkey's relationship with Cyprus. Cyprus became an EU member, but part of its territory was still occupied by Turkish forces (Konstandaras 2006).

Even though there are many discussions of humanitarian intervention, not all intervention has the goal of ending internal conflicts and resolving human rights disasters. Carment and Rowlands (1998, 572) point out that "civil war represents opportunities for some and challenges for others." It is also agreed that even if external actors do not instigate internal wars (Heraclides 2001), they can play a significant role in the process of civil wars. As discussed by Carment and James (2003, 11), "Far from resolving internal disputes, third-party involvement frequently translates into interference-prolonging and even intensifying such conflicts."

One extreme example that illustrates the role of external forces in the process of civil wars is the case of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire). The conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo occurred first in 1996 and recurred in the context of the second Tutsi opposition in 1998. During the first Tutsi opposition, which opposed the corrupt Mobutu Sese Seko regime, eight regional states supported the rebel Tutsis. South Africa and the United States tried to mediate an early settlement by providing an orderly exit for Mobutu. The war between the rebels and the government ended in eight months. However, another internal conflict emerged before a year had passed. More serious and destructive domestic and regional consequences were brought about by the second war. This second opposition by the Congolese Tutsis involved seven regional states taking opposing sides. It is reported that there have been more than three million casualties due to direct combat or war-related effects. This case illustrates the internal conflicts that are exacerbated by intervening outside forces.

Based on previous studies as well as the above case, it is obvious that third-party intervention can affect the outcome and the duration of civil wars. Thus, we can assume that the intervention of third parties in civil wars has meaningful consequences for the manner in which those wars evolve. However, it is not only the decision to intervene that we find academically and practically interesting. If every civil war featured some

sort of foreign intervention, then it would not be of much interest to us academically. This issue became very interesting, however, because we have found that the propensity toward intervention by third-party states varies. That means that we also have observed many cases in which no third-party intervention was made.

Noninvolvement by foreign states in certain civil wars has also brought about huge debates among scholars, practitioners, and even ordinary citizens. The existence of many failed and troubled states has required some sort of intervention and, particularly, intervention on humanitarian grounds. Those cases would be considered legitimate in the sense that no violation of the principle of sovereignty would be perceived as having occurred. However, we can see from history that there have been cases where no foreign involvement was attempted despite the voice of the international community.

For example, in Rwanda in 1994, all of the superpowers and the neighboring countries tried their best to "avoid" becoming involved in the conflict. Power (2002) questions the lack of action by the Clinton administration, which was considered more committed to humanitarian intervention and to a moral foreign policy than any U.S. administration since World War II. As Romeo Dallaire (the Canadian general who led the 1993 UN peacekeeping mission in Rwanda) notes in his book (Dallaire 2003), the Rwandan genocide could have been easily stopped if foreign powers had intervened in a timely fashion. However, as Power (2002) notes, the United States not only did not intervene to stop the humanitarian disaster, but it actively prevented other willing powers from intervening and taking action. After Hutu soldiers murdered ten Belgian peacekeepers on April 7, 1994, the Belgian government made it clear to the United States that it would pull its troops out unless the UN presence in Rwanda was reinforced. The United States let Belgium pull out its troops. The United States reportedly also influenced the decision making process of the UN Security Council when it decided to cut the strength of the UN Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from 2,500 to 500 just two weeks after the genocide began. We know what happened after that. More than 800,000 people died during the three months that followed.

Along with this observation of intervention and non-intervention in the history, now we see variation in the dependent variable: intervention and non-intervention by a third party in civil wars. As we can clearly see from history, some civil wars saw several foreign countries become involved, whereas there was no foreign intervention in others. For example, in civil wars such as the notorious genocide in Rwanda in 1994 and more currently in Darfur, Sudan, foreign countries including major powers have

been unwilling to intervene despite a cry for intervention on humanitarian grounds on the part of the international community. It seems to us that sometimes the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention is more respected, even though humanitarian interventions in those brutal cases would be considered legitimate according to international law (Hoffmann 1996). These variations in intervention and non-intervention decisions tell us that the decision to intervene is not just based on legal or moral principles. It is more of a political decision, a cost-benefit analysis whose aim is to procure more benefits through certain actions.

This study begins from this question of what factors lead third-party countries to intervene in other states' internal wars. Why do some civil wars lead to interstate crisis while others do not? Among the various strategies of intervention that foreign states can choose, unilateral military interventions are the subject of this book. As Otte (1995) notes, military intervention is one of the higher-profile forms of intervention because "military intervention is, firstly, and most obviously, a deviation from the internationally acknowledged norm of non-intervention, but it is also a deviation from the normal pattern of the relations between the intervener and the target state" (5). Practically, military intervention by third-party states into civil wars is very risky business for the intervening states in that they have to bear a huge cost burden and suffer a great degree of risk. Pearson (1974) also agrees that for foreign states to militarily intervene in foreign states' domestic conflicts entails considerable costs and risks.

In the current world system, not all states can sustain those costs and risks. Thus, many previous studies on military intervention have focused on intervention by major powers. However, military intervention is not exclusive to these major powers. Dunér (1983) shows that minor or small powers also have employed military intervention as a foreign policy strategy. Thus, we also need to consider the behavior of minor powers with respect to their involvement in civil wars.

As Regan (2000) notes, the question of why foreign states decide to unilaterally intervene in civil wars is still unanswered. The purpose of this book is to contribute to the civil war literature by expanding our knowledge of what factors lead third-party states to militarily intervene in foreign civil wars. Given that we have observed frequent military interventions by both major and minor powers, it is very important to understand why foreign states decide to intervene sometimes and not to intervene at other times.

With regard to third-party intervention in civil wars, numerous literatures have been generated that discuss the issues surrounding the question of whether military intervention by a third-party is legitimate and

ethical. These literatures have inquired into the moral and legal
implications of third-party intervention in civil wars and have tried to
determine the criteria that can be used to judge whether the intervention or
non-intervention is legitimate. However, in this book, I will not discuss
these ethical and/or legal issues regarding military intervention except in
considering them as basic theoretical background in my literature review
section. Even though the discussion of moral and legal issue of military
intervention is a completely separate academic inquiry from that of this
book, a brief discussion is necessary because many military interventions
have been made over the course of history in the name of humanitarianism.
Also, military intervention has sometimes been called for but not
sufficiently enacted for humanitarian purposes, as in Rwanda in 1994.

    In sum, the scope of inquiry of this book is the question of what factors
lead to third-party intervention in civil wars by both major and minor
powers. For this purpose, I propose that we consider four dimensions of
civil war intervention. The first dimension to consider is the civil war itself.
The characteristics of civil war are assumed to have some impact on a
third party's decision regarding intervention. Whether a given war is
triggered by ideological issues (identity wars) or ethnic/religious issues
(identity wars) is assumed to have an impact on the decision makers of
foreign countries. Second, the characteristics of intervening states should
be considered. Their domestic politics, including institutional settings,
should be taken into account if we want to see how their decisions
regarding intervention are made. As Cament et al. (2006) note, it is easier
for those leaders with authoritarian power to make a decision regarding
military intervention in foreign civil wars. Third, the relationship between
the host country and the intervening country needs to be analyzed. Their
formal alliances and ethnic ties are assumed to be factors in decision
making around foreign intervention. Moreover, following the realist
perspective, differences in military capability between the target country
and the potential intervener will also have an impact on the decision
making process. Finally, the relationship between the intervening states
should be considered. This consideration is not only limited to the cases
where there is more than one intervener. As we can infer from extended
deterrence theory, the existence of another country backing one side in the
civil war will yield a different decision on the part of a potential intervener.
Previous studies, including Regan's (2000), have neglected this dimension.
In most previous studies about foreign intervention, all interveners have
been treated equally.

    It is logically more reasonable to incorporate the interaction between
the potential and actual interveners into a decision calculation model.

Decision makers have to consider the actions of other potential interveners because this will drastically change their cost-benefit analysis with regard to a possible intervention. Regan (2000) began his theory of intervention by proposing the decision making model of potential interveners. However, as he admits, his statistical analysis, which uses the conflict as the unit of analysis, does not capture the dynamics between potential interveners as occurs in his decision-theoretic framework. He notes, "There are conceptual problems in using the conflict as the unit of analysis because the emphasis of the empirical model shifts from the perspective of the individual decision maker to the aggregate case, asking in essence whether certain structural and contextual conditions increase the probability of an intervention" (2000, 52).

In his next study with Lemke, he corrected this problem to some extent. Lemke and Regan (2004) explicitly relate Singer's (1963) international influence model to intervention into civil wars. They address the problem caused by using the conflict as a unit of analysis by including the potential interveners in the data for civil wars waged between 1944 and 1994. However, they do not incorporate the sequence of interventions by different interveners. Their analysis does not distinguish between the original interveners, who intervene in the civil war first, and the counter-interveners, who intervene to counter the involvement of the first interveners. Those counter-interveners did not choose to intervene at the start; however, the first interveners' entrance into the civil war then influences the calculations of the potential counter-interveners. The researchers also do not distinguish the first interveners from the second interveners, who intervene after the initial intervention has actually taken place. The cost and risks for the second interveners will be much less significant than those experienced by the first interveners. Thus, it is logically unacceptable to treat these different interveners equally in the analysis.

As Carment and James (2003, 11) point out, whereas the instances of ethnic intervention accumulate, "Unfortunately, students of conflict management are only beginning to construct theories about third-party interventionism with a general range of application, most notably with respect to ethnic conflict." Moreover, most current studies on ethnic interventionism have usually focused on the state where the conflict occurs (Carment and James 2003). However, those studies cannot explain why some states intervene and some states do not intervene in other states' internal wars.

This will be my contribution to the understanding of this phenomenon in international relations. By adding the relationship between potential and

actual interveners into the analysis, I hope to expand the literature on this subject. According to the data collected by Sambanis (2004) and Regan (2000), there have been 151 civil wars in the world (Sambanis 2004) and 63 of these have spurred external interventions. Among those 63 interventions, counter-interventions have been observed in 32 civil wars. More than 1 out of every 5 civil wars taking place between 1944 and 2001 has included interventions on both sides. More than half of the cases of intervention are cases that include both intervention and counter-intervention. Thus, without incorporating this important feature of external interventions, we cannot argue that we have fully understood the mechanisms of external intervention in civil wars.

As Dunér (1985, 2) points out, it is worth mentioning two points. First, as already shown above, it is generally agreed upon among scholars that internal wars have been the predominant type of conflict since World War II. The frequency of conventional warfare has declined, whereas there has been an increase in internal wars fought within the boundaries of single states. Secondly, it is within civil or internal conflicts that most interventions occur.

1.2 Outline of the Book

The goal of the remainder of this book is the development of a framework for understanding what leads to third-party intervention in civil wars and an analysis of intervention patterns that can enhance that understanding. Eight chapters follow this introduction.

Chapter 2 discusses the concepts and definitions of civil wars and intervention in this book. As will be discussed, the concept and the definition of civil war have not been agreed upon among scholars. There is no standard concept or definition of civil war. Thus, it is important to clearly indicate which concept and definition of civil war is being used in this book. Also the concept and the definition of intervention in this book should be clarified. Various scholars have considered different forms of involvement under the same heading of intervention. Consequently, without clearly defined terms, any analysis put forth in this book will hardly make sense to the reader.

Chapter 3 provides the general literature review. First, the literature regarding the moral and legal discussion of intervention will be reviewed. Second, literature on intervention in civil wars will be reviewed. I will focus on reviewing quantitative empirical studies of third-party intervention in civil wars.

Chapter 4 discusses the conceptual modeling of third-party intervention in civil wars. In this section, I will compare the simple model of third-party intervention, which is the theoretical conceptualization by Regan (2000), with my extended model of third-party intervention. Sequential characteristics of initial intervention and counter-intervention will be discussed and modeled.

Chapter 5 develops a framework for the analysis put forth in this book. With the conceptual modeling developed in Chapter 4, how we approach the intervention issue will be discussed according to the four-dimension framework.

Chapter 6 describes the historical evidence and the data that are used in this book. Historical evidence shows how my model and framework for analysis fits the study of the internationalization of civil wars.

Chapters 7 and 8 examine the cases of first intervention and second intervention, respectively. The research design and analysis of the first-intervention and second-intervention cases will be discussed in each chapter.

Chapter 9 summarizes the findings of this book and concludes with policy implications.

CHAPTER TWO

CONCEPTS AND DEFINITIONS

In this chapter, I am going to review the important concepts and definitions necessary for the discussion in this book as well as the general study of intervention. As is the case in many other social sciences, there exists a difficulty in intervention studies with regard to the concepts and definitions used in these studies. For example, the definition of intervention varies according to the ideas of the different authors. Thus, it is important to clarify what definition of each term is used in this book.

2.1 Definitions of Civil Wars

We have witnessed the rapid growth of empirical literatures on civil war in part due to the huge increase in the compilation of quantitative data sets. As Gleditsch et al. (2002) note, the Correlates of War project has been dominant for more than three decades as a reliable data source for both external and internal armed conflicts. They argue that one of the virtues of COW data is "its emphasis on strict and transparent operational procedures" (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 617). However, as Sambanis (2004) notes, there is no consensus on how to measure and operationalize civil war. The definition of civil wars varies according to the authors as their specific interests come into play in their studies.

   Here, I will discuss the several definitions and operationalizations of civil war. Starting from Singer and Small (1972), much literature on civil war has used the Correlates of War (COW) project data set. Small and Singer (1982, 210) define a civil war as "any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides." They distinguish civil (internal or intrastate) war from interstate or extrastate (colonial and imperial) war based on the war's being internal to the territory of a sovereign state and the government's role as a combatant. Operationally, they distinguish civil war from other forms of internal armed conflict based on the idea that state violence should be sustained and reciprocated and that the war should exceed a certain numerical threshold in terms of deaths. They adopt the convention of 1,000 fatalities

for an internal armed conflict to be categorized as a civil war. However, this idea has been criticized by several scholars, including Sambanis (2004), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Gleditsch et al. (2002), and Regan (2000), who suggest that the cumulative death criterion presents some problems. For example, the Northern Ireland conflict yielded more than 25 annual battle deaths every year during the period between1971 and 1993, as well as in 1998. That conflict has entailed more than 3,000 casualties in total, but it does not meet the COW threshold of more than 1,000 deaths in a single year.

Fearon and Laitin (2003) try to solve the problem presented by the cumulative death threshold of 1,000 by applying a rule that at least 100 deaths must occur every year on average in an ongoing war and that the aggregate death should exceed 1,000. They present the following criteria (Fearon and Latin 2003, 76):

(1) They involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, nonstate groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies.
(2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100.
(3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition.

They also provide the following secondary criteria for dealing with other coding issues (Fearon and Latin 2003, 76):

(4) The start year is the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a violent event occurred that has followed by a sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria.
(5) If a main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the fighting continues (e.g., Somalia gets a new civil war after Siad Barre is defeated in 1991).
(6) War ends are coded by observation of a victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace.
(7) Involvement by foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are satisfied.
(8) We code multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent central state on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination.
(9) If a state seeks to incorporate and govern territory that is not a recognized state, we consider it a "civil war" only if the fighting

continues after the state begins to govern the territory (thus, Indonesia/East Timor 1975, yes, and India/Hyderabad 1947, no).

With the above criteria, Fearon and Laitin (2003) identify 127 civil wars from 1945 to 1999. However, their solution to the death threshold also comes with problems. Moreover, one of the significant differences between Fearon and Laitin's (2003) work and other data sets is that Fearon and Laitin (2003) include extrasystemic wars. Those extrasystemic wars have completely different characteristics than do traditional internal conflicts.

By using a high threshold of deaths, one can distinguish civil wars from riots, terrorism, and some coups. However, this high threshold of death will exclude certain cases that fulfill all other characteristics of civil war but have fewer than 1,000 casualties.

Gleditsch et al. (2002, 618–19), as a part of the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, define an armed conflict as "a contested incompatibility that concerns government or territory or both where the use of armed force between two parties results in at least 25 battle-related deaths." The main reason for them to employ this coding rule is to avoid the problem caused by the high threshold cumulative death criterion.

Armed conflict can be divided into three subsets according to their intensity (Gleditsch et al. 2002, 619):

- *Minor Armed Conflict*: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict.
- *Intermediate Armed Conflict*: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year.
- *War*: at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year.

They also distinguish conflicts by type (619):

- *Interstate armed conflict* occurs between two or more states.
- *Extrastate armed conflict* occurs between a state and a non-state group outside its own territory. (In the COW project, extrastate war is subdivided between colonial war and imperial war, but this division is not used here.)
- *Internationalized internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups with intervention from other states.
- *Internal armed conflict* occurs between the government of a state and internal opposition groups without intervention from other states.

The last two categories are used to define the term "internal armed conflict." However, it is very difficult to compare their data set with other data sets that use the cumulative death criterion. If their coding rule is applied, some conflicts will be coded as distinct events that would be coded as one event if the cumulative death criterion were applied. This might be the reason why the correlation coefficient between their data set and other data sets is lower than in the case of any other pairs.

To solve the high threshold problem, Regan (2000) relaxes this high threshold of death and defines intrastate conflict as "armed combat between groups within state boundaries in which there are at least 200 fatalities" (21). With the 1,000 death criteria, it is inevitable that more cases of civil war in large countries will be included in the data set, since 1,000 deaths is an absolute threshold. Other than this lower death threshold, Regan's coding rule is almost identical to COW's operational criteria. Based on this lower death threshold, Regan (2000) identifies 140 intrastate conflicts during the period between 1944 and 1994.

Sambanis (2004) argues that there exist significant differences across civil war lists and that those differences are mainly caused by three questions: "What threshold of violence distinguishes civil war from other forms of internal armed conflict? How do we know when a civil war starts and ends? How can we distinguish between intrastate, interstate, and extrastate wars?" (815). Sambanis (2004) presents criteria for classifying an armed conflict as a civil war (829–31):

(a) The war takes place within the territory of a state that is a member of the international system with a population of 500,000 or greater.
(b) The parties are politically and militarily organized, and they have publicly stated political objectives.
(c) The government (through its military or militias) must be a principal combatant. If there is no functioning government, then the party representing the government internationally and/or claiming the state domestically must be involved as a combatant.
(d) The main insurgent organization(s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally. Additional external involvement and recruitment need not imply that the war is not intrastate. Insurgent groups may operate from neighboring countries, but they must also have some territorial control (bases) in the civil war country and/or the rebels must reside in the civil war country.
(e) The start year of the war is the first year that the conflict causes at least 500 to 1,000 deaths. If the conflict has not caused 500 deaths or more in the first year, the war is coded as having started in that year only if cumulative deaths in the next 3 years reach 1,000.

(f) Throughout its duration, the conflict must be characterized by sustained violence, at least at the minor or intermediate level. There should be no 3-year period during which the conflict causes fewer than 500 deaths.

(g) Throughout the war, the weaker party must be able to mount effective resistance. Effective resistance is measured by at least 100 deaths inflicted on the stronger party. A substantial number of these deaths must occur in the first year of the war. But if the violence becomes effectively one-sided, even if the aggregate effective-resistance threshold of 100 deaths has already been met, the civil war must be coded as having ended, and a politicide or other form of one-sided violence must be coded as having started.

(h) A peace treaty that produces at least 6 months of peace marks an end to the war.

(i) A decisive military victory by the rebels that produces a new regime should mark the end of the war. Because civil war is understood as an armed conflict against the government, continuing armed conflict against a new government implies a new civil war. If the government wins the war, a period of peace longer than 6 months must persist before we code a new war (see also criterion k).

(j) A cease-fire, truce, or simply an end to fighting can also mark the end of a civil war if they result in at least 2 years of peace. The period of peace must be longer than what is required in the case of a peace agreement because we do not have clear signals of the parties' intent to negotiate an agreement in the case of a truce/cease-fire.

(k) If new parties enter the war over new issues, a new war onset should be coded, subject to the same operational criteria. If the same parties return to war over the same issues, we generally code the continuation of the old war, unless any of the above criteria for coding a war's end apply for the period before the resurgence of fighting.

With these coding rules, Sambanis identifies 145 civil war onsets between 1945 and 1999. As seen in Table 2-1, these various coding rules yield various lists of civil wars. Sambanis (2004) notes that "disagreements over the coded year of onset and termination of civil war may matter for the inferences drawn when we analyze civil war onset, duration, or recurrence using different data sets" (831). These discrepancies between different data sets may also cause inferential problems in the study of third-party intervention in civil wars.

Table 2-1. Comparison of Civil War Lists

COW (v 3.0)		Sambanis (2004)		Fearon and Laitin (2003)		Regan (2000)	
	1944–1997		1945–1999		1945–1999		1944–1994
Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year	Country	Year
Afghanistan	1978–92	Afghanistan	1978–82 1992–96 1996–91	Afghanistan	1978–92 1992–	Afghanistan	1978–92 1992–
Algeria	1962–63 1992–	Algeria	1962–63 1992–	Algeria	1962–63 1992–	Algeria	1962–63 1993–
Angola	1975–91 1992–94	Angola	1975–91 1992–94 1997– 2002 1994–99	Angola	1975– 1992–	Angola	1975–91 1992–94
Argentina	1955–55	Argentina	1955–55 1975–77	Argentina	1955–55 1973–77		
Azerbaijan	1991–94	Azerbaijan Bangladesh	1991–94 1974–97	Azerbaijan Bangladesh Belgium	1992–94 1976–97 1956–61	Azerbaijan Bangladesh	1991– 1971–
Bolivia	1952–52	Bolivia	1952–52	Bolivia	1952–52	Bolivia	1946–46
Bosnia	1992–95	Bosnia	1992–95	Bosnia	1992–95	Bosnia	1992–
Burma	1948–51 1968–80 1983–95	Myanmar/ Burma	1948–51 1948–88 1960–95	Burma	1948–	Burma	1948– 1968–80 1983–92

Country		Country		Country		Country	
Burundi	1972–72 1988–88 1991–91 1993–	Burundi	1965–69 1972–72 1988–88 1991–	Burundi	1972–72 1988–88 1993–	Burundi	1972–72 1988–88
Cambodia	1970–75 1978–91 1993–97	Cambodia	1970–75 1975–91	Cambodia	1970–75 1978–92	Cambodia	1970–75 1979–91
Central African Rep		Central African Rep	1996–97	Central African Rep	1996–97		
Chad	1966–71 1980–88	Chad	1965–79 1980–94 1994–97	Chad	1965– 1994–98	Chad	1965–72 1978–82 1983–96 1989–
Chile	1973–73						
China	1946–50 1947–47 1956–59 1967–68	China	1946–49 1947–47 1950–51 1956–59 1967–68	China	1946–50 1950–51 1956–59 1991–	China	1946–50 1947–47 1959– 1980–
Colombia	1948–49 1949–62 1984–	Colombia	1948–66 1978–	Colombia	1948–62 1963–	Colombia	1948–48 1949–62 1984–
Congo-Brazzaville Congo-Brazzaville	1997–97	Congo	1993–97 1998–99	Congo	1998–99		
Costa Rica	1948–48	Costa Rica	1948–48	Costa Rica	1948–48	Costa Rica	1948–48
Croatia	1992–95	Croatia	1992–95	Croatia	1992–95		

Cuba	1958–59	Cuba	1958–59	Cuba	1958–59	Cuba	1958–59
		Cyprus	1963–67	Cyprus	1974–74	Cyprus	1963–64
			1974–74				1974–74
							1974–74
							1991–93
Dominican Republic	1965–65	Djibouti	1991–94	Djibouti	1993–94	Djibouti	
		Dominican Republic	1965–65	Dominican Republic	1965–65	Dominican Republic	1965–65
						Ecuador	
		Egypt				Egypt	1985–89
							1992–
El Salvador	1979–92	El Salvador	1979–92	El Salvador	1979–92	El Salvador	1979–92
Ethiopia	1974–91	Ethiopia	1974–91	Ethiopia	1974–92	Ethiopia	1960–64
	1976–77		1978–91		1997–		1962–91
	1978–83		1976–88				1977–85
	1978–91						1987–91
							1992–
				France	1945–54		
		France			1947–48		
					1952–54		
					1953–56		
					1954–61		
					1955–60		
						Gambia	1981–81
Georgia	1991–94	Georgia	1991–92	Georgia	1992–94	Georgia	1991–93
			1992–94				
Greece	1944–45	Greece	1944–49	Greece	1945–49	Greece	1944–49
	1946–49						
						Grenada	1983–83

Country	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Guatemala	1954–54, 1966–72, 1970–71, 1978–84	1966–72, 1978–94	1968–96	1954–54, 1966–72, 1972–, 1978–84
Guinea-Bissau		1998–99	1998–99	
Haiti		1991–95	1991–95	
Hungary				1956–56
India	1985–	1989–, 1984–93, 1989–, 1990–, 1946–48	1952–, 1982–93, 1989–	1954–64, 1985–
Indonesia	1950–50, 1953–53, 1956–60	1950–, 1953–53, 1956–60, 1976–78, 1975–99, 1990–91, 1999–, 2002	1950–50, 1953–53, 1958–60, 1965–, 1975–99	1950–50, 1953–53, 1956–60, 1963–, 1965–65, 1975–, 1975–
Iran	1978–79, 1981–82	1978–79, 1979–84	1978–79, 1979–93	1978–79, 1981–82
Iraq	1959–59, 1961–63, 1974–75, 1985–93	1959–59, 1961–70, 1974–75, 1985–96	1959–59, 1961–74	1956–59, 1961–66, 1974–74, 1985–93

Chapter Two

Jordan	1996–96	Israel	1991–93 / 1987–97 / 2000–	Jordan	1970–70	Israel	1991– / 1964–94
Laos	1970–70	Jordan / Kenya	1970–71 / 1963–67 / 1991–93	South Korea / Laos	1949–50 / 1960–73	Jordan / Kenya	1970–70 / 1992–
Lebanon	1960–62 / 1963–73	Korea / Laos	1948–49 / 1960–73	Lebanon	1958–58 / 1975–90	Laos	1960–62 / 1963–73
Liberia	1958–58 / 1975–90	Lebanon	1958–58 / 1975–91	Liberia	1989–96	Lebanon	1958–58 / 1975–88 / 1988–90
	1989–90 / 1992–95 / 1996–96	Liberia	1989–90 / 1992–97 / 1999–	Mali	1989–94	Liberia	1989–90 / 1992–93
Mozambique	1979–92	Mali	1990–95	Moldova	1992–92	Malaysia / Mali / Mauretania / Mexico / Moldova	1948–62 / 1990– / 1975– / 1994– / 1992–
		Moldova / Morocco/ Western Sahara	1991–92 / 1975–91	Morocco	1975–88	Morocco	1975–
		Mozambique / Namibia / Nepal	1976–92 / 1973–89 / 1996–	Mozambique	1976–95	Mozambique	1979–93
				Nepal / Netherlands	1997– / 1945–46		

Concepts and Definitions

Country				
Nicaragua	1978–79, 1982–90	1978–79, 1981–90	1978–79, 1981–88	1978–79, 1982–90, 1990–
Niger				
Nigeria	1967–70, 1980–81, 1984–84	1967–70, 1980–85	1967–70	1967–70, 1967–70, 1980–81, 1984–84, 1986–
Oman				1970–75
Pakistan	1971–71, 1973–77, 1994–95	1971–75, 1971–, 1973–77, 1994–99	1971–71, 1973–77, 1993–99	1971–71, 1973–77
Papua New Guinea		1988–98	1988–98	1988–91
Paraguay	1947–47	1947–47	1947–47	1947–47
Peru	1982–95	1980–96	1981–95	1982–
Philippines	1950–52, 1972–80, 1972–92	1950–52, 1972–92, 1971–	1946–52, 1968–, 1972–94, 1961–75, 1962–74, 1964–74	1950–52, 1972–, 1972–
Portugal				
Romania	1989–89			1989–89
Russia	1994–96	1994–96, 1999–	1946–48, 1946–50, 1946–47, 1946–48, 1994–96	1994–
USSR		1944–48, 1944–47, 1944–50		

Country	Years	Country	Years	Country	Years	Country	Years
Rwanda	1963–64 1990–93 1994–94	Rwanda	1944–48 1963–64 1990–93 1994–94	Russia Rwanda	1999– 1962–65 1990–	Rwanda	1963–64 1990–94 1991–92 1993–94
Sierra Leone	1991–96	Senegal Sierra Leone	1989–99 1991–96 1997– 2001	Senegal Sierra Leone	1989– 1991–		
Somalia	1982–97	Somalia South Africa	1988–91 1991– 1976–94	Somalia South Africa	1981–91 1991– 1983–94	Somalia South Africa Spain	1982–91 1991– 1970–94 1990– 1968–
Sri Lanka	1971–71 1983–	Sri Lanka	1971–71 1983– 2002	Sri Lanka	1971–71 1983–	Sri Lanka	1971–71 1982–
Sudan	1987–89 1963–72 1983–	Sudan	1987–89 1963–72 1983– 2002	Sudan	1987–89 1963–72 1983–	Sudan	1987–89 1963–72 1983–
Tajikistan Thailand Turkey	1992–97 1970–73 1991–	Syria Tajikistan Thailand Turkey	1979–82 1992–97 1966–82 1984–99	Tajikistan Turkey	1992–97 1977–80 1984–99	Tajikistan Thailand Turkey	1992–94 1965–85 1984–

Uganda	1966–66 1980–88 1996–	Uganda	1966–66 1978–79 1981–87 1990–92 1995–	Uganda	1981–87 1993–	Uganda	1966–66 1971–72 1980–86 1986–88
		United Kingdom	1971–98	UK	1950–56 1952–56 1969–99	UK	1969–
Vietnam	1960–65	Vietnam	1960–75	Vietnam	1960–75	Vietnam	1960–65
Yemen	1994–94	Yemen	1994–94	Yemen	1994–94	Yemen	1994–94 1986–86
Yemen AR	1948–48 1962–69	Yemen AR	1948–48 1962–70	Yemen AR	1948–48 1962–69	Yemen AR	1948–48 1962–67
Yemen PR	1986–86	Yemen PR	1986–86	Yemen PR	1986–87		
Yugoslavia	1991–92	Yugoslavia	1991–91 1998–99	Yugoslavia	1991–91	Yugoslavia	1991–92
Zaire	1960–65 1993–93 1996–97	Congo–Zaire	1960–65 1967–67 1977–78 1996–97 1998– 2001	Dem. Rep. of Congo	1960–65 1977–78 1996–97 1998–	Zaire	1960–65 1967–67 1977–77 1978–79 1992–
Zimbabwe	1972–79	Zimbabwe	1972–79 1983–87	Zimbabwe	1972–79 1983–87	Zimbabwe	1972–79 1980–88

These significant disagreements among different civil war lists make it imperative to discover how the results differ if we use different lists of civil wars. As we have already seen, Regan (2000) identifies 140 intrastate conflicts, of which 90 included at least one instance of third-party intervention. That means that about 64 percent of intrastate conflict included external involvement. However, according to Gleditsch et al. (2002), there have been 163 internal conflicts, of which 32 have included external participation by other states and 131 have not. This figure represents only 19.6 percent of total internal conflicts from 1946 to 2001, which is very different from the previous figure. As seen in Table 2-2, the correlation coefficients of these widely used civil war data sets range from as low as 0.51 between Gleditsch et al. (2001) and Sambanis (2004) to as high as 0.80 between Fearon and Laitin (2003) and Sambanis (2004).

Table 2-2. Correlations among Civil War Lists, 1960–1993

	COW 2000	Gleditsch et al. (2001)	Fearon and Laitin (2003)	Regan (1996)	Sambanis (2004)
COW 2000	1.00				
Gleditsch et al. (2001)	0.46	1.00			
Fearon and Laitin (2003)	0.70	0.54	1.00		
Regan (1996)	0.70	0.46	0.67	1.00	
Sambanis (2004)	0.74	0.51	0.80	0.72	1.00
Source: Sambanis (2004, 832)					

In this book, I am going to use Sambanis's list of civil wars for my analysis for several reasons. First, it is more reasonable to exclude extrastate conflicts from civil war lists because the characteristics of extrastate conflicts are significantly different from those of traditionally defined civil wars. Based on this reasoning, Fearon and Laitin (2003) will be not used. Second, Sambanis (2004) is more suitable for the analysis in that Gleditch et al. (2001) subdivide conflicts into multiple small conflicts just because of their annual number of casualties. If the data by Gleditch et al. (2001) are used, it is almost impossible to determine when a particular civil war ended.