Paradigm War

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Lessons Learned from 19th Century Piano Pedagogy

By

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To my beloved husband Nathaniel Laor
With admiration and gratitude

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

> [One should use caution when attributing] the word *mine* to any idea, in an age of printed paper, when a desk stands so close to the bookcase.
>
> —Jean Paul Richter (1804/1973)

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INTRODUCTION

MECHANISM VERSUS HOLISM IN 19TH CENTURY PIANO PEDAGOGY (1800-1850)

The literature of pedagogical music for the piano was the center of unparalleled critical dialogue and scholarly discourse in 19th century Europe. Focusing on theories of piano pedagogy and the merits of pedagogical music, this discourse was unique not only because of its subject matter but also because it was shared, shaped, and constructed by a wide diversity of contributors, including the greatest composers, performers, pedagogues, and music critics of the period, and it even addressed children. This book's objective is to reconstruct this unique critical discourse and to offer a novel conceptual framework for understanding the period's piano pedagogy—comprising musical works as well as theoretical and practical thought as they evolved in the first half of the 19th century. Looking back at pedagogical traditions developed in the first half of the 1800s, I contend that piano pedagogy was governed by a conceptual framework consisting of two paradigms—mechanistic and holistic—which emerged, respectively, from the Enlightenment and Romantic philosophies.

I suggest that application of my proposed mechanistic-holistic conceptual framework to the then newly developed field of piano pedagogy and music education holds great relevance today because modern pedagogies are founded to a great extent on 19th century paradigms. This conceptual framework may be used to invite a fresh and critical look at current theories and practices, thereby enabling a synoptic, integrative perspective of piano pedagogy from its inception.

The thriving tradition of open and critical dialogue about pedagogical music that was established in the 19th century has not been thoroughly studied (Applegate, 2005). Nor has this discourse enriched contemporary music research and educational practices. This paucity of research can be traced to two trends characterizing the field (Laor, 2016). First, unlike the rich 19th century multidisciplinary arena for dialogue, the socio-musical processes that took place in the 20th century led to the formation of

professional and institutional boundaries between pedagogues, performing artists, composers, and music researchers. Second, the predominance of restrictive rather than inclusive approaches to music research over the 20th century led, by and large, to the consideration of pedagogy as external to music and thus as outside the scope of music research interests (e.g., Laor, 2015).

The sharp distinction between subject matter and pedagogy in general education research over the 20th century was well noted by Lee Shulman (1986) in his seminal work on pedagogical content knowledge. In music research, the dichotomy between pedagogy and music has remained tacit and yet has continued to evoke intense emotional reactions. In the spirit of Bernard Shaw's (1903/2000) famous dictum, "He who can, does. He who cannot, teaches," some modern musicians and musicologists have demonstrated overt contempt toward pedagogical pieces—viewed as non-art—and toward pedagogy—considered incompatible with artistic genius. This attitude and its consequent practices have restricted modern musicologists and ethnomusicologists (Nettl, 2002) from applying their methods to the examination of pedagogical music, inasmuch as such music was considered to be sullied by educational objectives.

In the field of piano pedagogy, a recent review that I conducted of the literature used in U.S. higher education courses revealed either guides to teaching materials (e.g., Hinson, 2001; Magrath, 1995) or books focusing on practical issues and age-related dilemmas (e.g., Baker-Jordan, 2004; Bastien, 1988; Lyke, Enoch, & Haydon, 1996; Parker, 2007), rather than texts aiming to integrate historical knowledge with current practices. When these courses did seek a historical perspective, they mostly focused on the history of piano playing and the evolution of pianistic technique (Gerig, 1974; Ripin et al., 2013), rather than on a piano pedagogy that integrates developmental musical as well as psychological-educational and aesthetic perspectives. Above all, these higher education courses did not focus on the pedagogical music that reflects an intrinsic image of childhood and of the children for whom that music is intended.

This book opens by introducing the backdrop of 19th century piano pedagogical works and methods, and by presenting and explicating the proposed paradigmatic framework—of mechanism versus holism—for mapping the various approaches to piano pedagogy and for understanding the particular impasse that piano pedagogy reached in the first half of the 1800s in addressing the artistic dimension of music for the common person.

Mechanism is the doctrine stating that any whole can be fully reduced to and then reconstructed from its fundamental parts. This doctrine

therefore contends that there is nothing in the whole other than the sum of its parts. The scientific revolution at the outset of the Enlightenment period (in 18th century Europe) espoused mechanism—as opposed to the holism that characterized Aristotelian science. Holism is the doctrine that the whole fully permeates its parts and possesses qualities that surpass the simple reassembly of its fundamental parts. The holistic doctrine contends that there is indeed more that exists in the whole, beyond its mere parts. In the 18th century, when that added holistic element could not be explained by the new science, it was deemed illusory and had to be ignored (Agassi, 1979; Stern, 1990). Instead, the scientific Enlightenment outlook viewed only mechanism as an acceptable, rational methodology, although as described in this book, when this outlook was applied to the arts and to art education, some ambivalence emerged concerning this methodology's applicability.[1]

Romantic philosophy went back to foster holism as applied to art education at the end of the 18th century and peaking in the first half of the 19th century; yet, at times, this return to holism in art education exacted a high price. Namely, by accounting for works of art by referring to that very whole that goes beyond rationally formulated mechanistic rules, consequently, such artworks could only be attributed to geniuses, whose abilities could not be rationally explained or methodically taught. The sad result of the paradigm war was the inability of either mechanists or holists to offer a framework that could integrate and transcend both polarized methodologies. Neither paradigm could offer a methodology that would allow for full understanding of art and would permit imparting of art in a way that could enable a universal art pedagogy to be developed.

This volume depicts the struggle between these two methodological paradigms—mechanism and holism—as they were applied discretely and contradictorily to the fields of education and the arts. A comprehensive

[1] In this book I use the concepts "mechanism" and "holism" without attempting to demarcate their metaphysical from their methodological meanings (Healey, 2016). In the 20th century, it is customary to distinguish statements concerning the "reality" of things (e.g., metaphysical holism) from statements concerning the "study" of their reality (e.g., methodological holism). That is to say, methodological holism claims that understanding of a certain complex system is best sought at the level of principles governing the whole system's behavior, and not at the level of the structure and behavior of its component parts. In contrast, metaphysical (e.g., ontological) holism claims that some objects are not wholly composed of basic physical parts. This demarcation did not guide the works under study in this book.

methodology was highly needed that could offer solutions to these dilemmas for the researcher-scholar-educator, particularly in the arts. In this book, I present the work of Robert Schumann as breaking through the paradigmatic methodological polarity, indeed by transcending the paradigms and offering an implicit original integration that followed Jean Paul Richter's views on aesthetics and education.

To depict the intellectual context within which piano pedagogy of the 19th century was couched, the first major part of the book (Part I) describes ideas stemming from two relevant fields: education and aesthetics. With regard to education (Chapter One), I begin by reviewing the Enlightenment philosophy of education by presenting the ideas of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), as endorsed by leading educators of the time like Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771). The latter educators were both constricted by the mechanistic scientism that characterized Enlightenment philosophers such as René Descartes (1596-1650) and John Locke (1632-1704) (Riskin, 2015) when they attempted to apply Rousseau's ideas to the education realm concerning children's need for trust and freedom and the necessity to support children's efforts to develop.

Next, with regard to education, I present traditional Romantic educational philosophy. To represent this philosophy, I chose Georg W. F. Hegel's (1770-1831) philosophical ideas on education, which maintained and even developed some of the psychological insights of Rousseau but remained constrained by an authoritarian holistic philosophy.

I shall conclude the chapter by presenting the ideas of Jean Paul Richter (1763-1825) as breaking through the impasse created by the two aforementioned methodological paradigms in conflict. He viewed genius as a holistic developmental function that appears to different degrees in every child. Moreover, Jean Paul offered ideas as to its cultivation.

Turning to aesthetics (Chapter Two), I first present the orthodox mechanist view of the time, which was espoused, for example, by Jean Philippe Rameau (1683-1764) and Denis Diderot (1713-1784), and which considered art as mimetic. This view suggested that the rules for correct imitation could be given exhaustively and therefore that the teaching of art poses only technical problems to teacher and student alike. Art is thus available to all human beings. However, both Rameau and Diderot expressed their reservations; they well recognized the limitation of their methodology: It could exhaust neither the whole nature of the object of art nor the full impartment of its knowledge. Romantics such as Hegel attempted to amend the mechanist theory of art, claiming that "Nature" as

a model for imitation by artists could be replaced by "the genius," who should become the model for imitation by the common, ordinary lay artist. That is, only a genius can be artistically creative. Inasmuch as the workings of the genius cannot be learned or deduced but rather must be intuited by fellow geniuses, Romantics asserted that art is not available to all.

I conclude Part I of the book by pinpointing Jean Paul Richter (1763-1825), a German novelist, literary critic, and educator, as providing an alternative to both the Enlightenment mechanistic and Romantic holistic theories of education and aesthetics. If Romantic holists, like Hegel, viewed genius as a rare godsend, Jean Paul viewed it as a psychic function inherent to all humans: the creative imagination, which is multifaceted, diversified, and gradualist in nature.

The second major part of the book (Part II) applies these philosophies of education and aesthetics to the field of piano pedagogy by proposing a novel conceptual framework for understanding the opposing pedagogical traditions that developed in the early to mid-1800s, consisting of the mechanistic and holistic paradigms that emerged, respectively, from the Enlightenment and Romantic philosophies. Chapter Three maps the problem of piano pedagogy as a research field. In analyzing the 19th century primary sources that served as the database for the current book as well as secondary sources from later periods, I have identified two approaches with contrasting views about whether pedagogy is inherent to the study of music (inclusive approach) or is not (restrictive approach). I claim that musicologists of both approaches, as well as music education researchers, have not acknowledged the depth and intensity of 19th century piano pedagogy discourse and its relevance for current music education. Nor have they considered the evolving pedagogical repertoire for children at the time.

Chapters Four and Five comprehensively present the mechanistic and holistic paradigms as they apply to piano pedagogy. The mechanistic paradigm, deriving from the Enlightenment philosophy of science (e.g., René Descartes and John Locke), viewed nature as merely comprising tightly interacting parts determined by scientific laws, which could be fully mastered by devoted students. According to those 19th century discourse participants whom I claim seemed to apply mechanism to piano pedagogy, any devoted student of art (in our case music), whether professional or amateur, could learn to systematically reproduce, even if not create, artistic reality. Music as a whole would spring forth if students carefully analyzed and classified the various tightly linked components involved in piano playing and then meticulously practiced each one

separately.

In contrast, the writings and repertoire of the time period also revealed a holistic paradigm, deriving from Romantic philosophy, which emphasized that the whole of an object, or more specifically the whole of an artwork, cannot be methodically reduced to the sum of its discrete parts. The whole is always greater than the sum of its parts. That very essence that resists mechanistic analysis was considered by Romantics, like Hegel, to separate a mere assembly of sounds from a musical work of art, thereby relegating music creation to geniuses alone.

Thus, in Chapter Four, I begin by presenting the mechanistic tradition of piano pedagogy and the failed attempts of some traditional holistic pedagogues to improve on it. I review the mechanistic tradition of piano pedagogy by first centering on mechanistic theory and educational work; then by addressing some technological aspects of the mechanistic paradigm; and finally by turning to the critique of mechanistic piano pedagogy. I conclude my analysis of the mechanistic tradition by examining the ambiguous case of Carl Czerny (1791-1857), and I present his "holism" as a thinly layered facade for a sophisticated yet nonetheless thoroughgoing mechanism.

Then, in Chapter Five, I present a modified version of holism and its tradition in the field of piano pedagogy, which viewed art and education as intertwined and thereby transcended both the mechanistic and holistic approaches to piano pedagogy and music education. In this chapter, I analyze the evolvement of this alternative tradition, which I label the "modified holistic" tradition.[2] This tradition is presented by the works of Muzio Clementi (1752-1832), as well as by Ludwig van Beethoven's (1770-1827) pedagogical ideas, particularly his comments on Johann

[2] "Modified holism" was introduced into the 20th century philosophical literature to refer, for example, to the nature of complex wholes consisting of part-wholes, where the complex whole betrays emergent new properties that are not characteristic of its part-wholes (Wartofsky, 1975). Systemism, the idea that wholes consist of mechanistically ruled parts submitting to holistic ends (i.e. subsystems), may also fall under this definition. Systemism may be proposed as metaphysical (Bunge, 1975) or methodological (Laor & Agassi, 1990). These sophisticated modern definitions that may come under the umbrella of modified holism do not apply to the 18th and 19th century philosophies. Here, in my proposed version of "modified holism," I refer to the theories of exceptional thinkers of the time, who went beyond the dichotomy of mechanism and holism, and as such, these theories may be viewed as forerunners of the aforementioned modern integrative alternative philosophies.

Baptist Cramer's (1771-1858) etudes. It culminates in Jean Paul Richter's views on aesthetics and education (as described in Chapter Two) and in the progressive, modified holistic piano pedagogy of Robert Schumann (1810-1856), primarily in his *Album for the Young (Op. 68)* and in his aphorisms (*House-Rules and Maxims for Young Musicians*).

I conclude the book (Part III) with remarks on Jean Paul Richter's ideas and Robert Schumann's work, which I propose serve as the foundation for liberal and artistic piano pedagogy to this day (Chapter Six).

This book targets musicians, historians, and teachers alike. Its primary audiences are undergraduate and graduate students of piano, piano pedagogy, music education, and philosophy of music education. In addition, this book could be highly beneficial to musicologists with an interest in 19th century music and the repertoire of piano literature, and to ethnomusicologists who study how western music is learned and the materials that are used to teach it. Widening the lens, this book could accompany educated readers who wish to better understand their own and their children's journey toward music during piano lessons.

PART I

INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT

CHAPTER ONE

EDUCATION

> That the age writes so much on education shows at once its absence and the feeling of its importance.
>
> —Jean Paul Richter (*Levana*, 1806/1848)

A. Introduction

Historians of philosophy traditionally view the period between the mid-18th and the mid-19th centuries as a time of transition in Europe, witnessing a paradigmatic shift from Enlightenment to Romantic ideas concerning what humans are. The religious worldview was giving way to other more secular ones. Briefly, according to Enlightenment philosophy, all individuals are, and therefore ought to be considered as, scientists: All human beings are capable of exploring the natural world (Priest, 2005). In contrast, according to Romanticism, only a genius is granted privileged access to the secrets of "Nature" (Brogan & Falco, 2012). In this chapter, as a backdrop to the current book's research on piano pedagogy in 1800-1850, I review how these new philosophical worldviews gave rise to different educational philosophies, theories, and methods.

In the Enlightenment era, the most influential philosophers of education were the Swiss philosopher Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778) and German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Their writings may be seen as incorporating two implicit, mutually exclusive views of the human child that held implications for pedagogy. The first view, espoused by Rousseau, regarded children as, by nature, constantly searching and developing toward Enlightenment—a view that invited a scientific method of education that is respectful of each child as a person. The second view, espoused by Kant, regarded children as, by nature, submitting to their animal given endowment—a view inviting an educational approach that enforced harsh and punitive discipline. Indeed, both of these views were endorsed within leading educational works of the Enlightenment period, such as those of Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi (1746-1827) and Claude Adrien Helvétius (1715-1771).

Romantic educational philosophy, as expressed for example by the

German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831), explicitly underscored the second of the two aforementioned views of children, pinpointing that the pre-socialized child's animal nature was diametrically opposed to the fully socialized adult's human nature. For the child to be socialized, claimed the Romantic holist Hegel, the child's own individuality—which was viewed as merely animal—must be destroyed through repetitious, socially determined drilling and disciplinary efforts; socially accepted norms must come to replace it. This idea was part and parcel of Hegel's anti-individualist, collectivist views, which claimed that the ordinary individual cannot exist unless socially endowed by the ends and norms of the social collective (see Caird, 2002).

Only a true artist (qua genius, according to Romantic philosophers) was not expected to submit to such strict rules. However, one must prove oneself to be a genius, and children could not yet do so. Hence, Hegel's commonly upheld Romantic educational philosophy mandated that every child must undergo a meticulous drilling process (i.e., socialization), and only upon becoming an Enlightened adult could that individual be free to prove himself or herself. If successful, that is to say if the adult's artistic contribution was socially endorsed, then that adult might be acknowledged as a leading genius (Agassi, 1975).

A less known yet nonetheless influential Romantic view of education, which was mutually exclusive from Hegel's, was expressed by the renowned Romantic writer Jean Paul Richter in his essay *Levana* (1806/1848). Jean Paul followed Rousseau in prescribing that the child should be attended to with respect and with trust—all in the service of the child's developing genius. As can be seen in Chapter Five, Robert Schumann's progressive philosophy of music education drew on and further developed Jean Paul's views.

B. The Major Questions Facing Educators

Human beings are educable. This is an uncontestable empirical fact. Faced with this fact, the major questions facing any critical educator are: What is the goal of education? and What are the appropriate means for achieving it? The question about education's end-goal has been traditionally associated with another more general question: What is the nature of human beings? The answers given to the former questions presuppose, even if only implicitly, an answer to the latter. Different periods have offered different answers.

For example, the renowned rationalist Jullien Offray de La Mettrie (1709-1751) offered a view of the human as a machine, which reflected

both a belief and a hope that human beings are part of Nature and, as such, are accessible to the scientist, who can thus understand what makes them tick (La Mettrie, 1748/1927/1976). In the early modern age, the rise and success of mechanistic science—which regarded nature as merely comprising an assembly of tightly interacting parts (see definition in the previous chapter)—supported the assumption that this belief about human beings was rational. Against this background, the goal of education seemed simpler than ever: to construct the perfect human machine. To this end, one needed only to know the human machine (knowledge provided by the science of psychology), its goals (knowledge provided by science and by philosophy), and methods for its perfect development (knowledge provided by education).

Thus, in the period between the mid-18th and mid-19th centuries, education was on the one hand couched within a philosophical context while on the other hand making use of the sciences (like psychology or sociology). Some of the educators of the time were probably acutely aware of the problems arising from these sometimes conflicting pillars buttressing their thinking. Indeed, a curious asymmetry emerged, where most educators explicitly acknowledged their connections to science and openly referred to scientific discoveries—whether biological, psychological, social, neurological, perceptual, or other—but hardly ever referred to their philosophical sources and, if so, often fused them unsystematically. Even worse, as seen below, educators' overvaluation of science as an almost sacred body of revealed truths—their scientism—very often resulted in scholarly sermons rather than in open pedagogical discourse, much resembling their religious predecessors. Hence, scientism served to reinforce the suppression of philosophical analysis, often leading to uncritical endorsement of answers to those three aforementioned philosophical questions that lie at the center of any genuine educational effort (i.e., goals, means, and human nature). Indeed, educators of the time were presented with a wealth of educational literature, but they lacked the critical perspective for objectively considering these newly developing ideas.

In this chapter, I present the views of some eminent philosophers and educators of the Enlightened and Romantic periods, whose thinking still influences scholars and educators to this day. Specifically, as a backdrop to this book's investigation of piano pedagogy, I examine their thinking with regard to the core philosophical questions about human nature—both in childhood and adulthood—and about how that nature should inform educational processes. For even when these questions were not explicitly raised, the answers to them appeared to regulate educational efforts. Yet,

when uncritically adopted or implicitly assumed, such answers at times seemed to conflict with and thereby undermine the educational program's explicitly declared goals (Argyris & Schön, 1974). It should be noted that in this chapter I do not present an exhaustive review of the various philosophical-educational positions entertained by thinkers during the period under consideration. The exclusion of many eminent thinkers from this study is not meant to convey any kind of judgment about their views or their historical relevance or centrality. Rather, in the following, I aim to sketch the historical-philosophical map of early modern education.

To begin, one may note a parallel: One may recall that a central problem faced by early modern philosophers from the outset concerned the essence of human freedom, asking if individuals are free agents. Early modern philosophy of education focused on a similar question: Is the child a free agent? What would the affirmative or negative answer to these questions entail? How can the answers be classified (because they are rarely simple)?

One way to critically present the prevalent ideas in a given intellectual field is to describe them as constituting a myth. As explained by anthropologist C. Lévi-Strauss (1958/1976, 1964/1975), myths in human culture and human thought are consistently structured as binary pairs, particularly binary opposites or polar pairs (Agassi, 1977, 1979). In the specific case under discussion here, the two conflicting views regarding the central educational question about the nature of children may be conceptualized as such polar pairs. Indeed, once left unnoticed, these conflicting pairs may construct the mythic intellectual field of early modern education. In the following analysis, I chose Immanuel Kant and Jean Jacques Rousseau to represent the Enlightenment philosophical pole and George H. F. Hegel to represent the Romantic worldview pole. Pestalozzi's and Jean Paul's ideas were selected to serve as mechanistic and modified holistic case studies, respectively, for early modern educational theory.

It is important to note that although myths come in polar pairs, the culture erected upon these myths is dominated by all kinds of mixtures of the polar pairs. For example, in the domain of social philosophy, Rousseau (1755/1993) is known to have espoused both holism—coining the epithet "the general will" that belongs to society at large—and mechanism—recognizing the active will of particulars (individuals) who constitute the collective (whole) and, of necessity, constitute the active participants in the social contract. Thus, Rousseau did espouse the mixture of these two methodologies in different proportions (Agassi, 1977, 1979; Lévi-Strauss, 1958/1976, 1964/1975). Likewise, at times, one could observe

Enlightenment philosophers espousing holistic ideas and Romantic philosophers promulgating mechanism. In this book, I employ the notion of mythic polar pairs when discussing such dichotomies as mechanism/holism, nature/society, and the child as animal/human. Thus, although de facto elusiveness between the pairs may at times have characterized the reality on the ground, I utilize mythic polarities as a methodological tool to sketch the framework within which first-rate thinkers of the time came to an intellectual impasse—in the areas of education, aesthetics in general, and piano pedagogy in particular. Below I also describe the elements that helped to transcend those contradictions and to work toward their resolution, as inevitable in the case of mythical opposition (Laor, 1991; Lévi-Strauss, 1958/1976, 1964/1975).

C. Enlightenment Philosophy and its Implications for Education

The philosophy of the Enlightenment held that human beings are capable of understanding Nature. As mentioned above, anyone could be a scientist; therefore, people can certainly explore the world if they dare to exercise their own freedom. That is to say, the philosophers of the Enlightenment age viewed human nature as both universally rational and also as free and improvable—all qualities that guarantee human progress. This view of humans, coupled with the success of early modern science, may have accounted for the optimism of the period. Philosophers of the time believed that a process of progress would lead human beings to a better, even "perfect" future into the next millennium (Lessing, 1778/1896):

> No, it will come it will surely come the time of perfection when man the more convinced his understanding feels of an ever better future, will not, however, have to borrow from his future motives for his actions; when he will do the good because it is the good and not because there were imposed upon it arbitrary rewards which were earlier intended merely to steady his inconstant vision and strengthen it to recognize the inner better rewards.

For Enlighteners, reason constituted the ultimate grounds for hope as well as the standard for respecting the human individual. Such a standard, requiring respect, called into doubt prior patronizing attitudes toward people who were traditionally viewed as lacking in reason, such as the mentally ill and children (Laor, 1991). In examining Enlightenment era discussion about human nature by Kant and Rousseau, the current discussion focuses precisely on these ambivalent, conflicting views of the child as a human individual and as a learner.

i. Immanuel Kant

The German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), paragon of Enlightenment philosophers, concentrated much of his philosophical investigation on the problem of what demarcates the human from the animal. He was all too aware of human beings' animal nature and regarded reason and culture as making all the difference in people's ability to act humanely rather than animalistically. I present Kant's attempt to grapple with these questions before introducing Rousseau, in contrast to their chronological sequence, because, to my mind, Kant's views were much more conservative than Rousseau's. Kant, in fact, represented an effort on the part of a conservative thinker to deal with Rousseau's progressive innovations.

Although he asserted that it is within human capacity to follow the voice of reason that sets one free from the base instincts of the Kingdom of Nature, Kant (1803/1900) upheld the view (some may today add "from a Europocentric" perspective) that some human individuals were indeed savages who were still in bondage:

> The love of freedom is naturally so strong in man that when once he has grown accustomed to freedom he will sacrifice everything for its sake…. We see this also among savage nations who, though they may discharge functions for some time like Europeans, yet can never become accustomed to European manners. With them, however, it is not the noble love of freedom which Rousseau and others imagine but a kind of barbarism—the animal, so to speak, not having yet developed its human nature. Men should therefore accustom themselves early to yield to the commands of reason.

In contrast to Rousseau, who, as seen below, viewed non-European "savages" as noble and as epitomizing the virtues of those untainted by exposure to the corrupt influences of civilization, Kant maintained that in fact savages were mere barbarians, acting heteronomously (according to desires) rather than autonomously (according to reason or moral duty). Kant's view could morally justify all sorts of impositions on savages' freedom because they would not be considered members of the common pale of humanity.

Kant held a very similar view concerning children as emerging from an animal state: He asserted that as long as children do not partake in Reason and endorse Duty as a guide to their moral judgment, they cannot be considered free agents. Hence, reasoning with them would be practically futile, whereas discipline as a method of education would be morally prescribed (Kant, 1803/1900, pp. 2-3):