

Leadership and the Problem of Electoral Democracy in Africa

Leadership and the Problem of Electoral Democracy in Africa:

*Case Studies and Theoretical
Solutions*

By

E. Ike Udogu

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This book is dedicated to the African Union, for providing impressive templates for good governance in Africa, scholars, and civil society groups fighting for the advancement of consolidated democracy in this millennium.

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PREFACE

Proverbially, “They that are whole [have no need of a] physician, but they that are sick [do]” (Mark 2: 17). To paraphrase my preceding biblical reference in political terms, it is metaphorically fragile nation-states in the developing world, and Africa in particular, that need scholars to “nurse” their weak governance systems—especially democracy—into good health or consolidated democracy. In reality, this is what this book is all about because consolidated democracy could further stability and development.

Since most African countries gained home rule from colonial powers during the second half of the 20th century, the issue of electing thoughtful and selfless political leaders dedicated to a good governance project has been tough. A consolation on this matter, if one is to refer to it as such, is that few regions of the world are immune from the “curse” of poor leadership in the management and administration of their polities. As a consequence of this development in Africa, many countries were confronted with political instability, military coups and counter-coups, economic collapse, civil wars, and refugee problems. Moreover, some countries have failed to function as viable states due in part to unstable institutions and structures, and accordingly some of these states have been referred to as failed or collapsed states in political science parlance.

A major issue, related to the thrust of this volume, critical for advancing stability in this region is the leadership quandary that is frequently associated with a second problem: electoral malpractice. Africa needs scholars to diagnose the causes of her political illness and the abovementioned symptoms—i.e., leadership dilemma and electoral malfeasance—and produce solutions for the future. For this reason, the hypothesis I intend to examine and tackle in this book is that effective leadership is the foundation for the institutionalization of electoral democracy and sound governance that can pave the way for rapid and impressive development in the continent in this millennium. In order to pursue this line of inquiry, I discuss in the first chapter the general character and complexity of leadership notionally. This approach to my analysis is applied in an attempt to bring to the fore possible sources and intricacies of leadership qualities and why there are relatively few exemplary political leaders in much of Africa’s inchoate democracies.

In the succeeding chapters, I discuss case studies on electoral democracy in five countries subjectively selected from Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone Africa. I do so for the sole purpose of illustrating the conflictive nature and divisive consequences of electoral malpractice in these societies and by extension much of Africa at this juncture of the region's democratic experiments. This volume also explores the role played by leaders who undermine the fundamental basis of free and fair elections that are necessary in producing regimes with national legitimacy. In short, this study probes the linkage between the behavior of leaders and the extent to which they cleverly and myopically fix the electoral processes in their politics in order to retain power indefinitely. The outcomes of rigged elections do not "true" democracy make.

My concluding chapter returns to the question of leadership and suggests what I hope should be useful templates that could modify leadership character and produce those I term incandescent leaders who aim to govern effectively, and how they could go about it. Specifically, I reference the leadership theories enunciated by General Colin Powell and President Abraham Lincoln and further suggest, *inter alia*, their ideas on leadership as useful pointers for leaders in Africa.

In all, I argue in this volume that with adequate leadership, free and fair elections, political stability, and "good political life" for all, Africa can advance triumphantly toward its renaissance as the continent strives to claim the 21st century as her own.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

To paraphrase John Donne, the late English poet, “No man is an island; entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent; a part of the main [i.e. community, state, country and world]....” In light of the preceding allusion, it would be perverse for me to pretend that my completion of this volume happened solely on the basis of my academic efforts without support from my family, institution, and the works of scholars worldwide.

To this end, I am greatly indebted to the superb works of academics, civil society organizations, and governments that I reference in this book. Also, in a peculiar way, my thanks are extended to political actors whose electoral mal/practices inform the character of this book. My special thanks are extended, too, to the guardians of two imposing libraries—Belk Library and Information Commons at Appalachian State University and Drs. Bruce and Lee Foundation Library at Florence, South Carolina—that “housed” me while writing this book.

I thank my graduate assistant, Mr. C. S. Bare, for his help on this project, Dr. Onyile B. Onyile for formatting the volume, my colleague, Dr. Carey Fraser, and the University Writing Center for proofreading this manuscript. Finally, I thank the personnel at Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom, for producing and making this work available to you.

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ACRONYMS

AD	Alliance for Democracy
AD-Coligacao	Democratic Angola-Coalition
ADD	Alliance for Development and Democracy
AG	Attorney-General
ANC	African National Congress
ANPP	All Nigeria's People's Party
APC	All People's Congress (of Zambia)
APC	All Progressives Congress (of Nigeria)
APGA	All Progressive Grand Alliance
APP	All People's Party
ASU	Arab Socialist Union
AZ	Agenda for Zambia
BSAC	British South African Company
CASA-CE	Convergence for the Salvation of Angola-Electoral Coalition
CDP	Citizens Democratic Party
CNE	National Electoral Commission
CP	Conservative Party
CPO	Political Council of the Opposition
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DFRRI	Directorate of Food, Roads and Rural Infrastructure
DP	Democratic Party
EC	Electoral Commission
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FDA	Forum for Democratic Alternatives
FDC	Forum for Democratic Change
FDD	Forum for Democracy and Development
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FpD	Front for Democracy
FOFAC	Angolan Fraternal Forum Coalition
FPI	Ivoirian Popular Front
FUMA	United Front for Change of Angola
GASI	Global Awareness Society International
GP	Green Party

GURN	Government of National Unity and Reconciliation
HP	Heritage Party
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPC	Inter-Party Cooperation
KANU	Kenya African National Union
KY	Kabaka Yekka
LR	Liberation Rally
MAMSER	Mass Movement for Economic Recovery, Self-Reliance and Social Justice
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MCP	Malawi Congress Party
MMD	Movement for Multi-party Democracy
MPs	Members of Parliament
MPLA	Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola
MPLA-PT	Popular Front for the Liberation of Angola-Workers party
NAREP	National Restoration Party
NCC	National Christian Coalition
ND	New Democracy
NDP	National Democratic Party
NLD	National Leadership for Development
NMP	National Movement for Progress
NRMO	National Resistance Movement Organization
NRA	National Resistance Army
NRP	National Restoration Party
NU	National Union
PADEPA	Party for the Democratic Support and Progress of Angola
PAJOCA	Party for the Alliance of Youth, Workers, and Peasants
PAPOD	People's Party for Development
PDCI	Democratic Party of Ivory Coast
PDP	People's Democratic Party (of Nigeria)
PDP	People's Development Party (of Uganda)
PDP-ANA	Democratic Party for Progress-Angolan National Alliance
PF	Patriotic Front
PIT	<i>Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs</i>
PLD	Liberal Democratic Party
PNDA	Angolan National Democratic Party

PPE	Electoral Political Platform
PPP	People's Progressive Party
PRA	Angolan Reform Party
PRD	Democratic Renewal Party
PRS	Social Renewal Party
PSI	<i>Parti Socialiste Ivoirien</i>
RDR	<i>Rassemblement des Republicains</i>
R&D	Research and Development
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SAP	Strategic Adjustment Program
SDP	Social Democratic Party
SSS	State Security Service
TPDF	Tanzania People's Defence Force
UDA	United Democratic Alliance
UDF	<i>Union des Forces Democratiques</i>
UDV	Unilateral Declaration of Victory
UN	United Nations
UNC	Uganda National Congress
UNIP	United National Independence Party
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
UPC	Ugandan People's Congress
UPE	Universal Primary Education
USD	<i>Union des Sociaux Democratiques</i>
UN	United Nations
UNLF	Uganda National Liberation Army
UPND	United Party for National Development
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republic
WWI	World War 1
WWII	World War 11
ZANU-PF	Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front
ZED	Zambia for Empowerment and Development
ZCTU	Zambian Congress of Trade Unions
ZRP	Zambia Republican Party

CHAPTER ONE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

Now, of course, creating the conditions that allow people and communities to flourish in democracy cannot simply be a matter of holding elections; they are a necessary but not sufficient condition. Good governance requires free, fair, and transparent elections, a free media, independent judiciaries, and the protection of minorities. And democracy must also deliver results for people by providing economic opportunity, jobs, and a rising standard of living.¹

—US Secretary of State Hilary R. Clinton
Speech at the Headquarters of the African Union, Addis Ababa
June 13, 2011

It is much more important that the promise of democracy goes beyond just allowing people to freely choose their leaders. It is much more important that democracy should deliver on the promise of choice, of freedoms, of security of lives and property, of transparency and accountability, of rule of law, of good governance and of shared prosperity. It is very important that the promise embedded in the concept of democracy, the promise of better life for the generality of the people, is not delivered in the breach.²

—President Muhammadu Buhari
Speech at Chatham House, London, UK
February 26, 2015

This book, *Leadership and the Problem of Electoral Democracy in Africa: Case Studies and Theoretical Solutions*, is intended to address the issues raised in the preceding quotations. It alludes to strategies that might lead to political stability, peaceful coexistence among political factions, and “good political life” for Africans in the 21st century. This approach to my scholarship on Africa implies that the political developments on this

¹ Cited in Dominique E. Uwizeyimana, “Democracy and Pretend Democracies in Africa: Myths of African Democracies,” *Law Democracy & Development*, 16 (2012):141.

² Full Text of “Buhari’s Speech at Chatham House,” *Daily Post Nigeria* (February 26, 2015), 3, accessed May 5, 2015, <http://dailypost.ng/2015/02/26/full-text-of-buhari-speech-at-chatham>

continent in the 20th century left much to be desired, and change in this new millennium is imperative. This was and is the case when other regions of the world that were former colonies, as was Africa, are doing relatively well politically and developmentally. In truth, an African adage, “the wise learns from the mistakes of others and from the past,” informs the philosophy and writings of many contemporary Africanists in their quest to proffer solutions to some of Africa’s basic politico-economic problems. In short, their intellectual and scholarly concerns today are those of providing possible answers to the obstacles impeding growth and transformation following decolonization in one of the richest continents in the world with abundant untapped natural resources. But in order to suggest ways for assuaging political, economic, and social maladies endemic in a polity, it would be worthwhile for a scholar to first identify the sources of its problems.

In this instance, and in the context of this volume, I initially identified political leadership as an issue and later linked it to the problem of electoral democracy. It is to this end that my opening salvo of this book, in chapter 2, is “Leadership Crisis in Africa: An Overview.” In my discourses on leadership, I keep in mind its complexities, which I attempt to expose around some of its definitions, explications, and appurtenances. I also endeavor to bring to light the contexts in which leadership has been arrogantly displayed, and with disastrous consequences for the populations of African states.

A paradox on the whole matter of leadership in Africa is that, with a few exceptions, African leaders admit that the major reason for Africa’s social, political, and economic crisis is bad leadership. Yet, the leaders that have emerged in post-colonial Africa have done very little to address the attributes of poor leadership. There is little wonder, then, that Olusegun Obasanjo, a former president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, laments poignantly that African leaders have failed the continent.³ Kofi Annan, a former Secretary General of the United Nations from Ghana, was blunt in advising African chiefs to stop blaming colonial powers and colonialism for Africa’s ineffective leaders, political and economic woes, and current level of under/development.⁴

Be that as it may, chapter 2 attempts to provide some reasons as to why the preceding conjectures have been the case and why Africa needs

³ Olusegun Obasanjo, “Leadership Have Failed African Continent,” *GhanaWeb* (24 April 2013), accessed June 27, 2015, <http://ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=271990>

⁴ Barbara Crossette, “Stop Blaming Colonialism, U.N. Chief Tells Africa,” *New York Times* (April 17, 1998).

transformative leaders. It suggests, among other factors, that the current crop of leaders has in many cases been influenced by the culture of colonial rule in the continent, which African leaders mimicked following the departure of autocratic dominion administrators. In other words, colonial governors ruled despotically and violently as strategies to control the majority indigenous populations. African leaders applied the same authoritarian and violent means in governing their often multi-ethnic states in post-colonial Africa. In doing so, they antagonized ethnic groupings that were and are not their own.

The issue of legitimacy of multi-ethnic states came to the forefront when marginalized ethnic groups simply withheld their support for the central government. Sometimes these groupings, sensing that they were and are unable to tap into the country's economy, or whose hands are metaphorically amputated from exploiting the national coffers by the leader and ethnic group in power, call for self-determination and secession. This was the case in the war for self-determination launched by Eritreans against Ethiopia, for example. The intricacy of uniting a polity stemmed from the failure to fully implement the ideology of nationalism and patriotism following decolonization. Nationalism was the tool with which nationalists gained freedom from colonial domination but they could do very little to advance its spirit, in part due to the allure of ethnonationalism in the struggle for power.

This inability to forge an effective post-colonial state by post-colonial leaders has been one source of political instability. It fostered ethnic jingoism, its centrifugal tendencies and conflicts sometimes resulting in civil wars, internal displacements, and refugee crises as in Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, Ethiopia, and the Sudan to list a few. Given the fragility of the state inherited by African leaders from the colonial powers and their attendant oppressive governance techniques, with the rigging of elections and political turmoil in some, a number of African states have experienced military coups.

Soldiers are warriors trained for the defense of the territorial integrity of a state. They are not politicians adept at democratic philosophy and practice. In order to draw attention to this antinomy and expose the political naiveté of the military, this chapter briefly makes reference to the impact of the military coup and regime of General Ibrahim Babangida in Nigeria. It highlights the authoritarian and leadership quagmire that defined Babangida's tenure in this "giant of Africa." As an overview on leadership, this chapter illustrates that the leadership quandary in Africa is not limited to politicians but extends to the military that claims it could

succeed in the governance of society where civilian leaders have failed dismally.

Moreover, this chapter provides lucid synopses of the character of some African leaders, which are not flattering given the megalomania in the way they view themselves as the masters, and not the servants, of their citizens. In short, once elected, they acted like the “emperors” in Arthur Lewis’ sketch of West African leaders who, *inter alia*, considered themselves to be above the law-cum-national constitution, and expected to be treated as such by society and law enforcement agencies.⁵

The governance technique in Africa also has a lot to do with the nature of the state or how leaders view the state as custodians. If, as noted above, African leaders see themselves as kings and emperors, it follows that the state lacks national legitimacy and autonomy since it caters to the interests of a few—the leaders, subordinates, and vocal elites. This construction of a plutocracy of sorts militates against the advancement of democracy—particularly liberal democracy. In order to consolidate their authority and fully control the state in this arrangement, political leaders connive with plutocratic oligarchs to manipulate the electoral process to facilitate their election and reelection.

This chapter further discusses the implications of corruption, which is one strategy applied by leaders to retain political power. My discussion on leadership and corruption is intended to explain the elements that exacerbate the leadership crises on this continent as their impacts weigh heavily on the problem of good governance. Although corruption is *semper et ubique* and a global phenomenon, its effect on Africa’s inchoate or nascent democracies has devastating effects on societies. Indeed, so serious is the impact of corruption on society that the United Nations stated categorically that it impedes democracy and undermines the rule of law, which are essential for promoting free and fair elections and the advancement of stability and peaceful coexistence among the multiple ethnic communities in a nation-state.

Because of its serious implications on contemporary African politics, the African Union and the Economic Community of West African States crafted protocols intended to curb this malfeasance. These critical documents are reproduced in this chapter with a view to encouraging readers of this volume and anticorruption activists to use the tenets in these very important declarations to fight tooth and nail the evils of corruption

⁵ Arthur W. Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965): 30–32; see E. Ike Udogu, *African Renaissance in the Millennium: The Political, Social, and Economic Discourses on the Way Forward* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2007), 52–53.

that distort Africa's systems of governance at this significant juncture of its political development.

Chapter 2 also discusses the low premium placed on national constitutions by leaders. The importance of a constitution that outlines the structures, institutions, and rules with which to govern a society effectively is noted. It is worth stressing that as significant as this document is for good governance, many leaders see it as a nuisance—an obstacle to the way they wish to run their societies. In short, they fear that adherence to the provisions of the constitution could hinder their ambitions. So, some amend the constitution by bribing legislators to revise it. They do so not to further the interest of the polity but to enhance their power and stay at the helm of government, as in Burundi in 2015, for example. Constitutional crises sometimes arise when leaders call for an amendment to a constitution in order to boost their authority. If successful, elections that follow such an act are frequently rigged, and the process of fixing elections exposes the problem of electoral democracy in a nation-state and much of Africa that has often led to political destabilization.

In sum, the preceding discourses in this chapter bring to the fore the centrality of some issues that leaders exhibit in the governance of African countries. In their quest to retain power by hook or by crook, many chiefs wittingly or unwittingly create a crisis of legitimacy by way of electoral malpractice.

The following chapters of this book: chapter 3, Egypt and the Crisis of Electoral Democracy; chapter 4, Ivory Coast and the Crisis of Electoral Democracy; chapter 5, Zambia and the Crisis of Electoral Democracy; chapter 6, Uganda and the Crisis of Electoral Democracy; and chapter 7, Angola and the Crisis of Electoral Democracy are case studies intended to illustrate and illuminate some of the theories discussed in chapter 1. In each of the case studies, I provide a brief historic context within which to comprehend the country's colonial and post-colonial political developments, leading to my discourses on the electoral quagmires in these polities.

In my examination of the problem of electoral democracy in Africa, I make no reference to the formation, character, and role of political parties which are the vehicles through which political leaders in a democracy lose or gain power.⁶ It was not in my purview to do so in this volume, having

⁶ See Roy C. Macridis, "Groups, Parties, and Elections," in *Comparative Politics: Notes and Readings 7th edition*, edited by Roy C. Macridis and Bernard E. Brown. (Pacific Grove, CA: Brook/Cole Publishing Company, 1990); Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in *Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics*, edited by Sigmund Newman (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1956); Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their*

tackled the issue of “Political Parties, Elections and Political Legitimation” in Africa elsewhere.⁷ Instead, I focus my analysis on the activities of political factions and their leaders in the aforementioned countries and how they have struggled—and may continue to struggle—to accede to power by all means possible including, but not limited to, electoral misconduct.

My concern in this volume is on elections, and how strategies and performances and their outcomes are frequently contested by political parties that believe they have been cheated out of power by rivals and their leaders. In this regard, my brief reference to and illustration of two elections in Nigeria, a bellwether in Africa, is useful.

In 1999, following the birth of Nigeria’s Fourth Republic, the political contest was between two political titans, General Olusegun Obasanjo, the presidential flag-bearer of the popular People’s Democratic Party (PDP), and Olu Falae, the leader of a grand coalition between the Alliance for Democracy (AD) and the All People’s Party (APP). Obasanjo (PDP) won 62.8% of the votes, but it was an election considered by many Nigerians and observers to have been fixed. Consequently, Olu Falae never accepted the result. The result of this election is presented in Table 1 below.

Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London: Methuen Publisher, 1959); M. Weiner, *Party Building in a New Nation* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1967); Vickey Randall, ed., *Political Parties in the Third World* (London: Sage Publication, 1988); Dean E. McHenry, Jr. “Political Parties and Party Systems,” in *Democratic Transition in East Africa*, ed. Paul J. Kaiser et al. (Aldershot, EN: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2004); Renske Doorenspleet, “Political Parties, Party Systems and Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” in *African Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and Governance*, edited by M. A. Mohamed Salih (London: Pluto Press, 2003).

⁷ E. Ike Udogu, *Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States in the 21st Century* (Newcastle upon Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2010), 129–66.

Table 1: Republic of Nigeria Nigerian Presidential Election of 27 February 1999**Parties**

AD:	Alliance for Democracy
APP:	All People's Party
PDP:	People's Democratic Party

National Summary

Registered Voters	57,938,945	
Votes Cast	30,280,052	(52.3%)
Invalid Votes	431,611	(01.4%)
Valid Votes	29,848,441	(98.6%)

Candidates	Party	Votes	%
Samuel O. Falahe	AD-APP	11,110,287	37.2
Olusegun Obasanjo	PDP	18,738,154	62.8
Total		29,848,441	100

Source: Alex Kireev, Nigeria: Presidential Election 1999, accessed June 22, 2015
<https://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/n/nigeria/niger...>

Again, in the 2003 presidential polling, the PDP under an incumbent President Obasanjo won reelection by 61.8% of votes; retired General Muhammadu Buhari of the All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP) bagged 32% of the ballots, and Odumegwu Ojukwu of All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA) got 03.3%. Buhari (ANPP) and Ojukwu (APGA) did not concede victory to the PDP on the basis of electoral malpractice by PDP in the procedure and methods leading to the polling.⁸ Below is the result of 2003 election in Table 2.

⁸ Udogu, *African Renaissance in the Millennium*, 53.

Table 2: Republic of Nigeria Presidential Election of 19 April 2003**Parties**

All Nigerian People's Party	ANPP
All Progressive Grand Alliance	APGA
People's Democratic Party	PDP

National Summary

Registered Voters	60,823,022		
Votes Counted	41,331,691	(67.9%)	
Invalid Votes	2,319,620	(00.6%)	
Valid Votes	39,012,071	(99.4%)	
Candidates	Party	Votes	%
Muhammadu Buhari	ANPP	12,495,326	32.0
Olusegun Obasanjo	PDP	24,109,157	61.8
Odumegwu Ojukwu	APGA	1,295,655	03.3
17 Others	-	1,111,933	02.9*
Total		39,012,071	100

*An approximation

Source: Nigerian Independent National Election Commission, accessed June 22, 2015. <http://www.electoralgeography.com/new/en/countries/n/Nigeria/Nigeria-presidential-election-2003.html>.

Indeed, in his refutation of this result, Buhari of the ANPP, and current president of the Federal Republic of Nigeria following the 2015 presidential election between the All Progressives Congress and People's Democratic Party, expressed his distressing condemnation of the result of that polling thus:

[President] Obasanjo's so-called second term has not been obtained through the power of the ballot. He may force himself on the people by continuing to remain in power beyond May 29 [2003], but his government shall not be a democracy and should not be so treated. ...Nothing ever built on falsehood and deceit has endured and this one also shall follow the time honored pattern. ...His continued hold on power beyond May 29 runs against the grain of popular democracy and is therefore illegal. His government, as we have posited earlier, is consequently illegitimate and

shall continue to remain so for as long as it is based on the April 19 contraception.⁹

Such a political culture, I contend, in which “defeated” candidates in balloting fail to officially and publicly concede to the victor, has frequently led to political instability, violence, and even civil war.¹⁰ In some cases, too, political turbulence has led to military coups, with disastrous consequences for populations in a nation-state. Even so, contentious electoral democracy is commonplace in much of Africa, and it informs and brings to the limelight my concerns and concise analytic thrust in the case studies.

To sum up, my case studies reveal the problem of electoral democracy in both single and multi-party democracies. In the case of a single-party democracy such as in Egypt, the frequency of electoral malpractices led to an argument or hypothesis that politics in single-party states is less conflictive because it unites all opposition forces. Put another way, the theory that a single-party system mitigates centrifugal forces and the conflicts rampant in multi-party party democracies did not hold.

In order to illustrate the foregoing postulation, my selected case studies provide information on election results in tables followed by pointed explorations and analysis as to why the voting patterns were distinctive and, indeed, conflictive. In short, my analysis constantly brings to the forefront the problem of electoral democracy and relates the crisis to the leadership genre in these societies.

These studies also allude to the troubling aspect of a president or leader being constitutionally mandated with controlling the apparatus of the electoral process. In many, if not all, cases, the president appoints the officers of the National Electoral Commission responsible for organizing and supervising national elections. This power in the hands of a leader tends to corrupt the system when members are very close to the chief. In order to stay in power, a leader may bring pressure to bear on the commissioners to fix elections in his favor.

In light of the problems of electoral democracy that exist in the process of balloting and the attendant issues of political violence and social malaise, there is the possibility of a military coup, as in Ivory Coast, due partially to the lack of national support for a leader. The question is: what is to be done? This is the question I attempt to tackle in chapter 8:

⁹ E. Ike Udugu (ed.), *Nigeria in the Twenty-First Century: Strategies for Political Stability and Peaceful Coexistence* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 238.

¹⁰ Udugu, *African Renaissance in the Millennium*, 54.

“Applying Colin Powell’s and Abraham Lincoln’s Theoretical Templates on Leadership to African Politics: Some Pointers for African Leaders.”

In Africa, making the democratic transition to a consolidated democracy, as in the United States, Britain, France, and Canada, for example, with peaceful elections in which political power shifts from one party to another, has been tough. I argue, as many academics and politicians in Africa also do, that this problem has its roots in poor and inadequate leadership. These leaders often place their narrow interests above those of the nation-state.

What is encouraging today, however, is that the process of transitioning to consolidated democracy is on the right trajectory, despite the fact that its pathway has been wobbly.¹¹ My supposition is borne out of the fact that the African Union, through its African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,¹² supports this movement to the hilt. Assistance from civil society organizations, scholars, donor countries, and democratic Western powers for good leadership and democratic opening has been persistent, on the rise, and impressive. Overall, it was probably within the context of my foregoing conjectures that a former South African leader, President Nelson Mandela, stated without equivocation that

Africa is beyond bemoaning the past for its problems. The task of undoing that past is on the shoulders of African leaders themselves, with the support of those willing to join in a continental renewal. We have a new generation of leaders who know that Africa must take responsibility for its own destiny, that Africa will uplift [herself] only by its own efforts in partnership with those who wish her well.¹³

In truth, it is against the backdrop of my preceding suppositions that the concluding chapter should be visualized. Here, I examine and discuss theories and templates that could produce the genus of leaders Africa yearns for. These are leaders who will advance political stability, the respect of human rights, peaceful coexistence, development, and a “good political life.”

Indeed, such striking political, social, and economic growth could curb the exodus of Africa’s best and brightest to the developed world and elsewhere, not to mention the many poor and marginalized Africans

¹¹ Udogu, *African Renaissance in the Millennium*, 39–63.

¹² See “African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance,” accessed June 27, 2015, <http://www.achpr.org/instruments/charter-democracy/>

¹³ See “African Leaders on African Leadership & Governance: Excerpts from Selected Articles,” The African Leadership and Progress Network, accessed June 27, 2015, <http://www.africanprogress.net/Africanleaders.htm>

fleeing poverty and war zones to other African countries and Europe, with disastrous consequences.

In applying Powell's and Lincoln's theories and templates for producing effective political leaders in chapter 8, I emphasize that this is only one important model. In fact, when this chapter was presented as a paper at the 28th meeting of the Global Awareness Society International (GASI) in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, USA, in 2015, one of the questions asked following my presentation was: Why use Powell's and Lincoln's theories and templates for leadership in Africa? My metaphoric explication was that "a drowning individual never hesitates to clutch at a straw—any straw—with a hope for survival." In short, these complementary theories and overlapping templates for effective leadership augment the impressive Mombasa Declaration: The Code of African Leadership crafted by African leaders for producing exceptional leadership in Africa.¹⁴ Accordingly, combining elements contained in the Code of African Leadership with Powell's and Lincoln's models has the propensity to advance good leadership capable of propelling Africa to an impressive political, social, and economic revival in the 21st century.¹⁵

¹⁴ See "Code of African Leadership, Mombasa, 20 March 2004," accessed June 27, 2015

<http://www.worldpeacefoundation.org/ALC.code%20of%20African%20leadership>; see also E. Ike Udugu, "The Issue of Political Leadership in the Third World: What is to be Done?" *Journal of Third World Studies*, XXV, 1 (2007): 13–23.

¹⁵ Udugu, *African Renaissance in the Millennium*, x.

CHAPTER TWO

LEADERSHIP CRISIS IN AFRICA: AN OVERVIEW

Introduction

It is easy to experience a sense of déjà vu when analyzing political leadership in Africa. The perception is that African leaders rule failed states that have acquired tags such as “corruptocracies,” “chaosocracies” or “terrorocracies.” Perspectives on political leadership in Africa vary from the “criminalization” of the state to political leadership as “dispensing patrimony,” the “recycling” of elites and the use of state power and resources to consolidate political and economic power. Whereas African states enjoy external sovereignty, internal sovereignty has taken on a new meaning as political leaders outside the so-called formal Westphalia arena compete for power, provide state-like services and have monopoly of and over organized violence...¹

—Jo-Ansie Van Wyk

This chapter does not draw its analytic sap from theoretical explanations of leadership. Indeed, notional discourses on the attributes and characteristics of leadership have been robustly and splendidly discussed elsewhere.² My view on leadership in this chapter is aimed at

¹ Jo-Ansie Van Wyk, “Political Leaders in Africa: Presidents, Patrons or Profiteers?,” Occasional Papers Series: Issue 1, 2007, accessed September 12, 2014, <http://www.africaportal.org/dspace/articles/political-leaders-africa-presidents-patrons-or-pro%EF%AC%81teers>

² See, for example, J. Adams and J. D. Yoder, *Effective Leadership for Women and Men* (Norward, NJ: Ablex Publishing Corporation, 1985), 1–34; F. E. Fielder, *The Theory of Leadership Effectiveness* (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishers, 1967), 154–80; P. Bachrach, *The Theory of Democratic Elitism* (Boston, NY: Little Brown, 1967); E. Ike Udugu, “The Issue of Political Leadership in the Third World: What is to be Done?” *Journal of Third World Studies*, 25, 1 (2008): 13–23; *Confronting the Challenges and Prospects in the Creation of a Union of African States* (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, United Kingdom: Cambridge Scholars Publishing,

examining that intricate interlacement between the leadership style of African leaders and the complicated nature of the conduct of elections in their polities. In other words, attempts are made to expose some of the problems that often arise at that fundamental—some might say unique—intersection between leaders' vaulting and often blinkered ambition to be elected and reelected to power and citizens' conflicting choices at the ballot box. In the end, this chapter and volume suggest that such scenarios exacerbate political instability. It is how to mitigate the destabilizing political actions of politicians issuing from fraudulent, malfeasant, and virulent electoral competitions that retard the process of democratic consolidation in Africa that this chapter aims to tackle.

Accordingly, the following discourses relate to the question of leadership and, in a broad spectrum, its character in the governance of a society. Though an indispensable and important component of power, in most political, economic, and socio-religious situations, the meaning or denotation of leadership in all regions of the world is very complicated, and difficult to fully comprehend and explain. Part of its intricacies flow from the character of those who exercise a leadership role in a society. For that reason, the definition of leadership is not only convoluted but also hard to define to the full satisfaction of scholars. Added to this dilemma is the fact that different disciplines—especially in the social sciences—visualize leadership in different ways. Even so, good leadership is a critical attribute, essential for the successful management and governance of a polity.³ Consequently, many scholars have contended that, insofar as

2010); E. Ike Udogu, "Political Leadership and Governance in Democratic Nigeria," *Africa Quarterly*, 40, 3 (2000): 109–31; P. Hersey, *The Situational Leader* (Escondido, CA: Center for Leadership Study, 1984); P. G. Northouse, *Leadership: Theory and Practice* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 2004); Glen D. Paige, *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership* (New York: The Free Press, 1977); James M. Burns, *Leadership* (New York: Harper and Row, 1978); Robert C. Tucker, *Politics of Leadership* (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 1981); Jean Blondel, *Political Leadership: Towards a General Analysis* (London: Sage Publishers, 1987); Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Leadership and Conflict," in *Essays on Leadership: Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1998); Edgar F. Borgatta, Robert F. Bales, and Arthur S. Couch, "Some Findings Relevant to the Great Man Theory of Leadership," *American Sociological Review*, 19 (December 1954); B. M. Bass, *Leadership and Performance Beyond Expectation* (New York: Free Press, 1985); B. M. Bass, "From Transactional to Transformational Leadership: Learning to Share the Vision," *Organizational Dynamics*, 18, 3 (Winter 1998): 19–31.

³ Udogu, "Political Leadership and Governance in Nigeria," 114.