Transgressive Romanticism

Transgressive Romanticism

Edited by

Larry H. Peer

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Transgressive Romanticism

Edited by Larry H. Peer

This book first published 2018

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-5275-0361-5
ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-0361-8

TABLE OF CONTENTS

NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

LLOYD DAVIES is Professor of English at Western Kentucky University. His essays on Wordsworth, Romantic theory, and covenantal reading have appeared in *Christianity and Literature*, *Prism(s): Essays in Romanticism*, *British Romanticism and Jews*, and *Romantic Rapports*.

JAMES H. DONELAN is the Associate Director of the Writing Program at the University of California, Santa Barbara. His book *Poetry and the Romantic Musical Aesthetic* won the 2008 Jean-Pierre Barricelli Prize as the year's best book in the field of Romanticism studies. The recipient of a Distinguished Teaching Award from the University of California, Santa Barbara, Academic Senate, he writes frequently about Romanticism, particularly about its music, poetry, and philosophy.

RICHARD ELDRIDGE is the Charles and Harriett Cox McDowell Professor of Philosophy at Swarthmore College, where he serves as department chair. The author of six books and over one hundred essays, his most recent study *Images of History: Kant, Benjamin, Freedom, and the Human Subject* has received high praise. He is the editor of the *Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Literature* and the series editor of *Oxford Studies in Philosophy and Literature.*

AMY EMM is Assistant Professor of German at The Citadel. Her essays and book chapters on Kleist, the operatic nature of the feminine, Zacharias Werner, and music reception in Romanticism, joins her research on material mysticism.

CASSANDRA FALKE is Professor of English Literature and Culture at the University of Tromsø, Norway. Her books include *Literature by the Working Class: English Autobiography, 1820–1848* and *The Phenomenology of Love and Reading*. She has been Professor of Distinction, and has received Fulbright and National Endowment for the Humanities awards.

HOLLIE MARKLAND HARDER is Professor of French and Francophone Studies at Brandeis University, and Director of Language Programs in the Department of Romance Studies. She has published on Proust and Zola, and leads discussion groups at the Boston Athenaeum.

RICHARD JOHNSTON is Assistant Professor of English and Fine Arts at the United States Air Force Academy. He has received the Marshall Scholarship and a Jacob K. Javits Fellowship. The author of several poems and stories, he has been recognized as Outstanding Academy Educator.

MATT KERSHAW is a graduate student in Comparative Studies at Brigham Young University and recipient of the Lore Metzger Prize of the International Conference on Romanticism for outstanding student scholarship.

LARRY H. PEER is Professor of Comparative Literature at Brigham Young University and Executive Director of the International Conference on Romanticism. The author of over a dozen scholarly books, numerous essays, and two books of poetry, he has published on Byron, Friedrich Schlegel, Diderot, the Brontes, Goethe, Manzoni, Pushkin, Romantic literary theory, and the Romantic manifesto. He has been Altman Distinguished Professor of Humanities at Miami (Ohio) University.

KEVIN SAYLOR is an Affiliate Assistant Professor of English at the University of Dallas with interests in British Romanticism and current research on Keats.

THOMAS H. SCHMID is Professor of English at the University of Texas, El Paso, where he serves as the Director of Literature and Graduate Advisor. He is the author of several books and essays, including *Humor and Transgression in the Shelley Circle*, which won the Rocky Mountain Modern Language Association Book Award. His novel *Fools of Time* has recently appeared.

LORI YAMATO is Adjunct Assistant Professor of English at the City University of New York, Queen’s College, where she serves as a member of the Inclusion Program. She has published on Hamann, Herder, Kierkegaard, Romantic music, and Henry James.

INTRODUCTION

THE SWEEP OF TRANSGRESSIVE ROMANTICISM

LARRY H. PEER

Bondini's famous Italian opera company, having premiered several hits over the previous four years, arrived in Prague for the 14 October 1787 opening of Mozart's *Don Giovanni*. Unfortunately, the score was not finished. Already known for his speed of composition, Mozart worked day and night to complete it, under the working title of *Il dissoluto punito* ("The Rake's Progress") and, with a number of copyists putting everything together, delivered the final pages at the last moment. So it was that on 29 October Mozart took his bow before the curtains lifted, the audience cheered, and the opera finally played out, becoming instantaneously one of the major forces in music history, only increasing in reputation when the composer revised it for its Vienna premier seven months later, after having been appointed *Kammermusicus* ("chamber composer/musician") by Emperor Joseph II.

Mozart was still a child when he composed his first operas, including the still-performed *La finta giardiniera* ("The False Gardener's Maid"), and throughout his career he used the fundamental shape of the Italian aria, standard comic devices, and standard movement endings, formed by repetition of dominant and tonic chords. His plots were mostly just the latest versions of popular tales earlier adapted. *Don Giovanni* reveals a simple seduction motif within the Don Juan theme already given stage form by Tirso de Molina, Corneille, Goldoni and others, and in opera form by Righini, Albertini, and Berlati/Gazzaniga just before Mozart. In important ways, Mozart's operas, culminating in *Don Giovanni*, used and improved past motifs and conventions. Committed to orderly form, often a rococo delicacy, and the neoclassical canon of harmony and counterpoint, his mature operas bring the eighteenth century to a brilliant end.

Meanwhile, in Paris, Lavoisier was formulating his *Traité Élémentaire de Chimie* ("Elementary Treatise on Chemistry"), finally finishing it in

1789 to the adulation of leading scientists, just as Mozart was reveling in the adulation of leading composers. And, like Mozart's *Don Giovanni* in music, Lavoisier's great work brought to a glorious conclusion the discoveries and trends of eighteenth century hard science. Presenting a comprehensive and unified theory of chemistry, particularly in clarifying the Law of Conservation of Mass, Lavoisier's place in the history of science is secure also because of his observational method. Learning the latest ideas of observation as a young man while doing geological surveys and helping to develop the metric system, in addition to studying chemistry under Macquer and Condillac, Lavoisier became by the age of twenty-six a citizen of the world and an accomplished Enlightenment *philosophe*. Both Mozart and Lavoisier represent in a distilled form the apex of Pre-Romantic thought and practice (Cassirer 1951, 3–36), a spirit of clarity, harmony, balance, and unaided reason (Gay 1969, 24–55), and the ability to place themselves above mere emotion (Davies 1998, 673).

But twelve short years later we find something radically different. The lionized composer and musician was now Beethoven, and Pestalozzi's new school in Switzerland opened its doors to a radical new way of viewing and teaching science. In both cases, we see key cultural foundations being overthrown in a process that came to be known as *Die Romantik*, *romanticismo*, *romantisme, Romanticism*.

Beethoven had made his first appearance in Vienna in 1795 at a charity concert where he debuted one of his own piano concertos. Because of this concert and the efforts of his benefactor Count Waldstein, Beethoven's new way with music became a hot topic in intellectual circles. For the next five years he continued to compose, playing concerts all over central Europe, including in Prague where Mozart's great opera had had such success. Finally, after working on it for months, Beethoven completed his formidable First Symphony, breaking, with the third movement, the long tradition of light minuet style in favor of a brilliant scherzo. When, on April 2nd of the following year, he debuted the symphony in Vienna, many members in the audience were shocked. Well-schooled critics noted that with this symphony he took a leap into a new world of restless energy and dramatic emotion. In addition, the music demanded of the instrumentalists a precision and range never before needed. In place of delicacy, harmony, and traditional order, the world was now faced with nervous tension, wide swings in mood, and joyous eruptions of power.

As Beethoven's success broke over Europe between 1797 and 1799, the village of Burgdorf (Switzerland) was about to experience the result of a radically non-Lavoisierian way of conceptualizing and teaching science. Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi had just published his treatise *Meine*

Nachforschungen über den Gang der Natur in der Entwicklung des Menschengeschlechts (1797) ("My Enquiries into the Course of Nature in the Development of Mankind"). In addition to advocating as the deepest kind of education abandoning the study of theology in favor of taking students "back to nature," he insisted on grouping children by ability rather than age and focusing on individual difference rather than group similarity. Science is to be taught in the context of other facets of practical life, such as learning to spin, weave, plant, harvest, write, sing, and so on. Education in science joins the study of all aspects of humanity and nature, in the course of which an individual will learn to think for himself/herself, becoming radically individuated and responsible for her/his own moral, physical, and intellectual development. Pestalozzi was invited to organize higher education in the Helvetic Republic (the post-French Revolution political form imposed upon Switzerland) and decided to begin the entire process of schooling with small children in rural villages. After he had established schools first in Burgdorf (1800) and then Yverdon (1805) his theories and methods took root in many places in Europe. And today, fundamental libertarian notions of education, including Friedrich Kroebel's invention of the idea of Kindergarten, owe their origins to Pestalozzi's educational Romanticism.

But radical cultural shifts were moving all over Western culture, not just those typified by lines from Mozart to Beethoven and Lavoisier to Pestalozzi, violating traditional norms in virtually every sphere of human activity. Prior to the movement, for example, standard explanations of the role of emotions typically insisted upon their cognitive connections (Robinson 2005, 8–15). The relationship of feelings to physical stimuli, the notion that feelings are a type of thinking, and the insistence that feelings are epistemic (caused by frustration or fulfillment), made theory of emotions practically a cognitive science. Thus, if persons are forced to change their minds about an idea of another person, the attendant feeling is caused by a shift in evaluative judgment. In other words, it would be impossible to have a feeling about something, such as annoyance, anger, or shame, unless one "cognates" or "recognates" (recognizes) at some level; that is, more or less rationally evaluates a situation or person at some moment. The Romantics, however, theorize that emotion is not only one of the main modes of individual being, but that it is far from a species or function of cognition. Emotion wells up in individuals quite apart from cognitive facility. Furthermore, when emotion is expressed in art, it is not just the articulation of what wells up inside the artist, but a powerful and irresistible transfer of feelings from a creator into the psyche of the receiver as though the feelings originated there.

Too, previous assertions that external reality is experienced primarily empirically are exploded in Romantic theory. Prior to the movement, empiricists understood rational contemplation as the central way to process or even to attain knowledge (Milnes 2010, 3–11). Romanticism essentially abandons an epistemological and empirical apparatus of thinking in favor of the idea that reality is primarily experienced and even understood through deeper modes of apprehension, such as imagination and intuition. Resulting in a whole new idea of "mind," Romanticism posits the human spirit as the power to imaginatively construct and reconstruct rapports on an infinite number of levels between self and other, and to intuit reality by sensing ever-shifting correspondences.

Another important Romantic transgression centers on ideas about the natural world itself, where "Newtonian impersonality (and Romanticism) collide in poetic space" (Jacobus 2012, 1), the result of which is Romanticism's radical view of art's apostrophic power, its ability to hold multiple, complex, disparate things in tension the way science cannot. Not only that, but in order for science to grasp the nature of even the empirical world, it must learn to approach it as art. The reality of the natural world cannot be dealt with until it is represented to the mind what it is to itself through the sublimity of art. And true art is always open-ended, leading us as it does to a new understanding of order versus chaos in the human world as well as in the external world of nature. By valorizing the fragmentary as the fundamental condition of reality, Romanticism transmutes previous ideas of art and science as "system" (Chaouli 2000, 133–34). Thus reflecting a view that reality is more than the total of some set of symbiotic relationships in either the inner person or the external world, Romanticism finds that the very essence of identity rises from fragmentary interaction, where the necessity of living in perpetual ambiguity about the self and the external world marks the beginning of understanding.

Of course, throughout history new cultural movements in the arts and in philosophy overstep or even defy cultural norms and practices and in this general sense Romanticism is not unique. In the twentieth century, for example, thinkers such as Michel Foucault, who takes bits and pieces of thought from Marxism, structuralism, Nietzsche, and Bataille, have transformed the social sciences permanently (Lemert and Gillan 1982, 51–69). In the 1980s a group of New York filmmakers produced a manifesto entitled *The Cinema of Transgression*, challenging the hegemony of conventional American values by making films of extreme violence, perverse sexual scenarios, and stridently criminal brutality, sometimes shot with stolen camera equipment. By presenting these kinds of filmic transgressions, these motion picture ideologues postulate not only a new

kind of film but also a new kind of sociopolitical awareness (Pfeffer 2012, 3). And some contemporary architects, working on the periphery of the profession during the last thirty years, are actively attempting to destabilize environments, break boundaries of taste, and interrogate standard roles and mechanisms of production, in order to redirect the very definition of the art form (Sara and Mosley 2014, 4–7).

But Romanticism is a pointedly unique transformative trespass. A key to understanding the transgressive nature of the movement lies in the manifold attempts since its heyday to define what it is. The Romantics themselves built their discussions of this matter upon the idea of the fragmentary, inconsistent processes that from the beginning were understood as not participating in any conceptual framework, but that would lead to and construct multi-dimensional freedom. Differentiation to any possible systematic set is its origin and power. Its transgression of previous norms and practices represents nothing less than the major shift in the culture of the West, an entirely new sensibility and shaping principle never before seen (Frye 1968, 4–8). Its tenets embody a shift not only in one or two previous sets of norms but also in those of the entire complex of Western history. Although literary and art historians take as their task tracing lines of reference between ideas and practices, such investigations do not do justice to Romanticism, whose tenets and Promethean figures not only trace and represent connections, but relate in ways vastly more complex than before in Western cultural history all of what came before and how to use, abuse, reject, incorporate, transmogrify, and consummate Western history's value/practice mass. In the end, Romanticism is an approach to history and value that penetrates Western culture's entire state of mind, precisely that consequence envisioned, for example, by Hegel (Kaufmann 1960, 158) and then turns it inside out. Romanticism is the understanding that the basic practices and values of Western thought and art since the Greeks is based upon successive waves of misconception, with each wave not so much transgressing what came before but essentially reconfiguring the misconception. The movement's work is for the first time autonomous, a set of transgressive values and practices that cannot be diminished by any successor. It's self-awareness as process is entirely unique (Chai 2006, 63–81), transgressing logocentric perspectives that dominated Western culture from the first.

The transgressive nature of Romanticism suggests study collections such as this one, where a group of somewhat diverse essays becomes the beginning or the continuation of an open-ended conversation feeding academia's dialogic mode of inquiry. This book's colloquy includes the voices of younger as well as more established scholars, as well as views of

Romanticism from multiple linguistic traditions and academic disciplines. Richard Eldridge sets the stage for this diversity by suggesting that Romantic lyric poetry reveals in an especially powerful way the momentous significance of early nineteenth century literature and philosophy. This new poetry shows the consequences of Romanticism's ability to attack hyper-conventionality and a failure of attentiveness. Now that we understand this attack, we are haunted by a sense that we have lost an understanding of the animated life given to us by Romantic dynamism. By unpacking key sections of Hegel's *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* ("The Phenomenology of Spirit"), Eldridge finds the origin of this attack, and the fundamental Romantic transgression it fosters, in the rejection of Western culture's misunderstanding of self-consciousness, which leads to an assertion of a new kind of individuality that makes claims and reflectively assesses them. This discovery, that selfhood is radically active, self-grounding, and self-structuring, changes everything in human life, and is embodied in Romantic poetry.

The Romantics also found, and we find by studying Romanticism, that in the process of leading a deeply human life, radical selfhood does not separate cognition from emotion. In addition to this insight, and by focusing on Keats's *Hyperion* fragments, James Donelan shows that the poet's earlier vision of the poetic self and its self-consciousness, put forth in *Endymion*, is completely re-imagined in the later works. Keats's growing knowledge of not just the poetry of Milton, Dante, and Shakespeare, but the tradition established in the English language tradition by their poetry, provides him the context within which he comes to understand his own poetic self-consciousness as both a partaker of and a transgressor against the poetic past. A juxtaposition of the opening of each *Hyperion* fragment makes clear this new vision.

Lloyd Davies, in reading Keats's "To Autumn" as performative Romanticism, finds transgressive convergences parallel to Beethoven's *Cavatina*, particularly in compositional principles. Recognizing these compositional violations of standard Western poetic and musical practice requires a new, more focused, critical reading of Romanticism across the disciplines.

Keats's works show another kind of Romantic transgression as well, shown in the dynamics of his friendship with Benjamin Bailey. Although this relationship has been studied at length, particularly its influence on Keats's religious faith and skepticism, Thomas Schmid views the association in a new way. First of all, Bailey's religious bigotry is intertwined and informed by the discourse of nineteenth-century British imperial authority. Secondly, Bailey's admiration of both Wordsworth and

Byron as poets aestheticizes the exotic Ceylon landscape of his own poetry in Romantic ways. The result is a transformative tension in Bailey's writings and conversations between British commercial and political exploitation of the "Other" on the one hand and, on the other, Romanticism's non-commercial moral grounding in the natural world. As Keats experiences this tension in Bailey's writings and conversations, he moves away from the dogmatic aesthetic and religious sensibility of early British Romanticism, as in Wordsworth and Coleridge, in favor of a deeper, more complex discourse characteristic of later Romanticism.

Of course, Romantic transgression from the first goes beyond literary motifs into deep cultural changes. Hollie Markland Harder asserts a connection between on the one hand Romantic interest in how non-Christian religion and religiosity transmutes traditional Christian assumptions and behaviors and, on the other, contemporary literary and cultural expression following in the movement's wake. Harder shows how Michel Houellebecq's 2015 novel *Soumission*, a story about the moral evolution of a literature professor specializing in Huysmans's nineteenth century corpus, reveals a type of personal development, originating in Romanticism, involving profound religious struggle in the course of searching for ultimate meaning in life. One of the deepest ways in which that meaning is appreciated lies in a transgressive reconfiguration of Christian assumptions under the influence of Islam.

In Matt Kershaw's study of Beethoven's late piano sonatas, we learn that complex Romantic transmutations extend beyond literature into the other arts. Significantly, Kershaw demonstrates the particular way in which the composer's last works for the instrument transgress the art of music itself, at least insofar as music theory had before him been put into compositional and performance practice. The impetus for this radical and permanent change is Beethoven's invocation of and engagement with a dialectical synthesis of theory and practice we generally attribute to Hegel. By understanding the essentially oppositional conception of synthesis between pre-Romantic Kant and hyper-Romantic Hegel sounded out in Beethoven's piano, we come to understand the nuanced difference between Romanticism's idea of synthesis as trespass and earlier notions of synthesis as solution.

Kevin Saylor's study of the Romantic notion of epic shows how Romantic trespass works in the transmission of genre. Noting that Blake finds *Paradise Lost* itself lost in vacuous ideals of faith and hope, Saylor argues that greater poetic power and a more rational approach to truth are to be found in *Jerusalem* and, further, that Shelley's *The Revolt of Islam* transmits a more mythically defensible sense of the sacred than does either

Milton or the ancient Greeks and Romans. Finally, Keats's *Hyperion*, although not usually connected to the epic tradition, tells powerfully an apocalyptic myth, a most vigorous epic-like rendering of ontological revolution not seen in pre-Romantic literature.

At times, Romantic norms mine themes, types, and motifs in radically intrusive ways while using folk material. Thus, like its English language siblings, Hans Christian Andersen's (1838) "Det har Zombien gjort" ("The Zombie Did It") turns this particular folk tradition inside out, as Lori Yamato shows, by packing the legend with over-determined key terms forcing the reader to grapple with aspects of the zombie idea in more complex ways than in pre-Romantic culture. The effect is a typical Romantic one: signaling fidelity to a past tradition, in this case a literary and cultural type and motif, Andersen's story wrings out of the legend profound transmutations of the given, the traditional, and the status-repeating mere scary effects. Richard Johnson, too, argues for a similarly transgressive thrust in Byron's *Cain*. By carefully unpacking the text's nuances, Johnson shows the play's shocking retelling of the Biblical first family story to be a powerful and stirring call for individual freedom and intellectual daring, Romantic ideas subverting notions of traditional Christian notions of good and evil.

And Cassandra Falke, working with Godwin's *Caleb Williams*, takes us through a way in which a Romantic novelist violates even the typical pre-Romantic outlaw/criminal type. Rather than showing the criminal as a fundamentally, socially, and psychologically vile type, Romantic literary treatments such as Godwin's novel take the species to a far more complex level. Rising in prominence along with the proliferation of criminal biographies in eighteenth century chapbooks, early Romantic literary treatments of criminal behavior and the outlaw mind give us a hero/heroine whose partial innocence, individualism, loneliness, and forced insertion into complex social situations redefine ideas of evil. In the process of transmuting an earlier, more simple-minded view of socially-defined criminality, novels such as Godwin's permanently make intricately manifold a previously one-dimensional literary and social concept.

In the light of Romantic violation of genre, as shown by Kevin Saylor's study, and the movement's manipulation of themes and motifs, as we see particularly in the chapters by Lori Yamato and Richard Johnston, we are prepared to understand Amy Emm's view of the aesthetics of play in Romanticism, exemplified in the works of dramatist Zacharias Werner. His stage/closet drama encapsulates and then transforms not only earlier notions of play, as in Kant and Schiller, but also the conventional immateriality of early Romantic stage drama. Werner's ability to construct

a telling central object metaphor on stage represents a crucial innovation in the late stages of Romantic dramatic aesthetics.

With these essays, then, this book suggests that the idea of transgression, indeed, the very *need* to transmute the given, the traditional, the status quo, is central to Romanticism and, more importantly, is the essence of its process across languages and disciplines. That is, in Romanticism we find the successful attempt to estrange, lay bare, and violate any previous norm. How transgressive this process was must continue to be engaged and appreciated, as it invites us to tease out the indissoluble connections between everything that shifts, deviates, vacillates, and moves in any way.

Works Cited

Cassirer, Ernst. 1951. *The Philosophy of the Enlightenment*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chaouli, Michel. 2000. "Critical Mass, Fission, Fusion, Friedrich Schlegel's Volatile System." In *Rereading Romanticism*, edited by Martha B. Helfer, 131–49. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi.

Chai, Leon. 2006. *Romantic Theory: Forms of Reflexivity in the Revolutionary Era.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Davies, Norman. 1998. *Europe: A History*. HarperCollins Publishers.

Frye, Northrop. 1968. *A Study of English Romanticism*. Garden City: Random House.

Gay, Peter. 1969. *The Enlightenment: The Science of Freedom*. New York: W. W. Norton & Company.

Jacobus, Mary. 2012. *Romantic Things: A Tree, a Rock, a Cloud*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Kaufmann, Walter. 1960. *From Shakespeare to Existentialism*. Garden City: Random House. Lemert, Charles, and Garth Gillan. 1982. *Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Milnes, Tim. 2010. *The Truth About Romanticism: Pragmatism and Idealism in Keats, Shelley, Coleridge*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Pfeffer, Susanne. 2012. *You Killed Me First: The Cinema of Transgression*. Berlin: n.p. Catalogue of the KW Institute of Contemporary Art Exhibition.Robinson, Jennifer. 2005. *Deeper Than Reason: Emotion and its Role in Literature, Music, And Art*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Sara, Rachel, and Jonathan Mosley. 2014. *The Architecture of Transgression*. Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons.

CHAPTER ONE

TEXTS OF RECOVERY: POST-HEGELIAN REFLECTIONS ON THE WORK OF ROMANTIC LYRIC

RICHARD ELDRIDGE

I have appropriated my main title from Stanley Cavell's essay by this name in his *In Quest of Romanticism* (1994, 50). Placed at the head of an essay on the work of Romantic lyric, it suggests that major Romantic texts both processually aim at and can help their readers to move toward a certain kind of recovery. This suggestion naturally prompts questions: recovery from what? And what picture of psychosociopolitical health as something we both currently lack and might significantly approach is in view? It will be the work of this chapter to fill in answers to these questions. Already it should be clear that I am calling attention to the power of Romantic texts to cut against the grains of staleness, hyperconventionality, and failures of attentiveness—phenomena that, like major Romantic writers, I take to haunt modern personal and social life, as "Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers" (Wordsworth 1965, 182). Against such phenomena, transgression in the service of more animated life is called for.

Nowadays, however, that thought—that we stand in need of a kind of animation that Romantic lyric might help us to achieve, at least in part—is likely to seem to many to be narrow-minded, class-, race- and gender-specific, and distressingly Eurocentric. Often enough, perhaps, it is, at least as long as we are offered conceptions of animated life that focus primarily on the achievements of balance, grace, and decorum, themselves implicitly identified with upper-class, white, male, Euro-American social roles. But animated life need not be so conceived, and attention to Hegel can help us to articulate and to believe in the worth of a certain kind of transgressive animation. Or so, at least, I will argue.

That is, why might an American philosopher, whose primary training is in Anglo-American philosophy of language, especially Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell, take a serious interest in literature, especially Romantic literature? It is Derrida, Lacan, Deleuze, and other icons of French thought who have figured significantly in recent literary studies and shaped current intellection, so one might well wonder what a philosopher of my stripe could contribute to an understanding of Romanticism and vice versa. Specifically, what, if anything, does worrying about linguistic competence, the analytic/synthetic distinction, or the semantics/pragmatics interface have to do with understanding the writings of, say, Wordsworth, Hölderlin, Byron, or Hemans, as well as what is significant about them?

If there is a good answer to this good question, it has to do, I think, with the fact that the sort of philosophy I do as a result of my inheritance of Wittgenstein, Austin, and Cavell can be described as a critical, philosophical psychology or anthropology. It is a form of psychology or anthropology that dwells on human cognitive and moral powers and interests. But it is critical and philosophical rather than scientific insofar as it does not rely solely on experimentation and mathematical law-formulation in characterizing what human beings are either up to or might better or best be up to. Nor is it abstractly ideal or speculative. Instead, philosophy as critical psychology or anthropology undertakes both to articulate more clearly and to assess what is latent in a range of commitments and practices, in the hope that we might build on them and revise them in order to develop richer, freer, and more meaningful forms of human life. It is possible to think of this as an expanded inheritance of Austin's and Wittgenstein's practice of ordinary language philosophy that appeals to what we say when. This works not by counting noses or usages empirically, but by fully imagining a case and then inviting an audience to recall what it would naturally and immediately say—all this in a situation in which that audience, along with oneself, is initially caught up in misleading and self-betraying fits of abstract theorizing that have failed to pay attention to the phenomena closely and articulately. For example, Austin elucidates the difference between succumbing to temptation and losing control of oneself with a case that makes this difference unmistakable *for us* via our immediate hearing in our ears what we would say when. He thus attacks a hyper-rigid, moralistic way of thinking about human action, according to which loss of self-control is ultimately the sole moral failing from which all others flow (Austin 1990, 198). To remind us that one can succumb to temptation *without* losing control of oneself is to nudge us toward a clearer and richer view of both human action and human frailties,

according to which there are varieties of quite distinct failures to act well in sets of quite distinct circumstances.

How could anything *like* Austin's practice of ordinary language philosophy be at all relevant to the study of literature in general and of Romantic literature in particular? Uncoverings and rearticulatings of latent commitments are relevant only when we are somehow confused or have lost our way. In the case of literature nowadays, and especially of Romantic literature, one confusion—a confusion that sometimes entangles me—is that we have somehow forgotten or otherwise lost a clear articulation of the nature and value of the literary object, and so likewise of the nature and the value of the study of it. We have rightly rejected the idea of the literary object, pre-eminently the Romantic lyric, as having somehow sprung chthonically from the pure genius of its maker. Instead we are now likely, and to a considerable extent rightly so, to see the poetic or otherwise literary object as generated by a play of pregiven, uncontrolled bits of language that are subject to slippage, or as generated as an unconscious expression of shared fantasies, or as somehow caught up in the rationalization of one or another relation of domination. Studies of the literary object that begin from such points of view have their uses, and we know more now than we used to about the fragility of individual control of language, about the forces of fantasy, and about ineluctable facts of power. But in taking up these perspectives, we have also lost a sense of any special character of the literary object as strikingly formed to invite and sustain a distinctive form of attention, a practice of close reading. Some literary scholars take the very term *close reading* to be so tinged by what they take to be the classist, racialist, and gender-biased assumptions of the New Critics that they avoid it altogether, and in addition we now have on the books the putatively revolutionary practice of distant reading.

Yet, nonetheless, most of us who work on literature also continue to think of close reading as the distinctive, necessary, and special technique of the practice of literary studies as contrasted with cultural sociology or social history. As a result, it is common to practice close reading on a range of historically and culturally related objects, reading lyric poems closely both together and against medical discourses, advertising, penal discourses, recipes, legal statutes, or education manuals, themselves likewise read closely. It is all but impossible nowadays to write a successful doctoral dissertation or book without a strongly conjunctive "and" that links two or more disparate fields: "Wordsworthian Lyric and Disease," "Romanticism and Geology," "Computational Theory and the Romantic Mind," "Byron and Travel Literature," and so on. Or one might find a neglected or marginalized figure who can be shown to be in critical

interaction with more canonical ones. There is nothing in principle wrong with all this, and much of this work has both rightly corrected some forms of relatively vapid literary worshipfulness and yielded important results. Moreover, it is also by no means incompatible with close reading. But a frequent result, nonetheless, is a tendency to merge literary studies with one or another form of social or cognitive science and in doing so to compromise any claims to distinctively literary insight as it might be both achieved in literary texts (however conditioned by nonliterary factors they may also be) and properly studied by distinctively literary critical means. And so the nature and value of the humanities become increasingly questionable, as the humanities themselves become complicit in the dominance of the image of knowledge as achieved uniquely through scientific practices. This, you might think, is not healthy for literary studies, for the humanities more broadly, or for general culture. But how, if at all, can this situation be addressed and worked through, without retreat to outworn and empty conceptions of self, creativity, and value that we can rightly no longer accept?

I cannot hope to address this question with the sharpness, brevity, and convincingness of Austin's recovery of an understanding of varieties of moral failure. Even if we are in possession of a variety of inchoate commitments to a conception of literary value that might be made more explicit, we also lack a ready ordinary vocabulary for characterizing literary value in detail. Arguably, this is a problem primarily for reflective academics, as general readers seem to have little difficulty talking of literary value, greatness, and achievement. Nonetheless, if we are to be clear about what we are up to in literary studies, there is a question about how best to understand this talk. Lacking a ready-made clear vocabulary, I will have to proceed more indirectly, by developing terms for characterizing both literary value and the nature of human selfhood as distinctive achievements, not givens, where the achievement of fuller selfhood is connected intimately to an engagement with literary values.

My starting point here is paragraphs 394 and 395 of Hegel's *Die Phänomenologie des Geistes* ("The Phenomenology of Spirit"), the very opening paragraphs of Section C, "Reason," Chapter V, "The Certainty and Truth of Reason," Subsection C, "Individuality Which Takes Itself to be Real in and for Itself." Paragraph 394 begins as follows:

> Das Selbstbewußtsein hat jetzt den Begriff von sich erfaßt, der erst nur der unsrige von him war, nämlich in der Gewißheit seiner selbst alle Realität zu sein; und Zweck und Wesen ist ihm nunmehr die sich bewegende Durchdringung des Allgemeinen,—der Gaben und Fähigkeiten,—und der Individualität.—Die einzelnen Momente dieser Erfüllung und

> Durchdringung vor der Einheit, in welche sie zusammengegangen, sind die bisher betrachtete Zwecke. Sie sind als Absraktionen und Chimären verschwunden, die jenen ersten schalen Gestalten des geistigen Selbstbewußseins angehören und ihre Wahrheit nur in dem gemeinten Sein des Herzens, der Einbildung und der Reden haben, nicht in der Vernunft, die jetzt an und für sich ihrere Realität gewiß, sich nicht mehr als Zweck im gegensatze gegen die unmittelbarseinede Wirklichkeit erst hervorzubringen sucht, sondern zum Gegenstande ihres Bewußtseins die Kategorie als solche hat. (Hegel 1952, 283)

> Self-consciousness has now grasped the Notion of itself which, to begin with, was only *our* Notion of it, viz. that in its certainty of itself it is all reality; and End and Essence are for it henceforth the spontaneous interfusion of the universal, of gifts and capacities, and individuality. The individual moments of this fulfilling and interfusion, *prior* to the unity in which they have coalesced, are the Ends hitherto considered. These have vanished, being abstractions and chimeras belonging to those first shallow shapes of spiritual self-consciousness, and having their truth only in the imaginary being of the heart, in imagination and rhetoric, not in Reason. This, being now in and for itself certain of its reality no longer seeks only to realize itself as End in an antithesis to the reality which immediately confronts it, but, on the contrary, has the category as such for the object of its consciousness. (Hegel 1977, 236)

This is, to put it mildly, highly specialized vocabulary that is far from transparent; hence more than a little unpacking of it is in order. This opening idea is that we have now changed our standpoint for understanding self-conscious beings. Initially, in Chapters I to IV, self-conscious beings—that is, human beings with distinctive points of view on things and who engage in discursively structured activities of claim-making and reflective claim-assessing—were taken to be special kinds of objects, or objects with special powers, in the world. The facts of simply being made with faculties or powers a) of the sensible intake and recognition of particulars, b) conceiving of kinds, c) of describing relations between particulars under laws, and d) of asserting oneself and seeking recognition from another subject, were, successively, simply taken as given. In each case, the proposed understanding of the subject as a special kind of object failed to explain how claim-making activity and the reflective assessment of claims are possible. If any proposed explanation of what it is to be a subject fails to explain this, then it is, by Hegel's lights, obviously inadequate, for we are undeniably the kinds of beings who make claims and who reflectively assess them. Hence we now consider a new conception of ourselves as spontaneous end-pursuers.

One might of course from a natural scientific point of view reject Hegel's move here. After all, the human being is an evolved biological animal, and surely what makes the human being to be whatever it distinctively is must somehow in the end be explained by appeal to facts about the human brain and its evolutionary history. Perhaps, contra Hegel, we just are objects in the world with special kinds of biologically evolved powers. Psychology in Hegel's time might have been insufficiently developed to account for human claim-making activity and reflection on it (as it remains insufficiently developed in ours), but surely—it might be objected—it must be somehow possible to do so, at least in principle.

In favor of Hegel's move, however, it can be argued plausibly enough that there is a kind of self-defeating paradox attaching to the suggestion that we can fully understand human claim-making activity scientifically as a function of the brain and its evolutionary history. Surely the brain is the evolved locus of certain basic capacities of perception, spatial orientation, memory, and so on. But will a natural scientific account of these suffice to yield an explanatory account of claim-making and reflective assessment? As long as natural scientific theories centrally take the form of law formulations relating causes and effects, there is at least some reason to be skeptical. Law formulations cast effects as brought about by their causes with natural necessity. Ideally, in a fully specified law formulation with all independent variables registered in the account of the cause, that natural necessity amounts to inevitability. Yet the products we produce in our claim-making activity seem not to occur with inevitability. Ask me in relevant circumstances whether the cat is on the mat. Will I inevitably utter the syllable "yes" as an automatic output of my brain activity? No, not inevitably, but rather only as long as I have heard and understood the question, have paid attention, have found the light good enough, have decided to be sincere in replying, have not taken the question as metaphorical or allegorical, and so on. Claims about causes of human actions, including expressions of beliefs, are strongly hedged *ceteris paribus* in a way that seems difficult to sublime away by incorporating the hedges into independent variables in the antecedent of a law formulation. Analytic or definitional reductions of states of epistemic commitment, such as beliefs about cats on mats, to discrete, causally activated dispositions or brain states just do not seem to be in view. In involving strong "all other things being equal" hedging, the logic of belief is just different from the logic of cause-effect relations in nature that fall under natural necessity. We make strongly hedged and active contributions to our expressions of our beliefs, as we choose to act on some among many available motives, with various degrees of attentiveness and alertness. To

deny this is to deny the existence of the very phenomenon that wants explanation.

If this is right, then we must at the very least understand ourselves as ineliminably active beings, beings who both make a contribution to the structure of our consciousness insofar as it has discursively structured contents and who rank-order their motivations and decide to act on some of them rather than others at any given moment. And this is Hegel's point. We are now to understand ourselves—our discursive consciousness, our claim-making activities, and our actions that express them—as somehow self-grounding, not the result of natural necessity alone. We are to understand that form of being as itself *alle Realität* ("all reality"); that is, as not fully grounded in and not adequately explained only by any physical or biological natural facts.

From this point of view, Hegel goes on, for any existent human, discursively structured point-of-view-bearing subject, "Zweck und Wesen ist ihm nunmehr die sich bewegende Durchdringung des Allgemeinen,—der Gaben und Fähigkeiten,—und der Individualität" (Hegel 1952, 283). ("End and Essence are for it henceforth the spontaneous interfusion [of the universal . . . and individuality]" [Hegel 1977, 236]). That is to say, we are now considering human subjects who think of themselves as just so happening to have projects and ends that they as individuals freely choose to commit themselves to and to sustain. They, as it were, find themselves as just so happening to have one or another gift or talent—for example, an ear for music, a memory for historical facts, or athletic ability—not in virtue of material given such as brain states or muscle mass alone, but also as something they are just freely good at and to the development of which they might freely commit themselves. Such gifts and talents might be shared by anyone and are shared by many, so that it makes sense to think of them as universals: things that can be in more than one individual or place at one time. The issue for any subject who thinks of itself in this way is then: can I over time develop and exercise my talents freely in a way that both solicits continuing recognition of the worth of my course of life and sustains my own cathexis to it? The ends, goals, or projects to which one commits oneself are now understood not simply as ends, goals, or projects that one just happens to have and that mysteriously putatively demand one's allegiance as simply given, say by one's heart or imagination. These very same ends, goals, and projects are now understood as things to which one might freely commit oneself on the basis of reasons and as things the pursuit of which over time may require learning and the modification of strategies for their pursuit. Under this conception, one does not, for example, simply become a teacher, craftsman, parent, or

professional "just like that," for no reason and as a finished product. Rather one tries out one's gifts and talents over time, reflects on them, and modifies their exercise, as one freely goes on with a developing project. Moreover, having given up the strategies of brute domination, servitude, and withdrawal from the world, the human subject now confronts its environment or world not as something absolutely and inflexibly hostile and foreign to it, or antithetical to it, but rather as a set of material circumstances within which and on which it can work over time, through forming and revising strategies through which gifts and talents might be successfully expressed. In this sense, the rational human being, a project-having and reflecting subject, is certain of its own reality; it sets itself to a course of work and development with reasonable enough confidence that its efforts are not necessarily doomed to failure. As paragraph 394 puts it, for such a human subject, "das Tun ist an ihm selbst seine Wahrheit und Wirklichkeit, und die Darstellung oder das Aussprechen der Individualität ist ihm Zweck an und für sich selbst" (Hegel 1952, 284). ("Action is in its own self its truth and reality, and individuality in its setting-forth or expression is, in relation to action, the End in and for itself" [Hegel 1977, 236]). To undertake the active expression of individuality, developed and freely maintained according to reasonable standards and in response to circumstances, is just what it is to have a life as a human subject.

The question for Hegel will then be: is this conception of what it is to be a human subject, or what being a human subject ultimately consists in, adequate? Can it make sense of actually existing human subjects and their courses of life? And for Hegel the answer to this will be "No." Ultimately, the having and executing of projects on the part of individual subjects, taking themselves to have gifts and talents, must itself be understood as possible only through the inheriting, maintaining, and revising of historically developed forms of shared social practice and institutional life that have established themselves as reasonable enough among a people over time. Human beings will turn out to become the *distinctive* individuals they are and to *maintain* themselves in their individualities not only by taking themselves to have particular gifts and talents and then working to develop and express them over time, but also by being, and by thinking of themselves as being, essentially participants in shared, good-enough practical, social, and institutional forms of life, including forms of familial, economic, political, religious, and philosophical life. Here the idea of being good enough counts for something. Broadly characterized, only a modern, more or less post-European way of life that includes the central institutions of the nuclear family, a regulated free market economy,

and a parliamentary democracy is reasonably endorsable and hence stable and good enough.

For the moment, however, never mind this further argument. Consider only the account of what it is to be a human subject that has so far been sketched. Two things about it might immediately occur to you. First, it is plausible enough, at least in describing a certain stage of life: late adolescence. Like me, many of you spend a fair amount of your time around 18 to 22 year-olds. If they are lucky enough not to be fully dominated by economic necessities, then one of the things that is frequently, even centrally on their minds, as they seek to define themselves both in relation to and against their parents and peers, is how to become the grownup individual whom they inchoately take themselves to be. They seek somehow to define themselves by acting and choosing, while also maintaining a sense that this self-definition is a kind of exploration of who they really already are. Or as Hegel (1952; 1977) puts it in ¶401:

> Das ans Handeln gehende Individuum scheint sich also in einem Kreise zu befinden, worin jedes Moment das andere schoon voraussetzt, und hiemit keinen Anfang finden zu können, weil es sein ursprüngliches Wesen, das sein Zweck sein muß, *erst aus der Tat* kennen lernt, aber, um zu tun, vorher den Zweck *haben muß*. Ebendarum aber hat es *unmittelbar* anzufangen und, unter wledhen Umständen es sei, ohne weiteres Bedenken um *anfang, Mittel* und *Ende* zur Tätigkeit zu schreiten. (288)

> The individual who is going to act seems, therefore, to find himself in a circle in which each moment already presupposes the other, and thus he seems unable to find a beginning, because he only gets to know his original nature which must be his End, from the deed, while, in order to act, he must have that End beforehand. But for that very reason he has to start immediately, and, whatever the circumstances, without further scruples about beginning, means, or end, proceed to action. (240)

If one is lucky in things such as finding a good range of opportunities, helpful teachers, coaches, and mentors, and the support of friends, lovers, and family, all within a framework of an institutional life that is not brutely coercive and repressive, then one will more or less muddle through. In any case the central claim seems right: there is a moment in human life, at least in modern pluralized societies, when how one is to become more fully who one already inchoately is presents itself as a problem.

Second, Hegel's claim about how individuals address the problem of becoming who they are is not in any important sense inner, and it does not separate cognition from emotion. That is, the kind of self-understanding

one seeks as one seeks cathexis to nexus of activities and relationships involves reflection on how things have gone and are going within courses of worldly activity. One asks not, "What is in my mind?" but instead, "Does this activity or relationship feel right? Is it going well? Is it significant? Am I or am I not developing talents and powers of attention and interest within this setting?" Here thought and principle are not separated from passion and feeling. Ripeness is all. As Hegel observes in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of World History*, "Die Gesetze, Prinzipien leben, gelten nicht unmittelbar durch sich selbst. Die Tätigkeit, welche sie ins Werk und Dasein [setzt], ist des Menschen Bedürfnis, Trieb, und weiter seine Neigung und Leidenschaft" (Hegel 1968, 81). ("Laws and principles have no immediate life or validity in themselves. The activity which puts them to work and endows them with real existence has its source in the needs, impulses, inclinations, and passions of man" [Hegel 2013, 70]). From within complexes of passions, principles, internalized commands, practical and institutional possibilities, and senses of talent and gift, individuals in the process of self-formation seek to find their way to articulate clarity about who they are and what they are up to.

A set of interrelated further questions about this picture of the development of partially articulated, passionate, self-conscious individuality naturally suggest themselves. How is this development conditioned? More specifically, what about the roles of biology, parents, teachers, siblings, peers, and surrounding social forms and practices? Don't these influences set stronger limits to the development of self-conscious individuality than Hegel suggests? For Hegel, these limiting conditions are both real and yet also ultimately enabling. As already suggested, how they operate will get cashed out in a larger story about the development of *Sittlichkeiten* or forms of ethico-social life that are in the end beneficent for the development of meaningful self-conscious individuality within good enough social settings. For obvious reasons, we cannot be as confident as Hegel that all will go well and that these limiting conditions will prove to be beneficent and enabling in fact. As Robert Pippin (2014, 37) remarks in commenting on the continuing need for art in modernity as a vehicle for the development of individuality against the grains of social forms, that modern life is "a world of freedom realized, or reconciled social relations of persons who are free because they actually stand in relations of at least institutionally secured mutuality of recognition" is, contra Hegel, "clearly false as a claim about European modernity [both] in the first third of the nineteenth century" and on into the present. We are all too aware of the diversities of social forms and of the agonies and horrors that many of them, perhaps all of them, often enough impose on subject development.

The accomplished end of history in a life of right is clearly not at hand, and the development of individual subjectivity frequently involves normalization into a role that does not support reasonable cathexis to it, but is instead marked by remainders and shards of unacknowledged or unexpressed feeling, desire, and attitude.

Nonetheless, human subjects are not simply things. As the contemporary German philosopher Georg Bertram (2014, 12–13) aptly puts it, "die menschliche Lebensform [ist] eine in besonderer Weise reflexive konstituierte Lebensweise. Menschen sind das, was sie sind, nicht von Natur aus. Sie sind auch nicht schlicht aus einer Tradition heraus in dem bestimmt, was sie ausmacht. Menschen haben das, was sie sind, vielmehr auch immer wieder neu zu bestimmen. Was der Mensch ist, ist er immer auch dadurch, dass er Stellung nimmt." ("The human form of life is one that is reflexively constituted in a particular way. Human beings are not what they are by nature alone. Nor are they constituted as what they are as a simple result of tradition. Rather, human beings must also always determine what they are ever anew. The human being is what he is always also through the fact that he takes a stance").

Taking a stance in relation to available occasions of interest and action happens first through imitation. As Aristotle (1941, 1457) remarks, "Imitation [mimesis] is natural to man from childhood; one of his advantages over the lower animals being this, that he is the most imitative creature in the world, and learns at first by imitation." Learning via imitation, and in particular learning how to be a developed individual subject in a particular way, is not a matter of simple, passive behavioral conditioning, and it involves both processes of natural, fruitful growth, initiation, and apprenticeship, as Aristotle emphasizes, and also processes of defensive rigidification and self-protection, as Adorno emphasizes. For our purposes in thinking about literature, however, what is crucial is that engaging with art has a significant role in this course of development. As Bertram (2014, 14) puts it, "Die Kunst . . . leistet einen Beitrag zur Subjektwerden" ("art contributes to becoming a subject"). At early stages of development, this is largely a matter of learning how to notice, attend to, and take an interest in phenomena of one's shared world. While natural objects play a significant role, too, it is also all but inconceivable that children should learn language in the absence of images in picture-books, stuffed animals, toys, and other objects collected precisely in order to be objects of continuing, common attention and comment. Moreover, words—patterns of sounds or marks in use—are themselves artifacts that enable the focusing of attention and interest. At later stages, engagement with works of art often contributes to a reanimation of attention and

interest against the grain of the normalizing demands of occupational or social roles that may have become rigidified and may have come to inhibit wonder and attentive involvement in one's world. As Bertram (2014, 66) puts it, echoing Kant, the fullness of animated attention that a work of art can solicit and sustain works "gegen eine drohende Erstarrung" ("against a threatening petrification"). Or in Stanley Cavell's (1979, 20) formulation, "apart from the wish for selfhood (hence the always simultaneous granting of otherness as well, I do not understand the value of art."

Here both Bertram and Cavell are echoing a fundamental line of thought of Hegel's in his *Aesthetics* about the nature and value of art.

> Das allgemeine Bedürfnis zur Kunst also ist das vernünftige, daß der Mensch die inner und äußere Welt sich zum Geistigen Bewußtsein als einen Gegenstand zu erheben hat, in welchem er sein eigenes Selbst wiedererkennt. . . . Den Schein und die Täuschung dieser schlechten, vergänglichen Welt nimmt die Kunst von jenem warhhaften Gehalt der Erscheinungen fort und gibt ihnen eine höhere, geistgeborene Wirlichkeit. (Bertram 2014, 53, 22)

> The universal need for art . . . is man's rational need to lift the inner and outer world into his spiritual consciousness as an object in which he recognizes again his own self. . . . Art liberates the true content of phenomena from the pure appearance and deception of this bad, transitory world and gives them a higher actuality, born of the spirit. (Cavell 1979, 31, 9)

Art, one might say, presents the world as good enough to live in, as an arena in which distinctively human powers of making free and meaningful life can be significantly exercised.

These are exalted thoughts, and there is at least some plausibility in the thought that art invites and sustains a mode of emotionally involved fullness of attention to phenomena that is reminiscent of the fullness of attention that emerges out of the more immediate, sensory-fugal immersion in experience that is characteristic of early childhood. In *Why Does Literature Matter?*, Frank B. Farrell (2004, 9–22) insightfully proposes that literature (at least in the value-suffused sense that interests us) is an arrangement of words with phenomenological, metaphysical, truth-revealing, psychological, ritualized, regressive, translational, metaphorical, aesthetic, prelinguistic, pedagogic, selective, and linguistic dimensions. This long list of dimensions can be divided usefully into the two broader categories of the cognitive and the linguistic-formal. On the cognitive side, the phenomenological dimension involves an entry into rhythms and moods, the metaphysical a lighting up of things in the world, the truth-

revealing a seeing of things as belonging together, the psychological a registering of anxieties about subject-formation, the regressive a recovery of a magic and significance-suffused world of childhood, the prelinguistic a sense of feeling as bound up with embodiment, and the pedagogic a kind of training in experiencing. In relation to these seven aspects of the cognitive, the thought is that the literary work heightens or animates attention and a sense of being a subject in possession of powers of attention. The emphasis is on accession to an experience of meaningfulness on the part of a subject-in-development who is threatened by inattentiveness or petrification. Through engaging with these cognitive or disclosive dimensions of the literary work, we come to see and feel things about our world afresh and with reanimated interest.

The remaining six linguistic-formal dimensions of the ritual, the translational, metaphorical, aesthetic, selective, and linguistic point more toward the text of the work as itself an object of attention. In particular, the ritual is a matter of engagement with a work's own flow. As Farrell (2004, 24) goes on to observe, "Literature matters because these various functions of the space of literature allow for experiences important to the living of a sophisticated and satisfying human life, because other arenas of culture cannot provide them to the same degree, and because a relatively small number of texts carry out these functions in so exceptional a manner that we owe it to past and future members of the species to keep such texts alive."

All this, too, is not only exalted, but both plausible and important. It prompts wonder about exactly *how* striking literary texts do their work of immersing their readers in significant meaning-disclosive experiences and thus in contributing to life. Literary art in general is, as Hegel remarks in his *Aesthetics*, poetic representation, in contrast with theoretical representation, in as much as, like all art, it presents object and events as meaningful *to* an attentive, experiencing, feeling human subject. "Indem dies Element [die poestische *Vorstellung*] allen Kunstformen gemeinschaftlich ist, so zieht sich auch die Poesie durche alle hindurch und entwickelt sich selbständig in ihnen" (Hegel 1975, 123). ("Since this element [the poetic *imagination*] is common to all the art forms, poetry runs through them all and develops itself independently in each of them" [Hegel 1986, 89]). Lyric poetry, however, makes this poetic character of all art manifest in an especially clear and evident way. Analytically, we can distinguish four foci of attention in the lyric:

1) surface structure, both acoustic and visual-graphic