Teaching Peace as a Matter of Justice

Teaching Peace as a Matter of Justice:

Toward a Pedagogy of Moral Reasoning

By

Dale T. Snauwaert

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To Betty A. Reardon
and
Mary M. Darbes

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PREFACE

BETTY A. REARDON

"The condition of peace and justice is contingent upon the informed political participation of citizens who *are essential participants* in their pursuit."

With this sentence, Dale Snauwaert suggests a core purpose of peace education, preparing learners to be agents for achieving and maintaining a just peace, and points us toward a pedagogy for that purpose. This book is an essential work in peace and justice studies education, or in the broader sense, peacelearning, the preferred term of the Global Campaign for Peace Education, that should be on the shelves of every peace educator.

It is both a plea for and a vivid example of the need for conceptual clarity in the language of moral/ethical arguments, as in problem analysis and action-planning for peace. The precise articulation of ideas is a significant determinant of the efficacy of public discourse on all conflicted public issues. It implies that we must "know what we are talking about," prepared with adequate information on issue being argued, and achievement of mutual conceptualization of the problems at issue among interlocutors. This latter requirement calls for reasoned dialogue, a process tragically missing from present political discourse, making this volume essential reading for all concerned with present threats to democracy.

We live in a time in which those who dominate the public discourse and public policy-making "don't know what they are talking about." The discourse is characterized by ignorance of the fundamental facts of the issues at hand, disregard for truth, ridiculing scientifically valid information, disrespect for alternative viewpoints and denigration of human values. Snauwaert opens to peace education a path to responsibly confronting this problematic of democracy which now threatens not only democracy, but our survival and that of the planet that has birthed and sustained us. The development of the capacity for moral/ethical reasoning is the most promising route out of the amoral and immoral morass into which many world polities have sunken. Indeed, without a citizenry that has achieved and applied these capacities, I fear that we have little chance of surviving as a species, and certainly not as the reflective reasoning individuals and communities that produced human civilization.

To concretize and provide the basis for an inquiry into issues that comprise the problematic of any essentially immoral public order, Snauwaert provides us with direct and conceptually clear queries. These queries shed the light necessary to move forward into the confrontation of the differences in normative perspectives and worldviews that have produced the immoral morass. They are the queries that clarify the actual conditions of injustice in areas that should comprise the moral terrain of public policy making. The queries of "whose security," "who belongs," "whose truth" and "who gets what" raise the core questions of peace and justice, i.e., recognition of full personhood of all in a community, establishing agreement on normative standards and fair distribution of social goods. The query of "who decides" confronts the crucial ethical challenge of the locus of political power. In sum, the queries provide an essential framework for an effective pedagogy of moral reasoning and ethical judgment.

As Snauwaert asserts that peace is the presence of justice, that assertion is embodied in this inquiry into issues of human well-being and social justice. He invokes the principles enshrined in the international standards of human rights as articulated in the Universal Declaration and the Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and Social and Economic Rights. Responsible civil society clings to those standards as life vests in the roiling seas of authoritarianism and climate crisis into which the lack of public moral reasoning has cast us. Snauwaert helps to keep us afloat with an outline of an inquiry that is learner-centered and teacher-friendly, a model of a pedagogy of hope, brilliantly illustrated as he invites learners into a process of the conceptualization and design of a moral community based on essential ethical principles. Such is the pedagogy that all peace educators should be practicing in the face of present moral crises. Snauwaert's work will inspire and facilitate that practice.

Betty A. Reardon
May 2023

Note: I wish to express my gratitude to Janet Gerson who made it technically possible for me to provide this preface.

INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this book is to articulate a normative philosophical framework for the development of an educational approach to teaching peace as a matter of justice, specifically through the lens of moral and political philosophy. The inquiry pursued in the book explores a *normative* (ethical and moral)*,* as opposed to an empirical, approach to peace studies and peace education. As both a research and educational enterprise, the field of peace studies is interdisciplinary; the exploration of conceptual frameworks of peace, threats to, and violations of peace, and processes of peace building, are multidimensional endeavors requiring an array of disciplinary lenses. As such, inquiry into the causes of violence and its consequences, methods of resolving and transforming conflict, methods of building peace, and the articulation and justification of the moral principles, values, and institutions of peace on multiple levels of the human experience (from the individual, to the national, international, and global) define the substantive focus of peace studies (Lopez 1999, 2008).

The conditions of peace and justice are contingent upon the informed political participation of citizens who *are essential participants* in their pursuit. An essential aspect of citizens' capability to participate in the pursuit of peace and justice is their ability to be not merely recipients, but *dynamic agents of justice*. It will be argued that furthermore, this capability is importantly grounded in developing citizens' knowledge and capacities for moral reasoning and judgment regarding basic questions of justice (including matters of *injustice*). Thus, the focus of this inquiry is to articulate a philosophical framework for, and a pedagogical approach to, the development of moral reasoning and judgment pertaining to basic questions of justice, including the knowledge of those questions and their normative basis.

From a normative perspective, peace is a basic social *good*. It is an ethical value of the highest order of importance, for without peace, the pursuit of a good life is severely limited. Peace is a necessary social condition for the pursuit of a good life. In order to have a higher order interest in peace as an ethical value, the normative dimensions of peace require careful consideration. Peace involves both a plurality of normative questions as well as a consideration of the nature of moral reasoning and judgment. These questions concern what ethical values and moral principles

of justice can achieve justified acceptability and thereby might best be employed to regulate the institutions that comprise the basic structure of society on all levels, as well as to guide our judgments regarding specific issues and matters of peace and justice.

Peace has generally been conceptualized as the absence of violence (Galtung 1990). However, instead of defining peace in terms of an absence of violence, which makes violence the operative concept, we can define it as the positive condition of the *presence of justice*. Peace defines a social system regulated by justifiable principles of justice and ethical values essential for the pursuit of a good life. Establishing and sustaining peace within all levels of societies is a basic and urgent matter of justice.

As stated above, the purpose of this book is to articulate a normative philosophical framework for the development of an educational approach to teaching peace as a matter of justice. This articulation includes an exploration of the concept of peace (including violence), the method of moral reasoning as a means of normative justification of principles of justice, the exercise of judgment as the application of principles of justice and ethical values, a human rights conception of justice contextualized within the basic questions of justice, and responses to injustice in terms of both the principles of nonviolence and ethics of war and peace. A pedagogy of moral reasoning and judgment is constructed that is consistent with the fundamental ideas of justice and the freestanding logical structure of moral reasoning within the context of basic questions of justice and responses to injustice. As a foundational premise of this book, it can be asserted that the educational cultivation of the capacities of moral reasoning and judgment in the population of citizens is of paramount importance. This cultivation speaks to the very purpose of an education for peace and justice, one identified by the celebrated peace educator Betty Reardon as the development of the *political efficacy of citizens* (Reardon and Snauwaert 2015a).

1. Moral and Political Philosophy: Reconciliation

There are at least two basic views of moral and political philosophy: the Platonic and the democratic views (Rawls 2007). The Platonic view maintains the existence of a universal moral truth that defines justice and is inherent in a universal moral order independent of human creation that can be comprehended by reason and known through rational intuition. The democratic view does not appeal to an independent moral order. Instead, it invokes the authority of our human capacity to engage in moral reasoning

for the purpose of constructing basic principles of justice that may be reasonably agreed to by citizens.

From this democratic perspective, citizens' capacities for moral reasoning and judgment play a pivotal role in practical considerations of peace and justice. This book is informed by, and addressed to, persons who aspire to democracy, including its imperatives and applications in a variety of levels of social cooperation, from local to global. As will be discussed in detail in what follows, moral reasoning concerning justice is intimately linked to democracy and democratic processes of deliberation (Baier 1958; Forst 2014a; Rawls 1971, 1993, 2001; Sen 2009). It will be argued that peace and justice are contingent, in part, upon the active, informed, reflective, and deliberative moral and political participation of citizens. Engaged, informed *citizens are necessary participants* in the pursuit of peace and justice, and those citizens need to be capable of exercising moral reasoning and judgment regarding principles of justice and a complex array of basic questions of justice.

Following the 20th Century American political philosopher John Rawls, an appeal to a democratic view of political philosophy and moral reasoning further suggests four roles for political philosophy (Rawls 2007, 10-11): (1) to be *practical*, working to resolve conflicts; (2) to provide an *orientation that* enables citizens to gain greater clarity about their political ideas and how to reason about them; (3) to enable *reconciliati*on, enabling citizens to understand, evaluate, and possibly affirm their social world; and (4) to help citizens probe the limits of what is possible in terms of the political organization of society. All four roles of political philosophy will be invoked in the exploration of thinking about an education for peace and justice, however, *reconciliation* has a central role.

As the 19th century German philosopher Hegel (Hegel 1991 [1821]) maintained, *reconciliation* means that citizens come to understand and affirm the social and political institutions of their society, the basic structure of society, as expressing and being consistent with their dignity as free and equal persons (Rawls 2000a). Just social institutions constitute the background conditions within which individuals are free to conduct their lives. Individual ends and purposes are contingent upon what we can realistically expect, and what we can expect is relative to both our position in the society (and its advantages or inequalities) and the principles of justice used to regulate the social and political institutions of the basic structure of society (Rawls 1971). We often are not completely aware of their influence on the limits and possibilities of our lives.

One general approach to normative political philosophy suggests that a just society is built on and through the vast array of ethical and moral

personal and social relationships between individuals. It is argued that a just society is contingent upon the ethical and moral goodness and rightness of such relationships (May 2015). However, it can be argued on a more basic level that the normative quality of relationships between individuals is contingent upon the basic institutional structure of society, and if that structure is unjust, then it is difficult at best for the vast array of individuals to engage in ethical relationships. The basic institutional structure of society is the water we swim in, and if the water is polluted, the pollution conditions the quality of our swimming together. This institutional perspective is further explored in this book, along with the political philosophy of reconciliation.

The ideal of realizing ourselves to be free and equal persons within the context of just social and political institutional conditions, is however, contingent upon citizens coming to know and affirm that the institutions that shape our lives are reasonable and just. Reconciliation, the process of reconciling with one's social and political world, is therefore essential for a just and peaceful society. As the American philosophy John Rawls suggests, to be a citizen means that "one understands that society is held together not simply by the satisfaction of particular interests but by a sense of reasonable [i.e., just] order …" (Rawls 2000a, 355).

Furthermore, the importance of citizens becoming reconciled with their society is a key dynamic involved in creating and maintaining a balance of power between political institutions and citizens. Based upon the historical analysis of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson in their book *The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty* (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019) a balance of power between State and Society creates a narrow corridor of liberty. The dynamics of the creation and maintenance of this corridor of liberty occurs within the framework of a balanced, dynamic structure of state-society power relations—the right balance of power between the State (government institutions and the elites that control them) and Society (the people as citizens). Reconciliation paves the way to what Acemoglu and Robinson refer to as the "Shackled Leviathan": State power constrained by an informed and politically engaged citizenry (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019). The mobilization and empowerment of a society of citizens in relation to the State, balances the power between them creating a "corridor of liberty." The dynamics of this process of power balancing are referred to by Acemoglu and Robinson as the "Red Queen effect." The Red Queen effect (analogous to the Red Queen in *Alice in Wonderland* who tells Alice that in order to remain in place she has to keep running!) is that the State and Society must continually exercise sufficient and balanced capabilities relative to each other in order to maintain their

balance of power so that neither the state nor society dominates. Through this Red Queen balancing effect, a corridor of liberty, a social and political space is created within which justice can be established and freedom and equality protected.

State political power exists in a state of balance with the power of society when it achieves political legitimacy through consent. This balance creates a space, a corridor of justice, of positive peace, within a given society. The corridor constitutes the *sphere of peace as a balanced structure of State-Society power relations.* This balance of power as a part of reconciliation is contingent upon an informed and politically active citizenry, capable of engaging in the process of moral reasoning in order to justify and affirm principles of justice that regulate the basic institutional structure of society.

The main point of identifying a balanced structure of State-Society power relations, is to point out that engaged, informed *citizens are both necessary and essential participants* in the pursuit of peace and justice, and that citizens need to be capable of exercising moral and political judgment regarding a complex array of basic conflicts and questions of justice. In this sense citizens are the *agents*, and not the mere recipients, of justice (Forst 2017).

From the perspective of *reconciliation*, moral and political philosophy seeks to address the question of the justifiability, or normative validity, of the terms of social cooperation that are the foundation of the basic institutional structure of society, including its economic, political, and legal system (Rawls 1971, 1993). To say a norm and/or institution is right or wrong, just, or unjust, is to make a claim, and that claim should be backed by valid reasons, not merely personal preferences, or arbitrary authority. The process of moral reasoning and judgment is one of deliberating and offering reasons that justify those claims, including claims about the justifiability of social norms and institutions (Baier 1954, 1958; Singer 2011; Scheffler 1981).

It has long been recognized and is a premise of the argument in this book, that rational and reasonable citizens are a necessary condition for democracy, and thereby for peace and justice (Chomsky and Otero 2002; Dahl 2000; Dewey 1916; Freire 1998; Rawls 1993; Scheffler 1981; Sen 2002; Gutmann 1999). The fertile soil of autocracy, and thereby a potent threat to democracy and justice, is the irrationality and anti-intellectualism of citizens (Gessen 2020; Hett 2018; Paxton 2004; Stanley 2018). A case in point is the rise of Fascism in Germany and Italy after World War I (1920s-1930s) as a hostile anti-democratic movement. Fascism rests upon populism; its political base is the mass of ordinary people. As a political ideology and movement, it appeals, however, not to the reason of citizens,

but to their emotions. It appeals to "mobilizing passions" that support and feed the rise of fascism. The nature and danger of irrationality is illustrated by the case of Adolf Eichmann, as interpreted by the philosopher Hannah Arendt in her important book *Eichmann in Jerusalem* (Arendt 1994). Arendt observed that Eichmann, the official in charge of the deportation of Jews and others to the concentration camps, was incapable of the exercise of moral reasoning and judgment (to be discussed further in Chapter 8).

The educational cultivation of the capacities of moral reasoning and judgment in the population of citizens is therefore of paramount importance; this educational cultivation constitutes the core of an education for peace and justice. If the moral reasoning and judgment capacity of citizens is of paramount importance for peace and justice, then, as the political and educational philosopher Amy Gutmann suggests: "'political education' - the cultivation of the virtues, knowledge, and skills necessary for political participation - has moral primacy over other purposes of public education..." (Gutmann 1999, 287). The society, in particular the government, has, therefore, the civic duty to provide citizens with a political education that is devoted to the development of their capacity to engage in moral reasoning and judgment (Snauwaert 2020b). As a basic premise of this book, it can be asserted that the educational cultivation citizens' moral reasoning and judgment capacities is of singular importance; hence, the significance of a reflection on the normative philosophical foundations of an education for peace and justice.

2. The Organization and Summary of Chapters

This book is organized into 2 parts. Part 1 includes Chapters 1, 2, and 3, and lays a foundational framework of analysis by defining the nature of moral reasoning concerning peace and justice. The nature of this method of moral reasoning and judgment as an alternative to other ways of determining a moral point of view of what is good, right, and just, such as authority, social custom, and tradition, etc. is explored. This appeal to moral reasoning offers a basic framework for analyzing various considerations of justice which are central to exploring the questions of peace and justice discussed in the remaining chapters of the book.

The purpose of Part 1 is to explore: 1) conceptions of peace, and its core problematic, violence, as urgent matters of justice, 2) the nature of moral reasoning pertaining to justice, and 3) the pedagogical orientation and approach based as a foundational pedagogy of ethical and moral reasoning and judgment. If peace is conceived in terms of justice, what is the normative rational basis for a conception of justice, its normative meta-

criteria, and how should we educate future citizens to be able to participate in thoughtful moral reasoning about basic questions of justice?

In Chapter One the concept of peace will be explored in terms of both the content of peace and violence as its problematic, as well as the spheres of peace or the spaces/levels of society in which peace can occur. In terms of the content of peace there are two basic conceptions: negative and positive peace—negative peace being the absence of violence and positive peace being the presence of justice. In this discussion the idea of violence as the problematic of negative peace will be discussed in terms of its basic definition as the infliction of avoidable harm and the three basic forms it can take: direct, structural, and cultural.

Historically, peace has been defined as the absence of war between states (Galtung 1969, 167). This condition has been referred to as "negative peace," negative in the sense that it is a state of affairs *free from* significant degrees of direct, physical violence. However, the idea of peace has been expanded to include the absence of not only organized warfare but violence of all kinds. These other froms of violence have been conceptualized as structural and cultural violence. This expansion broadens the content of peace to include the absence of all forms of violence.

However, it will be argued that peace can be conceived more fruitfully in a positive sense: peace understood as the presence of justice. This notion of peace as the presence of justice is known as "positive peace". Furthermore, the ideas of justice and positive peace will be conceived in terms of human rights and their correlative duties. Lastly, the sphere of peace as the space within which peace occurs will be explored in terms of three levels: the nation-state, international society, and global society. The sphere of peace will be conceived as contingent upon the conception of the scope of justice. Principles of justice pertaining to the basic questions of justice explored in Part 2 will be considered on each level.

Chapter Two explores possible approaches to normative justification of principles of justice. It is argued that normative justification consists in offering reasons to support one's principles, values, and judgments; not any reason will do, however. Reasons of justification also require that the offered reasons be valid, that is, justifiable themselves. Moral reasoning concerns the justifiability and thus the normative validity of principles of justice, and the judgments based upon them, that pass the test of the criteria of fairness understood as presuppositions of moral reasoning. A *method of moral reasoning* is appealed to, rather than claims of the truth of an independent moral order or mere social acceptance and custom, in order to establish the criteria of the normative justifiability of ethical values, principles of justice, and judgments. It will be argued that the exercise of

moral reasoning grounded in the presuppositional criteria of fairness is a reasonable approach to normative justification in a world characterized by social and cultural pluralism/diversity.

Chapter Three articules the philosophical orientation to the proposed pedagogical approach. What principles can be applied to frame a pedagogical approach for the educational development of the capacities of moral reasoning and judgment articulated in Chapter 2? It is posited that a process-oriented and inquiry-based pedagogical approach, articulated in the philosophies of education of John Dewey, Paulo Freire, and Betty Reardon, is foundational to the development of moral reasoning and judgment.

Secondly, a foundational principle of this pedagogical approach is the orientation of teaching in terms of the logical structure of disciplines (Bruner 1965). The emphasis in this orientation is on understanding the structure of the subject matter in two basic ways: it's fundamental ideas and the nature of inquiry characteristic of the subject matter. Capacities of reasoning are developed through participation in, and exercise of, the forms of thought as structured in the methods of inquiry characteristic of disciplines of study and grounded in their fundamental ideas and methods of inquiry. A pedagogical outline of the exercise of moral reasoning concerning the basic questions of justice (as explored in Part 2) will be articulated within the project of defining and defending a *constitution of peace.*

In Part 2, the exercise and practice of applying moral reasoning to justify principles of justice, and the exercise of judgment as it applies ethical values and moral principles of justice to specific cases of policy, practice, and institutions, will be explored as a pedagogical process within the context of basic questions of justice:

- *Whose Security?* Who should have an equal right to security of person?
- *Who Belongs?* Who should be considered an equal citizen and thus a full participant in the society? (Mettler and Lieberman 2020)
- *Whose Truth?* What conception of truth and thereby reality should be affirmed? What is the valid basis of determining truth?
- *Who Gets What?* What constitutes a just distribution of the basic goods and resources of a society?
- *Who Decides?* Who should have political decision-making authority? Who should have power? What constitutes a just distribution of political power?

- *Whose Resistance?* Is there a right and duty to resist and redress injustice? If so, what principles of corrective justice should guide that resistance? Who should bear this duty to resist?

Exploration of these questions will provide background understanding of the basic questions of justice and demonstrate the pedagogy of moral reasoning and judgment. Answers to these questions of justice are necessary for the establishment of just and peaceful societies, from local to global; they form the fabric of a *constitution* of a *just* society. Through exercise of moral reasoning and judgment, Part 2 offers a framework and process for the conceptualization of such a society as part of a pedagogical practice, as outlined below. It is important to note that the exploration of the basic questions of justice, including background knowledge and alternative principles of justice as answers to these questions is not meant to be an exhaustive treatment. Rather the approach taken is *illustrative*, presenting exemplary possibilities as a means for the exercise and practice of moral reasoning and judgment. Although detailed discussion of the basic questions of justice and alternative answers in the form of principles of justice is pursued, the main purpose is not to determine necessarily *what* readers and students should think but *how* to think about the basic questions of justice that are foundational to peace and justice.

Chapter Four: *Whose Security?* Security is a fundamental good; freedom from physical violence, including the threat of violence, is a necessary condition for a decent life. Of course, an appeal to a human right to security of person is *one* possible answer to the question *whose security?* Is there a justifiable *human right* to security of person, expanding the scope of security to all human beings, or does the right to security of person stop at the borders of nations? Thus, the chapter will also explore two alternative conceptions of security of person that do not recognize a universal scope of security: the theories of Realism and International Society.

Chapter Five: *Who Belongs*? Who belongs and who doesn't is a basic question of membership and standing that every society addresses. Who should be considered a citizen and thus a full participant in the society? Should citizens have equal standing in society, or should membership be distributed unequally in terms of a social and political hierarchy? From a rights perspective, membership constitutes the "right to have rights," in the sense that it is membership that gives one the standing in the society to make justified claims; equal standing as a member is therefore the "equal right to have equal rights." Membership and equal standing therefore are of singular importance. The purpose of this chapter is to explore and discuss a process of moral reasoning, and thus a pedagogical framework, concerning the basic

principles of justice and values, and judgments based upon them, pertaining to laws and policies regarding the rational basis of membership, including immigration, *and* standing in society.

Chapter Six: *Who's Truth?* A basic problem for every society is the question of how to adjudicate conflicts of knowledge and truth (Rauch 2021). This adjudication is especially important, for beliefs are identity-defining. In exploring this question Charles Sanders Peirce's four methods of settling beliefs and opinions is employed (Peirce 1877). Peirce's four methods are tenacity, social acceptance, authority, and science. The method of tenacity is the attempt to hold on to one's belief by avoiding competing reasons that would challenge it: reasoning by avoidance. The method of social acceptance is an appeal to reasons that are generally accepted in one's social and cultural context, or taking the validity of what is accepted at face value without further scrutiny. The method of authority is for a recognized elite to supply and validate belief and to enforce it, if necessary, by force or coercion. The method of science, broadly defined, is to subject truth claims to critical public scrutiny grounded in established and recognized methods and standards of inquiry. Truth claims that survive such inquiry become settled and established (Peirce 1877).

In this chapter the validity of each of these methods as they apply to settling truth and knowledge is explored. It will be argued that we should appeal to the method of "science" as critical public scrutiny to settle truth. Furthermore, the chapter explores ways in which belief and truth can be distorted and weaponized in terms of disinformation for political purposes. The basic question to be reflected and deliberated upon is: what principles of justice pertaining to the process of fairly settling truth and belief should be adopted? What principles are most consistent with basic rights of freedom and the elements of fairness?

Chapter Seven: *Who Gets What*? The purpose of this chapter is to explore and discuss prominent conceptions of distributive justice within national societies and beyond to the question of global distributive justice. Distributive justice concerns the question of *who gets what*? *Distributive justice* pertains to the question: what is the most morally and ethically justifiable distribution of social goods? In other words, the principles of distributive justice tell us how the benefits and burdens of living in society together *should be shared,* including those relating to environmental sustainability and justice. A conception of distributive justice specifies: (1) rights *and* duties, (2) the content of those rights in terms of the social goods to be distributed, and (3) the scope of justice (meaning: How far should distributive justice reach? How inclusive should the moral community be?). Human rights provide a general statement of what we are due and what we

owe others, and thus distributive justice. However, they do not speak to the specific distribution of their content as well as the scope of that content's distribution. On what grounds are we to determine an unequal but fair distribution of social and economic goods?

The meaning of a just and peaceful society is contingent in part upon how distributive justice is conceived. For that we need principles of distributive justice. Reflection upon the various approaches to and conceptions of distributive justice is foundational to reasoning and judgments concerning peace, including the injustice of structural violence. Furthermore, justifiable and affirmed principles of justice, as common fair terms of social cooperation, are important tools that empower citizens and thereby are essential for the establishment and maintenance of the sphere of peace conceived as the corridor of liberty and justice. Distributive justice is a fundamental element of a just, positive peace, for without a fair distribution of social goods and opportunities, including environmental sustainability, a society will be burdened by structural violence, domination, and oppression.

Chapter Eight: *Who Decides?* 'Who decides' is the basic question of how political power should be distributed among the population, including citizens, as well as on what basis political power is justifiable and legitimate. As will be discussed, from within the moral point of view of the elements of fairness the recognition of reciprocal equality suggests that there is no person with authority that is a moral superior to any other person. From this perspective, no one is inherently superior to others. This moral equality suggests further that no one can claim political power/authority and in terms of reciprocity deny the same claim to others, and furthermore, others can reasonably reject others' non-consensual claims of power. Political power is therefore derived from consent. If power is delegated, it must be representative. In terms of impartiality, claims of political power/authority must be to the benefit of others not merely for one's own self-interest. These are the basic requirments and tests of justifiable answers to the question of Who Belongs. What kind of political system is consistent with fairness? What constitutes a fair distribution of political power? Is a democratic political system the most justifiable among the alternatives? What is the scope of democracy?

Chapter Nine explores the basic question of Whose Resistance? or *corrective justice,* in the sense that it considers what moral principles can guide our response to violations of the ethical values and moral principles of justice? The purpose is, thereby, to explore principles of justice that guide responses to resisting and redressing injustice. In that sense, the subject of this inquiry is to explore principles of *corrective justice* (Mills 2016, 2018).

Corrective justice is understood as *nonideal* theory in contrast with the ideal principles of justice that are explored earlier in the book. Nonideal theory is situated within an ideal theory of justice, for injustice can only be determined from within the parameters of an ideal theory of justice. Chapter Nine, thereby, explores the philosophy and strategy of nonviolence in response to the existence of injustice, including social injustice and structural and cultural violence, as well as the ethics of the possible use of military force in response to the injustice of military aggression. Nonviolence is both a normative philosophy of justice and a political strategy of transformative direct action; it is primarily a principled response to injustice. Nonviolent philosophy and strategy seek to transform social structures of violence, domination, and oppression through nonviolent direct action. Principles of corrective justice are grounded in the moral duty to resist and transform injustice. Therefore, the analysis begins with a discussion of the moral duty to resist injustice. Based on that duty, *nonviolent principles*, as the *default position of resistance* are examined, followed by an analysis of the basic question of whether the use of military force is justifiable in resistance to injustice, its limitations, and subsequent post-conflict obligations. The chapter examines what principles can be used to justify the use of force in particular cases (*jus ad bellum*), the principles that guide the use of force within acceptable moral limits (*jus in bello*), as well as principles that speak to moral responsibilities pertaining to the post-conflict situation and the restoration of peace (*jus post bellum*).

Throughout the book the principles of justice will be explored in various contexts and levels of human society essential to creating and maintaining a just peace. The process of moral reasoning in terms of fairness will be used to deliberate upon the principles of justice that are most justifiable in the pursuit, establishment, and maintenance of peace, and the application of those principles to moral judgment concerning matters of peace and justice.

PART 1

PEACE AS A MATTER OF JUSTICE AND MORAL REASONING

CHAPTER ONE

THE CONCEPT OF PEACE

This chapter explores the concept of peace, which includes discussions of violence as its' core problematic. The concept of peace has two basic dimensions. The first dimension seeks to answer the question: what is the content of peace? The second dimension is the "sphere of peace", which refers to the space where peace exists. The spheres of peace include the scope or range of peace: local, national, international, or global (Matsuo 2007). In general, the conditions of peace arise within organized social relationships that comprise the basic structure of society (Rawls 1971).

In terms of the content or value of peace, there are two basic conceptions, negative and positive peace; negative peace being the absence of violence and positive peace being the presence of justice. The idea of violence as the problematic of negative peace will be discussed as the infliction of avoidable harm, and the three basic forms it can take: direct, structural, and cultural.

Historically, peace has been defined as the absence of war; the absence of direct organized violence between states (Galtung 1969, 167). This condition has been referred to as "negative peace,"; negative in the sense that it is a state of affairs *free from* significant degrees of direct, physical violence. This work adopts an expanded concept of negative peace to include the absence of not only organized warfare, but the absence of violence of all kinds, including structural and cultural violence (discussed in detail below). This expansion broadens the content of negative peace to include the absence of all forms of violence (Galtung 1969).

If we define peace only in terms of an absence of violence, however, we allow violence to be the operative concept. If we define the conditions of peace in a pro-active, affirmative way, peace can be defined as the presence of justice; since violence itself is an urgent matter of justice, peace is more aptly defined as the presence of justice. This notion of peace as the presence of justice (and not the absence of violence) is known as "positive peace". While acknowledging the limitations of defining peace in negative terms as an absence violence, in favor of a positive definition that concieves peace as the presence of justice, it is still important to recognize that violence is the core problematic of peace. Violence is an urgent matter of justice

marking the presence of injustice. It is important to recognize that these two concepts of peace, negative and positive, are intertwined. In what follows, the ideas of justice and positive peace will be examined and further discussed through the lens of human rights and their correlative duties, beginning with an exploration of the nature of violence.

1. The Nature of Violence

The core problematic of peace is violence. Violence can be defined in the following way:

> *... violence is present when human beings are being influenced so that their actual somatic and mental realizations are below their potential realizations ... Violence is here defined as the cause of the difference between the potential and the actual ...* Violence is that which increases the distance between the potential and actual, and that which impedes the decrease of this distance (Galtung 1969, 168).

When an act, practice, policy, and/or institution impedes, damages, or destroys a person's or persons' realization of their potential as human beings, then violence is present. In other words, violence is that which dehumanizes. Therefore, harm can be understood as the suffering of a deficiency in one's ability to realize the fundamental interests necessary for a life of dignity, as the failure to protect the vital interests of persons. The ultimate act of violence, therefore, is take another person's life, for it destroys their potential; it is the ultimate dehumanization.

Another way to understand violence that converges with the above is to define it as the violation of the integrity (wholeness or intactness) of the being of another (Buffachi 2007). Furthermore, integrity refers not only to one's physical body but also to the autonomy of a person, the capacity to be self-determining (MacCallum 2009). From within these perspectives, violence can be understood as that which violates respect for the dignity of the person (May 2015). The infliction of psychological harm is also a type of violence so defined (Audi 2009).

However, there is a further requirement for the constitution of violence: the harm must be *avoidable*. Hence, we can define *violence as avoidable harm* (harm understood in terms of the definition above). Of course, the meaning of *avoidable* includes *intentional* harm (Galtung 1969; Reardon 2010b; Reardon and Snauwaert 2015a). To elaborate, if the harm is inflicted because of naturally occurring phenomena, such as a drought, flood, tornado, or viral pandemic, then, even though it causes harm or destruction, it is not violent, for it is unavoidable from a human perspective.

However, if many people die and are injured due to intentional poor construction of buildings and bridges to save construction costs and increase the builder's profits, then the harm may have been avoidable, and thus the builder may be guilty of the commission of violence. A viral pandemic is not violent as such, because the harm is generally unavoidable. However, if for political reasons the government's response to a pandemic causes avoidable illness and death, then that government may be committing violence against its own people. Government inaction in the face of global climate change due to humanly generated carbon emissions is another example of violence related to a seemingly naturally occurring phenomenon. The point here is that an act of violence is defined as an act of avoidable harm, the avoidable degradation of human potential.

1.1 Direct Violence

When there is an actor and their action is the cause of avoidable physical and/or psychological harm, then there is the commission of *direct violence* (Galtung 1969; Audi 2009). Psychological abuse or torture, for example, can be considered a form of direct violence, for it often inflicts permanent harm. The paradigm case of direct violence is aggressive warfare, the intentional organized violent use of military force, often inflicted between states but also by states against other forms of organization (e.g., terrorist groups). Aggression is the crime of unjustified use of force against innocent societies and persons (whether the use of force is ever morally justifiable will be discussed in detail in Chapter 9). As Michael Walzer puts it: "Every violation of the territorial integrity or political sovereignty of an independent state is called aggression" (Walzer 1997, 52). Such acts violate the self-determination and integrity as well as physical and psychological well-being of the people of the violated state. As Walzer suggests, aggressive warfare "interrupts peace ... peace-with-rights a condition of liberty and security that can exist only in the absence of aggression itself" (Walzer 1997, 51).

There are, however, potent forms of violence other than direct violence; violence is not limited to *direct* physical or psychological violence as we discuss in the following section which explores structural or systemic violence.

1.2 Structural Violence

One additional potent form of violence is what is referred to as "structural violence" or "systemic violence" (Galtung 1969; Žižek 2008).