Studies in the Philosophy of Philo

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By

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PREFACE

This anthology consists of five essays, some of which are updated articles published in various journals and primarily based on lectures dealing with Philo's Philosophical, Historical and cultural background, as well as with Philo's Judaic world in comparison to his Pagan environment and to Christianity.

The Book opens with an updated version of an essay dealing with Platonic and Stoic dialectic in Philo, published in 2016 (*Elenchos* XXXVII, fasc. 1-2, pp. 181-208) and based on a lecture I delivered the same year at the Society of Biblical Literature International Meeting (SBL) at Yonsei University in Seoul. In this essay I wish to make a proposal that may offer some solution to the problem of the surprising absence of a proper use of the dialectic of the late Platonic dialogues in Philo's works. Philonic scholars have not, to the best of my knowledge, raised this question; but Philo's very rare allusions to Plato's later dialogues were noted in Runia's comprehensive study on Philo and Plato's *Timaeus*.

The minimal presence of later Platonic and Stoic dialectic in Philo may point to an ideological approach. It should not be expected that Philo himself would clarify the reasons for his attitude towards this part of the Platonic dialogues, since it is not his method to expose his various sources or explicate his attitude towards them. A possible explanation of Philo's avoidance of the use of logical models of any type–indicating a shying away from dialectic–might be associated with the connection between logic and the activity of the Sophists (as he calls them) of his time.

In adopting philosophical concepts as ancillary to his exposition of the Torah, Philo is not prepared to accept the merely technical and formal aspects of philosophy, and especially those of dialectic, since logic–Stoic as well as Platonic–as used by the "sophists" of Philo's age, is likely to lead some of its practitioners to pervert the truth, both philosophical and scriptural. Philo, who is inclined towards adopting ideas popular in the philosophies known at his time as a means to presenting his own view– namely that it is the task of science to serve the law of Moses–could have easily forgone unpopular dialogues which would not cater to his ambition of glorifying the Torah of Israel among his fellow Jews, thereby serving as an alternative to the pseudo-philosophical wares sold by the Sophists. An elaborated and more comprehensive discussion of Philo's dialectic is

included in my book *Philosophy to the Aid of Biblical Interpretation* (Idra Publishing, Tel-Aviv 2022)*.*

The second essay is based on a lecture delivered in 2017 at the SBL's meeting at Humboldt University in Berlin. This essay (first published in the Shamir Yonah Festschrift) deals with the various philosophical names of God in Philo and their Sources in Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics. In order to illustrate God's ontological perspective in Philo's theological philosophy, it deals first with one of God's common names attributed to him by Philo, namely *to on*. Another of God's descriptions, "The One", which is clearly taken from the Bible and the Septuagint, where it is used in the masculine gender, appears in Philo in the neuter gender, *to hen*. A discussion of the theological context of both of these names as they appear in Philo reveals some measure of his complex notion of the divine, and help us towards understanding his involvement with the relationship between man, God, and His powers.

The next paper which deals with some Philosophical and political aspects of Philo's account of the migration of Abram from Ur of the Chaldees is based on an article in Hebrew published in 2012 (*Jewish Studies* 48, pp. 27-48) and a lecture in 2018 at Palazzo Rucellai in Florence (Lectures on Philo II conference). The paper discusses the allegorical significance of Abram's migration from Ur of the Chaldees as described in Genesis 12. An analysis of various passages of Philo shows that the three milestones associated with this migration–Ur of the Chaldees, Haran and Canaan–allegorically express three phases of mental development: curiosity, philosophical investigation and scepticism. Similarly the article deals with the identification of the Chaldeans with the Astrologists. The expulsion of the Astrologists from Rome as well as the expulsion of the Jews in 19 CE raises the possibility that Philo's commentary regarding Abram's migration contains a political message. The article concludes by explaining the relevance, in Philo's thought, of understanding the allegorical significance of Abram's journey to anyone wishing to gain a mystical-ecstatic experience, which according to Philo's system constitutes the peak of religious experience.

The fourth paper deals with Philo's Threefold Divine Vision and the Christian Trinity, published in 2016 (*HUCA* 87, pp. 93-113). This paper deals with a comparison between some aspects of God's nature as expressed in Philo's writings, and the (later) Trinitarian controversy in early Christian theology. This comparison emphasizes the fundamental difference between official Christian dogma and Philo's theology. In Contrast to those maintaining the official theological views which were accepted by the church stands, for example, Origen (who was declared heretic in 400 C.E.),

whose concept of the First Person of the Christian Trinity is closer to Philo's concept of God. The comparison of Philo's theology to Christian theology is based upon the significance which Philo attributes to the vision of the three men appearing before Abraham as God appeared to him at *Elonei Mamre*, as well as upon the exegesis offered by some of the Christian church fathers to this biblical description.

The fifth and final article published in 2022 (*Revue Biblique* 129/4) is based on a lecture delivered in 2018 at the University of Helsinki about Jewish and Christian Consolatory Literature as well as on a lecture in 2019 at the Pontifical Biblical Institute and the Gregorian University in Rome. This paper examines Joseph's non-interment as the main reason for Jacob's lack of consolation in Philo's *De Iosepho* 16-27 in which his attitude toward bereavement and grief is reflected to demonstrate the existence of Graeco-Roman consolatory literature grounded in the Stoic worldview alongside other philosophical schools in Philo. The biblical concern for proper burial as well as the Roman notion that leaving a corpse unburied had unpleasant repercussions on the fate of the departed soul may be the key to understanding Jacob's surprising words in *De Iosepho* 23 "it is not your death which grieves me, but the manner of it".

PLATONIC AND STOIC DIALECTIC IN PHILO

In this paper, dealing with Platonic and Stoic dialectic in Philo, I wish to make a proposal that may offer some solution to the problem of the surprising absence of a proper use of the dialectic of the late Platonic dialogues in Philo's works. Philonic scholars have not, to the best of my knowledge, raised this question; but Philo's very rare allusions to Plato's later dialogues were noted in David T. Runia's comprehensive study on Philo and Plato's *Timaeus*.[1]

Robert Hamerton-Kelly's[2] words concerning the need for a historical investigation of the traditions and sources employed by Philo in order to advance the understanding of his writings are not subject to controversy. Indeed, various scholars through the generations have identified Stoic elements in Philo, as well as Sceptical elements reaching Philo through the literature of the Late Academy and Pyrrhonists.[3] However, those scholars, investigating the influences of former philosophers, mainly concentrate on the major problems taken from the areas of philosophy commonly designated as Physics and Ethics in the ancient world.[4]

An investigation, such as the present one, of Philo's sources for problems and issues in dialectic (which in the ancient world included logic and some of the terms known today as metaphysical as well as, and mainly, rhetoric and poetics),[5] may serve as a test and a starting point for a

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[1] See n. 7. All the references Lincicum's has to late dialogues have nothing to do with the dialectic of these dialogues. See David Lincicum, "A Preliminary Index to Philo's Non-Biblical Citations and Allusions," *Studia Philonica* 25, (2013): 139-167.

[2] Robert Gerald Hamerton-Kelly, "Sources and Traditions in Philo Judaeus: Prolegomena to an Analysis of his Writings," *Studia Philonica* 1, (1972): 3-26, esp. p. 3.

[3] See the article by von Arnim which shows that a portion of Philo is based upon some of the Pyrrhonic τρόποι: Hans Friedrich August Von Arnim, *Quellenstudien zu Philo von Alexandria* (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1888), 53-100.

[4] It is well-known that in the ancient philosophical world not only did Physics concern itself with the nature of the material world but also with the nature of the gods. "Theology" was universally regarded as a part of "Physics".

[5] Rhetoric and poetics were regarded by philosophers – if not always by teachers of ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία –as part of dialectic.

discussion of Philo's attitude towards this significant segment of philosophy, as well as for a discussion of the attitude of the "Platonist" Philo to various facets of the dialogues of Plato.

It is a matter of common knowledge that Philo frequently uses Platonic materials. It is inconceivable that one could read even a few pages of his works without detecting quotations from, or latent references to, various dialogues within the Platonic corpus. [6] Yet it seems that there are facets of some of the dialogues of Plato whose presence in Philo can hardly be detected. One of the aspects of Plato's writings which is hardly visible in Philo is the dialectic of some of the later dialogues (which–as we shall see–were nonetheless familiar to Philo)– namely *Parmenides*, *Sophist*, *Philebus*, and *Statesman*.[7] A philosopher who uses Plato frequently should have good reasons why this central feature of these later dialogues forms no part of his attitude towards Dialectics.

In Plato's later dialogues we find a new approach to analysing and defining concepts as well as to discussing the relationships between general concepts, namely, a new kind of Dialectic (which is different from what we find in Plato's earlier dialogues), as presented by the main speakers in these dialogues. The format and formal structure of the later dialogues' logical argumentation is more developed than in the earlier dialogues. In the later dialogues we find an argumentative discussion based on an explicit method of question and answer rather than a long uninterrupted speech (see e.g. *Sophist* 217c-e) that re-examines and illuminates the middle dialogues' doctrines in a more complex way, without coming to any definite conclusion as in some earlier dialogues (whether or not Plato had changed his mind on various issues).

The majority of modern scholars situate Philo's philosophical perspective among the Middle Platonists[8] who knew and read Plato, but a *Plato dimidiatus*.[9] They drew heavily on the *Timaeus*, *Republic*, *Laws*, *Phaedrus*, *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and only tangentially on the other dialogues.[10] Basing

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[6] See, for example, Thomas Henry Billings, *The Platonism of Philo Judaeus* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1919); David Theunis Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: Brill, 1986. *Philosophia Antiqua* Vol. 44).

[7] Philo's rare allusions to Plato's later dialogues are noted by Runia, *Timaeus*, 486, n. 62.

[8] But see Runia's examination which led him to the conclusion that Philo is not a Middle Platonist: Runia, *Timaeus*, 505-519.

[9] See Runia, *Timaeus*, 486.

[10] See John Dillon's Index of Platonic Passages in *The Middle Platonists* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 458.

himself on Leopold Cohn and Paul Wendland's index, John Dillon asserted that Philo's particular favourites were the *Timaeus* and the *Phaedrus*, though he employs also the *Phaedo*, and key portions of the *Theaetetus*,[11] *Symposium*, *Republic*, and *Laws*.[12] Dillon assumes[13] that Plutarch and Atticus–not to mention the somewhat later Numenius–were familiar with Plato's *Sophist*.

There is no doubt that Philo was familiar with the *Sophist* and read it at least once: a proof of such a familiarity can be provided by a passage of Philo's *Deus*. 55-56 in which he discusses two types of philosophers, whom he designates as soul lovers and body lovers. The manner in which he describes the approach of these philosophers is reminiscent of the manner in which the Eleatic Guest in Plato's *Sophist*[14] deals with the two groups of philosophers which he designates "friends of ideas"[15] and "those who define existence and body, or matter, as identical".[16] Philo, as might be expected, phrases things in his own terminology, but no doubt the very *Gigantomachia* described in those pages of Plato was in his mind. In addition to Philo's knowledge of Platonic sources which was derived first and foremost directly from the dialogues, it is unlikely that Philo's familiarity with the Platonic *Gigantomachia* came to him through the doxographical literature. Usually Doxographers do not make use of metaphorical expressions like *Gigantomachia*. Although this example from Plato's *Sophist* leaves no doubt concerning Philo's familiarity with this dialogue,[17] it does not seem

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[11] As Wendy Helleman mentions, Philo's extensive quotations and specific mention of Plato's *Theaetetus* in his *De Fuga*. 62-64, and 82, indicate the importance for him of this particular section of *Theaetetus*. See Wendy E. Helleman, "Philo of Alexandria on Deification and Assimilation to God," *Studia Philonica Annual* 2, (1990): 51-71, esp. pp. 54-55.

[12] John Dillon, *The Middle Platonists, 80 B.C. to A.D. 220*, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1977), 140; Anita Méasson, *Du char ailé de Zeus à l'Arche d'Alliance: images et mythes platoniciens chez Philon d'Alexandrie* (Paris:*É tudes augustiniennes*, 1986).

[13] Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 83, 226, 256, 369, 227, 133.

[14] p. 242 ff.

[15] Plat. *Soph.* 246b7-8: νοητὰ ἄττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἴδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι. At 248a4-5 they are called "friends of the Ideas", while the "friends of the body" are simply called "the others" at 251d1.

[16] Ibid, 246b1: ταὐτὸν σῶμα καὶ οὐσίαν ὁριζόμενοι.

[17] Nikiprowetzky mentions *Soph.* 236a among other passages which constituted the Platonic background for Philo's relation of the words εἰκόσι... εἰκών in *Praem*. 28-30. See Valentin Nikiprowetzky, *Le commentaire de l'ecriture chez Philon d'Alexandrie* (Arbeiten zur Literatur und Geschichte des hellenistischen Judentums 11, 1977), 142. In his Index to Philo's Non-Biblical Citations and Allusions,

that the dialectic appearing in *Sophist* and other later dialogues had any significant impact on Philo's way of thinking.

Other Middle Platonists like Plutarch or Alcinous[18] do make use of Plato's later dialogues. As mentioned by George Karamanolis[19] Plutarch identifies the non-rational soul with the "disorderly and maleficent soul" of *Laws* X, with the "limitlessness" of *Philebus* (26b), the "congenital desire" and "inbred character" of *Politicus* (272d, 273b) and presumably assume the existence of a divine soul, guided by statements in Plato's *Philebus* 30c and *Sophist* 248d-249a. Dillon writes: [20]

> Technical logic was not among Plutarch's more vital concerns, and there is in his extant works not much to indicate which system he followed, although there is no reason to think that it differed much from that set out somewhat later in Albinus' *Didaskalikos*, which is itself a basic account of Middle Platonic Logic.

As for Alcinous, his argument that God is *ameres* ("without parts") owes something both to *Parmenides* 137c5ff and to *Sophist* 245a1ff as mentioned by Dillon.[21] On Alcinous's use of logic Dillon says:[22]

Lincincum indicated the link between *Deo* 4 and *Parmenides* 142a (Siegert's updated position concerning the authenticity of *De Deo* as Philonic is widely accepted), See: *Studia Philonica Annual* 25, (2013): 157.

[18] On the identity of Alcinous see Dillon's introduction to *Alcinous–The Handbook of Platonism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993), ix-xiii. As Jean-Baptiste Gouriant recently claimed, however that we know nothing about Alcinous, it is reasonable (acording to his doctrine) that he was a Platonist and not a Stoic, and should be dated to the 1st-2nd CE (based on the report that Arius Didymus was his source, at least on one occasion). Many intersecting points of similarity between Alcinous and Platonic authors of the second and third periods (in addition to Arius being his source), as well as his identification as a Platonic author of the time, have led Gouriant (and also Whittaker and Dillon) to define Alcinous as a Middle Platonist. See: Jean-Baptiste Gouriant, "La postérité de la classification aristotélicienne des syllogismes aux IIe et IIIe siècles: vers un organon long?," in *Ad notitiam ignoti. L'Organon dans la translatio studiorum à l'époque d'Albert le Grand*, ed. Julie Brumberg-Chaumont (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), 63-114, esp. pp. 91-92; Dillon, *Alcinous*, xiii; John Whittaker, *Alcinoos*, *Enseignement des doctrines de Platon* (Paris, 1990, 2002), xii-xiii.

[19] George Karamanolis, "Plutarch", *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Winter 2014 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), forthcoming URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/ win2014/entries/plutarch/>.

[20] Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 225.

[21] Dillon, *Alcinous*, 110.

[22] Dillon, *Alcinous*, xvi.

In the sphere of logic proper, Alcinous's approach is to attribute to Plato without reservation the whole system of Peripatetic logic as worked out by Aristotle, and further elaborated by Theophrastus and Eudemus, finding in the dialogues examples illustrative not only of categorical syllogisms, but also of "pure" and "mixed" hypotheticals. What we have here, then, is a most useful exposition of later Peripatetic logic, presented in such a way as to make it seem essential Platonism.

After saying, in his summary, that "the primary "achievement" of the Middle Platonists was to appropriate Aristotelian logic, together with the developments attributable to Theophrastus and Eudemus, for Plato, Dillon concludes that "it cannot be said that the Middle Platonists added much that is valuable to the science of logic".[23]

A possible cause of Philo's relative disregard of those very later Platonic dialogues was the position of these dialogues within the educational system until Philo's time. Plato's *Parmenides* began to occupy a central place in philosophical education only after the rise of Neoplatonic philosophy, approximately two hundred years after Philo's time. To the best of our knowledge, Plato's *Philebus* and *Sophist* were not at the core of philosophical education and were not systematically read in the schools of Philosophy. The situation remains unchanged today. These later dialogues, other than *Statesman*, are not among the dialogues which are much read or studied even within philosophy departments. It is not by accident that while concerning dialogues such as *Republic*, *Phaedo, Phaedrus* and *Symposium* new books and new translations frequently make their appearance in English, concerning Plato's *Sophist*, for example, there has been to date a few English commentaries: that by Lewis Campbell, published in 1867;[24] Francis Macdonald Cornford's important translation and commentary published in 1935,[25] and the incomplete commentary by Richard Bluck

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[23] Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 49-50. Dillon adds that "There are a few lost works of Plutarch, such as A Reply to Chrysippus on the First Consequent, A Lecture on the Ten Categories, A Discourse on Hypothesis, and On Tautology, which sound interesting, but there is no reason to suppose, on the basis of Plutarch's attested performance, that they contributed anything of basic importance." (Ibid)

[24] Lewis Campbell, *The Sophistes and Politicus of Plato* : with a revised text and English notes (Oxford : Clarendon Press, 1867).

[25] Francis Macdonald Cornford (ed. and trans.), *Plato's theory of knowledge*: *The* Theaetetus *and the* Sophist *of Plato* (London: Kegan Paul, 1935).

published in 1975,[26] as well as, Jacob Klein's commentary (1977);[27] Stanley Rosen's reading of the dialogue (1983);[28] Seth Benardete's translation and commentary (1986)[29] and David Ambuel's translation and analysis of the dialogue published in 2007.[30] In 1993 Nestor-Luis Cordero's new French translation of this dialogue was published which includes a novel commentary.[31] At the same time, this dialogue is not as yet included in those series published in English of translations of Platonic dialogues, for the use of Philosophy students, such as the Clarendon series. Perhaps the fact that these later dialogues are for the most part at the fringe of basic philosophical studies today might be one of the causes why scholars of Philo have neglected to search for traces of these dialogues in Philo. It is possible that in Philo's philosophical education, of which almost nothing is known,[32] these dialogues did not occupy an important place.[33]

What is more, most Platonists at that time did not even attempt to follow most of the logical ideas of the last dialogues, since they followed Stoic logical concepts and ideas, and as we learn from the various introductions to Plato (such as Albinus'), they attempted to read Stoic logical notions into their interpretations of Plato. As will be shown, Philo is quite familiar with Stoic logical concepts as well, yet, unlike other Middle Platonists, he makes no active use of them either.

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[26] Richard S. Bluck, *Plato's Sophist*: *A commentary*, ed. Gordon C. Neal. (Manchester, UK: Manchester Univ. Press, Publications of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Manchester 20, 1975).

[27] Jacob Klein, *Plato's trilogy*: *Theaetetus*, *the Sophist, and the Statesman* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1977).

[28] Stanley Rosen, *Plato's Sophist: The drama of original and image* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1983).

[29] Seth Benardete (ed. and trans.), *Plato's Sophist* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1986).

[30] David Ambuel, *Image and paradigm in Plato's Sophist* (Las Vegas, NV: Parmenides, 2007).

[31] Nestor-Luis Cordero, *Platon: Le Sophiste* – Traduction inédite, introduction et notes (Paris: GF Flammarion, 1993).

[32] See Dillon, *Middle Platonists*, 140-141.

[33] However, explaining the neglect of dialectic in Philo only as a sign of the times would appear to be partial. It is true that most scholars include Philo among the Middle Platonists–as Dillon had already done (see Runia's opposite view in note 8 above); but if one wishes to sort out the complex problem which this article sets out to answer, albeit partly, it is not really enough to point out that Philo belonged to a group called Middle Platonists, and that most members of that group were not all that interested in dialectic. As will be proposed later Philo's neglect of dialectic may be a conscious policy of eschewing the methods of his contemporary "sophists".

An exceptional case in which Philo drew on Stoic logic is the *Hypothetica* as mentioned by Gregory E. Sterling[34] and recently by Horacio Vela.[35] Sterling's hypothetical reconstruction of the origins of the *Hypothetica* suggests that:

> After the pogroms in 38 but prior to the departure for Rome in 39, Philo felt compelled to answer the Egyptian libel. He utilized the standard literary account from the *Aigyptiaka* of Lysimachus as his base. At the same time, his current opponents were not just the civic leaders, Isidorus and Lampo, but the intellectuals, Apion and Chaeremon. Intriguingly, both had ties to Stoicism. Could it be that the statements in Lysimachus' history became the battle ground for argumentation by means of Stoic logic? This would explain the contents, form, and function of the work.[36]

Sterling concludes that "The *Hypothetica* of Philo was designed to be a valid statement of the history and practices of the Jewish people. The validity it claimed was not through an appeal to sacred scripture, but to reason, i.e., the principles of Stoic logic". Following Sterling's suggestion that Philo, using Lysimachus's anti-Jewish writings as a model, responded directly to many anti-Jewish charges in preparation for the delegation to Gaius by using principles of Stoic logic based on analysing the genre, context, and contents of the *Hypothetica*, Vela re-examined the nature of Philo's reasoning and approach to biblical history in the *Hypothetica* arguing that Philo utilized elements of Stoic logic and the rhetoric of dilemmatic arguments to reason with his opponents and subvert their anti-Jewish slanders. Through this rhetorical approach, Vela says, Philo moved his adversaries beyond the conflicting records of written sources, Jewish and pagan, and trapped them in a positive and reasonable understanding of Jewish history and culture.[37]

Although the *Hypothetica* appears to be a clear case where Philo drew on Stoic logic, this may have been for a special purpose, which was the need to defend the Jewish position on grounds acceptable to both parties, as pointed out by Sterling, or as an example for Philo's usage of logic in refuting the *sophismata* of other people, as will be mentioned later, and not part of Philo's general practice. In this case "This strategy allowed Philo to

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[34] Gregory E. Sterling, "Philo and the Logic of Apologetics: An Analysis of the Hypothetica," *Society of Biblical Literature Seminar Papers Series* 29, (1990): 412-430.

[35] Horacio Vela, "Philo and the Logic of History," *Studia Philonica Annual* 22, (2010): 165-182.

[36] Sterling, "Logic of Apologetics," 429.

[37] Vela, "Logic of History," 166.

operate on a level playing field with critics of Jewish history for whom the scriptures had no authority" as Vela says.

Let us now examine Philo's use of some of the late Platonic and Stoic terms. In both dialogues, *Sophist* and *Statesman*, the Eleatic Guest proposes a new approach to the problem of definition which he refers to as διαίρεσις, division. If, for example, an angler is being defined (and this is the first example brought by the Eleatic in Plato's *Sophist* 218e2-221c4) it is necessary to begin from the wider group to which the angler belongs, men having an art; this is then classified into various types of artisans, these types in turn are reduced into sub-types and so forth, until a particular definition of an angler is achieved.

The prevalent assumption in the ancient world was, almost certainly, that this method of definition was one which Plato personally adopted. In the ancient world people were not concerned with the chronology of the dialogues,[38] and even the assumption that Plato could change his mind occurs (in the surviving literature) only once.[39] The chronology of Plato's dialogues has become an issue only in modern scholarship. The first attempts at such a chronology were made in the nineteenth century. The ancients did not usually occupy themselves with the idea of the chronology–not to mention the possible development–of an author. They took it for granted that all the author's works represented the same ideas, attitudes, techniques and the like.[40] The only indication that someone considered some

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[38] The ancient world's lack of interest in the chronology of the dialogues, as well as emphasizing that the chronology of Plato's dialogues has become an issue only in modern scholarship may save us from asking the question: If "division" is a logical procedure developed only by the late Plato, what about the earlier dialogues, where his logic seems to be more in line with the "genus proximum–differenta specifica" approach?

[39] See Charles H. Kahn, *Plato and the Socratic Dialogue: the Philosophical Use of a Literary Form* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 42-48. Serious concern with chronology began only in the 19th century, and only in the 20th century did polemics concerning the relationship between the Ideas and the μέγιστα γένη begin. The accepted assumption in the ancient world, as far as we know, was that both these approaches complement each other.

[40] See John Glucker, "Images of Plato in Late Antiquity," in *Physics, Cosmology and Astronomy, 1300-1700: Tradition and Accommodation*, Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science 126, ed. Sabetai Unguru (Dordrecht and London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991), 3-18, see esp. pp. 7-8. In note 18 to p. 8 (appearing at the end, on p. 17), Glucker refers as an example of lack of interest in, and knowledge of, the chronology of an author's work to ancient discussions of Aeschylus and Sophocles. He refers for evidence to his article "Aeschylus and the Third Actor," *Classica et Mediaevalia* 30, no. 1-2 (1969): 56-77.

possible development in an author comes from one of the Middle Platonists, who suggests that *Phaedrus* was Plato's earliest dialogue, since in it Socrates objects to writing down ideas, but Plato did write down his ideas in dialogues: ergo, he changed his mind.[41] This only indicates that the idea that an author may change occurred to one Platonist, and only under pressure–as a possible solution to a contradiction in principle which he saw between *Phaedrus* and other dialogues. Thus it appears that the problem of the chronology of Plato's dialogues is entirely irrelevant to Philo. For someone living in the age of Philo, when the whole idea of chronology and change and development in an author had not yet occurred to people, one assumes either (as is probably the case) that Philo paid little or no attention to any Platonic logical procedure in his more philosophical sections, since for him (as for most of his contemporaries) logic was Stoic logic–or that, had he given this a thought, he would work out some manner of reconciling the two logical "procedures", which in any case have some features in common.

Modern scholars, on the other hand, offer arguments as to whether the *diairesis* system and the "greatest kinds" which go with it supersede the Theory of Ideas appearing in the middle dialogues or merely complements that theory. In Philo there is a fair amount of allusion to the Theory of Ideas.[42] As to Philo's use of division, it appears that *diairesis,* forming the technical basis of Philo's hermeneutics, as shown by Irmgard Christiansen,[43] was not uncommon in Stoic logic,[44] and was likely to have become by Philo's time a normal analytic practice, independent of one's philosophical training.

Let us now consider those places where Philo employs terms which have a dialectical sense in Plato's later dialogues, and see whether their significance in Philo is identical to their meaning in Plato. A positive reply

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[41] See the Anonymous "Prolegomena to Plato's Philosophy", p. 214 in Carl Friedrich Hermann's Teubner edition of Plato, vol. VI = §45, 4-8 in the more recent critical edition: Leendert Gerrit Westerink (ed.), *Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co., 1962).

[42] See for example: Philo, *Opif*. 25; *QE* 2.52; *Spec*. 1.45-48.

[43] See the first chapter of Irmgard Christiansen, *Die Technik der allegorischen Auslegungswissenschaft bei Philon von Alexandrien* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1969); Henrik Tronier, "Virkeligheden som fortolkningsresultat*:* om hermeneutikken hos Filon og Paulus," [In Danish=Reality as a result of interpretation: on hermeneutics in Philo and Paul] eds. Morgen Müller and John Strange, *Det gamle Testamente i Jødedom og Kristendom*, "Forum for Bibelsk Eksegese" 4 (Copenhagen, 1993), 151-182. For an English summary see RRS, 204-205.

[44] For the use of *diairesis* in Stoic logic see: Diog. Laert. vii 61 (*SVF* III p. 214-215), 84, 132.

to this question would not be surprising, since Philo, as mentioned, was suffused with Platonic influences; moreover, the use of dialectic is actually called for, since it is one of the three major divisions of philosophy current in his time (Dialectic, Physics, Ethics). A negative reply to this question, or merely minor occurrences of these Platonic terms in Philo, on the other hand, would require explanation. We shall primarily consider the most important dialectical terms in the later dialogues and their appearances in Philo. In those dialogues – mainly in *Parmenides* and *Sophist*–those terms appear which the Eleatic Guest describes as "greatest kinds" or "forms" (μέγιστα γένη; μέγιστα εἴδη). These "greatest kinds" include Being (τὸ ὄν) and non-being (τὸ μὴ ὄν); the self (τὸ αὐτό; ταὐτόν) and the other (τὸ ἕτερον); the like (τὸ ὅμοιον) and the unlike (τὸ ἀνόμοιον); movement (κίνησις) and rest (στάσις).

Platonic dialectical terms from the later dialogues in Philo

In many places Philo makes use of the term γένος, where the meaning varies. It can be race,[45] family,[46] a breed of animals,[47] or, in the dative, by nature of one's birth,[48] etc. All these uses which Philo makes of this term are not dialectical. Philo's application of the term γένος in contrast to εἶδος is significantly less frequent. In the following passage of Philo's *Spec.* 4.132, in which there is a distinction between γένη and εἴδη of laws, there is likely to be a Platonic influence.

> For if we are right in describing the main heads delivered by the voice of God as generic laws (γένη νόμων), and all particular laws of which Moses was the spokesman as dependent species (εἴδη), for accurate apprehension free from confusion scientific study was needed, with the aid of which I have assigned and attached to each of the heads what was appropriate to them throughout the whole legislation.[49]

> In *Spec.* 1.194 Philo says:

> After having discoursed to this extent on these subjects he begins to classify the kinds (γένη) of sacrifices. He divides them into three principal classes

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[45] Philo, *Spec.* 3.113.
[46] Philo, *Fug.* 147.
[47] Philo, *Det.* 152.
[48] Philo, *Ebr.* 122.
[49] PLCL, vol. VIII, p. 91.

(εἴδη) which he calls respectively the whole-burnt-offering, the preservation-offering and the sin-offering.[50]

In his use of γένη and εἴδη in both passages, Philo does indeed employ dialectical terminology; however, the sharp distinction between γένη and εἴδη is more Aristotelian[51] and Stoic[52] than Platonic.[53] In Plato's Eleatic dialogues γένος and εἶδος are generally used alternatively.[54]

In *Mut*. 58 Philo says:

> There are very many kinds (εἴδη) of covenant, assuring bounties and gifts to the worthy, but the highest form (ἀνώτατον γένος) of covenant is "I myself".[55]

Here, in addition to the distinction between γένη and εἴδη, we also have the expression ἀνώτατον γένος, the highest form. A further echo of this expression is found in Philo's *Spec*. 3.46:

> No Jewish shepherd will allow a he-goat to mount a ewe or a ram a she-goat, or a bull a mare, or if he does he will be punished as an offender against the

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[50] PLCL, vol. VII, p. 211.

[51] The general distinction between the terms γένος and εἶδος is found in Aristotel's *Top*. See David M. Balme, "Γένος and Εἶδος in Aristotle's Biology," *CQ*, N. S., 12, no. 1 (1962): 81-98.

[52] The division of γένος to εἴδη in Stoic texts can be located in the words of Diogenes Laertius vii 61 in which he quotes Diogenes of Babylon: διαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους ἡ εἰς τὰ προσεχῆ εἴδη τομή, οἷον "τῶν ζῴων τὰ μέν ἐστι λογικά, τὰ δὲ ἄλογα" (SVF III p. 215, 1). Further evidence of this division can also be deduced from the titles of some of the lost books of one of the Stoic founders, Chrysippus, for example:
1.ὅρων τῶν πρὸς Μητρόδωρον τῶν κατὰ γένος α' β' γ' δ' ε' ϛ' ζ'
2. περὶ εἰδῶν καὶ γενῶν πρὸς Γοργιππίδην α' β'
3. πιθανὰ πρὸς τὰς διαιρέσεις καὶ τὰ γένη καὶ τὰ εἴδη καὶ <τὰ> περὶ τῶν ἐναντίων α'
See Diog. Laert. vii 189 (*SVF* II pp. 8-9).

[53] The post-Platonic distinction between γένος and εἶδος is expressed by Philo in the following passage of *Leg*. 2.13: …πρὸ γὰρ τῶν εἰδῶν ἀποτελεῖ τὰ γένη, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου... γένος...τὸ εἶδος... A similar distinction between the terms is also mentioned in Philo's *Her*. 126.

[54] See Constantin Ritter, *Neue Untersuchungen über Platon* (München: C. H. Beck, 1910, rep. New York, 1976), 230 f.; Catherine H. Zuckert, *Plato's Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2009), 684.

[55] PLCL, vol. V, p. 171.

decree of nature, who is careful to preserve the primary species (ἀνωτάτω γένη) without adulteration.[56]

The expression ἀνωτάτω γένη does appear in Plato's dialogues, though it is impossible to ascertain that it was particularly adopted by Philo from Plato. The same question also arises as we read the following passage of Philo's *Migr.* 155:

> It is this mixed multitude which takes delight not in a few species of lusting only, but claims to leave out nothing at all, that it may follow after lust's entire genus (γένος), including all its species (εἶδος). For we read "the mixed people that was among them 'craved after lust', after the genus itself, not some single species (αὐτοῦ τοῦ γένους, οὐχ ἑνός τινος τῶν εἰδῶν), 'and sat down and wept'".[57]

Here there is a distinction between γένος and εἶδος -but is it necessarily taken from Plato, or perhaps from Aristotle or the Stoics? Let us move from the more plausible to the lesser probability. Indeed our sources for the Stoic distinction of γένος to εἴδη date mainly from the second century BCE–such as Diogenes of Babylon whom I have quoted in a previous note, and his disciple Antipater of Tarsus,[58] and from the titles of the lost works of the third head of the Stoic school, Chrysippus of Soli, quoted in the notes above, though what had been written by the Stoic logicians in the second century may be assumed to have reached Philo not directly from their writings, but from reference books based upon their writings and the writings of others.

Concerning the other alternative, that Philo took the distinction between γένος and εἴδη from Aristotle, the problem remains to what extent Philo could have been familiar with Aristotle's acroamatic writings, and particularly the logical writings. It is true that those acroamatic writings, which had probably been out of circulation for over two centuries, were published in Rome by Andronicus and Tyrannio at the beginning of the first century BCE and were released to the book market approximately sixty five years prior to Philo's birth, though a fair amount of time must have passed

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[56] PLCL, vol. VII, p. 505.

[57] PLCL, vol. IV, p. 221.

[58] See examples for this, using "source criticism" of Antipater's book on definition, in Ivor Ludlam, "Antipater of Tarsus: A Critical Edition, with Commentary, on the Testimonia for his Life, Writings, and Logic" (PhD diss., Tel Aviv University, 1997), 256-263.

until they had spread among the readers.[59] Cicero, who was familiar with the texts written by Aristotle, early in his life, for publication, most probably had not as yet read those acroamatic texts.[60] Although it is occasionally possible to find statements in Philo reflecting Aristotle's lectures,[61] yet it is doubtful whether Philo himself had derived these statements from an Aristotelian text or had found them in some other author who had read them in Aristotle.

Ivor Ludlam's[62] findings concerning the Stoics' unfamiliarity with the existence of the Aristotelian term ὁρισμός, definition, and its incompatibility with their method in any event, also makes for the possibility that the distinction between γένος and εἶδος entered the vocabulary of logical terms in the Hellenistic period from Aristotle, even through an oral tradition. It is therefore possible that both Aristotle and the Stoics may have shared a common source for the division of γένος into εἴδη. It can reasonably be assumed that this division entered the vocabulary of logical terms in the Hellenistic period from the language of one or other of Plato's followers. The following passage, Philo's *Spec.* 1.194-196, particularly abounds in dialectical terminology.

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[59] Francis Henry Sandbach, *The Stoics* (London: Chatto & Windus Ltd., 1975), 21-22; Francis Henry Sandbach, *Aristotle and the Stoics* (Cambridge: "Cambridge Philological Society", Suppl. Vol. 10, 1985), 11.

[60] See Madvig's classic Excursus-Cicero, *De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum Libri V,* Io. Nicolaus Madvigius recensuit et enarravit (Copenhagen: Hauniae Gyldendalianae, 1876) 837-848: Excursus VII: *Ciceronis de Libris Aristotelis Testimonii Auctoritas Exquiritur*; Sandbach, *The Stoics*, 14, 48-49.

[61] For example, Philo's words in *Opif.* 120 concerning objects possessing seven visually detectable details: Τὰ δὲ διὰ τῆς ἀρίστης τῶν αἰσθήσεων ὄψεως κρινόμενα μετέχει τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ κατὰ γένος· ἑπτὰ γάρ ἐστι τὰ ὁρώμενα, σῶμα, διάστασις, σχῆμα, μέγεθος, χρῶμα, κίνησις, στάσις, καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲν ἕτερον. Philo's list relates to Aristotle's list in *De An.* II, 6 (without σῶμα): ...τὰ μὲν οὖν τοιαῦτα λέγεται ἴδια ἑκάστου, κοινὰ δὲ κίνησις, ἠρεμία, ἀριθμός, σχῆμα, μέγεθος... and mainly to Aristotle's *Sens.* I-III where Aristotle comments *inter alia* (*Sens.* I, 437a6-9): ...διαφορὰς μὲν γὰρ πολλὰς εἰσαγγέλλει καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἡ τῆς ὄψεως δύναμις διὰ τὸ πάντα τὰ σώματα μετέχειν χρώματος, ὥστε καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διὰ ταύτης αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα (λέγω δὲ κοινὰ σχῆμα, μέγεθος, κίνησιν, ἀριθμόν)...Although this is again not Philo's complete list. Concerning the possibility that Philo read Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics see John Glucker, "Aristotelian Reminiscences in Philo," *Elenchos* 34, fasc. 1 (2013): 189-200, esp. pp. 189-195.

[62] Ivor Ludlam, "Defining Terms in Aristotle's Topics: ΟΡΟΣ or ΟΡ<ΙΣΜ>ΟΣ?," *Mnemosyne* LII, fasc. 3 (2000): 267-287, esp. p. 280.

After having discoursed to this extent on these subjects he begins to classify (διαιρεῖν) the kinds of sacrifices. He divides them into three principal classes (ἄρχεται διαιρεῖν γένη καὶ τέμνων εἰς εἴδη τρία τὰ ἀνωτάτω) which he calls respectively the whole-burnt-offering, the preservation-offering and the sin-offering. To each of these he adds the adornment of suitable ritual, in which he succeeds admirably in combining decorum with reverence. His classification (διαίρεσις) is quite excellent and perfectly fits the facts to which it shews a logical sequence.[63] ...but where human interests were concerned, since the idea admitted of division (διαίρεσιν), the lawgiver also made a division, and appointed what he called a preservation-offering to correspond to the aspiration for participation in blessings, while he assigned the sin-offering for avoidance of evils.[64]

The use made by Philo, in this passage, of the terms διαιρεῖν, γένη, τέμνειν is familiar to us from Plato's *Soph.* and *Pol.*, and seems to indicate a Platonic influence. Similarly, the following passage in *Det.* 49, where Philo employs the terms ποιεῖν and πάσχειν *inter alia*, raises the probability that he thinks in Platonic terms.

For, when we are thinking of living beings, or material forms generally, which are separate from one another (ἕτερα), it is possible, nay easy, for the active (ποιοῦντα) to be one set and the passive (πάσχοντα) another. For, when a father beats a son by way of correction or a teacher a pupil, he that beats is one, and he that is beaten another. But when we are thinking of beings or bodies which are not separate, then action and passivity (τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ πάσχειν) are found in the same subject. And they are found not at different times and in relation to different subjects, but at the same time and in relation to the same subject (οὔτε ἐν ἑτέρῳ χρόνῳ οὔτε ἕτερον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν καὶ τὸ αὐτόν).[65]

The distinction Plato makes between ποιοῦν and πάσχον can be found, for example, in the late dialogue *Theaetetus*, which is generally regarded today as the last Socratic dialogue composed by Plato, in which Socrates says (182a3-b1):

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[63] "logical sequence" is the English translation by Colson of ἀκολουθίαν καὶ εἱρμόν. The word "logical" is not in the Greek, and has been added to make the English more precise.

[64] PLCL, vol. VII, pp. 211-213. One possibility for Philo's (admittedly not strictly technical) use of γένος, εἶδος and the distinction between them is that these terms (and the distinction between them) had already become part of the language of intelligent speakers of Greek, and most of them did not even stop to inquire where they came from.

[65] PLCL, vol. II, p. 235.

Then just examine this point of their doctrine.[66] Did we not find that they say that heat or whiteness or anything you please arises in some such way as this, namely that each of these moves simultaneously with perception between the active and the passive (μεταξὺ τοῦ ποιοῦντός τε καὶ πάσχοντος) element, and the passive becomes percipient, but not perception, and the active becomes, not a quality, but endowed with a quality?[67]

Also in the following passage of *QG* 1.64 Platonic terms are detectable, such as διαίρεσις, τομὴ, τάξις:

…What is the meaning of the words, "Not that thou dost not offer rightly (ὀρθῶς),[68] but that thou dost not divide (διαιρεῖν) rightly"? First of all, correct division (διαίρεσις) and incorrect division (διαίρεσις)[69] are nothing else than order (τάξις)... when He began to order refractory and unordered and passive substance, made use of cutting (τομῇ) and division (διαιρέσει)… This is a reprehensible and blameworthy division (διαίρεσις), showing a certain disorderliness of order (ἀταξίαν τινὰ τάξεως).[70]

In his final dialogue, *Laws*, Plato makes use of the term τάξις a number of times,[71] for example in *Leg.* 8.848c7-8 he says: "In the next place, there must be dwellings for the citizens separately arranged. A suitable arrangement (τάξις) for them will be this"[72]–though the context here, as in other places in which Plato employs the term τάξις, is not logical. In the late Platonic dialogue *Statesman* 261a3-6 the Eleatic employs the term τομή, a cut:[73] "Then since a reasonable distinction between this class and the rest has been made, by distinguishing the commands given as one's own or another's, shall we again divide this class, if there is in it any further line of section (τομή)?"[74] We have already discussed the broad dialectical usage which

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[66] The flowing ones.

[67] Translated by Harold North Fowler. See also Plat. *Tht.* 157a3-7.

[68] The Greek words are mostly taken from the reconstruction by Marcus in his comments.

[69] See example of the Stoic ἀντιδιαίρεσις in Philo's *Agr.* 139.

[70] PLCL, Supplement I, p. 39.

[71] See also Plat. *Leg*. 6.758d10-e2; 7.802c4-6; 8.833e6-834a2; 9.875c6-7.

[72] Translated by Robert Gregg Bury (LCL).

[73] See also Plat. *Soph.* 229b7-10 in which τομὴ serves as a metaphorical expression for διαίρεσις and the context is decidedly logical. An additional logical context is *Soph*. 266a1-2 in which Plato employs the verb τέμνω towards the division of poetics.

[74] Translated by Harold North Fowler (LCL).

Plato makes of the term διαίρεσις, and the above source taken from *Pol.* 261a3-6 provides some additional evidence. [75]

Let us now examine the appearance of the same three terms, τάξις, τομή and διαίρεσις, in Stoic texts. Examination of the term τάξις among the Stoics shows that it has no logical connection. Concerning the term τομὴ– although according to Maximilianus Adler's index[76] it is not a logical term for the Stoics–it seems from the following passage, Diogenes Laertius 7.61 (which is part of Diogenes' survey of Stoic philosophy), that we could draw a different conclusion.

> Species (Εἶδος) is that which is comprehended under genus: thus Man is included under Animal. The highest or most universal genus is that which, being itself a genus, has no genus above: namely, reality or the real; and the lowest and most particular species is that which, being itself a species, has no species below it, *e.g.* Socrates. Division of a genus means dissection of it into its proximate species (Διαίρεσις δέ ἐστι γένους ἡ εἰς τὸ προσεχῆ εἴδη τομή), thus: Animals are either rational (λογικά) or irrational (ἄλογα) (dichotomy). Contrary division dissects (τομὴ) the genus into species by contrary qualities: for example, by means of negation, as when all things that are are divided into good and not good. Subdivision (ὑποδιαίρεσις) is division applied to a previous division: for instance, after saying, "Of things that are some are good, some are not good," we proceed, "and of the not good some are bad, some are neither good nor bad (morally indifferent)."[77]

So here, too, the terms τομὴ and διαίρεσις have a distinct logical connection. We have seen that the Platonic, as well as the Stoic, τάξις is not connected to logic, while, in contrast, τομὴ and διαίρεσις are connected to logic both in Plato and the Stoics, although the use which Plato makes of the latter term is broader by far. However much it may be tempting to assume that Philo adopted these terms from Plato,[78] one cannot be conclusive.

An examination which I have conducted elsewhere into Philo's use of the terms τὸ ὄν, τὸ μὴ ὄν, τὸ αὐτό (ταὐτον), τὸ ἕτερον, τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ ἀνόμοιον, κίνησις, στάσις reveals that Philo scarcely employed these later

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[75] See also Plat. *Soph.* 235b8-d5.

[76] Maximilian Adler, *Index verborum notionum rerum ad Stoicam doctrinam pertinentium* (Leipzig, 1924)-Vol. IV of *SVF*.

[77] *SVF* III, pp. 214-215. Translated by Robert Drew Hicks (Diog. Laert. LCL, Vol. II, p. 171).

[78] As mentioned above, Philo's familiarity with Plato's *Sophist*, where the Eleatic Guest proposes a new approach to the problem of definition which he refers to as διαίρεσις, is unquestionable.

Platonic dialectical terms, and that when they do in fact come to light they are devoid of dialectical implications. Philo does employ the term τὸ ὄν, Being, as one of his regular appellations of the God of Israel. Another appellation of the deity is τὸ ἕν, the one, which is also one of the current terms occurring in these dialogues, mainly in *Prm.* and *Soph.*, in which the one and the many constitute one of the problems dealt with in dialectics.

Why then do those very dialectical aspects of the later Platonic dialogues not occupy a similar status in Philo's writings to the various aspects of other dialogues, such as the story of the creation of the world in *Timaeus* and all that it entails, or the Theory of Ideas of dialogues such as *Republic*? Did Philo decide, for reasons of his own, not to employ the same dialectic as that of the later dialogues? Did he adopt Stoic dialectic when dealing with those issues which were dominant in this part of philosophy from the third century BCE up until Philo's time and slightly later? In order to reply to this question, let us now examine the appearances of Stoic logical terms in Philo's writings, beginning with those terms known today as Stoic categories or Stoic genera.

Stoic logical terms in Philo's writings

In their book *The Hellenistic Philosophers*,[79] Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley summarize the ontological distinctions which are examined through the survey of Stoic ontological sources gathered by Hans F. A. von Arnim[80] in the matter of existence and subsistence and the four genera. The Stoic Genera defining the τι, the physical something, are: ὑποκειμένον (substrate); ποιόν (qualified); πῶς ἔχον (disposed); πρός τί πως ἔχον (relatively disposed). The search for Stoic categories in Philo's writings discloses that Philo almost never employed them in a dialectical sense at all.[81] There are a few exceptions. Two technical terms appear in a passage of Philo's *Aet.* in a clear logical Stoic context: paragraphs 48-49:

> So at least says the most esteemed among them, Chrysippus, who in his treatise on "increase" makes the following marvellous statement. Starting from the premise that there cannot be two individuals qualifying (δύο ἰδίως ποιά) the same substance he continues "as an illustration, suppose that one person has all his members and that another has only one foot and let us call

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[79] Anthony A. Long and David N. Sedley, *The Hellenistic Philosophers*, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), 163; Vol. II, 166-181.
[80] *SVF* II.
[81] In Philo's *Congr.* 61, for example, Philo employs the term ἄποιον, non-qualified, though in this connection not in a dialectical sense but as a physical term.

the first Dion and the defective one Theon and then suppose that Dion has one of his feet cut off." Now if we ask which of the two has suffered destruction, he thinks that Theon is the more correct answer. This savours more of paradox than of truth. For how can one say that Theon the unmutilated has been made away with while Dion whose foot is amputated has suffered no destruction? "Quite rightly," he replies, "for Dion who has had his foot amputated has passed over to the defective substance of Theon. Two individuals cannot qualify the same substratum (ὑποκείμενον) and so Dion must remain and Theon has been destroyed."[82]

Here Philo is referring to the placing of two "qualifying individuals" (ἰδίως ποιά) in the same substratum (ὑποκείμενον). Philo repeats the same idea almost verbatim in paragraph 51: "…two individuals (δύο ἰδίως ποιὰ) cannot qualify the same substratum (ὑποκείμενον)". Both passages form part of Philo's fifth argument–which argues against the Stoic theory in the matter of the world's conflagration (ἐκπύρωσις) and reconstruction [83] Philo employs here the Stoic division, which he attributes to Chrysippus, of "an individual of some sort" (ποιός)–into "a peculiar individual of some sort" (ἰδίως ποιός) and "a common individual of some sort" (κοινῶς ποιός). This logical significance of ὑποκείμενον is an exception here, since elsewhere, Philo uses the term ὑποκείμενον for an external sensory object,[84] the thinking object,[85] or even for the Stoic and Aristotelian physical substrate (ὕλη)?[86]

This unequivocal dialectical use of the term taken from the Stoic logic in his *Aet.* is unusual, and can surely be attributed to the purely philosophical character of this particular work, which Philo apparently wrote in his youth.[87] The nature of the later Philonic writings and their differing orientation seem to have enabled him to use various meanings of the term ὑποκείμενον without any difficulty, and it would not be surprising if the dialectical association of this term had been forgotten or overlooked by him. A survey of the sources assembled by von Arnim for Stoic dialectic includes two Philonic sources. The first source is taken from *QG* 4.117, which I shall quote from the translation of Ralph Marcus:

117. Who is the brother of Rebekah, whose name is Laban? (Gen. 24.29)

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[82] PLCL, vol. IX, pp. 217-219.
[83] See *SVF* II, 596-632, pp. 183-191.
[84] Philo, *Leg.* 3.56, 61.
[85] Philo, *Ios.* 126.
[86] Philo, *Leg.*1.29.
[87] See note 107 below.

Our soul has a natural brother who is rational and one who is irrational (ὁ μὲν λογικός, ὁ δὲ ἄλογος).[88] Now to the rational part is assigned Rebekah the virgin, constancy and perseverance; and Laban to the irrational part, for this is to be translated as "whiteness", which is a figure of the honours to the splendour of sense-perceptible things. For one should know very well that just as there are three different kinds of literal elements of speech, namely vowels, semi-vowels and consonants (φωνήεντα καὶ ἡμίφωνα καὶ ἄφωνα), so also is it with our nature. For the mind (ὁ νοῦς) is like the vowel, and the senses (ἡ αἴσθησις) like the semi-vowel, and the body like the consonant. However, I shall begin my exposition from the end. For just as the consonant by itself alone has no sound at all but when combined with a vowel achieves a literal sound, so also is the body by itself alone unmoving ; and it is moved by the rational soul (ὑπὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς) through the several organic parts toward that which is suitable and necessary to it. Again, just as the semi-vowels make lame and imperfect sounds, but, if they are combined with vowels, make fully articulated speech, so also is sense-perception half effective (ἡμίεργος) and imperfect, and it occupies a position midway between the mind and the body, for it has a part in each of them ; it is not inanimate (ἄψυχος) like the body, and it is not intelligent like reason (ὁ λογισμός) But when the mind (ὁ νοῦς) by extending itself (ἐκτείνων ἑαυτόν) is fused with, and engraved on it, it prepares it to see and hear rationally and at the same time to speak with reason and to perceive rationally. However, in the same way as the vowels by themselves alone and also when combined with other produce sound, so also is the mind moved by itself alone without anything else, since intelligible things are received and grasped by themselves alone, and it is also the cause of the movement of other things, giving release like the leader of a chorus. But, as I have said, the senses (are moved) to bodily perception by the rational part and are, as it were, effectively brought to their natural functions by the voices of the organic parts.[89]

The second passage is taken from Philo's words in *Agr.*139-141:

…how that of existences some are bodies, some incorporeal; and of bodies, some lifeless, some having life; some rational, some irrational, some mortal, some divine; and of mortal beings, some male, some female; a distinction which applies to man; and of things incorporeal again, some complete (τέλεια), some incomplete (ἀτελῆ); and of those that are complete, some questions and inquiries (ἐρωτήματα καὶ πύσματα), imprecations and adjurations, not to mention all the other particular differences (κατ' εἶδος), all of which are set forth in the elementary handbooks which deal with them.

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[88] The Greek words in parenthesis, proposed by Marcus, are as near certainty as one could expect.
[89] PLCL, Supplement I, pp. 399-401.

Again, there are what dialecticians are accustomed to call propositions (ἀξιώματα). Of these, some are simple, some not so (τὰ μὲν ἁπλᾶ τὰ δ' οὐχ ἁπλᾶ); and of the non-simple, some hypothetical, some inferential (τὰ μὲν συνημμένα, τὰ δὲ παρασυνημμένα), some <indicating> more or less, some moreover disjunctive (διεζευγμένα); and suchlike distinctions. They distinguish further things true, false, and doubtful; possible and impossible (ἀληθῆ τε καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ ἄδηλα, δυνατά τε καὶ ἀδύνατα); conclusive and inconclusive (ἀναγκαῖα καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα); soluble and insoluble (εὔπορά τε καὶ ἄπορα); and all kindred antitheses. Again, applying to incorporeal things which are incomplete there are the subdivisions into "predicates" and "complements" (κατηγορήματα καὶ συμβεβηκότα) and still more minute refinements.[90]

Although in the first of our passages Philo deals with τι, something devoid of body and in the second excerpt he broadly employed the Stoic division of the τι [91] into bodies and incorporeals, his disuse of the Stoic genera defining the bodies is conspicuous. On the other hand, this portion of Philo is rife with technical concepts of Stoic syllogistic theory which testify to Philo's acquaintance with fairly complicated technical terms from the theory of the ἀξιώματα and the συνημμένα of the Stoics. [92]

Of all the Stoic concepts mentioned by Philo in *Agr*.139-141, he makes further use of δυνατά τε καὶ ἀδύνατα, ἀξιώματα, συνημμένα, διεζευγμένα, συμβεβηκότα. In *Spec*. 1.282 we find again δυνατά τε καὶ ἀδύνατα where Philo says in reference to God: …θεὸς δὲ μόνος, ᾧ δυνατὰ τὰ παρ' ἡμῖν ἀδύνατα. However it is doubtful if the use here is technical, or merely a regular set of contrasts in Greek.

Philo employs the term ἀδύνατος, powerless, in other places as well,[93] but never in a technical sense [94], Philo makes further use also of the term

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[90] PLCL, vol. III, pp. 179-181.

[91] Though interestingly he labels this with a non-Stoic cognomen, τὰ ὄντα.

[92] Colson in his appendix to *Agr*. 140-141 surveys the list of the Stoics logical terms found in Philo in this passage, out of those which are mentioned by Diogenes Laertius 7.64-76, with examples clearly explaining their technical meaning. See PLCL III, pp. 492-493 and *SVF* II, 183, 186, 203, 207, 215 (pp. 59-70).

[93] Philo, *Virt.* 31; *Spec*.1.341.

[94] In a comment concerning Philo's use of this term in *Spec*.1.341 Colson reports two of the references in LSJ. The first is to Aristotle's *Ath. Pol.* 49: "The council also inspects the Incapables (ἀδυνάτους); for there is a law enacting that persons possessing less than 3 minae and incapacitated by bodily infirmity from doing any work are to be inspected by the Council, which is to give them a grant for food at the public expense at the rate of 2 obols a day each. And there is a Treasurer for these persons, elected by lot." The second reference is to the speech of the orator Lysias: ΠΡΟΣ ΤΗΝ ΕΙΣΑΓΓΕΛΙΑΝ ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΜΗ ΔΙΔΟΣΘΑΙ ΤΩΙ ΑΔΥΝΑΤΩΙ

ἀξιώματα - once again, not in a logical sense. [95] The same happens with συμβεβηκότα, [96] as well as with the terms συνημμένα and διεζευγμένα appearing a number of times in a musical context and not in a logical context. [97]

An examination of additional terms from Stoic logic, which did not appear in Philo in *Agr.*139-141, though appearing in other places, such as πολεμοῦντα,[98] διὰ πλειόνων,[99] ἐπίστασις,[100] τὸ πρᾶγμα,[101] shows that they, too, are devoid of logical context. The expression κατὰ δύναμιν, "as much as possible", which appears in logical contexts–for example in Diogenes Laertius vii 70: [102] "A privative proposition is one that contains a privative particle reversing the effect of a judgement, as (κατὰ δύναμιν), for example, 'This man is unkind'" also appears often in Philo without any dialectical connotations [103]–for example in the final words of his *De Aeternitate Mundi*:

> We have described to the best of our abilities (κατὰ δύναμιν) the arguments
> transmitted to us to maintain the indestructibility of the world. In what

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ΑΡΓΥΡΙΟΝ. Although the likelihood that Philo's familiarity with the term ἀδύνατος comes directly from the *Athenian Constitution* is small, the use Lysias makes of the term indicates that the reference is to a rhetorical term already in existence, and therefore probably not foreign to Philo. Be Philo's source what it may, he does not make dialectical use of it.

[95] Philo, *Deus.*150 ; *Legat.* 140 ; *Flacc.* 78 ; *Ios.* 72.

[96] Philo, *Mos.* 2.226.

[97] Philo, *Congr.* 76; *Somn.* 1.28, 205 ; *Leg.* 3.121. Although in *Agr.* 118 Philo does not use the term διεζευγμένα, yet according to Vela in this passage "Philo himself provides an example of an exclusive disjunction and tries to persuade his audience to choose one alternative over the other". Vela agrees with Sterling that Philo proposed an exclusive disjunction, but suggests that his argument took the form of the dilemma rather than one of the undemonstrated syllogisms. Vela concurs with Sterling in assuming that Philo appealed to Stoic logic, although in a slightly different manner. Rather than inclusive disjunctions, he proposes that Philo set up exclusive disjunctions in order to create dilemmatic arguments. "This strategy countered conflicting reports about the Jews and trapped his audience in a positive understanding of Judean history and culture". See Vela, "Logic of History," 169, 180-182.

[98] Philo, *Somn.* 2.90.

[99] Philo, *Congr.* 35 ; *Leg.* 3.162.

[100] Philo, *Leg.* 3.49.

[101] Philo, *Deus.* 90.

[102] *SVF* II, 204 (p. 66).

[103] Philo, *Leg.*1.38; *Deus.* 19.

follows we have to expound the answers given in opposition to each point. (150)[104]

It thus seems that Philo makes a merely rhetorical use of the dialectical concepts he enumerates in passages like *Agr.*139-141, without properly engaging in dialectics. The reference is to a vague list of Stoic concepts, which Philo never employs in a philosophical analysis proper.

The possibility of explaining the absence of Platonic dialectic in Philo by assuming that he used the Stoic dialectic popular in his time becomes invalid, then, since Philo abstains from using Stoic dialectic as well–though he sporadically employs one or two terms taken from Stoic dialectic, and on one occasion he provides a list of terms in one specific passage. This can hardly be compared to his regular use of Platonic and Stoic ideas in matters of physics and ethics. Did Philo not appreciate the significance of Stoic dialectic? Or did he perhaps consciously choose to forgo Stoic dialectic just as he refrained from the application of Platonic dialectic? In spite of some recent studies maintaining that, since in the "Middle Platonic" period Platonists and Stoics had "a common language", it follows that one cannot distinguish between them, this is not the *communis opinio* among scholars. A look at John Dillon's *The Middle Platonists*[105] might give one the impression that these Platonists were not mere blind followers of the Stoics, and were fully aware of other approaches to logic. It appears that in Philo's writings it is possible to distinguish between Platonists and Stoics–namely, it is possible to distinguish Platonic sources (which Philo knew, first and foremost, directly from the dialogues) from Stoic sources (familiar to Philo through the doxographical literature).[106]

A Proposed Solution

Our discussion of the minimal presence of later Platonic and Stoic dialectic in Philo may point to an ideological approach. It should not be expected that Philo himself would clarify the reasons for his attitude towards this part of the Platonic dialogues, since it is not his method to

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[104] PLCL, vol. IX, p. 291.
[105] pp. 49-51.
[106] The assessment of the amounts of Platonism vs. Stoicism in Philo changes from one scholar to another. Roberto Radice, for example, maintained that although Philo employs Stoic terms and expressions, the Platonic influence is clearly predominant in his writings.