Anger in the Long Nineteenth Century

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Critical Perspectives

Edited by
Ritushree Sengupta
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Cambridge
Scholars
Publishing

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This book first published 2023

Cambridge Scholars Publishing

Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library

ISBN (10): 1-5275-2922-3
ISBN (13): 978-1-5275-2922-9

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In a world of disappearing relations, I have been blessed with people who have made my life meaningful in the best of ways. I am most thankful to my maternal grandmother, Pranati Roy, for making me realize the value of forgiveness. She is the sole reason that I have regained my faith in human kindness and love. I am also indebted to my maternal grandfather, Dr. Prabhat Kumar Roy, probably from whom I have imbibed the gift of storytelling. I am forever grateful to Prof. Narendranath Sengupta, my paternal grandfather who was the first person to introduce me to Nineteenth-century literature. Lastly, my heart goes out to Anjali Sengupta, my paternal grandmother, my sharpest critic and a wonderful friend, who instilled in me a deep sense of resolute as I kept myself occupied with this project.

Both editors are thankful to Anway Mukhopadhyay, Assistant Professor at the Department of Humanities and Social Sciences, IIT Kharagpur, for introducing and assisting them, when designing academic projects. Finally, we thank the Editorial and Proofreading team at Cambridge Scholars Publishing, for helping accelerate the publication of this volume with valuable edits, suggestions, remarks and co-operation.

Suppress your Anger and Unyoke your Horses.

Rig Veda

INTRODUCTION

TENNYSON, ANGER AND THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

SHOUVIK N. HORE

> "To the awful verge of manhood, as the energy sublime
> Of a century bursts full-blossomed on the thorny stem of time."
> James Russell Lowell, 'The Present Crisis'

Part of the complication that arises when perusing Tennyson is the misconstruction underlying Tennyson's intention, and the intention of the poem as it presents itself to the reader; in other words, the purpose that Tennyson wants fulfilled in verse, both ideally and conceptually, contradicts the poem, if we concede, to begin with, that a great poem, whether belonging to an age or for all ages, has a deconstructive genius of its own, relishing in its versified glory only when the author is self-annihilated. Thus, at the beginning of *Locksley Hall*, first published in *Poems* (1842), Tennyson has already nailed the hammer on his conceptual coffin:

> Here about the beach I wander'd, nourishing a *youth sublime*
> With the fairy tales of sciences, and the long result of time;
> (Robert W. Hill ed., 115, ll. 11-12, emphasis mine)

The poem has landed itself, albeit unconsciously, in that grey patch between "youth" and "sublime", sublimity and beauty, and worst of all, in the conceptual precision as well as contradiction between Aristotle and Kant.[1]Tennyson has nourished himself with an oxymoron, not with Utopic ends but ideological retardation – conspiratorial conclusions to scientific means, through references to "science" and "time". The resultant is a pandemic, but the earliest echo of approaching anger is set in concrete terms, deluding and deferring the readers with the "story" of love.

This critical perspective is not equivalent with the claim that Tennyson is not *truly* angry; his ultimate anger might be directed upon Himself – the

deified 'I' or the reverential, social 'I', but this is not my central argument in the chapter. I contend that the poet-figure of *Locksley Hall* exhibits believable, or durable anger, at best, because it is considered a man's emotion on one hand, and legitimate when contextually justifiable and describable on the other – perhaps, the most significant reason behind the poem's admiration in Victorian England.[2]To that extent, of course, the protagonist, a youth jilted in love, is angry, within Aristotelian limits, but that anger is rendered legitimate only upon the fulfilment of three conditions set by Aristotle himself.[3]When the speaker berates Amy by saying,

> O my cousin, shallow-hearted! O my Amy, mine no more! (39)

And

> On a range of lower feelings and a narrower heart than mine! (44)

He expresses personal pain, in an apostrophic and exclamatory manner; the estrangement between himself and his beloved has its pathology and tautology ("shallow-hearted", "narrower heart"), although its adjoining feelings could be judged apocalyptic. What transpires next is an anger-induced vocabulary, emphasizing assonances and the affinity between an implicit "I", "my" and "mine", whose task it is to compensate in verse the disharmony of a chaotic marriage, more of benefit than true (in this case, ideal) purpose. Tennyson busies himself in demonstrating the false consciousness of pragmatic marriages, not realizing that this is the objective, second-order manifestation of his original, subjectively-enhanced terminological fallacy. Pain trickles down into retribution; the speaker cherishes, albeit fantastically, the downfall of their marriage, for it has nothing concrete, policy-wise, except the clandestine pleasure derived from the ego's retreat into the unconscious:

> As the husband is, the wife is; thou art mated with a clown,
> And the grossness of his nature will have weight to drag thee down. (47-48)

The humour at display is mordant; Tennyson introduces the agency, in the form of Amy's husband, as the poster child of absolute deterioration ("mated", "clown", "Grossness of his nature", "drag…down"), probably suggesting a retarded child for no fault of Amy, psycho-physiologically speaking, carefully re-arranging culpabilities. The strategy employed here involves the jilted lover persuading himself that his love should have been the Victorian categorical imperative – the evolutionary will of a progressive wife, a compromise with which is unimaginable. This, technically, is the

poet's "will" in the second line of the quote – the transition from argumentative envy to retributive anger, by initiating a graphological palimpsest with the motto – may the versifier be victorious.[4]Tennyson's speaker wraps up his immaculate anger by responding rhetorically to Amy's original belittlement of her lover's intentions – first, through charting the material and physical limits of convenient marriages and next, by dehumanising/animalising Amy, throwing light on the transitory ontologies promoted by such convenience, contradicting it with the immaterial (implicit) scope of her deification by the poet:

> He will hold thee, when his passion shall have spent its novel force,
> Something better than his dog, a little dearer than his horse. (49-50)

Tennyson employs his poet-speaker who expresses counter-belittlement by suspending Amy's dignity (in the marriage) within the abstract confines of man and animal; the use of mocking comparatives ("better than", "little dearer than") literally (through sophisticated language, that is) drags her down from the anthropological to the anthropomorphized domain; the act of "holding" is transferred to the connotative significance of "leashing" (extending the canine metaphor) and "reining" (equine metaphor), creating the foundation of his poetical ridicule. Undoing Amy's belittlement is justified, but the manner, or method of execution revolves around themes of revenge, in retrospect, and reversal of pain which substitutes matrimonial commitment with business metaphors ("spent") and de-subjectification ("something"), de-ontologizing Amy sufficiently for the poet to articulate his counter-belittlement. The poet-speaker of *Locksley Hall* is an Aristotelian, and he is legitimately angry.[5]

However, this begs the question: how legitimate is legitimate anger? To put it in another way, is legitimization of anger subject to gradation? If yes, is cessation of anger coterminous with its legitimization?[6]Or, is cessation suitable for delegitimization, granted that the narrator has identified the concrete source of his anger, and applied the means to a concrete remedy? Otherwise, is rational abstraction *from* anger its true legitimization, since it moralizes anger sufficiently for its co-existence with civilization? I begin with the assumption that positive, or durable anger is the main proposition of the speaker in *Locksley Hall*, and the poet aims at the highest, sustainable form of abstract anger, from where he abseils towards lower forms of pseudo-legitimate anger.[7]Thus, after the least legitimate coda of anger, the poet-speaker's initial "bluster" (ll. 63) is over,[8] the more sustainable, 'angry' forms start taking shape:

Am I mad, that I should cherish, that which bears but bitter fruit?
I will pluck it from my bosom, tho' my heart be at the root. (65-66)

He is mad, and not mad at the same time; in Aristotelian terms, the jilted lover who has experienced the malefit of convenient marriage has every right to express his extremes of personal pain, but madness threatens that rational outlook which is Aristotle's weapon for the resolution of anger-induced belittlement; thus, it clothes itself in insanity, resulting in destruction for its own sake, *sans* restoration of a previous state of affairs, compatible with the dissolution of convenient marriages and congenial towards the fulfilment of interpersonal gratifications which stand, institutionally, against the structures of civilization. The bitterness, therefore, is the apocalyptic; when the speaker asks, "Am I mad?", what he encapsulates within madness is this: "Am I wrong in expressing anger about perpetually delayed gratification in a transient world?" This is the first layer of legitimate anger, garnered promptly by the ambivalent phrase, "my heart be at the root". It adds a second layer to the discursive potential of the re-framed first question: "Am I wrong in expressing anger about perpetually delayed and dehumanized (taking into account the canine and equine metaphors used to deride post-marital lack of love) gratification in a transient world, when my ideal love qualifies for the Victorian Categorical Imperative for marriage?" This, I argue, is the partial maturation of his anger, since he internalizes the core argument of evolution: survival of the fittest, or, in this case, coexistence of the purest – a theme Tennyson exploited with near perfection in *The Two Voices*.[9]Legitimate anger is unleashed, and a third layer, by dialectizing "strife",[10] is added after the reference to "O thou wondrous Mother-Age!":

Make me feel the wild pulsation that I felt before the strife,
When I heard my days before me, and the tumult of my life; (109-110)

One can glean that strife has obstructed the poet-narrator's union with the zenith of Victorian morality; what he opines is that "wildness", absurdly, was the true civilizational exhibition, now repressed, a proposition that we are in a position to deny, taking into account the connotative significance of his "will". Repressed anger, when unrepressed, would probably attempt to reveal that strife-less primitivity, aside from wish-fulfilment, would not incapacitate that creative impulse ("pulsation"), leading to domestic happiness – a proposition that *repeats* the linguistic and conceptual uncanny inherent in "youth sublime" at the beginning of the poem. This theoretical flaw, oscillating in its *before-after*, posits a third layer of legitimate anger: Prelapsarian morality, in its microcosmic state, without the consequences of

Postlapsarian "strife", shall inundate it (eventually!) and lead to macrocosmic expansion of ideology. The fact that it is yet to happen rationally ("feel", "felt", "heard", etc.) leads towards anger-induced noble resentment in the poet-narrator's disquisition. Whether this transition reflects forgiveness or pacification, we cannot say, since strife overplays its part by both mending and rupturing his hypostatic wound, but what can be said is that the most appropriate theorization of anger is the only manner of alleviation from it.[11] Definition is palliation – Tennyson's cure stands revealed.

What then, is Tennyson's most legitimate form of legitimate anger? As the poem nears its end, the return of the repressed, original anomaly moulds it into perfect shape:

> Woman is the *lesser man*, and all thy passions, matched with mine,
> Are as moonlight unto sunlight, and as water unto wine - (pp. 120, ll. 151-52, italics mine)

If the poet-speaker discards the "woman" as an inferior man, it de-conceptualizes the objective of marital union (since a man cannot marry a man, biologically), for the fittest cannot be defined in its inferiority. Complicating it is the absent counter-imperative/narrative, that man could very well be the *lesser woman*, which Victorian England dare not utter for disrupting its patriarchal, and anti-evolutionary, hence flawed value-system. The ethical dogma cultivated, as a result, is a dilution ("moonlight unto sunlight", "water unto wine"), but it is propagated to suppress the conceptual ailment that the speaker's evolutionary "bluster" chronically suffers from – a string of mis-definitions which leads towards gender mischaracterization, ethical diabolism, anti-evolutionary hierarchy and worst of all – mendacity of original will and purpose, which proposed higher alternatives to convenient marriages, ironically descending much lower by avoiding the aporias of such ill—conceptualized leaps. Secondly, and lastly, these mis-definitions do not evolve from the conscious, argumentative spirit of the poet-speaker; they arise from the original mischaracterization of aesthetic and ethical characteristics ("youth sublime"), sourced in the unconscious of his ideological objectives. The poem is an exemplar of the ideological uncanny haunting Victorian England into the modern era, and the truest form of legitimate anger in *Locksley Hall*, according to Roger Ebbatson, is "millenarian apocalypse" (6), which might be reconstructed in the following manner: The revelation that any aorta of domestic idealism misleads to a mathematical conquest of the anti-domestic – that the apocalyptic eludes conceptualization by systematically sabotaging definitions (for they palliate), and that the domestic is ultimately a deterrent

to the Universal – in broader terms, a belated realization about the anti-apocalyptic drive of Nineteenth-century England gives final shape to the poet-speaker's anger, witnessed in *Locksley Hall Sixty Years After*, where tweaking "no" for "yes" in the first line and "never" for "ever" in the second creates the central argument of Tennyson's poem:

> Gone for ever! Ever? no – for since our dying race began,
> Ever, ever and for ever was the leading light of man. (ibid., 554, ll. 65-66)

The essays in this edited volume deal principally with notions of anger, resentment and the like, providing perspectives, both textual and cultural, to such texts and engage in healthy discourses with remedies at hand. Victorian Roskams, in the first chapter, argues how composers of the nineteenth century rallied against stereotypical Romanticism characterized by love, posturing, bureaucratic insouciance towards music and social status, principally using music as a tool for mitigating their anger towards objective fulfilment of aesthetic mediums. Through a close-reading of E.T.A. Hoffman's fictional characters, especially Johannes Kreisler, Weber's novel, *Tonkünstlers Leben*, and George Bernard Shaw's *Love Among the Artists*, Roskams prudently undertakes the task of re-evaluating the transition of anger-induced compositional virtue in each. Carina Koh, in the second chapter, asserts how *Wuthering Heights* may be read in the light of oscillating anger, demonstrating how it alternates between fruitful manifestations as well as descent into rage, alongside its necessary critical implications. In the third, Subhajeet Singha compares the depiction of Poe across visual and literary mediums, especially in James McTeigue's movie, *The Raven* and Matthew Pearl's novel, *The Poe Shadow*, cross-referencing the denotative capacity of literal and literary anger when placed beside his prose and poetry. Shaona Barik skilfully maps anger amidst colonial encounters in the fourth chapter, positioning and defining subversionary acts by domestic servants employed by their British masters, allowing the reader to walk that thin line between administration, mutually frustrative interactions and resistance. While Aparajita Mukherjee conducts a study of psychopathic anger in Browning's poems in the fifth, the sixth chapter, by Kathakali Sengupta, busies itself in formulating and re-conceptualizing brute anger in *Wuthering Heights*. Hemant Kumar Golapalli, in the seventh chapter, carefully investigates nineteenth-century perspectives on Swinburne, covering the trajectory from Aristotle through Seneca and William James to acknowledge the moral ambiguities the poet himself cultivated, and how it exposed the drawbacks of Victorian morality. This is followed by Ritushree Sengupta who, in the next chapter, deals with personal and authorship issues faced by Rudyard Kipling, with emphasis on

class conflicts within British administration and its internalization in select prose works. In the last two chapters, Swati Roy Chowdhury explores the representation of anger in the Bush poetry of the Australian poet, Henry Lawson, followed by Shouvik N. Hore's analysis of the transition from instinctive to creative anger in Hoffmann's *Mademoiselle de Scuderi*, Bharat Muni's *Krodha Rasa* in *Natyasastra* and Matthew Arnold's 'Youth's Agitations' respectively.

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Notes

[1] Youth, characterized by Aristotle in Chapter Twelve, Book II of *On Rhetoric: A Theory of Civic Discourse* (OUP, 2007), is "impulsive and quick-tempered and inclined to follow up their anger [by action] …and [they are] trusting, because of not yet having been much deceived" (George A. Kennedy tr., pp. 149-50). The youth in Tennyson's poem (let us say, for argument's sake, Tennyson himself) is impulsive when expecting cohabitation between youthfulness and sublimity, first and foremost, and deceived, quite rightly, by his ideological, conceptual trust in an incompatible oxymoron, a "youth sublime", before mischaracterizing the true source of his anger, thinking he had been deceived by his trust in Amy, followed by his impulsive rant about her beguilement which is nothing but the poet's resentment at his own mistake, the mis-definition. Youth and sublimity are incompatible because, according to Immanuel Kant, in *Observations on the feeling of the beautiful and sublime* (originally published in 1764), Sublimity "inspires admiration, but he is too far above us for us to dare to come close to him with the familiarity of love" (Frierson and Guyer ed., CUP, 2011, pp. 18). By this logic, the Youth has confused two aesthetic categories wildly/categorized them wrongly, and is unaware, at its beginning, of the apocalyptic range at its end. While loving Amy and basking in the false consciousness of sublime achievement is one thing, youth itself, as I have reiterated before, is non-conducive to sublimity. Kant concludes elsewhere in his *Observations*, that "A somewhat greater age is associated more with the qualities of the sublime, youth, however, with those of the beautiful" (ibid., 20). *Locksley Hall* therefore, is a tragedy, not in literal, but in conceptual terms, as Tennyson proves himself inadequately equipped with intricate designs between finer categories,

leading to ideological disaster, or to paraphrase Eliot, met his end in the beginning. The rest of the poem is a revelation of the flaw of conceptual interpositions.

[2] See "A Consideration of the Fame of "Locksley Hall"" by William Darby Templeman, published in *Victorian Poetry*, Vol. 1, No. 2, 1963, pp. 81-103. *JSTOR*, http://www.jstor.org/stable/40001204. Especially the criticism of John Forster on pp. 81 and George Brimley's on p. 86. For the analogy between anger, sublimity and manhood, see the 'terrifyingly sublime' section in Kant's *Observations*, pp. 19-20.

[3] "Those who are ill, in need of money, [in the middle of a battle], in love, thirsty – in general, those longing for something and not getting it – are irascible and easily stirred to anger" (118).

[4] "Envy may be transmuted into anger if the envious person rewrites the script to persuade himself that he was hurt by the envied person" (7). See "Enthusiasm and Anger in History" by Jon Elster, published in *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 64, no. 3, 2020, pp. 1-59. *T & F Online*, 0.1080/0020174X.2020.1821961.

[5] "Let anger be [defined as] desire, accompanied by [mental and physical] distress, for apparent retaliation because of an apparent slight that was directed, without justification, against oneself or those near to one" (2:1378b, pp. 116)

[6] See the section on the "induction of emotions" (71) in the 'Anger moderated and regulated' section of *The Routledge History of Emotions in the Modern World*, edited by Katie Barclay and Peter N. Stearns in 2023.

[7] I derive the term "durable anger" from David Konstan's phrase "anger as a durable feeling…which arises on the spot as an *aisthēsis* but is kept alive through subsequent reflection upon or recollection of the slight received" (101). See *Ancient Anger: Perspectives from Homer to Galen* (CUP, 2003), edited by Susanna Braund and Glenn W. Most.

[8] "The 'bluster' of the speaker of 'Locksley Hall' is, after all, a description of a random, uncontrolled or uncontrollable speech" (138). See *Rhythm and Will in Victorian Poetry* by Matthew Campbell for Cambridge University Press, 2004.

[9] When the "still small voice" instigates by foretelling that "Thou art so steeped in misery/Surely 't were better not to be" (Hill ed., 85, ll. 47-48) and "Thine anguish will not let thee sleep, / Nor any train of reason keep; (49-50), Tennyson's evolutionary spirit, *inter alia*, answers, "Were this not well, to bide mine hour, /Tho' watching from a ruined tower/How grows the day of human power?" (76-78). The lack of "any train of reason" is transmuted into "Am I mad?" in *Locksley Hall*, and "human power" into the evolutionary equivalent suggested through love.

[10] I believe Tennyson borrows the moral directives of strife from his fellow Cambridge Apostle and Utilitarian philosopher, Henry Sidgwick; according to him, the eradication of strife is conflicted between evolving into harmless sympathy and a conscious restrain of self-centered ends: "Increase of sympathy among human beings may ultimately do away with strife; but it will only be after a long interval, during which the growth of sympathetic resentment against wrongs seems not unlikely to cause as much strife as the diminution of mere selfishness prevents" (50). See Sidgwick's "The Morality of Strife" in *Practical Ethics: A Collection of Addresses and Essays* (OUP, 1998), with an introduction by Sissela Bok.

[11] "In forgiving, we neither "renounce" nor "repress" the protest that our anger registers, but decide that it is time to move beyond it on moral grounds" (230). Tennyson is creating the best moral ground in order to transcend the worst of anger (insanity, etc.), and that ground is the German *grund*, I argue, the highest question, the mathematical magnitude of which subdues and destroys the *macht* of anger – forgiveness registering reconciliation in favour of civilization, a cognitive compromise or an ontological keepsake. See Nancy Sherman's "Aristotle, the Stoics and Kant on anger" in L. Jost and J. Wuerth (Eds.), *Perfecting Virtue: New Essays on Kantian Ethics and Virtue Ethics*. Cambridge University Press, 2011. pp. 215-240.

CHAPTER ONE

ROMANTIC RAGE: HOW ANGER CHARACTERIZES THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY COMPOSER

VICTORIA C. ROSKAMS

> [W]hat do you all have against Johannes, what harm has he done you that you will grant him no place of refuge on this earth? You don't know? Then I'll tell you. You see, Kreisler doesn't wear your colours, doesn't understand your manner of speech; the chair you offer for him to sit in among you is too small for him, too narrow; you cannot take him for one of your own kind, and that vexes you. […] You don't care for Kreisler because you are uncomfortable with your sense of the superiority you cannot but allow him, because he has dealings with higher things than fit into your narrow circle, and you fear him.
>
> (E.T.A. Hoffmann, *The Life and Opinions of the Tomcat Murr,*181)

The furrowed brow and the grim, resolute mouth: take any portrait of Ludwig van Beethoven and these traits will most likely be present. Three foundational depictions from his lifetime – by August von Kloeber (1818), Ferdinand Schimon (1818/19), and Joseph Stieler (1820) – instituted the stormy expression by which Beethoven would become instantly recognizable. The appearance of anger on Beethoven's face affirms the viewer's preconceptions: this is a composer whose dedication to music overrides all else in his life, who teems with the 'seething turbulence of creativity' (Comini 47); his musical temperament cannot be constrained by the norms of civil society. Beethoven's anger is foundational: from it springs the Romantic composer, a figure constructed alike by music criticism and fiction. His rage is levelled against philistine publics, indifferent lovers, music-industry charlatans, and himself, for failing to live up to his own promise. Anger is so prominent an attribute in representations of composers in the nineteenth century as to invite understanding this emotion as broadly thematic, linked to contemporary developments in the

professionalization of composition. Around the turn of the nineteenth century, composers found themselves increasingly working within a free market. Concurrently, they staked a new claim of authority over their work, seeking audiences who valued art for art's sake. However, this new freedom frequently left composers railing against a public who seemed not to value their art. Anger thus reflects the transitional status of composers in this period.

From E.T.A Hoffmann's Kreisler at the beginning of the century, through writing by Carl Maria von Weber and Hector Berlioz, to George Bernard Shaw's Owen Jack (in his novel *Love Among The Artists,* 1881), fictional composers give vent to frustrations. This very act validates their claim to Romantic prestige: transcendent, sublime feeling was requisite in composers whose music similarly expressed ardent yet futile striving. As Alessandra Comini writes of Beethoven's reception: 'his outer appearance and inner life were made to resemble the gamut of emotions perceived in his music, and his music was interpreted as embodying the passions (and in some cases the defects) of his mercurial personality' (16). A new investment, on the part of writers, in music's ability to speak for the deepest of these passions is indicated by frequent recursions to musical expression within the following texts, as if language must give way under the weight of ire. Expressions of anger are also ideological manifestoes. All four writers under discussion in this chapter (Hoffmann, Weber, Berlioz, and Shaw) were music critics with a passion for, and vested interest in, convincing readers of music's value; the first three were also composers, for whom this vested interest was redoubled. Their fiction stages a dynamic representation of composers' dissatisfaction in order to affirm the image of the furrowed brow and resolute mouth as indicative of musical greatness. At the same time, they demand honour and respect for figures who – as my epigraph from Hoffmann notes, with echoes of *Hamlet* – deal with 'higher things than fit into your narrow circle'. As my analysis will suggest, this insistence on composers' singularity in fact contributed further to their demarcation from the mainstream of society, and perpetuated the apparent subjection which was motivating their anger.

Composers in early-nineteenth-century Europe felt they were operating within conceptually and materially different paradigms to their predecessors. Lydia Goehr's seminal 1992 study, *The Imaginary Museum of Musical Works,* proposed the year 1800 as pivotal in effecting this new understanding. Goehr's theory has provoked some debate: running the risk, like many theories of historical development, that its precision as to the year of change might be considered arbitrary.[1] Yet for my purposes here, Goehr's definition of the shift around 1800 as 'a transition in practice, away from

seeing music as a means to seeing it as an end' is instructive (206). Her emphasis on ways of 'seeing' music chimes with my focus on the ways in which musicians *conceived of* their craft and social status in their writing, regardless of the reality of their experiences.

The most important alteration in composers' practices was the decreased need to obtain patronage through either the Church or the aristocracy, as the influence of both institutions waned. This liberation was concomitant with changes in the aesthetic understanding of instrumental music's self-sufficiency. Thinkers such as the Schlegels, Ludwig Tieck, and Novalis accorded instrumental music the highest possible status among the arts,[2] with a consequent effect on practitioners: 'like their musical compositions, they were fast being liberated from the traditional power and restraint of ecclesiastical and aristocratic dignitaries […] musicians – especially the composers amongst them – were sharing in the revolutionary freedom claimed by a rising professional middle class, and gradually, through their liberation, were coming to be seen as independent masters and creators of their art' (Goehr 206). While a unilateral change in the practices of composers cannot be definitively identified, a discursive theme emerged around 1800, which emphasized the new freedom of music: 'there was a general consensus in certain circles of society that this art, so removed from the material world, should be released from the obligations of society and permitted an unbridled autonomy in a special world of its own' (Salmen 267-8). Hand in hand with music's autonomy, theoretically, went that of the composer.

Since the practice of aristocratic and clerical patronage did not disappear altogether, the frustrations of the Kapellmeister, whose compositions were bound by the whims of a court, remain a theme in nineteenth-century fiction. Yet the so-called 'freedom' of the composer in the new market brought its own provocations too. Goehr writes: 'composers believed that they should be able to live and function as free individuals, and that their productive activities should, if they should be subject to anything at all, be subject to the forces of an urban market for music' (207). The new necessity to court a public, however, merely replaced one difficult patron with another, and 'many were truly hit hard by the schism between the realities of unavoidable social dependence and a growing awareness of emancipation' (Salmen 273). Anger arose at the impossibility of attaining a truly liberated musical practice, and frequently at the philistinism of the public being courted. Throughout the nineteenth century, composers found the demands of the market incompatible with their own valuations of music. Often, composers raged against the musical machines with which they dealt: infrastructures in

which decisions were made, seemingly, by philistines who did not – unlike the composers themselves – have music's best interests at heart.

I separate the causes of fictionalized composers' anger into four themes: stereotypically Romantic posturing, love, philistinism, and social status. The composer's stormy capacity for love is a facet of Romantic posturing, but warrants separate consideration beyond other Romantic qualities such as eccentricity, restless striving, and unworldliness. These themes characterize the composers in the works by Hoffmann, Weber, Berlioz, and Shaw. While Hoffmann wrote extensively about various composers, I have limited the discussion here to his fictional Kapellmeister, Johannes Kreisler, who appeared as Hoffmann's *alter ego*, voicing the opinions of the music critic and sometime composer across several pieces of writing. Kreisler was introduced in Hoffmann's collection *Fantasiestücke in Callots Manier* (1814), in a group of writings entitled 'Kreisleriana'. He also appears in the novel *Lebensansichten des Katers Murr* (1820), in passages purporting to narrate his biography (the other passages being apparently written by a literate cat). Weber, Hoffmann's contemporary and another composer of foundational German Romantic opera, worked intermittently on the novel *Tonkünstlers Leben* from 1809 to 1820, presenting observations and events from the life of a young composer. Berlioz, one of the century's most prolific composer-critics, produced the collection *Les soirées de l'orchestre* in 1852, featuring stories told among the orchestra at a German opera-house during a series of (evidently dull) performances over 25 nights. Finally, Shaw's *Love Among the Artists* remains (like Weber's fragment) unfinished, predating his time as a music critic and, later, playwright. It evinces Shaw's lifelong interest in music, especially the Romantic figure of the composer still prevalent in the mid- to late-Victorian imagination: his Owen Jack is modelled on Beethoven and, even in the altered climate of 1881, rages against the same ills as his predecessors. All of these writers participate in the construction and perpetuation of a Romantic figure in which anger was a fundamental attribute, if also, as Shaw best recognized from his later vantage point, a mitigation of these composers' agitations for social change.

Romantic stereotypes

Romantic writers suggested music might possess 'putative expressive powers', encouraging 'the notion that a composer might "live" in his music, composing out his inner life' (Samson 271). Beethoven was the originating figure in this sense, bearing 'the romanticism of music […] in the depths of his spirit', as Hoffmann wrote in an infamous 1810 review of the former's Fifth Symphony (*Musical Writings*, 239). Comini confirms: 'It was the

dualism of tenderness and turbulence, a spirit assailed yet assailing, which Beethoven's personality bridged and displayed – in his demeanor as well as in his music. He *did* – frequently – look like, that is, *act* like, *feel* like, his scores' (32). Any anger identified in a composer's character might be emblematic of their triumphantly tempestuous works. Indeed, a stormy personality proved that composers had access to deeper emotions than the ordinary person. Authors shaped this assumption through their writing, appealing to an understanding of the Romantic genius as moody and affected which was already prevalent at the beginning of the century.

Writers had long speculated about the necessity of certain qualities in the composer. J.J. Quantz wrote in 1752: 'He who wishes to devote himself to composition must have a lively and fiery spirit, united with a soul capable of tender feeling; a good mixture, without too much melancholy, of what scholars call the temperaments' (qtd. in Hoffmann, *Musical Writings*, 44). Hoffmann drew on this ideal formula in creating Kreisler, but noted, at the very beginning of 'Kreisleriana', that 'nature had tried a new recipe but that the experiment had gone wrong: to counteract his over-excitable spirit and his fatally inflammable imagination too little phlegm had been added' (*Musical Writings*, 79). Early in *Katers Murr,* Kreisler is told by his friend Master Abraham, in a tone both chastising and admiring, that he is 'like a madman, driven by Heaven knows what infernal Furies', host to 'a seething volcano which might erupt in ruinous flames at any moment, ruthlessly consuming all around it!' (*Tomcat Murr*, 14). Weber conjures up a similar image of vacillation and imbalance in one of his chapter sketches: 'He feels out of his true element. His [element] is moody and unhappy, one moment wildly excited and the next sunk in the deepest gloom, quite unable to work' (318). Berlioz's First Evening opens with reports of the composer Corsino, who has in a 'towering rage' tussled with a theatre-manager and is in jail (9-10). In the Twelfth, he describes a typically Romantic figure called Adolphe D., whose temperament seems to hang in the balance: 'at once passionate and reserved, with the most singular mixture of stiffness and grace, brusqueness and forbearance, sudden gaiety and deep abstraction' (40). Notably, Berlioz had studied medicine and retained an interest in matters such as splenetic temperaments and their possible connection to creativity (Brittan 69). His account also appeals to an idea of the suffering artist already familiar to readers – Adolphe 'obviously was one of those artists *predestined* to suffering' (135, emphasis added) – suggesting a common understanding of Romantic stereotypes as something of a 'destiny', even a prerequisite, for artists by 1852.

The composer might be driven to anger by the exertions of writing powerful music: literary descriptions of restless striving confirm the

composer's unswerving devotion to his vocation. The redrafted opening of Weber's novel binds anger to the creative process, making music both a source and result of the composer's frustrations:

> And the hammer flew from its socket, several strings gave up the ghost with a ping – in fact, my annoyance got so much the better of me that I withdrew my hand from the keyboard, knocking over the stool and the bare manuscript paper, and started up, pacing my narrow little room with long steps, though even in my rage craftily avoiding the chests and various bits of furniture. For months I had been plagued, worried and tortured by an uncanny something, and during the last few weeks this feeling had become intolerable. It was a vague yearning towards the shadowing distance which might ease my pain, though I never really considered how. It was a painful tension in my inner being, frustrated by the consciousness of a high ideal, an urge to work which seemed doomed to disappointment, an irresistible inclination to work on the grandest scale and with all my faculties, coupled with an absence of all ideas and of the creative faculty itself – a chaos of shifting and worrying thoughts, so often dominating all artists and now completely dominating me. (321-22)

The protagonist's 'vague yearning towards the shadowing distance' and 'consciousness of a high ideal' recall Hoffmann's identification of 'nameless, haunted yearning' in Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, in his review which was contemporary with Weber's novel (*Musical Writings*, 250). Francesca Brittan describes *Sehnsucht*, the 'desire for an unattainable perfection', as characteristic of German writing in the early nineteenth century, and the identification of music with ineffable interiority made musicians particularly susceptible to such yearning (63). Hoffmann's Kreisler has been 'overcome by that indescribable restlessness' since his youth: 'a wild, crazy longing for something which I seek outside myself in restless activity, although it is hidden within me, a dark mystery' (*Tomcat Murr*, 53-54). Like Weber's composer, with his 'painful tension in my inner being', Kreisler's outward aspirations lead to the recognition of something 'hidden *within* me', according with a belief of the composer as somehow constituted *by* his music – bearing it as a 'dark mystery' within himself.

The composer thus found himself angered by the obligation to contain his art, newly granted a numinous autonomy by the Romantics, within worldly bounds. These writers emphasize their composers' unfitness to inhabit the same world as ordinary people. Kreisler strikes his companions as 'a menacing, uncanny creature' who 'perhaps […] meant to lure us into baleful magic circles' (*Tomcat Murr*, 40). He has recourse to the musical term 'dissonance' to express his sense of unworldliness: 'I have a profound sense of being good for nothing in a world which seems to me an eternal

and mysterious kind of dissonance' (*Tomcat Murr*, 217). We find a similar sense of frustrated misalignment in Weber:

> what life is more full of irritating little events and petty setbacks than that of the artist? He ought by rights to stand as free as a god, conscious of his strength and steeled by his art. He seems to be lord of the world until he actually sets foot in it. Then his dreams and his powers vanish and he finds himself confined within the narrow limits of everyday life (326)

Weber's conviction that the 'narrow limits of everyday life' are incompatible with the realms inhabited by the composer extends to a notion of language itself as an insufficient medium. As the composer is limited by 'everyday life', music is limited by language. In his marginal notes to a preparatory sketch of his novel in 1817, he remarked on his 'highly coloured', 'slightly precious and bombastic' prose: 'Perhaps it may be my very musicality that accounts for it' (360). Kreisler, similarly, figures the spirit of music within him as 'a confused, baffling dream of a paradise of the utmost contentment which even the dream *cannot name*' (54, emphasis added). Provoked by the inexpressible, he yet glories in its potential to transcend the 'petty setbacks' with which the composer must contend. For George Eliot's Julius Klesmer, in *Daniel Deronda,* a character whose ancestry to Kreisler has been traced by Delia da Sousa Correa (135-36), music provides a non-verbal avenue for expressing anger. When provoked, 'with one of his grand frowns', Klesmer '[shakes] his hand as if to banish the discordant sounds', or 'mak[es] a mysterious, wind-like rush backward and forward on the piano' (Eliot 104, 224). Music, imbued with Romantic subjectivity, permits the evocation of anger, surpassing verbal expression.

This sense of the limitlessness of musical expression makes music both a cause of, and remedy to, anger. Weber's composer writes: 'I had recourse to music, in the hope of being able to express my feelings in sound, driven as I was by passion and heated to fever-pitch' (355). In 'Kreisleriana', the composer exalts how music 'transports [man] from his enslavement here below, from the oppressive torment of his earthly existence' (*Musical Writings*, 88). And 'earthly tribulations', in *Katers Murr,* are subject to 'only one angel of light with power over that evil demon' – 'the spirit of music' (54). This sense of music as both irritant and salve bolsters the composer's Romantic credentials: while his quest to compose great music tests him, it is ultimately justified because of the peace it may bring, not only to him, but to all listeners.

These characteristics – eccentrically unbalanced temperaments, an irritable striving for artistic perfection, misalignment with the ordinary world – were inventions of Romantic literature and remained attached to the

figure of the composer long into the nineteenth century. Owen Jack, in *Love Among the Artists*, has 'somewhat Beethovenesque qualities' according to Frances Pietch (256), and has been explored by Donna Beckage as a 'distant literary relative' of Beethoven (94). While these studies focus on Beethoven's 'distinctive personality' (Beckage 96) as inspiring Shaw's character, by situating my discussion of Jack here I hope to prove that his irascible nature has more to do with a literary construction in which Beethoven is just one facet, with figures like Hoffmann, Weber, and Berlioz as significant contributors. Shaw is the only one of my chosen authors who was not also a composer, and this novel predates his time as a music critic for *The World* and *The Star* (1886-94); nonetheless, he had moved in musical milieus since childhood, when his mother engaged the singing tutor John Lee (Pietch 218-21). *Love Among the Artists* reveals, despite Shaw's interest in modern figures like Wagner, a lasting fascination with predecessors both real and fictional. One moment, in which Jack is observed composing at the piano, indicates the violence of his nature:

> grotesque noises mingled with the notes of the pianoforte. […] The player was not only pounding the keyboard so that the window rattled in its frame, but was making an extraordinary variety of sounds with his own larynx. […] Jack was alone, seated at the pianoforte, his brows knitted, his eyes glistening under them, his wrists bounding and rebounding upon the keys, his rugged countenance transfigured by an expression of extreme energy and exaltation. (46-7)

'Marking each *sforzando* by a toss of his head and a gnash of his teeth', Jack imprints on his music the anger he displays elsewhere in the novel (47). This is reminiscent of accounts of Beethoven from throughout the century, which – like the portraits discussed in my introduction – emphasized characteristics in the composer which were gratifyingly identifiable in his music. Like Beethoven, Jack is strikingly 'rugged' in appearance (5). Beckage notes that Jack shares with Beethoven a neglect for his clothing (97), but his 'old creased frock coat, with a worn-out hat' (Shaw 4) are also reminiscent of Kreisler's eccentric attire: 'his clothes were ill-suited […] his waistcoat unbuttoned, his neckcloth only loosely tied, his shoes so thick with dust' (*Tomcat Murr*, 41). An 1822 Hoffmann drawing, depicting Kreisler 'in madness', dancing and brandishing a pipe, is brought to mind by Shaw's description of Jack, after he has been dismissed from his teaching post:

> Jack, when he had had his laugh out, walked quickly away, chuckling, and occasionally shaking his fist at the sky. When he came to Colonel Beatty's house, he danced fantastically past the gate, snapping his fingers. He laughed

> boisterously at this performance at intervals until he came into the streets. (53)

Jack's 'fantastical' dancing recalls the *Fantasiestücke* in which Kreisler first appeared. Modelled on eccentric Romantic precedents, Jack is 'unstable as dynamite', his bouts of anger attesting to his lineage (116).

As in my previous examples, the obligation to subsume his musical vocation to matters such as business causes anger in Jack, who declares, 'I hate business and know nothing about it' (20). This aversion provides continuity with Berlioz's Adolphe, who fumes at a pupil, 'Get out of here! I don't want you or your money' (135). As Beckage notes (98, 100), Jack's disregard for his living quarters and rudeness to his landlady (to whom he rages, 'Begone, you Jezebel', 'you crocodile', and 'you ungovernable old hag', 82-3), are direct Beethoven references, which Shaw makes overt when Jack quips to the landlady: 'I sometimes wonder what part of my music will show the influence of your society upon me. My Giulietta Guicciardi!' (141). (Guicciardi was a student of Beethoven's, dedicatee of the *Moonlight* Sonata and purportedly object of his affections.) Ultimately, Jack's anger vindicates him as a true artist – most notably in the fact that he is not well received by those around him. Herbert, Shaw's portrait of a dilettante painter, brands Jack 'ill-mannered and ill-conditioned' (45) and 'the most uncouth savage in London' (385). It is this savagery, however (recalling that Romantics since Rousseau had celebrated closeness to nature, especially as embodied in the simplicity of the child), which proves Jack's worth.[3] When Herbert deems Jack 'so far from possessing the temperament of an artist' (204), this is a call from Shaw to take Jack's violent outbursts as, conversely, the *ideal* temperament for the artist. Jack's success as a composer – while Herbert fails in painting – more than anything suggests Shaw's affirmation of the Romantic composer's anger as underlying a truly creative spirit.

Love

If anger and music are brought together in these literary portraits as phenomena which exceed verbal expression, a third, intertwined phenomenon is love. Love is a cause of these composers' anger and a spur to composition, further validating their Romantic credentials: their capacity to love is equated with their capacity to give voice to the deepest human feeling in their music.

Berlioz's Adolphe, a compendium of Romantic stereotypes as 'one of those artists predestined to suffering', has a 'rage for loving' which exceeds expression (141). Faced with the realization that his lover Hortense is a

philistine, his reaction blends anger and the ineffable: 'he first riveted on Hortense a dark glance full of threatening fire. Then, striding restlessly about the room, fists clenched, teeth convulsively set, he seemed to be taking counsel with himself about the way in which he should speak' (142-43). Just as his anger springs from disappointment at his lover's musical shortcomings, Berlioz connects the composer's musicality with his 'rage for loving': the idea of imbalanced temperament returns as he speculates upon 'the balance in Adolphe's heart between his violent love and his despotically impassioned artistic convictions' (141). 'Love-pathology' was, as Brittan explores, a common trope across Berlioz's work, notably his *Symphonie fantastique*, which utilized the *idée fixe* to yoke together musical and amorous longing and convey the obsessive nature of his love for the actress Harriet Smithson (54).

'Violent love' similarly characterizes Jack in Shaw's novel. Proposing to Mary Sutherland, he denigrates himself as an ogre and deplores his 'rough frame' and 'ardent temper', yet cites this ardour as evidence of his ability to love her (259-62). Mary's refusal provokes an angry response which amounts to a re-inscription of Romantic tropes. Jack rages: '*I* hanker for a *wife*! […] *I* grovel after *money*! What dog's appetites have this worldly crew infected me with! No matter: I am free: I am myself again. Back to thy holy garret, oh, my soul!' (264-65). Disappointment in love prompts a recursion to the stereotype of all-consuming devotion to art, which itself might cause anger, but satisfies the 'holy' requirements of the artist's 'soul'. Pietch and Beckage have both pointed out that this moment further ties Jack to Beethoven, whose bachelordom was celebrated by his admirers as proof of his marriage to a less worldly ideal: his music (Pietch 271-72, Beckage 98-99).

In suggesting the composer has no need for love, Shaw reconfigures his Romantic literary precedents. Shaw's relationship to these precedents was both admiring and critical, and while he sketches his character along eccentric, temperamental lines, he discards the elevated sentimentalism of the earlier examples. For Shaw, 'the development of musical talent is not all inspiration, but involves relentless discipline and hard work', and therefore he criticizes 'the exaggerated emotional transports of such fictional musicians as were to be found in the novels of E.T.A Hoffmann' (Pietch 273-74). Hoffmann's composer needs love, in spite of the anger it causes him, to create. Early in *Katers Murr,* Kreisler's music is interlinked with the object of his love, Julia; and with anger, too, as she witnesses him berating his guitar as a 'wilful little creature' (39). Julia tells him, 'We overheard the charming way you addressed the little thing, and then we saw you angrily throw the poor creature away into the bushes, so that it sighed

aloud in tones of lamentation' (*Tomcat Murr*, 42). From this moment, she is drawn to Kreisler, retrieving his guitar so that he might continue making the music which attracts her: the 'little thing', the 'poor creature', is personified and paralleled with Julia herself. Anger may result from music-inspiring love, but it is also proof of it: the musical lover must be ready to 'strike down the most admirable folk in homage to the ladies of their hearts if there were no convenient giants or dragons to hand' (*Tomcat Murr*, 119). This presages Kreisler's most angry moment of the novel, in which he indeed appears ready to 'strike down' a romantic rival. As he '[draws] the blade from his sword-stick, assum[ing] the posture of a fencer', Kreisler reverts to musical metaphor:

> little do you know that Julia has at her side a bold Kapellmeister with a sufficiency of music in him, a Kapellmeister who, as soon as you approach her, will take you for a damnable chord of fourths and fifths that needs to be resolved! And the Kapellmeister will do as his profession requires, which means he will resolve you by putting a bullet through your brain, or running this blade through you! (*Tomcat Murr*, 158)

Music again provides the idiom for what language cannot express: the depth of feeling which encompasses Kreisler's love for Julia and his anger at the 'damnable chord of fourths and fifths' who is his rival. It was this emotionalism which had gone out of fashion by the time Shaw wrote his novel towards the end of the century. Nonetheless, the idea of conflict between the composer's worldly and unworldly loves – woman and music – remained potent.

Philistinism

The early nineteenth century also saw composers becoming obliged to engage in the worldly by navigating new social practices. Once obliged to seek patronage from court or church, they now had the option of appealing to a rapidly expanding public. This public, however, was not in the main familiar with the musical standards by which composers and performers swore. Although institutions were set up with increasing enthusiasm throughout the century, both to facilitate the distribution of music and to educate audiences as to the erudite consumption of it, Goehr points out: 'most of these institutions were newly born themselves, and were therefore unable or unwilling as yet to treat composers in a consistent and fair manner' (210). Composers were not only angry in fulfilment of their new reputations for depth of feeling, but because their works were not receiving their dues, either from the public or from the dedicated institutions. Music might

nominally be more respected than ever for its ability to give voice to passion, but composers still raged against philistinism: those who failed to see music's value at all, or those who valued it only from a financial perspective.

Hoffmann's and Weber's writings show that philistinism was already a cause of anger for those working within a patronage system. The first section of 'Kreisleriana', entitled 'Kapellmeister Johannes Kreisler's Musical Sufferings', gives vent to frustration at Kreisler's students, asking: 'Is it right to torture honest musicians with music as I have been tortured today, and am tortured so often?' (*Musical Writings*, 85). As notions of professionalism became attached to music, a sense of exclusivity arose: 'honest musicians' were singularly able to appreciate the 'noble and sacred art of music', while patrons necessarily 'violated' it and subjected it to 'damnable abuse' (ibid). As will be echoed in Shaw, one of Hoffmann's primary targets is noblewomen, whose bad singing is attributed to 'hellish demons', spurring a harsh invective from Kreisler which boils over in an accumulation of gerunds: 'blithely go on with your shrieking, squeaking, miaowing, gurgling, groaning, moaning, warbling, wobbling!' (*Musical Writings*, 83). Weber's composer is similarly frustrated by the poor standards of his patron, lamenting 'the wretched task of setting to music his verses, which have neither wit nor feeling' (318). Written before 1820, these instances illustrate the contempt felt by composers for their noble and royal patrons, who desultorily engaged in the arts while failing to credit the artistry of the men they employed.

Little had changed by the time Berlioz wrote his *Soirées* in the 1850s. Jacques Barzun explains that the 'egalitarian Second Republic' was viewed with suspicion by Berlioz, who feared it might merely replace the musically uneducated aristocracy with the musically uneducated masses, as prime determinants of the country's musical culture. He found 'that a Second Empire was as bad, if not worse – and with the same old badness' (*Evenings,* xii). Ignorance continued to reign, to the chagrin of characters like Adolphe in the Twelfth Evening. After being subjected to a poor performance, he longs for a kindred spirit who 'would break in the skulls of the manager, the singers, and the musicians, instead of condoning by your applause the most shameful profanation that genius can endure' (137). In the Tenth Evening, Berlioz writes in the voice of Music, personified, in conversation with a government minister. 'Music' cries: 'my heart is broken by the utter contempt, the lordly indifference of a public concerned about everything except me; a public which thinks itself sophisticated, though it has never felt anything' (123). That the public's indifference is 'lordly' reveals its continuity with the prior indifference of noble patrons: though the bourgeois

think themselves 'sophisticated' in patronizing music, they too fail to appreciate it. The Evening ends with the minister's hope that, one day, 'foolish orders and absurd whims will no longer be imposed on you [Music]' (126), but even the charged adjectives in this sentiment imply Berlioz's lasting resentment.

Shaw's perspective, in Britain towards the end of the century, was no brighter. As Pietch writes, 'Shaw includes in his fictional presentation the same fight against low taste and commercialism that he [later] waged as a music critic' (256). His composer encounters poor standards even in musical institutions. As the Antient Orpheus Society prepares to stage Jack's work, he loses his temper at a musician who finds it unplayable: 'Jack, choked by the effort to be persuasive and polite, burst out raging: "It can be done. It must be done. You are the best clarinet player in England. I know what you can do." And Jack shook his fists wildly at the man as if he were accusing him of some infamous crime' (173). Like his precedents, Jack lambasts perfunctory engagement with music, especially by women: 'I get ten guineas a day at present for teaching female apes to scream, that they may be the better qualified for the marriage market' (253). This is the fight waged by Shaw to which Pietch refers – like his composer and his Romantic forbears, Shaw valued music in and of itself, decrying the ends to which it was implemented, such as qualifying young women for the 'marriage market'. The composer's anger, again, derives from his feeling of exclusivity. Jack is dismissed from his post as choirmaster for bemoaning their standards: '[he] said that if he was a God and they sang to him like that, he'd scatter 'em with lightning' (86). The composer's sense of himself as like a 'God' owes to his elevation in Romantic ideology, but holding the position of sole arbiter of quality is clearly burdensome. As the following section will make evident, the exceptionalism of Romantic ideology could at times contradict and hamper the more collectivist claims for the composer's usefulness in society: such as the claim that, by improving people's musical standards, he might improve their general wellbeing. Anger was both a proof point of Romantic individualism and the motivating rhetoric of collectivist claims.

Perfunctory valuations of music also made the industry's financial dimensions contemptible for many composers. The exploitation of music is a recurring point of anger in Berlioz's *Evenings*. In the Fourth, the composer Corsino criticizes a music manager who makes 'successful raids on the great masters' for profit (58). His language combines devaluation with violent grotesquerie as he describes: 'The fellow I am speaking of killed and skinned the works of celebrated composers. […] I almost let him suspect what I thought of him, and on one occasion so far forgot myself as very

nearly to tell him my opinion of his musical abattoir' (57-58). This imagery returns later: 'the composer feels he is being garrotted but is careful not to complain' (91). Ultimately, Berlioz unites the two main aspects of philistinism – a weak perception of music's intrinsic value and a keen perception of its financial value – when he states, in the Twenty-First Evening:

> Music makes herself beautiful and charming for those who love and respect her; she has nothing but scorn and contempt for those who sell her. That is why she is so bad-tempered, so insolent, and so stupid nowadays in most of the great theaters of Europe, which are sunk in speculative finance, and where she is accordingly treated like dirt. (242)

In the Tenth Evening, Berlioz's employment of the first-person voice might encourage the reader to feel that, in speaking as 'Music', he in fact speaks for composers themselves. Here, too, the attribution of bad temper and insolence to music could equally apply to composers. Just as Romantic writing proposed, music could speak for the composer – and voice his anger at being 'treated like dirt'. True, composers felt the involvement of 'speculative finance' devalued the art they honored, but they were equally 'bad-tempered' on behalf of themselves.

Social status

To demonstrate why composers were angry for themselves, and not just the art they practiced, I briefly turn to an essay by Franz Liszt from 1835, in which he surveys the ostensibly egalitarian workings of the market and reveals that little had changed since the days of patronage, when composers such as Haydn lived as a 'bound servant' obliged to access noble residences via the service doors (Salmen 268). In 'On the Situation of Artists', published in the *Gazette musicale* (to which Berlioz was a frequent contributor), Liszt lamented the 'pain, misery, troubles, and disappointments' – nay, the 'ever bleeding wounds' – of the supposedly emancipated musical artist (105). Liszt remarks: 'I fail to see any considerable improvements in the modern artist's condition, namely, in their fortune, reputation, equal standing in society, as well as the money they earn as compensation for their noble spirit and birth' (109). Instead of being recognized for their 'noble spirits' as 'the priests of art', composers were subjected to the 'bemoaning pageantry of crude exploitation [and] pathetic subordination' (110, 113). Liszt's spiritualization of his profession calls attention to the influence of Saint-Simonism on this essay: this ideology, prevalent in France in the early decades of the nineteenth century, gave pride