Phenomenological Approaches to Intersubjectivity and Values

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Edited by

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INTRODUCTION

LUÍS AGUIAR DE SOUSA AND ANA FALCATO

As witnessed by the number of recent publications on the topic, there has been a renewed interest in phenomenology in recent Anglo-American philosophy. This interest, however, has been almost exclusively directed at phenomenology's possible contributions to issues pertaining to the cognitive sciences and philosophy of mind in general. Phenomenology's remarkable insights are still largely overlooked when it comes to contemporary debate, not only, say, in ethics and aesthetics, but concerning values in general. The present volume is meant to address this gap. For all intents and purposes, this volume can be taken as a collection of papers on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity. However, it is not meant to be just another companion to the topic of intersubjectivity or another collection of assorted essays on phenomenological issues. The idea behind it is that intersubjectivity is the key to what phenomenology has to say about values.

It also provides an opportunity to introduce the work of continental scholars whose contributions will, for the most part, be new to English-speaking academics. The authors of the chapters in this volume are specialists in the fields of phenomenology, post-structuralism, continental social philosophy, philosophy of mind and philosophy of literature. The papers collected here reflect original research on almost all the great phenomenologists' views on intersubjectivity. Accordingly, the book gathers essays on the work of Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Emmanuel Levinas. Beyond these, there are also other papers that focus on phenomenologists who are less well known or studied in the Anglo-American world, but whose reflections on intersubjectivity and its relation to ethics are especially relevant, such as Max Scheler and Gabriel Marcel.

As a matter of principle, we have chosen to provide as comprehensive an account of phenomenology as possible rather than focusing strictly, say, on Husserlian phenomenology. The downside of this is that the book does not feature papers on certain highly relevant phenomenologists of intersubjectivity and the social world, such as Edith Stein, Alfred Schutz, and those from the so-called Munich school, such as Adolf Reinach. On the

other hand, one of the distinguishing features of this volume when compared to similar efforts is that it takes seriously what Merleau-Ponty so poignantly wrote about the nature and practice of phenomenology: the responsible philosopher will say that "phenomenology allows itself to be practiced and recognized as a manner or as a style, or that it exists as a movement, prior to having reached full philosophical consciousness. It has been en route for a long time, and its disciples find it everywhere, in Hegel and in Kierkegaard of course, but also in Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud" (Merleau-Ponty 2012, lxxi). In keeping with Merleau-Ponty's idea of phenomenology as a style of philosophizing rather than belonging to a specific school or the endorsement of a fixed set of doctrines, this volume includes studies on authors who are not usually associated with the phenomenological tradition but whose "style of thought" can be said to be, at least in some respects, phenomenological. Accordingly, the reader will find papers dealing with authors or certain strands of thought that normally fall outside the scope of volumes on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, such as the relation of Foucault's and Deleuze's thought to their phenomenological forebears, the relevance of the phenomenology of intersubjectivity to psychiatry, the problem of intersubjective communication of ethical standpoints through literature, the ethical status of shame and, finally, the nature of war and its remembrance.

As stated above, what makes this volume special and distinct from other collective works on the phenomenology of intersubjectivity is its insistence on the axiological—that is, the ethical and existential—dimension of phenomenology's account of intersubjectivity. In other words, most of the papers do not focus exclusively (and some not at all) on the cognitive dimension of the problem of intersubjectivity. Furthermore, intersubjectivity is perhaps the topic in which issues concerning the theory of knowledge and cognition, which formed the core of Husserl's concerns at the beginning of the phenomenological movement, start to take on an axiological and ethical dimension. It is not by chance that in Levinas, for instance, phenomenological reflection culminates in an ethics based on the encounter with the "face of the other". One can see that this axiological turn in phenomenology was in some sense already unavoidable from the moment Husserl discovered the original character of the presentation of the "other" as an integral part of the phenomenal world. The topic of intersubjectivity is further distinguished by the fact that there seems to be not only much common ground but also a shared approach to the problem of the other, despite the many differences between the various phenomenologists' stances. In fact, one of the most striking conclusions one reaches when reading through some of the papers contained in this volume is that all phenomenologists discussed in this collection share the idea of the "original" character of the presentation of

the other—that is, the idea that the other is not artificially reached by way of explicit or implicit reasoning. The phenomenological subject is at its innermost core a social subject, for the other is not like any other object I constitute. The "other" is a condition of the possibility not only of objectivity in general, but of cultural objects and values.

From this common basis, there is admittedly much division among phenomenologists. To begin with, while Husserl (and in a way, even Merleau-Ponty) still seems to espouse the idea that our access to the other is primarily cognitive, subsequent phenomenologists, especially Scheler, Heidegger and Sartre (not to speak of Marcel or Levinas), are explicitly opposed to the idea that our access could be primarily cognitive in nature, although each of them expresses his own position in different ways, using different vocabulary. Heidegger and Sartre say that our relation to the other is one of being, not knowing; Scheler says that we access the other through what he calls "love"; Marcel speaks in terms of "availability" or "unavailability" to the other; Levinas speaks of an original ethical encounter with the face of the other. Another issue that is particularly connected to the nature of our openness to the other and that recurs in many of the phenomenologists discussed in this volume is that of a priori and global or holistic access to the other. Albeit in different forms, it is possible to find this idea in Scheler, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Connected to it is also the notion, especially present in the work of Scheler and Merleau-Ponty, that our own subjectivity, far from being insulated from the world and others, is dependent for its constitution on the relation with the other. I myself, as a subject, am only co-constituted along with the other subject. According to this view, the difference between me and the other, as subjects, derives from a primordial intersubjective, or intercorporeal, relation, if not a straightforward identity with the other.

Thus, to return to a previous point, the introduction of the topic of the other confers on phenomenology an undeniable, if sometimes only implicit, ethical dimension. In fact, from a phenomenological point of view, the hope of finding a foundation for ethics or morality must lie in the correct phenomenological analyses of the way in which the other is given to me. Furthermore, to the extent that values are linked to our social existence and have an essentially social dimension, the phenomenology of value must be connected to the phenomenology of intersubjectivity.

As for the structure of the present volume, it consists of three parts. The first part contains papers dealing with the more epistemological or cognitive dimension of the problem of intersubjectivity. It opens with Paul Zipfel's paper on the accessibility of the other in Husserl. What is the meaning of Husserl's talk of inaccessibility when it comes to the experience of the

other? Zipfel tries to elucidate this question by means of a discussion of the meaning of "direct" and "originary" in Husserl. According to Zipfel, "directness" refers to the self-givenness of an object, while "originality" refers to the belonging of an object to a unified stream of consciousness. Husserl's talk of the other ego's being accessible only in its inaccessibility comes down to the fact that the other ego is given directly to me, but in an unoriginal manner—that is, as another stream of consciousness that is unable to be temporally unified with mine. What is originally given to me is only the other's body, not his ego with its stream of consciousness.

In the following chapters of the first part, both Luís Umbelino and Luís Aguiar de Sousa focus on Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological approach to intersubjectivity, especially in his *magnum opus*, the *Phenomenology of Perception*. Luís Umbelino stresses the fact that our lived experience is always already an intersubjective experience. If this weren't the case, we would never come up with the idea of otherness based on our own private experience. After showing how Merleau-Ponty's conception of intersubjectivity is related to Husserl's, Umbelino points to the body, not only as lived but also as pre-personal, anonymous and habitual, as forming the primordial layer of our experience of the world and others. He also emphasizes the role that Merleau-Ponty's conception of habit plays in the constitution of intersubjectivity to the extent that it short-circuits the subjective-objective divide.

Luís Aguiar de Sousa focuses on the relation between Merleau-Ponty's accounts of intersubjectivity and subjectivity and their relation to Merleau-Ponty's reading of Husserl. De Sousa claims that Merleau-Ponty's philosophical project revolves around the introduction of a phenomenological conception of subjectivity that differs from both rationalist/idealist and empiricist/realist/materialist conceptions. Furthermore, the author shows that, according to Merleau-Ponty, our social nature prevents us from having the status of a transcendental subject and that this is at the center of Merleau-Ponty's reading of Husserl. The intersubjective relation occurs only on the basis of an anonymous intercorporeal relation. Solipsism contains a kernel of truth that it does not understand. It is true that I can never live the point of view of the other as mine, but the very distinction between "me" and "other" is drawn against the background of lived intercorporeal relations. De Sousa also contends that the nature of intercorporeal relations should not be conflated with a state of utter indistinction and identity between bodies.

In the next chapter, Roberta Guccinelli explores the notion of the "ecological self" in Max Scheler. She raises the question of the existence of a pre-cognitive vital layer which humans share not only with each other but with all living beings. She emphasizes in particular the importance and

function of the lived organism, as the locus of our "ecological identity", in shaping our most basic values and how we, as members of a species, encounter our environments. Guccinelli then goes on to consider the consequences of Scheler's conception of ecological identity for knowledge of self and others. Knowledge of the self is subsidiary to the most basic sense of self we have through our embodiment. The latter is also what primarily opens us to others before any form of reasoning and knowledge concerning others is in place.

To conclude the first part, Jorge Gonçalves broaches the phenomenology of intersubjectivity from the point of view of psychiatry. Gonçalves focuses on the intersubjective relation between doctor and patient. His guiding question is how to understand the minds of patients. Gonçalves emphasizes the advantages of the phenomenological approach to the other over theories that start out from me as an individual and that postulate the need to infer the mind of the other. However, as the author also shows, not everything that concerns the other is directly shown via our immediate access to his or her body's expressive nature. The other remains elusive. For that reason, Gonçalves views narratives as a way of understanding the other. In the end, Gonçalves leans towards a hybrid solution to explaining my access to the other. He argues in favor of a phenomenological approach coupled with the understanding of the other's narrative when it comes to psychiatric patients. As an example, he presents the theories and results of Louis Sass, who has proposed an understanding of schizophrenia that relies on an understanding of patients' narratives.

Whereas the first part of the present volume comprises papers that deal primarily with phenomenological approaches to the epistemological problem of how we "know" or "access" others, which lead the authors not only to the phenomenology of cognition but also to the phenomenological description of the pre-cognitive layer of our access to the other, the second part deals more with the existential and ethical dimension of our access or openness to the other. In its opening chapter, Hélder Telo's paper focuses on Scheler's account of our relation to the other considered as a whole and in its ethical dimension. Telo shows that, for Scheler, the notion of the other has an a priori character, and he sums up Scheler's critique of popular theories of his time, such as the theory of analogical reasoning and of empathy (*Einfühlung*). Telo brings to the fore Scheler's idea that the other as a whole, not just a particular other, forms the background that renders possible the experience both of myself and of any individual other. Furthermore, it is this experience of the other as a whole that is also at stake in the experience of particular communities. Telo also highlights and analyses personal love as that in which genuine access to the other consists

for Scheler. It is through "love", in Scheler's technical sense, that we are opened not only to particular others but, a fortiori, to the "other as a whole". Finally, Telo brings out the phenomenological foundations of notions such as "social group" and "community", showing how they are part of an encompassing total community, according to Scheler, and how the highest ethical value consists in loving the total community of others, which entails loving every single other.

The next chapter, written by Paulo Lima, deals with the problem of access to the other in Heidegger's *Being and Time*, with a view to determining what Heidegger understood by loneliness or being-alone (*Alleinsein*). Lima shows how Heidegger's "existential" approach to the problem of the other proceeds from a critique of the so-called "cognitive" approach. According to Lima, the "cognitive approach" was represented by the theories of "empathy" (*Einfühlung*), especially that developed by Husserl, to which Heidegger opposes his category of being-with (*Mitsein*). In this way, Lima's paper also represents a very important scholarly contribution to clarifying one aspect of Heidegger's (mostly silent) relation to Husserl's phenomenology. Lima shows that, according to Heidegger, every instance of *Einfühlung* already presupposes the more primordial, existential, contact with the other. Very much like in the preceding chapter by Hélder Telo, Paulo Lima also explores the idea that our primary contact with the "other" as such forms the background of our encounters not only with particular others but with the self as well. Being-with has an a priori character that precedes every factical encounter with particular others. Loneliness is only possible as a modification of being-with and presupposes the latter. Lima describes two forms of loneliness that can be found in the early Heidegger. The first concerns the factical absence of another being like myself. The second concerns the possibility of my feeling lonely regardless of the factical presence of others. As a result of the analysis of these forms of loneliness, Paulo Lima concludes not only that being-with, the a priori community of myself and the other, has an existential structure, but also that loneliness ensues from a breakdown or disturbance of that existential community.

In the third chapter of Part Two, André Barata looks at Sartre's phenomenology of intersubjectivity against the background of what he considers the failure of Husserl's effort to solve the problem of the other. Barata shows that Sartre's approach represents a "relational", "ontological" and "practical" turn in dealing with the problem of intersubjectivity, in contrast to Husserl's purely epistemic, cognitive approach. Using Saramago's novel *Blindness* as an example, Barata also provides a more positive assessment of the experience of shame than Sartre does. While

shame may be the source of our existential hell, it also holds us in check from a moral point of view. In this paper, André Barata also examines Sartre's analysis of concrete intersubjective relations such as love, language and masochism. According to Barata, parallel to Husserl's epistemic failure in assuring us of the other, there is in Sartre a practical failure in the recognition of the other. Nonetheless, although we are far from being condemned to be with each other in the way Sartre describes, Barata concludes that Sartre's theory of intersubjective relations may constitute an accurate diagnostic of human relations in the modern age.

Next, Elodie Malbois's paper consists in a reconstruction of Gabriel Marcel's position on intersubjectivity. Malbois starts out by characterizing the concepts of "availability" and "unavailability" based on the variety of pronouncements Marcel makes about them throughout his oeuvre. After determining what "available" means, she proceeds to an analysis of the meaning of Marcel's claim that to be available is to see the other as a subject. From here she passes to a consideration of what it means for the other to be available to me and what reciprocal availability, which for Marcel is true intersubjectivity, represents. Malbois also points out that Marcel does not tackle the problem of other minds, for according to him the Cartesian way of raising the problem of the other is merely abstract. According to Malbois, Marcel is instead concerned with the various ways of being with others, in particular by means of the conceptual pair "availability"/"unavailability", with which Marcel distinguishes authentic from inauthentic types of relation with others. As Malbois shows, "availability" and "unavailability" may provide a phenomenological foundation for an ethical theory and for authenticity—that is, true selfhood—in the sense that we can only genuinely be ourselves by being with others. Furthermore, as Malbois shows, for Marcel I cannot even know or think of myself independently of others. At the end of her essay, Malbois also addresses Levinas's critique of traditional accounts of intersubjectivity as a reduction of the other to the same.

Levinas is also the main concern of the final chapter of the second part, written by Vlad Niculescu. The author lays out a Levinasian critique of Heidegger's existential understanding of sociality and the philosophical question concerning it. According to Nicuslescu, the Heideggerian way of asking about the other is always reduced to a mode of self-care. Inquiry into the meaning of the Being of any entity is subordinated to inquiry into the meaning of the entity which I myself am, *Dasein*. Niculescu reinterprets Heidegger's threefold division of the formal structure of every question: the distinction between that in regard to which something is questioned (das *Gefragte*), the entity that is questioned (das *Befragte*) and what is sought out

by the questioning (das *Erfragte*). Inspired by Levinas, the author claims that this distinction implicitly involves reference to the other, as she to whom the question of the meaning of Being is addressed. Understood in this way, the meaning that I solicit from my interlocutor wholly transcends my pre-conceptual understanding of it. The other is available to be questioned by virtue of her face expression. The other elects me as inquirer. The other's face summons me to attendance; I not only solicit the other in my questioning, but the other herself appears as a summons to solicitation. Social transcendence is not linguistic, but purely addressative or phatic. World-concern and self-concern have been subordinated to solicitude (*Fürsorge*). According to the Levinasian view, as articulated by Niculescu, reflection on the other is endowed with an ethical status inasmuch as it stands before his or her judgement.

The third and final part of the book is dedicated to connections between the phenomenology of intersubjectivity and values and other authors and topics that fall outside the scope of what is usually held to be the domain of phenomenology. In its first chapter, Gianfranco Ferraro focuses on Michel Foucault's tacit relation to Merleau-Ponty on the one hand and to Gilles Deleuze on the other. Ferraro traces the late Foucault's ontology of immanence to his phenomenological forebears, especially Merleau-Ponty— a topic of great interest to many but one that has hitherto not received the attention it deserves. According to Ferraro, there is no essential contradiction between Foucault's early archaeological perspective and his late, more ontological perspective. He also focuses on the relation between Foucault's conception of immanence and Deleuze's parallel notions of "Life" and "Transcendental Immanence", claiming that these are pivotal to understanding Foucault's "technologies of the self". Finally, Ferraro shows how Deleuze's ontology of immanence can be assimilated to Foucault's idea of an ontology of actuality or modernity.

Although it does not deal directly with a phenomenological philosopher, Ana Falcato's paper is an original exploration of a topic that will be of great interest to anyone studying the phenomenology of intersubjectivity: the experience of shame, and in particular the moral dimension of this emotion, as analyzed in the works of Bernard Williams, Kant and the novelist J. M. Coetzee. The paper begins with a brief characterization of Bernard Williams's genealogy of shame, after which Falcato turns to the role of shame in Kant's moral philosophy, showing that, contrary to what is usually held, Kant ascribes moral value to shame. She also shows that Kant's moral interpretation of shameful experiences is opposed to the way in which shame is portrayed in J. M. Coetzee's fictional work. While Kant emphasizes the role of shame in exposing our animal, sensible self and

inciting us to lead a moral life, for Coetzee shame constitutes an assault on our intellectual self-conceit that leads to a renewed appreciation of our animal, biological nature.

Following Falcato's foray into J. M. Coetzee's fictional work, the next paper, by Grace Whistler, also deals with the literary treatment of philosophical issues and perspectives. Whistler raises the question of the use of literary devices to communicate ethical perspectives through the example of Camus's *L'Étranger*. Here the intersubjective connection concerns the relation between the author, or, in this case, the main character and narrator, Mersault, and the reader. Grace Whistler explores issues related to the narrative style employed by Camus/Mersault, showing how it is used to introduce the reader to Mersault's world, conveying the latter's ethical worldview. At first, what Camus's style of narration conveys is Mersault's indifferent outlook on life, the stance of the "absurd". Nonetheless, Grace Whistler shows that this is not the definitive "moral of the story" of Camus's novel. Through a change of literary style, Camus tries to convey Mersault's moral development to the reader; the style, and as a result Mersault's character, shifts radically from the beginning to the end of the novel.

Finally, Nicolas de Warren's paper, which might surprise readers due to its non-conventional, non-academic style, functions as an epilogue of sorts to this collection of essays. De Warren's text is a remembrance of, and a meditation on, the moral catastrophe of the First World War. De Warren's paper reflects on the disastrous consequences of technological development at the time of the First World War in terms of its sheer capacity for destruction, of both human and non-human lives, and its impact on transforming the relation between humans and their environment. The evolving nature of war was manifested, in turn, in war trauma such as "shell shock", which is now known as post-traumatic stress disorder, and its expression in modernist art and poetry. The text ends with a more general reflection on war remembrance, the pity it arouses, and the potentially redeeming nature of poetry in connection with Homer's *Iliad*.

Reference

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. 2012. *Phenomenology of Perception*. Translated by Donald A. Landes. Abingdon, UK: Routledge. Originally published as *Phénoménologie de la perception*. Paris: Gallimard, 1945.

PART I.

THE COGNITIVE AND EPISTEMOLOGICAL DIMENSION OF THE PROBLEM OF THE OTHER

CHAPTER 1

THE INACCESSIBILITY OF THE OTHER EGO IN HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY

PAUL F. ZIPFEL

In[1] the work of Edmund Husserl, the appearance of the other ego as an appresented co-constituting that accompanies the immediate presentation of the other's lived body is distinguished from my own constituting by its inaccessibility. How this sense of inaccessibility is to be characterized will be the focus of the present study. Phenomenologically, it is impossible to say that I do not encounter other egos, as my world is filled with them. It is possible to doubt the veracity of these appearances, but to do so is already to rush past the phenomenological evidence needed to investigate the appearance of the other ego. Thus, there is something given, and while it is inaccessible, this inaccessibility is to be understood in a pregnant sense. The other egos appear as inaccessible because, as Husserl notes:

> neither the other I herself, nor her lived experiences [*Erlebnisse*], her appearances themselves, or anything else belonging to her own essence becomes given in my experience originally. If it were, if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately she herself and I myself would be the same. (Husserl 1999, 109/139; translation altered)[2]

[2] For all Husserl citations, the English pagination comes first, where available, followed by the German pagination.

Here, and in other passages,[3] the accessibility of the other ego is different than the way in which inanimate objects are given, in that it is a constituting that is not originally mine and what belongs to it is not directly accessible. Thus, it is my contention that accessibility, phenomenologically considered, is a function of the originality of the conscious act and the directness of its contents.[4] This terminology must be clarified in order elucidate the full sense of accessibility. After exploring Husserl's usage of these terms, I will employ this terminology in describing three modes of consciousness: recollection, the primal impression of immediate experience, and expectation. I then discuss originality and directness in *Fremderfahrung*[5] to show the way in which the experience of the other ego is different than the above three acts of consciousness, which allows for a clear elucidation of what Husserl means by accessibility. Through a careful explanation of these modes of experience, I argue that Husserl uses "accessibility" to denote a special type of originality that separates the givenness of the other ego's conscious life from my own. I then show how the other ego is accessible to me as an other ego through the inaccessibility of her conscious life, which is given to me directly as an object and indirectly as an enacting of her conscious acts.

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[3] See *Ideas I*, wherein Husserl speaks of the experience of the other ego in reference to its originality (Husserl 1983, 6/8); in *Basic Problems*, Husserl notes that the other ego has a stream of consciousness similar to my directly given stream (Husserl 2006, 102/87), and later in the same text, Husserl uses "direct" and "original" to distinguish my stream of consciousness from that of the other ego's (Husserl 2006, 142-146/220-224).

[4] Accessibility for Husserl does not concern mediation, at least not in the way that the contemporary literature discusses it. As Cairns notes, mediation can be used to denote any occurrence of a medium, even a spatial distance or lived body, but phenomenologically my embodied experience of a spatial object is immediate (2006, 6). This broad sense of mediation is also used against the phenomenological approach in the debate on social cognition (Zahavi 2011, 547-549). That mediation can be taken in various ways according to various thinkers or disciplines places a greater importance on clarifying what Husserl means regarding the accessibility of the other ego.

[5] I refrain from using empathy here, as Husserl himself was unhappy with the term (Husserl 2006, 164/234). Empathy is an act of a higher order that is not always at play in the experience of the other ego. That is, the associative act of *Paarung* is an experience of our conscious act directed toward the other ego, but it is not empathy proper.

Direct and Indirect Experience

Husserl's use of the term "direct" is at times non-technical and applied to experience in various manners according to its object. Such ambiguity is mirrored in the contemporary scholarship. On one hand, direct perception is used in analytic philosophy of perception to describe the direct grasping of the object itself as opposed to representations or appearances of the thing.[6] Further, direct is used in work on social cognition to denote theories that argue that other minds are observable.[7] In general, there is little agreement on what is exactly meant by saying an experience or perception is direct.[8] For instance, how is the perceptual directness of spatial objects related to the perceptual directness of other minds: assuming I have direct perception of the cup in front of me, do I have the same direct perception of the consciousness of the server who handed me the cup? Such differences in contemporary scholarship are informative for reading Husserl's work, as he uses "direct" to characterize the presentation of other egos and spatial objects, but he also notes that the intuition of other egos is fulfilled in different ways than spatial objects. Husserl would likely argue that I cannot directly perceive the other ego, at least not in the technical sense of perception, but this does not mean that there is no direct experience of the other ego.[9]

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[6] This is both in reference to analytic readings of Husserl and other philosophers in the tradition who hold that we perceive objects immediately (Tostenson 2010).

[7] As opposed to so called Theory-theory or Simulation-theory supporters whose arguments assume a basic unobservability of other minds. For overviews of these two positions, see Ratcliff (2012, 474-475), Williams (2017a, 194-195), Zahavi (2014, 139-141).

[8] Williams describes a direct experience as being "more immediate, experiential, and intuitive" (2017b, 158). In attempting to distinguish direct perception from simulation, Gallagher refers to direct perception as "nothing more than perception itself" (2008, 537). In analytic philosophy of perception, direct perception is used more for a name to describe perceptual theories that grasp objects without representation and are characterized by the transparency of perception, i.e. they do not assert the existence or influence of constitutive data (such as sensations of bits of color) that make up the perception of an object, rather the components of the object perception are the components of the object itself (when looking at how one perceives a table, one finds components pertaining to the table and not sensorial data) (Tostenson 2010). My personal favorite is Zahavi, who admits that "one should acknowledge that there simply isn't any established view on what 'direct' means" (2011, 548).

[9] There is an ambiguity in the usage of perception, and part of that ambiguity will be explored in this present work. I perceive the other ego in so far as I am aware of them, interact with them, etc. However, I cannot grasp them as I can a physical

The task of this section, then, is to uncover a functional pattern to Husserl's use of direct, but I do not pretend that an exhaustive study of his usage of the term is likely to find a uniform meaning.[10] I begin with some considerations from the secondary literature, derived mostly from the work on social cognition. I use the framework given in these arguments to assess passages from Husserl that offer a picture of his usage of direct, one which influences the contemporary usage. When possible, I attempt to find citations in which he contrasts the direct and the indirect. In doing so, I hope to clarify the way in which certain things are given directly to consciousness and how other things are given indirectly.

In his attempt to clarify the phenomenological position in the debate over social cognition, Dan Zahavi offers a descriptive account of what is meant by direct. In response to other theorists who argue that the perception

object. Even the apperceived other sides of a physical object can become grasped in a perception, which is impossible for the apperceived other ego. Husserl often states that one does not perceive the other ego, or that she is not given directly in perception, but this does not mean that I do not experience other egos in my everyday life. Other egos are there, just as tables and chairs are there, in my experiential world. Thus, the following discussion will focus more on the experience or the consciousness of the other ego as opposed to the strict perception of her in order to avoid this terminological pitfall.

[10] That Husserl uses terms loosely while having an underlying functional distinction can also be found in Steinbock's analysis of Husserl's use of *fremd* and *andere* (Steinbock 1995, 57-60). Steinbock notices a pattern in the use of these terms that, while not uniform, allows for a conceptual distinction Husserl himself did not notice or with which he was unconcerned. He argues that *fremd*, as alien or foreign, is an axiological concept, while *andere* is a logical one. *Andere* indicates the other as in the second thing under investigation, not the primary, while *fremd* connotes an irreducible and irreplaceable thing separate from the originally investigated thing. His example of a foreign language not being equivalent to a second language best exemplifies this distinction. In the case of *direkt* and *indirekt* I have recourse to *Husserliana XXIII*, particularly §2 of the first *Beilage*, wherein Husserl lays out a functional demarcation largely in line with the following discussion. I still hold that this usage is not entirely consistent for a few reasons: (1) this distinction is also described as genuine and non-genuine in the same *Beilage*, showing that a terminological distinction does not seem to be on Husserl's mind; (2) the terms are sparsely used in the discussions of phantasy and image consciousness even when it seems that he is discussing this distinction; and (3) the same conceptual distinction in other texts is made between the *direkt* and the *mittelbar*. Again, this is not to say that Husserl was unaware of this concept, or that this concept cannot be drawn out of his work. Rather, I am drawing out Husserl's present but little clarified distinction between direct and indirect perception, which furthers the current project of clarifying the accessibility of the other ego in its inaccessibility *and* offers a possible foundation for the usage of direct in the contemporary debates on social cognition.

of the other ego cannot be direct if it is given contextually,[11] Zahavi argues that the proper dichotomy should be between direct and indirect or mediated. What is directly perceived is said to be:

> my primary intentional object. There is, so to speak, nothing that gets in the way, and it is not as if I am first directed at an intermediary, something different from the other's psychological state, and then only in a secondary step target it. Moreover, and importantly, the state is experienced as actually present to me, thereby making the experience in question very different from, say, reasoning that the other is upset, because the letter she received has been torn up, or inferring that the other is drunk because he is surrounded by a dozen empty beer bottles, or concluding that the other must be furious because I would be furious if I had been subjected to the same treatment as he has. (Zahavi 2011, 548)

I have included the final three examples because they situate nicely the atmosphere in which Zahavi is defining "directness". The first two examples would be standard fare for Theory-theorists who argue that our perception of the other mind is one of theoretical positing based on contextual and cultural knowledge. The third example brings to mind Simulation-theory, which argues that we posit the other mind's psychological state based upon how we would respond in a similar set of circumstances. In relation to both of these theories, Zahavi defines direct as bypassing the need for such (usually) high-level intermediary cognitive processes in favor of an unmediated grasping of what is right there in front of me: the other ego. This other ego, or the psychological state of the other ego, is my primary intentional object, and thus given directly to me phenomenologically.

While this descriptive account of what is meant by "direct" is helpful in distinguishing the phenomenological account of social cognition from its challengers, it does not offer a technical or rigorous starting point because it is unclear as to what exactly qualifies as my primary intentional object.[12] Zahavi describes my primary object as "experienced as actually present to me", which Husserl often calls *Leibhaftigkeit*, the being there in person. However, there are many objects that are given to me in person, as actually present before me, that are nevertheless not my primary intentional object. For instance, the desk at which I sit writing this is not the primary object of

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[11] Zahavi is specifically referring to Jacob (2011, 528).

[12] While this is a critique of the definition offered by Zahavi, it is clear that such a rigorous definition was not his goal in this text. His description of "direct" is helpful in distinguishing the phenomenological position regarding social cognition from its challengers.

my intention, nor is the laptop my desk supports. Rather, my primary intentional object is the paper itself as I compose it; yet, the desk and the laptop are directly given to me, even in the background. I also have memories which are directly given, and the temporal surroundings of those memories are directly given, although they can be understood as secondarily intended.

Zahavi also calls an experience direct when there is "nothing that gets in the way" of my experience of the object. In a direct experience, there is nothing other than the object (no intermediary) that facilitates my experience of the object. Husserl offers a similar description in *Husserliana XXIII* when he describes the manner in which phantasy presentation is indirect:

> In perceptual presentation we have *one* apprehended object, and this is also the object meant. In phantasy presentation we have two apprehended objects; namely, the phantasy image and the image subject presented to it: only the latter, however, is meant, presented in the proper sense. Perceptual presentation presents its object directly, phantasy presentation indirectly: phantasy presentation presents its object in such a way that it first brings to appearance another object resembling the object, *by means of* which it apprehends and means the object in image. (Husserl 2005, 122/112)

From this it is quite easy to see that directness is a function of the givenness of the object; as Dorion Cairns describes it, in a direct consciousness the object appears itself without some intermediary, while an indirect consciousness is of something "indicated, or represented, or signified, by something else" (Cairns 2006, 3). The easiest example of this, and one often used by Husserl, is an experience of a painting. When I view a painting, say of my cat, there is a double intending: I have an intention of the image of the object and of the object itself (Husserl 2005, 121-122/112). In one sense, I view the painting and think of my cat, that is to say my actual cat and not this painted image before me. In this intention, the painted image acts as an indication, a pointing towards an object that is re-presenting what is meant.[13] In a second intention, I can view the painting as an object itself, as when I focus on its brush strokes or its color. In this second intention, the image of the cat is itself directly given; it is the intended of my intending. However, the object of the first intention, my cat itself, is indirectly given, because it

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[13] "For the image here [in image presentations] is the 'objectification' of sense contents, and yet this objectification is not a perceptual presentation. It is not the representing [*repräsentirende*] object, the 'mental' image that is meant, but the depicted object, the image subject; not this tiny little figure appearing in the colors of the photograph, but the 'real' child" (Husserl 2005, 121-122/112).

is only indicated. I do not have a consciousness of the current state of affairs concerning my cat; rather, I have only an image of my cat, which is not the intended of the intention (Husserl 2005, 126/116, 150/136).

This is not to say that a direct consciousness demands that its object be given as simultaneous with its act. For instance, the remembering of my cat, a present act with a past object, is a direct consciousness.[14] Cairns emphasizes that this makes the remembering different from a picturing, for the object of my recollection is itself given as my object, it is merely given as something just-having-been. Cairns also notes that the same can be said for dreaming and anticipation, in that their objects are the dreamt and the anticipated.[15] The directness of consciousness, then, is not dependent upon the current existence[16] of its object. Rather, the directness of a conscious act still comes down to the way in which an object is given: a direct consciousness is one in which the object *itself* is given as opposed to indicated or in some other way presented through something else, which is apprehended but not meant.[17]

Cairns offers an interesting example of physical perception to illustrate the difference between direct and indirect givenness, specifically the way in which I can have a simultaneously direct and indirect consciousness of the same object:

> Looking into a mirror, I mean the seen images as depicting contemporary physical events, which may well be, at the same time, objects of a direct perceiving consciousness: I see what I take to be a mirror-image of my hand and, at the same time, I see what I take to be my hand itself. Thus I have a direct consciousness of something as "an image" and, simultaneously, both

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[14] Husserl also says: "Remembering…now brings *the* past directly to intuition as [the past] itself, [namely,] a past that was intended in empty memory" (Husserl 2001, 124/81); "Memory is *direct* presentation of what is past, just as perception is direct presentation of what is present" (Husserl 2005, 287/235); See also Cairns 2006, 5.

[15] Husserl also describes recollection and anticipation as intuitive consciousnesses whose content stands before us itself (2005, 602/501).

[16] "The fundamental error in [the belief that the object of a direct consciousness must be simultaneous with that consciousness] is the belief that the consciousness of something involves the existence, in some manner or other, of something that is the object of the consciousness – if not its existence in reality then at least its existence as somehow in the mind of the person who is conscious of something" (Cairns 2006, 5).

[17] It should be noted that for Cairns this givenness need not be intuitive: "In sensuously perceiving something, I am directly conscious of it in its entirety; but I am conscious of only some parts and qualities of it as given… I am directly conscious of the perceived thing as having more to it than it presents; and I am conscious of this more directly, though not intuitively" (2006, 7).

an indirect and a direct consciousness of something else as "my hand".
(Cairns 2006, 4)

In viewing my hand in the mirror, I obviously have a direct consciousness of the image of my own hand. Further, I have an indirect consciousness of my hand itself as the intended object indicated by the mirror image of my hand. This also occurs when I look in a mirror to see if I have toothpaste in my beard. In such an experience, I see both my face and the mirror-image of my face, but my intention is obviously directed toward my face itself – which is indirectly given through the mirror image. When I reach up to wipe the toothpaste from my beard, I have verification of the current state of affairs through multiple sensual fields of experience. I feel the kinesthetic motion of my head leaning into the mirror to get a better angle of the offending bit of toothpaste. I feel my hand touching my face as it wipes it away. Thus, I have other consciousnesses of my body while it is indirectly given to me in the mirror image. My face, indirectly given through the mirror image, is presented as it currently is, verifiable through my kinesthesis and sense of touch.[18] In this way, I have an object simultaneously given indirectly and directly. Such a double givenness is obviously not possible in the case of the painting of my cat, for even if I am looking at the painting while petting my cat, the painting does not offer a re-presentation of the current state of affairs with regard to my cat. I can see her directly in front of me, or indirectly as the indicated painted cat. Thus, the directness of consciousness is not dependent upon the simultaneity of the consciousness and its object or the existence of the object. It is based purely on the givenness of the object to consciousness.

Husserl discusses the directness and indirectness of consciousness in a similar manner in an appendix to *Basic Problems in Phenomenology* (Husserl 2006, 141-147).[19] Here he lists both memory (later changed to *Vergegenwärtigung*) and expectation as direct modes of consciousness. When I remember an object (an event, a person, or anything else previously experienced), it is directly given as an itself[20] that has been, a thing of the past. Husserl offers an example of recalling a restaurant to illustrate the

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[18] Husserl also notes this intertwining: "I see how my hand moves, and without it touching anything while moving, I sense kinetic sensations, though as one with sensations of tension and sensations of touch, and I localize them in the moving hand" (1989, 158/151).

[19] In this appendix, Husserl also uses ownness and authenticity to describe acts of consciousness, but I will maintain the thematic focus of the current section and limit my discussions to directness.

[20] Husserl notes that this "itself" is given as belonging to "my" consciousness, which is important for the discussions of originality in the following section.

difference between these direct modes of consciousness and an indirect one. When I remember a restaurant that I have visited, it is a mode of direct consciousness in that the object is given as the remembered restaurant itself. However, if I were to "posit it as present, as existing now, then the Now and that which is objective in the Now are in no way self-given. *The Roons*[21] is given to me as something remembered and something past… its still-existing-now and its being-simultaneous-with the Now of perception – all that is not directly given" (Husserl 2006, 146/223). Positing it as still-existing now is not quite a picture consciousness, according to Husserl, and thus slightly different than the above discussion, but in both cases the object is not given itself; it is only indicated. In Husserl's example, the indication comes from my past experiences as opposed to an image proper, but the objects indicated are of indirect consciousnesses nonetheless.

We can now say that the directness of a conscious act is based solely on the givenness of the object of that consciousness, now clarified as self-givenness: that which is given as itself is given in a direct mode of consciousness, while that which is given through something else is given in an indirect mode of consciousness. This clarification will help to delineate the accessibility of phenomena, but it is not enough for what Husserl has in mind phenomenologically when he discusses accessibility. I have a direct perception of the other ego, as Zahavi and Shaun Gallagher have shown, but the other ego is still accessible only in its inaccessibility. To fully flesh this out, we must consider originality.

The originality of experience

In the *Cartesian Meditations*, the accessibility of the other ego is often discussed in relation to originality: that which is particular to the other ego's own essence is not given to me originally. In contrast, Husserl notes that, "[i]n [transcendental self-experience] the ego is accessible to herself originally" (Husserl 1999, 22/62; translation altered). Husserl explores this distinction with more depth in the same appendix to *Basic Problems* mentioned above, in which he investigates the way in which streams of consciousness are given as individuated, specifically my stream as separate from the stream of other egos.[22] In my phenomenologically reduced stream

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[21] The specific restaurant in Husserl's example.

[22] This argument is reconstructed from Appendix 7 of *Basic Problems* and the fifth meditation in *Cartesian Meditations*, but the entirety of these texts help formulate the problem of originality and the other consciousness. In fact, in certain places within the lectures from *Basic Problems*, later amendments made by Husserl insert terminology relating to originality (mostly *originär*) to clarify the original meaning.

of experience, I have consciousnesses of objects that are not always given as *my consciousnesses*, properly speaking. For anyone who has felt shame or embarrassment, as described by Sartre in exploring the look, this is a readily available experience. When I fall off of the weight bench at the gym and I notice all of the much more capable and healthier people looking at me, I am conscious of every single pair of eyes. This means that I have an awareness of not only specific objects in my world, but also of some of those objects having an awareness of me. I see them seeing me; I have a consciousness of a conscious act that is not my own. How do I separate my own conscious acts from all of these other acts, my looking from theirs? Phenomenologically, all of these are given as differing from my own in that my various consciousnesses are marked with originality and the acts of the other egos are not, but how are we to understand this originality?

In an appendix from *Husserliana XIII* concerned with the differences between psychological and phenomenological origins, Husserl attempts to clarify what is meant phenomenologically when one asks about the origin of a consciousness. These analyses consider the originality of the perceived object and the way in which fundamental consciousnesses can be called original, and Husserl ends with an in-depth consideration of the way in which the question of originality demands a genetic methodology. In the beginning of the text, Husserl treats originality as a concept admitting of degrees. An object that is perceived is originally present, while what is not perceived is unoriginal.[23] Even when originally present, an object can be perceived imperfectly, such that there are other parts or sides that are intuitable but not originally perceived. Husserl calls this an original perception in a relative way, because it points to a possible givenness that is more originary in that it gives more of the object. Thus, Husserl notes that "the process of perception is more original than the individual perception" (Husserl 1973a, 347; my translation). It is this sense of originality[24] that is important for the present task, as "the object is all the more originally given, more encompassing, in more sides and parts, the more it comes to actual perception within the process of perception. And the perception of the object

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[23] "Die Ursprünglichkeit kann besagen, dass der Gegenstand wahrgenommen ist, im Gegensatz die Nicht-Ursprünglichkeit, dass er nicht wahrgenommen, nicht originär präsent ist (originär 'da')" (Husserl 1973a, 347).

[24] The second sense of originality as foundational is one that Husserl seems to waiver on within the text, even crossing out a paragraph dealing with the topic. The third sense, originality in terms of genetic constitution has more to do with constitution in general than the constitution of the other ego, although it should be noted that the question of the originality of my own experience as opposed to my experience of other ego's (and their experiencing) is on his mind in discussing all three senses of originality.

is all the more originally given, all the more richly given in original fullness, if it brings more of the object to more original givenness" (Husserl 1973a, 347; my translation).[25] From this, we can see a possible link between the directness of a consciousness and its originality, in that what is given more fully and richly, i.e. given as itself as opposed to indicated, is given more originally.[26] My own conscious acts, then, are more original than the conscious acts of the other ego, because they are directly experienced by me. My acts include my psychic perception – the acting through of my acts. The acts of the other ego are given to me directly as the content of my own acts, but not as an acting, not as the living of the other ego. Her psychic contents are merely indicated, and thus not given to me in actual perception. As Husserl notes: "The more properly my own [*eigentliche*] perception (primordial presence of the object), all the greater originality" (Husserl 1973a, 347; my translation). According to this differentiation, the given consciousnesses (both my own and those that are foreign) separate themselves out according to the "fullness of their originality" (Husserl 1973a, 348; my translation). My own experiences bring more to original fullness than my experience of the other ego's experiencing.

We also see this type or originality at play in *Cartesian Meditations*. Here, the originality of a consciousness depends upon the givenness of its fulfillment.

> Whatever can become presented, and evidently verified, *originally* – is something *I* am, or else it belongs to me as peculiarly my own. Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable experience – an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated – is "other." (Husserl 1999, 114–115/144)

Husserl contrasts two types of experience here: the first is an experience of something that can be reduced to my own experiencing, my ownness; the second is an experience of something that always points beyond it to something indicated. When I fall off of the weight bench, I have a consciousness of other conscious acts with my action as their object, and these consciousnesses are not originally mine. My sensation of pain and regret are my own; they are presented to me without moderation. The seeing me fall, however, is not. I see the other egos *see* me fall, as acts accomplished or undertaken, but the acting of them is only indicated. The living activity of the other ego is an unoriginal consciousness, one that I do

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[25] Thank you to Marco Cavallaro for his help with this translation.
[26] In this appendix, Husserl treats originality as a concept admitting of degrees.

not possess. These unoriginal experiences are unfulfillable primordially, in that their objects cannot be brought to direct givenness; the object of the other consciousness cannot be mine: I cannot see me as the others do. Yet, these unoriginal experiences are directly given, in that they are there in person without an intermediary, as Zahavi described. I see all of the looks, and even the people not looking because they may feel it is poor gym etiquette or because they were too absorbed in their own workout. Thus, I have experiences (the other egos seeing me) directly given to me with their indirectly given objects (me as seen) that are not originally my experiences, and the experience of this unoriginal experiencing (me seeing the other ego see me) is itself my original experience. From this we can see that the directness of a consciousness will be helpful in determining the originality of an experience, but it is not sufficient for the determination of originality, which demands more qualification than the clarification of the givenness of its object.

Husserl offers a better clarification of the appearance of originality in §37 of *Basic Problems*. In my everyday life, I have a single, unified flow of consciousness that I can scroll through as needed in order to construct a sequence of events. I know that before I made breakfast this morning, I woke up, fed the cats, got dressed, brushed my teeth, etc. I can go back further to falling asleep, preparing for bed, spending Sunday with my wife at the market, etc. What is more, I can often construct whole parts of my life in this way, such as that time I met Deron Williams[27] in the airport or when a security camera at work caught me falling over for no reason. Phenomenologically, every consciousness has its "temporal halo" or surroundings that are given with it – each now has its retentive past and protentive future, but also each remembered now has the same (Husserl 2005, 80).[28] However, this halo is not always clearly given for various reasons. I do not remember the events that occurred between my falling over at work and meeting Mr. Williams, and I cannot quite order them properly in my memory: Did I meet Mr. Williams after the fall and possibly told him the story? Had the humorous anecdote not yet occurred? Husserl states the problem phenomenologically: "must [two remembered streams of consciousness] fit into the unity of a stream of consciousness which, however, is not [in advance]²⁹ given at all?" (Husserl 2006, 81). The answer

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[27] Deron Williams was a professional basketball player who played collegiate basketball at the University of Illinois.

[28] For the constitution of this halo, or temporal context, through retention, see Rodemeyer (2010, 232-233).

[29] Husserl added this to the text sometime after 1924.

reveals a special law of consciousness, and it lies in the present positing of the two memories:

> Two memories each, which belong to the unity of a present moment of consciousness that joins them together, combine to form a unity of memory, i.e., a unity of time-consciousness, albeit one that is not intuitively filled, in which the remembered of the one memory and the remembered of the other memory unite in the *one* remembered, *in one time*, and thus in accordance with this unitary consciousness, they are necessarily intuitable, being either simultaneous or in succession. It may be the case that the temporal order is indistinctly apprehended… But then it is an indeterminateness that harbors within itself determinability… Consequently, it must be "possible" to clearly and completely awaken a memory-series and to run through it such that it connects the one memory to the other in such a way that it really brings about the continuous temporal connection in the stream of consciousness. Of course, that is a motivated possibility. But this is not to say that we *actually* have this memory series at our disposal. (Husserl 2006, 81)

This long quote offers the law of consciousness by which a stream of consciousness is given as unified, and thus, as original to me as the I of this unified stream. The remembering of the two memories in a present consciousness – "an encompassing, synthetic consciousness" – forms a unity of experience within the present flow of consciousness, a harmonious temporal context. This unity need not be totally clear, brought to intuition such that I can trace the steps from one memory to the other. It does not even need to be clarified to the point that I can say which one came first or that they did not simultaneously happen.[30] Rather, the unity is one of *motivated possibility*: the unity is given as intuitable, fillable, determinable.[31] It is motivated by the harmonious temporal context of my own experiencing.[32] If I recall my encounter with Mr. Williams, it is connected

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[30] I can recall that I hung out with my friend on Friday and that I have seen *Star Wars: The Last Jedi*, but I can be unclear as to whether I saw that movie with my friend last Friday.

[31] Husserl also says, "Here we have a judgment motivated by another judgment, but prior to the judgment the temporal forms themselves motivate each other. In this sense we can say that even the pervasive unity of the stream of consciousness is a unity of motivation. In the personal attitude this means that every act of the Ego is subject to the constant apprehension characterizing it as an act 'of' the Ego, as 'my' lived experience" (1989, 239/228).

[32] Rodemeyer shows how this is both a context of content as well as structure. The structure of retention modifies retentions "in such a way that the temporal connection from one event to the next can be ascertained in reflection" (2010, 233). The "passively present content maintained by my retaining and recollecting