The Crisis of Democracy? Chances, Risks and Challenges in Japan (Asia) and Germany (Europe)

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Edited by

Carmen Schmidt and Ralf Kleinfeld

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PREFACE

This volume contains selected and revised contributions of the conference "The Crisis of Democracy? Opportunities, Risks and Challenges. A Comparison between Japan (Asia) and Germany (Europe)," which took place from 15 to 17 March 2018 at the University of Osnabrueck (Germany).

This conference was concurrently the 14th meeting of the German-Japanese Society for Social Sciences (GJSSS), which brings together outstanding social scientists from Japan and Germany. Founded in Tokyo in 1989 and celebrating its 30th anniversary in 2019, the GJSSS has been dedicated to comparative research on social change since its inception. The topic of the 14th session on "The Crisis of Democracy" is therefore a continuation of the scientific focus of the GJSSS.

I would like to thank the following institutions for their generous support in the preparation and implementation of this conference:
- the University of Osnabrueck, in particular the School of Cultural Studies and Social Sciences, the Japan Research Centre, and the University Society,
- the Japan Foundation,
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Special thanks go to several individuals for their invaluable help in preparing the conference and completing the publication process, especially to my assistants Andrej Galic, Lea Sachs, and Jana Konieczny.

Finally, I would like to thank all those who took the time to read and comment on the chapters of this publication as well as the authors of this book for their patience during the publication process.

Although the chapters of this book are arranged in a logical sequence of five main parts, each chapter stands alone and the reader can immerse himself in the publication at any point.

The transcription of Japanese terms follows the Revised Hepburn Romanization system. A macron over a vowel in a Japanese word indicates that the length in pronunciation is doubled.

Carmen Schmidt
Osnabrueck, March 2019

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRACY

CARMEN SCHMIDT, RALF KLEINFELD

The crisis of democracy

"Is democracy in crisis?" With this question, Joji Watanuki, Samuel P. Huntington, and Michel Crozier started their legendary report on the governability of democracies delivered to the Trilateral Commission meetings in Kyôto, Japan, in May 1975.[1] They provided a predominately optimistic prognosis of democracies' viability in the West and Japan. Some 40 years later, however, this question is being posed with increasing urgency. Besides severe economic and fiscal crises, we have also witnessed a visible loss of trust in political, economic, religious, and other institutions. Many European governments implemented strict austerity measures, sometimes provoking strong resistance from their citizens, to reduce their budget deficits, whilst Japan expanded its "quantitative easing" program, i.e., printing money to buy bonds—with an open result to date. Demographic change processes have had an impact on the economy and the socio-political system, including on the labor market, in both regions.

Further, Europe faces new challenges due to the refugee crisis, the growing importance of increasingly right-wing populist parties such as the *Alternative für Deutschland* (AfD) and the urgent need to democratize the European Union if its citizens' support is to be maintained. In East Asia, North Korea's nuclear war threats, and disputes about Japan's colonial past and about uninhabited islands between all the countries involved have led to growing nationalism instead of encouraging a move to an East Asian Union. The crisis of democracy is therefore visible and tangible in both Europe and East Asia.

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[1] The full text can be found here:
https://archive.org/stream/TheCrisisOfDemocracy-TrilateralCommission-1975/crisis_of_democracy_djvu.txt (retrieved at 14.4.2018)

This volume focuses on Germany and Japan, whereby both countries are analyzed within their regional cultural background, namely Western Europe and East Asia. Japan and Germany are used as examples as both belong to the small number of countries that Samuel Huntington considered part of the second wave of democratization, which was the product of an exogenous democratization strategy that the victorious nations of World War II applied. In both countries, their experiments with democracy started in the second decade of the 20th century and were terminated by military rule in Japan and the fascist Hitler regime in Germany. The military command of the Allied occupation promoted democracy vigorously, turning both countries into sustainable, representative liberal democracies for decades (Huntington 1991: 34ff.).

A binational analysis offers a number of advantages over the usual procedure of either limiting a study to a single country and generalizing the results obtained, or identifying country-specific differences within a framework of multi-country comparisons but not explaining them in depth. Focusing on Japan and Germany, and including examples from Western Europe and East Asia, offers the possibility of identifying transnational tendencies and understanding the two countries' differing developmental consequences against the background of their different historical-cultural traditions and institutional realities. Analyzing the differences in development that stem from the two countries' cultures and values contributes to a culturally sensitive understanding of their crises of democracy and their consequences.

This interdisciplinary publication, with contributions from political sciences, sociology, economics, psychology including developmental psychology, history, law, and educational science, is intended to shed light on the future of our democracies, our economies, and our educational systems. In addition, the aim is to highlight our party politics, national policies, social-structural changes, and socialization in the family and school, and the related value changes. These value changes stimulate citizen protests, new social movements, the founding of new parties, and new integration and disintegration processes in our search for a "good life," a "good society," and a trustworthy, legitimate democracy. We are also interested in the implicit and explicit objectives of the actors on the various levels—the macro, micro, and individual level—within this process of change. Since the future of democracy is closely related to the political globalization process, we are also interested in new forms of supranational political organization and regional integration.

Analyzing the crisis

Theoretical considerations: Democracy and social change

The publication covers five main parts. The theoretical considerations in the *first part* focus mainly on democracy and social change. From this point of view, the crisis of democracy is analyzed as a crisis that occurs during the transition from modernity to the second, or digital, modernity. *Schmidt* starts with an interpretation of the cleavage theory as a dynamic model of the sequence of crises in the development of nations and assuming that, as a result of globalization, contemporary societies are subject to fundamental structural change. She discusses whether the political system, the parties, and democracy should be transcended in order to respond to globalization's challenges and the associated societal change. She regards the globalization of politics, economy, and society as a turning point in the development of advanced nations—as fundamental as that between tradition and modernity—and concludes that such a significant change will not necessarily remain unchallenged, peaceful, and democratic if adaptation to that change fails.

Beyond challenges due to globalization and ecological and demographic changes, democracies are involved in digital transformations based on artificial intelligence (AI), which challenge their goal of ensuring democracy and individuals' well-being. Referring to digital transformation's risks and chances on the societal and the individual levels of democracies, *Trommsdorff* focuses on the question of how top-down societal and bottom-up individual regulations can serve democratic values and people's well-being. She discusses adaptations to technological innovations and the regulation of their political, socio-economic, and psychological implications. She argues that even though top-down regulations may be the most important form of government, the strengthening of bottom-up self-regulatory processes is expected to contribute to an informed acceptance and an improvement of the transformation processes. Consequently, not only governments and private sector institutions, but also cultural practices, social norms, and individual behavior are constructing and shaping the conditions of further digital transformation and its meaning for democracies and human beings.

Yazawa discusses community and modernity against the background of postmodernism and democracies' contemporary problems, like populism, by using Daniel Bell's theory of the cultural contradictions of capitalism. Since populism is intended as a medication for healing occurring rifts and the loss of identity in the second modernity, it tries to counter this crisis

with a "us against the others" ideology to create religious-like new belongings. Like *Schmidt*, he regards the end of modernity as a radical change and analyzes this new reality by using singularity, a new concept. Since individuals are increasingly freed from the bonds of various groups, geographical locations, and traditions, he argues that we must look for an answer to the identity question within the individual dimension in order to solve capitalism's cultural and political contradictions and the crisis of democracy.

Caprara analyzes the functioning of democracy from a psychological point of view. He investigates how traits, values, and self-beliefs influence political thought and action. He concludes that democracy may work effectively and develop if citizens and their representatives are equipped with the mindsets required to turn to practice and realize the values of honesty and integrity that they proclaim. This, however, requires a widespread sense of moral understanding of, and concern for, the common good at all levels of society. He regards education as the most important tool to raise the level of citizens' moral reasoning and commitment to an ethic of public good, and to achieve such a value change in the future.

Democracy, citizenship, values, and citizen participation

The *second part* of this volume discusses citizenship, values, and citizen participation as key elements for the strengthening of democracy and as terrains of democratic empowerment. In Europe, political referenda and more direct forms of citizen participation are the subject of public and political discussions. At the beginning of the new millennium, Japan introduced a far-reaching decentralization reform to boost citizen participation and involve the public in politics.

Hüstebeck analyzes democratic innovations as new forms of citizen participation in Japan's policy-making process aimed at improving the country's democratic control and legitimacy. She argues that democratic innovations can enhance participants' political knowledge, civic skills, and democratic virtues. But there are also limits to these innovations, such as that they are highly time-consuming and are implemented top-down. She nevertheless concludes that such forms of institutionalized citizen participation can improve democracy's legitimacy, and argues that democratic innovations are especially feasible in a democracy like Japan with a traditionally hierarchical relationship between its citizens and the state.

History has, however, shown that traditional forms of participation are increasingly replaced with new forms of involvement and mobilization. Instead of top-down-introduced forms of citizen participation, we see

citizen involvement from below in South Korea. *Shin* shows the remarkable rise of bottom-up mobilization in this country over the past years. Millions of citizens participated in the "candlelight" protests against free-trade treaties in 2008 and to oust the then Prime Minister Park Geun-Hye in 2016–17. Mobilization via the internet played a crucial role in these protests. The author presumes that South Korea will experience a boost in democracy through its citizens' protests and participation.

Kimura analyses the system of citizen participation in death penalty trials, which Japan introduced in 2007. However, what was thought to add "common sense" to these trials and to enhance the democracy's legitimacy turned into the reverse. The survey he conducted showed a rather uninformed public. Against the background of a possible death penalty, citizens' participation in these serious forms of trials seems rather undesirable.

The argument is made that there is a significant correlation between the modernization process, values, citizen participation, and democracy. A value change from religious-traditional to secular-rational values characterizes modernity, while a value change from survival to self-expression values and reflexive thinking characterizes the second modernity (Inglehart & Welzel 2010, Beck 1986, Schmidt 2018).

Mori critically analyzes the value change and the modernization process in Japan. He argues that what was called "rationalized traditionalism" (Bellah 1957), i.e., copying the Western modernization process by maintaining Japanese traditions at the same time, was suitable for the first, or simple, modernity. However, after the 1980s when Japan had become a leading industrial nation, this success story came to an end. Mori concludes that this "rationalized traditionalism" proved unsuitable for finding answers for the rapidly aging society and other second modernity challenges.

Huang and *Yi* discuss this problem in respect to China, which is modernizing rapidly and is, simultaneously, on the way to becoming a digital society. They argue that this modernization process is a revolution in itself and that, contrary to Japan where traditions were maintained during modernity, this means a transformation of China's traditional culture and thinking method through Western rationalism and in order to cope with modernization and digitalization's challenges.

National, sub-national, and global democracy

Part three discusses democracy on various levels. On the one hand, we see a political power shift to international or supranational organizations like

the World Bank, the IMF, or the EU, and, on the other hand, to the sub-national level as part of national strategies to strengthen democracy, transparency, and efficient service delivery. Furthermore, we see the rise of new political issues and the formation of new political parties. However, the national level is still the core of democracy's legitimacy.

Murakami focuses on the national level in Japan. Against the background of its one-party dominant system, Japan was often criticized for its lack of democracy. Murakami shows that the single-seat districts partially manufacture its "stability" in leadership. On the other hand, it is also due to the opposition's failure to contribute to democratic multi-party politics.

There is also a distinct relationship between regionalism and the strengthening of autonomy and democracy. While some scholars insist that open, flexible networks of horizontal cooperation can contribute to democratic decision-making, others fear that such a governance concept may weaken traditional representative democracy and lead to local political elites dominating decision-making.

By studying the process and activities of the "European Metropolitan Regions" in Germany, *Yamai* argues that municipalities and their voluntary cooperation can play an important role in region-making "from below." His analysis nevertheless shows that regional governance cannot avoid conflicts of interests between local authorities and between central and local governments. The rise of citizens' movements could constitute an additional difficulty, which the conflict regarding "Stuttgart 21" shows. He argues that regional participation in decision-making can, however, contribute to democracy's legitimacy, specifically in Germany, which has a long tradition of regional autonomy.

Minami analyses the Okinawan movement for independence from Japan and discusses the pro and con arguments, as well as the economic impact of a potential independence and its Okinawan citizens' opinions. His analysis shows that even though this independence is often on political elites' agendas, only a small majority of Okinawan residents support such a move.

Vázquez-García points to the growing electoral importance of new issues, like the industrial exploitation of edible species, by analyzing the case of the Spanish Animalist Party Against Mistreatment of Animals (PACMA), which opposes unlimited mass production and consumption, and by discussing new forms of political articulation such as a boycott of animal consumption. He argues that cosmopolitan democracy not only surpasses national frames, but also includes a much larger number of actors and groups than democracy during modernity. The cosmopolitan democracy concept should therefore include an element of ethical and

moral concern for the groups most affected by globalization processes, such as women and ethnic, cultural, or linguistic minorities, among others. In this sense, the care for animals and our relationship with them emerge as being essential for reflection and democratic political practice. Democracy in the second modernity should therefore be considered as "democracy beyond human borders."

Besides new political issues, researchers have pointed to more direct public involvement in politics (Inglehart & Welzel 2010). *Pape* discusses multi-level democracy and demands more direct democracy. In contrast to the authors in part two, he takes a system perspective rather than a citizen perspective. He argues that direct voting may carry enormous risks at the national and international levels, because the higher the level of governance, the wider the geographical impact. However, he argues that direct voting seems sensible at the local level, since the fewer people that are concerned, the better they are informed about issues.

Education, social order, and democracy

The *fourth part* focuses on education, social order, and democracy. Here, we discuss the link between democracy, social structures, institutions, customs, and practices. A knowledge-based society and life-long learning are regarded as a requirement for a successful second modernization and education as the main antidote to authoritarianism (Welzel & Kirsch 2017, Schmidt 2018). However, in the short term, the current labor market, which manifests itself in discussions on the "lack of skilled labor" (*Fachkräftemangel*) and "educational inflation" (*Bildungsinflation*), does not match the rising educational levels.

Based on a detailed analysis of the transition process from school to work in Japan, *Pilz* and *Alexander* consider the impact of economic and social insecurity on the younger generations. Since Japan's school system is hierarchically ordered, only graduates from top-ranked schools and universities are experiencing a smooth transition to work life. Consequently, parts of the Japanese youth are excluded from certain careers and therefore also from advanced social and political participation.

Germany and Japan have seen a remarkable expansion in their numbers of students and institutions. *Kornadt* compares and discusses these changes in Japan and Germany. However, this expansion, which was meant to enhance Germany's economic productivity and to reduce its social inequality, led—in contrast to Japan—to a considerable lowering of its academic standards. Kornadt therefore demands significant changes to the

German education system in order for it to meet digital modernity's demands.

Inglehart already pointed to the connection between modernization, education, and the rise of individualistic values in the 1970s (Inglehart 1971). Since that time, many have pointed to the steady weakening of shared collective identities and the impact of this on democracy. To date, it is not clear whether individualization will undermine collective solidarity and the civic values that Putnam (2000) and Flanagan and Lee (2003) suggest are vital for democracy, or whether it will lead to increased acceptance of pluralism and cosmopolitan values, thereby fostering liberal democracy, which the World Values Survey (WVS) suggests (e.g., Inglehart & Welzel 2010).

Nishijima compares and analyzes communication behavior in young Germans and Japanese. His findings show that when this is compared to that of former generations, youngsters are increasingly keeping their distance from their friends and peers. Related to democracy, the interpersonal relationships of young people in Japan reveal a crisis *by* democracy rather than *of* democracy. Contrary to *Yazawa*, he argues that the individualistic attitudes that democracy encourages have had a negative influence on the lives and well-being of young Japanese, because they significantly harm traditional group belonging and the sense of community.

As the discussion above reveals, democracy comprises informal constraints like cultural norms and values, although the more purposive formal ones, embodied in particular organizational structures, are equally important. In this sense, organizational democracy means that members of an organization/corporation participate in the processes of organizing and governance (Harrison & Freeman 2004: 49).

Morikawa analyzes the crisis of democracy in Japan, using Niklas Luhmann's systems theory. In contrast to the presumption of a functionally differentiated society, where no functional system dominates another, he argues that Japan is increasingly taking on the features of an "organization society," where the members of dominant organizations, such as big companies and their networks, enjoy full inclusion and access to privileges, while non-members are excluded. The political system's dominance, i.e., the LDP-government dominance of other organizations such as the mass media, is specifically striking and could be a massive threat to democracy.

Democracy, public policies, and consensus building

Part five focuses on democracy, public policies, and consensus building. In this sphere, we increasingly observe a shift from confrontation to cooperation in order to engage the public in public policy discussions and enhance the quality of the democracy. Juergen Habermas has already pointed

to the importance of reasonable discussions and debates between citizens to ensure the public good and to make political decisions. In what he called "deliberative democracy," the focus shifts from political decisions' results to the process of involving citizens in political decision-making (Habermas 1996 [1992]: 277-292).

Abe explores the debate on Japanese constitutional reform, one of the most controversial issues in Japan, which splits the Japanese public into two opposing camps. Through an analysis of the five most important nationwide newspapers' editorial articles and by using a text-mining approach, he provides insights into the public discourse, its different arguments, and how politics and a changing international environment influenced the discourse. Overall, political dissidence seems to be widening on this matter, instead of consensus being achieved.

With regard to fiscal policies, Japan did not impose the austerity measures that the West did. Instead, it expanded its program of "quantitative easing." *Hirashima* tries to explain Japan's current fiscal consolidation situation and analyzes the fiscal policy pathways and decision-making over the last 20 years. He shows that decision-making mainly took place on the institutional level, involving parties and governments as the main actors. He argues that short-sighted decisions were prioritized to ensure electoral survival rather than fiscal consolidation on a longer-term basis and citizens' involvement. He blames factional struggles and a lack of democracy within the major parties for hindering coherent reconstruction strategies.

Environmental politics is another topic of concern. After the 2011 triple catastrophe and the meltdown in the Fukushima nuclear power plant, ecological problems came increasingly into focus. Beck (1986) had already critically pointed to the role of experts in a risk society. On the basis of Niklas Luhmann's social systems theory, *Tokuyasu* discusses the problem of non-experts participating in risk assessment in Japan and argues that public understanding is required to improve the democratic discourse.

Musch examines how the Netherlands, a country known for its tradition of consociational democracy and corporatism, is dealing with the challenges of migration and climate change. In this respect, she shows that in the cases of immigrant integration as well as energy and climate policies, the government has relied on the action repertoire of negotiation democracy. But this, however, was accompanied by only slow, incremental changes, which found their expression in more public participation and refined implementation control. Incremental changes are a main characteristic of negotiation democracies. In the case of immigrant integration, however, the pressure from populists in particular led to political change.

Based on an interview study, *Namba* compares the consensus-building processes of closed military base sites' renewal and reconstruction in Germany and Japan to identify potential problems for the return of American bases to Japan. He identifies legal and industrial differences and land ownership as the main differences between Germany and Japan. He nevertheless concludes that the most fundamental difference between the two countries is the public's perception of this topic and the lack of regional and municipal power in Japan.

Mann discusses the relationship between the strengthening of democracy and public health policies. By comparing Germany and Japan, he highlights the welfare state's challenges and the need for awareness of the concept of "fit" people in order to achieve medical care for all. A public discourse on this matter seems necessary to achieve this goal, since the aging society is a serious threat to the democratic supply of medical care.

Finally, *Schmitz* and *Schmitz* refer to the current migration crisis in Western Europe, which leads to challenges for the immigration countries and their democracies. By analyzing acculturation processes, they try to assess the possible acculturative outcomes. Based on their findings, they argue that the successful inclusion of migrants into the larger society may only be achieved when both the majority and the ethnic groups are highly motivated towards this goal. Not dealing adequately with challenges and the existing sources of conflict may contribute to the rise of populist parties that pose a serious threat to our democracies.

Conclusion: The democracy transition crisis

In contrast to their 1970s colleagues, the contributors to this publication mostly point to the existence of a crisis of democracy in the West and East Asia. However, this is more a crisis of adaptation to social change than an actual crisis of democracy.

The various chapters analyze democracy from various angles and it has become very evident that a single correlation cannot describe democracy. It is not a one-dimensional relationship. Democracy depends on structures and agency. It is related to the political system, the parties, the educational system, and the organization of society as a whole. Concurrently, it has a close relationship with the citizens and depends on citizen participation and voluntary engagement. It is related to the collective and the individual, and their well-being. Democracy depends on notions of citizenship, identity, and civil society. It is interrelated with the economy and with security, but also has a close relationship with values. The public and the way of consensus building are as important as the role played by the transition

from industrial modernity to the second, or digital, modernity, since democracy and citizens' values and roles are also subject to change.

From this perspective, the current crisis of democracy can be described as a crisis occurring with the transition from modernity to the second modernity. Traditional modes of conflict solution, participation, consensus building, and agenda-setting seem to fail. The traditional parties are in a crisis, with new parties, mostly right-wing populist parties, coming to the fore. However, the populists demand that history be rolled back to provide a solution to the current crisis and praise the advantages of a modernity that no longer exists. Consequently, the political system, the citizens, structures, and agency need to adapt to social change to overcome the current crisis of democracy.

Social-structural changes occur more rapidly than in the past. Digitalization, AI, and robotics are accelerating these changes, which lead to benefits, but also to threats to political systems, citizens and their privacy, and to democracy. In order to cope with these changes and their consequences for democracy, their impacts on the individual and the collective, on structures and agency, we need to clearly analyze these changes and their outcomes within the framework of modernization and ongoing social change. In an increasingly interdependent and globalizing world, there is also a need to include a global and cosmopolitan perspective on democracy and social change to complement a mere national perception.

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PART I:

THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS: DEMOCRACY AND SOCIAL CHANGE

CHAPTER ONE

SOCIAL CHANGE AND DEMOCRACY
IN POST-INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES:
CHALLENGES AND RISKS IN THE TRANSITION
FROM MODERNITY TO THE DIGITAL AGE

CARMEN SCHMIDT

Introduction

International financial crises, the euro crisis, and growing youth unemployment are increasingly causing feelings of insecurity in the populations of those nations, which, as forerunners of modernity, seemed to have achieved a high level of economic and social security. This high level of security and representative democracy had guaranteed the legitimacy of the system of modernity (Habermas 1973). Currently, however, processes, commonly dubbed "globalization," seem to progressively challenge this legitimacy (Habermas 1998, Beck 2000: 17ff.). Given that globalization constitutes a "critical juncture" in advanced contemporary societies' historical development, it could undermine political institutions, thus jeopardizing these nations' stability and political order. There are good reasons to assume that the current change is as fundamental as the transition from a feudal order to the territorially defined nation-states (Zürn 2002: 215).

Until the 1970s, Lipset and Rokkan's cleavage theory was one of the widely used theoretical frameworks in comparative political science. These authors' most frequently cited hypothesis maintains that, since the 1920s, there had been a "freezing" of party systems and voter alignments (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 50). Social scientists, however, increasingly noticed an "unfreezing" of voter alignments since the 1970s. The cleavage theory was therefore presumed to have lost its capacity to explain political interest intermediation in advanced industrial societies (Dalton 2014: 155-182, Dalton et al. 1984).

By interpreting the cleavage theory as a dynamic model of the succession of crises in nations' historical development, first leading to the cleavage structure's "crystallization" and "freezing," but broken open at the onset of new critical junctures, it is still a useful framework in comparative political science research (Schmidt 2001). We will discuss political transformation by this dynamic model to illustrate the newly emerging cleavage structure in post-industrial society.

However, not only advanced industrial nations' cleavage structure is at stake, but also the nation-state and its institutions. The process of political globalization, or "denationalization" (Zürn 1998: 9), has triggered not only economic and cultural transformation, but also that of the territorially defined nation-state's social and political structures and institutions. In Europe, the fiercely debated topic of European integration illustrates political globalization's problems in the European context (Grande & Kriesi 2013: 95).

The following questions should, therefore, be addressed: Which cleavages arise in the course of the transition from an industrial to a post-industrial society and could lead to political polarization? What role do established parties play in this process? Under which conditions will a transformation of the system become possible? Moreover, which inner tensions and consequences will result from the transformation?

We start by presenting the underlying interpretation of the cleavage theory as a dynamic model of "alignment" and "dealignment" in nations' historical development. After that, we identify those cleavages that emerge in the post-industrial society, before discussing the implications for established political parties. Finally, the transformation of the political system is considered, as well as its associated tensions and consequences.

The cleavage theory as a dynamic model of development: From modernity to post-industrial society

The cleavages of modernity: Alignment

In their introduction to "Party Systems and Voter Alignments," Lipset and Rokkan systematically analyze the correlation between the social structure and a political system (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). According to their explanatory model, the emergence of parties can be interpreted as social interests being transformed into alternative parties. Parties articulate a specific group's interests and organize themselves as being relatively stable along a given society's main structural cleavages. A political system, therefore, reflects the fundamental cleavages that divide society.

However, the parties that emerge vary from nation to nation, depending on the given cleavage structure and electoral rules (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 26ff., Schmidt 2001: 43ff.).

Concerning the modern European party systems, the National Revolution and the Industrial Revolution both caused the main cleavages, leading to party formation. The conflicts that the National Revolution created emerged from the central nation-building culture and the ethnic, religious or linguistic subcultures, as well as from the emerging nation-states and the church's established rights, especially concerning its control of education. In its early stage, the Industrial Revolution caused a cleavage between the urban bourgeoisie and the big landowners, i.e., between urban and rural interests. Class differences gained increasing importance with the industrial working class's growth. In developed industrialized societies, the conflict between classes became the dominant conflict and had the most significant influence on party systems' structure (Lipset 1962).

Historically, cleavages vary from nation to nation and parties can embody more than just one cleavage, which is why the model can serve as a grid for political systems' comparative analysis (Lipset & Rokkan 1967: 124). In the Federal Republic of Germany, the cleavage between capital and labor was also of outstanding importance. Besides, the church–state conflict played a significant role. Until the 1970s, these two conflicts marked the dividing line between the two major parties: the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democratic Party (SDP).

The destructuring of modernity: Dealignment

A series of social transformation processes were responsible for the unfreezing of party alignments. In parallel with the restructuring of the economic sectors, the number of primary and secondary sector employees declined rapidly. Simultaneously, the number of service sector employees increased markedly. Today, the third sector employs more than 70% of the working population in most advanced societies. The number of traditionally self-employed also started to decline significantly.[1] Therefore, the numerical size of traditional conservative parties' supporter groups (peasants, self-employed) and social democrats (unionized workers) is shrinking, while the number of those with no party ties has increased sharply. Further, the church's influence has weakened markedly over time, reflect-

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[1] After a significant decline, the number of self-employed has recently increased. However, most self-employed people do not have employees as, for example, lawyers and doctors do. In Germany, the "Ich-AG," comprising only one person, is explicitly increasing.

ed by the steady decline in the number of regular worshippers (in respect of Germany, Gluchowski et al. 2002: 187). This has led to a noticeable decline in these social groups' influence on electoral outcomes.

Furthermore, it has been argued that the polarization of the advanced industrialized countries' electorate along their economic cleavages is slowing down due to value change, which specifically affects the younger and more educated parts of society. Instead of economic or material conflicts, value cleavages have become more prevalent (Inglehart 1977). This value change has led to increased voter preferences for "new" post-materialist policies (Hildebrandt & Dalton 1977) and to a severe decline in traditional party loyalties. Younger voters with post-materialist attitudes are no longer attracted to existing parties with "old" materialistic politics. The pluralization and individualization of lifestyles also contribute to voters no longer feeling attached to the traditional social milieu parties (Zapf et al. 1987, Gluchowski 1991). Consequently, beyond Germany, fewer voters are aligning themselves along the cleavages of "social class" and "religion."

The erosion of traditional milieus and voter alignments to certain parties, an increase in those voters who make their decisions freely and without party affiliation, and an increase in those who refuse to vote, which the steadily declining turnout rates reflect, are important consequences of the abovementioned processes. However, not only is the number of non-voters growing, but also the number of respondents stating that no party represents their interests adequately (in respect of Germany, Neu 2009: 11).

Given the demographic processes and the generational change, the apparent disintegration is likely to accelerate significantly in the near future. Dealignment trends are particularly evident among the younger generation, while the older generations exhibit a substantially higher turnout and a higher affinity to one of the established parties (Schmidt & Knipperts 2013). What has been called a "crisis of democracy" is, therefore, also a crisis of the representation of younger generations' interests.

During modernity, the political left–right dimension was a meaningful concept to analyze political issue positions. Since the 1970s, however, this ideological division has also declined in importance (Inglehart 1984: 32). The German Green Party was the first to declare that it was "neither left nor right, but forward." Many of the new parties follow this example and try to avoid the old ideological split into left and right, for example, the Italian MoVimento 5 Stelle.[2] However, it has been argued that ideological divide did not disappear, but that individual values and preferences mainly determine it (see Caprara in this book). According to the World Values

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[2] The blog of the leader of the movement, Beppo Grillo, on May 20, 2013, as cited in Corbetta & Vignati 2013: 53.

Survey (WVS),[3] two dimensions have progressively replaced the "old" left–right dimension: the traditional vs. secular and the survival vs. self-expression dimensions. Tradition and religion issues are patriotism, abortion, euthanasia; belief in God, and a preference for authority. The second-dimension issues deal with the acceptance of diversity (including foreigners), and attitudes towards people with specific controversial lifestyles, such as vegetarianism, as well as a willingness to engage in political activism.

The cleavage theory as a dynamic development model

Lipset and Rokkan noted a long-term freezing of the party systems and the relevant conflict structures in European countries after their formation in the 1920s. The previous subsection clarified that, since the 1970s, an unfreezing of the party systems and electoral ties has been noticed in advanced societies. According to Flora, conflict structures as used by Rokkan are the result of discontinuous processes of "freezing" and "opening" at critical junctures in history (2000: 21). Unfreezing and a new formation of the traditional conflict structure accompany the process of "breaking up"; cleavage structures and the resulting party systems are therefore time-bound.

The weakening of party ties and the emergence of new cleavages are thus a logical consequence of the transition from industrial to the globalized, post-industrial, digital society. Like the modernization process, the globalization process also causes specific cleavages in post-industrial societies, which may lead to political organization (Schmidt 2015: 366f.).

Figure 1-1 aims to represent the cleavage theory as a dynamic model of development. It should be noted that the process of nation building and the Industrial Revolution took place well before political consolidation, i.e., before the formation of party systems in the 1920s. There was an apparent time gap between the social and political development, which might also be applicable today (Zürn 1998: 63), even though progress has accelerated significantly. Further, it should not be overlooked that, in Germany, the period of fascism interrupted the "freezing" of the party system and voter ties between 1920 and 1960, which was by no means as linear as the figure suggests. Whether the current realignment process will run smoothly remains uncertain. Much depends on whether the political system's transformation, which is still imprisoned in modernity, succeeds. We will deal with this transformation in Part IV.

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[3] See http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/WVSContents.jsp (accessed 27.4.2018).

Irrespective of conflict's precise dimensions in a given party system, Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) model can be interpreted as a cyclical development model. According to this model, existing conflict structures "break up" when new critical junctures occur, thus triggering new cleavage constellations. The transformation process from modernity into a post-industrial society can be interpreted as such a critical juncture. Consequently, the cleavage structures that arise during the transformation into a post-industrial society should be revealed.

Figure 1-1: The cleavage theory as a dynamic development model

Source: Own compilation.

Globalization and cleavage structure: Realignment?

The change in the structure of societal interests accompanying economic and social development can be regarded as the main reason for the weakening of voter alignments. Against the background of the globalization processes, we analyze this change in order to discover significant cleavages that could lead to a reorganization of party systems and voter loyalties, i.e., to political realignment.

The modernity's relevant cleavages arose through the Industrial Revolution and the nation building process. Globalization processes characterize post-industrial society. Although there is much disagreement about the definition of the term globalization, sociologically seen it mainly takes place in three dimensions: the cultural, economic, and political dimensions (Kriesi et al. 2012: 7). These processes occur almost simultaneously and are interlinked with one another. They cannot be considered separately since they are mutually dependent and reinforce one another. They cannot,