

Polish and Irish Struggles for Self- Determination

Polish and Irish Struggles for Self- Determination:

Living near Dragons

Edited by

Galia Chimiak and Bożena Cierlik

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INTRODUCTION

GALIA CHIMIAK AND BOŻENA CIERLIK

This book presents a selection of papers from two conferences which took place in Dublin and Cork in 2018, the year in which the Polish and the Irish nations celebrated the centenary of two historically mirrored events. The concomitant struggles for (re)gaining national independence and achieving women's agency in public life that Polish and Irish men and women successfully undertook in 1918 have been used as a point of reference to juxtapose hitherto unstudied synergistic linkages between these two countries' histories. To compare the experience of those two nations, the Polish Embassy in Dublin initiated and organized with Trinity College Dublin the September 25, 2018 "Women's Suffrage and National Independence in Ireland and Poland" conference, and also supported the September 29, 2018 conference "Polish and Irish Paths to Independence," which took place at University College Cork.

The purpose of this pioneering publication is to critically reflect on the road to national independence in Poland and Ireland on the occasion of the centenary of the reshaping of Modern Europe. Both Poles and Irish had long dreamt of and fought for independence as both nations were under foreign rule prior to 1918. The Irish nationalist revolution against British authority and Polish uprisings against the occupying powers – Russia, Germany, and the Habsburg Empire – figured heavily in their post-independence politics, in ways not unlike those of twentieth-century nations that gained independence through a nationalist revolution. Polish and Irish nations alike were politically mobilized and lobbied for their independence among the Polish and Irish diaspora in the United States. The denial of statehood and the struggle to retain identity in the face of imperial pressure created a shared historical experience and, following independence, the need to heal national divisions.

The effort for national self-determination was not the only historical achievement that Poland and Ireland could celebrate back in 1918. Women's suffrage was another milestone enhanced by the (re)gaining of independence in Poland and Ireland. In order to negotiate the twin identities of feminist and national goals, Polish and Irish women's groups hoped that

their activism would grant women political rights while promoting genderless patriotism. Although women's empowerment did not dominate the political discourse, it nonetheless paved the way for greater political agency in these countries. The fact that Poland and Ireland were among the precursors, on a worldwide scale, in terms of granting voting rights to women also merits attention.

The title of the book itself refers to a quotation from J. R. R. Tolkien's *The Hobbit, or There and Back Again*: "It does not do to leave a live dragon out of your calculations, if you live near him." Poles and Irish were living near "dragons," i.e. imperial powers, and the nations had to plan and execute their liberation by taking into account their powerful neighbours and conquerors. At the same time, women's empowerment had for centuries been hindered by patriarchy, the rules of which were internalized by both men and women. Hence, Polish and Irish women had to outwit their own "dragon," i.e. the unchallenged patriarchal culture, to enhance their agency in the public and private spheres alike.

Importantly, in twentieth-century Europe, Ireland was comparable in character and condition to the new nations such as Poland, rather than the established Western democracies. After all, the legacy of being the object of conquest and displacement played a central role in the national consciousness of both Ireland and Poland. For much of modern history, Poles have asked themselves how their country could be restored to its former independence. The Poles and the Irish alike were convinced that only a free state of their own would allow them to overcome the political, social, and economic challenges and dependencies inherited from foreign rule. They firmly believed that the (re)creation of an independent state would address these problems. The subsequent policies of the Polish and Irish states were therefore directed by historical claims and memories.

Tellingly enough, although the celebrations of the centenary of (re)gaining independence for many countries in Europe after the end of the First World War have not come as a surprise, it is still not a widely known fact that women's suffrage was another milestone facilitated by the regaining of national self-determination in Poland and Ireland alike. In the pre-independence era, Polish and Irish women were fulfilling their prescribed roles as bearers of national culture, but they also proved indispensable when it came to undertaking the struggle for independence, protecting the national virtue, language, and tradition, and preserving the very existence of the nation, both in Poland and Ireland.

Giving women agency in public life was part of the reform introduced by the first independent Polish government. Women rights' organizations sprang up in both countries and advocated for women's enfranchisement. In

Ireland, the suffragist movement played a pivotal role in the process of granting voting rights to women over the age of thirty in 1918. Namely, the Representation of the People Act in 1918 guaranteed the right to vote to British and Irish women alike who were aged thirty and over, and were university graduates or fulfilled a property qualification. This concession as far as women are concerned was motivated by the observation that “calls for women’s suffrage could no longer be ignored, particularly in light of their contribution during the war.”¹ In Ireland, universal suffrage was extended to women in 1928, whereas in Poland universal women’s enfranchisement took place on November 28, 1918 when the Provisional People’s Government of Poland under the socialist Jędrzej Moraczewski announced a law, which was accepted without opposition and which stipulated that any citizen aged twenty-one or over, irrespective of gender, held the right to vote and stand for elected office.

This brief overview of the paths to women’s suffrage in Poland and Ireland against the background of the process of (re)gaining national independence in these two countries poses questions, the detailed answers to which go beyond the ambition of this introduction. How were the issues of women’s rights formulated and enacted in the two countries? In what ways did the fight for national independence shape women’s history in Ireland and Poland in the early twentieth century and beyond? How were theoretical concepts regarding gender equality put into practice, and how has the political empowerment of women impacted Polish and Irish societies? These are some of the important questions addressed in this volume.

The year 2018 marked not only the centenary of (re)gaining national independence for many countries as well as the enfranchisement of Polish and Irish women, but also the seventieth anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights advocated *inter alia* for the equal rights of men and women, and its tenets still represent a blueprint for action in many countries of the world. As the President of the Republic of Ireland Michael D. Higgins put it, “any paradigm of gender equality as being the gift of men, given either generously or reluctantly, has always missed, and will always miss, the point. Gender equality is a right achieved and not a gift.”² The same

¹ <https://www.parliament.uk/about/living-heritage/transformingsociety/parliament-and-the-first-world-war/legislation-and-acts-of-war/acts-of-war---representation-of-the-people-act-1918-->.

² Michael D. Higgins, September 27, 2015, during the Global Leaders’ Meeting on “Gender Equality and Women’s Empowerment – a Commitment to Action,” in New York.

argument applies to the right for self-determination of all nations. This volume will discuss in detail how the Polish and Irish fought for and achieved the right for self-determination, and how these efforts also impacted the civilizational achievement of women's enfranchisement.

Bożena Cierlik's paper argues that the Polish military effort on both the eastern and western fronts during the First World War was an important element in bringing the issue of the re-emergence of the Polish state to the international arena. Polish Legions, the Blue Army, and other Polish military units were an integral part of the war effort. Polish soldiers were also drafted into the Prussian, Austrian, and Russian armies where they distinguished themselves on the battlefields. Cierlik points out that the Habsburg, Prussian, and Russian empires, and later France and the USA, had a vested interest in winning over the Polish population's support, as the prolonged war needed soldiers on the eastern front, being as decisive to the outcome of the war as the western one. Cierlik argues that various international declarations promising, first vaguely, and later more precisely, the establishment of the Polish state after the First World War were the outcome of not only the pressure of the Polish independence movements in Europe, but, in a huge part, also the visibility and importance of the Polish military, the need for Polish recruits, and the recognition of their effort as part of the Allied forces.

Tomasz Pudłocki's paper focuses on a little-known Canadian, William John Rose, who was not an official member of the Polish delegation at the Paris Peace Conference, but contributed to the discussion on the Polish question due to his knowledge and understanding of the issues of the Polish plight, especially the Duchy of Cieszyn. As the Paris conference laid the foundations for the future order in Europe on a scale not seen for the past hundred years, its final decisions were the outcome of various coalition partners. Pudłocki argues that Rose acted as the unofficial ambassador of the rapprochement between the Polish territorial stance and the Anglo-Saxon understanding of the Polish territorial demands. As a British subject who spent war years in Central Europe (in the Duchy of Cieszyn), he was trusted by the unsympathetic British more than the Poles making their case in Paris. Pudłocki points out that the Polish delegation used Rose's connections to advocate for the Polish case. Rose had a limited role in his official capacity, yet brought the issue of Cieszyn to the discussion table and contributed to the better understanding by the British and American delegation of the territorial, political, and economic position of Cieszyn for Poles.

Iwona Sakowicz argues that the British politicians and British public were hostile to the Polish territorial ambitions in 1918 due to the negative

image and perception of Poland and Poles in the years prior to the First World War. Sakowicz's research focuses on the British press in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries as a source of popular knowledge about Poland and the main influence on the British public opinion regarding Polish history and culture. Poland was not a frequently discussed subject in the pages of the British press due to the lack of accurate information coming from Berlin or Vienna. Polish aspirations to create an independent state were seen as an internal matter for Russia, not an international issue. After all, Russia was an ally in British eyes. The British press never denied the courage and heroism of the Poles; however, as Slavonic people, they had a relatively low place in the British hierarchy of nations. Sakowicz believes that such an outlook created a simplified picture of Poland and Poles in the British public opinion. She argues that the Polish question in the eyes of British politicians and the public opinion was an "insolvable" problem threatening the political order in Europe.

Aleksandra Bilewicz analyses the Polish cooperative movement and its forgotten role in the process of regaining Polish independence in 1918. Before the First World War, cooperative movements took different forms in each partitioned Polish province; however, she argues that it not only advocated the idea of economic nationalism, but also created a democratic culture among its members. Partitions and foreign oppression (especially in the Congress Kingdom of Poland) shaped the Polish cooperative movement in terms of the emphasis it put on individual freedom and the process of building democracy from the roots to the top. Therefore, it left its own universal legacy for the future, carried during the interwar period and after the Second World War. Bilewicz argues that because the Polish cooperative movement represented the tradition of democratic and self-help institutions, it was designed to serve the national Polish interest against occupying empires and transfer cooperative ideas to the local ground. It was used as an instrument to defend the national interest and became an important political force behind pro-independence movements in building the foundation of the independent state, as well as playing a significant part in organizing and educating the working class.

Aneta Stepień's paper draws parallels between Polish and Irish women's struggles for suffrage by comparing two of the most prominent representatives of the women's movements in those two nations: Aleksandra Piłsudska and Constance Markievicz. Stepień's analysis makes it clear that the campaign for women's rights was taking place alongside the struggle for national self-determination. She also demonstrates how – in spite of Polish and Irish male revolutionaries' initial disapproval of women's activism as meddling and interfering with what they considered the most

important cause, i.e. the fight for self-determination – time proved that women's involvement in not only rhetoric but also military activity made their male compatriots concede that, having shared the dangers in liberating Poland, women had earned the granting of political rights. Stępień also highlights one very important argument, which is that the relative scarcity of written heritage by Piłsudska and Markiewicz cannot be considered to signify their limited commitment to the cause of suffragism. On the contrary, Stępień argues that Polish and Irish military suffragettes actually focused on organic work and not on leaving written proof of their commitments for future generations.

Róisín Healy's chapter deals with a little known aspect of Western support for the Polish cause in the nineteenth century. It was not only Western European men but also women who openly expressed their solidarity with the Poles while trying to make an impact on, for example, the British foreign policy towards Russia. Healy further contributes to the existing literature on the involvement of women in public life as she provides evidence that it was not just charitable activities that enhanced Western women's agency but also their engagement in advocacy in the international arena. Even enfranchisement did not immediately translate into granting Polish and Irish women access to areas considered more appropriate for men, like diplomatic service. It was mostly women from the UK and France who grasped opportunities to use unofficial channels to advocate for the cause of Poland. These female foreign-policy lobbyists were as dedicated to their cause as their sisters, the suffragists, although the former remained uncritical of the power imbalances inherent in politics. Nonetheless, through their personal example, women advocates paved the way for later generations of women in areas considered to be male.

Louise Ryan analyses the Irish women's suffrage campaign against the sociopolitical situation in the country. The tensions between nationalism and suffragism in Ireland are discussed against the background of other countries which faced anti-colonial struggles such as India, and countries which regained independence such as Poland. The contraposing of national independence and enfranchisement is not a thing of the past, however. In the 1980s, when the mass movement and trade union Solidarity was established in then-communist Poland, a sign at the gate of the Gdańsk shipyard read: "Women, do not stand in our way, we are fighting for Poland." This phrase seems to reflect the sociopolitical context in nineteenth and twentieth-century Ireland. However, Ryan also highlights one important characteristic of the Irish suffragist movement – that there were underlying divisions within that movement, especially between militant and constitutional suffragists. Yet Irish women activists managed to maintain

suffrage unity despite their political differences, although they were aware that the truce on political matters would be only temporary. This pragmatic approach, albeit fragile, paid off. Importantly, the 1916 Rising acted as a catalyst of change as it both reduced the sometimes hostile attitude towards suffragists in Ireland and diminished the differences among suffragists themselves.

Hence, this book presents a pioneering publication on the basis of multi-layered and multi-disciplinary research on Irish and Polish history and culture, as there have been separate publications on Polish and Irish history but no comparative analysis has been undertaken on the issues discussed in the proposed volume. This would be the first publication to compare the regaining of the independence of Poland and Ireland and the granting of voting rights to women in both countries. This publication is an example of the cross-pollination of ideas and perspectives as it includes contributions from historians and sociologists specializing in Poland and/or Ireland. As such, this volume will contribute to the ongoing analysis about cross-cultural similarities and dependencies observable in the examples of Poland and Ireland, and could be of interest to academics, history teachers, and students at undergraduate and postgraduate levels interested in Polish and/or Irish history, as well as the Polish diaspora in Ireland and the UK.

CHAPTER ONE

IMPORTANCE OF THE POLISH MILITARY EFFORT IN THE FIRST WORLD WAR

BOŻENA CIERLIK

My brother we are divided by ill-fate and the guard: Behind two hostile ramparts our death is our reward. In groaning trenches we listen to the thunder of guns: I, your enemy, you, my enemy, we face each other once.¹

On the eve of the First World War the map of Europe did not include a Polish state. The Polish lands were partitioned between their neighbours, and for nearly 123 years had been part of the Habsburg, Prussian, and Russian empires. The war pitted major European states against each other over the balance of power and created a strain in those empires least able to bear it – namely, the Habsburgs and Russians. The new Europe was negotiated in 1918 on the basis of Wilson's points based on national sovereignty and self-determination, granted only to the Allies of the Entente, in order to produce an acceptable peace. The British and French also subscribed to this idea in Europe, as well as against the dominance of the authoritarian military rule of Germany and the Habsburg Empire over much of the continent. However, Allied plans for the post-war future focused on transformation rather than dissolution. The military collapse of the Central Powers was followed by the disintegration of the vast empires of the Habsburgs and Romanovs and the territorial reduction of the Hohenzollerns. But it was in East Central Europe that the results of the war and the fall of the imperial structures were most visible, as for centuries national and imperial interests had collided precisely there. The statesmen in Paris were not the sole architects of the new post-imperial order, and they often simply sanctioned decisions made by the emerging and victorious states and their military forces on the ground.

¹ "She who has not died", *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*, October 3, 1914.

The European war presented an unprecedented opportunity to raise the Polish question on the international arena, as it was the first time that the partitioning powers were on opposite sides of the conflict. It must be borne in mind that the restoration of a Polish state did not feature in their war aims – in fact, they came to the war without any specific objectives regarding Poland. However, this war had far-reaching consequences in relation to the Polish borders.

Russia's military aims were its ambitions in the Balkans, and this was its primary reason for going to war in 1914. Annexation of Western Galicia, Posen, and Silesia at the expense of Germany and Austria-Hungary would have required the undesirable creation of some form of Polish kingdom, albeit under Russian authority. Habsburg's military aims in contrast were mostly focused on the Balkans. But if the Habsburgs did not consider expanding their East Central European territories, the question of how not to upset the balance within the multi-ethnic empire remained. Was Austria-Hungary able to retain the status of a great European power, or was it to become an obsolete multi-ethnic empire, unable to control its national minorities? The German war aims, on the other hand, were evident soon after the start of the war in the so-called "September Program,"² which included territorial expansion in France, and the German economic and political domination of Central Europe through the concept of *Mitteuropa*, based on a system of small semi-autonomous states (including Poland) under Prussian rule. It is clear therefore that none of the empires had any political interest in the creation of an independent Poland.

The war had a tremendous impact on Poland and its people, as the theatre of the military conflict in the east was the partitioned Polish territories. It would eventually force all European players to take a stance regarding the Polish question to win over the Polish population and encourage military conscription. The war on the eastern front started with two Russian offensives – north towards East Prussia, stopped by Hindenburg, and south towards Galicia, where Russian forces occupied Lviv. Winter 1914–15 settled the eastern front along the second partition line, but by the end of 1915 the German army took over Eastern Galicia and occupied Warsaw and Wilno. Early on, all Polish partitioned territories were under German occupation. The war forced hundreds of thousands of Poles to fight in one of the three armies. In the Congress Kingdom nearly forty-three thousand Poles were conscripted to the Russian army. In the Prussian partition, fifteen thousand Poles were in the German army, and the Austrian army had around sixteen thousand Poles conscripted for the three-year service, which was

² September Program of German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg.

compulsory in all partitioned Polish territories. The greatest tragedy was that over four years of the war Poles had to fight against each other in foreign armies, and nearly four hundred thousand of them died.³

One of the most popular Polish poems of the First World War was “She Who Has Not Died,” written in 1914 by Edward Słoński.⁴ This poem, consisting of nine short verses, became his legacy. It illustrated the Polish experience in the First World War – Poles as subjects of three different partitioning powers: Russia, Prussia, and the Habsburg Empire, fighting against each other and motivated by a vision (or, as it might seem, an illusion) of a united and independent Poland. “Behind two hostile ramparts, there we stand ... And when you see me from afar you’ll fire at me instead: into a Polish heart you’ll aim your Russian lead. For by day I dream of her and I see her in my dreams: She has not died and she will rise again where our blood streams.”⁵

On the eve of the First World War Polish society was divided. “We should all pray that this war will last some time, as a lot of time is needed for Europe to realise the importance of independent Poland,”⁶ wrote one of the members of National Democratic Party (*Endecja*) in 1914. The outbreak of the war was met with high hopes and expectations by all Poles: “There are too many of us who declare that they don’t want Poland to be this or that. But the most important idea we have is that any kind of Poland should exist.”⁷

The Polish narrative of the First World War was dominated by the conflicting war aims of the Polish independence movements. Some believed in the promises of the Grand Duke from August 1914 that Polish lands would be united under the reign of the Russian tsar, while others saw the future of a united Polish land under Habsburg leadership. Józef Piłsudski and the PPS⁸ were convinced that independence could be achieved by association with the Habsburg Empire and military means. Piłsudski believed that no one wanted to “spill blood for Poland” or had any political solutions for independence, but “we, Legionnaires were pioneers in making it possible to shed blood for Poland. We tried to show our fellow countrymen

³ Stefan Kieniewicz, *Historia Polski 1795–1918* (Warszawa: PWN, 1997), 491–3.

⁴ Edward Słoński, Polish poet 1872–1926, soldier of Polish Legions; author of popular patriotic poems during the First World War.

⁵ “She Who Has Not Died,” *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*, October 3, 1914.

⁶ Konstanty Broel Plater, “Z dni listopadowych 1916 na Zachodzie”. *Pro Fide, Rege at Lege*, (1927), 80.

⁷ Jan Cynarski-Krzyszowski, “Przelotne wspomnienia o Romanie Dmowskim,” *Robotnik* (January 26, 1939).

⁸ Polish Socialist Party.

that it was sane and reasonable to shed our blood for ourselves, not for others.”⁹ The Two Emperors Address of 1916, after the Austro-Prussian eastern offensive had begun, hoped to capitalise on this and mobilize volunteers for the army units based on the concept of Polish Legions.¹⁰

Roman Dmowski and the National Democrats put their faith in the Russian Empire to unite the Polish lands.¹¹ As the war progressed, the chances of a Russian solution to the Polish problem gradually vanished. “The chief reason lay in the character and limitations of Russian policy itself,” admitted Dmowski. Russia (and the UK and France by association) had treated the Polish problem exclusively as its own internal affair. Lord Hugh Cecil reminded parliament that British recognition of Polish independence to Russians equalled the notion of proposing Home Rule for Ireland.¹² However, by 1917 circumstances had changed, and “now, nobody in Poland and only a small minority in Russia believe in the settlement of Poland’s future by Russia”, the German solution of the Polish problem was unacceptable as far as the Allies were concerned, for it would mean the most important step in the conquest of the whole of Central Europe by Germany, only the establishment of the independent Polish State remains.”¹³ However, the Russian Revolution changed the political status of Poland. The proposal of the Grand Duke Nicholas that “may the barriers which have divided the Polish people be united under the sceptre of the Russian emperor”¹⁴ seemed like empty words. The Petrograd Soviet Declaration stated that “Poland has the right to complete independence,”¹⁵ and the Proclamation of the Russian Provisional Government promised that “the

⁹ Speaking in Kalisz 1927. See Józef Piłsudski, *Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier* (London: Faber and Faber, 1931), 184.

¹⁰ For the account of popular opinion within the Polish society during the First World War see Maria Czapska, *Europa w rodzinie. Czas Odmieniony* (Kraków: Znak 2004).

¹¹ See Roman Dmowski, *Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska* (Lwów: Towarzystwo Wydawnicze H. Altenberg 1908). See also Roman Wapiński, *Roman Dmowski* (Lublin: Wydawnictwo Lubelskie 1988).

¹² Norman Davies, *God’s playground*, vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 388.

¹³ Roman Dmowski, March 26, 1917. Memorandum on the Territory of the Polish State, Public Record Office, Kew F0371/3000-63741, in *The Reconstruction of Poland 1914–23*, ed. Paul Latawski (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1992), Appendix 3.

¹⁴ Proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas, commander in chief of the Russian Army, August 14, 1914.

¹⁵ The Petrograd Soviet declaration to the Polish people, March 28, 1917.

Russian people recognised the full right of the fraternal Polish people to determine their own fate.”¹⁶

On the eve of the First World War, the military preparations were so widespread that parties associated with both the political left and the nationalist right, the Poles supporting the war aims of the Entente (the UK, France, and Russia – one of the partitioning powers), and those who went with the Central Powers (Habsburgs and Prussia – both partitioning powers) all regarded recourse to an armed movement a major element in their political strategy.

The Polish Legions

In the late nineteenth century, militarization became a discourse within Polish politics, and the emphasis was on the possibility of armed action which in turn reflected the increasing conviction that war was inevitable and Poles must anticipate its consequences. From the Napoleon years and the memory of the Dąbrowski legion,¹⁷ along with unsuccessful attempts to resist the partitions associated with the Kościuszko uprising and the November Rising of 1830–1, the military initiative was of great significance to Poles as part of their national tradition of armed resistance. It associated national liberation with armed forces, and equated patriotism with military voluntarism. The Polish historical narrative portrayed the failed January Uprising of 1863–4 not as a national disaster but as a source for practical lessons in mass mobilization and military tactics. Polish nationalism had to find a solution to the disintegrating effect of modern class-based political programs which underlined issues that split Poles along socioeconomic lines, and to renew an emphasis on Poland’s military glories based on class inclusion.

Piłsudski (and the larger part of the PPS) believed that only military action would help to resolve the Polish question. In his lecture in Paris in 1914, he stated that “only the sword now carries any weight in the balance for the destiny of a nation,”¹⁸ and all hopes for Polish independence rested on the results of the war, and in particular the defeat of Russia by the Central Powers.

The Polish Legions as armed forces were set up in August 1914 in Galicia as a response to the outbreak of the First World War. Thanks to the

¹⁶ Proclamation of the Russian Provisional Government, March 30, 1917.

¹⁷ Dąbrowski Legion formed in the Napoleon Army as the Polish armed force

¹⁸ Lecture to the Geographic Society in Paris 1914. See: William Fiddian Readdaway, *Marshal Pilsudski* (London: Routledge, 1939), 67.

efforts of the KSSN¹⁹ and the Polish members of the Austrian parliament, the legions under the command of Józef Piłsudski became an independent formation of the Austro-Hungarian army.²⁰ They were composed of the members of various sporting clubs, followed by Riflemen's Associations which appeared with the unofficial approval of the Austrian authorities. Since 1912, Piłsudski had reorganized them in more explicit military style, and by 1914 he had nearly twelve thousand volunteers from Galicia and the Habsburg Empire ready for action.

In August 1914, Piłsudski with his four thousand volunteers crossed the border from Galicia to the Congress Kingdom to start the uprising against Russia. They occupied Kielce in the name of Poland, but found very little support and were forced by the Russian troops to withdraw.²¹ However, the point was made that they would not passively watch what was happening in Europe. On August 27 Austria agreed to form two Polish Legions with their own uniforms and colours under the command of Austrian army officers of Polish nationality. Initially, the Polish military organization had two Legions: eastern and western. Each Legion was given the aim of recruiting eight thousand men from those not drafted into the Austrian army and volunteers from the Russian Empire. It was based on the model of the Austro-Hungarian army, but with its own uniforms and command in the Polish language. The Eastern Legion, after an initial Russian victory in Galicia, was disbanded in September 1914 when its soldiers refused to fight against Russia. The Western Legion was divided into three brigades. The First Brigade, with around 5,500 volunteers under Piłsudski's command, fought in Galicia in the summer of 1914 (the battles of Konary, Limanowa, and Łówczów). The Second Brigade (Carpathian Brigade) of similar size under the command of Józef Haller fought from May 1915 in Hungary and Eastern Galicia (Bukovina, Bessarabia). It is forever remembered in the Polish narrative for its spectacular attack on the Russian position in the battle of Rokitna in June 1915.²² The Third Brigade was formed in May 1915 under the command of Stanisław Szeptycki, (later Bolesław Roja) and fought in the Wołyń region.²³

¹⁹ Alicja Dybkowska, Jan Żaryn and Małgorzata Żaryn eds. *Dzieje Polskie* (Warszawa: PWN, 1998), 216.

²⁰ For more see Stefan Arski, *Galicyjska działalność wojskowa J. Piłsudskiego 1905–14* (Warszawa: PWN 1967).

²¹ For more see Waław Lipinski, *Walka zbrojna o niepodległość Polski 1905–18* (Warszawa: Wydawnictwo LTW 1935).

²² Second Cavalry Squadron under the command of Captain Dunin Wąsowicz.

²³ See Nigel Thomas, *Polish Legions 1914–18* (London: Osprey Publishing, 2018), 5–16.

The legions fought on the Russian front both in Galicia and the Carpathian Mountains.²⁴ In the first two years of the war they took part in a number of successful battles against the Russians and became famous for their bravado and military effectiveness, although they suffered heavy casualties. In 1915 the legions participated in the large Habsburg-German offensive on Warsaw. In May that year they fought in the battles at Konary and Kostiuchówka (in the Wołyń region), where nearly five thousand Poles defended the eastern front in an exposed position against Russian attacks. The casualty rate was very high (about forty percent), but the Polish soldiers gained a reputation as courageous in offensive and for being able to hold difficult positions.²⁵ Over the next two years their forces grew to nearly twenty thousand men. Zamoyski noted that, “they had no more of a country than they could carry in their heads, morale was high and these young men fought like lions in the convictions that someday they would march into free Poland.”²⁶

By August 1915 the territory of the Congress Kingdom had fallen to the Germans, and Piłsudski became frustrated at the Habsburg’s unwillingness to accommodate Polish political aims, despite the huge military effort made by Polish soldiers. Piłsudski and his volunteers already proved that Poland represented a military as well as a moral force and he was careful to state that they were neither Austrian troops nor allies of the Central Powers – he did not want to use Polish soldiers under German command against the British or French. He opposed the expansion of the Legions without any political concessions, and since the Germans were not prepared to grant such terms Piłsudski resigned in protest.²⁷ Under his order, most of the legionaries refused to swear allegiance to the emperor and were interned in Beniaminów (officers) and Szczypiorno, or dispersed to other fronts. The roughly three thousand who took the oath were sent to the Italian front.²⁸ The Polish Legions were renamed the Polish Auxiliary Corps in 1916.²⁹ Its Second Brigade with Józef Haller stayed under Austrian command,

²⁴ Brusilov Offensive.

²⁵ See Stanisław Jan Rostworowski, *Nie tylko Pierwsza Brygada* (Warszawa: Egross, 1993).

²⁶ Adam Zamoyski, *The Polish Way* (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1987), 334.

²⁷ Sikorski had a more optimistic opinion about concessions from the Central Powers. See Roman Wapiński, *Władysław Sikorski* Polski Słownik Biograficzny (Warszawa: Wiedza Powszechna, 1997), 469–75.

²⁸ See Stanisław Biegański, “Zaplecze przysięgi Legionów w roku 1917,” *Niepodległość* 9 (1974): 218–8.

²⁹ Habsburg Emperor Decree of September 20, 1916.

however, as a protest against the treaty of Brest Litovsk, in 1918³⁰ they crossed the front line at Rarańcza and joined other Polish units in the Russian army. Haller managed to make his way to France via Murmansk where in July 1918 he took command of the Polish Blue Army. In June 1917, Austria transferred the legions to German command, while Piłsudski was arrested in Warsaw and incarcerated in Magdeburg. The Polish Army became the *Polnische Wehrmacht*, and in October 1917 formally came under command of the Polish Regency in the Kingdom of Poland. However, the successful recruitment of Poles was not possible without Piłsudski, as Germans belatedly realized.³¹ In November 1918, Piłsudski as commander of the Polish Legions easily filled the void of the leader after the German withdrawal from Warsaw.

The Polish Legions did not manage to expand to huge numbers, with less than thirty thousand soldiers, but grew to symbolize the Polish military struggle for the independent state, and this gave them iconic status during the war and later during the years of independence. They were a response to Poland's historical dilemma and the paradigm for the future Polish Army and state. They were a "founding myth for the creation of modern Poland."³² In Piłsudski's own words: "In 1914, I was not concerned with settling the details of the military question in Poland, but simply this: was the Polish soldier to remain a mystical entity deprived of flesh and blood?"³³ The Polish soldier was not something to be banished from storybooks but a real force in demanding and fighting for free Poland. "I wanted Poland, which had forgotten the sword so entirely since 1863, to see it flashing in the air again in the hands of her own soldier."³⁴

The legions were an elite formation, deemed as "the most thoroughly educated and sophisticated army in the history of warfare," as forty percent of First Brigade were members of the intelligentsia stratum of Polish society.³⁵ Legionnaire recruits were educated and literate: "our generation

³⁰ The March 3, 1918 Treaty of Brest Litovsk ceded most of the Polish eastern territories to Germany.

³¹ Its numbers grew to nearly nine thousand.

³² M.B.B Biskupski, *Independence Day: Myth, Symbol and the Creation of Modern Poland* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9.

³³ Józef Piłsudski, *Memoirs of a Polish Revolutionary and Soldier*, 183.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ Joseph Rothschild, *Piłsudski's Coup d'Etat* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 102. See also Witold Dworzyński, *Wieniawa: poeta, żołnierz, dyplomata* (Warszawa: WSP, 1993).

was raised on reading Sienkiewicz,³⁶ writing songs, poems, and stories about their exploits, which created a long-lasting legend, portraying them as a symbol of Polish heroes fighting for “your freedom and ours.”³⁷ They were also a Polish military “redeemed by blood,” whom Piłsudski saw as “the cadres of the future Polish Army.”³⁸ Not just a symbol but also an army whose contribution to the war effort was recognized and forced the Central Powers to address the issue of the Polish people after the war.

Polish soldiers in Russia

Dmowski in *Germany, Russia and the Polish Question*³⁹ argued that Germany was a greater threat to Poland, and therefore Poles must side with Russia in any future conflict between these two.⁴⁰ He pointed out that Poland was a key to supremacy in East Central Europe, and if both empires went to war it would create the opportunity to advocate and bargain for Polish autonomy. By 1915 his argument became reality, as Germany was the real enemy for Poles and the European war was as much about Polish territories on the Eastern front as Alsace Lorraine in the West.

In Warsaw, the Polish National Committee was founded by the National Democracy leader Roman Dmowski in November 1914. During the turbulent war years the Polish National Committee moved to Lausanne and later to Paris, and rallied international leaders to address the Polish question. But it was only in June 1918 that France, the UK, and Italy recognized and supported its objective for a united and independent Polish state.⁴¹

³⁶ Kornel Krzeczunowicz, *Ostatnia kampania konna* (London: Veritas, 1971), 23–4.

³⁷ See Andrzej Makowski, “Literatura wobec niepodległości,” in *Salon Niepodległości* (Warszawa: PWN, 2008), 105–7. See also Bolesław Leśmian’s poem “The Legend of the Polish Soldiers” and some of Jacek Malczewski’s drawings.

³⁸ Alina Kowalczykowa, *Piłsudski i tradycja* (Chotomów: Wydawnictwo Verba, 1991), 76 and M.B.B. Biskupski, *Independence Day*, 13.

³⁹ Roman Dmowski, *Niemcy, Rosja i kwestia polska* (Lwów, 1908).

⁴⁰ Before 1914 in the Prussian partitioned lands of Poland, the Polish population had been discriminated against and suffered persecution during Bismarck’s *Kulturkampf*. The German colonization program intensified with the 1908 legislation for German resettlement on Polish-owned land, as well as a cultural offensive against Germanized Poles (in 1870 Poles lost the right to use their own language in schools and administration). As a result of these policies, National Democracy became an anti-German political movement for the majority of Poles. For more see Lech Trzeciakowski, *Kulturkampf in Prussian Poland* (New York: East European Monographs, 1990).

⁴¹ Roman Wapiński, *Roman Dmowski*, 24–5.

The Proclamation of the Grand Duke Nicholas on August 15, 1914 promised autonomy for the Congress Kingdom expanded by the annexed parts of Galicia and Posen region under Russian rule. However, details of the future kingdom were always very vague. Dmowski and the Polish National Committee lobbied for a greater commitment on Russia's part but nothing came of it except permission to form a military unit, which in January 1915 became a part of the Russian army. The Puławy Legion, as was known, did not attract a huge number of volunteers, at only around one thousand men, because only a few were at all keen to serve under a Russian command which treated occupied Eastern Galicia like a Russian province, and where civilians suffered from chronic misrule. The Russian army never trained its officers to assume any civil responsibilities.⁴² The legion was sent to the eastern front in spring 1915 but suffered extremely heavy losses and only ten percent of the unit survived, later joining the Polish Corps. The Puławy Legion was seen as a non-German alternative to Piłsudski's legion, an important factor for the American diaspora who did not want to be associated with Germany or any military units attached to them.

The German occupation of the Congress Kingdom and the Two Emperors' proclamation forced the Russian government and its allies to take a more defined stand on the Polish question. The British and French governments joined with the Russians to protest against recruitment of Poles for the German army in the kingdom. Allied governments publicly sympathized with the Polish pleas, however, in private they left the Polish issue to Russia as an internal matter for it to resolve by itself.

From 1917, Dmowski and the Polish National Committee started recruitment on a large scale for the Polish Legions in Russia as a means to stop Polish soldiers from the dissolved Russian army joining Bolshevik units. Three military units were set up: the First Polish Corp under the command of General Józef Dowbór Muśnicki was set up in Bessarabia, the Second Polish Corp with General Jan Stankiewicz, who was later joined by Józef Haller who with his Second Brigade crossed the German-Russian front at Rarańcza,⁴³ and the Third Corp with General Michaelis. Nearly twenty thousand men fought in the Polish Corps in Russia, but they did not make any significant contribution to the eastern front and were disarmed or interned by the German army after the Brest Litovsk peace treaty.⁴⁴ Other

⁴² Max Hastings, *Catastrophe: Europe goes to War 1914* (London: William Collins, 2014), 403–8.

⁴³ As a protest against the Treaty of Brest Litovsk.

⁴⁴ For more see Mieczysław Wrzosek, *Polskie Korpusy Wojskowe w Rosji w latach 1917–18* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 1969), also Henryk Bagiński, *Wojsko polskie na wschodzie 1914–20* (Warszawa: Oficyna Wydawnicza Gryf, 1990) and

Polish forces in Russia fought with the Allied Forces and Russian Whites against the Bolshevik army. The Fourth Division under the command of General Lucjan Żeligowski was brought to Odessa by Marshal Foch's order to protect Crimea,⁴⁵ where eventually it became part of the French Forces, and only in April 1919 came back to Poland through Romania. The Fifth Siberian Division under the command of General Walerian Czuma had nearly twelve thousand soldiers and fought against the Bolsheviks in Siberia.⁴⁶ Some soldiers of the Siberian division who managed to escape capture by the Bolshevik army marched from Irkutsk to Charbin to be evacuated to Gdańsk in 1920 by a British ship. On their return to Poland, both Divisions became an integral part of the Polish Army with their invaluable combat experience. Polish armies in Russia were part of the Allied force, and like the rest of Polish forces proved their combat usefulness.

Polish Soldiers in Prussian Poland

When the First World War broke out, thousands of Prussian Poles were mobilized for the German army. "The Pole carried the Prussian rifle because he had to. No one asked him, no one explained to him why and what for."⁴⁷ Polish soldiers had nothing to gain in the German army. They were part of a conflict beyond their comprehension or sympathy, and the only way to remedy this situation was to pledge some support for the future Polish state.

Germany came to the war without any plans for the Polish question and did not look for any contact with the Polish independence movement.⁴⁸

Mieczysław Wrzosek, "Polskie formacje wojskowe w Rosji w latach 1917-1920". *Niepodległość* (1998) 5: 127-141.

⁴⁵ Part of the Denikin Army.

⁴⁶ See more: Kazimierz Krajewski, "Nie tylko Dowborczycy". *Biuletyn: IPN*, 1(2009): 27-36.

⁴⁷ Leon Prauziński and Adam Ulrich, *W marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem powstańców wielkopolskich 1914-1919* (Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha, 1939). For the study of Polish soldiers in Prussian army see Alexander Watson, "Fighting for Another Fatherland: the Polish Minority in the German Army 1914-1918," *English Historical Review* 522 (2011): 1137-66.

⁴⁸ National Democracy became an anti-German political movement for the majority of Poles as the result of the German policies and its leaders agreed that in the event of the European war, Polish interest would be best served by a Russian victory. For more on Prussian policy in Polish lands see Daniel Grinberg, Jan Snopko and Grzegorz Zackiewicz eds. *Lata Wielkiej Wojny. Dojrzwanie do niepodległości 1914-1918* (Białystok: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu w Białymstoku, 2007) and

However, military developments in 1915 and 1916 made the Polish issue attractive for the Central Powers. After an exhausting military campaign, the need for fresh recruits made it necessary to address the question of the Polish future state in exchange for a Polish army ready to fight against Russia. The performance of the Polish Legions during the Brusilov offensive⁴⁹ impressed Austrian and German command and showed the military prowess of the Polish soldiers: "If Poland will be a foreground of the expanded German state, then the Polish Army has to be a front military guard of the German army in the future conflict with Russia."⁵⁰ On the other hand, Piłsudski was worried that the Central Powers would not address the Polish question if there was too much enthusiasm for the Polish forces in their armies. His political game with the Habsburgs was not effective as the Austrian army was not a strong military partner, and in the end Germany gained the upper hand.⁵¹

The German-Austrian victories forced the Russians out of the Congress Kingdom territory and made it necessary for the Central Powers to address the future existence of a restored Polish Kingdom: "Polish wishes for the evolution of a Polish state and for the national development of a Polish kingdom will now be fulfilled ... with a hereditary monarchy and a constitution,"⁵² as was stated by the two emperors' manifesto. It did not provide details of the future state but it was an important step towards the creation of Poland after its disappearance from the map of Europe and the harsh policy of Germanization of the Polish population. It did not result in any significant gains for the Polish cause, as it was based on vague promises only. The Two Emperors' Declaration announced after the Habsburg-Prussian offensive hoped to mobilize Polish recruits for the German army based on the structure of the Polish Legions. It aimed to harness some support for the Central Powers, especially since the German army was in Warsaw.⁵³ Its real purpose was to encourage Poles from the Congress Kingdom to join the Austrian and German armies after their heavy losses

Richard Blanke, *Prussian Poland in the German Empire (1871–1900)* (Boulder, CO: East European Monographs, 1981).

⁴⁹ Battle of Kostiuchnówka, July 4–6, 1916.

⁵⁰ Von Beseler, quoted in Leon Grosfeld, *Polityka państw centralnych wobec sprawy polskiej w latach pierwszej wojny światowej* (Warszawa: PWN, 1962), 151, and Zbigniew Grabowski, "Polska Siła Zbrojna 1917–18," *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 15 (2014): 35–66.

⁵¹ Mieczysław Wrzosek, *Polskie formacje wojskowe podczas pierwszej wojny światowej* (Białystok: Sekcja Wydawnicza Filii UW, 1977), 133.

⁵² Two Emperors Manifesto, November 5, 1916.

⁵³ Since the summer of 1916.

during the battles of the Somme and Verdun in 1916. However, the proclamation did not generate enough support since even the abolition of language restrictions in the Polish territories was not passed in the Prussian Parliament.⁵⁴

The promise of a Polish state came together with an order to organize an army. But recruitment was curtailed by the volunteers joining the underground Polish Military Organization as the more acceptable solution. As Piłsudski noted: "Germany as well as ourselves need the Polish Army. But we have to remember that it is ours."⁵⁵

From April 1917, as the Habsburg army needed German support to hold their positions on the eastern front, Polish units and auxiliary forces, under German pressure, were transferred under German command with only 2,700 soldiers left after a confrontation over the oath of allegiance. Some believed that the oath was designed as a form of subordination of the Polish Legions.⁵⁶ However, the new Polish Army, the *Polnische Wehrmacht* as it was ironically called, stayed under German command until October 1918 and was left as a training cadre for the German army. Despite its small numbers (around four thousand people, as the recruitment did not reach the expected numbers), it had a crucial role in the formation of the professional military cadre of the new Polish Army in independent Poland. Polish soldiers were trained according to German standards. This army had a well-organized military and organizational infrastructure with the nucleus of all the required divisions – infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

The creation of the *Polnische Wehrmacht* was an outcome of the compromise agreement between the German idea of using Polish soldiers on the frontline and the pro-German independence movement in Poland ready to engage in building an armed force. It was designed to encourage the sympathy of Poles and as a tool for recruitment for the eastern front. After the Brest Litovsk treaty which fitted very well within the *Mitteleuropa* concept (as it would create a Poland politically and economically dependent on Germany), the *Polnische Wehrmacht* was meant to be a propaganda tool against Polish recruitment for the army in France. From the Polish point of view, it was a catastrophe, because not only was a huge part of Polish territory taken away from the Poles, but, as a result, Poland and its future became an internal issue for Germany and not an international question. The Polish Regency government in Warsaw tried to increase the size of the real

⁵⁴ March 1917.

⁵⁵ Piłsudski interview in *Tygodnik Ilustrowany*, January 6, 1917, in Józef Piłsudski, *Pisma zbiorowe*, vol. 4 (Warszawa: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego, 1937), 102.

⁵⁶ Zbigniew Grabowski, "Polska Siła Zbrojna 1917–18," *Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy* 15 (2014): 50.

Polish Army and German association ceased to be attractive. When the impending collapse of the Central Powers seemed inevitable, the Regency took command of the *Polnische Wehrmacht*, and on November 10 command of the army and the task of forming a new Polish government were given to Piłsudski. By this time, the Polish Army had nearly thirty thousand soldiers, one third of them properly trained and ready for combat.

The Blue Army

No peace can last, or ought to last, which does not recognise and accept the principle that governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed, ... statesmen everywhere are agreed that there should be a united, independent and autonomous Poland.⁵⁷

The outbreak of the war stimulated American immigrant populations to support their countries of birth. The neutrality of the US prevented organized action but did not stop individual men enlisting in one of their own forces in Europe. However, this all changed after April 1917 when the USA joined the Allies. Poles, among other nationalities, wanted to organize their own military units affiliated with the Allies to fight for their fatherland. The Polish American army, formally designated as the Polish Army in France, became the biggest force to sail from the USA to the European continent. The recruiting campaign was very successful in the Polish American diaspora with the reluctant authorization of the federal government operating the selective service system.⁵⁸ What distinguished it from the American and Allied efforts was the absence of the existing governments to which these military formations were responsible; furthermore, the government in Poland (the so-called Regency Government since the German occupation of Warsaw in 1916) was seen as the enemy.⁵⁹

Documents from the Office of the Chief of Staff in the War Department indicate that a comprehensive census of the number of possible Polish recruits was carried out, and tables of the extent Polish population in the

⁵⁷ President Woodrow Wilson's "Peace without Victory" Senate speech, January 22, 1917. See Victor Mamatey, *The United States and East Central Europe 1914–20: a Study in Wilsonian Diplomacy and Propaganda* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

⁵⁸ The Selective Service Act of May 20, 1917, allowing for an American draft.

⁵⁹ Records of the Selective Service System, State Department, Suitland, Maryland, December 1917, p. 10073, also cited in Joseph T. Hapak, "Military Intelligence on Polonia in 1918: a Document," *Polish American Studies* 45, no. 1 (1988): 74–82.

United States were produced.⁶⁰ There were over 1.7 million people of Polish origin in the US, with the majority (over fifty-four percent) living in big cities. The biggest concentration was in Chicago (over twenty-four percent of population), followed by New York (over twelve percent), and Detroit Michigan, Buffalo, NY, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania (all between six to seven percent).⁶¹

This represented a huge pool of possible recruits for the American and Polish armies. Leaders within the Polish diaspora hoped that the Polish force on the continent would help to accomplish the goal of independence with assurances from both sides, as the Central Powers and Russia all promised solutions to the Polish question, although these were usually quite vague. Even the US President Wilson referred to the Polish situation in his “Peace without Victory” speech in 1917, and again as one of his points in 1918. So, therefore, many Polish Americans believed that the US championed a realistic Polish state and embraced the opportunity to demonstrate their loyalty to the United States and to fight within the US army against the Central Powers.

British and French armies were badly damaged during their offensives in 1917. Their ally, Russia, was effectively out of the war following the Bolsheviks revolution. American entry to the war brought some relief for the western front, but by October 1917 the eastern front collapsed and the German army occupied all Russian Polish territories. A treaty with the Bolsheviks⁶² freed up a large number of German troops from the eastern front and shifted the German military effort to the already strained western front.

After Wilson’s promise of a “united, independent and autonomous Poland,”⁶³ France sanctioned the formation of a Polish army on French soil, and officially recognized the Polish National Committee in Paris. The UK, Italy, and the USA followed, which meant that the Polish Army was recognized as co-belligerent of the Entente. This new development was not only the outcome of the Russian revolution, as Polish recruits were seen to be of great value to the already stretched Allied forces.

Meanwhile, in France the situation was helped by events which had an impact on the success of the American draft. On May 20, 1917 a Franco-Polish Military Mission was set up, and on June 4, 1917 the French President Raymond Poincaré acknowledged the presence of the Polish

⁶⁰ Memo from Director of Military Intelligence to the Provost Marshal General, War Department (August 31, 1918), 1, US National Archives.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 2.

⁶² Treaty of Brest Litovsk, March 3, 1918.

⁶³ January 1917, “Peace without Victory,” Wilson address to the US Senate.

soldiers in the French army from the start of the First World War in the form of the Bayonne Legion, a small⁶⁴ military unit formed from Polish volunteers in France in August 1914. The Bayonne Legion however had no recognition as a Polish unit and later became part of the French Foreign Legion as the drafting quickly stopped after protests from the Russian embassy. Polish volunteers fought on the western front in Champagne (1914–15) but sustained heavy losses of nearly seventy percent.⁶⁵ Nonetheless, the June decree helped to pinpoint the Allied intention to restore a Polish state and allowed for the creation of a Polish army in France. From the start, the French expected to draw the majority of recruits from the Polish American diaspora. France needed manpower (as Marshal Joseph Joffre acknowledged during his visit to the USA in April 1917), and the Polish Army would be of great help for the French forces. A six-man mission was despatched to USA (with Waław Gąsiorowski⁶⁶ and Stanisław Poniatowski⁶⁷ of the Franco-Polish Committee) to “investigate all questions concerning the recruitment of the Polish Legion destined for France.” The intended recruits included a large number of Polish men employed as miners.⁶⁸

Nearly ten million men registered for the lottery of the US draft, however only citizens and alien declarants were eligible for service. Some Poles were seen as enemies, and therefore “public interest required that recruitment for the Polish Army should not be encouraged.”⁶⁹ Poles born in Germany and Galicia, for example, were technically enemy aliens, and therefore excluded from the service.

⁶⁴ Only two hundred soldiers.

⁶⁵ For more see David Stefancic ed. *Armies in Exile* (Columbia, NY: Columbia University Press, 2005).

⁶⁶ A popular journalist, prominent in France, later replaced because of conflict with Ignacy Jan Paderewski.

⁶⁷ His surname, like the last Polish king before the partitions and one of the Napoleonic generals, had great popularity within the Polish diaspora.

⁶⁸ Gąsiorowski’s report is in the N. D. Baker Papers in Ossolineum cited in Joseph Hapak, “Selective Service and Polish Army Recruitment during World War I,” *Journal of American Ethnic History* 10, no. 4 (1991): 42.

⁶⁹ Second Report of the Provost Marshal General on the Operation of the Selective Service, US National Archives. However, Hapak argues that the main concern was not to disrupt the work of the Deleware Hudson Co. coalmining operations, which had a considerable number of Polish miners. See Joseph Hapak, “Selective Service and Polish Army Recruitment,” 45.