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Edited by

Volkan Ipek and Ebru Ilter-Akarcay

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

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The protagonists of the struggle for independence in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East have exerted the greatest influence in this book as we not only wanted to commemorate them with specific chapters but also thank them for having opened the path to postcolonial studies. We attribute this book a critical role since it was structured along presentations from the First International Tricontinental Conference organized in 2017 with postcolonial politics constituting the main theme. It was the first academic event dedicated to Third World states as the backbones of postcolonial studies. It was an intentional move to select the contributors from among the participants of the Tricontinental 2017 panels, by taking into account the extent to which they could contribute originality to the literature.

We would like to thank, first and foremost, the administration as well as the offices at Yeditepe University for having given us the chance to organize the Tricontinental 2017. This book is overall its fruit. We would also like to thank the faculty who contributed a lot to the feasibility, structure, planning and implementation of the project of the Tricontinental 2017. Among them, Dr. Bilgen Sutcuoglu comes the first. Our thanks also go to Siobhan Denham for her marvellous language skills and proofreading support. In addition, we also would like to express our gratitude to the various teams of Cambridge Scholars Publishing for all the effort they made while editing our book. We more than appreciate the guidance received from Rebecca Gladders, Amanda Millar, and Sophie Edminson. Last but not the least, we are grateful to our close friends and family who did not hesitate in supporting us whenever we needed comments or advices.

We devote this book to young scholars who would like to focus on the Third World or Global South studies. We hope that we somehow touch upon their ideas and stimulate their interest. We, the authors, claim all the responsibility for our arguments, debates and questions in the following chapters. At the closing of his PhD thesis, Stephen Hawking wrote: “This piece, all in all, is my original study”. In memory of Hawking, we voice the same: “This piece, all in all, is our original study”.

Volkan Ipek
Ebru Ilter-Akarcay

CHAPTER 1

AN INTRODUCTION: A GATEWAY TO THE TRICONTINENTAL DEMOCRACY

VOLKAN IPEK

When a journalist asked Mahatma Gandhi what he thought about Western civilization, Gandhi replied that it would be a great idea indeed. Friedrich Hegel or Jules Ferry who thought that Western civilization had the right to rule the Eastern world would definitely disagree with Gandhi. Instead, Gandhi would be supported by Julius Nyerere or Aimé Cesaire who believed that Western civilization was a project constructed by the Western colonization of the Eastern one.

Independent from this debate on the West and the East, which is very fundamental to civilization studies, Gandhi's sarcasm consists of two possible dimensions for this study. The first one regards the word "civilization" as Gandhi might have tried to highlight how the journalist could refer to a process of imperialism through which hundreds of thousands suffered *as* civilization. The second one highlights the dimension of the adjective "Western", through which Gandhi might have tried to emphasize that what the journalist called Western was actually constructed through the Eastern. The first dimension is studied from a theoretical perspective by the Huntington School that splits civilization into different pieces which have been argued to be at odds since the end of the Cold War. The second one, rather, has developed within a historiographical perspective that focuses on colonialism to show how the Western civilization was defined over what the Eastern was not, as argued by the Fanon School. In terms of vocabulary usage here, Eastern refers not only to the East but also to the South. Symbolized by the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, the Eastern that contains the southern too has

always been in the locus of the West that was prominently embodied by Europe and the USA.

Reckoning the Middle East, Africa and Latin America within its Western locus, however, needs an analysis of postcolonial theory for sure. Nevertheless, this analysis shall not be in a way that nourishes the Western locus and its civilization, and definitely not in the context of how it was used to define the Western locus with binary oppositions. Accordingly, a postcolonial study on the Middle East, Africa and Latin America needs to focus on the local, with a prescription that shows how the Middle Easternness, Africanness and Latin Americanness are nourished by the Western locus. In light of this, showing this prescription throughout democratization by monitoring how people in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America adapt, live and experience their democracies is the main goal of this study. The main subject of this study, then, is to monitor how the locals of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America as the colonized subjects of history regard Western democracy today. With reference to postcolonial theory which analyses the ongoing impacts of the colonizer (Europe) over the colonized (Middle East, Africa and Latin America) after decolonization, the main goal of this study is to show democracy as the impact of the West on the locals and to see what processes locals in these regions have used to install it in their state systems.

Related to the given context of democracy, the authors of this study argue that democracy in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America is an ongoing process with some institutional achievements, but again it is far from the Western conceptualization. By combining postcolonial theory and democratization, we try to show how the locals of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America try to imply democracy in their own systems, with particular case studies. On the basis of the combination of postcolonial theory and democratization, we try to monitor how the democratization attempts of the locals of these three regions are extensions of their hybrid identity that was constructed with the symbols of their own culture and the symbols of their European rulers in the colonial period. Overall, we try to show how these states have difficulties in implying consolidated democracy as implied in Europe, by referring to this hybridity in which the local culture affects the European culture so as to consolidate democracy. Chapters depicted in the study, in brief, state that consolidated democracy fails in these regions because it is installed as an addition and adaptation of a Western notion onto local non-democratic fabrics. The book is an exhibition of democratization in the postcolonial

structure of the Middle East, Africa and Latin America. It is also a practice of what Huntington once said in *Political Order in Changing Societies* (1968), that "Western political science would do better to try to understand non-democracies, especially in developing countries, rather than to explain why they were not, or could not become, democracies".

To understand democracy in these three regions as the book wants to express it, the relationship between postcolonial theory and democratization must be comprehended. Postcolonial theory, in brief, is a more or less distinct set of reading practices, if it is understood as preoccupied principally with analysis of cultural forms which mediate, challenge or reflect upon the relations of domination and subordination between nations, races or cultures, which have roots in European colonialism and imperialism which continue to be apparent in the present era of neo-colonialism (Gilbert 1997). It is historical self-invention or the need to make a new start to erase painful memories of colonial subordination devoted to the academic task of revisiting, remembering and interrogating the colonial past that is not simply a reservoir of raw political experiences and practices to be theorized from the detached and enlightened perspective of the present (Gandhi 1998). Deliberately, it involves a political analysis of the cultural history of colonialism and investigates its contemporary effects in Western and tricontinental cultures, making connections between the politics of the past and present (Young 2011).

What makes democracy a hybrid concept in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America derives from its inbetweenness and admiration for European themes of postcolonial theory. Colonialism as a cultural and scientific process that aims to control the colonized makes the colonized a product of colonialism. Cultural forms in newly classified traditional societies were reconstructed and transformed through colonial technologies of conquest and rule, which created new categories and oppositions between colonizers and colonized. At the end, the culture of today's colonized was created in the colonial time by the colonizer. This is why the colonized of today feel close to the colonizer (Dirks 1996). There is also the double consciousness aspect of inbetweenness, which indicates that the history of the African diaspora for example, as a colonized entity, creates a postmodern situation where the Africans feel a mixture today when they encounter the European imperial conquest of the past. The colonized then feel a double identity, a double soul in their mind, which at the end makes them two minds and two thoughts in thinking, being and

seeing. Therefore, the colonized consider that they think, are and see like Europeans. The culture of the colonizer who colonized the locals was the real catalyzer that moved them to attain their civilized status in the postcolonial period (Gilroy 1993). Then comes hybridity, as the cultural interaction of the colonizer with the colonized in the colonization which led to the creation of a culture in the postcolonial states that involves an intermingling hybridity; if this is followed by cultural interactions between colonizer and colonized that finally impact the identity of the colonized, it eventually leads to the creation of a mixed culture throughout the world where colonialism was seen. This is why we see multiculturalism as a result of this interaction of the culture of the colonizer with the culture of the colonized in postcolonial peoples. Having been constructed with the mantra of "almost the same but not white", the history and culture of the colonizer constitutes transcultural relations between the West and the East (Bhabha 1994).

Democracy that was perceived as a hybrid project structured in the Middle East, Africa and Latin America gained importance for academia when Freedom House rated 45% of 195 states as free, 31% as partly free, and 24% not free in 2011, whereas in 1973 just 29% of 151 countries were rated as free, 28% partly free and 43% as not free. The notion of free, partly free and non-free being of states was about the level of democracy, which has often been regarded as the form of government that is essential for the improvement of citizens' lives in human history (Dahl 1998; Sen 1999). States are divided into four within this perspective: the high capacity undemocratic ones like China, the high capacity democratic ones like Germany, the low capacity undemocratic ones like Sierra Leone, and the low capacity democratic ones like Botswana. With its reference to how free a state is, democracy comes up as a form of government in which power is invested in multiple people. Implemented first in the United States and France as two symbols of the Western world before it was adapted by many other states, it moves with the principle of the continuing responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens, considered as political equals with unimpaired opportunities (Tilly 2003). Democracy is also used as a container concept, including much more than just people's representatives. Five essential conditions are required for democracy in this manner; these are meaningful and extensive competition among individuals and organized groups, a highly inclusive level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, and a level of civil and political liberties-freedom of thought. In addition, freedom of expression, right to assembly and demonstration, to form and join

organizations, freedom from terror or unjustified imprisonment, and constitutional liberalism in which civil liberties must be guaranteed are the essences of democracy (Diamond, Linz and Lipset 1995). Related to this, a regime is democratic if it maintains broad citizenship, equal citizenship, binding consultation of citizens at large with respect to governmental activities and personnel, as well as protection of citizens from arbitrary action by governmental agents (Tilly 2000). Unlike other forms of government, democracy allows individual citizens to freely pursue what they cherish for their own personal lives. Holding competitive and free elections on a regular basis, democracy also requires political leaders to implement policies that would benefit the majority rather than a minority (Cardoso 2011; Powell 1982). In a constitutional government, when the majority has substituted its particular interest for the community's general interest, a self-serving rule of the many – democracy – resulted. Consolidated democracy is a highly debated concept in the literature. It is recognized that a change of regime, whether through revolutionary overthrow of government or otherwise, is not enough to establish democracy. But the factors that contribute to consolidation need some other indicators. Without a consolidated democracy, there might be a grey zone called competitive authoritarianism, electoral authoritarianism, and hybrid. These regimes are not consolidated democracy or authoritarianism per se but the perception of democracy for authoritarian states. Democratic institutions are merged with authoritarian practices (Miller, Martini, Larrabee, Rabasa, Pezard, Taylor, Mengitsu 2012). In terms of origin, it is inspired by polyarchy which describes a state that has certain procedures to follow the democratic principle (Dahl 1971). The process of constructing the necessary pillars of democracy in a state, varies according to some conditions. Regime environment, changes of inequality and trust of networks, occasional shocks, public policy changes define the success level of democratization. All these pillars vary from era to era and from region to region, with multiple ways instead of just a fixed one. According to these conditions and principles, democratization occurs in a limited period of time such as decades or over years but not over a very long time. Nevertheless, problems such as the non-willingness of political leaders to adapt to democracy always block democratization (Tilly 2003). These leaders primarily tend to democratize the regime thanks to the economic and social linkages they have had with the West (Levitsky and Way 2010). This comes with the assumption that democratization is the installation of Western-style institutions such as elections, parliaments and political parties (Grugel 2003). With all its aspects, democratization has strong

linkages with many notions such a nationalism, modernization, border setting and citizenship.

Concerning nationalism, it revived with decolonization and also the end of the Cold War which led to the rise of new nations. Since it takes interests to the top position of state agenda, nationalism does not allow democratic peace theory to work out which states democratic states would never fight each other for reasons like political stalemates and neo-imperialist conditions, inflexible interests and short time horizons, competing for popular support, weakening of central authority, or prestige strategies. The fight between Armenia and Azerbaijan as two electoral democracies is a recent example (Mansfield and Snyder 1995). Looking at modernization as the second aspect of democratization, it is seen that states under dictatorial regimes are not more likely to experience a transition to democracy as they reach higher levels of economic development. The possibility of a dictatorship's death and establishment of democracy depends on GDP per capita income and strongly affects the survival of democracies as well as their birth. Deliberately, democracy can be established at any level of economic development, but the probability of its survival is much more likely if the per capita income in that state is high (Przeworksi and Limongi 1997; Lipset and Rustow 1970). Border settling, on the other hand, underlines the territorial peace theory which proposes two hypotheses; the likelihood of conflict class and the likelihood of observing joint democracy within dyad rise, and the increase of democratization when a state settles its borders with all its neighbours (Gibler 2012). Last, citizenship directs attention to the analysis of social relationships, power struggles and quality of people's lives. It shows democracy can only exist where there is popular consent, popular participation, accountability and practice of rights, tolerance and pluralism. It provides an instrument to distinguish weak versions of democratization from democracy itself (Grugel 2003).

Democratization that is presented within inbetweenness has also been influenced by admiration for the West, mostly for Europe as a continent and a system. Reference has to be made to its linkage with nationalism here, because nationalism that was defined as the rule by the self in the 18th century was Western oriented which creates resentment towards the unmerited exclusion by the one-sided love affair of so many intelligentsias with the West and its values (Smith 1991). This one-sided love affair rose to a level where the colonized states in the postcolonial episode wanted to seem more European than the Europeans themselves even. Whereas the

colonized states were giving importance to the local symbols and institutions on the eve of independence, they started to amalgamate their own local symbols with the European ones on the basis of the impacts created by the Europeans during the colonial episode. This brings postcolonial theory to a point where the focus becomes the locals who adopt their own culture and this European culture that was created in the colonial episode. At the end, the analysis shows us locals who defend European culture more than even the Europeans do (Emerson 1995).

The locals' adaptation of Europe was a project initiated by the colonizers during the colonial period. The colonial administrations gave names to the new states, drew their boundaries, constructed their capitals and formed central administrations and political institutions. At the end, new states of Africa for example constructed the sum of the rights and pieces of these colonizer states. Among all, the state is directly imported from Europe, a simple copy and a source of an inefficient violence in the colonized lands. There is also the role of the political elites in these states who were trained in Europe (Guibernau 1996). The first generation of African presidents, for example, often pursued foreign policies strongly tied to the former colonial powers. In addition to formal ties they developed a policy of dependency on Europe with a shared culture and political values of colonially trained African presidents and their European counterparts. These elites were so Western oriented that even though they campaigned for independence, they tried hard to get the sympathy of the Europeans. Leopold Sedar Senghor as the first President of Senegal is the only African to be inducted into France's prestigious and selective *Academie Française* (Gordon 2013). In the creation of this admiration, Europe has a specific role. France, for example used cultural policies such as *Francophonie* in Africa in the postcolonial episode. The Francophonie that was found in the Franco-African summit conferences by the 1970s became a cultural instrument which vaccinates French education systems and linguistic policies into the locals in Africa (Harbeson and Rotschild 1991). The impacts of Francophonie increased with Mitterand's socialist regime that started in 1981, which found iself strictly limited by historical constraints and by the weight of economic, political and strategic interests. A wide network of intergovernmental organizations and conferences tried to institutionalize linguistic, cultural, educational, and communicational links existing between Africa and France by the opening of the Ministry of Francophonie in 1988. In addition, François Mitterand's Africa adviser was his son – Jean Christophe Mitterand – who pledged to liberalize

French foreign policy in Africa. In this context, President Mitterand made thirteen visits to Africa acting on the reports of his son (Martin 2012).

The book tries to depict democratization as an impact of the West on the Middle East, Africa and Latin America, overall, and argues that democratization in these regions is far from being as consolidated as in the West because of their hybrid nature of Western democracy with local non-democratic values. Bihter Tomen in "A Conceptual Framework of Democratic Backsliding" presents a theoretical framework that will identify explanatory factors for democratic backsliding. By using ideas of concept formation, following the conceptual logic of Sartori (1970), and Munck and Verkuilen (2002), and building on Bermeo's (2016) conceptualization of backsliding, Tomen argues that the defining attributes of democratic backsliding are executive aggrandizement/overreach (marked by weakening of institutions), enacted by democratically elected populist/charismatic leaders, strategic electoral manipulation and a decline in vertical and horizontal accountability (marked by lack of an impartial judiciary and audit agencies). In order to support this theoretical framework, Tomen investigates two cases from Latin America—Venezuela and Ecuador. Her contribution also serves as an analytical tool to understand the increasing authoritarian tendencies in other countries. To assist the theoretical framework of the book as does Dr. Tomen, Dr. Itır Toksöz in "Science Fiction, Colonialism, Afrofuturism: A Political Discussion at the Crossroads of the Core and the Periphery" describes the colonial side of postcolonialism by attributing it to science fiction. By looking at the Middle East and Africa, Dr. Toksöz specifically argues that Africa and the Middle East have been the venues of science fiction that deals with future colonization. Dr. Toksöz looks at such examples in contemporary science fiction and questions how and why people were not able to escape colonizing behaviours of the past in science fiction. Dr. Toksöz evaluates the findings against the backdrop of issues of democracy, democratization and development in Africa, not only through works of Western science fiction but also through works of a nascent science fiction in Africa. Dr. Fatima Lamharhar in "The Case of Democratic Transformation in Africa: Calendar Views" examines democratization specifically in Africa and discusses the difficulties of reaching full democracy in the continent. By evaluating the elections in Africa between January 2015 and December 2016, Dr. Lamharhar analyses whether elections alone were necessary to provide democratization in the continent and why African states cannot escape from tyranny while implementing democracy. In the African vein, Dr.

Volkan Ipek in “The African Arab Spring: From People to Presidentialist Practices in The Gambia and Zimbabwe” analyses how the Arab Spring influenced sub-Saharan Africa and the presidential system in Africa with the comparative case studies of the Gambia and Zimbabwe. Dr. Ipek argues that even though the Arab Spring influenced the presidential practices in Africa and abolished many long-lasting presidents, the new ones who came to power have not yet taken any steps towards democracy and they are about to repeat the former presidential practices. Speaking of the Arab Spring, Dr. Ozgur Unal Eris in “Analysis of Democratization in Morocco and Tunisia after the Arab Spring” evaluates the reforms carried out in the 2011 Arab Spring in Morocco and Tunisia. By considering the conditions for democracy in these two North African states since the Arab Spring, Dr. Eris tries to draw attention to the fact that while both countries have authoritarian pasts involving foreign exploitation and nationalist elites, governing by controlled democracy, they started a new wave of democratization after the Arab Spring. Dr. Eris regards Morocco and Tunisia as actors of a region previously untouched by the third wave of democratization which suddenly took a central position within debates on democratization and analyses the constitutional changes after 2011 in these two states as a method to test this democratization. Dr. Hasret Elcin Kursat Coskun, in “The Decivilization and Depacification of the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and the Balkans in the 19th and 20th Centuries: A Case for the Civilizational Theory of Norbert Elias” on the other hand, regards Turkey as the continuum of the Ottoman Empire and therefore a postcolonial power and looks at how it impacted the Balkans by focusing on the Balkan Wars. Dr. Coskun brings a historical multi-perspective analysis to Turkey as a Middle Eastern state in the postcolonial episode. By viewing the Ottoman Empire as a Western state once upon a time, Dr. Coskun analyses contemporary Turkish Foreign Policy to the Balkan states with reference to how the Ottomans perceived the Balkans in the Balkan War. In this transition to the Middle East from Africa, Z. Aslı Elitsoy in “The Israeli Social Justice Protests of 2011: A Non-Arab Call for Dignity" points out that when a series of demonstrations shook the Arab world between 2011 and 2013, sustained street demonstrations simultaneously took place in non-Arab countries of the region like Turkey, Iran and Israel. In an attempt to decontextualize the “Arab Spring” from its ethnicity-based interpretations, she offers an alternative explanation from a regional perspective by analyzing the Israeli Social Justice Protests of 2011, also known as the tent protests. She argues that despite their varied aims, demands, and political backgrounds, all Arab and non-Arab protest movements can be seen as the outcomes of the new collective

revolutionary imaginary in the Middle East. Dr. Aylin Aydin-Cakir and Duygu Merve Uysal in "Explaining de jure Judicial Independence: Evidence from two MENA Countries" also analyse the level of democracy in two Middle Eastern states—Egypt and Tunisia—by looking at how their judiciary systems work. Focusing on the post-Arab Spring period of the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries, Dr. Aydin-Cakir and Uysal attempt to understand why the design of a weak and dependent judiciary in Egypt's Constitution of 2014 is observed, whereas the formulation of an independent judiciary in Tunisia's Constitution of 2014 appears to be quite successful. Arguing that the constitution-making processes affect the design of constitutions, Dr. Aydin-Cakir and Uysal use most similar system designs (MSSD) and conduct a systematic comparison of Egypt and Tunisia in terms of the constitution-making process and de jure judicial independence. Identifying the shared and defining characteristics of presidentialism in Latin America, Dr. Ebru Ilter Akarcay emphasizes recent trends in this variant of legislative-executive relations. The growing debate on term limits, increasing resort to run-off elections, incorporation of a mechanism traditionally associated with parliamentarism into presidential systems and the replacement of violent exits of presidents by a combination of legislative-judicial-popular ventures currently set the tone of presidentialism in Latin America. While the bulk of these changes point at the flexibilization of a system that was once considered to be synonymous with rigidity, major flaws and defects are believed to characterize the democratic performance of Latin American political systems. The author indeed concludes that, no matter how extensively an informal separation of powers could be established in the region, the changing dynamics of presidentialism still fall short of safeguarding the intensity or quality of democracy in the region. Dr. Bruno De Conti, Dr. Paulo Van Noije and Arthur Welle in "Brazilian Economy: From Euphoria to Crisis (2003-2019)" analyse democratization in Brazil from the perspective of the modernization theory of economic development. By comparing Brazil's current economy with the past, Dr. De Conti, Dr. Van Noije and Welle look for the real reasons of this rapid change from boom to deep crisis in the Brazilian economy. In addition to economic reasons, such as the current status of the international economy and the structural fragilities of the Brazilian economy, the authors also hold government officials responsible for this rapid decrease which also has a negative impact on the level of democratization. Speaking of Brazil again, Dr. Patricia Villen in "International Migration to Brazil and the Crisis of Democracy" analyses the level of democratization in Brazil through the migrant labour force that comes to Brazil from other parts of

the world. Dr. Villen scrutinizes the status of international migrants in Brazil and tries to test democratization in Brazil through the behaviour of the Brazilian government towawrds these migrants.

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CHAPTER 2

A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK OF DEMOCRATIC BACKSLIDING

BIHTER TOMEN

Introduction

Albeit a vast breadth of research in democratization literature, the concept of democratic backsliding (regression) remains understudied. The term can be defined as democratic transition in reverse. According to recent accounts, we have entered a new period of backsliding since the mid-2000s (Puddington 2012). Recent instances of backsliding are marked by executive takeover in countries like Venezuela, Hungary, Ukraine, the Philippines and Thailand. Most studies in backsliding focus on case-specific changes in institutional, political and economic configurations. This paper attempts to present a theoretical framework that will identify explanatory factors of democratic backsliding. The scope of backsliding varies from country to country, but it usually takes place in hybrid regimes (usually from defective democracy to electoral authoritarianism and beyond) where political institutions are weaker compared to their counterparts in consolidated democracies. By using the idea of concept formation, following the conceptual logic of Sartori (1970), and Munck and Verkuilen (2002), and building on Bermeo's (2016) conceptualization of backsliding, this paper argues that the defining attributes of democratic backsliding are executive aggrandizement/overreach (marked by weakening of institutions), democratically elected populist/charismatic leaders, electoral manipulation and a decline in vertical and horizontal accountability (marked by lack of an impartial judiciary and audit agencies). The paper acknowledges that democracy is a *type* of regime with varying *degrees*. Democratic backsliding, on the other hand, is a *process* under which democratic norms deteriorate on a sliding scale. In order to support this theoretical framework, I will investigate two cases from Latin America—Venezuela and Ecuador. It is important to note that

this conceptualization will also help as an analytical tool to understand the increasing authoritarian tendencies in other countries.

Democratic backsliding can be called democratic transition in reverse. Out of the 25 democratic breakdowns since 2000, 18 have occurred after 2005. Only eight of these 25 breakdowns came as a result of military intervention (Diamond 2015). The majority of the breakdowns resulted from the abuse of power and the desecration of democratic institutions and practices by democratically elected rulers—election fraud and executive abuse or "executive strangulation of political rights, civil liberties, and the rule of law" (Diamond 2015, 147). Thus, we can safely say that the cause of breakdowns is less about military interventions and more in line with the rise of populist leaders and institutional changes that they initiate.

Democratic Backsliding in the Democratization Literature

Bermeo (2016) defines democratic backsliding as "debilitation or elimination of any of the political institutions that sustain an existing democracy". Similarly, Diamond (2015) defines backsliding as "subtle and incremental degradations of democratic rights and procedures that finally push a democratic system over the threshold into competitive authoritarianism" (144). Paradoxically, democratic backsliding more commonly occurs when democratically elected executives embark on a number of institutional changes that weaken the checks on the executive power, roll back constitutional constraints, weaken the opposition parties and dissent, reverse independent judiciary, and use their control over public resources to manipulate public opinion through media (Levitsky and Way 2002; Greene 2007; Bermeo 2016; Gumuscu and Esen 2016). The scope of backsliding varies from country to country, but it usually takes place in hybrid regimes—from defective democracy to electoral authoritarianism and beyond—although, one cannot exclude the possibility of backsliding in liberal democracies.

Considering the centrality of the notion of democracy to democratic backsliding, we first need to briefly tackle the concept of democracy. It is such a broad, elusive and abstract concept. Significant disagreement over how to define and measure democracy has been the norm among democratization scholars. They cannot agree on which indicators are more prominent in measuring democracy. Many scholars state that it is essentially a 'contested concept' (Schmitter and Karl 1993; Held 1996; Lawson 1993; Dahl 2000). One of the most prominent definitions come

from Dahl (1971) who has a procedural understanding of democracy which he names a 'polyarchy'. His definition consists of several elements: constitutionally elected officials in government, frequent and fair elections, voting rights for all adults and the right to stand in elections, universal right to express oneself without the threat of violence, right to seek alternative sources of information, freedom to form associations and parties and inclusive citizenship (Kurki 2010). Schumpeter defines democracy as "institutional arrangements for arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote" (Schumpeter quoted in Huntington 1990, 6-7). Beyond the procedural definitions of democracy, we have varieties of democratic regimes (Table 1). These democratic regimes types—also coined 'democracy with adjectives'—are based on different understandings and definitions of democracy. There are three main democratic regimes: a) Liberal Democracy (Consolidated Democracy), b) Defective Democracy (with subtypes: Delegative, Tutelary, Illiberal) and c) Electoral-Autocratic regime types (with subtypes: hegemonic-electoral authoritarianism and competitive- authoritarianism). Below I compile the attributes of each type.

	Consolidated	Hybrid Regimes	
Varieties of Democratic Regimes*:	***Liberal Democracy***	***Defective Democracy***	***Electoral-autocratic Democracy***
Attributes	- Rule of law - Pluralism - Civil and Political Rights	1. Delegative: a democracy where political power is delegated to a strong leader (i.e. president). 2. Tutelary: a democracy where the military retains the right to intervene in political affairs. 3. Illiberal: democracy which lacks civil rights.	1. Hegemonic-Electoral Authoritarianism: presence of multiparty elections, regardless of competitiveness. 2. Competitive Authoritarianism: open, free but not fair elections.

Table 1. Democratization types compiled by the author.

Liberal democracy can be defined as being strongly committed to the rule of law, independence of the judiciary and the constitution, free and fair elections as well as respecting the rights of the individual, toleration, and the legitimacy of liberal democratic procedural governance (Kurki 2010). Based on Western liberal philosophy, liberal democracy respects and guarantees political and civil rights for the individual. The protection of these rights is paramount to the preservation of liberal democracy. Political and civil rights are also the yardsticks against which we can measure and categorize countries as liberal, defective or electoral-autocratic. The latter two are also called hybrid regimes because they include both democratic and authoritarian attributes. Hybrid regimes are all unconsolidated democracies. Defective democratic regimes can either be delegative, tutelary or illiberal. Electoral authoritarian regimes can either be hegemonic-electoral or competitive-authoritarian.

Delegative democracy occurs when a political leader wins a presidential election and "is enabled to govern the country as he sees fit, and to the extent that existing power relations allow, for the term to which he has been elected" (O'Donnell 1993, 8). Accountability is problematic and the parliament/congress and the judiciary can be sidetracked. This regime type is especially suitable in understanding defective democracy in Latin American countries like Ecuador or Venezuela where the president is "the embodiment of the nation and the main custodian of the national interest" above all party politics. O'Donnell (1993) also mentions that delegative democracies often use "devices such as the ballotage: if elections do not directly generate a clear-cut majority, that majority *must* be created for supporting the myth of legitimate delegation". This is an extremely important point since we observe leaders like Chavez, Maduro and Correa turning to referenda in order to create constituent assemblies to rewrite constitutions to their benefit. In 2017, the opposition-controlled congress in Venezuela was replaced by the Constituent Assembly, thanks to the referendum called by President Maduro. In 1999, the Constituent Assembly which came into effect by the referendum called by President Chávez made significant changes, including increasing the presidential term from five to six years, and unifying the two chambers of the National Congress into a National Assembly.

Tutelary democracy is another type of defective democracy, in which the elected government's power is restrained by the military, which intervenes in the political process through informal ways (Esen and Gumuscu 2016). Przeworski (1988) defines this regime type as "a regime which has

competitive, formally democratic institutions, but in which the power apparatus, typically reduced by this time to the armed forces, retains the capacity to intervene to correct undesirable states of affairs".

According to Zakaria (1997), democratically elected leaders, often after being re-elected or re-affirmed through referenda, are "routinely ignoring constitutional limits on their power and depriving their citizens of basic rights and freedoms". Illiberal democracy is a type of regime that while granting political rights to its citizens, limits civil liberties such as religion, and freedom of expression. This type of defective democracy without constitutional liberalism is prone to producing dissent, repression and conflict.

Lastly, there are electoral-autocratic democracies. Hegemonic-electoral authoritarian regimes are those in which civil rights are highly diminished and political rights are usually a façade. They hold multiparty elections regardless of competitiveness. Therefore, in some places, elections are only for show. Competitive-authoritarian regimes, on the other hand, can be defined as the party in power abusing its control over the state-owned media and regulatory agencies; using legal actions to harass critics and reward supporters in the media and civil society; and relying on widespread use of public resources and abuse of public policy instruments to gain access to greater private finance for the incumbent party (Levitsky and Way 2002). Thus, elections are truly competitive as multiple parties compete at the ballot box, but the playing field is so heavily skewed in favour of the incumbent that it is usually impossible to beat the party in power out of office.

As mentioned above, defective democracy and electoral-autocratic regimes are called hybrid regimes because they grant a mix of political and civil rights to varying degrees to their citizens. Regimes where backsliding takes place are usually hybrid regimes. For instance, a country can transition from tutelary to competitive-authoritarian. Aside from the theoretical underpinnings of each type, Freedom House measures each country's political and civil rights every year and ranks them on a scale from 'free' to 'partly-free' to 'not-free'. Political and civil rights can also be defined as electoral and constitutional rights, respectively. For Freedom House, political rights consist of free, fair, competitive elections, universal suffrage, freedom to form political parties and opposition, and holding representatives accountable (in line with Dahl's procedural definition of democracy—or what he calls a polyarchy). Civil rights are comprised of

freedom of expression, assembly, religion, and media. It is also important to note that Freedom House indicators for democracy also include attributes such as "socioeconomic rights," "freedom from gross socioeconomic inequalities," "property rights," and "freedom from war" which cannot be grouped as either political or civil rights (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 10). If political and civil rights are fully realized in a country, then we have liberal democracy. If any of the political and/or civil rights are limited, we have a defective democracy. Democratic backsliding occurs when any or all of these rights are in decline.

Concept Formation

The first task is the identification of attributes that are constitutive of the concept under consideration. However, there is fixed rule that can be used to determine what attributes must be included in a definition of a certain concept. The important thing is to avoid "extremes of including too much or too little in a definition relative to their theoretical goals" (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9). In concept formation, scholars may face problems of maximalist and minimalist definitions of the concept. The issue of maximalist definitions arises when a concept includes too many attributes. The sheer overburdening of a concept with too many attributes may decrease its usefulness by making it a concept that has no empirical referents because it becomes too abstract (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9). Maximalist definitions tend to be so overburdened with attributes that it becomes too abstract or too broad to measure empirically. The other option in concept formation is to choose a minimalist definition. Here, it becomes easier to find instances of a concept and allow for the study of numerous empirical questions. However, if a concept is so minimalist that all cases automatically become instances, researchers "must add attributes to a concept as a way to give it more content and thus better address relevant theoretical concerns and discriminate among cases" (Munck and Verkuilen 2002, 9). Minimalist definitions run the risk of omitting relevant attributes in the construction of a concept.

Munck and Berkuilen (2002) argue that the attributes of a concept must be organized in a way that follows two basic rules of conceptual logic: avoid problems of conflation and redundancy. In organizing the attributes of a concept vertically, it is necessary that less abstract attributes be placed on the proper branch of the conceptual tree, that is, immediately subordinate to the more abstract attribute they help to flesh out and make more concrete. Otherwise this attribute will be conjoined with attributes that are

manifestations of a different overarching attribute and give rise to the problem of conflation—misplacing components of an attribute (13). On the other hand, attributes at the same level of abstraction should tap into mutually exclusive aspects of the attribute at the immediately superior level of abstraction. Otherwise the analysis falls prey to the distinct logical problem of redundancy—repeating the same attributes in different categories (13).

Conceptualization	Task	Standard of Assessment
Democratic Backsliding	Identification of Attributes. Vertical organization of attributes by level of abstraction (i.e. attributes, components of attributes, subcomponents of attributes)	Concept specification: Avoid maximalist definitions (the inclusion of theoretically irrelevant attributes) or minimalist definitions (the exclusion of theoretically relevant attributes). Conceptual logic: Isolate the "leaves" of the concept tree and avoid the problems of conflation and redundancy.

Table 2. Types of democratic backsliding, Source: Munck and Verkuilen (2002).

We should also consider Sartori's (1970) 'ladder of abstraction' as a method in concept formation. This ladder is based on a pattern of "inverse variation between the number of defining attributes and number of cases" (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 434). Thus, concepts with fewer defining attributes apply to more cases and are therefore higher on the ladder of abstraction, while concepts with more defining attributes apply to fewer cases and therefore are lower on the ladder of abstraction. One of Sartori's goals is to show how conceptual differentiation can be increased by moving down the ladder of abstraction to concepts that have more defining attributes and fit a narrower range of cases.

The Defining Attributes of Democratic Backsliding

In the democratization literature, numerous scholars have naturally attempted to conceptualize democracy and that is why we have a proliferation of definitions and identifying attributes for democracy. Here, we have a more difficult task at hand, as this paper attempts to conceptualize democratic backsliding. Democracy is a *type* of regime with varying *degrees*. Democratic backsliding, on the other hand, is a *process* under which democratic norms deteriorate on a sliding scale. Nevertheless, this paper attempts to identify the *defining attributes* of democratic backsliding while following the conceptual logic of Sartori (1970), and Munck and Verkuilen (2002). The defining attributes are executive aggrandizement/overreach (marked by weakening of institutions), democratically elected populist/charismatic leaders, electoral manipulation and a decline in vertical and horizontal accountability.

1. Executive aggrandizement/overreach: Bermeo (2016, 10) argues that "a form of backsliding occurs when elected executives weaken checks on executive power one by one, undertaking a series of institutional changes that hamper the power of opposition forces to challenge executive preferences, disassembling of institutions that might challenge the executive". Executive takeover can be done by using constitutional assemblies, holding referenda, or using the courts or legislatures where supporters of the executive are in the majority. Indeed, the defining feature of executive aggrandizement is that institutional change is either put to some sort of vote or legally decreed by a freely elected official resulting from a democratic mandate (Bermeo 2016, 10-11). Thus, elected executives frame these changes as an outcome of a democratic process (through a majority-controlled legislature or referendum), therefore legitimizing these undemocratic steps. In Ecuador, Correa changed the constitution in 2008 which granted him presidential powers such as the ability to dissolve parliament, gave him increased control over constitutional oversight bodies, restricting media freedom and extending the presidential term to two consecutive four-year terms.

2. Democratically elected populist/charismatic leaders: The recent rise of populist parties and populist leaders in Latin America, Eastern Europe and even the United States brings the question of populism to the forefront. Populism is an elusive concept with numerous definitions. The common features of this concept seem to include an anti-establishment (anti-status quo) rhetoric where an 'outsider' or 'newcomer' criticizes the established

power structures in politics and claims to change it. Another feature is positioning the demands of citizens against the political elite, reiterating to be 'the voice of the people'. It is important to note that populist leaders are democratically elected and are usually able to sustain their base support by the masses over a long period of time. There are several definitions in the literature that capture the essence of the concept. Panizza (2013), for instance, argues that the concept includes speaking like the people, speaking for the people, the politics of antagonism and politics of redemption; whereas Conniff (2012) stresses the charismatic appeal to the common people and the significance attached to winning elections (Selcuk 2016, 573). Barr (2009) defines populism as "a mass movement led by an outsider or maverick seeking to gain or maintain power by using anti-establishment appeals and plebiscitarian linkages". Furthermore, Carrión (2009) emphasizes personalistic leadership, an unmediated or poorly institutionalized relationship between the leader and masses, 'us versus them' discourses and distrust of democratic institutions that would limit the power of the leader. In the last decade, it is those countries, where a populist leader/party has the executive power that have seen democratic backsliding. This is because the populist leaders promise to make political changes to the status quo so as to reflect the demands of the people. They can campaign on anti-immigrant rhetoric or redistribution promises. Furthermore, because they have strong mass support from the public, they can manipulate the rules to create majoritarian assemblies or turn to plebiscites. Latin America has never run out of populist leaders. Venezuela and Ecuador have been ruled by populist parties since the end of the 1990s. Other examples of populist leaders in the history of the region are Juan Domingo Perón and Eva Perón in Argentina; José Maria Velasco in Ecuador; Getulio Vargas and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva in Brazil; Evo Morales in Bolivia; Lázaro Cárdenas and Andrés M. López Obrador in Mexico; Juan Velasco Alvarado, Alberto Fujimori, and Alan García in Peru. Besides the Latin American cases which will be discussed below, there are other examples of democratic regression where a populist is in power. Hungary's Fidesz Party under Prime Minister Orban, and Poland's Law and Justice Party under Jaroslaw Kaczynski are recent examples of executive takeover by populist leaders.

3. Electoral manipulation: Strategic electoral manipulation can be described as tilting the electoral playing field in favour of incumbents (Levitsky and Way 2002; Bermeo 2016; Gumuscu and Esen 2016). As a third attribute of backsliding, strategic election manipulation denotes a range of actions aimed at tilting the electoral playing field which include

hampering media access, using government funds for incumbent campaigns, keeping opposition candidates off the ballot, hampering voter registration, packing electoral commissions, changing electoral rules to favour incumbents, and harassing opponents—but all done in such a way that the elections themselves do not appear fraudulent. Strategic manipulation differs from election-day vote fraud since it typically happens long before the election day and rarely involves obvious violations of the law. In 2016, Maduro denied access to foreign journalists, local reporters and even drone images to cover protests in Caracas. Venezuela's government has had a tumultuous relationship with the media. Although Chávez created his own pro-government media, alternative media outlets are numerous and outspoken about the government policies. In Ecuador, Correa passed a communication law in 2013 to exert control over a largely critical private media. As a result of this legislation, hundreds of lawsuits were launched, cowing editors, undermining the financial base of newspapers and even forcing cartoonists to 'rectify' their images. Police have raided newsrooms, publications have been shut down and at least one journalist has been forced into exile. Under the law, the state's media watchdog, known as SuperCom, has enormous powers to penalize media outlets not just for what they publish.

4. A decline in vertical and horizontal accountability marked by lack of an impartial judiciary and audit agencies: Diamond (2008) argues that the primary example of *vertical* accountability is a genuinely democratic election (48). But ensuring democratic elections requires a truly independent electoral administration capable of conducting all the necessary tasks from registering voters to counting votes with strict integrity and neutrality. Other effective forms of vertical accountability include public hearings, citizen audits, the regulation of campaign finance, and a freedom-of-information act. Horizontal accountability, on the other hand, invests some agencies of the state with the power and responsibility to monitor the conduct of their counterparts. It is often through executive aggrandizement that the agencies responsible for administering elections, monitoring government actions, or making legal decisions are either incapacitated or politicized. O'Donnell (1993) claims that representation entails the idea of accountability: the representative is held responsible for the ways in which he acts in the name of those for whom he claims to be entitled to speak. In consolidated democracies, accountability operates not only vertically in relation to those who elect the officers (except, retrospectively, at times of elections), but horizontally in relation to a network of relatively autonomous powers that have the capacity of calling