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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

AOI	Arab Organization for Industrialization
CA	Constituent Assembly
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations
DRI	Democracy Reporting International
EAF	Egyptian Armed Forces
EGX	Egyptian Stock Market
EGIS	Egyptian General Intelligence Service
EMC	Egyptian Movement for Change
ERSAP	Economic Reform and Structural Adjustment Program
ETUF	Egyptian Trade Union Federation
FDI	Foreign Direct Investment
FJP	Freedom and Justice Party
IAF	Islamic Action Front
ICG	International Crisis Group
IEMP	Ideological, Economic, Military, and Political
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IMF	International Monetary Fund
IPO	Initial Public Offering
ISMs	Islamic Social Movements
LCPS	Lebanese Centre for Policy Studies
MB	Muslim Brotherhood
MENA	Middle East and North Africa
NASCO	El Nasr Automotive Manufacturing Company
NDP	National Democratic Party

NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSF	National Salvation Front
NSPO	National Service Project Organization
POS	Political Opportunity Structure
SC	Salafist Call
SCAF	Supreme Council of the Armed Forces
SCC	Supreme Constitutional Court
SIS	State Information Service
SMs	Social Movements
SMT	Social Movement Theory
SSI	State Security Investigations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

INTRODUCTION

Revolutions offer exceptional opportunities for knowledge because they provide a unique chance to contemplate power, societies, and social movements and to observe changes as well as their underlying reasons. Revolutions thus challenge prevailing knowledge production assets and present alternatives to them. The uprisings that started on 17 December 2010 in Tunisia and overthrew dictatorships there and in Egypt, Libya, and Yemen were representative of major crises that required grassroots changes. The Islamic movements played a crucial role in the Arab uprisings and the period thereafter. This has increased interest in Islamic social movements (ISMs) and the impact of the six years following the Arab spring on their ideology.

The shifts that occurred during the Arab Spring are, without a doubt, a vital historical period for the MENA region and for studying Islamic movements and changes in their ideology. These Arab Spring shifts prompted consequent ideological shifts in the majority of MENA-based Islamic movements and steered them in two prominent ideological directions. The first is represented by Islamic movements that recognize the primacy of making change from within the existing state, through political and electoral participation, and lean towards specialized political action to become a part of the modern national state. What is notable about this particular direction is how the Arab Spring shifts thrust the Salafist movement towards a new phase, when Salafist groups and blocs decided to become involved in political action and the partisanship experience. For decades, the Salafist's primary faction remained adamant about prioritizing da`wa, social and educational work, refusing to play the political game and citing various excuses and reasons. The second are movements that do not believe in national borders and seek to establish a caliphate, through violence. The great majority of these movements are of an extremist fundamentalist orientation and do not follow a single model. Al-Qaeda represents one model and its competitor, the Islamic State (ISIS), represents another. This is in addition to some local armed radical movements, as in the Syrian case.

Social movements in general and the Islamic movement in particular still require serious study to elucidate the reasons for the changes to them, their means, objectives, and impact on their countries and on reflection about the Middle East .It is not possible to talk about "Islamists" as a single bloc when discussing Islamist attitudes towards the Arab revolutions, democracy, and equality. A vast number of intellectual and political movements exist among Islamic movements. A division based on the degree of moderation makes it easier for many thinkers and researchers exploring the impact of political participation on behavior, attitudes, and the ideology of Islamic movements (Wickham, 2004a; Schwedler, 2006; Tezcür, 2010). Indeed, some researchers argue that there is an inevitable relationship between participation and moderation in Islamic movements. However, Wickham (2013) argues that such a relationship is not necessarily mechanical or linear but rather subject to many variables, most notably the nature of the internal balances in Islamic organizations and the relationship between the centers of power and the organizational hierarchy.

Examining the ideologies of Islamic movements after the Arab Spring will aid in understanding their role – or lack thereof – in the stability of their countries and, ultimately, the region. It is beneficial to evaluate the various types of Islamic movements in terms of religious denomination and ideological discrepancies so as to have a clear vision during the debate, as they are diverse entities that can take on various forms and are non-homogeneous at times. Recognizing this diversity will produce a more thorough analysis and classification of these movements. It will make it possible to determine whether they are extremists or moderate, introverted or open to the views of the other, whether they interpret religious text using traditional tools – which cannot be shaped or molded to suit the current reality and its developments –, or whether they are movements that are constantly evolving to meet any current reality or future developments.

The Egyptian protests in early 2011 contained surprises for many analysts, who were driven to reexamine the turbulent situation in the Middle East. The 2011 protests were not new in Egypt, which has witnessed many protest movements such as Kefaya (Enough), as well as workers' and youth protest movements, which have increased significantly over the last few years. While the toppling of Mubarak was a surprise to some, it could perhaps have been anticipated.

Mubarak's regime has maintained itself and re-asserted its authority for 30 years. The Egyptian state, on one hand, has given its citizens more money,

but fewer social benefits, while on the other hand, it demands more taxes. This is due to its weaknesses, the deterioration of public services, low levels of law enforcement, and poor employment and economic development (Soliman, 2011). the most important economic resolutions that have affected the Egyptian economy during the period of 1952-2015, along with the accompanying political factors, are as follows: agricultural reforms, the move towards Arab socialism, the shift towards liberalism, the open market in Sadat and Mubarak's era, financial and monetary policies, the exchange rate, consumer support, external debt crises, negotiations between Egypt and international donors and financial institutions, and privatization and employment (Ikram, 2018). the security service under Mubarak's regime has been inflated and has the upper hand in the country (Soliman, 2011).

As for the Egyptian army's role in the political regime, Yazid Sayegh's paper, entitled "Above the State: The Officers' Republic in Egypt" (2012), has been a core of focus politically and academically. Sayegh argues that the Egyptian Armed Forces have expanded "their thorough penetration of almost every sphere of Hosni Mubarak's crony patronage system", as well as that Mubarak's regime has gained the support of the senior officers after his promise to reappoint them after their retirement to positions in ministries, government bodies, and state-owned enterprises. The prestigious positions the army has occupied during Mubarak's era drive the army to worry more about its own interests following the protests in January 2011, and, as Sayegh argues, the Egyptian army has sought to consolidate its power over the political regime and to stay above the law and beyond the control of the constitution and elected bodies.

Zeinab Abul-Magd in her book Militarizing the Nation: The Army, Business, and Revolution in Egypt (2017), widely discusses the influence of the Egyptian army in the political regime. Abul-Magd argues that the Egyptian army has adapted to the decisive transformations, and benefited from them. The army succeeded in shifting to socialism in the 1960s, to the open market in the 1980s, and to neoliberalism from the 1990s, onwards. All of these transformations are accompanied by the army's attempt to enhance its political sovereignty and expand a large business empire. Abul-Magd also argues that the army's previous security doctrine has adopted an Arab national identity, and a socialist ideology, that is outwardly oriented toward regional affairs; however, its new doctrine focuses on domestic issues in Sadat's era.

In the Egypt context, After Mubarak was deposed and power assumed by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF), the armed forces attempted to gain a pivotal role in Egypt's future, politically, constitutionally, and economically. It delayed the transfer of power to the civil authorities and tried to establish a framework for future politics that would preserve its institutional interests (Sayigh, 2012b, pp. 7–8). In April 2012, the International Crisis Group (ICG) summarized the armed forces' policy during the revolution as follows:

> "Eager to remove itself from the political limelight, [SCAF] nonetheless has worked hard to ensure its concerns and interests would be protected once it stops ruling. Its ensuing efforts to manage the outcome of the transition undercut the trust it enjoyed. And, finally, its inability to achieve its goals led it to prolong its stay in power, which further eroded its credibility and thus ability to promote its objectives" (ICG, 2012, p.17).

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces made clear its ambition to preserve vast powers during the era after Mubarak. A number of supra-constitutional principles supported by the Military Council were announced in November 2011. These aimed at strengthening military power and autonomy, indicating that the army – as was the case in Turkey – was the guarantor of the civil state. The supra-constitutional was dropped under public pressure (El Fegiery, 2012, p.2). The Military Council attempted to preserve and explicitly defend its interests, entrenching the exceptional status it has retained. Such developments gave rise to many worries and concerns. The Military Council attempted to include articles in the 2013 and 2014 Egyptian constitutions that would grant it permanent military guardianship, including the right of cassation in all military affairs. This would limit the ability of civil powers to introduce policies for Egypt in the future. Under such circumstances, any democratically elected government would suffer chronic instability (Sayigh, 2012, p.3).

It is clear that economic, political, and military factors played a role in the January 25 revolution and the subsequent protests. However, the mixture of such components differs at different times. The main aim of the protests was to overthrow the Mubarak regime, yet the deterioration in economic conditions, uneven distribution of wealth, spread of corruption, and abuse of power played a major role in the outbreak of the revolution.

Based on the above, I have noted that there are many dimensions to the changes in Egypt: the economy, armed forces, and political regime, as well as the relation between them. These will serve as the theoretical basis of

my argument. I began by expanding and stretching the theoretical frame of understanding to incorporate the changes within the regimes. I found that theories giving "single-factor" explanations are not sufficient for interpreting the ideological transformation of the Islamic movements within the Egyptian state and for answering the study's underlying question of how and why change in the regime led to ideological transformations within the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Salafist Call (SC)? In order to answer this question, I have referred to Michael Mann's theory of social power in order to understand the changes within the Egyptian regime and their impact on the ideological transformation of the Islamic movements.

The Muslim Brotherhood came out of the 25th of January uprising as the largest opposition party, gaining tremendous attention both in Egypt and internationally (Wickham, 2013). It began to reconsider its position, in particular asking whether it should take a risk in the hope of reaping more gains or slow down and pursue a prudent strategy. The economic problems and political instability caused splits within the Muslim Brotherhood, which, exacerbated by the diverse character of the Muslim Brotherhood, were not very homogenous. When a group of youths started calling for change and reform inside the party and subsequently withdrew after their demands were rejected, they began to form other political parties, such as A-Tayyar Al-Mesry, or joined other political movements. In addition, some leaders left the Brotherhood, for example Abdel Moneim Abul Fotouh, Mohamed Habib, and Hamid Al-Defrawi (El Sherif, 2012, January 12).

Nevertheless, the Muslim Brotherhood's attempts to strengthen its power came at the expense of its relationship with the other political and revolutionary forces. It is worth mentioning here that Morsi's attitude towards restructuring the Constituent Assembly and his insistence on supporting Islamist allies created a gap between him and the secular and liberal parties that partially supported him in the second round of the presidential election. Furthermore, the Muslim Brotherhood's brief spell in power was not sufficient to enable it to solve practical problems, such as relieving congestion or reviving the economy. Unable to make ideological concessions for fear of being accused by its supporters of abandoning its principles and ideas, the Muslim Brotherhood was also unable to introduce any real reforms to the agencies and institutions of the state and therefore lost the confidence and support of the revolutionary forces. Over time, it sided with its social and religious base, as is clearly reflected by the issue of the constitution, one of the major disputes with the other political forces

and a milestone on the road to the Muslim Brotherhood 's subsequent loss of power. Elements from the old regime also conspired to make Morsi fail.

The role of the armed forces in Egypt continued after the January 25 revolution. They too were striving to protect their economic interests and showed political ambition. On 12 August 2012, Mohamed Morsi, issued a group of bold and surprising resolutions, ordering the retirement of Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantwai and Chief of Staff General Sami Anan and the cancelation of the complementary constitutional declaration. The importance of these resolutions reflected Morsi's strong desire to put an end to the interim phase and to end the role of the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) (Schmidt, 2013, February 27).

Egypt's ruling power networks were made up of a triangle of the armed forces, the economy, and politics. The MB managed its interests and was influenced by this triangle through strategies and alliances that gave it no assistance in ruling Egypt. This raises the question of what impact the transformations of these three power networks had on the ideological transformations of the MB.

On the other hand, the surprising results achieved by Salafists in the first post-Mubarak parliamentary elections (2011-2012) have raised numerous questions on the nature of these parties, their political program, and their social visions. Furthermore, their electoral performance reflects the existence of a regulatory mechanism within the Salafist groups, although their work at the beginning of the revolution showed some confusion, which was also reflected in the statements made by the Salafis.

After the January 25 revolution and the decision of the Salafis to participate in the parliamentary and the Shura Council elections, despite their former reluctance they were forced to provide details of their vision for the future of Egypt. They had to define the shape of the state and the nature of its governance, describe social life, and move from preaching or religious discourse to developed political thought concerning democracy, or to a combination of the two. The Salafists had problems forming policies on many issues that emerged after the revolution. It faced difficulties in adapting some areas of its ideology for several reasons, but in particular because its huge inheritance of past religious provisions based on religious texts was incompatible with many concepts such as democracy and political pluralism. In addition, a seamless ideological adjustment needed to be made in a short period of time.

The changing political dynamics in Egypt led the SC, including the Al Nour Party, charity and infrastructure networks, to find religious justification for some of the decisions that contradicted some of its political views prior to the military coup of 3 July 2013. The controversial support provided by SC to the army led to an increase in internal divisions. However, even now SC is still attempting to present itself as an alternative to the MB. This, at least for the time being, had the blessing of the state (Youssef and Hashem 2014, May 9). By supporting the actions of the army, the SC hoped to acquire political privileges in the future. This raises the question of how and why changes within the regime's power networks led to an ideological transformation within the SC.

This book aims to explore and examine the effect of the regime's power network on the ideological transformation of the Islamic social movements in Egypt. My book argues that the political structure is only partially able to explain that transformation and "single-factor" explanations alone are not sufficient for its interpretation. My book stretches our analytical framework and expands it to include ideological, economic, military, and political networks. According to Michael Mann's theory of social power, each of these networks "is centered on a different means of organization and social control" (Mann, 1986a, p. 3). Mann's theoretical framework helps to highlight some of the interconnected networks that contributed to changes within the Egyptian regime, as well as to understand the transformations in the regime's power networks that led to the 2011 uprisings. In addition, the book will address how such transformations were the basis of the ideological transformation of the Islamic social movements in Egypt. Besides Mann's theory, the book will use Hakan Yavuz's typology of Islamic social movements (2003) to link between the regime's power network and the ideological transformation of Islamic social movements. Yavuz has developed a typology of Islamic social movements to explain why some Islamist movements became society-centered or state-centered.

This combination between Mann's theory and Yavuz's typology has contributed to the formulation of the hypotheses in this book; surpassing the limitations of the "Inclusion-moderation hypothesis," the research explains that changes undergone by the ISMs are not a result of changing political opportunities alone. Instead, the ideological transformation of ISMs is a product of and response to changes in the interrelationships between the regime's power networks (ideological, economic, military, and political). This combination model explains the structural transformation under which

Islamic movements shift from societal to state-oriented movements or vice versa.

The book compares the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) and Salafi Call (SC). It considers the time span between 1981 and 2013, which is shaped by the rule of Hosni Mubarak until the ousting of the Islamist president Mohamed Morsi on 3 July 2013. This period of time is appropriate to provide an objective view of the transformation of the regime's power network that caused the 2011 uprisings that in turn opened up a political opportunity for Islamic movements. The main question in this analysis asks how changes within the regime's power networks affected the ideological transformation of Islamic movements in Egypt. The aim of comparison between the MB and SC is to identify differences and similarities and to understand the factors behind them. This leads to questions on three levels. The first explains the structural transformation under which Islamic movements are transformed from societal to state-oriented movements, which in itself raises the following sub-questions: What is the role of the armed forces in politics and the economy? How did the decline of the old regime open up "interstices" or gaps for new social forces such as SC to emerge? Did the Mubarak regime have an ideological power network, and, if so, what was the nature of this network? Was it secular? Was it anti-religious?

The second level represents the link between structure level and explanation of ideological transformation of ISMs. The questions are the following: How and why did the fragmentation of the power networks provide a motivation for the Islamic movement to turn into to state-oriented movements? How are ISMs able to access the state structure? How did the MB and SC gain greater power within the political network?

The last level explains the ideological transformations of ISMs and produces the following question: How do changes in the power networks of regimes facilitate or restrict the trajectory of development of Islamic movements in terms of their ideology, goals and political strategy? This raises the following sub-questions: What is the ideological transformation of ISMs towards civil state, women, and minorities such as Copts? How did MB and SC deal with the following: State repression, alliances with other movements, state institutions? How and why did changes within the regime's power networks lead to an ideological split within MB and SC? How does the SC seek to justify its political participation based on core Islamic values?

Three main arguments recur and are validated throughout the book. First, the changes undergone by the ISMs are not a result of changing political opportunities alone. Instead, the ideological transformation of ISMs is a product of and response to changes in the interrelationship between the regime's power networks (ideological, economic, military, and political networks). After the outbreak of protests in January 2011, the capacity of Mubarak's regime to maintain control over the political network declined. When the Mubarak regime collapsed, the Egyptian military was the most powerful force and was able to take over after the revolution. It was in fact the main driver of the new political system.

Second is the Brotherhood remained oriented towards the state but the decline of the power networks of the old regime led to changes in the MB's strategy for gaining control over the power networks from accommodation to confrontation, the MB sought to enlarge its access to political power, but the Egyptian military weakened the MB's dominance over the political and economic networks. While The decline of the power networks of the old regime led to a change in the SC from a society-oriented to a state-oriented movement. And led to a change in the SC strategy for gaining control over the power networks from withdrawal from political life to accommodating or participating in politics. the decline of old political power that led the SC to develop from a movement that avoided dealing with the dominant power networks (in the Hosni Mubarak era) to one that was interested in cooperating with them.

Third, while the dominance of conservatives in the Brotherhood's post-revolutionary leadership contributed to the rapprochement with the Salafists. The decline of power networks in the old regime led to the emergence of political positions within the SC that observed regulatory interests and neglected democratic standards, citizenship, and equality between men and women.

 The study mostly uses primary sources (original texts, interviews, face-to-face and telephone interviews, audio-visual lectures, and TV talk shows) to investigate the ideas of the MB and SC and works with original texts, most of which are in Arabic. A large number of ideas, information, and situations furthermore originate from TV dialogues and programs in the form of questions and answers.

This book endeavors to become a part of the academic contributions towards understanding the ideologies of Islamic movements, both before and after the transformations brought about by the Arab Spring.

Furthermore, it aims to contribute to an understanding of the ideological transformations of Islamic movements within Egypt, particularly following the protests of 25 January 2011. Although the MB and the SC are Egyptian movements, their ideologies reach far beyond Egyptian borders. The book aims to enrich the academic field by:

1. Contributing to the study of Islamic movements as social movements, and identifying their prevalent ideologies, through which the process of recruitment and mobilization, as well as the framing of democratic issues, civil society, and governance visions are carried out. This is a continuation of the study of Islamic movements as social movements that was reflected in the writings of many scholars, such as (Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Gamson & Meyer, 1996; Ibrahim, 2002; Goldstone, 2003; Koopmans, 2004; Hafez & Wiktorowicz, 2004; Meyer, 2004; Della Porta & Diani, 2006; Tarrow; 2011).

2. Paving the way for studying non-jihadist Salafist movements, as it is critical to comprehend these movements and to decipher their ideologies. The book attempts to study a particular type of Salafism as a social movement – the Salafist Call, whose orientations are contradictory to those of more traditional Islamic movements such as the Muslim brotherhood; it also differs from the jihadist Salafis.

3. Comparing the two major Islamic movements in Egypt, stressing the significance of comparison between Islamic movements as a means to understanding their differences and to avoid addressing them as if they shared one unified ideology.

4. Attempting to widen the research framework for studying the impact of shifts in the political structure on Islamic movements to include economic and military factors.

This book consists of an integrated five-chapter plan, including the introduction and conclusion. The first chapter discusses the factors and key terms employed in this book; these factors are the main foundations on which the thesis is designed. They are based on Michael Mann's theory of social power. The book focuses on the definition of the four sources and their clarification in abstract ways so that they serve as effective tools in the dialectical theory I am seeking to prove. My assumption is that the ideological transformations of the Islamist movements were the result of a change in the four sources of social power. However, I have found that

SMT does not sufficiently explain ideological transformation in the Egyptian case and therefore does not sufficiently answer the study questions.

The aim was not only to define each source of the four sources of social power but also to address the dynamics of the relationship among them, applying what is known as the IEMP model (ideological, economic, military, and political), and the gaps that result from this relationship, which Mann calls "interstitial emergence." This is the point of convergence with SMT theory. the chapter will use Hakan Yavuz's typology of Islamic social movements to link between the regime's power network and the ideological transformation of Islamic social movements to explain why some Islamist movements became society-centered or state-centered.

The second chapter discusses the changes within the Egyptian regime under Mubarak's rule from 1981 until early 2011. It focuses on three interrelated aspects; the first aspect tracks the historical evolution and the power networks of the regime of Hosni Mubarak. It also explores the time before that when Mubarak inherited the regime from his predecessors Mohammad Anwar Alsadat and Gamal Abdul Naser. Mubarak worked on promoting new networks of power to prolong and strengthen the grip of his regime. The chapter therefore also describes the transitions between power networks that took place under his regime, and how relationships were formed between them, especially the military and the economy. Finally, it shows how the regime used its political power to protect the economic interests of the military.

The second aspect discusses the sources of social power separately. It addresses the question of whether there was an ideology for the state and studies the economic aspect in Mubarak's regime, the transformations that took place in the regime, the status of the military in the state, and its relationship with politics and the economy. The third aspect involves reviewing the gaps that emerged in the power networks, leading to the January 25 revolution. The focus is on those gaps in the power networks from which the MB and SC benefited by being able to increase their influence on the new regime.

The third chapter will discuss the MB, four aspects of which in particular. The first is the goals it pursued during Mubarak's rule and how it sought to achieve these goals in the context of the POS and power network transformations. This involves focusing on the MB's interaction with

Mubarak's regime, and the transformations taking place throughout his time in power. The second aspect focuses on the MB in the post-Mubarak period and the ideological transformations at that time. The MB developed its ideology to reach the parliament, the Shura council, the presidency, and it issued the 2012 constitution, taking advantage of gaps in the power networks to gain power. The third aspect is the period of Morsi's rule, his accession and control of political power, how the relationship between political power and other sources of social power was managed, and finally, the flaw in this relationship which led to his removal. It will additionally address the ideological transformations in the Brotherhood in the period of Morsi's rule, in particular examining the 2012 constitution and how the Brotherhood addressed many issues, such as women, minorities, human rights, citizenship, liberal and secular parties, and the civil state.

The fourth chapter is dedicated to the Salafi Call movement, exploring three interrelated aspects in particular. The first aspect is its regulatory structure and its ideological positions under the Mubarak regime on many issues such as democracy, political parties, political participation, Copts, and the perception of the ruler. The second aspect is the ideological transitions that occurred after Mubarak, the impact of these transitions on the splits within the movement, and the disengagement of the rest of the Salafists from their alliance. The third aspect is its mechanisms for dealing with power networks and the ideology it established to do so, especially the justification it put forward while transitioning from the alliance with the Brotherhood to the alliance with the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF).

The fifth and final chapter compares the MB and SC before and after Mubarak's rule, using cross-case analysis techniques including case-ordered effects and causal networks in four main areas. First, it examines the transitions and ideological perceptions of many issues such as democracy, citizenship, minorities' rights, women's rights, and the role of Islamic law in politics and the state. Second, it explores the ability of these movements to accept the ideas of others and to not impose a specific pattern on individuals, especially regarding cultural issues and values. Third, it compares the way the two movements deal with the sources of social power, especially the military and political power. Fourth, it discusses the relationship between the MB and SC. The aim of this comparison is to identify differences and similarities and understand the factors behind them.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: POLITICAL OPPORTUNITY STRUCTURE, POWER NETWORKS, AND A TYPOLOGY OF ISLAMIC SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

1. Political Opportunity Structure (POS)

The concept of political opportunity structure (POS) is central to studies of SMs and to contentious politics in general. Theories of POS have been developed primarily to understand SMs, but the idea that dynamic changes in state weakness or political opportunities can encourage mobilization also has clear relevance for the risk of civil war (Gleditsch and Ruggeri, 2010). Many researchers have benefited from the process of linking the concept of the social movement to the POS, whereby the POS has become a good tool for monitoring, analyzing, and understanding the internal structure and dynamics of SMs (Tilly, 1978, pp.98–142; McAdam et al., 1996; Tarrow, 1998).

The POS approach is a political process approach which "stresses the crucial importance of expanding political opportunities as the ultimate spur to collective action" (McAdam, McCarthy, & Zald, 1996, 1996, p.7) and pays "systematic attention to the political and institutional environment in which SMs operate" (Della Porta & Diani, 2006, p.16). It involves analyzing the POS constraints under which movement actors seek to acquire and allocate resources for collective action and the constraints on the political environment that help shape intramovement considerations and transformation of social movements' ideologies (Hafez, & Wiktorowicz, 2004, pp.65–66). In this sense, political opportunity is the mediator between the social forces and political change in societies.

The POS theories tend to highlight the role of specific changes or events that may provide windows of opportunity for protesters to achieve

collective action or capitalize on weaknesses or gaps on the regime side (Meyer, 2004; Tarrow, 1994). For Robinson (2004), the opportunity "must show how specific changes in the external environment led to specific changes in the opportunities available to the SMs" (p.123). Scholars using the POS approach recognize that other factors, such as resources, identities, framing, organizational forms, networks, and tactics affect SMs (McAdam et al., 1996, Tarrow, 1998, Della Porta, & Diani, 2006).

Sidney Tarrow (2011) argues that informal networks facilitate the work of SMs, especially in the context of state repression. She says: "Informal associational networks provide a space for movement organization that is outside of the political arena and therefore cannot be infiltrated by a state's repressive forces with the aim of lessening the impact of the movement's message. In highly authoritarian contexts, informal associations are necessary for covert movement organization" (p. 17). But in other cases, the state's increased reliance on the "channeling" of protest may have produced both a decline in repression means and a shift on the part of protesters to quieter forms of contention (ibid., p.174). Gamson and Meyer (1996) discuss how the dynamic aspects of political opportunity fluctuate over time. They include public policies and elite instability that affect a specific movement's emergence and decline. For them, the institutional and dynamic aspects of political opportunity should be emphasized in the shifting political context in which SMs struggle rather than in the internal dynamics of movements.

Some POS writers emphasize the mobilization of resources that are external to SMs. In addition, they postulate that factors may vary depending on the level of analysis and emphasize mechanisms in the immediate environment that trigger mobilization. McAdam identifies four dimensions of political opportunity: The relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system; the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity; the presence or absence of elite allies; and the state's capacity and propensity for repression (1996, p.27). Sidney Tarrow agrees with McAdam, determining visible POS factors as the following:

1. Opening of access to participation for new actors;
2. Availability of influential allies;
3. Emerging splits within the elite; and
4. Evidence of political realignment within the polity (2011, pp.163–165).

This theory is distinguished by adopting several levels of analysis. It shares the interests of the theory of resource mobilization, in addition to its interest in the organizational aspect of SMs, which should be – according to this theory – organized to affect the construction of power. It also has an interest in the cultural facet, which can be a uniting point among the different SMs, thus creating common goals that everyone seeks to achieve. In addition, it studies the structure of society interactively, from two perspectives: First, political opportunities "influence the choice of protest strategies and the impact of SMs on their environments" (Kitschelt, 1986, p.58). Second, the concept of political opportunity deals with opportunities that are derived from interaction between SMs and political actors or institutions (Koopmans, 2004, p.65). According to SMs scholars, SMs can generate their own opportunity (Jenkins and Klandermans, 1995, p.4; Tarrow, 1998, p.72).

Key areas of concern regarding political opportunity include the level of state repression, which depends on the opportunity available to the opponents to change the structure of power and the opportunities for mobilization to take on particular forms (McAdam, 1996, p.23). In other words, political opportunity can be found in SMs that use their resources, capabilities, and societal conditions to make a change.

Some scholars stress the open/closed understanding of the POS; they consider state structures to be either "open" or "closed". Eisinger (1973, p.15) writes that protest is most likely "in systems characterized by a mix of open and closed factors." In an open POS, collective action is likely to result in change and will incur few negative costs, because of the easy availability of influence through formal channels, thereby increasing an individual's incentive to identify with a collective entity (Tarrow, 1994, p.17).

A closed POS, however, limits the movement's ability to organize itself in formal spaces. Closed systems are more likely to push actors outside formal channels and onto the streets into informal networks, increasing levels and degrees of unconventional political action. Although the existence of informal networks may act as alternative spaces for mobilizing support, the movement will encounter many more obstacles than in an open POS (ibid.). Some researchers have argued that the use of coercion reduces protest participation by increasing its costs. Others propose that coercive methods increase the costs associated with protest, leading to the radicalization of individuals and, thus, increasing the amount and severity of protests (Opp and Roehl 1990, p.523). Other

writers meanwhile argue that the relationship between protests and POS is not linear but curvilinear; it is neither full access nor its absence that produces the greatest degree of protest (Eisinger, 1973, Lichbach & Gurr, 1981; Francisco, 1995).

The concept of POS was developed in order to explain the "when" of social movement mobilization, identifying the conditions that facilitate or account for mobilization. It also explains the "how" of social movement action; and "why" collective actions and protests occur and under which conditions (Tarrow, 1994, p.83; Kitschelt, 1986). However, some SM scholars argue that the POS is insufficient to explain and understand the ideological transformation of ISMs. They argue that ISMs are a product of and response to socio-economic transformation (Ibrahim, 2002). As Koopmans and Statham (2000) and Huntington (1993) point out, non-political external constraints that SMs face should be treated as social, cultural, economic, and geographic opportunities, which include discursive opportunities.

Political opportunity structure is only partially able to explain the ideological transformation of ISMs in Egypt. POS theories need to be stretched and expanded to explain the changes of non-political external factors such as ideology, the economy, and the military. Michael Mann's theory of social power is therefore incorporated in the theoretical framework in order to better grasp the changes within the Egyptian regimes and to understand how such changes affect the ideological transformation of ISMs. I claim that POS does not sufficiently explain the ideological transformation of ISMs in Egypt and therefore does not sufficiently answer the questions of this study.

2. Michael Mann's Theoretical Work: Four Sources of Social Power

The main model of power, according to Mann, is that with four sources of social power: Ideological, military, economic, and political power. Each of these sources is centered on a different means of organization and social control (Mann, 1986a, p.3). Mann's overview of the four sources of social power (also referred to as the IEMP model of organized power) is as follows: "A general account of societies, their structure, and their history can best be given in terms of the interrelations of what I call the four sources of social power: ideological, economic, military, and political (IEMP) relationships." He describes these four sources as "overlapping

networks of social interaction" and "organizations, institutional means of attaining human goals" (ibid., 2). Each has always presupposed the existence of the others. However, that does not mean that the networks are usually equal in their importance; one or two are usually more dominant than the others. The four networks can fuse and borrow from each other in complex ways. One kind of organizational power can be turned into any of the others, and the way the four power networks is interrelated varies from time to time and from one place to another. My assumption was that this would be a powerful theory for comparing Islamic movements in Egypt. Mann (1986a) suggests that "Pressures toward institutionalization tend to partially merge [the four major sources of social power] in turn into one or more dominant power networks" (p. 30).

The four sources of social power offer an alternative approach to understanding the changes in Egypt and their impact on how Islamic movements achieve their goals. Briefly, Mann explains the four components as follows:

1. He defines the ideology network in terms of those organizations concerned with meaning, norms, and ritual practice (ibid., p.22).

2. The economic network is the set of institutions concerned with satisfying material needs through the "extraction, transformation, distribution and consumption of the objects of nature" (ibid., p. 24).

3. There are four historical reasons for distinguishing between political and military powers. First, "military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized." Second, most historical states have not controlled all military forces. Third, sometimes the military declares war regardless of the decision of the state. Fourth, "political power structuring" is determined by military power (ibid., p.11).

4. The fourth and final network, "the state," is defined as a political network whose primary function is territorial regulation (ibid., pp.26–27).

2.1 Ideological Power

The organization of Mann's ideological power comes in two forms: Socio-spatially transcendent power and immanent morale (1986a, p.23). Socio-spatially transcendent power covers a larger territory in a diffuse manner

and transcends the existing institutions of ideological, economic, military, and political power, dealing with the sacred rather than the secular. It develops a powerful autonomy. In other words, any collapse in one of the other power organizations impacts on the transcendent ideological system and does not necessarily result in its own collapse (ibid.).

In contrast, immanent morale serves to intensify power. Immanent ideological power refers to the solidarity or morale of a specific social group and codifies its position within a society. Immanent ideology is less dramatically autonomous in its impact, and is usually extensive and diffuse1 (ibid., pp.23–24).

Mann (1986a) discusses the extension of social identity, relying on the capacity of ideological power to transcend existing social structures by extending social identity across the genders, classes, and either across state boundaries or in their interstices to become far more extensive, diffuse, and potentially universal (p. 364). This is achieved through the following three main areas of experience: "[T]he fundamental questions of existence", interpersonal ethics, norms and morality, and the family and life cycle that expand collective power and mutualism (ibid.; Jacoby, 2004, p.61). According to Jacoby (ibid.), the inherent transcendency of ideological power could, in other words, be immanently employed to mobilize support for new or established social structures (p. 61). When ideology is able to transcend and establish new social structures, it has the capacity to supersede existing structures. It depends on immanently mobilized support for these structures to avoid dedicating absolute meaning outside the existing economic, military, and political structures (ibid.).

Jack Snyder (2006) discusses how some ideologies generate a jump in social power that allows them to expand their control over the land and people. He puts forward a key set of mechanisms to explain how ideologies help to increase the effectiveness of the mobilization of power

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[1] Tim Jacoby (2004) argues that the control of literacy is imperative in order to have significant ideological influence, to provide civil society with an infrastructure that is universalist, and to increase the decentralized and egalitarian ideological power network (p. 61). This enables messages to be spread without deviation from the original form. Mann says: "This was the two-step infrastructure of literacy that supported the extension of ideological power that now occurred", whereby written messages were carried by individuals within each locality and thence transmitted downward by oral means (1986a, p.364).

in the social network. There is a range of mechanisms that help to explain how to become an effective ideological power.

The first of these mechanisms and basic elements is the organizational capacity of the potential for the emergence of such a network. This depends on the available infrastructure, such as the means of communication, schools, houses of worship, and religious institutions subject to the system. Ideas need a means to facilitate them and spread their control over the land and people (ibid., p.310). The second element is the presence of "suppliers of ideology" suitable for the power networks (ibid.). Mann insists that ideological power is much more than just a matter of manipulating emotions and supporters with money. It is important that suppliers of ideology are able to provide an ideology and meanings that play a major role in the stories of the society in which they resonate (ibid.). The third element is the demand for ideas and ideologies by large social groups, benefiting (ibid.), according to Mann (1993), from the emotions generated by local and family relations, hence creating more extensive and more expanded networks (p. 227). The fourth element is dynamic competition with positive feedback from the three elements mentioned above; this consolidates the grip of ideological power and expands its scope, making it more effective in the organization of collective action than its competitors and attracting positive institutional, discursive, and behavioral feedback (Snyder 2006, p.321).

2.2 Economic Power

Economic power for Mann is particularly powerful because it combines intensive and extensive power, as well as authoritative and diffused power (Mann, 1993, p. 7). As already outlined, these two distinctions provide four ideal-typical forms of organizational reach. He confirms that the "most effective organization would encompass all four forms of reach" (Mann, 1986a, p.8). Extensive powers are gained through the distribution, exchange, and consumption of goods (Mann, 1993, p.7). Mann argues that the exchange may occur extensively; in this case, when opportunities are open, exchange may encounter influences beyond its capacity (1986a, p.25). Intensive power is seen as everyday labor cooperation with an extensive circuit including distribution, exchange, and consumption (Mann, 1993, p.7).

It is important to talk about the relationship between economic power and other sources of social power. Mann approached this matter by defining three economic terms: Classes, social stratification, and ruling class. He

confirms that his definition of "class" denotes a purely economic power grouping, and he distinguishes between "social stratification", which includes any type of distribution of power, and the term "ruling class", which denotes "an economic class that has successfully monopolized other power sources to dominate a state-centered society at large" (Mann, 1986a, p.25). According to Tim Jacoby (2004), Mann argues that the classes do not emerge as "pure" features of modernity, but that they are divided by other networks of social interaction, both from within the relations of production and through the influence of non-economic forces (p. 94).

Mann distinguishes four phases in class struggles and the development of class relations: Latent, extensive, symmetrical, and political class structures (Mann, 1986a, 24; Mann, 1993, p.8).

1. Latent: This level does not reach any very pronounced organizational form because it coexists alongside other power organizations; these other organizations include familial, clientelist, tribal, local, and other relations. These are characteristic of the earliest civilizations and have continued to exist to the present day (Mann, 1986a, p.216).

2. Extensive: "They exist where vertical class relations predominate in the social space in question as against horizontal organizations" (Mann, 1986a, p.216). There are two types of extensive class organization: "Unidimensional", if there is one predominant mode of production, distribution, and exchange; or "multidimensional", when there is more than one mode (ibid., p.217).

3. Symmetrical: This is when extensive classes possess similar organization structures (ibid.).

4. Political: When class is organized for the political transformation of the state or the political defense of the status quo, the political organization can be symmetrical or asymmetrical. It is symmetrical when extensive classes possess similar organization structures and asymmetrical when only one class (usually the ruling class) is politically organized (ibid.). In my research I will therefore focus on this phase because of its relationship to economic power.

2.3 Military Power

In the context of a relationship between military power and the state, Mann rejects two reductionist theories. He disputes the argument that the militaristic state is supreme over the economic and ideological structures. In other words, he rejects the state as a physical force and as the prime mover in society, as purported by Germanic writers such as Gumplowicz (1899), Ratzenhofer, and Schmitt (Mann, 1986b, p.110). He also criticizes the second reductionist theory that portrays the state as an arena in which military force is mobilized domestically and used domestically and internationally; it merely represents the physical force in society. The state is not an arena where domestic economic/ideological issues are resolved (ibid., p.111).

Mann uses organizational form to identify military power, defining it as follows: "It derives from the necessity of organized physical defense and its usefulness for aggression. It has both intensive and extensive aspects, for it concerns questions of life and death, as well as the organization of defense and offense in large geographical and social spaces. Those who monopolize it, as military elites, can obtain collective and distributive power." (Mann, 1986a, pp. 25–26)

Mann distinguishes the political powers from the military powers in the state. He justifies this separation with the following four eventualities:

1. The historical context played a role in some European countries in the Middle Ages and in Islamic states. Mann notes that most of these states did not possess a monopoly on the organized military. It is useful to analyze political powers characterized by centralized, institutionalized, territorial regulation, while "military powers are of organized physical force wherever they are organized" (Mann, 1986a, p.11).

2. Conquests are made by military groups that may be independent of their home states, and when such a military group conquers, its power increases in relation to its own state; Mann gives many examples, such as military groups in many feudal cases and the barbarians (ibid.).

3. Although military organization is usually under state control and is separate from state agencies, historically the military has often overthrown the state political elite in a coup (ibid.).

4. In the context of international relations, when the relations between states are peaceful but stratified, Mann refers to the "political power structuring" of the wider international society that is not determined by military power; he cites the examples of Japan and former West Germany, both powerful states but largely demilitarized (ibid.).

Mann sees most of the internal developments in military organization during the nineteenth century as an example of the institutional autonomy of the military from elements of civil society and state control (Mann, 1993, p.439). To achieve this autonomy, military organization had two functions; the primary function was war, in which the military and the state collaborated with regard to foreign policy and with industrial capitalists, and the military was independent from mass political parties and public opinion (ibid.). The second function was the military as entwined with society and the state, embedded in broader political power networks and dominant economic classes. In this case Mann suggests that the military represented the interests of the dominant classes in society, which led to domestic repression (ibid., pp.439–440). According to Mann, the two functions result in "a dualism within the military crystallization": "[B]ureaucratization, professionalization, military-industrial technology, old regime domination of high command and diplomacy, and insulation of military and diplomatic decision making had recreated an autonomy of military power." This means that military power had power over all other state structures and over military power that its formal incorporation into the state merely masked." (ibid.)

From a wider perspective, Mann argues that domestic militarism has an important role in contextual diversity in contemporary state societies. Militarism blends with the forces of capitalism and social representation, resulting in four variations: Autocratic militarism, capitalist–liberal militarism, liberal reformist incorporation, and semi-authoritarian militarism.

An example of the first variation, *autocratic militarism*, was in Tsarist Russia, where the policies adopted by the rulers were marked by inequality between citizens; they suppressed workers and polarized class. At the same time, the regime's forces enforced strike bans and discrimination; the state elites were interested in economic issues and collaborated with security forces (Jacoby, 2004, p.221). According to Mann (1993), this period "aimed at a state that brought a highly centralized and politicized exploitation into almost every aspect of life" (p. 662). As a result, the