Perspectives on Synchronicity, Inspiration, and the Soul

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By

Rico Sneller

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This book is dedicated to the memory of Carl du Prel (1839-1899)
and Ludwig Klages (1872-1956).

"Bodies which either possessed a malleable (fluid, supple) condition or adopted it after a violent collision, can proceed from being merely next-to-each-other to being into-each-other.
—Paul Kammerer[1]

"It has been a long time since philosophers have read men's souls. It is not their task, we are told. Perhaps. But we must not be surprised if they no longer matter much to us."
—Cioran[2]

"the Sun and the Moon began to move [*se movimentar*], and the volcanoes began to move [*se movimentar*] tearing the womb of fear [*o ventre do medo*] (deep inside myself [*no fundo ... eu mesma*]); from the fire, men were born and from the sea enormous pieces of female bodies appeared, covered in gelatine, making themselves, composing themselves: it was disturbing. I even lost my sense of balance and could see nothing; everything was movement [*movimento*], and I was afraid [*tive medo*] to fall backwards [*de cair para trás*] like the world…"
—Lygia Clark[3]

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[1] "Zum Ineinander statt bloßen Aneinanders kommt es bei Körpern, die einen plastischen (flüssigen, weichen) Zustand entweder besaßen oder bei heftigem Zusammenstoß annahmen." Paul Kammerer (1919). *Das Gesetz der Serie. Eine Lehre von den Wiederholungen im Lebens- und im Weltgeschehen*. Stuttgart und Berlin: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 1919, p. 410; my trans.

[2] "Il y a longtemps que les philosophes ne lisent plus dans les âmes. Ce n'est plus leur métier, dira-t-on. C'est possible. Mais aussi qu'on ne s'étonne pas s'ils ne nous importent guère." Cioran (1973) De l'inconvénient d'être né. In E.M. Cioran (1995). *Œuvres*. Paris: Gallimard, p. 1294; trans. Richard Howard (2011). *The Trouble with Being Born*. New York: Seaver Books.

[3] Lygia Clark & Hélio Oiticica (1998). *Cartas 1964-1974*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora UFRJ, p. 247; trans. Sergio Fernandez and Jeff Lloyd.

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INTRODUCTION

Worldviews

Our times show a remarkable tension. On the one hand, a scientific, largely materialist worldview, seems to impose itself with vigour. Especially in the so-called post-truth era, rife with 'fake news,' politicians and journalists insist on the need to provide reliable, scientifically tested evidence for any 'fact' one wishes to come up with. On the other hand, new forms of spirituality are embraced by always more people. Whether this is due to the increasingly experienced emptiness inherent to consumerist societies, or to globalisation processes which may illuminate the darker, nihilistic sides of Western civilisation, cannot be decided here. Probably both are the case.

The tension or anachronicity between scientific and spiritual worldviews, being already striking in itself, becomes even more complicated when we realise that there is no such thing as a single scientific worldview. Since its inception in the 16th and 17th centuries in Europe, scientific research has distributed itself over a variety of disciplines, every single one of those inclined to pursue its own, topical, if not idiomatic worldview. How would these not differ amongst themselves, and in their individual successive stages? Whereas contemporary biomedical and neurological research tends to develop materialist accounts of human nature (not to mention other life forms, or even reality as a whole), quantum physics seems to be more susceptible to immaterialist or spiritual interpretations; this is understandable since the very point and purpose of quantum physics is to question the hitherto assumed stable nature of the first particle ('atom'). Arthur Koestler writes that "[t]he mechanistic universe gradually disintegrated, but the mechanistic notion of causality survived until Heisenberg's indeterminacy principle proved its untenability. Today we know that on the sub-atomic level the fate of an electron or a whole atom is not determined by its past. *But this discovery has not led to any basically new departure in the philosophy of nature*, only to a state of bewildered embarrassment, a further retreat of physics into a language of even more abstract symbolism."[1] The

[1] Also see Arthur Koestler (2014, 1959). *The Sleepwalkers. A History of Man's Changing Vision of the Universe*. London: Penguin Books, p. 505; my italics. Also see Dean Radin (2009/2006). *Entangled Minds: Extrasensory Experiences in a*

abstract level of theorising in quantum mechanics hardly allows intellectuals of other disciplines who are unfamiliar with doing experimental research in a laboratory setting, to assess if the defended physical models extend the mere didactical use and have ontological value.

This picture is further complicated by the fact that scientific *worldviews* are often rather prompted by popularising scientists and their audience than by scientific theorists and researchers themselves. The latter may be more prone to persevering in an inquisitive approach of nature than to pretending to offer a conclusive representation of it. They know that paradigms can shift over time and that the theoretical framework within which they are working could be overtaken tomorrow by another, that does more justice to unruly empirical evidence. The upshot of this is an intensifying clash between a plurality of approaches, the simplified forms of which regularly prevail, and contribute to the above-mentioned current anachronistic tension. Let us say, for the sake of clarity, that 'spiritualistic' accounts challenge 'materialist' accounts of human nature and, accordingly, of reality.

As it is not my aim in this book to analyse sociological issues, I will only briefly mention here the following aspects that further confuse perplexed intellectuals who try to makes sense of their own time. For one thing, power games and strategic behaviour play a role in the debate on the nature of human being, of life as a whole, and the universe. Those who control the media (politicians, opinion-makers, news presenters) have an interest in promoting the worldviews that 'support' their own political or social views. Their input in the debate is regularly negligent of the uncertainties related to the opinions they wish to defend, let alone that they can reflect on the premises and mindset upholding these views. For another thing, people's ideas and beliefs are not necessarily pure; on closer, psychoanalytical inspection, they might (though they need not) represent strategies for dealing with inner turmoil (anxiety, feelings of guilt). The more emphatically people insist on their worldview, the more it becomes probable that this worldview is primarily promoted to conceal this turmoil.

These issues harm any attempt to further debates on human nature and the existence of the human psyche or soul. When in the present book, I will be

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Quantum Reality. New York: Paraview; David Bohm (1980). *Wholeness and Implicate Order*. London/New York: Routledge; Chr. McMillan, R. Main & D. Henderson, Eds. (2020). *Holism. Possibilities and Problems*. London/New York: Routledge.

taking a stance in those debates, I cannot always avoid the intricacies mentioned above. Self-reflection, and clarity about my position, will hopefully reduce simplifications to an acceptable level. The position I want to defend here is outspokenly anti-materialist. I want to make a case for the notions of the 'psyche' or the 'soul,' in other words, for a widely embracing conception of consciousness. Though my pretensions are more modest than his, I feel very comfortable with the subtitle and dedication of a book written by the 19th-century philosopher Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1796-1876, son of Johann Gottlieb Fichte) on human nature: *Anthropologie. Die Lehre von der menschlichen Seele. Begründet auf naturwissenschaftlichem Wege für Naturforscher, Seelenärzte und wissenschaftlich Gebildete überhaupt*[2] (trans.: Anthropology. The Doctrine of the Human Soul. Grounded on a Scientific Way, for Natural Scientists, Psychologists and Academically Trained People as Such). I hope that what can be gleaned in my book makes sense to the categories of people mentioned here: *Naturforscher, Seelenärzte* and *wissenschaftlich Gebildete überhaupt*. Unfortunately, an English translation of these German job descriptions hardly renders what it should provide. It almost collapses under the weight of modern Anglophone academia jargon (in which the English noun 'scientist' *already* designates someone who strictly obeys the most rigid empiricist doctrine of testing and experimenting in a laboratory setting). A *Naturforscher*, rather than a modern day natural scientist or naturalist – *fathoms* the depth of nature, at the risk of succumbing to it. A *Seelenarzt* is not so much a psychologist as a doctor of the soul: someone who takes the *depth* of the soul phenomenon seriously, which makes any (objectifying) *science* of it problematic. A *wissenschaftlich Gebildeter* is not someone trained in 'doing science,' but someone to whom their study of the sciences (including the humanities) has led to *Bildung* ('all-round formation'); their 'science' will preferably consist of 'knowledge'. The *Naturforscher, Seelenärzte* and *wissenschaftlich Gebildete überhaupt* represent what I would call 'metaphysicians'. In chapter 3, I will define 'metaphysician' as someone who feels challenged and encouraged by *synthesis*, even if that synthesis is only part of an as yet unaccomplished Reality which is always, apparently, on the verge of becoming. I will suggest that a metaphysician is susceptible to 'ecstasy'; that is, to 'being under the sway of provisional synthesis' and fuelled by *das Ahnungshafte* (Max Picard).

Going even further, I am tempted to follow the injunction of the 20th century Bengali 'natural scientist' Jagadish Chandra Bose (1858-1937). Bose was famous for his invention of the crescograph (a device to observe plant

[2] I.H. Fichte (1876/1860). Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus.

growth) and of wireless telegraphy. He pleaded for combining scientific research with spirituality and self-reflection. When opening his research institute, the Bose laboratory, he overtly called it both a laboratory *and* a temple.[3] A parallel view is held by the French philosopher Simone Weil (1909-1943), who goes as far as claiming that scientific research is but one form of religious contemplation. For this claim, Weil relies on Greek Antiquity, where, she says, the same approach was followed.[4] The argument Weil gives for associating science and religion is that the "blind impartiality of inert matter" and the "inexorable regularity of the world order" can be rightfully "proposed to the human soul as a model of perfection" and teach it "the virtue of patience". (Weil, 1999, p. 1192f.; my trans.)

I am fully aware that an extension of academic training today – even beyond all-round formation in liberal arts (*Bildung*) – towards a proper spiritual or contemplative attitude would go much too fast for a great many scholars. "Science would never confide in a spiritual automatism triggered by meditation or exercises," Hermann Friedmann asserts, "but, as it knows that thinking all too easily leads to automatic deviations, it will constantly check their logical admissibility and empirical correctness."[5] Still, in the course of this book, the compelling character of projects like Bose's or Weil's will perhaps be mitigated. For such projects to make sense at all, especially for Western readers, it will be indispensable to consider that which is usually neglected in any scientific training, and which forms the central theme of this book: the soul or consciousness at large.

The asynchronicity of contemporary worldviews just mentioned (roughly speaking, materialist and spiritualist) does not necessarily create a barrier for addressing the question of the soul as something properly human. What would create a barrier, though, is a twofold threat.

On the one hand, this threat consists of a fervently imposed materialism, that claims more certainty than it can account for. Such materialism would prematurely mute any critique against its premises. Koestler writes that "since the space-time framework, the concepts of matter and causality as understood both by classical physics and by commonsense experience, have

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[3] Mukherji, Visvapriya (1983). *Jagadis Chandra Bose*. Publications Division, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Govt. of India, Ch. X.

[4] Simone Weil (1999). l'Enracinement. In *Oeuvres*, Paris: Gallimard, p. 1192.

[5] Hermann Friedmann (1930/1925). *Die Welt der Formen. System eines morphologischen Idealismus*. München: C.H. Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, p. 23; my trans.

been abandoned by modern physics, there seems to be no justification in refusing to investigate empirical phenomena because they do not fit into that already abandoned philosophy." (Koestler, 2014, p. 505)

But the other threat would be a naïve spiritualism, that lacks philosophical depth and reflective profundity. Such spiritualism would precipitately throw away the intellectual arms it could have used in responding to reductive materialism. If I am siding with spiritualism, this does not imply a surrender of thinking to the immediacy of feeling. Yet, one of the most pressing problems I am dealing with in this book is that the discursive strategy (which I cannot avoid using) risks distorting what it wants to address. As writing poetry or just quoting mystical texts minimises the impact I would like to have on contemporary *Naturforscher, Seelenärzte* and *wissenschaftlich Gebildete überhaupt*, I will continue to set up a philosophical argument while trying to reduce its 'objectifying,' 'representationalist' pretensions.

Philosophical Company

In this book, I will often resort to several unjustly forgotten philosophers. They account for a wholly new approach that would, if it were accepted, bring about a complete paradigm shift. Beyond my first and foremost aim – to make a case for the soul, or consciousness more broadly conceived –, I also intend to present those forgotten philosophers to an anglophone audience. Neglecting what they have to say only aggravates the self-fulfilling prophecy of a (simplified) empiricist scientific paradigm, and enhances the intellectual predicament of contemporary spiritual needs. Philosophy, I believe, cannot be compared to mere continuous and incremental self-correction; each thinker has fathomed Being in their distinctive way and cannot be reduced to preparatory services offered to the alleged 'broader' look of their successors. On the contrary, past or forgotten philosophers may have unjustly suffered from social pressure or power games which have nothing to do with philosophy itself – except that several contemporary philosophers have a hard time *analysing* and *unmasking* such mechanisms.

Despite the oblivion in which many thinkers explored in this book have fallen, numerous developments in contemporary art and philosophy, as well as in particular scientific disciplines (theoretical physics, innovation sciences, industrial engineering, parapsychology, etc.), seem to confirm some of their theses. Ludwig Klages (1872-1956) or Hermann Friedmann (1873-1957), for example, advocated a correction of a one-sided 'haptic' mindset (based on privileged *tactility*) by what Friedmann called an *optic*

approach, favouring *visibility*. Unravelling the implicit choices on which our overall Western account of Being or reality is based, highlights the contingency or even arbitrariness of its principles. The most important of these principles is perhaps 'causality'. Reduced to mere *efficient* causality in Modernity, it is often still confused with a *necessary* or *logical* relation, despite Hume and Kant. Both reduction and confusion are impediments to a perception of non-causal processes, like those which Paul Kammerer called *serial* and C.G. Jung *synchronistic*. Addressing the justified character of a notion of 'soul' should simultaneously insist on the philosophical entitlements of 'seriality' or 'synchronicity,' by underlining the arbitrariness of both 'causality' and the standardised ('haptic') mindset which it presupposes. Acausal processes are not irrational at all, nor are visual contemplation and associative thinking necessarily leading the inquisitive intellectual astray.

Klages and Friedmann, who were contemporaries, are both perpetuating a tradition of thinking which roots at least in Schopenhauer and which is continued by 19th-century philosophers as Carl du Prel (1839-1899), Gustav Fechner (1801-1887), Lazar von Hellenbach (1827-1887), Immanuel Hermann Fichte (1797-1879), Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906), or (to some extent) Paul Kammerer (1880-1926). What these thinkers have all in common is an emphasis on the enhancement of consciousness, or altered states of mind, as a necessary condition for more in-depth access to reality. With such an approach, they can hardly avoid bringing 'reality' or 'Being,' on the one hand, and 'soul' or 'psyche,' on the other, into close connection with each other, to the point of apparently 'confusing' both. C.G. Jung, who is equally heir to the Schopenhauerian tradition, qualifies reality as 'psychoid' – soul-like. Provided that this does not exempt reality from its unalienable *otherness* as regards the soul, I am inclined to subscribe to Jung's qualification. By insisting on the need to attribute otherness to reality (which I will never be able to know in advance), I by no means want to imply that we are in full possession of reality's correlate, that is, 'soul,' 'psyche,' or 'inwardness'. Strangeness ('alterity') is to be found on both sides, I think; both on the side of reality and of the soul. To put it simply, just as the world outside will ultimately be a mystery to me, I will likewise be a mystery to myself as well. I do not even mention here that the personal pronoun 'I' used here is not itself as evident as it seems, nor can it ever be taken for granted. While being almost impossible to avoid, the pronoun 'I' may still be an obstacle for truth-finding. But let us not anticipate what is to follow in this book.

In chronological order, I will now introduce to the reader some of the thinkers which from now on, I will frequently resort to and who are very important for my overall argument. In doing so, I will not need to interrupt myself unnecessarily in the chapters to come by first having to present them before continuing.

A thinker who inspired me to write this book and whom I hold in high esteem is Carl du Prel (1839-1899). Du Prel has unfortunately been wholly forgotten today. He can be seen as the main bridge between Schopenhauer, on the one hand, and Freud and Jung, on the other. Du Prel's endeavours in elaborating on 'exceptional experiences' as a purported *confirmation* of Schopenhauer's metaphysics of will maybe did not contribute to his 'scientific' reputation. Du Prel held fascinating ideas, many of which are *implicitly* accepted, even by modern people; for example on the existence of 'transcendental' consciousness, only to be accessed in dreamless sleep. The two books I will frequently refer to are his *Philosophy of Mysticism* (*Philosophie der Mystik*[6]) and *Die monistische Seelenlehre*[7] (The Monistic Doctrine of the Soul). Du Prel was very optimistic about the prospective evolutionary enhancement of human consciousness. I will draw on his notion of the sensation threshold (*Empfindungsschwelle*); this threshold allegedly prevents us from haphazardly crossing the border of the unconscious. Only during so-called 'altered states of consciousness' (somnambulism, hypnosis, dreaming, dying, etc.), it is crossed. One can imagine that the vulnerability of such states, despite their experience-based nature, hardly gives them the weight which 'evidence-based' science covets.[8]

Frederic Myers (1843-1901) was a classicist and one of the founding members of the Society for Psychical Research. He introduced the term 'telepathy'. Though Myers has a lot in common with Carl du Prel, his work is less philosophical and more empirical. I will mainly consult his marvellous book *Human Personality and its Survival of Bodily Death* (1906). This book contains a lot of 'evidence' concerning exceptional experiences, and theories to explain these. One way of doing this was hypothesising about the existence of a "subliminal self," in addition to the

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[6] Carl du Prel (1885). *Philosophie der Mystik*, Leipzig: Günther; trans. (1889) *Philosophy of Mysticism*, by C.C. Massey. London: George Redway.
[7] Carl du Prel (1888). *Die monistische Seelenlehre*. Leipzig: Günther.
[8] For a monography on Du Prel see Tomas Kaiser (2006). *Zwischen Philosophie und Spiritismus. Annäherungen an Leben und Werk von Carl du Prel*. Lüneburg: Universität Lüneburg.

usual "supraliminal self". Throughout this book, I will frequently use these terms. Though Myers died more than a century ago, his ongoing relevance for psychic research could appear from the recent publication by Terence Palmer, *The Science of Spirit Possession*.[9] This book was dedicated to Myers and drew on its methodology.

Ludwig Klages is another philosopher who greatly influenced me, even though I will sometimes take a different approach. Klages was a 'philosopher of life' (*Lebensphilosoph*) who is mostly known for his magnum opus *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele* (The Spirit as the Adversary of the Soul, 1929-1932).[10] This impressive book is a philosophical masterpiece, and one of the most thorough phenomenological studies of consciousness of the 20th century. In my view, it far by-passes what Heidegger wrote about it in *Sein und Zeit*. Klages' contemporary Hermann Friedmann, whom I will introduce hereafter, wrote: "According to common scientific standards, Klages' work and language are so unusual that it is to be feared that a fruitful reception of this work on behalf of our contemporary science would only take place with the greatest difficulties." (Friedmann, 1930, p. 302; my trans.) Klages had a decisive influence on C.G. Jung, Walter Benjamin, *Gestalt* psychology, etc. He may have been neglected mainly due to his ('metaphysical') anti-Semitism (which I believe rests on complete ignorance of the Jewish tradition) and his tight writing style (probably 'aggravated' by his stubborn use of stimulating drugs). Klages' account of the *soul* as an original susceptibility to life, constantly threatened by the attacks of *Spirit* ('reason' or 'will'), has much in store that a study of the human soul and synchronicity awareness could reasonably benefit from.[11]

Despite the fully-fledged oeuvre which he left us, Hermann Friedmann is still more ignored. Friedmann was jurist, biologist, and philosopher, whose *Die Welt der Formen* (The World of Forms) may have deterred those

[9] Terence Palmer (2014). *The Science of Spirit Possession*. Newcastle: Cambridge Publishers.

[10] Ludwig Klages (1981, 1929-1932). *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag.

[11] For one of the few English introductions to Klages, see Paul Bishop (2018). *Ludwig Klages and the Philosophy of Life. A Vitalist Toolkit*. London/New York: Routledge. Also see Gunnar Alksnis (2015, 1970). *Chthonic Gnosis. Ludwig Klages and his Quest for the Pandaemonic All*. München: Theion Publishing. Recently, the following translation appeared: *Of Cosmogonic Eros* (2018); trans. Mav Kuhn. München: Theion Publishing. For a more historical approach see Nitzan Lebovic (2013). *The Philosophy of Life and Death. Ludwig Klages and the Rise of a Nazi Biopolitics*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

readers who feel uncomfortable with discussions of mathematics, physics, and biology *jointly* with reflections on linguistics, poetry and philosophy. Friedmann was an all-round intellectual who tried to ground a new conception of science based on 'morphology' or a doctrine of forms. I already referred to Friedmann's distinction between the prevailing 'haptic' approach and a desirable 'optic' approach; the latter endowed with the capacity to *integrate* phenomena, whereas the former tends to dissect them.[12] Friedmann is another thinker whose contemporary neglect can be associated with his implicit attack on some fundamental premises of science (premises based on notions such as 'evidence,' 'causality,' 'proof,' 'matter,' 'subject'/'object'-distinction, etc.). Whereas Friedmann disagreed with Klages' thesis about a thwarting, life-destroying Spirit (*Geist*), he significantly shared the Klagesian account of images (*Bilder*).[13]

A fifth author I will be drawing on throughout this book is the German biologist-philosopher Hans Driesch (1867-1941). Starting as an empirical researcher of morphogenesis (embryonic development) and being confronted with its potentially anti-Darwinian, anti-materialist implications, Driesch turned more and more to philosophy. At the beginning of the 20th century, he gave the famous Gifford Lectures in Aberdeen. These have later been published as *The Philosophy of the Organism* (*Philosophie des Organischen*). Here and in other publications, Driesch defends the idea of 'entelechy' as an immaterial principle that has to be taken into account when trying to evidence morphogenesis. The notion of 'entelechy,' he argues, will enable us to account for the wholeness, integrity and unity of an organism, without reducing this wholeness to a mere conceptual or logical wholeness. Organic wholeness, Driesch affirms, is experience-based, living wholeness, which demonstrates a vital *form*. In this book, I will repeatedly dwell on Driesch' *Philosophy of the Organism* and his *Wirklichkeitslehre* (Doctrine of Reality).[14] I will exploit the definition of entelechy – a living organism's

[12] It is not without reason that I will frequently quote Marcel Proust throughout this book. Walter Benjamin writes that the gesture of *touching* is fully alien to Proust: "Diese Geste [der Berührung] ist keinem fremder als Proust. Er kann auch seinen Leser nicht anrühren, könnte es um nichts in der Welt." Walter Benjamin. Zum Bilde Prousts. In Walter Benjamin (1999). *Gesammelte Schriften* II/1. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 321.

[13] For an interesting autobiographical account, see Hermann Friedmann (1950). *Sinnvolle Odyssee. Geschichte eines Lebens und einer Zeit 1873-1950*. München: C.H. Beck.

[14] Hans Driesch (1921). *Philosophie des Organischen*. Leipzig: Wilhelm Engelmann; and id. (1917). *Wirklichkeitslehre. Ein metaphysischer Versuch*. Leipzig: Emmanuel Reinicke Verlag. For autobiographical information, see Hans Driesch (1951).

focus on becoming a whole (*Ganzheit*) that is, a spontaneous, self-contained actor – and use it for purposes far beyond biological morphogenesis.[15]

Paul Kammerer coined the term 'seriality,' which is almost an equivalent of what Jung would later call 'synchronicity'. Kammerer was a biologist who started as a musical composer, while endeavouring himself into philosophy in his main work, *Das Gesetz der Serie* (The Law of Seriality). In this book, he outlined a governing principle in nature beyond standard causality. Throughout his life, Kammerer was far better known as an anti-Darwinian researcher who did experiments with reptiles and allegedly demonstrated that acquired traits are inheritable (rather than the product of random mutation). His amazed Darwinian opponents were unsuccessful in repeating the experiments (reptiles hardly mate in captivity), but could not disprove their reliability. After having been accused of fraud (probably falsely), Kammerer took his own life.[16] As the Darwinian paradigm dominates scientific biology, it can hardly surprise that Kammerer's alternative (Mendelian) theories about inheritance are entirely ignored today. It was mainly Jung who saved Kammerer's ideas about seriality from oblivion, by re-coining them as 'synchronicity'.[17]

Otto Rank (1884-1939) was an Austrian psychoanalyst. He was closely associated with Freud. However, Rank gradually emancipated himself from his master. One of his views which will be particularly crucial for me concerns what he terms "birth anxiety". Rank believes that human birth – being detached from the mother and being thrown into empty space – creates our first and most original trauma. This view embarrassed Freud, insofar as it deprived the Oedipus complex of its status of being a universal psychological glossary. Instead – and this is why Rank's position interests me – it allowed for a more independent state of human creativity, art and culture. Rank claimed that these are to be seen at the immediate background

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Lebenserinnerungen. Aufzeichnungen eines Forschers und Denkers in entscheidender Zeit. München/Basel: Ernst Reinhardt Verlag.

[15] For a recent introduction to Driesch, see Hans Gerding, Hein van Dongen & Rico Sneller (2014). *Wild Beasts of the Philosophical Desert. Philosophers on Telepathy and Other Exceptional Experiences*. Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Ch. 6.

[16] For an analysis of Kammerer's experiments and the accusation of fraud, see Arthur Koestler (1971; repr. 2016). *The Case of the Midwife Toad*. London: Hutchinson & Co. Biographical information can also be found in Julya Rabinowich (2016). *Krötenliebe*. Berlin: Hanser Verlag.

[17] C.G. Jung (1952). Synchronizität als ein Prinzip akausaler Zusammenhänge. In C.G. Jung & W. Pauli, *Naturerklärung und Psyche.* Basel: Springer Verlag.

of the birth trauma which they are emulating with. Creativity, Rank argued, is an ultimate human endeavour for self-immortalisation.[18]

A final author I will mention already here and whose theories I will discuss in chapter 3 is Max Picard (1888-1965). Picard was a German-Swiss philosopher of culture, who wrote among many others two books on physiognomy, *Das Menschengesicht* (The Human Face) and *Grenzen der Physiognomik* (The Limits of Physiognomy).[19] He was a friend to Gabriel Marcel, who is better known as a leading Christian existentialist philosopher. Both authors share conversion to Christianity from Judaism, as well as a higher ('paranormal') sensitivity. (Gerding et al., 2014, Ch. 7)[20]

Methodology

A short methodological remark may be desirable at this point. I already noted that this book is destined to *Naturforscher, Seelenärzte* and *wissenschaftlich Gebildete überhaupt*; that is, those who are taking seriously the unanswered questions upon which their discipline rests. It is a modest attempt to deal with the tension between human consciousness as an object both of *research* and *experience*. Superfluous to say that the terms 'subject' and 'object' themselves cannot remain unscathed in such an attempt, as already Schopenhauer taught. Remarkably, the philosophical tradition which Schopenhauer initiated – and which flourished in the 19th and the early 20th centuries – seems to have been brutally discontinued. Not only by reductionist philosophies 'ensnared' by the 'implications' of modern brain research, genetics, or neurology; but also by the philosophical epigones of Nietzsche and Heidegger who vulgarised the spiritual struggles of these thinkers and transformed them into flat secularism. What I believe is lacking in our age of a renewing spiritual sensitivity is a robust philosophical account of spirituality which unearths hitherto neglected potentials for its corroboration. Such an account would have the double advantage of not only reshuffling the history of Western thinking and discovering some of its forgotten treasures but also of paving ways towards East-West dialogues. What I believe is the most potent lesson Western thought (if such a thing exists in purity) could take from Asia is a broader

[18] For an interesting study of Rank, see E. James Lieberman (1998, 1985). *Acts of Will: The Life and Work of Otto Rank*. New York: Free Press.
[19] Max Picard (1947, 1929). *Das Menschengesicht*. Erlenbach: Rentsch Verlag; id. (1937). *Grenzen der Physiognomik*. Erlenbach: Rentsch Verlag.
[20] Also see Gabriel Marcel – Max Picard (2006). *Correspondance 1947-1965*. Introd. Xavier Tilliette. Paris: l'Harmattan.

approach to *method*. In chapter 1, I will argue that a rigorous methodology demands more than the sole scepticism or logical-dialectical acuteness with which it has been identified over the ages. What is also essential is an ongoing self-reflection, nourished by meditation and ethical purification. Needless to say that this is an immense task which no philosopher or researcher can ever claim to have definitively accomplished.

A point worth noting here is my view that (what is called) 'literature' can give supportive *evidence* – despite its so-called 'fictitious' character. Throughout my book, I will repeatedly quote literary sources. Essential for my overall account is the Cyclops narrative extant in Homer's *Odyssey* and its Latin sequel, Virgil's *Aeneid*. I will repeatedly come back to it as I think it offers many clues for clarifying my ideas and intuitions. For example, despite its ambiguity, the Cyclops can function as a paradigm for (with a term from Hermann Friedmann) a *haptic* approach which favours tactility over vision.[21]

Other literary sources are Marcel Proust's *A la recherche du temps perdu* (1913-1927); Thomas Wolfe's *Look Homeward, Angel* (1929); Robert Musil's, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften* (1930-1932); Joris-Karl Huysmans' *A rebours* (1884); James Joyce's *Ulysses* (1922); John Steinbeck's *The Grapes of Wrath* (1939); etc. I am inclined to attribute truth value to these novels, also in light of the global appreciation they have received (Nobel Prize, Pulitzer Prize, etc.). The same applies to the work of the artists to whose work I will be referring, such as the American photographer Francesca Woodman (1958-1981), especially her self-portraits and her artbook *Some Disordered Interior Geometries*; the Brazilian artist Lygia Clark (1920-1988); the American photographer Saul Leiter (1923-2013); the Japanese photographer Nobuyohsi Araki (1940); the American paintress and child prodigy Akiane Kramarik (1994), etc.

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[21] Horkheimer/Adorno's reading of the Cyclops narrative in *Dialektik der Aufklärung* is, while certainly interesting, also confusing if not contrived. If Ulysses – as the modern citizen – both fights and continues mythical violence (using cunning), it becomes unclear, 1) how (if at all) myth can give birth to its own undermining (i.e., Ulysses, Modernity), and 2) how the critical confrontation between Ulysses (Modernity) and Polyphemus (the mythical) should be interpreted. Granted, similar questions are incumbent on my own argument, but (other than Horkheimer/Adorno) I try to escape the impasse by insisting on the requisite transition from monoculism to contemplation; in other words, on the question of soul. See Horkheimer & Adorno (1988, 1944). *Dialektik der Aufklärung. Philosophische Fragmente*. Frankfurt: Fischer Verlag, pp. 71-76.

Since the concepts of 'image' and 'imagination' will be essential for me in this book, one can reasonably assume that I cannot take any boundaries between 'fiction' and 'non-fiction' for granted. While acknowledging Aristotelian logic as an indispensable propaedeutic for setting up arguments, the intuitions on which these arguments ultimately rely are far beyond it.

Short Outline

In chapter 1, I will start outlining some pathways to the notion of 'soul'. Instead of 'soul,' I will also frequently use the word 'consciousness'. It should be clear, however, that 'soul' covers a broader field since it includes consciousness and unconscious alike. A useful distinction I will often resort to is a distinction made by Hermann Friedmann between an 'optic' and a 'haptic' approach. In Ludwig Klages we find something similar. It will turn out to be necessary to brighten one's overall theoretical approach; without having clarity about it, one remains blind to the contingent nature of one's conclusions, however sound they may seem.

Next, I will successively sketch a more direct and a more indirect form of access to the soul; the first consisting of increasing self-awareness and interiorisation, the second of the contemplation of some external phenomena. I will try to explain that the general distinction between 'inside' and 'outside' needs revision, to the extent that it relies upon problematic notions of space and matter.

I will end by addressing the complex issue as to pathological self-awareness, which forms a serious threat, both to internal and external soul access.

Whereas chapter 1 describes internal or immediate soul access from a more general perspective, in chapter 2 I will discuss this form of access from a more particular perspective: the enhanced way of soul-access which I will refer to as 'inspiration' and 'ecstasy'. Using Carl du Prel's words, I will define inspiration as "clairvoyance of one's own soul", and ecstasy as the corresponding experience of this clairvoyance. Together with ecstasy, I will characterise inspiration as being based upon a vocation experience and an inner drive. In contradistinction to prevailing biologistic approaches, and drawing on Ludwig Klages, I will extend the allegedly 'unique' instinct of self-preservation with a drive towards self-abandonment; the latter being indispensable, in my view, to account for art and culture. I will analyse both drives as different yet mutually connected ways of dealing with shame, anxiety and birth trauma (Rank). When discussing ecstasy, it will turn out to be impossible to avoid the so-called 'pathological'. In conclusion to

chapter 2, I will try to make a useful distinction between the former and the latter without excluding their coincidence. I will analyse the phenomenon of (what used to be called) 'possession' in terms of an over-identification with selfhood and a penance complex.

Under the header of 'synchronicity,' chapter 3 discusses a possible overlap between 'soul' and 'world,' or 'inside' and 'outside'. By 'synchronicity' I understand a meaningful yet acausal series of concurrent events that seem to reflect someone's actual mindset. Since synchronicity seems to challenge ordinary causality, I will briefly dwell on the historical and sometimes problematic presuppositions of this notion in the history of Western thinking. I will pay attention to the intriguing notion of 'necessity' which, eliminated by Hume from the notion of causality, returns on a higher level; it returns without, for that matter, confusing sheer (Aristotelian) logic and experience.

Synchronicity can be witnessed both on an individual and on a social level. To avoid casuistry, I will mainly refer to some global examples of synchronicity, for instance, the enigmatic simultaneity of discoveries and inventions in world history without a common cause. Since I hypothesise that developing new insights and ideas in art, science and philosophy may be surrounded by synchronicity experiences, I have randomly selected some examples of each category that might make my hypothesis probable (though not more than that).

As a case in point of a commonly accessible synchronicity experience, and guided in this by Max Picard, I will discuss 'physiognomy'. I define 'physiognomy' as an immediate invitation to synchronicity encounters in the present. While a human countenance can be seen as a coalescence of individual causal chains, such an approach seems ridiculous, ultimately even for the plastic surgeon whose job it is to restore facial flaws. A countenance is commonly experienced as a unity which comprehends and synthesises such individual causal chains. A serious encounter with a face, I will argue, may even bring together physiognomy and ecstasy.

In the final chapter, I will dwell on death and suffering. I take these to be revelatory limit experiences of the soul. After suggesting that standard accounts of death are insufficient since negative (they interpret death in terms of mere cessation), I will argue that death is better conceived as enhanced 'subliminality'. To underpin my claim, I will try to investigate the phenomena of memory and recollection – of which Hans Driesch claims that these tend to give a unitary trait to personality. I will contend that

trauma, which blocks and impedes memory, may find its sole solution in the experience of death.

To address the questions about 'survival,' I will resort to the subject of images and imagination in light of a reconsideration of 'presence'. In addition to subliminal enhancement, death may make visible an image in the moribund which consolidates presence without making it available. Suffering, I will argue, can be seen both as resistance against subliminal enhancement and as a desire towards undisturbed wholeness or completeness, amidst an experience of incompleteness. A thorough re-reading of the Cyclops narrative, both in Homer's *Odyssey* and in Virgil's *Aeneid*, will turn out to offer promising perspectives when illuminating suffering.

CHAPTER 1

PATHWAYS TO THE SOUL

Introduction

In this chapter, I will start addressing the notions of 'soul' and 'psyche' themselves. I will argue that they challenge the way we usually approach objects whose nature we are asking for. To substantiate my claim, I will resort to a distinction made by Hermann Friedmann between a 'haptic' and an 'optic' attitude; the former being oriented on tactility, the latter on visuality and visibility. Implicitly, Ludwig Klages supports this distinction, when he characterises the Western tradition as primarily based on tactility (and concomitant objectification). To illustrate the possibly obnoxious core of hapticism, I will quote passages from the Cyclops narratives in the *Odyssey* and the *Aeneid*. As already mentioned in the introduction, the Cyclops ominously exemplifies what is at stake in hapticism on a larger scale.[1]

Next, I will discuss two ways of approaching the soul: as inwardness and as an outer phenomenon. The first approach refers to immediate self-access, the second to a spectator perspective.

Whereas self-access indeed implies immediacy, we should not ignore that inner impediments may impose themselves. A threshold may inhibit self-penetration. Carl du Prel, for example, introduces the significant term 'threshold of sensibility' (*Empfindungsschwelle*). Thereby, he intends to designate content which lies beneath immediate sense perception and which is consequently out of reach. Depending on the assumed flexibility of the threshold, one can or cannot access *altered* states of consciousness. True, irrespective of inner thresholds, claims about inwardness or self-access are not necessarily flawless, let alone compelling. Self-deception cannot be excluded. I will argue that, to minimise the possibility of being misled, one should respect specific *codes*. I will distinguish three such codes: following a particular way of life, overcoming fixations, and enhancing concentration. It will turn out to be conceptually precise. Otherwise, one might easily be

[1] Despite the adjective 'cycl*optic*'.

confused if for example Patañjali, author of the *Yoga sutras*, famously defines 'concentration' as "the fixing of the mind in one place". In contrast, Pierre Janet identifies what he terms as *idées fixes* as a primary obstacle. For that reason, I will propose to translate *deśa-bandhaś cittasya dharana* as "the enleaguing of the mind with one place" or "unique mental ligament".

Finally, I will examine to what extent the soul can be approached as an outer phenomenon, that is, from a spectator perspective. I will try to clarify two things. Firstly, that it is indispensable to re-interpret prevailing notions of space and matter, and secondly, that with 'spectator perspective' I do not mean to imply any neutral stance of a supposedly disengaged subject. I will instead argue that a specific loss of one's mind is requisite. As possible examples of the soul's outer manifestation, I will successively discuss (1) ideation, (2) production of kin or procreation, (3) self-relatedness, and (4) repetitive constellations. I will make use of the work of Frederic Myers, Hans Driesch, Gustav Fechner, Carl du Prel, Levinas, Walter Benjamin, and others.

By way of conclusion to this chapter, I will briefly address the problematic subject of failed soul access. Excessive concentration and self-immersion could easily lead to becoming overruled by personal obsessions and fixations, in the form of neuroses or even psychoses. I will discuss two literary examples of each, one from Proust's novel *La prisonnière* and another from J.-K. Huysmans' *A rebours*. I will put these examples in the theoretical perspective of Pierre Janet, Frederic Myers, Otto Rank and Alphonse de Waelhens.

'Do we have a soul?'

> "[T]hat all roads to the mind [*Geist*] start in the soul, but none lead back there again."
> —Robert Musil[2]

> "God said, 'Let there be light' – and what is the light of God? It is the soul of man."
> —Franz Rosenzweig[3]

Do we *have* a soul? one could ask. Has not any evidence for the existence of a separate, non- or meta-physical soul been gradually deleted with the

[2] Robert Musil (1997, 1930-32). *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften I*. Hamburg: Rowoldt Verlag, p. 393; trans. Sophie Wilkins (1995). *The Man Without Qualities*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Ch. 86.
[3] Frans Rosenzweig (1990, 1921). *Der Stern der Erlösung*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, p. 123; trans. William W. Hallo (1971). *The Star of Redemption*. New York/Chicago/ San Francisco: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, p. 111.

rise of the physical sciences? Is not man a machine (La Mettrie), or, in contemporary language, the inevitable material outcome of a predetermined, neurological-genetic patchwork? Is not life itself, both human, animal and vegetal, a complex chemical-physical process, the essence of which will one day be unravelled by the life sciences? Is not 'soul' another name for man's moral or spiritual core, the non-existence of which has meanwhile been demonstrated not only by those life sciences but also by (positivist) sociology or (behaviourist) psychology?

As a rule, examining the presuppositions of a question can show why that question is unanswerable. Which, then, are the presuppositions of the question, 'Do we have a soul?' There are at least four, I believe. First, it assumes that a soul is something that can be had or possessed. Second, it takes for granted the existence of a (material or physical, *pre*-psychical) subject ('we'), supposedly capable of deciding if it has or lacks a soul. Third, it anticipates a particular meaning of the word 'soul' (i.e., something spiritual) – for, without this anticipation, the question would become meaningless. Fourth, it rashly assumes that, for something to exist, it must have object character, that is, it must be definable, discernible or delimitate. The question itself objectifies; it follows a 'representationalist' model – as if the soul were something that could be represented by a concept.

Referring to Socrates, already Heidegger insisted that the *particular* way in which the father of Western philosophy asked his questions ('what is justice, love?,' etc.) unjustly anticipated a particular answer ('there must be a ready-made *thing* or an *entity* called Justice, Love,' etc.). Instead, Heidegger continued, Socrates could just as well have asked for the *way* in which justice, love, etc., are: *how* is justice, love? etc. Such a question would have avoided a premature reification of justice, love, etc., and a reduction of these notions to definable or delimitate entities with object character.

Why are we so familiar today with the Socratic, reifying *what-is* questions that we hardly see any problem in asking them? And how do these questions obfuscate a possibly more adequate picture of what they are hinting at? In his breath-taking magnum opus *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele*, Ludwig Klages sets out to describe how the Greek-European tradition issues in thinking as an objectification strategy. In this tradition, Klages argues, thinking objectifies to the extent that it 'disturbs' the act of *viewing* or *contemplating* (*schauen*) the world. It does so by implicitly crediting the *tactile* sense with a predominant role. Tactility, being only one of the senses, merely approaches the environment as a continuum of pressure and counterpressure; our 'object world' owes its existence to the literal,

'Cycloptic' short-sightedness of a prematurely and unilaterally promoted tactility, at the expense of visibility, viewability, or contemplatability.[4] As a case in point, Klages says, can be taken Kant's notion of 'reality' as the phenomenal side of a '*thing*' *in itself* ('Ding' an sich). (Klages, 1981, p. 339) Whereas Indian thought, Klages continues, still forms an amalgam of Aryan and Asian thinking, and is therefore endowed with the same flaws as the Greek-European tradition, Chinese Daoism, ignoring or neglecting the 'pressure' and 'resistance' that govern tactility-based worldviews, has a proclivity to sheer contemplation. As a result, when compared to Greek-European thinking, Daoist thinking has developed a wholly different approach to *space*. (Klages, 1981, p. 341) I will come back to the notion of 'space,' and the need for revising its naïve Newtonian version, when discussing the soul as an 'outer phenomenon' below. By his analysis, Klages does not intend to simply oppose Europe's tact-based and China's vision-based worldviews as inadequate versus adequate. He merely wants to underline the arbitrariness of object-thinking and to expose the one-sidedness of reification. Ultimately, a sole emphasis on vision and contemplation (as in Daoism) equally leads to narrowmindedness – although, to be honest, perhaps less than the Greek-European alternative, which has led to unspeakably sadder consequences (the destruction of our life-world by technology on a global scale).[5]

Klages is undoubtedly not the only one to criticise a one-sidedness of the European tradition. His argument about the preponderantly tact-based approach is further corroborated in the work of Hermann Friedmann, especially his *Die Welt der Formen*. In this extremely important and yet wholly forgotten book Friedmann addresses the issue of a "haptic" (i.e., tact-based) versus an "optic" worldview.[6] The haptic approach thrives on

[4] "Allein das ist nun das Eigentümliche des abendländischen Verstandes überhaupt, dass er auch bei Bevorzugung von Gestalten und 'Formen' vor den Körpern und Stoffen seinen Gegenstand *nach Analogie* von Dingen behandelt." Klages, 1981, p. 338.

[5] "Verglichen mit europäischer Geistigkeit ist ostasiatische Geistigkeit minder lebensgefährlich, weil sie zwar am Ende vertrocknen macht, Blumen gewissermaßen in Strohblumen wandelnd, nicht aber *um sich greift* gleich einem fressenden Feuer." Ibid., p. 340. European thinking, Klages argues, is characterised by an "*schaudererregenden* Angriff *auf die Wirklichkeit*". Ludwig Klages (1936/1910). *Grundlagen der Charakterkunde*. Leipzig: J.H. Barth, p. 165; trans. *The Science of Character*, by W.H. Johnston (1929). London: George Allen & Unwin.

[6] Paul Kammerer speaks here of *Berührungskausalität* (tangential causality), as opposed to *Beharrungskausalität* (inert causality) or *Serialität* (seriality). The latter entail synchronicity, see Ch. 3. Kammerer, 1919, p. 365, 453 and passim.

the average physical or physiological methodology and interprets beings in terms of tangible, delimitate objects, which are connected by attraction or repulsion (*Zug und Druck*). It is accompanied by a corresponding causality principle, which presupposes the interaction between those objects to be similar to an active stimulus that communicates a measurable impetus to a passive recipient. It is the haptic approach with which we have become all too familiar, Friedmann argues, so much so that we tacitly identify it with the only available approach which we can rely on. The optic-morphological account, which Friedmann advocates, draws on viewing and vision; instead of chronology, it entails a synchronicity principle and concomitant interrelatedness of actors. It partly overlaps with Klages' notion of contemplation (*Schauen*). For an example of *optic* causality, Friedmann refers to paintings, which are better interpreted in light of, for instance, the rightness of their perspective or harmony of colours. When it comes to an understanding of an artwork (and, mutatis mutandis, of our world), an optic approach will make more sense than a haptic approach:

> "The haptic defectiveness of the sculpture [*haptische Mangelhaftigkeit des Bildwerkes*] is confronted with an opponent: interpolating, reintegrating optic fantasy, which heals all fractures. Therefore, that which exists only partially from a haptic perspective, will 'increase' in existence from an optic perspective; optic existence by no means coincides with haptic existence." (Friedmann, 1930, p. 32; my trans.)

Friedmann associates the haptic and the optic account with two different, albeit often oscillating, mindsets. Whereas the haptic mindset, he argues, aggravates the innate drive towards self-preservation and issues in self-confirmation and authority over the observed object, the optic mindset, in complete self-negligence and self-abandonment, instead focuses on the 'object' itself, to the point of almost absorbing it. (Friedmann, 1930, p. 33f) In the next chapter, I will come back to the two inner drives implied here (i.e., self-preservation and self-abandonment), without for that matter taking over the extreme oppositional relation which Friedmann assumes exists between them. 'Haptic' and 'optic' may be useful yet unstable, self-invigorating categories. In the third chapter, I will associate optic causality with *synchronicity* experiences. Upon closer scrutiny, Friedmann states, the haptic approach is not so much focussed on the object of perception but a subject's *self*-preservation while facing it – as if it were primarily a *threat*. Therefore, it responds to its observations with pleasure or pain (*Lust oder Unlust*), depending on what the perceived object does to the perceiving subject. The optic approach, on the other hand, consists of self-abandoning contemplation of the perceived object. It responds to its object with approval

or disapproval (*Billigung oder Missbilligung*) – an attitude that aims at effacing self-involvement, similar to Klages' contemplation.[7] In psychoanalytical terms, a *purely* optic approach (if it existed) would have overcome inner unconscious fixations and projections, and be wholly free towards its object. (Friedmann, 1930, p. 36)[8] "Rigid links rooting in the essence of a haptic world, still captivate our contemporary psychology, logic and metaphysics within this world. Only persistent impregnation, completion and experiencing [*ein beharrliches Durchdringen, Ergänzen und Erleben*] of our optic-morphological concepts and ideas can lead to a fully consistent theory and practice of the form. (Friedmann, 1930, p. 61; my trans.) As said, 'haptic' and 'optic' approach may not be existing as a pure opposition, as Friedmann sometimes seems to suggest. Yet, the distinction is beneficial, I think, to highlight the involvement of a mental attitude or mindset in how we perceive the world.[9]

To underline my view that what Friedmann calls a 'haptic' approach is not innocuous, I will illustrate it here by referring to the Cyclops narrative in Homer's *Odyssey*. It is my claim that 'hapticism' is to some extent exemplified by Polyphemus, the brutal Cyclops who kills and swallows several of Ulysses' comrades in his cave. See, for example, the following passage, in which, instead of offering hospitality to his visitors, the Cyclops grabs and devours two of them. It is Ulysses himself who is speaking in the following, shocking passage:

> "The cruel wretch [νηλέι θυμῷ: 'with a ruthless *thumos*/mind'] vouchsafed me not one word of answer, but with a sudden clutch he gripped up [ἐπὶ χεῖρας ἴαλλε] two of my men at once [σὺν δὲ δύω μάρψας] and dashed them

[7] "ist der Optiker, der Distanz zu den Dingen hat, ihnen selbstvergessen hingegeben". Friedmann, 1930, p. 34.

[8] Also see Walter Benjamin's doctrine of resemblances: "Die Gabe, Ähnlichkeit zu sehn, die wir besitzen, ist nichts als nur ein schwaches Rudiment des ehemals gewaltigen Zwanges, ähnlich zu werden und sich zu verhalten. Und das verschollene Vermögen, ähnlich zu werden, reichte weit hinaus über die schmale Merkwelt, in der wir noch Ähnlichkeit zu sehen imstande sind." Walter Benjamin. Die Lehre vom Ähnlichen. In Walter Benjamin (1999). *Gesammelte Schriften* II/1. Frankfurt: Surhrkamp, p. 210.

[9] The crucial importance of opticality is underlined by the Italian psychologist Sante de Sanctis (1862-1935), who argues that, when it comes to facial expressions, attention – *regardless* of the sensory faculty which is predominant – tends to follow an *optical* paradigm. Even the facial expressivity of *thinkers* draws from paying *optical* attention: "dass die Mimik des Denkens nur einem Typus angehört, dem *optischen*." Sante de Sanctis (1906). *Die Mimik des Denkens*. Halle: Carl Marhold, p. 98.