Pakistan after Trump

# Pakistan after Trump:

Great Power Responsibility in a Multi-Polar World

By

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To my grandparents, Suraj Prakash Kapur (1925-1990)
and Rita Shahani (1934-2013), who lost everything in 1947,
and to my father, Anil Kapur, who has been my rock

AUTHOR'S DISCLAIMER

I have used the term "Azad Jammu and Kashmir" or its abbreviation, "AJK," in parts of this book. As an Indian scholar, I acknowledge that this term is politically problematic for the Indian government, which considers this to be "Pakistan-occupied Kashmir." As a scholar, I have strived to maintain neutrality by using the terms "Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir (IJK)" and "Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir (PJK)" when referring to the parts of the original princely state of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) controlled by India and Pakistan, respectively. However, for analytical clarity, it has been necessary to use the term "AJK" in some places to differentiate this area from Gilgit-Baltistan, which is also part of the original state of J&K and hence part of PJK. Within Pakistan, AJK and Gilgit-Baltistan are administratively separate. In addition, AJK is the western part of Jammu and is not a part of the Kashmir valley. Therefore, it would be incorrect to refer to it as "Kashmir." Finally, since India lays claim to the whole princely state of J&K, including Gilgit-Baltistan, it is important not to ignore Gilgit-Baltistan by equating AJK with PJK, but rather to be clear about the two separate but integral components of PJK.

CONTENTS

ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures

Tables

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Abbreviations

AJK	Azad Jammu and Kashmir
ANP	Awami National Party
BJP	Bharatiya Janata Party
CBD	Comprehensive Bilateral Dialogue
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CPEC	China-Pakistan Economic Corridor
Daesh	Al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham
ES	English school
FATA	Federally Administered Tribal Areas
FCR	Frontier Crimes Regulation
GID	General Intelligence Directorate
HoA	Heart of Asia—Istanbul Process
HuJI	Harkat-ul-Jihad-i-Islami
IJK	Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
IR	International relations
ISAF	International Security Assistance Force
ISI	Inter-Services Intelligence
ISPR	Inter Services Public Relations
ISS	International security studies
J&K	Jammu and Kashmir
JeM	Jaish-e-Muhammad
JI	Jamaat-e-Islami
JuA	Jamaat-ul-Ahrar
JuD	Jamaat-ud-Dawa
LeJ	Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
LeT	Lashkar-e-Taiba
LoC	Line of Control
MQM	Muttahida Qaumi Movement
MTT	Muqami Tehreek-e-Taliban
NAP	National Action Plan
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NDS	National Directorate of Security
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
PAT	Pakistan Awami Tehreek
PJK	Pakistani-administered Jammu and Kashmir
PML-N	Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz
PPP	Pakistan Peoples Party
PTI	Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf
PTM	Pashtun Tahafuz Movement
QCG	Quadrilateral Coordination Group
RSS	Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
SSP	Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan
TAPI	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India (gas pipeline)
TNFJ	Tehreek-i-Nifaz-i-Fiqh Jafariya
TNSM	Tehreek-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi
TTP	Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNCIP	United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNGA	United Nations General Assembly
UNHCR	United Nations Refugee Agency
UNSC	United Nations Security Council

INTRODUCTION

> The greatest danger of the current discourse is that we too become terrorists; and that as we demonise, dehumanise and brutalise the enemy "other" it becomes a war *of* terrorisms, rather than a war *on* terrorism.
>
> —Richard Jackson, *Writing the War on Terrorism: Language, Politics and Counter-terrorism*

On 11 September 2001, terrorists belonging to the global terror network Al Qaeda hijacked four passenger aircraft in the United States. The hijackers flew two of the aeroplanes into the World Trade Center in New York and rammed a third aeroplane into the Pentagon in Washington, DC. The attack killed almost three thousand people. The United States responded by garnering international support for a "global war on terror." This "war" has consisted, notably, of invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq (Hayden 2009, 57-71; Hoffman 2006; Watson 2009, 1).[1] Thus, it has both challenged and upheld the conventional understanding of war as an *interstate* conflict—a conflict between countries. Terrorist groups are non-state actors, and this conflicts with the idea of a war on *terrorism*. However, simultaneously, the attacks on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and former President Saddam Hussein's government in Iraq constituted assaults on states and hence adhered to the conventional conception of war as interstate conflict (Pilbeam 2015, 88).

US and British forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, bombing Al Qaeda bases and Taliban government installations. "Operation Enduring Freedom" toppled the Taliban regime, following which Hamid Karzai took over as Afghan president, with the support of the United Nations (UN)-mandated International Security Assistance

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[1] The US Defense Department emailed staff at the Pentagon in March 2009 asking them to replace the phrase "global war on terror" with the less contentious term "overseas contingency operation" (Burkeman 2009; S. Wilson and Kamen 2009).

Force (ISAF). In 2003, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) assumed command of ISAF (Afghanistan International Security Assistance Force; K. Booth and Dunne 2002, 11; Public Broadcasting Service).

Although the international society of states unanimously supported "Operation Enduring Freedom," the UN did not sanction the US-led offensive in Iraq in 2003 to unseat Hussein. After the United States, the United Kingdom (UK) and Spain withdrew a UN Security Council (UNSC) resolution they had tabled, anticipating its veto, the United States put together a "coalition of the willing," consisting of thirty-eight countries that conducted the operation. Nevertheless, following the invasion, the United States again approached the UN and sought its approval for the maintenance of forces in Iraq (Beehner 2007; Newman 2004; Plunkett 2011; Press-Barnathan 2004, 205-06; Yew 2007). Galia Press-Barnathan (2004, 204-06) argues that the war in Iraq constituted a manifestation of US unilateralism, but it simultaneously revealed the limits of the United States' hegemony. Citizens of the United States and other countries protested against the war, displaying the agency of individuals in the face of action by the globally hegemonic state. Meanwhile, the United States' inability to pressure the UNSC into granting a resolution was significant, even if it did not prevent the war. Furthermore, the destabilisation of Iraq following the 2003 invasion paved the way for the emergence of al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi al-Iraq wa al-Sham (Daesh), often referred to in the West as ISIS, ISIL or IS. Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou (2018, loc. 3374) lists "the degenerated consequences of an Iraqi society preoccupied with and occupied by war for three decades since September 1980" as one of the reasons for the rise of Daesh. He claims that "the two most important events in the historical socio-genesis of IS [were] the torture at Abu Ghraib and the hanging of Saddam Hussein" (Mohamedou 2018, loc. 3483). Hence, he proclaims that "Iraq (2003) led to IS" (Mohamedou 2018, loc. 3538). Daesh's appearance in Iraq and Syria has revealed the United States' failure as international hegemon to ensure international security and promote liberal values through its "war on terror."

In this introduction, I will explore these themes of international terrorism and counterterrorism, the security landscape in Pakistan, and the English School (ES) of international relations (IR)—the theoretical

approach I employ in this book to make my claims. I will define the terms *terrorism* and *terrorist groups* and question the use of the adjective "global" to describe the "war on terror." I will also explore the *globalisation* of terrorism, problematising the conflation of terrorism with Islamist terrorism since 11 September 2001.

Colin Wight (2009) maintains that the *de-historicisation* of terrorism studies has meant that scholars writing about terrorism in the post-2001 world have tended to focus on psychological rather than historical and political factors leading to terrorism. This has led to a neglect of the process by which the state itself has evolved, and the ways in which non-state actors have challenged the state's claim to be the only legitimate employer of violence in a territory, ever since the birth of the modern state in Europe between the fifteenth and eighteenth centuries (Drogus and Orvis 2008, chap. 2).

Furthermore, Barry Buzan (2004a) has pointed to the growing relevance of non-state actors in international politics and suggested that the ES's concept of *world society* offers a helpful framework through which we might understand and study this transformation of world politics. Towards the end of this introduction, I will explain my use of the ES to study the issue of militancy in Pakistan, building on Buzan's (2015, 126) identification of the ES as "a neglected approach to International Security Studies." I will also explain my positionality as an Indian scholar studying security in Pakistan.

Terrorism and Terrorist Groups

The difficulty of defining terrorism is exemplified by the inability of UN member states to arrive at a definition, with non-Western states accusing the West of a colonial attitude that portrays even "legitimate" freedom fighters as terrorists (Romaniuk 2010, 38-39; P. Wilkinson 2011, 165). As Colin Wight (2009) quips, "The cliché that it is a bit like pornography, and you will know it when you see it, has a grain of truth to it."

Various authors have approached the task of defining terrorism in different ways. For Bruce Hoffman (2006, 41-42), terrorism consists of "the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change." Thus, terrorist violence is about creating *fear*, employing *violence*, and having *political*

aims. Hoffman also emphasises the *target audience* of terrorism, suggesting that terrorism often seeks to intimidate a wider audience than "the immediate victim or target." In addition, Hoffman characterises terrorism as *sub-national* and *non-state* violence, and says that it is usually about seeking power, leverage, and influence. These three factors—power, leverage, and influence—are the means through which terrorists seek to effectuate political change.

For Colin Wight (2009), terrorism is about communication—he sees it as "a form of violent political communication." He also characterises terrorism as "illegitimate" violence that targets "*non-state* actors and institutions," rather than the government (italics mine).

Adopting a different approach, Alex Schmid (2004) argues that there are five distinct ways of understanding terrorism—as crime, politics, warfare, a means of communication, and religious fundamentalism. Meanwhile, Leonard Weinberg, Ami Pedahzur, and Sivan Hirsch-Hoefler (2004, 782) have conducted a survey of articles on terrorism in three academic journals and concluded that there exists a consensus definition of terrorism within academia. This consensus definition considers terrorism to be "a *politically motivated* tactic involving the *threat or use of force or violence* in which the *pursuit of publicity* plays a significant role" (italics mine).

Based on these definitions, this book understands terrorism to have *political* roots, to employ violent means to *communicate*, and to challenge the state's claim of being the only *legitimate* employer of force in a territory. I focus on the political roots of terrorism, drawing on work by Robert Jackson (2005), Arun Kundnani (2016) and Colin Wight (2009), who assert that there has been a *de-politicisation* of terrorism in research conducted after 2001, causing scholars to over-emphasise the link between terrorism and religious ideology. As a result of this neglect of the political grievances that lead to terrorism, scholars and other observers have excessively focused on Islamist violence and ignored other types of terrorism. I also see terrorism as a form of communication, drawing on Buzan's (2004) claim that all violence is a form of social interaction. Finally, I look at how non-state actors such as terrorists have challenged the state's claim to having a monopoly over the "legitimate" use of force within a given territory (Halliday 1994; C. Wight 2009; Wulf 2007). These claims about the de-historicisation and de-politicisation of terrorism inform my analysis of the emergence of

terrorism in Pakistan, especially since the 1980s, and my emphasis on history and politics to understand why and how this happened and what it means for the present and future.

Although authors such as Brian Phillips (2014) and Hoffman (2006) see terrorist groups as subnational organisations, in fact these groups increasingly operate transnationally, and this is certainly the case for many groups operating in Pakistan. Therefore, I understand terrorist groups to be sub-national as well as transnational organisations that employ terrorism. I replace the words "terrorism/terrorist" with "militancy/militant," "separatism/separatist," and "extremism/extremist" in various places to provide variety to readers and avoid repetitiveness, but also, sometimes, to provide a nuanced understanding of the aims and ideology of a particular group, or out of sensitivity to the moral ambiguity surrounding some forms of political violence, such as Kashmiri separatism.

Is the "War on Terror" Global?

Many scholars consider the United States' description of the "war on terror" as global to be problematic. For instance, Helen Dexter (2007) discusses how for some authors, the interventionism of the United States and its Western allies represents post-imperialism. Robert Patman (2006, 964) declares that although the United States dabbled in multilateralism in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September 2001 attacks, its approach to the "global war on terror" has mostly demonstrated a heightened form of *American exceptionalism*: "the informal ideology that endows Americans with the conviction that their nation is an exemplary one." His argument is underpinned by the United States' disregard for the opposition of most members of the UNSC to the Iraq war. He postulates that this sort of unilateralism on the part of the United States cannot continue in a globalising world and that greater international cooperation and the support of other countries and multinational institutions are essential ingredients of a successful response to international terrorism. Paul Wilkinson (2011, 170-81) and Peter Romaniuk (2010, 3-4) similarly maintain that the reaction to the globalised terrorist threat has been insufficiently multilateral. Wilkinson (2011, 173) perceives a "huge gulf between the rhetoric and the reality of international cooperation against terrorism,"

which he attributes to the dominance of the realist paradigm among policymakers. Furthermore, his argument in favour of an international response to terrorism is supported by his contention that terrorism constitutes an "attack on human rights," rendering counterterrorism a duty of the international community (Wilkinson 2011, 181). Patman (2006), Romaniuk (2010) and Wilkinson's (2011) conceptualisation of contemporary terrorism as a globalised risk underpins their support for a more multilateral approach to terrorism.

Globalisation and Terrorism

While scholars have been unable to agree on whether globalisation exists, this book adopts what David Held and Anthony McGrew (2000, 2) refer to as the *globalist* position, in that it considers globalisation to be real and significant. In terms of definition, it draws on Jan Aart Scholte's (2005, 53-59) understanding of globalisation as a proliferation of trans-planetary, supranational connections among people. This also corresponds with Frank Lechner and John Boli's (2015, 2) definition of globalisation as "the processes by which more people across large distances become connected in more and different ways."

Robert Denemark (2010) draws a link between fundamentalism and globalisation, suggesting that globalisation has contributed indirectly to religious fundamentalism because, for him, "globalization is an extension of modernization and post-modernization," which he sees as the antithesis of religious fundamentalism. Denemark (2010) suggests that fundamentalism is a reaction against modernity and post-modernity. However, it is essential to differentiate between terrorism and fundamentalism.

Given that the "global war on terror" rhetoric of former US President George Bush's administration seemed to conflate global terror with Islamist terror, it is worth pointing out that, through history, terrorism has taken on various hues, both secular and religious. David Rapoport (2002) has divided modern history into four waves of terror. These are the *anarchist wave*, which lasted from the 1880s to the 1910s; the *anti-colonial wave*, which took place from the 1920s to the 1950s; the *new left wave*, which extended from the 1960s to the 1990s; and the *religious wave*, which began in the 1970s and continues. During this ongoing religious wave, adherents of several religions, including

Hinduism, Sikhism, Judaism, Christianity, Islam and the New-Age Movement, have been suspected or convicted of having perpetrated religiously motivated terrorist attacks (Ahuja 2014a, 2014b; Gilani 2014; Komireddi 2011; Koppikar 2011; Rapoport 2002).

However, the Islamist groups Al Qaeda (and its franchises Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghrib) and, more recently, Daesh are significant in the globalisation of terrorism because of their ability to recruit globally (Mohamedou 2018, loc. 1324-2367). Al Qaeda espouses an ideology that favours attacks on the *far enemy*, as discussed below (Gerges 2009; Rapoport 2002; Sageman 2008, 42-43). Since Islamist militancy is directly relevant to the subject matter of this book, being the most prevalent form of terrorism affecting Pakistan, I focus on the globalisation of Islamist violence here. However, it is important to note that this approach is not without its problems. For instance, violence within Pakistan by Baloch and Pashtun ethnic secessionists does not fit the stereotype of religiously motivated terrorism. Nor does political violence by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM), which represents the Mohajir community of Partition refugees. The over-emphasis on Islamist violence in the post-9/11 era is a genuine problem that serves to mask the fact that many other forms of terrorism have and continue to exist around the world. However, given the violence unleashed *within* Pakistan in the twenty-first century by Islamist groups such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Daesh and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), this is an important focus of the political violence studied in this book.

Various authors have approached the idea of the globalisation of terrorism in different ways. Olivier Roy (2004, 51) focuses on the recruitment of Al Qaeda militants from among the Muslim diaspora in the West since the 1990s. Thomas Hegghammer (2010/11, 53) traces the path of an Islamist terrorist from the West via combat zones such as Afghanistan and Iraq to membership of transnational terrorist groups like Al Qaeda. His study of "the globalization of jihad"[2] focuses

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[2] The term "jihad" and its derivatives are deeply contested within Islamic legal scholarship and political thought (Afsaruddin 2016). Because Islamist militants *see themselves* as being mujahideen, I do not shy away from using the terms "jihad," "*jihadi*" and "mujahideen." As a work of scholarship, it is important that this book does not suppress the voices of Islamist terrorists, who are central actors for this study—however politically incorrect the use of this

on religiously motivated fighters who travel from their home countries to war zones, whom he distinguishes from international terrorists who target civilians outside these zones. He argues that "foreign fighter mobilizations empower transnational terrorist groups such as al-Qaida, because volunteering for war is the principal stepping-stone for individual involvement in more extreme forms of militancy." Thus, he highlights the internationalisation of terrorist training.

Marc Sageman (2008, 29-31) draws a distinction between Al Qaeda the organisation and Al Qaeda the social movement. His primary argument is that Al Qaeda the organisation, or Al Qaeda Central, has been replaced in importance by a looser, more informal web of militant networks spread across the globe. Sageman (2008, 37-38) traces the origins of the globalisation of Islamist violence to a debate that emerged in the 1970s with the dissemination of a pamphlet authored by radical Islamist theorist Muhammad Abdel Salam Faraj. In it, Faraj argued that fighting the *near enemy*, the "apostate" local ruler, was more critical than warring against the far enemy, Israel.[3] In the 1990s, it was argued by a small group of Salafis[4] that the overthrow of the near enemy, the local Middle Eastern "apostate" governments, was dependent on expelling the far enemy or Western powers from the Middle East. According to Sageman, the 11 September 2001 attackers were proponents of this latter approach. For him, it is terrorists whose focus is on the far enemy who constitute global Islamist terrorism.

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terminology may be. Nevertheless, I am acutely sensitive to the fact that this risks the demonisation of a whole religion and its adherents and have therefore sought to minimise my use of these terms, especially given the contemporary political context.

[3] Faraj was representative of a faction of Salafis who believed that the local Middle Eastern rulers were apostates as they had adopted Western ways to the extent of having abandoned true Islam (Sageman 2008, 37-38).

[4] Salafism refers to a puritanical movement within Islam that advocates strict adherence to the Quran, the *sunna* (the example of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)) and the consensus of the *salaf* (the companions of the Prophet Muhammad (SAW)). Quintan Wiktorowicz (2006, 208) proclaims that there are three major factions within the Salafi movement: "the purists, the politicos, and the jihadis." References to Salafism within this book are concerned with the violent faction of Salafis.

Sageman (2008, 40-43) also traces Al Qaeda's path towards global terrorism. According to him, after the Soviet Union withdrew its soldiers from Afghanistan in 1989, a few hardcore militants did not return to their home countries but stayed behind in Pakistan, swearing allegiance to Osama bin Laden or one of his senior representatives. Similarly, Mohamedou (2018, loc. 902-08) recounts that in 1988-89, as the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the "chatter" of radical Islamists monitored by intelligence agencies started to focus "on the creation of a dedicated, larger organisation that would go beyond the operational purpose of Maktab al Khadamat, and indeed beyond the confines of the Afghan-Soviet conflict itself." The birth of Al Qaeda is traced to 11 August 1988, although it underwent several changes in nomenclature, from Al Jaish al Islami, to Sijil al Qaeda, to Al Qaeda al'Askariya. Mohamedou's account differs from Sageman's in that he traces the emergence of al Qaeda to Khost province of Afghanistan, rather than to Pakistan. But what is clear is that the organisation emerged from the debris of the Cold War and the Afghan war of the 1980s, and that it was born in the border region of north-western Pakistan and southern Afghanistan.

As a result of pressure on Pakistan from the group members' home governments, this group shifted base to Sudan. The far-enemy thesis gained traction among some of these militants, including bin Laden, who returned to Afghanistan in 1996 and was followed there by 150 of the Sudan-based militants. Three months later, bin Laden issued a "declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places"—referring to Saudi Arabia and Palestine (Sageman 2008, 40-43). This document contained a call by bin Laden for Muslims to target the far enemy rather than the near enemy, focusing on expelling the United States and Israel from Saudi Arabia and Palestine (Gerges 2009, 31).

For Fawaz Gerges (2009, 30-31), this shift from localist to globalist jihad has its roots not only in Faraj's near enemy/far enemy dichotomy and the end of the Afghan war but also in the Gulf War and the deployment of US troops to Saudi Arabia. Also consequential was the 1990s defeat of localist Islamist militants and movements in their home countries. He argues that the ideological split between transnational mujahideen focused on the far enemy and religious nationalists who

fight the near enemy represents an ongoing schism in the *jihadi* movement (Gerges 2009, 34).

This globalisation of Islamist extremism, and, in particular, of Al Qaeda, points to a problem for IR theorists: How can theories that focus on relations among states understand violent non-state actors who target states and their citizens? This relates to a long-standing debate among IR scholars on whether theory ought to be state-centric, a dispute that finds its contemporary manifestation in the debate over globalisation (Hay 2010, 279-80). With globalists having called into question the continuing relevance of realism and neorealism—for long the dominant theories of IR—on account of their complete reliance on state-centrism, it is pertinent to consider how alternative theoretical approaches can contribute to this discussion (Hay 2010, 279-80). The next section will address this issue using the lens of ES theory.

The English School Theory of International Relations

The ES represents a theory of IR that sees the *international system*, *international society*, and *world society* as three interlinked concepts that are at play in international politics. Hedley Bull's (2012, 9) foundational definition of an international system of states is that such a system "is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave—at least in some measure—as parts of a whole." He describes an international society as "a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, [that] form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions" (Bull 2012, 13). Finally, "By a world society we understand not merely a degree of interaction linking all parts of the human community to one another, but a sense of common interest and common values, on the basis of which common rules and institutions may be built" (Bull 2012, 269).

Scholars of IR have often perceived the ES to be synonymous with the "international-society approach." Indeed, theorists from the school have traditionally prioritised international society (Buzan 2001, 471; Buzan 2004a, 7; Dunne 2010, 142; Linklater 2005, 84; Linklater and Suganami 2006, 13; Little 2000, 398). However, contemporary ES

scholars such as Buzan (2001, 2004), Tim Dunne (2010) and Richard Little (2000) have argued forcefully that the international-system and world-society levels of analysis constitute invaluable contributions to IR theory. They consider one of the critical strengths of the ES to lie in its ability to theorise in the twenty-first-century globalised context wherein transnational identities and forces wield considerable influence on international politics, but states remain relevant.

These concerns of the evolving ES with globalisation and non-state actors informs the analysis in this book of terrorist groups as transnational actors in a globalising world where states remain the primary actors in terms of counterterrorism. I consider states to remain relevant despite globalisation and the increasing power of transnational forces that transcend the state. In that sense, this book falls within the *pluralist* strand of the ES, as explained further in Chapter 2.

Equally, though, this book will test the strength of the ES as a contemporary theory of IR. The unilateralism displayed by the United States in the "global war on terror," as well as the challenge to international society's monopoly over the use of violence posed by global terrorists, constitute tests for international society as a viable concept in today's world (Dunne 2010, 154). The ES traces its history back to the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics, which was established in 1959. The committee developed its thinking on international society over subsequent years, culminating in the publication of *Diplomatic Investigations* (Butterfield and Wight 1966). 1977 witnessed the publication of the first edition of Bull's (2012) *Anarchical Society*. In the 1990s, a new generation of ES authors contributed to *International Society and the Development of International Relations Theory*, edited by Barbara Allen Roberson and published in 1998 (Buzan 2001, 472-74; Roberson 2002). However, with the dawn of the twenty-first century, Buzan (2001, 471) complained that the ES had become "an underexploited resource in IR." Therefore, one of the tasks of this book is to shed light on whether the ES remains relevant to contemporary IR, by testing its ability to provide insight into the phenomenon of transnational terrorism.

World Society and Transnational Actors

As Parag Khanna (2011, chap. 2) shows, globalisation has caused some so-called "weak states" to become still "weaker," while

empowering multinational corporations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational terrorist groups, criminal groups, and drug gangs. Peter Willetts (2011, 328-38) divides political players into five categories—governments, multinational corporations, single-country NGOs, intergovernmental organisations, and international NGOs— while also acknowledging the impact of guerrilla and terrorist groups and criminal gangs on the international order. Given this range of influential global players, he criticises the state-centric approach to IR, arguing in favour of a pluralist model wherein the activities of states as well as transnational actors are considered.

As a solution to this "new world disorder" wherein "interhuman identities [. . .] have spilled out of state containers," Buzan (2004a, xiii-137) proposes bringing transnational actors into the ES's analytical framework by placing a greater emphasis on the world-society level of analysis offered by the school. The world-society level transcends the state system, instead treating individuals, non-state actors and the global population as the focus of analysis. Clubbed with the ES's international-system and international-society concepts, world society allows IR scholars to cope with the changing world dynamics brought about by globalisation. Through the juxtaposition of international and world society, the ES is capable of considering interstate relations and non-state systems simultaneously, thus helping IR as a discipline to make the transition to the evolving world order.

In identifying this potential for the ES's world-society idea to respond to the challenge to IR theory posed by the growing clout of non-state actors, Buzan (2004a) makes a significant contribution to thinking on globalisation and the ES. His book *From International to World Society* directly addresses the question of non-state violent actors in theoretical terms, which is an essential step in developing the concept. Barak Mendelsohn (2005, 46) uses the ES to empirically analyse the risk posed by Al Qaeda to international society. In doing so, he aims to incorporate violent non-state actors more fully into the ES's work by considering how they pose an existential threat to the international system and international society. However, Mendelsohn confines his analysis to the international-system and international-society levels, never venturing into the world-society realm to explore the conceptual opportunities it offers for grappling with the globalisation of terrorism. This is because he is limited by the traditional, international-

society approach of the ES and ignores Buzan's (2004) work on utilising the world-society concept to study non-state and transnational phenomena. Because of this neglect, Mendelsohn's writing remains state-centric and concerned with the security of states, ignoring both the security of human beings and the political and historical reasons for the violence perpetrated by terrorist organisations. Since the referent object for security is the state in Mendelsohn's work, there is no scope for worrying about why terrorists do what they do or what impact the actions of states have on individuals.

Building on the work of these contemporary ES theorists, this book addresses the gaps in Mendelsohn's analysis by bringing into focus the security of individuals and by placing terrorism in its historical and political context at the domestic, regional, and global levels. Thus, it employs three levels of analysis—the state, the region and the world—with the state acting as the primary unit of analysis. However, this book is informed by the idea of world society and a critical sensibility, and it considers individuals to be the primary referent object of security. This is discussed further in Chapter 2, but for now, suffice it to say that this book considers the role of the state to be to secure the human beings living within its frontiers.

The International System, International Society, and Counterterrorism

Mendelsohn (2009a) advances the idea that international society has a *responsibility* to support states where terrorists have established bases when these states do not possess the wherewithal to prevent militants from using their territory as an operational base. This is because, he argues, terrorism constitutes an existential threat to the international system and international society, so it is incumbent upon "stronger" states within international society to address this threat within the borders of "weaker" states if the latter are unable to do so. Mendelsohn insists that international society must uphold the legitimacy of such states and reinforce their ability to fight terrorism. This book explores this idea of international society having a responsibility towards states that are unable to counter terrorism adequately using their own resources alone. This entangles my work in the debate between *pluralists* and *solidarists* in the ES, because of their emphasis on state sovereignty and collective action, respectively. As a

postcolonial state, Pakistan is sensitive to issues of national sovereignty, and a solidarist approach risks violating this sensitivity. My work, therefore, is essentially pluralist, although it contains a robust solidarist element because of its exploration of international society's collective responsibility towards Pakistan. This book recognises and respects Pakistan's sensitivity regarding its sovereignty, while maintaining that collective international action need not breach state sovereignty. In this sense, my work bridges the pluralism/solidarism divide within the ES.

In a different article, Mendelsohn (2012, 590-613) presents his states-versus-non-state-actors thesis in a new form, depicting Islamist extremist groups as religious challengers to the secular Westphalian order, with Al Qaeda and Hizb-ut-Tahrir providing examples of a violent and a non-violent Islamist extremist group respectively. Employing the ES's conceptual framework, he demonstrates how these groups undermine both the international system and international society and seek to replace them with an alternative, religion-based order. Emphasising the need to take this challenge seriously, he argues that scholars have, in any case, been increasingly considering alternatives to the state-based international order, such as world government, suggesting that they do not see the existing set-up as being inviolable. Additionally, he emphasises the growing lethality of weapons, asserting that the level of the threat to the international system and international society is rising.

The pertinence of Mendelsohn's argument was underlined by the rise of Daesh from 2011 to 2017 and its ambition of setting up a caliphate (Wilson Center 2019). This is because Daesh's territorial ambitions have highlighted the threat posed by violent extremist groups to the state-based international order. Simultaneously, however, the emergence of Daesh brought to the fore the problematic and West-centric nature of Mendelsohn's claims. As Mohamedou (2018) contends, terrorism scholarship has tended to neglect the political and historical context for the emergence of Al Qaeda and Daesh—namely, the Afghan jihad of the 1980s and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. He frames Daesh's extreme violence as a form of counter-imperialism, of violence being returned to its sender, in the wake of the United States' imperialist war in Iraq since 2003 and the human-rights violations this has entailed. He further problematises the Euro-centrism of the statist understanding of international order that predominates in terrorism studies, positing

that this understanding is ignorant of spatial and temporal realities in Asia, Africa, and South America.

This leads to the question of *why* the state-based international system should be defended against threats, and why a religion-based order such as a caliphate should be unthinkable. The question of Daesh's extreme violence is pertinent, although, as Mohamedou (2018) emphasises, the violence of powerful states has *also* been lethal, yet we consider the status-quo international order acceptable.

Buzan (1991, 306-08) holds that *revolutionary-revisionist* forces, which challenge "the organizing principles of the dominant status quo," feel vulnerable in a hostile world. In an international society that upholds the institution of territoriality, a revolutionary-revisionist state such as Pakistan with respect to Kashmir is more likely to be criticised by the international community than a status-quo state such as India that is happy with the status quo of possessing the Kashmir valley. Buzan (1991, 308) claims that ideological differences between status-quo and revisionist powers amplify mutual fear and hostility.

Applying Buzan's argument to Islamist terrorists, it is possible that states, as the status-quo powers, have exaggerated the threat posed by terrorist groups in the post-9/11 scenario. This suggests that the vast sums of money spent on defeating Islamist terrorists may well be a consequence of this exaggerated sense of fear and hostility. Paying more attention to "soft" counterterrorism could help deflate the tensions that have caused much human suffering since 2001.

Returning to the pluralist and solidarist positions within the ES, it is useful to consider Nicholas Wheeler's (2000) exploration of this distinction in the context of humanitarian interventionism. Wheeler explains that pluralism privileges the aim of *order* in international life, whereas solidarism privileges *justice*. Hence, pluralism gives priority to the rights and duties of states and the institutions "of sovereignty, non-intervention, and non-use of force" (Wheeler 2000, 11). Conversely, for solidarists, individuals have rights that states must safeguard, and this places a moral responsibility on states "to protect the security of their own citizens" as well as human beings everywhere (Wheeler 2000, 11-12). From this perspective, the institutions of human rights and humanitarian intervention are prioritised.

Within a pluralist approach, the emphasis is on the right of a state to exist. Consequently, pluralism manifests in interstate relations

through "the reciprocal recognition of state sovereignty and the norm of non-intervention." Conversely, solidarism considers it possible and realistic to expect diverse states to "reach agreement about substantive moral standards," and gives international society a moral right to seek to uphold these standards. Here, the stress is on an individual's right to security (Bellamy and McDonald 2004).

Samuel Makinda (2005b), however, challenges the distinction between pluralism and solidarism. He avows that ES theorists who make this distinction have misunderstood the work of earlier scholars such as Bull and Martin Wight, who comfortably swung between pluralist and solidarist ideas. Furthermore, he claims that the dichotomy between state security and human security is a false one, as all security ought to be people-centred from a democratic perspective.

Makinda's (2005b) perspective is helpful in considering international cooperation to counter terrorism. Islamist terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda and Daesh have posed a threat to the international system of states in the post-9/11 era, but simultaneously have been threatened themselves by human-rights violations that have taken place during the "war on terror." Wali Aslam's (2016) work on the ES and Pakistan adopts a pluralist stance in critiquing the United States' drone strikes in the former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan (which in 2018 were absorbed into Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (R. Yusufzai 2018)). In this book, I similarly take a pluralist position, in deference to the intense nationalism that characterises postcolonial South Asian states such as Pakistan. However, despite Pakistan's sensitivities surrounding sovereignty, there is the broader question of who should be the referent object of security—the state or the individual. While pluralism favours the security of the state, solidarism recognises the individual as the ultimate referent object of security. Terrorist attacks within Pakistan in reaction to the "war on terror" have targeted both the Pakistani state and civilians in the country. Therefore, I consider both to be the referent objects of security in this book, but I maintain a critical scepticism about whether the state system is worth protecting at all.

Makinda (2003) raises the question of how international society ought to confront non-state actors in his analysis of the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. He asks how an international security threat posed not by a state, but by a transnational actor, ought to be addressed. Is military

action against a state the best way of tackling such a risk? While it is true that Afghanistan under the Taliban was giving refuge to Al Qaeda, this can be read through the lens of Pashtunwali and the Pashtun norm of hospitality. It is unclear that the Taliban would have strongly resisted an attempt by Western states to target only Al Qaeda without toppling the Taliban regime, especially if we consider former Taliban emir Mullah Mohammad Omar's reported comment that likened bin Laden to a bone that was stuck in his throat (J. Burke 2012; Partlow 2011). Furthermore, the question of whether state-centric military operations, with massive civilian casualties, have increased radicalisation is a serious one. Military counterterrorism operations in Pakistan have displaced many people, while US drone strikes in the country have caused civilian casualties. Marina Espinoza (2018, 13) quotes a Pakistani photographer as explaining how drone strikes cause hatred towards the United States among people who have witnessed a drone attack. Espinoza (2018, 13) links anti-American sentiment to drone survivors' anger "at the injustice." Meanwhile, Stanford Law School and the NYU School of Law's *Living under Drones* document reports that Pakistani interviewees "emphasized their belief that enmity toward the US stems largely from particular US rights-violating post-9/11 policies, and could be reversed if the US changed course." The report quotes a victim of a drone strike in 2011 as asserting that "we don't have any revenge or anything else to take from America if they stop the drone attacks" (International Human Rights and Conflict Resolution Clinic at Stanford Law School and Global Justice Clinic at NYU School of Law 2012). In 2012, Pakistani ambassador to the United States Sherry Rehman told *CNN* that drone strikes radicalised "foot soldiers, tribes and entire villages in our region" (Imtiaz 2012). Thus, there are grounds for questioning the overemphasis on military counterterrorism, and for seriously considering the potential of alternative, "soft" counterterrorism approaches.

Like Mendelsohn (2012), Makinda (2003) understands terrorism to be a threat to the norms and institutions of international society and argues that a collective response from international society is the best way to counter such a threat. He argues that "by the end of 2001, the United States was increasingly acting unilaterally, claiming that it did not want to be constrained by international norms, institutions and regimes" (Makinda 2003, 44). Makinda reasons that a consensus within international society would accord greater legitimacy to counterterrorism

efforts and that the UN is the most legitimate body to conduct multilateral counterterrorism operations.

Mendelsohn (2009b, 2-10) disagrees with Makinda's (2003) disparaging assessment of the United States' actions post-2001. He reasons that, from an ES perspective, "The role of the hegemon or the great powers is not unimportant: they set the agenda, articulate a program to pursue it, and facilitate its execution" (Mendelsohn 2009b, 2). He sees a crucial role for the hegemon in the struggle between international society and militant groups and claims that hegemony constitutes one of the institutions of international society. Mendelsohn (2009b, 8) defines hegemony "as an actor enjoying a level of power so overwhelming that no single rival can challenge it." This reveals a tension between the perceptions of different ES theorists regarding the United States' leadership of the "global war on terror." It signals a need for research on whether multilateral counterterrorism initiatives should be undertaken by the hegemon in the international system, by a group of *great powers*, or by an international organisation such as the UN (Bull 2012, 194).

James Plunkett's (2011) reading of Bull suggests that unipolarity is inimical to the proper functioning of international society. Plunkett (2011, 804) attests to unipolarity's encouragement of bilateralism to the detriment of multilateralism and propounds the idea that "bilateral relations would kick the legs from under the shared interests that provide the core of Bull's conception of international society and its institutions." He argues that for Bull, the preponderance of one state carries with it the risk that this state will violate the norms of international society with impunity and without regard for other states.

Plunkett's (2011) opinion does not concur with Mendelsohn's (2009b) understanding of the role of hegemony in the ES, highlighting the difficulty of arriving at an appropriate mechanism for international society to respond to global terrorism. Bull (2012, 222) himself seems to espouse a nuanced position that is not necessarily at odds with either Plunkett's or Mendelsohn's stance. He states that "one of the means by which the great powers can seek to legitimise their role is by co-opting the major secondary powers, which are by definition their major potential rivals, as junior partners in their system of global management." This is, indeed, what has come to pass in the "war on terror," with the United States cobbling together a "coalition of the willing" when it was