Latin America and the Global Political Stage

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From the Columbian Exchange to Trumpism

Edited by

Joshua Hyles

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

FOREWORD

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The following chapters are adapted from papers presented at the twenty-third annual Eugene Scassa Mock OAS Conference, held in November, 2019, at St. Mary's University in San Antonio, Texas. The academic research conference, held in conjunction with two intercollegiate competitions (the Mock Summit of the Americas/Organization of American States and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights Moot Court Competition), was open to undergraduate, graduate, and postgraduate presenters wishing to discuss any aspect of the history and politics of the Americas. Allowing for such a wide range of experiences and academic interests provides a wealth of research that celebrates the wide and challenging scope of understanding the countries and people of the Americas. An array of different perspectives is presented here, from sociology to history to economics. Though at first glance this collection seems unrelated, upon closer inspection it reveals a vast and intricate set of relationships rooted deep in a shared, tumultuous past and looking forward to a promising, but not promised, future.

The Americas, taken together, have been the victim of academic and political homogenization. Rather than a collection of 36 independent and distinct states, too often the Americas have been lumped together as "Canada, the U.S., Central America, South America, and the Caribbean," with too little attention paid to the nuances of culture and history that make the states of the Americas distinct. Part of the *raison d'etre* of the ESMOAS annual conference and competition, as well as this publication, is to educate students of history, culture, and politics about this diverse hemisphere.

The first section of the book considers four political case studies from South America—Chile, Brazil, and a pair from troubled Venezuela. Nathan Stone from the University of Texas presents the first chapter from the field of history, an analysis of the origins of the armed insurrection movement by the MIR in the late 1960s in Chile, in many ways a precursor to events later across the Americas (Nicaragua and Venezuela, for example). Following this, James Norris from Texas A&M International University takes a more quantitiative approach, presenting a data analysis of Brazilian citizens'

attitudes toward the way democracy is being practiced in Brazil. In Chapter Three, Claudia Donoso from St. Mary's University considers the Venezuelan mighration crisis from the viewpoint of Ecuadorean foreign policy and Ecuador's actions in dealing with an influx of refugees from its historically more prosperous neighbor. Finally, Betsy Smith from St. Mary's University looks at the same issue from a judicial and legal perspective, following the proceedings of the International Criminal Court with regard to former president Maduro.

Section Two switches focus to culture and trade. First, Krista Gehlhausen from Concordia University Texas looks at the negative impacts NAFTA has had on the nation of Mexico. Alejandra Huerta from Universidad Regiomontana then considers the impact of trade with South Korea on the Mexican culture through a sociologically-oriented case study. In Chapter Seven, Regan Murr from the University of Mary Hardin-Baylor takes a closer look at another cultural clash—the independence movement of Cuba in the early twentieth century, as it attempted to emerge from a long shadow cast by the United States and its informal, soft power influence in the hemisphere. Finally, Daniel Hoover from Baylor University looks further back in the history of Mexico and Central America with a historical analysis of gender and sexuality and their role in power negotiations and the patriarchy during the time of the Spanish Inquisition.

Section Three looks more to the future, as the countries of the Americas face (sometimes together, sometimes at odds) the future. Chapter Nine opens the section with Jacob Wright of San Diego State University looking at the longstanding Good Neighbor Policy that defined U.S.-Latin American relations for the greater part of the last half-century, as Franklin Roosevelt attempted to redefine the relationship between the United States and its southern neighbors as one of more equality and reciprocity. In Chapter Ten, Aleena Stephens of the University of Mary Hardin-Baylor considers the process of elections and the modern policies of election interference and meddling. Also hailing from Mary Hardin-Baylor, Rebekah Wood then looks at more domestic voting policy, analyzing the impact and potential of military veterans as a voting group, using the region around Fort Hood, Texas, as her area of study. Finally, Chapter Twelve considers the globalized future and the decline of U.S. hegemony in the hemisphere that has been the defining theme for the last century. In this political science study, Luke Benz from the University of Mary Hardin-Baylor looks particularly at economics and trade in an attempt to predict the new role of the United States in the Americas.

Taken together, these papers and the ESMOAS Conference provide a multifaceted, multifocal insight into the rich history, complex relationship,

and diverse cultures of the Americas. The editor would like to thank the Faculty Steering Committee of the Eugene Scassa Mock OAS Program and the presenters from the 2017 ESMOAS Conference for their valuable support and research.

SECTION ONE:

CASE STUDIES IN THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAS

CHAPTER ONE

THE ORIGINS OF CHILE'S MIR: A CALL TO ARMED INSURRECTION, 1965-1970

NATHAN STONE
UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN

Abstract

Chile's *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria*, MIR, was unique among revolutionary movements. Founded in 1965 as a response to the passive "wait-and-see" politics of the traditional Chilean left, MIR proposed a daring program of direct action. If they robbed a bank, it wasn't just for the money. They made it a clever public statement, mocking the accumulation of wealth in the hands of so few. If they hijacked a truck full of frozen chicken, they took their loot to Chile's urban shantytowns and gave it away to the poor. MIR's leadership was independent, well-read and young. Confrontational insolence would become their signature style. MIR's base was committed but small, without funding, training or arms. Quickly overpowered by the military regime after 1973, their legacy is one of all-or-nothing commitment to a better world.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Dr Jonathan Brown at the University of Texas for his comments on early drafts of this article, and the women of *La Agrupación de Familiares de Detenidos Desaparecidos,* in Chile, for many years of support and friendship.

Introduction

At the apex of the Latin American Cold War, Chile's *Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria* (Movement of the Revolutionary Left), or MIR, became the nation's primary advocate of Cuban-style Marxist revolution.

The traditional Chilean left—Communists and Socialists—considered MIR quixotic and unrealistic, while the conservative right and the U.S. State Department wrote them off as mindless terrorist puppets of a hypothetical international conspiracy. But Chile's MIR became a viable manifestation of the new independent Latin American left, (hereafter, New Left), with unique characteristics and local roots.[1]

During the Pinochet years (1973-1990) and for some time thereafter, reasonable dialogue about MIR, academic or otherwise, rarely surfaced. Recently, however, survivors have lost their fear. Memoirs have emerged. Together with original documents and periodicals, it has become possible to piece together who the original *Miristas* were, what motivated them, and how they put their principles into action.[2] One such survivor asks, "How does an ordinary guy become a revolutionary militant?"[3] As electoral triumph drifted into realm of possibility for Chile's traditional left, why were so many of Chile's best and brightest drawn to MIR's call for armed revolution? That is a good question.

This essay will show how MIR's unique program attracted young idealists on its own merits. MIR's charismatic and youthful leaders made convincing arguments about the causes of, and the solutions for, widespread

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[1] The new Latin American left included Argentina's ERP (Ejército Revolucionario del Pueblo), Tupamaros in Uruguay, Bolivia's ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional) and Venezuela's FALN, (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional). Perú's MIR shared a name with its Chilean counterpart, as did Venezuela's MIR, but there was no organizational connection. Aldo Marchesi calls this phenomenon the New Left, noting that all groups were youthful, critical of Soviet Socialism, and interested in mobilizing the masses in urban slums, ignored by the traditional left. Aldo Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, tr. Laura Pérez Carrara, (New York: Cambridge, 2017), 4.

[2] In the prologue to Marco Álvarez Vergara, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria: Historia de la Fundación del MIR Chileño*, (Santiago: LOM Ediciones, 2015), Andrés Pascal Allende, one of the few survivors of MIR's top brass, and Secretario General in exile for decades, relates how Carmen Castillo, the mother of Miguel Enríquez's second child, hid Miguel's writings and letters under the floorboards of her parents' home. Those were recently recovered and included in the growing Archivo Miguel Enríquez, in Santiago. Enríquez was one of the founding members, and Secretario General from 1967 until his death in 1974.

[3] Enérico García Concha, Todos los Días de la Vida: Recuerdos de un Militante del MIR Chileno, (Santiago: Editorial Cuarto Propio, 2010), 19. Sources for this study are in Spanish. Chilean last names consist of a patronymic and a matronymic. When only one is used, it is always the patronymic. The names and acronyms of organizations have been left in Spanish. Most are recognizable cognates. Translations in the text and footnotes are this authors' own.

and worsening poverty, both urban and rural. They understood their option not as mindless mayhem, but as a carefully considered ethical imperative.

MIR spun off from the traditional Chilean left between 1965 and 1970. The movement coalesced around the ideals of the Cuban revolution, home-grown anti-American sentiment and a fervent commitment to self-sacrifice for the revolutionary cause. There is no evidence to show Soviet or Chinese participation. Though most militants disappeared or went silent after the military coup in 1973, MIR left behind a legacy of unconditional loyalty, careful reflection and youthful audacity that has no parallel, even among other movements of the New Left.

Sources present a special challenge in this research.[4] Miristas all had code names. They learned to be secretive, distractive and deliberately mis-informative, because of the mostly underground nature of their organization. Political manifestos often put facts aside to promote causes and rally supporters. Notably, the subversive left was not alone in that regard. A parallel dynamic of bias is clearly observable in official sources.[5]

This is not to say that scholars should disregard pamphleteering and sign-waving. In fact, declarations demonstrate the founders' thinking, what they hoped to achieve and how. This study will uncover the evolving culture behind the movement. As one author put it, "until lions have their own historians, all hunting stories will glorify the hunters."[6] What did Miristas understand about themselves? What inspired them? How did their unique revolutionary identity come about?

The Founding

On April 2 of 1957, a general protest paralyzed Chile for two days. *La revolución de la Chaucha,* also called *La batalla de Santiago,* erupted in response to a rate hike in city bus fares. The parallel to a recent revolt in Santiago over Metro fares is striking. In 1957, the fare increase was part of an austerity package suggested by U.S. economists and imposed by

[4] Chilean journalist Ascanio Carvallo speaks of an "overabundance of doubtful documents" in Soledad Pino, *De Armas Tomar, Vidas Cruzadas por el MIR*, (Santiago: Ediciones Diego Portales, 2016), 12.

[5] William Slater, "The Revolutionary Left and Terrorist Violence in Chile," (Rand Report for the USAF, 1986), calls the MIR "a terrorist group," 6, and lumps it together with every available manifestation of leftist violence in Latin America. That can't be taken as any more objective or accurate than any of MIR's internal sources.

[6] Álvarez, La Constituyente Revolucionaria, 16. He is quoting an African proverb.

President Carlos Ibañez del Campo.[7] Twenty thousand took to the streets. Sixteen protesters died. The Enríquez brothers, Marco, Edgardo and Miguel, participated in Concepción. Marco declared in an interview that Miguel had lain down in front of a bus and barely escaped serious injury when the driver refused to stop.[8] He had just turned thirteen.

Before Fidel Castro's victory over the Batista regime in 1959, the winds of change already blew strongly in Chile. The protests of 1957 marked the beginning of a generalized process of radical politicization.[9] Miguel Enríquez would go on to become a founding member and, later, Secretary General of MIR. While Salvador Allende's leftist coalition embraced revolution through the ballot box, the *vía pacífica,* Ministas advocated armed rebellion, the *vía armada*.[10] By December of 1967, the Enríquez brothers, along with their close friends, Bautista Van Schouwen, Luciano Cruz and Andrés Pascal, would become the youngest cohort to ever take charge of a major political movement in Chile. How did that happen?

Having earned 39% of the popular vote, Socialist candidate Salvador Allende lost his third presidential bid to Christian Democrat Eduardo Frei in 1964.[11] The following year, disillusioned by electoral politics, radical splinter groups met at the shoe and leatherworkers' union at Calle San Francisco #269, in old-town Santiago.[12] The 93 delegates represented Santiago, Valparaíso, Talca, Linares, Concepción and Puerto Montt. No delegates were expected from the left-leaning northern mining regions. The

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[7] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 32, used the former name, but it can be confusing, because an earlier protest in 1949 had the same name. The austerity measures came as part of an economic reform proposed by a team of U.S. economists, the Klein-Saks Mission. Chaucha was a coin, worth about a nickel, the amount of the rate hike.

[8] From a 1999 interview with Marco Enríquez, quoted in Álvarez*, La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 32. See also, Pedro Naranjo, Mauricio Ahumada, Mario Garcés y Julio Pinto, eds., *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario en Chile: Discursos y Documentos del Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria, MIR.* (Santiago: LOM, 2004), 33.

[9] Eugenia Palieraki, ¡La Revolución ya Viene!, El MIR Chileno en los Años Sesenta. (Santiago: LOM, 2014), 37-38. See also, Eugenia Palieraki, "La Opción por las Armas," *Revista Polis*, No. 19, 2008.

[10] Allende's coalition was called FRAP (Frente de Acción Popular) in 1964, and UP (Unidad Popular) in 1970.

[11] More than the 36%, with which he won in 1970. The right strategically backed Frei in '64, to keep Allende out.

[12] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 56-60. The Sindicato de la Federación de Cueros y Calzados had anarchist leanings, but the members who attended the Congreso did not participate significantly in that organization.

highways had washed out in recent heavy rains. Chile was still very Third World, then.

Clotario Blest, the grey imminence of the Catholic labor movement, had called the meeting that would become MIR's Constitutional Congress. [13] Blest had a long trajectory, and working people revered him.[14] The meeting was open to "persons and parties who agree on the urgency of organizing a genuine revolutionary party that heeds the historic call of tearing down the old capitalist economic structures, and constructing, on their ruins, a socialist regime."[15]

Orders from Moscow always commanded Communist Party militants to wait. Miristas adamantly refused. "The bureaucratic leadership of the traditional left," they said, "has shattered the hopes of workers."[16] MIR's Political-Military Thesis proclaimed the urgency of "direct action" to overcome the "permanent electoral dance" that had disillusioned the Chilean proletariat.[17] *Reform* and *gradualism,* touchstones of the *via pacífica,* became MIR's dirty words.

MIR would not be Soviet, but it would not be Maoist, either. In February of 1966, as a delegate for Concepción's Student Federation, Miguel went to China. The rural dimension of the Maoist revolution fascinated him, but

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[13] Palieraki, ¡*La Revolución ya Viene*!, 31-40. See also, Matías Ortiz Figueroa*, Cada Día es Continuar: Política e Identidad en el MIR, 1965-1970*, (Concepción: Ediciones Escaparate, 2014), 69-70 and Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 23. Clotario Blest belonged to the generation of Dorothy Day and Peter Maurin of the Catholic Worker Movement, founded in New York, 1933. His competition was Luis Emilio Recabarren's traditional, orthodox, labor-oriented Marxism. This author had the privilege of knowing an octogenarian Clotario Blest in 1983. Lifetime bachelor married to his cause, he lived in an old house full of cats near downtown Santiago, but he never missed a protest.

[14] He had founded ANEF (Agrupación Nacional de Empleados Fiscales) in 1942 and CUT (Central Única de Trabajadores) in 1953. He personally called the assembly in 1965 with explicit support from the VRM-R (Vanguardia Revolucionaria Marxista-Rebelde) and the PSP (Partido Socialista Popular).

[15] From El Rebelde, No. 31, July 1965, also, quoted in Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 56. El Rebelde was the official newspaper of the VRM-R. It continued under MIR. The complete text of the invitation is reproduced in Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 129-131. Motivations for the call included the failure of the bourgeois government of Eduardo Frei, the cowardice of the traditional left (PCCh and PS) and the arrogance of U.S. interventionism, citing the recent invasion of the Dominican Republic, (1965).

[16] MIR, Declaración de Principios, 1965, reproduced in Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 131-135.

[17] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 64. Revolución permanente was a Trotskyite catch phrase.

Chinese accomplishments disappointed.[18] Working people lived in extreme poverty, there. According to MIR, Mao's revolution had failed.

As Fidel Castro called for revolutionary unity, MIR publicly committed to revolutionary independence.[19] When Soviet tanks rolled into Prague in August of 1968, MIR's weekly magazine, *El Rebelde*, energetically repudiated the move. "This was not in defense of socialism," they said, "…but a defense of the bureaucratic interests of the USSR."[20]

Chile's MIR came into being during the Christian Democratic government of Eduardo Frei. As such, opposition to Christian Democratic reform came to define MIR's identity.[21] In March of 1966, the Frei government suppressed a strike in the northern mining town of El Salvador. Eight miners died, consolidating the *Mirista* conviction that Christian Democratic rule would always defend developmental capitalism—a.k.a., U.S. interests—at the expense of the oppressed masses.[22] To be anti-Frei was to be anti-American. U.S. manipulation created political antibodies in the Chilean system, and MIR could be counted as one of those.

MIR self-identified as Marxist-eclectic. They would be an urban, rural, insurrectional, revolutionary vanguard.[23] Ministas embraced the urban guerrilla approach of the Brazilian revolutionary strategist, Carlos Marighella, along with the rural insurrectional policy of Che Guevara. And yet, they remained isolated. Fidel Castro refused to train the declared opponents of

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[18] *Ibid.*, 72 and Palieraki, *¡La Revolución ya Viene!*, 132. Palieraki speculates that Enríquez asked for money and didn't get it. Naranjo, et al, Miguel Enríquez y el proyecto revolucionario, 45, relates that a plane from Hong Kong to Japan that Miguel was supposed to have taken, went down killing all passengers. His family feared the worst, but he had taken a later flight.

[19] Tanya Harmer, *Allende's Chile and the Inter-American Cold War*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2011), 140. "Fidel very clearly told … Miguel Enríquez that the revolution in Chile 'would be made either by Allende or by no one' and that MIR therefore had to unite behind him."

[20] *El Rebelde,* (Sept 1968), quoted in Naranjo, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto*, 55. See also 107-110, and Ortiz, *Cada Día es Continuar*, 154.

[21] See *Punto Final*, Año I, Número 20, enero 1967, back cover. The political cartoon depicts Frei as a guest of LBJ in Washington, while the promised Revolución en Libertad dies skewered by the Christian Democratic symbol.

[22] "Balance DC: mascarón de proa del imperialismo," *El Rebelde*, No. 36, May 1966, cited in Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 73.

[23] Palieraki, *¡La Revolución ya Viene!,* 90. She quotes *El Rebelde*, July 31, 1965, "Estamos resueltos a crear en el país un movimiento marxista-leninista capaz de pensar por sí mismo… (y) una política que haga de Chile una República soberana, independiente y socialista."

his erstwhile ally, Salvador Allende.[24] Communists and Socialists had blocked MIR's participation in the Havana-based OLAS (*Organización Latinoamericana de Solidaridad*). Even so, the black-and-red flag that delegates chose for themselves in 1965 demonstrated Mirista admiration for Cuba's M-26 Movement. Fidel only agreed to train Miristas on the island in 1973, when the *golpe de estado* seemed unavoidable.[25]

This essay will focus on MIR's the early days, when the founders were most vulnerable, but also, most independent. From 1965-1967, MIR fell into the bureaucratic trap of traditional Chilean politics, moving from meeting to meeting, congress to congress, making grandiose declarations and analyzing realities. The old guard, men in their fifties, liked it that way.

Miguel and his cohort did not. They got busy organizing students. Miguel personally coordinated MUI, *Movimiento Universitario de Izquierda*, a MIR affiliate. Bautista van Schouwen took the reins of student government at the medical school and Luciano Cruz took charge of FEC, the *Federación Estudiantil de Concepción*.[26]

In November of 1965, when Senator Robert Kennedy met with students in Concepción, Miguel Enríquez was there to confront him about the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Vietnam war and the Peace Corps. The *New York Times* reported, "Angry leftist students spat on Senator Robert F. Kennedy and threw eggs, rocks and money at him when he visited Concepción University tonight. He had been warned by student leaders to stay away."[27] MIR's young leaders got their pictures in the paper.[28] Confrontational insolence would become their signature style.

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[24] Before 1970, only three Miristas ever went to Cuba for military training. See Álvarez, La Constituyente Revolucionaria, 79 and Ortiz, Cada día es continuar, 119, 179. See also, Marcello (sic) Ferrada Noli, "Nelson Gutiérrez, In Memoriam," in Professors Blogg (sic) on Human Rights for All, (Stockholm, October 12, 2008). Former member of the Central Committee, Ferrada Noli claims he went to Cuba for guerrilla training in 1962. Another Mirista trained in Cuba during that period was Max Marambio, son of Socialist Party leader and personal friend of Fidel. He became commander of GAP, Allende's bodyguard, in 1970.

[25] After 1970, 300-400 Miristas did go to Cuba for military training. See Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 29, 145.

[26] Álvarez, *La Constituyente*, 59, 84. MUI, University Left Movement; FEC, Student Federation of Concepción.

[27] New York Times, (Via Associated Press) November 17, 1965, 1.

[28] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 82-84. Kennedy's visit was reported in the local newspaper as "an embarrassment", (El Sur, November 17, 1965). Miristas believed that Peace Corps was a CIA front. See also, Palieraki, ¡*La Revolución ya Viene*!, 187, and *Madera Tribune*, Number 131, 17 November 1965.

In Santiago, students signed up in droves. Secondary students joined FER, *Frente de Estudiantes Revolucionarios*, a MIR farm team. When MIR's Third Congress rolled around in December of 1967, young delegates far outnumbered the old guard. At 23, Miguel became Secretario General.[29] His pointed comment to the outgoing Secretary General Humberto Valenzuela was, "You guys have been unionizing for 48 years and still no revolution."[30] The time for talk had passed. Direct action would replace idle words, *sí o sí*.

The Founders and What They Thought

Historian Hal Brands asserts that, if revolutions occurred because of poverty, authoritarianism and exploitation, then all of Latin America should have fallen to insurgents long ago.[31] Although every social conflict has complex multilayered dimensions, the success or failure of an uprising often depends less on ethical motivation and economic theory than on the strength and resolve of the ruling class. After World War II, predatory elites in Latin America routinely found logistical, economic and military support in the United States. The New Left saw that unholy alliance not as a beacon of hope for a brighter tomorrow, but as the underlying cause of growing economic uncertainty for the poor.[32] MIR's founders shared that vision.

MIR's early documents identified Chile as largely rural. Beginning in the 1940's, attempts to industrialize attracted workers to the cities. As subsistence agriculture gave way to cash crops for exportation, life in the countryside became unsustainable.[33] Peripheral urban encampments,

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[29] Ortiz, *Cada Día es Continuar*, 142-143; Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 91-92. According to Cuban intelligence sources, Enríquez was in Cuba in November of 1967. The Cubans were aware of the fact that he would soon become MIR's leader. Fidel's recognition afforded him the necessary prestige to assure his election.

[30] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 90, and based on Humberto Valenzuela, *Historia del Movimiento Obrero*, (Santiago: Quimantú, 2008), 135. Some believed Miguel Enríquez had been groomed by the old guard to become the new leader, but the truth is, the youngsters took it over, and the old guard was not happy about it.

[31] Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2010), 5.

[32] *Punto Final*, September 1967 through March 1968, identifies the Frei government as a collaborator of U.S. imperialism. Moreover, the Alliance for Progress promoted U.S. economic interests, creating massive debt. See Jerome I. Levinson and Juan de Onís, *The Alliance Tbat Lost Its Way*, (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970).

[33] Tesis político-militar, 1965, in Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 151-152. See also, Heidi Tinsman, *Partners in Conflict: The politics of Gender,*

Chile's *poblaciones,* emerged as a new phenomenon. A burgeoning mass of disconnected city-dwellers, recently cut off from the relative safety net of *hacienda* vassalage, began to organize, unionize and radicalize. MIR's analysts perceived that capitalist development tended to augment the misery of the masses.[34] Frei's Christian Democrats proposed more of the same. Miristas understood that developmentalism could not possibly solve the problem.

After 1973, the Pinochet regime portrayed Miristas as violent terrorists with irrational personalities. According to the military fairy tale, foreign ideologies had seduced these young doctors, teachers and sociologists, irrevocably transforming them into mindless agents of foreign states committed to enslaving the Chilean people and forcing the rich to give up their privileges or run away to Miami. That perception was rooted in fear-driven, CIA-funded propaganda.[35]

For decades, systemic injustice in Chile had brutalized and impoverished the common man. MIR pledged to fix that. Miguel Enríquez, Luciano Cruz, Bautista van Schouwen and Andrés Pascal sought the sources, models and strategies that offered a hope of success. Badly armed, underfunded and fiercely independent, their promise struck a chord that resonated with youthful shakers and movers. Their posturing was not always practical, but it was definitely attractive. Though their adversary proved insurmountable, MIR showed an unusual level of thoughtful discipline that saved them from the trigger-happy banditry that undermined the revolutionary credentials of other movements of the New Left.[36]

Who were those first Miristas, and what made them so remarkable? Former militant Enérico García Concha remembers the men of MIR's inner circle as good friends with a great sense of humor. On September 19th of 1969, the young revolutionaries took a break from their planning session at a safe house in the barrio alto of Santiago to watch the traditional military parade at Parque O'Higgins for Fiestas Patrias. The boys lined up along the parade route to share the patriotic spirit of the day, but with a special mission, to observe the kinds and quantities of weapons that soldiers carried.

Sexuality, and Labor in the Chilean Agrarian Reform, 1950-1973 (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002).

[34] Naranjo, et al, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario*, 5. See also, Andrés Pascal Allende, El MIR Chileno, Una Experiencia Revolucionaria, (Rosario, Argentina: Ediciones Cucaña, 2000), 16-20.

[35] See Memorandum Prepared for the Special Group, April 1, 1964, FRUS, 1964-1968, vol XXXI, doc 250, 557.

[36] Ascanio Carvallo, "Introducción" in Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 14. Trigger-happy banditry: pistolerismo.

When the first battalion rounded the corner, *el Chico* Zorrilla leapt into the arms of the towering Luciano Cruz, pretending to be a scared little boy. *"¡Huevón, maricón!,"* he exclaimed. *"No me habíai (sic) dicho que eran tantos…"*[37]

Political humor became MIR's hallmark. Clever young rebels orchestrated every stunt like a student prank with a punch line. Laughter would revolutionize the moldy mental patterns that made it seem normal for the rich to get richer at the expense of the poor.[38]

Miguel Enríquez was the uncontested cacique of MIR's merry pranksters. He was, oddly, the youngest of four brothers. His two male siblings, Edgardo and Marco were also founding members. Born in 1944 on a naval base in Talcahuano, Miguel was the son of a prominent doctor and Socialist Party member. Doctor Enríquez later became Rector of the Universidad de Concepción. Miguel's mother, a lawyer, taught him to argue a point with clarity and precision.

As a child, friends described Miguel as intelligent, argumentative and kind. He was an avid reader who enjoyed chess, sports, classical music and hiking. At school, good teachers loved him, and bad ones hated him.[39] Roberto Moreno, a close collaborator of the inner circle, remembers Miguel's charismatic leadership and his surprisingly limited skill in extemporaneous speaking. He tended toward petulance, product of an innate shyness that few understood.[40]

Miguel's insolent confrontational style became MIR's trademark, and Chilean youngsters loved it. Miristas never called their movement a political party. They had no intention of ever participating in electoral politics. They came, not to take over existing power structures, but to destroy those and create new ones.[41] Ambitious, yes. And extremely utopian. Miguel's nickname was *el Viriato.* MIR's radically utopian program became *el viriatismo.*

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[37] García Concha, *Todos los Días de la Vida*, 39. Roughly translated, "You idiot! You never told me there were going to be so many of them…" Habíai is a Chilean form of había.

[38] Marchesi, *Latin America's Radical Left*, 60-75, suggests that exiled Uruguayan Tupamaros living in Chile after 1968 shared with the younger Miristas the values and techniques of symbolic politics.

[39] Naranjo, et al, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario*, 33.

[40] Pino, *De Armas Tomar,* 137. Roberto Moreno reports that Miguel never gave speeches without a text. Luciano Cruz was better at improvisation. Bautista Van Schouwen was probably Miguel's primary speechwriter.

[41] Álvarez*, La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 113. They assumed existing structures would perpetuate oppression.

Andrés Pascal describes his first meeting with Miguel in 1964. A classmate of Edgardo in the History Department at the Universidad de Chile in Santiago, the two had made the trip to Concepción to participate in a secret training camp in the mountains at Nahuelbuta. When Andrés arrived, Miguel, Bautista van Schouwen, and several others were arguing over the roles that national heroes, Bernardo O'Higgins and José Miguel Carrera, had played in the struggle for independence. They recognized the Spanish conquest as genocidal and they understood that the independence struggle had left the European elites firmly entrenched.[42] Their history lesson was not the official version, but it was deeply rooted in grassroots experience. MIR's young founders admired the courage and decision of Che Guevara, but their local champions were the Mapuche warrior, Lautaro, and the independence-era icon, Manuel Rodríguez.[43]

Proletarian would not accurately describe the young founders of MIR. Like Che Guevara, they came from middle-class backgrounds where solidarity with the poor grew out of family values. They typically used words like *option*, *conscience* and *commitment*. In Miguel's personal statement on his application for medical school in 1961, he wrote, "everything has been given to me…, the time has come to give back."[44] It was just after the Bay of Pigs invasion and students demonstrated in support of the Cuban Revolution. Miguel wrote, "if I am not naturally courageous, I will become courageous by way of reason."[45] He lived those years in the company of Bautista, Luciano and his brothers, Marco and Edgardo.

Best friend, Bautista van Schouwen, backed up his revolutionary soulmate for nearly fifteen years. Van Schouwen compensated the impetuous brilliance of his sidekick with measured, thoughtful analysis. Classmates at Liceo Enrique Molina in Concepción, Miguel and *el Bauchi* joined the Socialist Youth (JS), but endless party bureaucracy infuriated them.

The friends were separated for a time in the tumultuous year following Miguel's election as Secretario General. First in his class at the medical school, El Viriato won a coveted scholarship to specialize in neurology in

[42] Pascal Allende, *El MIR Chileno*, 21.
[43] Lautaro was a Mapuche warrior who led the fight against the Spanish invasion. Manuel Rodríguez was the famous guerrillero of the independence. O'Higgins had him executed when he became too popular.
[44] Naranjo, et al, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario*, 36.
[45] *Ibid.*, 37.

Santiago. El Bauchi continued his residency in Concepción.[46] It was 1968, a year to be remembered, worldwide.

More than any other, Van Schouwen managed to formulate the specific identity that made MIR unique. In a 1969 letter to his mother, Van Schouwen wrote that the roots of the revolutionary ethic could be found in the writings of Ernesto Guevara.[47] El Che described a universal compassion for humanity that gave rise to infinite commitment and self-sacrifice. The selfless, egalitarian *hombre nuevo* could only prosper in a world radically different from the present one. That driving ideal made the revolution a moral imperative.[48] Miristas famously eliminated the formal, class-based *usted* from their vocabulary. They addressed each other as *compañero: one who shares my bread*.

Luciano Cruz was the life of the party and instigator of its excesses. Also, a childhood friend from the Liceo, his earliest participation was in the Communist Youth League, JJCC. He attended the medical school in Concepción with *el Bauchi* and *el Viriato*. He stood six-foot-five, and *shy* was not in his dictionary. Manic, impulsive and captivating, Luciano put MIR on the map in 1966 by winning the presidency of Concepción's student federation (FEC) without having to pact with any delegates from the traditional left.[49]

Luciano had boundless charisma. He could speak off the cuff and he could mobilize a crowd.[50] A consummate trickster, Luciano once disguised himself as a soldier and spent a week on an army base with Chile's elite squad, the *boinas negras*, convincing trained military personnel to secretly join the movement and teach military strategy at MIR's clandestine *escuelas de guerrilla*. He recruited nine, three of whom lived to tell the tale.[51]

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[46] Naranjo, et al, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario*, 36-59. No one is sure, but most observers believe that Bautista van Schouwen was the primary author of the Tesis Político-militar, 1965 version and 1967 revision.

[47] Ortiz, *Cada Día es Continuar,* 252. Granted, they worked with an idealized image of "El Che".

[48] *Ibid.*, 223-255. El hombre nuevo was the Marxist notion of post-revolutionary human subjectivity. After the coup, the slogan "el MIR no se asila" exemplified the self-sacrifice expected of militants.

[49] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 84.

[50] On crowd dynamics in Concepción, see Marian Schlotterbeck, *Beyond the Vanguard*, (Oakland: UC Press, 2018).

[51] García Concha*, Todos los Días de la Vida*, 54 and Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 30. Tradition attributes a similar ruse to Manuel Rodríguez, the nineteenth century hero of the independence, mentioned above.

The Cubans took Luciano to *La Isla* for training in September of 1968.[52] He didn't stay long enough to have completed the whole course in guerrilla warfare, but he did learn strategies for clandestine operations, and the artisanal technology of civil disruption.[53] Those, he passed on to eager young militants at MIR's secret training camps. Tragically, Luciano did not live to see the first shot fired. He died in August of 1971, under mysterious circumstances.

Andrés Pascal did not belong to the circle of friends from Concepción. After attending Saint George's, an elite academy in Santiago, run by North American religious with a social justice agenda, he went on to study sociology and history.[54] At the university, Andrés met the Enríquez brothers. They were all members of the Socialist Youth, (*Juventud Socialista,* or JS).

Allende on his mother's side and a nephew of the future Socialist President, Andrés had likewise grown disillusioned with the "electoral dance" of his inherited political affiliation. With Marco and Edgardo Enríquez, he broke away from the party to form the VRM-R, (*Vanguardia Revolucionaria Marxista-Rebelde*), one of the factions that would become MIR in 1965. The only founding member from the capital, Andrés was instrumental in the recruitment of new members in the universities and secondary schools there.[55] He is also, among the founders, the only survivor, a voice from the past for researchers and nostalgic revolutionaries.

Andres's understanding of sociology influenced MIR's involvement in rural and indigenous mobilizations in the agricultural south. Through his eyes, scholars have gained access to the thought patterns and reading lists that founding members used to formulate their radical stance.[56] Their

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[52] Naranjo, et al, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario*, 54.

[53] Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 142-143. Improvised fire-bombs were common. Miguelitos, made from four-inch nails, could puncture the tires of any passing vehicle. Militants learned to short-circuit local electrical power by throwing an iron rod with a hook bent into the end, such that it would hang from the top wire and short out the bottom one.

[54] "Los Pascal Allende De Valparaíso a la Revolución... y de Vuelta", interview in *La Segunda*, Santiago, December 15, 2017. The military regime expelled the Holy Cross fathers from their own school in 1973. Fathers Whelan, Plasker and Devlin were instrumental in hiding Andrés after a shootout with DINA agents in 1975.

[55] Palieraki, ¡*La Revolución ya Viene*!, 171-172. Palieraki argues that MIR grew among students as a form of resistance to the Christian Democratic reforma universitaria. Also, García Concha, Todos los días de la Vida, 27.

[56] Ortiz, *Cada Día es Continuar*, 159-160, 257-268; García Concha*, Todos los Días de la Vida*, 53-55, and Pascal Allende, *El MIR Chileno*, 53-69.

authors ranged from Von Clausewitz and Fanon to Ho Chi Minh and Gramsci.

Notably, few women appear among the founders. Two exceptions emerge. Beatriz Allende, daughter of then Senator Salvador Allende, attended the medical school in Concepción with Miguel and the boys. She belonged to MIR, prior to the Popular Unity years, only returning to formal Socialist Party militancy when her father was elected President in 1970.

Historian Tanya Hamer shows how Beatriz was instrumental in securing MIR's participation in the presidential bodyguard, known as GAP, but she never mentions Beatriz's membership in MIR.[57] Beatriz also functioned as a one-woman back channel between MIR and the Popular Unity coalition. Married to a Cuban agent, she was probably instrumental in convincing Fidel to throw his full support behind MIR in 1973.

The other pivotal feminine figure in MIR was Lumi Videla. She came over from the Communist Youth League in 1965 while still a student at the Pedagogical Institute of the Universidad de Chile, also known as *el Pedagógico.* There, she recruited and trained many new members. A humble woman, Lumi worked tirelessly with her youthful recruits at community organizing in Lo Hermida, a massive *población* on the east side of Santiago.[58]

The Rank and File

While hoping to mobilize masses, MIR self-defined as an elite vanguard. Estimates of membership ranged from 400 to 10,000. Real numbers will probably never come to light, but the disparate perceptions reflect an organizational strategy adopted after the younger generation took over in 1967. How could they gather in all the diversity of the disaffected left, spur those formed in bureaucratic sloth to action, and get control of the wild-eyed crazies who wound up on their doorstep? How could they train so many untried aspirants in revolutionary strategy and political doctrine? They needed to broaden their base without diluting their message.

Members were classified as sympathizers, aspirants and militants. Only those who valued the cause more than their own lives could become

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[57] Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, 36, 54, 112. GAP stands for Grupo de Amigos del Presidente. See also, Marco Álvarez Vergara, *Tati Allende: Una Revolucionaria Olvidada* (Santiago: Ed. Pehuén, 2017).

[58] Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 59. Álvarez lists six more women, most of whom were not militants, but collaborators, from Santiago and Concepción. He claims that the historiography about MIR has tended to make them invisible. See also, Palieraki, *¡La Revolución ya Viene*!, 206.

militantes. Leaders would invite top militants to *professionalize,* which meant giving up work and family to devote all their time and energy to the movement.[59] Outside the movement, militants created affiliate organizations for students, workers and campesinos. Some of MIR's subsidiaries included MUI, *Movimiento Universitario de* Izquierda; MCR, *Movimiento Campesino Revolucionario*; FTR, *Frente de Trabajadores Revolucionarios* and FER, *Federación de Estudiantes Revolucionarios*.[60]

Herminia Concha, a loyal sympathizer and local leader in Población Santa Adriana of Santiago, told an interviewer, "We loved (the Ministas) because they came to help the poor… we knew they were our friends."[61] Helping the poor was more than a discourse. On one occasion, militants stole a truck loaded with frozen chickens, drove it to the población, and gave the chickens away.[62] The young vanguard won hearts and minds in ways that Christian Democratic bosses and Peace Corps volunteers never dreamed possible.

So, what makes a person want to join a revolutionary organization? Survivor Enérico García Concha had some thoughts on the subject. Sometimes coincidence, he says, or even accidents. Often, it has to do with family, environment and worldview. Enérico says he became a Mirista because he contracted the flu in April of 1961. He stayed in bed listening to a minute-by-minute account of the Bay of Pigs invasion on the radio. That simple experience catalyzed his sentiments. Later, the death of Che Guevara and the example of the Viet Minh transformed his vague sympathy for a noble cause into an honor-bound obligation with a strategy.[63]

Inspired by Clotario Blest and Miguel Enríquez, Enérico found his way to MIR. There, he found the strength, clarity and cohesion that other leftist groups lacked.[64] He joined the rank and file in 1968. Soon, he became Miguel's driver. He learned to take orders and cover his tracks. He got arrested during the Frei administration for printing flyers on a clandestine mimeograph. He attended guerilla training camps in the mountains near Santiago before fledgling Ministas had any idea of who they were up against. But they had fun. Participants felt important. Eventually, Miguel, Andrés

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[59] Ortiz, *Cada Día es Continuar,* 223-224, and 237-255. Spanish: ayudistas, aspirantes, and militantes.
[60] English translations: MUI, Leftist University Movement; MCR, Campesino Revolutionary Movement; FTR, Workers' Revolutionary Front and FER, Federation of Revolutionary Students.
[61] Interview with Álvaro Riffo, quoted in Palieraki*, ¡La Revolución ya Viene!,* 235.
[62] García Concha, *Todos los Días de la Vida*, 32.
[63] *Ibid.*, 19.
[64] García Concha, *Todos los Días de la Vida*, 20.

and Baustista van Schouwen invited him to professionalize. After 1970, Enérico became a member of GAP, (*Grupo de Amigos del Presidente*), Salvador Allende's bodyguard.[65]

Like Enérico, every militant had a story. Most came from comfortable, middle-class backgrounds. Guillermo Rodríguez Morales was an exception, in that regard. He grew up in an overcrowded tenement in old-town Santiago. As a child, he led his blind grandfather around the city by day for panhandling. By night, he read to him. That was how Guillermo learned to love books, an odd trait for a poor boy.[66] When Guillermo turned ten, his family moved to Población El Pinar on the south side. In the población, he discovered the workers' federation, CUT, and he met Don Clotario, a man he called humble, unpretentious and good.[67] He would visit Don Clotario at his thick-walled adobe townhouse on Avenida Matta. The wizened sage lent him books and gently guided his reading. Guillermo devoured Che Guevara's diaries and the history of the Mexican Revolution.

In 1967, barely 15, Guillermo and two classmates from Liceo 10 approached MIR's leaders on a whim.[68] The cadres gave them a copy of the Political-Military Thesis and told to read it. They were to return in two weeks if they still wanted to join.

The boys decided not to read it. They had a plan. They broke into their high school and stole the mimeograph machine. They had practice at that sort of thing, and they knew it would be useful for clandestine printing. The boys handed over their booty, and MIR's high command was impressed. They immediately incorporated Guillermo as an active militant—code name, *Alma Negra*—and his two buddies became aspirants—*Malo Grande* and *Malo Chico*.[69]

Militant status meant Guillermo would undergo rigorous training, which consisted of long meetings where trainees read forbidden manifestos and argued over revolutionary strategy in the comfortable homes of other militants. They learned to organize in cells so that no one would know too much about the others. Guillermo measured up intellectually. He surpassed his comrades in street-wise instinct and courage. But he was different.[70]

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[65] *Ibid.*, 27-68. GAP was a nickname coined by curious journalists.
[66] Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 19-63. Soledad Pino has edited six first-person accounts, based on long interviews.
[67] *Ibid.*, 23. He says there was never any pressure to join a movement. Don Clotario assumed that right reason would serve as a guide.
[68] *Ibid.*, 19. The expression he uses, "nos tincaba entrar". They "took a fancy to the notion…"
[69] *Ibid.*, 20. "Black Soul, Big Bad Boy and Little Bad Boy."
[70] Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 21, 25.

In theory, Miristas practiced the classless society, but Chileans have deeply ingrained classist habits. Guillermo felt outclassed. His shoes were different, his music was different, and his food was different. Even his body smelled different, and his comrades were surprised to discover that he had no idea of how to use a telephone. But, because he was poor, breaking rules came easily to him. MIR's middle-class vanguard needed to learn from his audacity. Enérico García concurs on that point. In Chile, he says, poor people broke the law to survive. Rich people broke the law because they assumed it was their right. Middle-class people had an innate respect for the law. Most Miristas, including the founders, came from that respectful middle class.[71]

The militancy of Roberto Moreno Burgos had a unique twist. His father was right-wing and working-class, but his brother, Mario, played soccer for *Colo-Colo,* a popular local team. In the locker room, Mario had discovered the players' union. He initiated the younger Roberto into leftist politics and paid for his studies at the *Universidad de Chile*. Doing surveys for economics class, Roberto discovered a kind of poverty that he had never seen before. In 1964, a grown man with a degree in business, Roberto went to work in Havana for the Ministry of Commerce. While working in Cuba, he asked for guerrilla training. The Cubans turned him down.[72]

Returning to Chile, a fellow employee at the *Universidad de Chile* in Temuco gave him MIR's Political-Military Thesis. He instantly became hooked and sought membership. He found the leadership warm, charismatic and intelligent. MIR's council put him in charge of the agricultural region south of Concepción, where the indigenous Mapuches, with MIR's help, struggled to take back their ancestral lands. Five years older than most of the Central Committee, Roberto's administrative training and experience made him an asset. MIR needed structure. The Secretary General asked him to professionalize, and he did.

MIR's rank and file was not especially proletarian, nor did it draw on the disaffected sons and daughters of the Chilean elite. Their common denominator was education. They were young rebels who could read. MIR's charismatic leadership attracted ardent, intelligent and youthful thinkers. To

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[71] García Concha, *Todos los Días de la Vida*, 49.

[72] Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 135-143. Moreno reports that during the UP government, and not before, 300-400 Miristas received military training in Cuba. The idea was that they should be ready when the coup came. The arms that Harmer reports were hidden away in the Cuban embassy (Harmer, *Allende's Chile*, 233) had been intended for those trained operatives. According to Moreno, Miristas lobbied Fidel to receive their arms, and he reportedly answered them, El compañero Allende no quiere, (Comrade Allende won't allow it).

stop future groups like MIR, the Pinochet government would strive to eliminate free higher education in Chile.[73] All future Chilean intellectuals would either come from wealthy families or walk away from their studies with a domesticating burden of student debt.

Direct Action

In a 1968 interview with *Punto Final,* the magazine's director asked a young Secretary General about the "acts of terrorism" attributed to MIR in other news sources. Miguel's response came right out of MIR's Political-Military Thesis.[74] He said, you call it "terrorism" when you don't agree with the objectives[75]. MIR defined its operations in a surprisingly traditional way, as legitimate use of force, a lesser evil for a greater good.

Before 1970, MIR's direct action had a recognizable style and a message. The leadership never sent the rank and file to take risks they had never taken themselves. Operatives who acted impetuously faced expulsion.[76] Revolutionary praxis required conscientious discipline. All operations were also learning experiences, but disruption was tricky business. Medical students, sociologists and history majors had little experience at breaking the law.[77] Political objectives got twisted in news reports. Armed struggle could easily spiral out of control.

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[73] Brian Loveman, *Chile: The Legacy of Hispanic Capitalism*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), 286.

[74] There were, actually two. The first Tesis was from 1965. (See Álvarez, *La Constituyente Revolucionaria*, 145-164.) The revised version of 1967 included statistics. It was more explicit about the urgency of direct action.

[75] *Punto Final*, Año II, No. 53, (April 23, 1968), 2. Mindless violence can exist. The point is that state-sponsored violence is rarely catalogued as terrorism, while revolutionary violence for the benefit of marginalized classes, is.

[76] Pino, *De Armas Tomar*, 139. See also, Naranjo, et al, *Miguel Enríquez y el Proyecto Revolucionario*, 44 and Palieraki, *¡La Revolución ya Viene!,* 287-365.

[77] Palieraki, ¡*La Revolución ya Viene*!, 372-375, and García, *Todos los Días de la Vida*, 49. It is worth noting that ultra-left splinter groups like VOP (Vanguardia Organizada del Pueblo) and MR2 (Movimiento Revolucionario Manuel Rodríguez) committed assassinations that were blamed on MIR. VOP was, in fact, responsible for the assassination of former Minister of the Interior, Edmundo Pérez Zujovic in June of 1971. Historian Hal Brands erroneously attributes that murder to MIR, in *Latin America's Cold War*, (2010), 110.

Figure 1.1: Punto Final[78]

Across Latin America, the New Left had made its share of mistakes. To create chaos that would supposedly bring about revolution, Venezuelan guerrillas of the FALN attacked a passenger train in 1963, killing four guards and three local tourists. Public opinion turned against them.[79] In June of 1970, Argentina's Montoneros assassinated former President Aramburu. In July of that same year, Uruguayan Tupamaros executed FBI agent Dan Mitrione.[80] These movements had their revolutionary explanations for why

[78] *Punto Final*, Año II, No. 53, (April 23, 1968), 2. Mindless violence can exist. The point is that state-sponsored violence is rarely catalogued as terrorism, while revolutionary violence for the benefit of marginalized classes, is.

[79] Jonathan Brown, *Cuba's Revolutionary World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2017), 261. FALN (Fuerzas Armadas de Liberación Nacional) was the armed guerrilla faction of Venezuela's MIR, no relation.

[80] Hal Brands, *Latin America's Cold War*. 109; Brown, Cuba's Revolutionary World, 407-409. Brands calls Dan Mitrione a "public safety advisor", but he was an FBI agent, a CIA asset and a renowned instructor of torture. He was also personal facilitator for then up and coming Pastor Jim Jones, infamous for the 1978 Jonestown (Guyana) massacre. See Langguth, A.J., "Torture's Teachers." *The New*