Neighborhood Organization and Social Control in Changing Urban China

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A Cross-Cultural Perspective

By

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CHAPTER 1

CHANGING URBAN CHINA: THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF ANALYSIS

Over the course of several decades, China has embarked upon a bold project of economic reform. The rigid state controls over the economy established after the Communist Revolution have been relaxed in many areas, and a Chinese style of market economy has emerged. This economic reform has been remarkably successful in stimulating economic growth. Now China has become the second largest economic power in the world.

The economic reform in China has resulted in profound changes in the social structure in general and in the landscape of cities in particular. Pre-reform China was one of the most egalitarian developing countries in the world (Parish 1981; Whyte and Parish 1984: 44). Mao's policies fostered a stratification system with minimal socio-economic inequalities. In contrast with the sharp residential segregation along racial and socio-economic lines in the U.S. and other Western countries, urban China's neighborhood differentiation was modest (Zhang and Deng 1998). As economic reforms have been implemented, the driving force of a market economy has become increasingly prominent in China, and the characteristics and dynamics of urban China have changed significantly. Several significant changes have been observed regarding neighborhood organization, social control, and crime.

1. Surging crime

One significant change is the rising crime since the 1980s. China had very low crime rates before the nation carried out its economic reform and open-door policy. The nation was regarded as being a "crime free" society (Fairbank 1987; Rojek 1996; Zhang et al. 2007). Official statistics indicate that China had only five to six criminal cases per 100,000 inhabitants annually during the 1950s and 1960s (Dai 2001). The reality of crime has been changing dramatically since the early 1980s when economic reform and the open-door policy were implemented. Official data indicate a

340% increase in total crime and a tenfold increase in serious crime from 1979 to 1990 (Zhang et al. 2008). The total criminal cases received by courts were 495,741 in 1995. By 2015, the total number reached 1,126,748 which was an increase of 127.29% (Qin 2017). The surging crime rates have resulted in growing public concern about their safety and security (Liu and Messner 2001, Liu 2006; Liu 2005; Liu 2004). Many households, especially wealthy households, have adopted security measures, such as installing anti-theft doors and steel window screens, and have exercised greater precautions than were typical in the past (Tang and Parish 2000).

2. Dissolved work units

Before economic reform was carried out in China, state-owned work units in urban China had served as a grassroots organization for maintaining social order and preventing crime (Henderson and Cohen 1984; Troyer 1989; Whyte and Parish 1984; Zhang et al. 1999). As many Western scholars observed, these work units were not only business establishments for employment and income. They were functional agencies of Chinese government and performed multiple functions such as providing health care, assigning houses, solving family disputes, and sponsoring trips and sports for their workers. Consequently, many communities in urban China were formed on a basis of work units. Residents in a community might come from the same work unit and know each other well. Issues or problems in the community might be notified to the work unit's administration and the work unit might get involved in dealing with the issues or problems. This interrelationship greatly facilitated control at the neighborhood level and contributed to community cohesion, social ties, and shared values among neighbors (see Whyte and Parish 1984 and Zhang et al. 1999 for a detailed discussion of the establishment and functions of work units in social control). However, since the 1980s, especially the 1990s when the nation was experiencing deeper economic reform and massive privatization of state-owned business establishments, the work unit system collapsed (see Tang and Parish 2000 for a detailed discussion of the change).

3. Breaking down of the dual citizenship system

Another dramatic change involves the breaking down of the dual citizenship system that had been implemented through the urban registration system referred to as *hukou*. This dual system of citizenship effectively limited population mobility from rural to urban areas, contributing to social control in urban areas. Economic reform has placed great pressure on this

dual system of citizenship due to the labor surplus in rural areas and the need for a more open labor market in the growing cities (Oi 2000). In response to the pressure, Chinese authorities have loosened restrictions on population mobility from rural to urban areas. The result has been the movement of a large number of rural residents to cities (Keister and Nee 2000; Ma 2001). This so-called "floating population" has significantly changed the character of selected urban areas, and there has been growing concern over poverty and crime in neighborhoods where rural migrants are concentrated (Solinger 1999; Xu 2008). A number of Chinese studies have conducted preliminary analysis of the link between rural migrants and crime (e.g., Tang and Liu 2006; Wang 2010; Xu 2013a; Zhang 2010). The studies commonly indicate a significant association between rural migrants and crime in urban China, although their analysis lacked systematic data collection.

4. Growing economic inequality

In contrast with the sharp residential segregation along racial and socio-economic lines in the U.S., urban China's neighborhood differentiation was modest before the economic reform (Zhang and Deng 1998). It reflected a limited status hierarchy whereby urban residents were classified into status groups in terms of their affiliation with work units and political/administrative positions (Bian 2002). People in state-run work units usually had a higher socio-economic status than those in collectively owned work units, and cadres (persons who held political and administrative offices) enjoyed higher prestige and privilege than common workers. Accordingly, neighborhoods were differentiated into three basic types consistent with these different status groups: municipal neighborhoods, where common residents lived; neighborhoods of state-run work units; and neighborhoods with heavy concentrations of the cadres. Compared to the more market-oriented processes of ecological differentiation of neighborhoods in the West, this system of Chinese urban ecology formed under Mao reflected governmental planning and policy decisions. Housing was owned almost exclusively by municipal governments or work units.

As China has developed a market economy and allowed private enterprises to develop and establish, a new urban economic elite has emerged. It consists of business owners and high-ranking managers in private enterprises or joint ventures with foreign investments who are able to purchase expensive residences with many amenities in newly built neighborhoods (Ding 2000; Duckett 2001; Logan and Bian 1993; Nee 1992; Nee and Su 1998). The residential moves of the new economic elite, along

with the old political elite, have made neighborhoods much more diverse in Chinese cities than they were in the pre-reform era. At the same time, "a new urban poverty stratum is emerging from laid off and retired labor" (Bian 2002: 96). Currently, it may be difficult to foresee how far the social and economic differentiation and inequality would go in the context of a Chinese style of socialism. A valuable lesson for the Chinese is the racially-divided, ecological clusters of concentrated poverty which resulted from the social transformation of inner-city areas in the U.S. during the 1970s and 1980s. This "American Apartheid" has had a profound impact on neighborhood organization and social control (Sampson 2012).

5. Reduced involvement of residents in social control effort

Along with increased economic stratification and geographic mobility, economic reform has promoted additional changes such as decreasing involvement in voluntary organizations that may also have important implications for social control. In the past, Mao's "mass line" approach to social control was often carried out with the voluntary, unpaid involvement of the "masses" in political campaigns (Leng and Chiu 1985). The demarcation between formal and informal control was blurred, in that control activities engaged in by non-governmental personnel were often initiated and directed by state agencies. For example, special groups or committees might be formed by senior residents to mediate disputes and conflict between neighbors or between family members. The activities of these resident committees were often led by neighborhood police stations. This close interweaving of public officials and the citizenry was made possible by a stable residency, intimate relations among neighbors, and one-floor housing with a shared yard. As the market economy has developed, the traditional interweaving of formal and informal control has weakened due to increased residential mobility, the demolition of shared-yard housing, and new housing projects. In addition, as the goal of making money has become an accepted tenet, people's willingness to do labor-intensive, unpaid, and even dangerous jobs for social control has been declining significantly (Rojek 2001).

Traditionally, China had engaged in a kind of community policing which was guided by Mao's mass line since the Communist Party took power in 1949. One of the essential aims of police work under Mao's regime was to mobilize and organize residents to be involved in the building of community safety and security (Dutton 2000; Wong 2001; Zhong 2009). The general principle was "police are people and people are police." Such community policing, which was politically motivated, based, and operated,

played an important role in residents' safety and security. As China has implemented economic reform and developed a market economy since the 1980s, getting rich has become an important goal in the Chinese society. As a result, it has become difficult to mobilize and organize residents to be involved in efforts to secure community safety (Dutton 2000). "The police sirens no longer seemed to stir the masses to action" because a new guiding principle, "forward march of money", has become dominate under the newly developed market economy (Dutton 2000: 61). The public have been losing their interest and political energy to get involved in efforts to secure their community safety.

6. Privatizing security services

In an effort to curtail increasing crime and social unrest, China has been pursuing an overarching control policy called "comprehensive management of public security" (*shehui zhi'an zonghe zhili*), which goes beyond the simple mobilization of the traditional criminal justice system to assign responsibilities to workplaces, schools, and neighborhood committees, as well as fee-based security and property management companies to fight crime and reduce social unrest (Wang and Minzner 2015). The rise of a market economy has also meant the proliferation of contract-based social control services, in which the emphasis on the rule of law has diminished the elasticity of the previous police regime and increased the autonomy of market demands for security services (Dutton 2000; Zhong and Grabosky 2009). As a result, a notable structural change in urban China has been the commodification of security services. Market-based or private security companies have sprung up to meet the demands of urbanites for customized social control (Sun and Wu 2010). The rising prominence of Chengguan (or the urban management department) in China's struggle to keep street vendors in order and *wu-ye* (realty management companies) is an example of the commodification of policing in an increasingly commercialized society (Xu, 2013b).

A variety of contracted services has emerged within a neighborhood as defined by the jurisdiction of a neighborhood committee. For some newly established, affluent communities, these fee-for-service management companies provide services ranging from street cleaning and landscaping to security patrols and responses to neighborly disputes. Some of the services overlap with the activities traditionally performed by neighborhood police stations and neighborhood committees, such as operating hidden cameras and security patrols. Since their first appearance in 1985 (Zhong 2009: 159), security service firms (or *bao'an fuwu gongsi)* have become ubiquitous in

urban China and frequently work in tandem with real estate management companies (*wu-ye*) to provide services to maintain social order in urban communities.

Initially prompted by the security needs of foreign-owned enterprises, private security firms are considered as subsidiaries of the local branches of the police and are believed to cover one-third of all police work serving clients such as manufacturing businesses, banks, restaurants, and residential complexes (Dutton 2000; Zhong and Grabosky 2009). Such contracted services can be conceptualized as market-based control that is increasingly charged with providing ancillary support to manage neighborhood disorderly conditions, particularly in the current campaign by the central government to establish a "harmonious society" and to preserve stability (or *wei-wen*) in China (Zhong and Grabosky 2009). This change implies a dramatic shift of urban policing from an exclusively political/governmental matter to a mixed private/public venture.

7. Development of homeowner associations

As self-managed and resident-based organizations, homeowner associations are fairly common to deal with community-related issues in the West. This type of community organization did not exist in pre-reform urban China because a large proportion of houses were owned by the state. As discussed above, state-owned work units typically assigned houses to their employees, and employees did not own the houses. House management and maintenance were typically performed by the work units. With the economic reform, a house market has developed with a large number of new house projects. Urban residents have gained the opportunity to buy and own their houses. The development of private house ownership has promoted the development of homeowner associations in those newly developed residential communities, especially those new, affluent communities. The basic functions of these associations are to protect homeowners' residential properties and represent them in the monitoring of the utility, management, and maintenance of community facilities. If there are any issues about house conditions or community facilities, the associations may represent the residents to request the builders or the contracted community services to instigate repairs or improvements.

Although homeowner associations have emerged in some well-developed communities, our fieldworks in a few Chinese cities indicated that these community-based organizations were not as functional as their counterparts in the West because of the unique organizational infrastructure represented by neighborhood committees and neighborhood police stations

in urban China. Community affairs, especially safety- and security-related affairs are still handled by these two organizations. The only function of homeowner associations is their responsibility to contact the building companies or contracted community services when homeowners have complaints about their house conditions or the contracted services. When they have this responsibility, they often ask neighborhood committees for help and assistance. However, as China is becoming more open and Chinese are getting more private properties, it is uncertain how these organizations would develop and what roles they would play in communities in the future.

8. Changing lifestyles of residents

Under Mao's ideology of egalitarianism, urban residents, with the exception of the political elite, were expected to receive similar material resources. The ideology of "poor" socialism also dictated that people were to live in a working class style. Any pursuit of individual wealth was viewed as non-socialist or bourgeois. This fostered a common, rather low standard of living with little individual differentiation. These ideologies were reinforced by the cultural emphasis on collective well-being rather than individual comfort. The ideological beliefs were propagated and reinforced through the work units of the state-planned and controlled economy. Urban citizens relied on their work units for the "iron rice bowl" of lifetime employment, egalitarian wages, and welfare benefits. As a result of these ideological, political, and economic forces, people had similar lifestyles, similar clothes, similar houses, and similar leisure activities.

However, with economic reform, appreciable differentiation has emerged among urban residents. The gradual establishment of a market economy has opened up a freedom of individual choices. The ideologies of egalitarianism and poor socialism are fading, and the state is relinquishing the controlled economy. Today, Chinese people are gaining purchasing power and the development of a market economy has been providing great opportunities for them to act more like consumers elsewhere in the modern world (Davis 2000). The Chinese are increasingly able to engage in the lifestyles of a consumer society. Consequently, individualism has been growing and individual lifestyles have been becoming more diverse. These changes may have a profound impact on social control and order maintenance in urban China.

9. The emerging "community lament"

Row houses with a shared courtyard were the dominant type of housing structure in urban China before economic reform. The layout of these living spaces facilitates regular interaction among residents and promotes social solidarity. Due to limited private living spaces in each family, many daily activities (e.g., cooking) were performed in the shared spaces. As a result, residents got to know each other very well. In addition, the layout of row houses provided for effective surveillance of the neighborhood. Residents were able to easily watch and see people and activities in their communities.

With economic reform and urban development, most row houses have been demolished and replaced by apartment buildings in an effort to improve living conditions. High-rise apartment complexes have become the dominant housing structure in newly developed neighborhoods, making face-to-face interactions difficult to sustain. Also, as governments and work units no longer have control over house assignments and management, a housing market has become a major driving force in the distribution of urban residences. Residents in urban China have begun to experience a "natural selection" based on their purchasing power, as experienced by people in the West. Residents in a high-rise apartment complex may rarely know each other and have few opportunities to get to know each other in such a one-to-one separate living structure. Residents, especially those aged residents, have begun to lament their lost community. Living conditions have been significantly improved, but the community is in decline which may have a profound implication for neighborhood organization and social control. The long call for a return to community values in the West may also have become a reality.

In sum, the homogeneous structure of Chinese cities in the past has been dramatically transformed. The urban landscape is more diverse and differentiated. Neighborhoods vary along some of the structural dimensions that have long been considered as criminogenic by social disorganization theory. Poor neighborhoods are juxtaposed with affluent neighborhoods; housing growth has stimulated residential mobility; the population is more heterogeneous as large numbers of rural migrants settle in the cities; and individualism and freedom of choices have been growing. A widely shared view among researchers is that these changes accompanying economic reform have weakened the traditional mechanisms of social control in urban China and have been challenging the Chinese authority to develop new mechanisms for order maintenance.

The social-ecological differentiation in urban China provides a valuable opportunity to study how neighborhood structural characteristics, such as residential stability, and home ownership and neighborhood processes such as social ties and collective efficacy, shape resident and community well-being. This kind of research has been performed for a long time since the late 19th century in the West. Western theory and research may be applicable to the study of neighborhood effects in urban China, but the application may require caution and accommodation of the Chinese reality.

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CHAPTER 2

THEORETICAL MODEL AND ANALYTICAL APPROACH

In the West, identifying neighborhoods for research purposes has proven to be quite difficult, largely because neighborhoods have no official or formal status. The situation in urban China is quite different. Neighborhoods are formalized units of social organization that are managed by officially recognized "neighborhood committees" (*Jü Wei Hui).* The organizational infrastructure and the larger social and political context of neighborhoods produce distinctive dynamics and processes of social control for resident and community well-being. The analysis of neighborhood effects in urban China thus involves several important issues in the context of Western theory and research. These issues are either theoretical or analytical.

1. The nature and organization of neighborhoods in urban China

When the Chinese Communists came to power in 1949, they built a fairly unique political system in urban areas that entails the penetration of the government into local communities (Whyte and Parish 1984; Tang and Parish 2000). The system has a top-down hierarchical structure of administration consisting of a city government, district governments, and City-Street Offices, along with the leadership of a Communist Party Committee at each level of the administration. City-Street Offices are the grassroots-level governmental agencies. Each City-Street Office has administrative power and authority over a number of neighborhoods, which are organized in terms of the jurisdictions of neighborhood committees. A neighborhood committee is a semi-official agency that deals with daily affairs such as mediating disputes and conflicts between residents and taking care of some family needs. The City-Street Office appointed members of neighborhood committees in the past, but now they are likely to be elected by residents. They receive salaries and related benefits from

the City-Street Office. The day-to-day operations of neighborhood committees are directed and instructed by the City-Street Office.

This "top-down" political structure largely shapes the organization of neighborhoods. Although today a market economy has become an important force for residential selection in urban China, the ecological boundary of neighborhoods is still defined by the semi-official agencies – neighborhood committees. They are nested in a top-down political system and serve as organizations for the government to engage in governing at the grass-roots level. This structure and organization may be a better fit for Park and Burgess' view that defines neighborhoods as special areas conditioned by a set of ecological, cultural, and political forces (Park and Burgess 1925 [1967]). The ecological landscape of neighborhoods is layered onto the political and administrative system. Therefore, considerations of extra-local processes and the larger social/political system may be more important to understand neighborhoods and their effects in urban China. There is a clearer and more direct link between informal and formal control through the work and activities of neighborhood committees at the neighborhood level. Therefore, the forms of neighborhood organization, processes, and mechanisms in urban China may significantly differ from those observed in the West.

2. Outcome variables of analysis

A difference may not only exist in the neighborhood organization, processes, and mechanisms, but also in the outcome variables such as crime and disorder. Studies conducted in China have constantly shown that the rates of serious and violent crimes such as robbery and aggravate assaults are still much lower than those observed in Western countries (Zhang et al. 2007), although crime has been rising in China since the 1980s. Consequently, serious and violent crimes may not be suitable for causal analysis with neighborhood characteristics due to very small variances. Many studies have focused on the relationship between neighborhood characteristics and property offenses in the Chinese context which represents a sharp contrast with Western research.

Additionally, our fieldwork indicates that many Chinese have experienced some unique forms of offenses such as telephone or internet frauds. The prevalence of these offenses may be directly related to the social and economic context in the nation's transition. They deserve research attention in addition to those common offenses. Also, neighborhoods in urban China may have different forms of physical and social disorder such

as occupying public space (placing personal items) without permission that may not be prevalent in Western neighborhoods.

3. A cross-cultural approach

I adopt a cross-cultural approach that involves two tasks for this book project. One is to apply Western concepts and theories of neighborhood effects to analyze similar phenomena in the Chinese context given that a large body of research has accumulated in the West. Such an application allows the testing of the generalizability of Western concepts and theories in a non-Western context. The other task is to conceptualize and introduce new variables intended to capture distinctive social-cultural features of the Chinese neighborhoods and unique forms of crime and disorder. The first task is regarded as one of the greatest benefits of comparative research given that such research is seeking universal "iron laws" across different social and cultural settings (Bennett 2004; Kohn 1987). The second task is more challenging because it not only requires knowledge and understanding of Western theories and research, but also knowledge and understanding of the unique features of the Chinese context.

By performing these two tasks, the hope is to contribute to the development of broader, more comprehensive theories that integrate the applicable Western concepts/variables with those concepts/variables that are formulated and applied to accommodate non-Western contexts, such as China. Applying the approach may provide valuable insights for researchers to conduct studies in other developing countries which may also have experienced significant changes during the processes of modernization. The social contexts of these nations and the change that they have experienced may also reveal some unique features in neighborhood effects. Criminological theories are inevitably "saturated with cultural meaning," to borrow a phrase from Marenin and Reisig (1995: 502). It is a constant call to use comparative inquiry to gain more knowledge and a better understanding of social processes that are truly general and in so doing to "make sense out" of outcomes typically viewed from a national or local perspective (LaFree 2007: 16; see also Adler 1996; Farrington 2000).

4. A systemic model

The term "systemic model" proposed by Bursik and Grasmick (1993) implies a systemic approach to considering the role of local community in social control. The consideration assumes local community as a complex system of friendship and kinship networks with formal and

informal associational ties (Bursik and Grasmick 1993: 12). The breadth and depth of these networks and ties show neighborhood organization and thus provide a foundation for neighborhood social control. Also, the model views neighborhood social control as a system that involves social control at the private, parochial, and public levels. An additional mechanism of social control is effective socialization in the system. Bursik and Grasmick conceptualized it as "systemic control" (Bursik and Grasmick 1993: 13).

Social control at the private level is "grounded in the intimate informal primary groups that exist in the area" (Bursik and Grasmick 1993: 16). The primary mechanisms of such control may include direct criticism, ridicule, ostracism from groups, deprivation, and desertion that take place in the primary groups. Social control at the parochial level is rooted in broader local interpersonal networks and the interlocking of local institutions and organizations. The parochial order is a manifestation of the relationships among neighbors. The public level of social control is viewed as external to a community. The work of such social control may largely depend on the ability of local organizations and representatives to secure external economic resources and services for the community. One of the major resources and services is the police agencies and their work which are an important form of public control. As a mechanism of social control, effective socialization is grounded in the intimate, primary groups, broader local interpersonal networks, and local institutions (e.g., schools or churches). Sampson and his colleagues also emphasize such a systemic approach to studying the neighborhood effects. They advocate the "neighborhood-based rather than variable-based approach to understand the configuration of social dynamics and causal processes – the 'everything' of the city" (Sampson 2012: 23).

I adopt the approach and borrow the term "systemic model" to analyze neighborhood social control in urban China. The term is the same, but the model may unfold different principles and assumptions because of the unique features of Chinese neighborhoods and organization. The top-down hierarchical structure of administration under the leadership of the Communist Party makes a systemic model more suitable to study neighborhood organization and social control in urban China. The structure entails the penetration of the government into local communities (Whyte and Parish 1984; Tang and Parish 2000). The different forms of neighborhood social control in urban China are more connected and bound together because of the penetration. Informal social control such as collective efficacy at the parochial level is more likely to be directed and influenced by the agencies of public control such as police. The lines between "informal" and state-initiated social control are blurred.

The lowest unit of a municipal police force in urban China is a neighborhood police station. It is called a "neighborhood" police station because each of the stations has an office in a neighborhood that has jurisdiction over several neighborhoods for residents' security and has a close relationship with the respective neighborhood committees. Recently, a community police office has been established within each neighborhood under the neighborhood police station to further facilitate police services and work in a community. As an integral part of the communist social control regime, policing is quintessentially community oriented, albeit with varied intensity over the decades, and it has long been embedded in neighborhoods in urban China. As Zhong (2009) succinctly pointed out, "policing in China is by its nature in the community, for the community, and by the community."

The blurred lines between informal and public control are also largely enhanced by a unique form of social control – semi-public control represented and performed by the neighborhood committees. These committees are commonly characterized as people's organizations, but they are directed and supported by local governments. They carry out tasks assigned by the government and at the same time, they initiate their own activities in response to resident needs and demands. In the past, members of neighborhood committees were commonly appointed by the City-Street Offices, which are the grassroots governmental agencies. They are now likely to be elected by residents while receiving wages from the government (see Chapter 5 for a detailed discussion).

Neighborhood committees and neighborhood police stations jointly organize community-based control programs such as *Tiao-jie*, *Bang-jiao*, and neighborhood watch. Literally, *Tiao-jie* means mediating and solving disputes and conflicts among residents or between family members (Clark 1989; Whyte and Parish 1984; Zhang et al. 1996). *Bang-jiao* is intended to provide assistance, guidance, and direction to residents who have committed minor offenses, have been caught by police agencies, or have been released from correctional institutions. Neighborhood watch is to organize senior, retired, residents and other volunteers to patrol neighborhoods. Typically, neighborhood committees serve as the primary organizers with help and assistance from neighborhood police stations (see Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion).

Social control at the private level is also rooted in some unique forms of primary and intimate networks; for instance, *guanxi* which is commonly defined as a personal network that involves individual bonding, empathy, reciprocity, and trust among relatives and friends. Both Chinese and Western researchers have observed a relational culture of *guanxi* in

every aspect of Chinese life (Fei [1949] 1992; Liang [1949] 1986; King 1985) that represents a sharp contrast with the typical Western individualistic orientations, as reflected in weak personal ties, infrequent interaction, and low intimacy. *Guanxi* is a unique form of social ties, indicating an individual's stake or roots in a community and thus it may be an important form of social control at the private level. Zhang et al. (2009) have found a significant relationship between *guanxi* and fear of crime in neighborhoods of urban China.

Along with the development of a market economy and new communities with newly built houses, a notable organizational change in urban China has been the emergence of contracted community services. These contracted services vary appreciably across urban neighborhoods. For some newly-established and affluent neighborhoods, these companies provide a variety of services ranging from neighborhood cleaning to security. They engage in night patrols and manage security devices (e.g., hidden cameras). Some of the services overlap with the activities traditionally performed by neighborhood police stations and neighborhood committees, although for many neighborhoods, contracted companies only provide cleaning services. Furthermore, some neighborhoods, especially older ones, do not have any contracted services. Such contracted services can be conceptualized as market-based control. The contracted companies perform their security activities in collaboration with neighborhood police stations and receive instructions and support from the police stations. Their activities are also coordinated and supported by neighborhood committees.

The systemic model I propose contains a spectrum of social control ranging from private control as rooted in *guanxi*, to informal control (e.g., collective efficacy) at the parochial level, to semi-public control as represented by the neighborhood committees, to public control in the form of community policing, and to the market-based control as represented by the community-contracted services. These different forms of social control on the spectrum are largely interrelated and interact with one other under the neighborhood organization and administrative structure of governing in urban China. Their interrelationship is likely to form a social control system that may need to be analyzed as a whole for its effect on resident and community well-being in urban China.

5. Multilevel analysis

The analysis of neighborhood effects involves methodological and statistical issues in an effort to avoid the concern of ecological fallacy. The methodological issue is that neighborhood structural characteristics and

processes should be treated as emergent properties of social aggregates (Sampson et al. 2002). These emergent properties or ecological phenomena should be measured at the neighborhood level and expressed as aggregate scales or rates. The approach of "ecometrics" proposed by Raudenbusch and Sampson (1999) calls for systematic procedures to measure neighborhood processes and mechanisms. They have tried different procedures such as surveys and systematic observations through videotaping to capture neighborhood structural characteristics and processes in a multiple and systematic way. Some of their procedures such as surveys may be applicable in measuring the neighborhood structural characteristics and processes of urban China while others such as systematic observations may not be feasible in the Chinese social and political context. Given the unique organizational infrastructure of neighborhoods in urban China, we have tried surveying three major types of informants, including residents, chairpersons of neighborhood committees, and community police officers. The data collected from the surveys of different informants provide opportunities to create more valid and reliable measures at the neighborhood level by performing cross-validation.

Analysis of neighborhood effects also requires appropriate statistical techniques. The application of hierarchical linear modeling to the analysis allows for taking into account the nested nature of individual responses within ecologically defined neighborhoods in creating aggregate outcome variables across the neighborhoods. It permits an assessment of the effects of neighborhood structural characteristics and processes on variations of the outcome variables by considering the effects of compositions within neighborhoods. Such multilevel analysis addresses the ecological patterning of crime and disorder. This volume adopts the statistical approach in assessing neighborhood effects in urban China.

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