The European Union in the Age of (In)Security:

From Theory to Practice

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Edited by

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PREFACE

In the twenty-first century, the course of history on the European continent is known for a dynamic, transnational and transcultural process dominated by two types of antagonistic evolutions: on the one hand we have the European construction phenomenon of the United States of Europe, and on the other we see the movements for national identity and an important number of Eurosceptics, in the context of Brexit, the refugee crisis and the COVID-19 pandemic.

In the spirit of Jean Monnet's desire to "Continue, continue, there is no future for the people of Europe other than in union," the objective of this volume is to analyse the process of the European construction of the road to the United States of Europe, with a focus on the challenges and issues the Union is currently facing, from illegal migration to the refugee crisis, fake news, populism, insecurity, the Eastern Partnership, and the COVID-19 pandemic and its effects on the European economy. For the European Union's citizens, security continues to be a top priority.

This volume proposes a transdisciplinary, multilevel approach from a historical, economical, geopolitical, sociological and security-related perspective regarding a highly important issue in the European Union. The volume brings to the fore an important issue on the international arena, namely the enlargement versus integration debate in the European Union. The book is part of a constructivist approach with a dynamic perspective on the political, social, economic, military and societal, where the actors and the system structure are interconnected.

In the context of globalization, insecurity takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations in the economic, political, military, social, demographic, and societal fields of the European Union. The first of the volume's eight chapters focuses on building the discourse on migration in the European Union, with special attention given to different nationalist speeches. The second chapter mainly focuses on the curricula, schools of thought, and institutional approaches to security studies in the twenty-first century. The aim of the third chapter is to emphasize and explain how attitudes towards diversity are being perceived by both people with immigrant backgrounds and natives living in today's culturally heterogeneous Germany, followed in the fourth chapter by a sociological reflection on the migration of Romanians returning home. The fifth chapter brings to the fore

ways of fighting misinformation in the European Union. The sixth chapter focuses on the efforts to relaunch the economic activities affected by the COVID-19 pandemic. The last two chapters focus on the Eastern Partnership of the EU, highlighting the case study of Moldova and Transnistria.

The European Union in the Age of (In)Security: From Theory to Practice is a research and analysis tool created within the Jean Monnet Project Building a Better Future – Learning EUrope@School: Education for Democracy, Security, Diversity and a World of Youth (OurEUrope) for students, professors, researchers, stakeholders, politicians, specialists on international relations, and security studies. This volume is also a guide for the general public interested in the evolution of the European Union, today's challenges and tomorrow's opportunities. The Jean Monnet Project was co-funded by the Erasmus+ Programme of the European Union, at the Babeș-Bolyai University, between September 1, 2018 and August 31, 2020.

A group of professors from the Babeș-Bolyai University, the Department of International Studies and Contemporary History, the Free International University in Moldova, the Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy in Bucharest, the Aurel Vlaicu University in Arad, the Constantin Brâncuși University of Târgu Jiu, and the Lucian Blaga University in Sibiu contributed to the creation of this volume. The authors' analysis approaches encompass the strategy of promoting the European ideal of competence, competitiveness, and professional quality of research in the field of international relations. I thank them for all their hard work! I truly appreciate their commitment to science and research.

The volume will be offered to the partner schools, high schools and universities involved in the project activities, as well as libraries, local and national profile institutions, decisionmakers, media partners and representatives of the civil society.

Last but not least, I would like to thank all those involved in the implementation of the Jean Monnet Project Building a Better Future – Learning EUrope@School: Education for Democracy, Security, Diversity and a World of Youth (OurEUrope) and in the creation of this volume for the human and professional quality they showed in the implementation of activities, for the support provided, their expertise, quality materials and the beautiful memories.

Claudia Anamaria Iov
Cluj-Napoca, September 2020

FOREWORD TO THE SECOND EDITION

Welcome to those reading this volume again! This foreword section gives you information on how and why the second edition is different from the first, issued in 2020.

Why did I create this second edition? The answer is quite simple. First of all, the years 2020 and 2021 were full of challenges to the security of humanity in general and the European Union and its citizens in particular, the COVID-19 pandemic being among the most tragic episodes in the contemporary history of insecurity. The pandemic, along with other violent threats, is responsible for the deaths of millions of people, but also for material damage that has affected the economy as a whole, while also endangering the social order and internal stability of several states. In this context I considered a second edition of the volume to be appropriate to complement the topics addressed in the first, with two new chapters on the effects of the pandemic on individual identity as well as economic and social security. Now the volume has ten chapters, with the two new ones falling within the constructivist, transdisciplinary approach of the volume. The fifth focuses on the personal and community identity between virtualization and restoration in the current context of the COVID-19 pandemic, while the aim of the seventh chapter is to highlight the COVID-19 pandemic challenges for the European social and economic security.

Secondly, the first edition was very well received by its target audience in Romania, which is why I considered that the publication of a second edition at a prestigious publishing house abroad will provide access to this well-documented material, anchored in European realities to a much larger audience.

I want to extend the viability of the volume to current and future readers and, at the same time, open up a new market for ideas among researchers interested in European security studies.

Finally, thanks to all the collaborators for both the quality materials and the beautiful memories!

Claudia Anamaria Iov
Cluj-Napoca, November 2021

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CARD: Coordinated Annual Review on Defence
CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policy
CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States
CSDP: Common Security and Defence Policy
Destatis: Federal Statistical Office of Germany
EaP: The Eastern Partnership
ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community
EDF: European Defence Fund
EEAS: European External Action Service
EEC: European Economic Community
EFTA: The European Free Trade Association
ENI: European Neighbourhood Instrument
ENP: European Neighbourhood Policy
ENPI: European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument
ESS: European Security Strategy
ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy
EU: European Union
EUBAM: EU Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and Ukraine
EUGS: The European Union's Global Foreign Policy and Security Strategy
EUPM: European Union Police Mission
EuroAtom: European Community of Atomic Energy
FRONTEX: The European Border and Coast Guard Agency
FHWS: University of Applied Sciences Würzburg- Schweinfurt
FYROM: Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GDP: Gross Domestic Product
IOM: International Organization for Migration
MCI: Multicultural Ideology
MIRIPS: Mutual Intercultural Relations in Plural Societies
MPCC: The Military Planning and Combat Capability
MVNIA: Mihai Viteazul National Intelligence Academy
NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Alliance
NGO: Nongovernmental Organization
NMS: Black Sea Synergy
PCA: Partnership and Cooperation Agreement
PESCO: Permanent Structured Cooperation

PMR: Pridnestrovian Moldavian Soviet Socialist Republic
R+V Versicherungen: Raiffeisen and Volksbanken Insurance (Raiffeisen und Volksbanken Versicherung)
TEU: The Maastricht Treaty
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
UN: United Nations
US: United States
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WEU: Western European Union

CHAPTER ONE

SECURITY AS A "SPEECH ACT" FROM THEORY TO PRACTICE: DISCOURSE CONSTRUCTION ON MIGRATION IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

CLAUDIA ANAMARIA IOV[1]

Introduction

The nexus between migration (legal or illegal) and security is undoubtedly one of the main topics on the European agenda nowadays. Yet the policies of states and supranational bodies seem to have had little success in preventing unwanted flows and effectively managing immigration and integration. On the one hand, the development of this nexus is profoundly connected to the complex integration process from the mid-1980s (the Schengen Agreements, the Internal Market) followed by an accelerated European enlargement process that aimed for a more united and secure Europe.

In the global-security environment, the European Union is a regional actor that aims to ensure the economic security of member states and the protection of the socio-economic and societal safety of its citizens, but crises (of European political identity, the 2008 economic crisis, Brexit) and security challenges the EU is facing (transnational organized crime; terrorism; natural disasters; regional conflicts at the borders of the Union; gun, drug, and people trafficking; potential interethnic and interreligious

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conflicts within the EU) have weakened its ability to provide security, stability and prosperity, leading to a high degree of anxiety in terms of the uncontrolled migration issue, simultaneously giving analysts and Eurosceptics the chance to speak again of a "Fortress Europe."[2] These threats are not new but, in the context of globalization, some of them have taken certain particularities, generating direct effects upon other security sectors,[3] especially non-military ones.

Security has always been the goal behind the integration process, which is why the European theorists' propensity for a diversified security agenda, with a focus on the issues affecting existence and development, is understandable. In this context, the article proposes a transdisciplinary examination of security and migration issues in the EU, exploring the concerns of states and policymakers regarding the need to protect both the security of the host states and the fundamental rights of migrants. Key issues include the role of socio-economic and security issues or hidden agendas in national policies. The migration-security relationship takes on new dimensions with ample reverberations in the social, economic, political, and societal fields.

Societal Security: Concept, Criticism, and Research Perspectives

Traditionally, throughout history, humans have been preoccupied with ensuring security, which is why Maslow's Pyramid places it immediately after the physiological needs. From an etymologic point of view, the word "security" comes from the Latin *securitas* meaning without worry, the absence of danger, serenity. In the time of the Roman Emperor Hostilian in 251 CE (together with Trebonianus Gallus), the goddess providing protection and welfare for the state was called Securitas; thus, according to popular belief, she was perceived as a figure protecting against threats.

Despite its age, security is an ambiguous, "contested concept,"[4] a kaleidoscope of referent objects, practices, actors, and instruments, being

[2] Virginie Mamadouh, "The Scaling of the 'Invasion': A Geopolitics of Immigration Narratives in France and The Netherlands," *Geopolitics* 17, no. 2 (2012): 392.

[3] Barry Buzan, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde, *Securitatea, un nou cadru de analiză* [*Security: A New Framework for Analysis*] (Cluj-Napoca: CA Publishing, 2010).

[4] Walter B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts," in *The Importance of Language,* ed. Max Black (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1962), 121–46; Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, Statele şi Frica – O agendă pentru studii de securitate internaţională în epoca de după Războiul Rece* (Chişinău: Cartier, 2014), 19.

non-reductive to a basic sense or fixed linguistic form. Throughout history the word has received a series of definitions and interpretations according to the actors' interest, making the transition from the realist to the neorealist approach towards the end of the Cold War and from the constructivist to the post-constructivist one nowadays.

Security sectorization appeared amid the diversification of security actors and objects of reference in the last years of the Cold War, and especially after its conclusion while the Soviet Union was collapsing and the "Third Balkan War" was beginning.[5] This was the context which diversified the range of mostly non-military threats to the integrity of the state and its people. The diversification of security actors, nature of reference objects and threats brings about new opportunities of analysis, marking the expansion of the security-studies field and, in our study, making way for the two research questions: (1) What needs to be secured? (2) Whose security is relevant in such a debate: the security of states or humans?

Barry Buzan reported the announced failure of traditional interpretations of security in the post-Cold War world and opened the perspective for a new debate in *People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era* (1993). Using a neorealist approach, he argued in favour of an extended interpretation of security with five major interdependent intervention sectors: military, political, economic, environmental, and societal.[6] This denounces the definitions of security as restrictive, ideologized, politicized, and limited in traditional parameters, unable to formulate integrated responses to the new non-military threats. According to it and starting from the current international reality, security is a socially subjective construct built on the perception of certain objective facts and data.[7] If we consider that the state is the main actor representing a major source of both threats and security for individuals,[8] Buzan takes the hourglass model of Ole Wæver, placing the state and national security, namely "the conceptual centre of security,"[9]

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[5] Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (London: Penguin, 1996); see also Misha Glenny, *Balcanii Naţionalism, Război şi Marile Puteri 1804–2012* [*The Balkans, 1804–2012: Nationalism, War and the Great Powers*] (Bucureşti: Trei, 2020).

[6] Barry Buzan, *Popoarele, Statele şi Frica – O agendă pentru studii de securitate internaţională în epoca de după Războiul Rece* [*People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*] (Chişinău: Cartier, 2014), 27.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid., 34.

[9] Ibid.

at the intersection of the two levels of analysis: the international system and the units (the actors being the states, nations, or the transnational companies).

Fig. 1.1. The security hourglass model



Source: Ole Wæver[10]

Fig. 1.1 subscribes to the analysis logic proposed by this paper, bringing to the fore the interconnectivity between the state's security (obtained by military, diplomatic, and economic means), societal security (moral, preservation of identity) which refers to security outside the state or *near* it,[11] and the individual security (the physical security of the citizens, goods, and property). By analysing the interdependent dynamics of the migratory phenomenon and security within the EU, we observe that the leading securitization-actor role is shared between the member states (national level) and the Union's institutions (supranational level), while

[10] In Ronnie D. Lipschutz (ed.) *On Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
[11] Ole Wæver, "Societal Security: the Concept," in *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, eds. Wæver et al. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993).

the object of reference remains the same – namely the European society, which is comprised of the essential and defining features of the member states. An example is the way in which national security is defined in the National Security Strategy of Romania:

> National security is the fundamental condition for the existence of the nation and the Romanian state, and a fundamental objective of the government; in terms of references, it encompasses the values, interests and national objectives. National security is an indefeasible right that stems from the people's full sovereignty, is based on constitutional order and is fulfilled in the context of European integration, Euro-Atlantic cooperation and global developments.[12]

We thus have the security of the state with national and European identity, and in this triad the state is the guarantor of territorial, societal, economic, and human security. Applying this theory to the issue of migration and the refugee crisis, or only to the freedom of movement within the EU (guaranteed by EU treaties – an area of free movement for people, goods, services, and capital), the state is the one which (in conjunction with the European institutions) is responsible for ensuring security for its own citizens (EU institutions, as the guarantor of EU citizens' security, are seen as a political construct), and at the same time guaranteeing security for immigrants within transit and host states. Due to an emphasized visibility (in the European societies and the media), immigrants have changed their status from a social and economic issue to a societal, even a military one in some states, whose solution lies in the close cooperation between the origin, transit, and host states, based on an integrated management in the European Union.

A step towards a constructivist epistemology was made in the collective work *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (1993), which highlights the importance of societal security by analysing the relationships between European identity and immigration. As a consequence there was a transition from the threat of the Cold War and nuclear attacks to multiple threats to security, marked by terrorist-group actions; gun, drug, or people trafficking; illegal migration networks; natural disasters; and falling birth rates. In this paper, Wæver defines the interpretation of the societal-security concept, following the Copenhagen School, as "the preservation, under acceptable conditions for development,

[12] *Strategia Naţională de Apărare a Ţării pentru perioada 2015–2019 – O Românie puternică în Europa şi în lume* [National Defense Strategy 2015–2019 – A Strong Romania Within Europe and the World] (Bucureşti, 2015).

of traditional patterns of language, culture, association and national identity, religion, and customs."[13]

In the paper *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde define societal security as a "security of identity,"[14] referring to their communities and identities.[15] For the representatives of the Copenhagen School, security has the role of preserving societies, "the organizational concept in the societal sector [being] that of identity,"[16] hence any threat to the identity of a society is a threat to its security. The common threats to societal security are migration and horizontal and vertical competition.[17]

Recent, visible, and repetitive events on the international arena – organized crime and terrorism – add to the threats to societal security. Up until the end of the twentieth century, migration, organized crime, environment, identity issues, asylum policies and terrorism were perceived as part of internal politics, being underrepresented in the international political discourse. In recent years, in the light of the new events on the international arena, they have become a priority on the European agenda, prompting a new way to approach security with a focus on the issues related to society and individuals, such as migrations, demography, interethnic conflicts, culture, the environment, economic development, and national identity versus European identity.

Terrorism and organized crime are related to the political and military security sectors of the state, but their effects within the society (panic, fear, xenophobia, interrupting daily activities), associated with poverty, declining birth rates, and an increased ageing process in Western Europe, all favour the appearance of social anomie,[18] as Emile Durkheim argued, which may lead to a general societal crisis. The transnational effects and international solidarities that these two activities generate in the context of globalization prove the way in which a national military or political security issue can be internationalized with extensive economic, social, and identity reverberations. Globalization slowly destroys the lines

[13] Ole Wæver, Barry Buzan, M. Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe* (London: Pinter, 1993), 23.
[14] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Securitatea*, 172.
[15] Ibid.
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid., 173.
[18] Ilie Bădescu, *Istoria sociologiei: Perioada marilor sisteme* [*The History of Sociology: The Period of Great Systems*], vol. I (Galaţi: Porto Franco, 1994).

between foreign and domestic policy, the economy and security,[19] and identity and security, politics, and culture.

At its core, societal identity encompasses everything that can be comprised in the word "us" built in different ways, taking into account the size of the group and intensity of the common-membership feeling, so any threat to the group identity (religious, cultural, national policy, linguistics) becomes a threat to security. Such an example is represented by the ethnic groups the Kurds and the Roma, who struggle to preserve their identity in other national states without the support of a mother state. The European integration process is considered and presented by nationalists as a threat to national identity by creating a wider, European one in which national identities are lost. At another level, the process of creating a political European identity itself can be threatened by various events (terrorism, Brexit, natural disasters, the refugee crisis, the economic crisis,[20] regional conflicts, interethnic conflicts, pandemics) and could determine the regression of this integration process. In the same train of thought, using the precedent created by the UK, statements by the French far-right politician Marine Le Pen have been a direct attack on the European political project of building the United States of Europe.[21] She promised her voters a Europe of nations to replace the European Union:

> I will announce a referendum to be held in the first six months of mandate regarding the place of France in the European Union. I will renegotiate France's agreement with this Europeanist tyrannical system which will no longer represent a project, but a mere parenthesis of history, that will one day, be only a sad memory.[22]

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[19] Cristian Troncotă, *Neliniştile insecurităţii* [*The Anxieties of Insecurity*] (Bucuresti: Tritonic, 2005).

[20] The continuing vitality of national identifications played out symbolically during the demonstrations in the spring of 2010 in Greece and Germany during the economic crisis.

[21] The idea of a United States of Europe in not a new one. It has a long history with an important list of names (personalities, politicians, analysts, professors) connected to it. Winston Churchill in his famous "Speech to the Academic Youth" at the University of Zurich in 1946, said: "There is a remedy which … would in a few years make all Europe … free and … happy. It is to recreate the European family, or as much of it as we can, and to provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of United States of Europe."

[22] Message on Twitter during the French presidential election campaign (2017) (https://twitter.com/mlp_officiel).

On the other hand, Emmanuel Macron's discourse was more in favour of Europe and an EU that goes faster, delivers concrete responses, and re-establishes the connection with the citizens of France at a grassroots level.

The Copenhagen School argues that security issues are built on the discursive act, hence we can speak of securitization only when there is an audience to accept this case as a matter of security, and a threat to a common value. In his paper *Securitization and Desecuritization*, Wæver promotes the idea that security represents "a speech act," meaning that security is not something real and objective, but which refers to speech itself: "The process of securitization is what in language theory is called a speech act. By saying the word something is done."[23]

A process of securitization requires a securitizing actor (the state, a political party, a NGO, an international organization), a referential object (identity, cultural survival), and an audience (a community, a society, a nation). Only when all these elements exist can we speak of a securitization process.

In *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*, the authors pose a rhetorical question: "When does an argument of a certain rhetoric and semiotic structure reach a sufficiently great enough effect to determine the audience tolerate the violation of rules that would be otherwise followed?"[24] The possible answer is: when the threat is visible, almost imminent. An example of this is the September 11 terrorist attacks of 2001, which triggered the "War Against Terror," an action that initially enjoyed the full participation of the US audience followed by Europe. Another is the issue of illegal and uncontrolled migration waves and the absence of the real inclusion of newcomers (immigrants to France were portrayed by Sarkozy in the Grenoble speech of July 30 2010 as a threat to national security), or the 2015–16 refugee crisis. These examples prove the securitization actors' ability to convince the public, through the act of speech, of the need to adopt exceptional measures[25] by breaking the rules of common policy. The particular feature of securitization is the survival of the object of reference to which the securitization actor/actors relate. The process is successfully completed when the public accepts the approach presented by the securitization actors.

[23] Buzan, Wæver, and de Wilde, *Securitatea*, 48.
[24] Ibid., 46.
[25] Ibid., 26.

> The success of securitization is not decided by the one in charge of securitization, but by the public of the speech act: does the public accept that something is an existential threat to a common value?[26] … A speech that takes the form of presenting an issue as an existential threat to an object of reference does not create securitization – this is a movement of securitization, however, the issue is securitized only when and if the public accepts it. Acceptance does not necessarily imply civilized discussions that lack dominant factors; it just means that order is also based on coercion and consent. Securitization can never be simply imposed, it is mandatory for everybody to bring arguments.[27]

Securitization as a speech act can be used abusively by certain political leaders in their endeavour to play the card of nationalism in order to manipulate, especially during election campaigns (for example Marine Le Pen in 2017 or Nicolas Sarkozy in the 2010 Speech at Grenoble) or in public interventions to win over the electorate's loyalty, for example Viktor Orbán stating that "Europe has been betrayed, and if we do not stand up for it, this Europe will be taken away from us,"[28] emphasizing the we–they identity split that threatens our survival. Identity is not a given, an object, "[collective identity] is not 'out there' waiting to be discovered"; it is a discursive phenomenon, an "identity discourse on the part of political leaders, intellectuals and countless others, who engage in the process of constructing, negotiating and affirming a response to the demand … for a collective image."[29] Hence Bill McSweeney's main criticism of the Copenhagen School and the process of securitization as a speech act, more precisely that of "moral nihilism,"[30] both for the actor who securitizes and for the audience. The question here is related to the audience role in the securitization process: does the audience have an active or a passive role? Orbán emphasizes an active role: "We must turn to the people so that they can say 'yes' or 'no' to what is happening today."[31]

In conclusion, the representatives of the Copenhagen School, the Second Generation of Securitization Theorists, and, in general, constructivism argue that security issues are built – created by securitization movements in which the actor exaggerates or dramatizes the importance/significance or

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[26] Ibid., 54.
[27] Ibid., 46.
[28] Viktor Orbán, Discussion document "Signs of the Times" (Budapest: October 30, 2015).
[29] Bill McSweeney, "Identity and Security: Buzan and the Copenhagen School," *Review of International Studies* 22, no. 1 (1996): 93.
[30] Ibid., 90.
[31] Viktor Orbán, "Signs of the Times."

the effects of a certain issue or particular event, referring to them as an existential threat to an object of reference, claiming the right to use any means available to manage that specific issue.

The Securitization of Migration in the European Union: Between Theory and Practice

In the context of massive migration from the underdeveloped states in North Africa or those with military instability in the Middle East towards Europe, the object of reference is identity which, when facing multiple threats, can be a national, European, or religious in the logic of Christianity versus Islam. These events gave rise to heated debates in the sense of Carl Schmitt's "friend versus enemy" theory, which goes beyond the common political framework. Jef Huysmans argues that, in this context, migration is perceived as a threat to the Western society: "Migration is identified as being one of the main factors weakening national tradition and societal homogeneity. It is reified as an internal and external danger for the survival of the national community or western civilization."[32]

What is migration? When and how did it become a security issue? According to the International Organization for Migration (IOM) migration is:

> The movement of a person or a group of persons, either across an international border, or within a State. It is a population movement, encompassing any kind of movement of people, whatever its length, composition and causes; it includes migration of refugees, displaced persons, economic migrants, and persons moving for other purposes, including family reunification.[33]

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, international statistics showed that one in thirty-five people was an immigrant, which means that if all of them occupied a well-defined territory they would form the sixth largest country in the world in terms of population.[34] From an economic-advantage perspective, the legal migration of labour force to the EU

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[32] Jeff Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 38, no. 5 (December 2000): 758.
[33] International Organization for Migration (IOM), Key Migration Terms, https://www.iom.int/key-migration-terms#Border-management.
[34] Alexandra Sarcinschi, *Migraţie şi Securitate* [*Migration and Security*] (Bucureşti: Universitatea Naţională de Apărare "Carol I", 2008), 8.

contributes to the reinforcement of the workforce deficit in developed countries, and also supports sustainable economic growth, reducing the effects of demographic ageing, given the fact that migrants are usually people aged eighteen to forty. If current demographic tendencies are maintained, over the next fifty years Western European states (e.g. France, Spain, Italy, Germany, the UK) will be able to maintain their demographic size and economic growth with the help of the positive-migratory increment from Central and East European states, as well as the migrant flows from outside Europe.

The migration phenomenon is currently ever more present in Europe and the issue of illegal migration is omnipresent on the international agenda. Common threats are rearranged in "a spiral of insecurity" which culminates with the "image of the immigrant," perceived as "a nexus of all fears."[35] According to Huysmans, migration was placed in a logic of security, being perceived at a discursive level as a triple threat to the welfare state, public order, and the community's cultural identity.[36]

Migration, refugees, and asylum issues have become important topics of contemporary-security politics in the European Union for both policymakers and the scholarly literature on the subject[37] under the so-called "securitization of migration." The securitization of migration and migrants is nothing new for European history as the Kurdish, Pakistani, and Algerian diasporas were associated with terrorist attacks in Western Europe during the 1970s and 1980s. The perception of migration as a threat to national security, a nexus of all fears, has certainly heightened in recent years, due to the rapid rise in the number of international migrants from 214 million in 2010 to 244 million in 2015 (according to the International Organization for Migration, out of which illegal/irregular migrants vary from 40 to 60 million worldwide), and in part due to a political and mass-media anti-propaganda.

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[35] Claudia Arădău, "Migration: The Spiral of (In)Security," *Rubikon* (March 2001), 3.

[36] Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," 751.

[37] For details see Dider Bigo, "Migration and Security," in Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (eds.), *Controlling a New Migration World* (London: Routledge, 2001), 121–2; Didier Bigo and R. B. J. Walker, "Security and Migration," *Alternatives* 27, no. 1 (2002): 1–92; Rens van Munster, "Logics of Security: The Copenhagen School, Risk Management and the War on Terror," *Political Science Publications* no. 10 (2005): 10–11; Rens Van Munster, *The Politics of Risk in the European Union: Securitizing Immigration* (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2009); Thierry Balzacq, "The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 1 (2008): 75–100.

In Europe, Germany, France, Greece, and Hungary each had more than 100,000 illegal immigrants in 2015, followed by Italy, Spain, the UK, Austria, and Poland, according to Eurostat (see Fig. 1.2 below). With regards to the origin of the newcomers, the number of Syrians registered an exponential growth from 32,025 in 2013 to 857,740 in 2015 (Eurostat) amid the civil war in Syria and the political and religious crisis in the country triggered by the Arab Spring. A rising trend is observed among Afghan immigrants whose number in the EU states reached 408,550 in 2015 (Eurostat) (see Fig. 1.3 below).

Fig. 1.2. Non-EU citizens found to be present illegally in the EU28 and EFTA (2015)



Source: Eurostat (http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation)

Fig. 1.3. Main citizenship of persons found to be illegally present in the EU28 (2014–15)



Source: Eurostat
(http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/Statistics_on_enforcement_of_immigration_legislation)

The history of Western Europe includes three main stages of migration (1940–60, 1960–80, and 1990s–the Arab Spring) that led to what is known today as "Fortress Europe." Nowadays, Europe is witness to a new stage in the history of migration, a fourth one, which started with the Arab Spring and peaked again with the refugee crisis of 2015–16. This new stage has brought a number of changes in terms of the number and visibility of immigrant waves and refugees, how they are perceived (as terrorists, illegal immigrants, or opportunists, for example), the EU's integrated approach in managing this situation or the direct effects of this "crisis" on the European economy, the European integration process, and the division of the European leaders between "for" and "against" accepting the refugee rates. The unifying attitude and reassertion of leadership in solving the refugee crisis was set out by the former High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Federica Mogherini, in several interventions, as well as in one of her Facebook posts:

> Although sustained, our work is not always visible. But we will keep going, as the European Union has never and will never consider abandoning civilians a solution. Our priority is to protect civilians everywhere, especially these days in Aleppo and the rest of Syria.[38]

Migration, as a source of insecurity, has been a leitmotiv during the crisis period (particularly economic, which draws the limits of the welfare state) in the discourse of policymakers who justify their failure by finding "scapegoats" in the "others," especially the immigrants: "The discourse reproduces the political myth that a homogenous national community or western civilization existed in the past and can be re-established today through the exclusion of those migrants who are identified as cultural aliens."[39]

According to the scale and extent of the threat, securitization can be institutionalized or ad hoc depending on the intensity, scale, and duration of the issue that is presented as an existential threat. At the EU level, migration can be securitized through two processes: the first at a national or European discursive level (especially used by political actors – an old electoral practice, exacerbated by the great recession and used by right-wing parties, who wish not to lose xenophobic segments of the electorate), and the second aiming at the creation of security agencies,

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[38] "Federica Mogherini, declarație tranșantă despre rolul lui Bashar Al-Assad în Siria," *DC News* (October 22, 2015), https://www.dcnews.ro/federica-mogherini-declara-ie-tran-anta-despre-rolul-lui-bashar-al-assad-in-siria_487334.html.

[39] Huysmans, "The European Union and the Securitization of Migration," 758.

based on Jef Huysmans' analysis (FRONTEX is such an agency at EU level, alongside the common European policies on migration) or the European Treaties.

In the context of the increased interest of the media towards the scale and effects of the refugee crisis, the Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orbán appeared with a series of political statements in the logic of Carl Schmitt's "friend versus enemy," with a focus on the cultural and religious differences between Europeans and the newcomers, enrolling himself in the first category of actors who securitize migration by presenting it as an *existential threat*, thus justifying the need to raise fences to prevent the advancement of immigrants and refugees:

> Those arriving have been raised in another religion and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims … Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian?[40] … Everything which is now taking place before our eyes threatens to have explosive consequences for the whole of Europe. Europe's response is madness. We must acknowledge that the European Union's misguided immigration policy is responsible for this situation.[41]

This type of statement, dramatizing the situation and meant to amplify restlessness, creates an artificial interdependence relation between immigrants/refugees-identity and the military and identity security of host states. It has a precise political purpose: to draw in alienated or disappointed voters by portraying them in direct and uneven competition with the newcomers (undocumented immigrants) for their jobs, welfare system, preservation of religious values and even the European identity itself.

> An illegal immigrant will be able to obtain neither residence documents nor French nationality. When you want to move to a new country, you don't start by breaking the law and demanding rights. To all foreigners of any nationality and religion that we have received into our country, let me remind you that the only laws and values that must be observed are the French ones.[42]

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[40] Gerald Warner, "Hungary's Viktor Orban, Sole Voice of Sanity in the EU, Tells the Truth on Immigration," *Breitbart* (London: September 8, 2015).
[41] Ibid.
[42] Marine Le Pen, 2017, Campaign speech, https://awpc.cattcenter.iastate.edu/2017/09/01/presidential-campaign-launch-march-9-2017.

It is thus observed how an interdependence relationship is created between the economic, social, and identity effects of the refugee crisis which threaten the welfare state and security of the European nations' cultural identity, unique nature and fundamental elements that define them as societies. This dramatization can go as far as inducing the idea of a generalized conspiracy and plan to destroy European religious and political values.

> [this is] about the desire of some to implement a deliberate project … which seeks to marginalise nation states. Where they have failed to overcome Christianity and the identity of the nation state in conventional political struggle, they will attempt this by ethnic means. In opposition to this conspiracy, and against this betrayal, we must turn to democracy, we must turn to the people.[43]

The virulence of such statements was accompanied by the construction of a fence at the border with Serbia to keep out refugees. A physical artefact with symbolic values (by no means a real military or security utility to stop refugees), the fence represents on one hand the physical transposition of the "clash of civilizations,"[44] and on the other the securitization of migration by separating and protecting the group "us" (Europeans, Christians) from "the others." By applying the Christian logic, in the Church the "fence" enclosing God's vineyard (this world) represents the Scripture, guiding and protecting the Christian world from doom.

In total, EU member states have built more than 235 km of fences at the EU's external borders costing in excess of 175 million euros, including a 175 km fence along the Hungary–Serbia border; a 30 km fence along the Bulgaria–Turkey border, which is to be extended by a further 130 km; 18.7 km of fences along the borders of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla with Morocco; and a 10.5 km fence in the Evros region along the Greece–Turkey border.[45]

The reaction of the former European Commission president Jean-Claude Juncker when these fences were raised was emblematic of their uselessness against the immigration phenomenon on the grounds of

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[43] Viktor Orbán, "Signs of the Times."

[44] Samuel P. Huntington, *Ciocnirea Civilizaţiilor şi Refacerea Ordinii Mondiale* [*The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*] (Bucureşti: Antet, 1998).

[45] Amnesty International, "Refugees Endangered and Dying Due to EU Reliance on Fences and Gatekeepers," (November 17, 2015), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2015/11/refugees-endangered-and-dying-due-to-eu-reliance-on-fences-and-gatekeepers.

insecurity within parent states: "Fences may prevent refugees from moving on, but no fence and no wall is high enough to deter these people from coming to Europe when they are fleeing war and violence in their home countries."[46]

"Zero migration" is not a viable phenomenon and would probably have disastrous effects on the world economy, which is why member states and the EU institutions are responsible for finding and coming up with medium and long-term integrated solutions for the management of migration, whether for economic, family reunification, or political and military insecurity reasons. Furthermore, migration is part of the process of the transformation of structures and institutions that grow and diversify through a major process of change within global politics, economies, and social relations.

In the same registry of symbolism, but also referring to control and surveillance, the actions of enhancing border-control procedures (especially at the borders of transit countries) were meant to ensure an integrated management of the phenomenon, to identify smugglers and networks of illegal immigration or gun, people, or drug traffickers that might take advantage of this crisis and facilitate access into Europe.

The use of surveillance and control technologies by security agencies (for example FRONTEX) and the militarization of borders imprints in the European public conscience the idea that there is a security issue – a potential threat, even – which requires the intervention of security agencies through the implementation of additional security measures. These visible measures that also to a certain extent affect the free movement of EU citizens come to complete the common European policies in terms of migration. By doing so, securitization actors (in this case, security agencies) encourage the individual on what to think about and how to do so.[47] For example, the local authorities of the states bordering Italy (a country which includes a significant number of refugees in Lampedusa, Sicily, and Southern Italy), such as Austria, France, Slovenia, and Switzerland, have strengthened border controls in order to ensure better management of North African immigrant waves.

The grounds of the common policy on migration were set in 1986 by the Single European Act and perfected through the Treaty of Maastricht in 1993 by creating a pillar dedicated to Justice and Home Affairs. Besides

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[46] Gabriela Baczynska and Sara Ledwith, "How Europe Built Fences to Keep People Out," *Reuters* (April 4, 2016).

[47] Thierry Balzacq, "The Policy Tools of Securitization: Information Exchange, EU Foreign and Interior Policies," *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46, no. 1 (2008): 81.